

1 **Engineering and legal considerations for decommissioning of offshore oil and gas infrastructure in**  
2 **Australia**

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6 *Offshore oil and gas platforms, pipelines and other ancillary offshore infrastructure*  
7 *are aging in Australia and current regulatory frameworks favour complete removal*  
8 *at the end of life. However, evidence indicates that artificial reefs have formed*  
9 *around some of these structures and their removal could cause more harm than*  
10 *good. Furthermore, other perceived social, environmental and economic benefits of*  
11 *a total removal policy may not be warranted. The Australian regulator (NOPSEMA)*  
12 *is currently exploring the possibility of supporting an in situ decommissioning policy,*  
13 *in which alternatives to full removal such as leaving in situ, partial removal or*  
14 *nearby relocation may be adopted if demonstrated to be the preferable approach.*  
15 *This will necessarily involve changes to law and policy but such amendments must*  
16 *be evidence-based. The evidence needed will largely involve the disciplines of*  
17 *engineering and natural sciences, but also fields such as environmental*  
18 *management, economics, social sciences and law. If Australia were to progress an in*  
19 *situ decommissioning policy shift, research will be needed across all of these areas*  
20 *in the specific national context. This paper commences by outlining emergent*  
21 *engineering knowledge, showing the general conservatism of current*  
22 *methodologies available to assess the integrity of decommissioned offshore*  
23 *facilities. Thereafter, the particular legal environment in Australia is explored. This*  
24 *article contributes to the growing body of literature on in situ decommissioning but*  
25 *in setting a multi-disciplinary research agenda takes a more holistic approach.*  
26

27 **Introduction**

28 The first infrastructure for the offshore petroleum industry was constructed in the early 1920s. The  
29 disposal of these installations did not begin until the 1970s with more complex structures being  
30 decommissioned in the 1990s (Athanassopoulos et al., 1999). Today there are thousands of offshore  
31 oil and gas installations and platforms across the globe in addition to a range of subsea  
32 infrastructure, pipelines and wells. Much offshore infrastructure has been in service for several  
33 decades and is due or will soon be due to be decommissioned (Hamzah, 2003). For example, over  
34 550 platforms and subsea production facilities are situated in the North Sea, a mere 7% of all North  
35 Sea installations have been decommissioned to date and much is forecast for the coming three  
36 decades (Royal Academy of Engineering, 2013), while South East Asia hosts close to 1700 offshore  
37 installations, nearly half of which are older than 20 years and are due to be retired (NUS, 2013).  
38

39 In Australia, the first offshore petroleum infrastructure was constructed in the Bass Strait in the  
40 1960s (DIIS, 2015) with construction accelerating in the 1980s with the development of the North  
41 West Shelf (Haggerty & Ripley 1988). Over the intervening period the sector has grown significantly  
42 and today Australia is one the world's major liquefied natural gas (LNG) suppliers. Taking into  
43 account the timeframes for exploration, project development and operations, much of the early  
44 infrastructure is now towards the end of its life. Assets may function beyond their initial design life  
45 through reassessment of the infrastructure condition (so-called 'life extension') if a field continues to

46 produce economically. Additional infrastructure may be installed to optimise production methods  
47 that may cause existing infrastructure to be unused. In the context of this paper, “end of life” is  
48 taken as when economically viable production is no longer possible using the existing infrastructure  
49 or asset configuration, and a decision is made by the Operator to abandon the infrastructure.  
50 Decommissioning is always a consideration regardless of the age of the asset, because of its  
51 influence as a future liability. However, attention on decommissioning issues is becoming  
52 increasingly visible in Australia as end of life is imminent for a number of developments. Over the  
53 coming years decisions will increasingly need to be made about the decommissioning approach for  
54 more of that infrastructure.

55  
56 The sections that follow demonstrate the engineering and legal concerns and possible responses. No  
57 doubt there is further research to be undertaken and evidence to be gathered but a key issue for the  
58 future is to ensure that the Australian law and policy framework deals adequately with  
59 decommissioning and in doing so provides certainty and the optimal outcome across owners,  
60 investors and operators as well as other stakeholders including the broader community.


61  
62 The end of life options for offshore infrastructure include complete removal (the current position in  
63 Australia), in situ decommissioning (leaving the infrastructure in place either completely intact or  
64 with the topsides removed and legs toppled), removal and relocation offshore (for example as a dive  
65 site or fishery), as well as partial removal (removing some parts of the infrastructure while leaving  
66 others in situ)(Ekins et al, 2005). Offshore relocation and in situ decommissioning have received  
67 attention in recent years as science has emerged of the artificial reefs that form around  
68 infrastructure during their operations, leading to enhancement of the habitat and biota. Recent  
69 Australian observations of biota at oil and gas installations include Pradella et al. (2014), Mueller  
70 (2015) and Leckie et al. (2016) (Figures 1, 2).

71



72

73 *Figure 1. Established marine ecosystems around offshore oil and gas infrastructure (Figures adapted from Leckie et al.*  
74 *2015; Leckie et al. 2016)*



75  
76

Figure 2. Growth of seabed pockmarks linked to fish activity around a pipeline system offshore Australia (Mueller 2015)

77

78 The potential role of oil and gas infrastructure as habitat for marine biota is a major driving force of  
79 the 'rigs-to-reefs' debate and policy changes that provide for partial removal (Claisse et al. (2014),  
80 Macreadie et al. (2011)). Current rigs-to-reefs options often involve relocating the rig to a new site,  
81 thus reducing environmental benefits in terms of preserving an established ecosystem. A further  
82 development of decommissioning policy would be a wholly in situ approach with the rig remaining at  
83 its original location on the basis of an improved environmental outcome, potentially with societal  
84 and economic benefits also resulting. The successful implementation of a 'rigs-to-reefs' program in  
85 the US has drawn interest in Australia.

86

87 International law and policy has a significant role to play in setting standards in ocean areas and has  
88 provided a framework for decommissioning that influences the approaches in many nations  
89 including Australia. Whilst this international framework is critical, it is also clear that different law  
90 and policy approaches have been taken in different countries and their analysis is also relevant  
91 (Techera and Chandler, 2015).

92

93 At the international level both the *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea* (UNCLOS) and  
94 the *London (Dumping) Convention* are relevant and Australia is a party to both. 'Decommissioning' is  
95 not specifically referred to, although reference is made to the need to deal with obsolete offshore  
96 platforms, and the term 'abandonment' is used (Hamzah, 2003). The earliest relevant international  
97 law is the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf (a predecessor to UNCLOS) which  
98 requires entire removal. This Convention remains in force and Australia has implemented this  
99 provision. The favouring of complete removal has also influenced the UK and EU policy (Techera and  
100 Chandler, 2015).

101

102 UNCLOS is now considered to be the dominant instrument in the area of oceans governance, and  
103 Article 60(3) provides that abandoned or disused infrastructure shall be removed taking into account  
104 'generally accepted international standards established... by the competent international  
105 organisation'. The Maritime Safety Committee of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) has  
106 responded by developing soft law (non-binding) *Guidelines and Standards for the Removal of*  
107 *Offshore Installations and Structures on the Continental Shelf and in the Exclusive Economic Zone*

108 (IMO, 1989). Section 2.1 requires a case-by-case evaluation prior to any decision to allow offshore  
109 infrastructure to remain on the seabed. Criteria include the safety of navigation, rate of  
110 deterioration and risk of structural movement, environmental effects on the marine environment,  
111 costs, technical feasibility and risks of injury associated with removal. Finally, reference is made to  
112 'determination of a new use or other reasonable justification' for in situ disposal. The reference to  
113 'new use' is innovative and may include utilisation as an artificial reef. It is this approach that has  
114 been taken in some US states through its 'rigs-to-reefs' policy (US Bureau of Safety and  
115 Environmental Enforcement, undated). The Standards make provision for complete removal of  
116 structures in shallow water and weighing less than 4,000 tonnes, and allowing other concrete and  
117 steel structures to remain in place provided there is 55 m of clearance (IMO, 1989).

118  
119 There are relatively few other relevant provisions in UNCLOS and the only other key international  
120 law is the *Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter*  
121 *1972* (London Convention) and *Protocol to the London Dumping Convention 1996* (Protocol). These  
122 instruments focus on controlling pollution of the marine environment through regulating the  
123 dumping of waste. Under article III of the London Convention, dumping includes the deliberate  
124 disposal at sea of waste including 'platforms or other man-made structures' but not 'placement of  
125 matter for a purpose other than the mere disposal ... provided that such placement is not contrary  
126 to the aims of this Convention'. Again this would permit re-use of obsolete infrastructure as an  
127 artificial reef for example. The *1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution*  
128 *by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter* (Protocol to the London Convention) expanded the  
129 definition of dumping to include 'any storage of... platforms or other man-made structures at sea;  
130 and any abandonment or toppling at site of platforms or other man-made structures at sea, for the  
131 sole purpose of deliberate disposal' (Articles 4.1.3 and 4.1.4). Again an exception is given that  
132 dumping does not include placement for a purpose other than disposal, 'not contrary to the aims of  
133 this Protocol' (Article 4.2.2).

134  
135 It is clear, therefore, that international legal frameworks have favoured complete removal but do  
136 not prohibit in situ decommissioning, or the spectrum of options in between including partial  
137 removal and relocation. This lack of certainty is unhelpful for countries seeking to implement law  
138 and policy and in circumstances where 'decommissioning may become one of the major issues  
139 facing the global offshore industry in the near future' (Parente et al., 2006). This brings sharply into  
140 focus the need to explore the various decommissioning options from perspectives of engineering,  
141 marine science – in relation to both conservation and fisheries – and to analyse laws and policies  
142 that can support and facilitate such activities.

143  
144 Whilst the current regulatory framework has served Australia well during exploration and  
145 development phases, decommissioning is not appropriately addressed. In 2014 the Australian  
146 Government announced a review of Australia's offshore petroleum resource management  
147 framework by the Department of Industry Innovation and Science . The resulting Offshore Petroleum  
148 Resource Management Review (of which only the Interim Report of November 2015 has been  
149 released) examined the policy and regulatory framework which governs Australia's offshore oil and  
150 gas resources across all phases from exploration, project development and operations, through to  
151 decommissioning. The last of these was not, however, considered in detail and it is clear that much  
152 more work in this area must be done. In particular, in the Interim Report it was noted that '[t]here is

153 a lack of clarity around policy and regulatory requirements for decommissioning offshore petroleum  
154 facilities in Commonwealth waters' (DIIS, 2015).

155

156 It is therefore timely to consider the myriad of decommissioning issues. In designing a  
157 decommissioning law and policy framework a complex balance must be made between economic,  
158 environmental, political and societal outcomes whilst addressing 'perspectives of risk and  
159 stakeholder expectations' (DIIS, 2015). However, it is clear that an appropriate regulatory framework  
160 cannot be developed in isolation of the science and engineering issues. This paper seeks to draw  
161 together these areas and advocates for greater inter-disciplinary engagement, as well as public  
162 engagement, as Australia seeks to advance its decommissioning agenda.

163

164 This article commences by exploring engineering issues, and emergent knowledge, involved in de-  
165 commissioning offshore infrastructure. Thereafter the Australian regulatory context is explored  
166 followed by suggestions to move the decommissioning dialogue forward. This article contributes to  
167 the growing body of literature on in situ decommissioning but in setting a multi-disciplinary research  
168 agenda takes a more holistic approach.

169

170

## 171 **Engineering of decommissioning**

172

### 173 *Offshore oil and gas infrastructure types*

174

175 The offshore infrastructure that requires decommissioning when a field becomes unviable includes a  
176 range of facilities with varying scale, such as:


177

- 178 • *Platforms, composed of support structures and topsides.* The support structures are typically  
179 of steel latticework, or concrete pillars. The topsides are generally sandwich layers of steel  
180 decking supporting the production equipment and ancillary facilities such as  
181 accommodation.
- 182 • *Floating facilities.* Ship-shaped facilities are an alternative host for production equipment  
183 and facilities. These can be sailed away for ex situ decommissioning or re-use at the end of  
184 the field life. The associated mooring system of chains, wire rope and anchors also requires  
185 decommissioning, as well as the system of 'risers', or vertically-oriented pipelines linking the  
186 facility to the seabed.
- 187 • *Subsea equipment and supporting structures.* Subsea equipment includes wellheads,  
188 manifolds and termination structures for pipelines. An emerging trend is to place other  
189 parts of the production equipment on the seabed rather than on a platform or floating  
190 vessel, including gas compression facilities.
- 191 • *Pipelines.* Infield pipelines transmit hydrocarbons from a network of wells to a single  
192 production facility. Export pipelines send oil and gas to shore. Other small diameter  
193 pipelines deliver chemicals that are injected to ease flow in the main pipelines, and there  
194 are also cables for the provision of electrical and hydraulic power as well as communication  
195 via wire or fibre. Other short lengths of pipeline called spools or jumpers are used to  
196 connect subsea facilities.

- 197 • *Ancillary facilities.* Additional structures placed at the seabed include heavy concrete  
198 mattresses, rocks transported from land or other dense structures that are placed on  
199 pipelines to improve stability. Various types of structure are also placed on pipeline routes  
200 to create undulations that ease the relief of thermal expansion.
- 201 • *Wells.* Wells connect a well-head on the seabed to the hydrocarbon producing reservoir and  
202 comprise a bore lined with multiple strings of steel pipe, cemented in place. Wells are  
203 initially vertical, but at depth can deviate by any angle to horizontal and can extend for  
204 distances of several kilometres.

205  
206 Two contrasting examples of field architecture are shown in Figure 3, which present different  
207 decommissioning prospects. Figure 3a is representative of a typical piled jacket, such as the  
208 Woodside North Rankin (NR) A and B platforms. These form two of the largest pieces of  
209 infrastructure that make up the North West Shelf Venture (NWSV), offshore Australia. The NRB  
210 platform has a topsides weight of 23,600 tonnes, supported by a steel jacket weighing a similar  
211 amount totalling 23,000 tonnes, standing in 125 m of water. In contrast, Figure 3b is indicative of a  
212 fully subsea development, such as the Gorgon project, which has no infrastructure above the water  
213 surface. One of the largest structures associated with Gorgon is the manifold structure located  
214 above the Jansz gas field, in 1350 metres of water. The manifold and the supporting steel mudmat  
215 each have a weight of around 1000 tonnes, occupying a footprint of  $\sim 40 \times 30$  m on the seabed.  
216 These units required special lifting equipment to be lowered to the seabed, during their installation  
217 in 2014.

218



219

220

221 *Figure 3. Contrasting offshore field architectures; (a) a steel jacket structure, such as at the North Rankin complex, part of*  
222 *the NWSV, (b) subsea architecture, such as at the Greater Gorgon Jansz field*

223

224 Both the NWSV and Gorgon projects feed gas to onshore liquefied natural gas (LNG) plants. The gas  
225 is transmitted via pipelines with internal diameters of 0.6 – 1 m. These pipelines cross  $\sim 100$  km of  
226 shallow water, typically 40 - 80 metres deep, where additional stabilisation measures are required to  
227 prevent damage during cyclones and under strong tides and internal waves. These stabilisation  
228 measures range from an additional layer of 50 - 200 mm of dense concrete applied to the outside of  
229 the pipeline, to intermittent anchoring via rock dump, concrete mattresses or piles that are driven or  
230 drilled into the seabed.

231

232 As outlined earlier in this paper, a common practice in the North Sea and in other regions is to  
233 remove all infrastructure upwards from a short distance below the seabed, with minor structures  
234 often also being recovered. For example, a recent decommissioning plan from a small North Sea  
235 project (Endeavour, 2013) reveals detailed arrangements to recover 250 segmented concrete  
236 mattresses, each weighing ~ 4 tonnes, for disposal in an onshore landfill site. For the more high  
237 profile case of the Brent Platforms, currently being decommissioned by Shell, a purpose-built vessel  
238 has been designed and built, at a cost of approximately US\$2 billion. The *Pioneering Spirit* is 382  
239 metres in length and features a unique twin hull design. This allows the vessel to straddle the  
240 topsides of an offshore platform and lift the deck free from the structure for removal to an onshore  
241 location. The total cost of decommissioning the Brent platforms is expected to be several billion UK  
242 pounds (Maritime Executive, 2015). These practices have been driven by legal developments  
243 including the *Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic*  
244 (OSPAR) Annex III that requires States to prevent or eliminate pollution from abandoned offshore  
245 installations, and prohibits the dumping of such structures. The later OSPAR Decision 98/3 confirmed  
246 that this means the removal of the majority of all structures, with only the possibility of footings  
247 remaining. The only derogation from this rule is on a case by case basis and requires international  
248 approval (Techera and Chandler, 2015). These examples highlight both the significant engineering  
249 challenges associated with the removal of these facilities, as well as the breadth of activity that  
250 extends to even minor structures. In all cases, it is necessary to mobilise vessels and crew into a  
251 hazardous environment to perform these recoveries, and there are significant financial costs  
252 involved.

253

254 A conventional rigs-to-reefs approach involving relocation of a rig to another offshore site still  
255 requires removal and transport of the topsides and jacket structure, but removes the requirement of  
256 onshore disposal of the jacket. An in situ decommissioning approach would in addition alleviate the  
257 need for removal and transport of at least part of the jacket.

258

259 Beyond purely engineering considerations, approaches and responses may in part reflect different  
260 regulatory requirements in each jurisdiction. Permitting in situ decommissioning, or partial removal  
261 and relocation will not only affect existing infrastructure that is reaching the end of its life, but also  
262 decision-making regarding new projects. This lends weight to the argument that a clear law and  
263 policy framework will provide greater certainty for operators and investors.

264

265 There is little doubt that there are engineering challenges with decommissioning, whether  
266 infrastructure is removed completely, relocated or left in situ. The question can therefore be asked:  
267 from an engineering perspective is it possible, and indeed more rational, to leave offshore  
268 infrastructure in situ – or relocated elsewhere offshore – for decommissioning? The next section of  
269 this paper examines some of the engineering considerations of these approaches.

270

271 *Engineering assessments: design criteria for the operating life vs. acceptance criteria for in situ*  
272 *decommissioning*

273

274 If the costs and risk associated with engineered removal are to be eliminated, the alternative must  
275 be demonstrated to be safe from an engineering design perspective. The rationale for such an  
276 assessment is somewhat different for the post-decommissioned afterlife compared to the initial

277 design life, when the field is producing hydrocarbons and there are many workers onboard. The key  
278 engineering design acceptance criteria for in situ decommissioning requires that the structure is  
279 sufficiently stable on the seabed that there will not be dispersal of the structure – in either large or  
280 small parts – that creates either unwanted environmental impact or a hazard to shipping. In other  
281 words, a minimum criteria that will ensure no adverse effect of the decommissioned structure on  
282 the surrounding environment and other ocean users. In contrast, during the initial design life for  
283 operation producing hydrocarbons and accommodating people, the design criteria are more  
284 stringent: tighter criteria govern the allowable movements or deformations of structures and  
285 pipelines. These criteria are set by the need for smooth operation of machinery and equipment, and  
286 prevention of damage to containment systems that would lead to hydrocarbon release, especially  
287 for manned facilities.

288

289 As well as the differing design acceptance criteria that apply before and after decommissioning, it is  
290 likely that the design inputs will have altered, due to changes in the surrounding environment and  
291 the structural condition of the infrastructure over the previous tens of years of field operation.  
292 These changes can be both positive and negative. The changes in design criteria and inputs between  
293 the initial design of a facility and the in situ decommissioned state are discussed in more detail in the  
294 following sub-sections.

295

296

#### 297 *Engineering acceptance criteria for in situ decommissioned infrastructure*

298

299 Conventional engineering design assessments in the oil and gas industry are predicated on a risk  
300 profile associated with the presence of hydrocarbons that have the potential to cause explosive  
301 damage and environmental harm, often in close proximity to temporary or permanently stationed  
302 personnel. Given the high potential consequences of an unwanted event, the design point is chosen  
303 to ensure an extremely low event probability, in order that the total risk is acceptable.

304

305 For oil and gas facilities that have undergone in situ decommissioning or have been decommissioned  
306 and relocated to another offshore site, the engineering integrity of the infrastructure post-  
307 decommissioning should be assessed using a different engineering assessment, because the  
308 associated risk profile is very different. There is no longer the presence of hydrocarbons – assuming  
309 well abandonment and facility purging has been performed correctly – and there are no personnel  
310 remaining on the platform (unless the post-decommissioning use involves transformation into, for  
311 example, a recreational facility).

312

313 The transformed risk profile means that engineering design assessments require recalibration, for  
314 example to revisit the ‘safety factors’ that contribute to the margin between the design loads and  
315 the available resistance. Also, the choice of input parameters requires revisiting. For example, a steel  
316 jacket structure offshore north west Australia may currently be designed to withstand a storm with a  
317 10,000 year return period. This ensures a sufficiently low likelihood of structural damage in that  
318 event or other smaller events, given that personnel on-board would be immediately affected by any  
319 such failures, or an unacceptable oil spill may be triggered.

320



321 In contrast, the same facility when decommissioned offers no potential for hydrocarbon release and  
322 no human risk. Instead, engineering assessments must quantify the risk of the facility being unstable  
323 and moving en masse or via dispersal to present a hazard to the environment or to other ocean  
324 users, e.g. shipping or nearby active facilities. A consequence of instability may simply be a  
325 requirement, after the instability has been identified via monitoring, that engineered stabilisation  
326 measures be introduced. Therefore, a lower risk level may be tolerable post decommissioning and  
327 the engineering assessment may involve less onerous design events and reduced 'safety factors'. As  
328 well as instability of the overall facility, it is necessary to consider the potential for disintegration and  
329 dispersion of the parts, and the associated hazards and impacts. The potential disintegration and  
330 dispersal of subsea infrastructure as well as the main platform structures should be considered. As  
331 an example, if the facility corrodes such that erect structural elements disintegrate, they are likely to  
332 become more stable when dispersed locally at the seabed.

333

334 While the contrasting risk requirements during operation and after in situ decommissioning are  
335 somewhat obvious, current engineering practices are not easily translated between scenarios  
336 because of embedded assumptions and a lack of previous research focus on the very long term  
337 behaviour relevant to post-decommissioned integrity.

338

339 Permanent well abandonment (PWA), a critical part of decommissioning offshore oil and gas  
340 developments, is an established engineering process. While PWA involves engineering challenges in  
341 terms of the number and location of wells to be dealt with and the technology to efficiently and  
342 cost-effectively manage plugging and abandonment, PWA is required to the same integrity  
343 regardless of the post-decommissioned use or activity, i.e. whether a facility is removed completely,  
344 partially or left in situ. It is therefore not a consideration when reviewing alternative strategies for  
345 decommissioning.

346

347 The design inputs for the stability analysis of two types of decommissioned facility are now  
348 discussed. The transformation of certain design inputs over the operating life of the facility is  
349 highlighted, showing that these often have a net beneficial effect.

350

### 351 *Engineering considerations for decommissioned platforms*

352

353 Decommissioned platform structures can be left in place or partially removed (e.g. removing only  
354 the topsides, or the topsides and supporting structure down to a particular level, such as below the  
355 wave zone). The US 'rigs-to-reefs' program has predominantly taken the approach of removing  
356 topsides and then toppling or relocated the supporting jacket structure. Once the weight of the  
357 topsides is removed, the weight and wind loading transmitted to the supporting structure is  
358 significantly reduced, but wave loading on the jacket remains. The net effect is a reduction in load  
359 that is beneficial to the integrity of the jacket structure, and can be offset against any reduction in  
360 strength due to ongoing corrosion and other structural deterioration.

361

362 Removal of the topsides may, however, reduce the overall stability of the jacket structure. The  
363 vertical loading from the topsides weight may serve to stabilise the platform. This is because the  
364 weight counters any tension and uplift in the upwind legs if the jacket has piled foundations (which  
365 are common across the North West Shelf, Senders et al. 2013). If the structure has a flat base resting

366 on the seabed (such as the Bayu-Undan steel jacket platforms in the Timor Sea, Neubecker & Erbrich  
367 2004, or the Wandoo concrete platform, Humpherson 1998), the topsides weight contributes to  
368 enhance the sliding resistance. Without the topsides, the platform may therefore be less stable,  
369 even though the weight-induced load in the individual structural elements is reduced.

370

371 The stability and integrity of an existing platform, at the end of its initial design life, is already  
372 commonly assessed for life extensions, where the facility has a renewed purpose or the production  
373 is continuing as a result of tieback developments. Life extension requirements have therefore led to  
374 the development of methods for reassessing the stability and integrity of a jacket for a period from  
375 typically 30 years after installation onwards to up to 60 years beyond. The process of life extending  
376 an existing platform has been codified (Norsok 2015), and the techniques are relatively mature. A  
377 life extension assessment considers the current (e.g. 30 year old) condition of the facility (so-called  
378 condition-based design, e.g. Marshall & Copanoglu 2009, Solland et al. 2011, Paik & Melchers 2014),  
379 along with design criteria that are updated if required to reflect better information on the loading  
380 and the environment. The life extension analysis may also use new analysis methods that reflect  
381 changes to the state of practice since the platform was designed.

382

383 For a platform that is decommissioned in situ, the engineering approach can be the same as a life  
384 extension, but projecting further into the future, and recognising the changed consequences of  
385 failure without hydrocarbons and people present. This type of analysis, using established  
386 engineering methods including condition-based design, but projecting further into the future, can  
387 establish whether a jacket decommissioned in situ will satisfy requirements for stability and non-  
388 dispersion. Extrapolation of the engineering analysis to a longer future period will introduce  
389 uncertainties beyond conventional life extensions. For example, corrosion rates in the marine  
390 environment vary between regions and with water depth due to differences in temperature, water  
391 velocity, and biological effects (Melchers 2006). Effects of climate change on ocean temperature and  
392 nutrient levels may also influence corrosion (Chaves et al. 2016). A decommissioned structure may  
393 have minimal or zero planned maintenance, and protection and monitoring systems such as cathodic  
394 mitigation of corrosion may not be active. This need to project further into the future, under  
395 different conditions to the operating life, hampers projections of the deterioration in jacket strength.

396

397 The foundations of the jacket may be simpler to deal with. In contrast to this general reduction in  
398 jacket integrity, the geotechnical capacity of foundation piles, provided by the surrounding  
399 sediment, appears not to deteriorate with time, but generally rises, typically by a factor of 2 or more  
400 for some seabed conditions (Lim & Lehane 2014, Yang et al 2016).

401

#### 402 *Engineering considerations for decommissioned pipelines*

403

404 Pipelines are often laid directly on the seabed in an unburied state, except where intensive fishing or  
405 shipping activity requires burial for protection. To ensure the pipeline is stable through the operating  
406 life, it is often necessary to add concrete weight coating or intermittent anchors, rock dump or  
407 mattresses that hold the pipe in place during storms. There has been a general recognition for many  
408 years that such an approach may be conservative (Palmer, 1996), because the pipe may 'self-bury' or  
409 lower into the seabed due to sediment transport processes.

410

411 This behaviour has only recently been quantified via laboratory testing (Draper et al., 2014; Cheng et  
412 al., 2014), backed up by systematic field observations from pipelines offshore of Australia (Leckie et  
413 al., 2015). This body of research has been distilled into design guidance that allows the progressive  
414 burial of the pipeline during the operating life to be 'banked' in design. This generally leads to a  
415 reduction in the stabilisation works required, because the stability of the pipeline progressively rises  
416 from the as-laid condition. Techniques are now available to predict whether the metocean  
417 environment and local sediment properties are conducive to self-burial, and if so, the rate at which  
418 self-burial will evolve, and whether this will be uniform along the pipe length or intermittent (Draper  
419 et al., 2014).

420  
421 This research has application to post-decommissioned pipelines, because the techniques can be  
422 extrapolated to the very long term condition of pipelines left on the seabed. In this way, the  
423 balancing influences of (i) changing self-burial, (ii) reducing structural strength (due to corrosion) and  
424 (iii) potential changes in metocean environment – for example from climate change – can be  
425 connected into a systematic assessment of the long-term stability. This is a more rational  
426 engineering basis than the conventional design approach which assumes that as-laid burial  
427 conditions apply throughout the time period considered.

428  
429 To date, when assessing the integrity of pipelines for the purposes of in situ decommissioning, direct  
430 observations of self-burial have been relied on in assessments of integrity. For example, the Challis  
431 field subsea flowlines, located in the Timor Sea, were observed to have become uniformly self-  
432 buried with only the upper 10 - 25% visible at the seabed (PTTEP Australasia, undated; Wright,  
433 2015). In this case these flexible flowlines – made from nylon and stainless steel – are expected to  
434 have a high longevity in the absence of the pressure and temperature cycles associated with  
435 operation.

436  
437 However, the decay of plastic pipeline coatings, and other plastic elements within structures such as  
438 the plastic ropes in concrete mattresses, may eventually lead to a small volume of material release  
439 into the oceans. Ocean plastic accumulations are already found globally, and an additional \$8M  
440 tonnes are estimated to be entering the oceans each year (WEF 2016), with Australian waters having  
441 a globally typical density of ocean plastics (Reisser et al. 2013). Set against these numbers, the  
442 relative impact contribution is important to recognise. Offsetting strategies may be a more  
443 appropriate use of resources, offering a greater net impact on the total volume of plastics present in  
444 the ocean compared to imposing a requirement to recover small volumes of plastics that are  
445 currently contained within large structural elements and may not be released freely into the ocean  
446 for a long period. Meanwhile, in relation to the steel component of pipelines, long term observations  
447 of corrosion show that the rates of material decay are highly region-specific (Rosen et al., 2015), as  
448 noted earlier for jacket structures.

449  
450

#### 451 *Engineering considerations for decommissioned subsea facilities*

452  
453 Subsea facilities include a range of infrastructure that support subsea pipelines from the well to an  
454 offshore facility or to shore. They include pipeline end manifolds, pipeline end termination  
455 structures, in line structures, valve protection structures and pipeline buckle initiators. Many of

456 these structures are supported on mat foundations, often with short vertical skirts that penetrate  
457 the seabed.

458

459 Engineering design for the operational life of subsea foundations is governed by capacity and  
460 serviceability (displacement) criteria. These ensure the foundation is sufficiently large to distribute  
461 the structure weight across the seabed and resist operational and environmental loads without  
462 unacceptable displacements that may prevent the structure from operating as intended or  
463 overstress connections, potentially leading to loss of containment. Development of fields with  
464 increasingly high temperatures and pressures in deepwater regions with very soft seabeds (for  
465 example, with the strength of toothpaste), leads to heavy subsea structures and increasingly large  
466 (and therefore heavy) foundations to support them. An extreme example is the Jansz manifold at ~  
467 1000 tonnes, while more typically subsea structures and foundations weigh ~1-200 tonnes, but still  
468 often require specialist vessels to install them.

469

470 Removal resistance of subsea infrastructure can exceed the installed weight due to (i) partial burial  
471 of the foundation and (ii) the strength of the seabed that leads to suction developed between the  
472 seabed and the underside of the foundations during lifting. The seabed supporting a subsea  
473 structure becomes stronger during the operating life simply due to the presence of the structure;  
474 the particles of the seabed rearrange in response to the additional weight, and the seabed becomes  
475 denser and therefore stronger as a result. A further reduction in seabed density and therefore  
476 enhancement in seabed strength can occur in response to operational activities, such as the shearing  
477 mechanism in the seabed invoked by thermal expansion and contraction of pipelines attached to a  
478 subsea structure.

479

480 Recent research has demonstrated gains in capacity of mat foundations due to changes in seabed  
481 strength due to simply self-weight loading (Gourvenec et al., 2015; Feng and Gourvenec, 2015) and  
482 due to operational processes (Cocjin et al., 2014; Cocjin et al., 2015; Feng and Gourvenec, 2016).  
483 Other research has demonstrated the development of suction under skirted mats when lifted, such  
484 that a mass of soil is brought up with the foundation rather than simply lifting the foundation off the  
485 seabed (Gourvenec et al., 2009; Mana et al., 2013; Li et al., 2015). The additional uplift resistance  
486 can be 5 – 10 times the product of the foundation area and the seabed strength, depending on the  
487 seabed conditions.

488

489 In the context of decommissioning, the increased seabed strength over the field life can have a  
490 significant impact on the required lift capacity for removal of subsea infrastructure. A significantly  
491 stronger lifting capacity may be required compared to installation. However, for in situ  
492 decommissioning, the research findings show that the geotechnical stability of subsea infrastructure  
493 may significantly increase over the field life, reducing the risk of dispersal of the infrastructure. This  
494 gain in foundation capacity, potentially coupled with a reduction in the loading on the infrastructure  
495 from partial removal, will tend to reduce the likelihood of the infrastructure being destabilised after  
496 decommissioning, relative to during the operating life.

497

498 *Engineering aspects: summary*

499 This review of the engineering aspects of decommissioning has highlighted challenges associated  
500 with removal of oil and gas facilities, due to their scale. Engineering protocols exist for extending the

501 operation of a facility beyond the original design life, and we have emphasised that these life  
502 extension principles represent a skeleton basis for the engineering of in situ decommissioning, which  
503 avoids some of the challenges of removal. Models for the long term condition of oil and gas  
504 structures, in the face of corrosion and material degradation, can be devised based on life extension  
505 approaches, if the future extrapolation has a sound basis. A recurrent theme of emergent research is  
506 that the stability of subsea infrastructure is often enhanced, over time, due to changes in the  
507 strength and bathymetry of the seabed caused by consolidation and sediment transport. This  
508 discovery, when matured into reliable and accepted forecasting models, provides support for in situ  
509 decommissioning as opposed to removal. This engineering outcome complements the recognition  
510 that these facilities can represent an important habitat for marine biota, which is better left in place  
511 than removed.

512

513 Meanwhile, the same emergent engineering concepts apply to the intermediate decommissioning  
514 option of relocating infrastructure offshore as an artificial reef, potentially with augmentation to  
515 maximise its performance as a fishery. Offshore artificial reefs are engineered structures subject to  
516 the same environment as oil and gas platforms, and comprised of similar elements and materials  
517 (e.g. Scott et al. 2015). Upscaling of this artificial reefing, whether or not connected with oil and gas  
518 decommissioning, will also benefit from engineering refinements.

519

## 520 **Legal aspects of decommissioning**

521

### 522 *The regulatory challenges*

523 The above analysis demonstrates the extent of recent research and developing engineering  
524 knowledge. Such information is critical if a science-based policy approach is to be taken. There is  
525 little doubt that there are further issues at the intersection of engineering, law and policy which will  
526 need to be explored further before any law and policy shift is made. At this point it is important to  
527 reflect upon the role of law and policy. Public policy provides a context and agenda which is actioned  
528 through regulation. Law itself can therefore be both regulatory and facilitative. Clearly there are  
529 standards to be set that must be adhered to with repercussions for failure to meet those standards.  
530 But law can also be utilised as a lever to facilitate the achievement of a policy outcome. If a change  
531 in policy is adopted, and in situ decommissioning becomes preferred, then the law can be drafted in  
532 ways aimed at facilitating this goal. The National Offshore Petroleum Safety and Environmental  
533 Management Authority (NOPSEMA) and the petroleum industry in Australia, is currently facing these  
534 very issues. Before considering recommendations for the future, the current Australian regulatory  
535 landscape must be explored.

536

### 537 *The Australian Context*

538 Australia is a federal jurisdiction which presents some special issues in the regulation of  
539 decommissioning, even offshore. The scheme of the Commonwealth Constitution is to allocate  
540 specific powers to the Commonwealth and residual powers to the states. The Commonwealth does  
541 not have a specific power to legislate for minerals and petroleum resources. Jurisdiction over  
542 onshore mineral and petroleum resources does not fall within the ambit of the enumerated powers  
543 in s51 of the Commonwealth Constitution. Having said that, certain of the Commonwealth's powers  
544 (such as under s51(xx) (Corporations), or s51(i) (Trade and Commerce) and s. 51(xxix) External  
545 Affairs) are sufficiently broad to allow control over major aspects of petroleum operations. The 1958

546 Geneva Convention and the external affairs power formed the constitutional basis for the  
547 Commonwealth to enact legislation regulating petroleum operations on the Australian continental  
548 shelf. The discovery of petroleum in the Bass Strait off the south-east of Australia in the 1960's  
549 prompted the passing of legislation to regulate those activities in the form of the Petroleum  
550 (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (Cth), which was followed by the states and Northern Territory for their  
551 legislation, the intention being that there would be a common mining code regulating the  
552 continental shelf. A few years later the Commonwealth asserted its sovereignty over Australia's  
553 continental shelf as against the states and territories of Australia through the Seas and Submerged  
554 Lands Act 1973 (Cth). This was challenged by the state of New South Wales but was upheld by the  
555 High Court of Australia in *New South Wales v Commonwealth* (1975).

556

557 At that time the Commonwealth had virtually no competence in petroleum regulation while some of  
558 the states, such as Western Australia, did have and had been issuing permits offshore. So rights over  
559 the offshore area were segregated, under the Offshore Constitutional Settlement, an arrangement  
560 much of which persists to this day, with the states and Northern Territory playing an important role  
561 in the day to day regulation of petroleum operations (OPRR, undated). As a result state or territory  
562 offshore petroleum legislation applies for their coastal waters (the inner three nautical miles), and  
563 state or territory onshore legislation applies for internal waters, and any onshore operations. The  
564 Commonwealth legislation (and not the state or territory legislation) applies over the rest of the  
565 continental shelf. This area ("Commonwealth Waters") extends from three nautical miles offshore to  
566 the edge of the continental shelf, including the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (12-200 nautical  
567 miles).

568

569 What this means is that a gas pipeline connecting an offshore field in Commonwealth Waters to an  
570 onshore terminal would require three separate licences, one for each area. Decommissioning that  
571 pipeline would involve consideration of Commonwealth and state or territory petroleum legislation  
572 as well as other relevant Commonwealth and state and territory legislation relating to matters like  
573 the environment, safety and other specific areas (such as sea dumping).

574

575 The main focus of the rest of this section will be the decommissioning rules applying in  
576 Commonwealth Waters. There are several reasons for this. The first is that Commonwealth Waters  
577 include Australia's most important offshore sedimentary basins; the Carnarvon and Browse basins  
578 off Western Australia and the Gippsland basin off the coast of Victoria. The second, which is  
579 explained below, is that Commonwealth competence and influence over offshore petroleum  
580 regulation has been growing steadily since the 1960's and that of the states and the Northern  
581 Territory has declined. Finally, notwithstanding the enactment by the Commonwealth of an updated  
582 version of the mining code contained in the 1967 legislation, it still contains principles which are  
583 followed by the other states and Northern Territory in their offshore petroleum legislation. The  
584 principle statute which now regulates exploration and production of petroleum in Commonwealth  
585 Waters, including the development of fields and their decommissioning, is the *Offshore Petroleum  
586 and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006* (Cth) (OPGGSA). The OPGGSA provides in s 572(3) that: "A  
587 titleholder must remove from the title area all structures that are, and all equipment and other  
588 property that is, neither used nor to be used in connection with the operations:(a) in which the  
589 titleholder is or will be engaged; and (b) that are authorised by the permit, lease, licence or  
590 authority." This provision is similar to the analogous provision contained in the statute replaced by

591 the OPGGSA, s98 Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (Cth). The main difference is that s98 puts  
592 the removal obligation on the operator, while the OPGGSA puts it on the titleholder. As is discussed  
593 below, the OPGGSA does admit the possibility of in situ decommissioning, but exceptions to the  
594 removal principle and the associated policy are not well-developed.

595

596 The other principal Commonwealth Acts that need to be considered for Commonwealth Waters are  
597 the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act (EPBCA) and the Environment  
598 Protection (Sea Dumping) Act 1981 (SDA). The EPBCA provides that a person must not take an action  
599 having, or likely to have, a significant impact on the environment in Commonwealth Waters without  
600 the approval of the Environment Minister. The SDA, which implements the 1996 Protocol to the  
601 London Convention, requires a permit from the Minister for the Environment to dump waste,  
602 including platforms and man-made structures, in Commonwealth Waters.

603

604 Since 2005 significant reforms have taken place in the regulation of petroleum activities in  
605 Commonwealth Waters and, apart from sea dumping which remains with Department of the  
606 Environment, day to day administration is now in the hands of two Commonwealth bodies,  
607 NOPSEMA and the National Offshore Petroleum Titles Administrator (NOPTA). NOPSEMA was given  
608 statutory responsibilities which include occupational health and safety, structural integrity of  
609 facilities, wells or well-related equipment and environmental management under the *Offshore*  
610 *Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Amendment (National Regulator) Act 2011* (Cth). NOPTA is  
611 responsible for resource management, titles administration and advice to the Joint Authorities; a  
612 Joint Authority exists for the offshore area proximate to each state and the Northern Territory,  
613 constituted by the resources minister for the relevant state or the Northern Territory and the  
614 Commonwealth minister. The Joint Authority concept goes back to the 1967 common mining code  
615 and is the main remaining state and territory involvement in decision-making. As part of the reforms  
616 of the regulation of offshore petroleum the applicable regulations were consolidated and revised, a  
617 task completed in April 2011 resulting in the *Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage*  
618 *(Environment) Regulations 2009* (Cth), *Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage (Safety)*  
619 *Regulations 2009* (Cth), and *Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage (Resource*  
620 *Management and Administration) Regulations 2011* (Cth)).

621

622 Under the OPGGSA and its regulations decommissioning activities must be conducted under an  
623 accepted field development plan, well operations management plan, offshore project proposal,  
624 environmental plan and safety case, and accordingly variations to cover the decommissioning  
625 activity will have to be approved before it commences. NOPTA reviews field development plans  
626 which require approval by the relevant Joint Authority. NOPSEMA approves the other plans and the  
627 safety case. The starting point for the NOPSEMA approvals is an offshore project proposal which  
628 must be submitted under the Environment Regulations prior to commencing an offshore project and  
629 which covers any activity undertaken for the purposes of the recovery of petroleum. The offshore  
630 project proposal is a life-of-project approval which describes each activity that is part of the project,  
631 the facilities used and how those facilities will be dealt with at the end of the project. An  
632 environment plan cannot be submitted until NOPSEMA has accepted an offshore project proposal  
633 that includes that activity. As a result of other streamlining reforms in 2013 approval of actions  
634 subject to control under the EPBCA, is generally no longer required. This is because environmental

635 approval by NOPSEMA of most petroleum activities in Commonwealth Waters is taken to satisfy  
636 EPBCA requirements.

637

638 The possibility of an alternative to the removal obligation in OPGGSA s.572(3) lies in the fact that it is  
639 subject to any other provision of the OPGGSA, the regulations and a direction given under certain  
640 sections (see s.572(7)). Indications of other approaches are to be found in several places. OPGGSA  
641 s.270, which deals with the surrender of titles, provides that the Joint Authority may only consent to  
642 a surrender of a title if the titleholder has to the satisfaction of NOPSEMA removed all property  
643 brought into the area to be surrendered by any person concerned in the operations authorised or  
644 “made arrangements that are satisfactory to NOPSEMA in relation to that property”. OPGGSA, s.586,  
645 which gives NOPSEMA power to issue directions to titleholders to remove property from a title area,  
646 also allows NOPSEMA to direct the titleholder to make other arrangements satisfactory to NOPSEMA  
647 in relation to property. Presumably these arrangements could fall short of complete removal. If the  
648 titleholder was able to make arrangements satisfactory to NOPSEMA for non-removal in connection  
649 with surrender of the title, then this would squarely raise the question of whether the removal  
650 obligation had been overridden. As a practical matter, if the surrender was consented to by the Joint  
651 Authority in those circumstances, it is inconceivable that action would be taken to enforce removal  
652 under s.572(3). The question then becomes one of whether it is possible to make those  
653 arrangements.

654

655 There is currently no clear policy guidance on whether in situ decommissioning would be accepted  
656 and in what circumstances. As a practical matter the fact that the removal obligation is subject to  
657 the qualifications mentioned in the previous paragraph means that the regulator’s views can have a  
658 large influence on the way decommissioning is carried out, and the titleholder and regulator are  
659 forced to negotiate about which decommissioning option is suitable (Barrymore and Butler, 2015). A  
660 discussion paper produced in 2008 highlighted several things. First, that there are a number of ways  
661 in which a structure may be decommissioned and that the most appropriate option will likely vary  
662 between installations (DRET, 2008). One of the options discussed was the creation of artificial reefs  
663 (DRET, 2008). The point is made that the case for an artificial reef may need careful, evidence- based  
664 assessment and analysis which critically considers a range of matters including the values and  
665 motivations, the likelihood of artificial reefs addressing those values, evidence of other impacts and  
666 potential impacts on fisheries. Second, that discussion paper suggested that ‘any decommissioning  
667 proposal needs to have an acceptable environmental impact, acceptable safety considerations, not  
668 expose other users of the sea to risks, and, within these constraints, minimise cost for industry and  
669 any residual liabilities for the community’. This can be regarded as supportive of in situ  
670 decommissioning (DRET, 2008). Third, the existing regulatory model involves a range of authorities  
671 and decision makers and there may be opportunities for streamlining.

672

673 What would be an acceptable environmental impact for a plan involving in situ decommissioning is  
674 likely to be a critical matter. The Environment Regulations incorporate an outcomes-based approach  
675 through the requirement of an environment plan governing decommissioning. The outcomes sought  
676 include reducing environmental impacts and risks of an activity to as low as reasonably practicable.  
677 The *Environment Regulations, 2009* require that the plan must demonstrate that the environmental  
678 impacts and risks of the activity will be of an acceptable level. Minimizing environmental impact may  
679 necessitate in situ decommissioning in some circumstances, if complete removal would pose a



680 greater environmental risk or cost. Such a scenario is likely where significant coral reefs have  
681 developed on infrastructure, or where ecologically-significant species are resident. For example, the  
682 detection of an endangered deep-water coral species on structures in the North Sea during the  
683 1990s raised ethical and legal issues regarding the protection of such species during the  
684 decommissioning process (Bell and Smith, 1999).

685

686

### 687 **Setting the agenda**

688

689 Australia has become a global leader 'adopting new technologies and developing innovative  
690 approaches to oil and gas exploration' (DIIS, 2015). It is clear that the same level of leadership is now  
691 needed to provide clarity and certainty on decommissioning. The Interim Report indicates some  
692 appetite for this with identified actions including development of a clear policy framework for the  
693 decommissioning of offshore petroleum fields and associated infrastructure and that the  
694 'Department of Industry, Innovation and Science will work with NOPSEMA, government agencies,  
695 industry and other stakeholders to develop a decommissioning policy framework' (DIIS, 2015).

696

697 The above analysis demonstrates that different types of offshore infrastructure (for example,  
698 platforms versus pipelines) will require different engineering solutions, and therefore legal  
699 responses. This diversity may require more sophisticated law and policy responses extending beyond  
700 simple weight and water depth differentials provided for in the current international legal  
701 framework. The issues are made more complex because of the differing ages of the infrastructure;  
702 some was constructed at a time when removal was a clear requirement and yet it has been said that  
703 'most offshore structures were not designed to be removed' (Parente et al., 1994). Further work is  
704 needed to map out the characteristics of the infrastructure and engineering issues pertaining to  
705 each.

706

707 Similarly, in relation to legal issues, NOPSEMA has acknowledged that a 'necessary first step ... will  
708 be to examine decommissioning frameworks in comparable regimes around the world, to identify  
709 what has and has not been successful and the reasons why (DIIS, 2015).' The oil and gas industry  
710 may be global but there are a wide range of different legislative frameworks across the world,  
711 creating a complex regulatory landscape (Techera and Chandler, 2015). NOPSEMA has recognised  
712 that it is unlikely, given the differing ocean environments, that there will be a one-size-fits-all  
713 approach that would apply in all countries (DIIS, 2015). Nonetheless, science-based policy may lead  
714 to a suite of best practice options. A comparative analysis, from a variety of disciplines, is thus  
715 warranted.

716

717 The Interim Report also notes areas of concern in different disciplinary fields. In order to influence  
718 government and progress the policy shift necessary, these disciplines will need to work together to  
719 provide coherent and comprehensive evidence-based recommendations. The emergence in recent  
720 years of multi-disciplinary research centres and teams provides a valuable opportunity to do so. Such  
721 concerns are not limited to engineering and law. NOPSEMA has noted that

722

723 'as is the case with many complex public policy decisions, the most challenging aspects  
724 relate to uncertainty and values differences, particularly where these combine and make it

725 difficult to identify options acceptable to all stakeholders. Similarly, differing perceptions of  
726 risk – especially where these occur over different timeframes – make it  
727 challenging to quantitatively compare and choose among decommissioning options based  
728 upon, for example, predicted environmental impact' (DIIS, 2015).

729

730 To overcome this challenge, and achieve a holistic approach to decommissioning, it is necessary to  
731 evaluate information on different considerations (law, engineering, environment, social, safety)  
732 against the criteria of multiple stakeholders. Emergent research and evidence cannot be applied  
733 without such a framework that facilitates quantitative and defensible decommissioning decisions  
734 that optimise decommissioning outcomes across competing stakeholder groups. Fowler et al. (2014)  
735 describe one such framework, based on participatory multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA). A  
736 recent example of this new decommissioning approach is Shell UK's stakeholder consultation for the  
737 decommissioning of infrastructure in the Brent field, which involved direct stakeholder input into a  
738 multi-criteria decision analysis (Shell 2013).

739

740 One critical input to such a holistic approach will be determining the value for stakeholders of  
741 various potential re-uses of decommissioned infrastructure. These may include 'artificial reefs,  
742 marine research facilities, renewable energy technologies, aquaculture, and tourism' (DIIS, 2015). Of  
743 these options, the artificial reef option would conventionally require removal and relocation of  
744 platforms but would provide the best environmental outcomes if structures are not removed, given  
745 the extensive development of reef organisms that may have already occurred at installation sites.  
746 The other options would utilise infrastructure in situ for further development.. It is critical that the  
747 'decommissioning decision-making framework must have flexibility to adapt to changes in science,  
748 technology, stakeholder perceptions and other circumstances' (DIIS, 2015). These decisions are  
749 important because if complete removal is favoured it has a more finite end point, whereas re-use  
750 will require ongoing 'complex legal and regulatory processes that require decisions around  
751 ownership transfers and liability' which must be provided for in any new regulatory framework (DIIS,  
752 2015).

753

754 The Interim Report clearly envisages interaction with stakeholders including owner and operators  
755 themselves as well as engineering experts. Engagement is also needed with other disciplines  
756 including natural and physical sciences, as well as social sciences including sociologists, economists  
757 and those engaged in corporate governance. If anything can be learnt from the UK experience  
758 involving Brent Spar, it is that community engagement and support is critical.

759

760 The Interim Report does not deal with decommissioning in any detail and makes few  
761 recommendations beyond suggesting that it 'should be on a case-by-case basis' and that [s]afety and  
762 navigation will be of paramount concern, and the Australian Maritime Safety Authority should be  
763 involved in the planning process' (DIIS, 2015). It is therefore critical that further research is  
764 undertaken, in partnership with all stakeholders, alongside consultation envisaged by NOPSEMA, to  
765 inform science-based policy-making.

766

767 A further contribution to the Australian decommissioning debate is the recent report by the  
768 Australia's Federal Government Growth Centre, National Energy Resources Australia (NERA), on the  
769 Australian oil and gas industry competitiveness (NERA 2016). NERA highlighted Australia's

770 requirement to build capability in the Abandonment phase of projects, describing Abandonment as  
771 *“a looming threat, or an opportunity”*. NERA highlights Australia’s US\$21B future liability associated  
772 with decommissioning – which is shared between operators and taxpayers – and states that *“The*  
773 *opportunity and rationale is clear for Australia to invest and build the relevant capability before the*  
774 *wave of decommissioning activities commences. By finding solutions to reduce risk, time and cost of*  
775 *decommissioning, Australia could maximise value in this phase of the Oil and Gas value chain.”*  
776

777 This call to arms urgently invites intensified cross-disciplinary activity, across research, policy and  
778 public awareness, in partnership with all stakeholders in Australia, to seek and facilitate novel  
779 approaches to oil and gas decommissioning.

780

## 781 **Conclusion**

782

783 Whilst all stakeholders will want to ensure decommissioning is achieved in the best way possible, a  
784 vital first step is determining precisely what it is that needs to be done. There is little doubt that  
785 pressures on the ocean environment will only increase. Growing populations will increase demand  
786 on fisheries and likely lead to the development of large offshore aquaculture projects. Similarly, the  
787 demand for energy may see broad implementation of wave energy and other renewables.  
788 Meanwhile, much of Australia’s oil and gas infrastructure is located among popular commercial and  
789 recreational fisheries, and there is evidence that this infrastructure contributes to the abundance of  
790 marine life. This diversity of ocean uses militates against a purely targeted approach focusing on  
791 decommissioning in and of itself. A holistic approach, focusing on cross-industry and multi-  
792 disciplinary outcomes will be needed. Because Australia developed a strong offshore petroleum  
793 industry later than other jurisdictions, it is only now facing large scale decommissioning challenges;  
794 or viewed differently, opportunities.

795

796 Governing bodies and industry should carefully study the experiences of other nations in an attempt  
797 to adopt best practice and avoid previous pitfalls; and make a substantial investment in coordinated  
798 research across the numerous fields relevant to decommissioning. This review has highlighted the  
799 evidence that Australia’s oil and gas infrastructure hosts diverse biota, and has shown that current  
800 engineering life extension approaches, coupled with emergent research, offer new potential to  
801 reliably evaluate the stability and integrity of infrastructure that is decommissioned in situ, or which  
802 is relocated and repurposed offshore. Development of this evidence base to support in situ or  
803 offshore-relocated decommissioning of obsolete platforms based on a rigs-to-reefs concept, along  
804 with in situ decommissioning of subsea infrastructure, could serve all stakeholders and the  
805 environment well. Australia is thus in a unique position to show leadership in adopting innovative  
806 approaches, but this must rest on a strong evidence base.

807

808

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810

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819 decommissioning.

820

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