

# **UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON**

FACULTY OF SOCIAL AND HUMAN AND MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES GRADUATE SCHOOL

Southampton Education School

## **Exploring the Relationship between Education, Economy and Individual Civic Attitudes: A cross-national analysis in England, Spain, Sweden, Poland and Chinese Taipei**

by

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Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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## **ABSTRACT**

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### **EXPLORING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EDUCATION, ECONOMY AND INDIVIDUAL CIVIC ATTITUDES: A CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS IN ENGLAND, SPAIN, SWEDEN, POLAND AND CHINESE TAIPEI**

Liyuan Liu

This thesis analyses the impact of the national economy on four European countries – England, Spain, Sweden and Poland – and one East Asian country – Chinese Taipei – and introduces the association between the economy and political trust and support for democracy. Since education has been long discussed as a mechanism for the creation of economic competitiveness, the restoration of trust and the promotion of a more democratic and trustworthy society, the thesis sheds light on whether there is a relationship between education and civic attitudes.

In this work, I demonstrate changes in the real economy across participating countries by constructing a composite index of the economic crisis, using OECD data and Chinese Taipei national statistics. I report the associations between the economy and individuals' civic attitudes by using trend data analyses on the basis of the World Values Survey (WVS) and European Social Survey (ESS) datasets. I explore the relationship between educational attainment and civic attitudes via a two-step model (multiple regression modelling) by using the WVS database. Moreover, to expand education's meaning, I employ Lave and Wenger's Communities of Practice (CoP) theory and examine its impact on young adolescents' learning of civic attitudes by multilevel modelling based on the IEA International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS) 2009.

The findings of the research show that the impact of the crisis is uneven among participating countries. Moreover, the empirical results suggest that individuals' political trust is highly responsive to the economy; although the evidence about democracy is not clear-cut, I find that citizens' support for democracy is not entirely immune to the economy.

Drawing upon the WVS data, I find that individuals' educational attainment has helped to weaken the negative impact of the recession on participants' civic attitudes, based on aggregated data. Yet, the evidence in light of separate countries demonstrates that the association between individuals' educational attainment and political trust seems largely dependent on the years of democracy in a society. Although the impact of formal education on democracy is always positive and significant, our empirical evidence points out that the relationship between education and democracy has actually been reduced in the most crisis-ridden country, Spain, during the recession.

The multilevel analysis (MLA) results, based on the IEA ICCS 2009, predict that all CoP-associated variables positively and significantly affect students' civic attitudes with a few exceptions. 'Peer discussion' negatively affects students' political trust and support for democracy. Young people's experience of engaging in outside-school activities is not always positively associated with their civic attitudes.

In the educational arena, studies of CoP theory have mainly focused on its influences on certain types of young people's citizenship competence, such as democratic values and political participation. Research that focuses on how the CoP theory affects students' civic and political attitudes is underexplored. Our MLA results confirm that political trust can be learnt through participation in CoP, such as democratic values and so on.

In addition, I find that young people's support for democracy and trust in national institutions were school-related variables, as a large amount of variance was explained at school level for these two factors with regard to MLA results. In addition, I find that after adding school-level variables, that is, a school's social economic status (SES) and its open climate, the results of political trust become less homogenous across countries, while democracy remains stable. Following this logic, I also examine the impact of school and indicate that attending different schools actually affects young people's political trust.

This project selected five countries for the analyses, because these countries loosely represent different welfare regimes and different fortunes in terms of the economic performance during the economic recession. Substantial cross-country differences appeared in terms of the associations between educational attainment and citizens' political trust, being largely reliant on the history of democracy: in a consolidated democracy such as Sweden and England, education brings political trust when the economy encounters economic recession. In countries in transformation, such as Poland and Chinese Taipei, education always positively affects support for democracy, but is negatively associated with political trust.

Moreover, in countries with a free market regime, such as England, people are more likely to be affected by fluctuations than in countries with a universalist regime, such as Sweden. This is potentially because the relatively high levels of social benefits in Sweden tend to protect unemployed people better than those people in England. In countries with a traditional regime, such as Spain, the family pays the price of the crisis and resists market economy turbulence. Since the industries in Spain that were hit hardest by the current crisis are male-dominated, the empirical results show that Spain has been severely affected by the recession both in terms of the national economy and people's civic attitudes. In contrast, in East Asian countries – Chinese Taipei, the state plays an important role in supporting the national economy, as well as sustaining social cohesion. This helps me to understand that good economic performance is closely linked to high levels of political trust.

Special and durable regional traditions also affect the way that young adolescents learn active citizenship. Referring to the multilevel analyses, social learning is more powerful than the traditional approach in countries marked as having liberalism, individualism and egalitarianism (England and Sweden). In contrast, the traditional style of teaching is more effective in enhancing active citizenship in countries with a uniform curriculum and a marked sensitivity for social hierarchies (Spain, Poland and Chinese Taipei).



# Table of Contents

<b>Table of Contents .....</b>	<b>i</b>
<b>List of Tables.....</b>	<b>v</b>
<b>List of Figures .....</b>	<b>vii</b>
<b>DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP .....</b>	<b>ix</b>
<b>Acknowledgements .....</b>	<b>xi</b>
<b>Definitions and Abbreviations.....</b>	<b>xiii</b>
<b>Chapter 1:       Introduction .....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1   Background .....	1
1.2   Research questions and hypotheses .....	3
1.3   Outline of the thesis.....	4
<b>Chapter 2:       Literature review.....</b>	<b>5</b>
2.1   Democracy .....	5
2.1.1   Athenian democracy.....	6
2.1.2   Participatory democracy.....	7
2.1.3   Civic republicanism .....	8
2.1.4   Liberal democracy.....	9
2.1.5   Asian-style democracy.....	11
2.1.6   Regimes of social cohesion .....	16
2.1.7   Conclusions .....	18
2.2   Trust .....	19
2.2.1   The concept of trust.....	20
2.2.2   The concept of political trust and its categories .....	22
2.2.3   The concept of social trust .....	24
2.2.4   Trust and democracy .....	24
2.3   Economy and individuals' civic attitudes.....	26
2.3.1   From the 2008 financial crisis to the European debt crisis .....	27
2.3.2   What is the relationship between economy and citizens' civic attitudes?.....	28
2.3.3   How did the economic crisis affect citizens' political trust? .....	29

2.3.4	How did economic development affect political trust?.....	30
2.3.5	How did the economic crisis affect citizens' belief in democracy?.....	32
2.3.6	How did economic development affect citizens' belief in democracy? .	33
2.3.7	Conclusion .....	35
2.4	Education.....	35
2.4.1	Nie et al. 's Cognitive Theory.....	36
2.4.2	Constructionist approaches to learning.....	39
2.4.3	Diversity social networks/contexts and citizenship learning.....	41
2.5	Theoretical framework: bridge to the Methodology .....	47
2.5.1	Research question one .....	47
2.5.2	Research question two.....	49
<b>Chapter 3:</b>	<b>Methodology .....</b>	<b>57</b>
3.1	Philosophical paradigm and research design.....	57
3.2	European Social Survey .....	59
3.2.1	Overview.....	59
3.3	World Values Survey (WVS).....	61
3.3.1	Overview.....	61
3.3.2	Variables and methods.....	63
3.3.3	Missing data treatment.....	72
3.3.4	Selection of countries.....	72
3.4	ICCS 2009 Datasets .....	74
3.4.1	Overview.....	74
3.4.2	Variables and methods.....	77
3.4.3	Missing data treatment.....	88
3.4.4	Selection of countries.....	90
3.5	Data analysis.....	90
3.5.1	Research question one – Investigating the impact of the economy on political trust and support for democracy .....	91
3.5.2	Research question two – Exploring education's mediating role between a nation's economic status and civic attitudes .....	91



3.6	Ethical issues .....	93
3.7	Conclusion.....	93
<b>Chapter 4:</b>	<b>The effects of formal education .....</b>	<b>95</b>
4.1	Trend analysis of the economy .....	95
4.1.1	Results: the changes of the composite index across countries over years.....	95
4.2	Trend analysis of individuals' civic attitudes .....	97
4.2.1	Comparing the WVS and the ESS dataset.....	97
4.2.2	Results: the attitudinal shift of political trust across countries over years.....	100
4.2.3	Results: the changes of people's endorsement of democratic values across countries over time .....	106
4.2.4	Results: the changes of the index of civic attitudes .....	108
4.3	Two-step model .....	111
4.3.1	Pooling the data for all countries: The individual-level determinants of individual civic attitudes .....	111
4.3.2	Separate models for each country: The individual determinants of individual civic attitudes .....	115
4.4	Discussion.....	121
4.4.1	The impact of the national economy.....	121
4.4.2	The association between the economy and political trust .....	122
4.4.3	The association between the economy and support for democracy....	122
4.4.4	Formal education's effects .....	123
4.5	Limitations.....	125
<b>Chapter 5:</b>	<b>The effects of learning contexts .....</b>	<b>127</b>
5.1	Descriptive information on students (original variables) .....	127
5.1.1	Young people's political trust and support for democracy .....	127
5.1.2	Learning communities .....	129
5.1.3	Demographic variables .....	131
5.2	Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) .....	132
5.2.1	Results: political trust and support for democracy .....	132

5.2.2	Results: learning communities .....	133
5.3	Overall descriptive information on students (new variables).....	137
5.4	Multilevel analysis (MLA) .....	139
5.4.1	Results: Political trust.....	139
5.4.2	Results: democratic values.....	148
5.5	Discussion .....	152
5.5.1	Young adolescents' political trust and support for democracy .....	152
5.5.2	Young adolescents' participation in Communities of Practice (CoP)....	152
5.5.3	The effects of the CoP learning perspectives.....	153
5.5.4	The effects of schools.....	156
5.6	Limitations .....	157
<b>Chapter 6:</b>	<b>Conclusions.....</b>	<b>159</b>
6.1	Original contributions.....	159
	The development of an index of economic crisis .....	159
	The application of communities of practice theory to the topic in the context of diverse cultures .....	160
	A challenge to the ICCS technical report and its use of a single combined indicator by the development of separate scales for family and peer discussion.....	161
6.2	The key findings.....	161
6.2.1	The associations between the economy and adults' civic attitudes ....	162
6.2.2	The effects of formal education and situated learning.....	163
6.2.3	The effects of schools.....	166
6.2.4	The effects of cultural differences .....	166
6.3	Brexit, the economic crisis and the implications for citizenship education.....	168
6.4	Limitations .....	173
	<b>Appendices.....</b>	<b>175</b>
	<b>Appendix A.....</b>	<b>177</b>
	<b>Bibliography .....</b>	<b>183</b>

## List of Tables

Table 1 Comparisons between different models of democracy in the West .....	10
Table 2 Summary statistics (mean and standard deviation) for three components (raw scores).....	65
Table 3 Summary statistics (mean and standard deviation) for three components (z-scores).....	66
Table 4 Selection of countries (WVS data).....	73
Table 5 Selection of countries (IEA ICCS 2009 data) .....	90
Table 6 Selected countries and time of data collection in WVS and ESS datasets .....	98
Table 7 A comparison between the items reflecting individual's civic attitudes in the WVS and ESS .....	100
Table 8 Example of the recoding of variables by using a higher score to indicate a positive attitude .....	101
Table 9 Parameter estimates and standard errors for the analysis of political trust by using WVS dataset on a max 4 scale .....	102
Table 10 Parameter estimates and standard errors for the analysis of political trust by using the ESS dataset on a max 10 scale .....	103
Table 11 Democratic values .....	107
Table 12 Parameter estimates and standard errors for items on democratic values (a max 4 scale) by using the WVS dataset .....	107
Table 13 Descriptive statistics for the political trust index.....	109
Table 14 Descriptive statistics for the democracy index .....	110
Table 15 Individual-level determinates of political trust in merged files at two time points ...	112
Table 16 Determinants of democratic values in combined files at two time points.....	114
Table 17 The individual-level determinants of political trust across countries at two time points. .....	117
Table 18 Individual-level determinants of democratic values across countries at two time points. .....	120

Table 19 Means and standard deviations of the dependent variables .....	128
Table 20 Descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) of learning contexts .....	130
Table 21 Descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) of geographic variables .....	131
Table 22 Selected AMOS output for hypothesised two-factor model: goodness-of-fit statistics	132
Table 23 Selected AMOS output for hypothesised five-factor model: goodness-of-fit statistics	133
Table 24 Descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) for variables .....	138
Table 25. Proportion variance explained at two levels across countries (political trust) .....	140
Table 26 Parameter estimates and standard errors for the analysis of political trust.....	143
Table 27 Parameter estimates and standard errors for the analysis of political trust.....	146
Table 28 Proportion variance explained at two levels across countries (democratic values) ..	148
Table 29 Parameter estimates and standard errors for the analysis of democratic values.....	150

## List of Figures

Figure 1 Categories of trust.....	23
Figure 2 GDP per capita and trust in 1992.....	31
Figure 3 The theoretical framework .....	55
Figure 4 Full model.....	85
Figure 5 Overall summary of missing values in the combined dataset .....	89
Figure 6 Changes in the index from 2007 to 2012.....	96
Figure 7 Hypothesised two-factor CFA model of individuals' civic attitudes .....	132
Figure 8 Hypothesised five-factor CFA model of learning contexts .....	134



# DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP

I, Liyuan Liu, declare that this thesis and the work presented in it are my own and have been generated by me as the result of my own original research.

**Exploring the Relationship between Education, Economy and Individual Civic Attitudes: A cross-national analysis in England, Spain, Sweden, Poland and Chinese Taipei**

I confirm that:

1. This work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research degree at this University;
2. Where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or any other qualification at this University or any other institution, this has been clearly stated;
3. Where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly attributed;
4. Where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given. With the exception of such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work;
5. I have acknowledged all main sources of help;
6. Where the thesis is based on work done by myself jointly with others, I have made clear exactly what was done by others and what I have contributed myself;
7. None of this work has been published before submission:

Signed: .....

Date: .....





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## Definitions and Abbreviations

AEM	Absolute education model
CEE	Central and Eastern European
CFA	Confirmatory Factor Analysis
CIVED	International Civic Education Study
CoP	Communities of Practice
ESS	European Social Survey
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IEA	International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement
ICCS	International Civic and Citizenship Education Study
IRT	Item Response Theory
MLA	Multilevel analysis
MLR	Multiple Linear Regression
NRC	National research coordinators
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
SES	Socioeconomic Status
WVS	World Values Survey
PRC	People's Republic of China



# Chapter 1: Introduction

## 1.1 Background

Although the full impact will not be known for years, the 2008 global financial and economic crisis must be considered as having been especially grave in Europe, due to the recent enhancement in the global connectedness of world economies and changes in the balance of economic power between East and West (Earle, 2009; Roth, 2009a, b). Moreover, the impact of this crisis is unprecedented. It is a much greater crisis than other recent economic downturns such as the bursting of the dotcom bubble in 2000 and the Asian economic recession in 1997 (Gamble, 2010). The lessons from past experiences show me that economic crises have a detrimental impact on civic attitudes such as people's belief in democracy, social and political trust (Hetherington, 2005) and participation in general associations (Putnam, 2000; Inglehart, 2003). As a result of the current crisis being much deeper (Bernanke, 2008), this thesis hypothesises that citizens' civic attitudes may well be more severely affected by this unprecedented recession than before. Furthermore, as education has long been considered an important factor in facilitating increased trust in economically challenging times (Bernanke, 2008), the research will investigate whether there is a relationship between education and civic attitudes.

To address the above issues, this thesis will conduct analyses among several regimes in both developed and developing countries. In the 2008 global financial and economic crisis, many studies have suggested that Western countries, rather than Asian countries (specifically East Asian countries) were assigned to be the main actors (Diamond, 2011; Green and Janmaat, 2011; Stiglitz, 2010b). For instance, while the majority of Western states suffered a negative impact from the economic recession, most East Asian countries' economies inevitably experienced downturns in world trade in the aftermath of the world economic recession yet are now mainly back on course (Green and Janmaat, 2011). Regarding this greater crash, Green and Janmaat (2011) commented that it is indeed a crisis of neoliberal financial capitalism, and to some extent this economic crash potentially promotes the long-term global economic shift from the West to Asia.

In terms of the 2008 global crisis, one of the most novel aspects is the remarkable degree of global economic integration (Bernanke, 2008). It is not difficult to understand that the high degree of integration leads to financial shocks being transmitted worldwide at the speed of light

(Bernanke, 2008). More pertinently, the direct impact of globalisation on the labour market will be the global division of labour and skills-based technological change. For instance, in developed countries those workers who were poorly educated and with fewer skills found themselves less capable of surviving in the new labour market (Green, Janmaat and Cheng, 2011).

On the one hand, in developed countries such as European countries, globalisation brought a multitude of social ills, such as mounting unemployment, civic conflict and even decreased social cohesion, with extremely unequal distribution of income and wealth (Hutton, 2002; Wilkson and Pickett, 2009). In particular, when these social ills were impacted upon by the 2008 economic crisis, the resources (i.e. jobs) for distribution were reduced, therefore civic and political attitudes faced a huge challenge in the economic recession.

On the other hand, developing countries in East Asia, which are more competitive and have lower wages (Green, Janmaat and Cheng, 2011), are arguably more cohesive and disciplined societies that were able to remain more socially stable and maintain economic success, even in the context of global recession (Green, Janmaat and Han, 2009). Furthermore, with the development of the economy, some researchers have speculated that the impact of increasing wealth might lead to changes in attitudes towards democratisation (Dowd, Carlson and Mingming, 2007).

Therefore, the severe economic crisis in Western countries offered an excellent moment to examine the impact of the crisis on people's support for democracy and their trust in political institutions. Moreover, the continued economic boom in East Asian societies is an opportunity to examine the impact of economic growth on education and citizens' civic and political attitudes (i.e. basic democratic values, civic and political participation, participatory attitudes, political trust, etc...). More importantly, I believe that the relationship between education and citizenship varies according to economic status. During the 2008 economic crisis, the requirements for education generally increased in most Western countries because education often works as the creation of economic competitiveness (Green, 2011), the restoration of political trust (Bernanke, 2008; Gamble, 2010) and the promotion of a more democratic society (Dewey, 1916). In contrast, continued economic development raises a nation's educational level and offers a better chance of becoming democratic. Similarly, economic performance shapes the reputation of political institutions and brings high levels of political trust (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003).

There are two main socialisation factors that affect people's learning of citizenship; formal education and learning through social participation in communities of practice (CoP). For several decades, people have placed heavy emphasis on how formal education affects people's citizenship learning, including their political participation, elections, citizenship knowledge and skills, and basic democratic values as well as their civic attitudes (Converse, 1972; Carpini and

Keeter, 1996; Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry, 1996). However, more recently, constructionist learning, which suggests that people are nested in several communities of practices at any given time and can learn citizenship in a wide variety of arenas, has been used to explore the relationship between education and citizenship learning in a wider range of contexts (i.e. family, open classroom etc.) (Lave and Wenger, 1991; Wenger, 1998; Biesta et al., 2009; Hoskins et al., 2012). The research tries to consider these two approaches both theoretically and practically in order to explore whether there is a relationship between education and civic attitudes.

In addition, it is interesting to apply social comparison theory in this project in terms of considering similarities and differences in East Asian countries. The social comparison theory, initially mentioned by social psychologist Festinger in 1954, analyses how people evaluate their views and abilities by comparing themselves to others to reduce uncertainty in these domains and learning how to define the self (Festinger, 1954). In Chapter 2, I analyse the similarities and differences of East Asian countries. These countries have significant overlap, as they are all influenced by either a weak or a strong Confucian culture, yet some are dominated by Western-style democracy while others are governed in a more authoritarian way. As suggested by social comparison theory, if discrepancies arise between the evaluator (i.e. authoritarian countries) and comparison group (i.e. democratic countries), there is a tendency to reduce the divergence by either trying to persuade others or changing their opinions to attain uniformity (Festinger, 1954). Once democracies achieve massive success in certain East Asian societies, it will implicitly and explicitly affect their neighbours' attitudes towards democracy, as they have an important overlap of culture and daily customs. Due to the limits of datasets and time, this project may not be able to address this issue fully, but the theoretical work on the similarities and differences of East Asian countries may provide other scholars with some useful information to do so.

## **1.2 Research questions and hypotheses**

In this section, I will present my research questions and hypotheses to highlight the concerns of the research. The research questions are:

- (1) What are the effects of the economy on adults' attitudes/values towards political trust and democracy?
- (2) Is there a relationship between education and civic attitudes?

### **1.3 Outline of the thesis**

Chapter 1 of this thesis will provide the background and explain how this affects individuals' civic attitudes in the West and in East Asia, and then raise questions regarding the mediating role of education for citizenship in various economic contexts. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on four components that comprise various types of democracy, political trust, the economy and education. The interactive relationship between these four components is introduced, as well as pointing out some of the gaps in the literature.

Chapter 3 follows with the methodology adopted in the research, which is also used as a bridge to link theory and data together. In this chapter, I initially introduce the philosophical paradigm and research design, and then describe the main datasets used and analytical sampling methods and variables.

Chapters 4 and 5 respectively show results from the test of how formal learning and informal learning affect individual civic attitudes by using two waves of the World Values Survey (WVS) and the International Civic and Citizenship Education study (ICCS) 2009.

Chapter 6 provides the concluding comments on the empirical results, and presents the limitations of my research design and the implications of the thesis for further theory and practice.



## **Chapter 2: Literature review**

This chapter aims to define the core concepts of this thesis: (1) civic individual attitudes, subdivided into citizens' support for democracy and citizens' trust in political institutions; (2) the economic crisis in the West and economic development in East Asia; (3) education. It will also theoretically contextualise this study, in particular the interplay between individual civic attitudes and the economy. It will then consider how individual civic attitudes change within and between countries as a result of different economic contexts. Finally, the chapter will link this to respective differences in education systems in the different countries.

### **2.1 Democracy**

This section explores the major theoretical models of democracy: the Athenian model; the participatory democracy model; the civic republican model; the liberal model; and Asian-style democracy. The ideological battle between democratic societies and authoritarian or partial democracies in East Asian countries presents many intriguing challenges and debates for both Western liberal political thinkers and Eastern scholars (O'Dwyer, 2003). East Asia's particular cultural values – including, for example, Confucianism and Authoritarianism – to some extent influence certain societies' patterns of education and democratisation. Based on this, are Confucianism/authoritarianism and Western democracy fundamentally against each other? How do different forms of democracy impact on their social institutions (schools) and shape their citizens?

To find some answers, I will analyse various types of democracy, as well as explore the reciprocity with citizenship within each type. It makes sense that a 'good' citizen is not born, but has to be imbued and cultivated by education, daily customs and practices (Patten, 1996). Schools, here, have been regarded by national governments as the central site for teaching civic competence (Hoskins et al., 2012). The articulation of different forms of democracy provides me with the cultural background knowledge to help to understand citizens' particular attitudes and behaviours with the logic and mechanisms of the political context where they live. For instance, within certain Western democracies, citizenship education has the aim of moulding people into active and capable citizens, in turn benefiting democratic politics, whereas in authoritarian regimes (some East Asian societies) a different form of citizenship is taught with the purpose of shaping citizens who cherish and respect authority.

### **2.1.1 Athenian democracy**

Democratic forms of government stem from ancient Greece, about 2,500 years ago. It was a form of self-government where all citizens met, discussed, enacted laws and made decisions in a public assembly (Held, 2006). The word 'democracy' is derived from the Greek and is defined as rule by the people. Inter alia, the term 'rule' stands for 'to have power or command' and 'to exercise supreme authority', while 'the people' suggests that authoritative power belongs not to a minority but the whole people in the constitution of a democracy (Held, 2006). From Aristotle's (1961) perspective, democracy represents the spirit of liberty: 'The interchange of ruling and being ruled' formulates political liberty, while 'living as you like' refers to civil liberty (Aristotle, 1961).

In other words, democracy encompasses two dimensions: popular sovereignty; and individual liberty. The former refers to the empowerment of citizens, who can equally and directly influence government decisions (direct democracy), whereas the latter means that people have a right to live without arbitrary interference from government (Shaohua, 2007). These political ideals – equality among citizens, liberty, respect for law and justice – have deeply affected political thinking in the West (Held, 2006).

Athenian democracy placed emphasis on individuals' engagement in public issues. The Athenian model of citizenship encouraged all men from various backgrounds to participate freely and fairly in politics in order to create and nurture a common life. Pericles (1947, cited in Held, 2006, p.14) stated that 'we do not say that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man who minds his own business; we say that he has no business here at all'.

Athenian democracy was noted for its general commitment to the principles of civic virtue: commitment to the republican city-state; and the subordination of individual lives to public life and the common good (Held, 2006). In Athenian discourse, the 'public' and the 'private' seem to have been bound together. Citizens had both rights and duties. However, their rights were not those of private individuals. From this perspective, some important notions such as the modern liberal idea that human beings are 'individuals' with rights cannot be directly attributed to Athens (Held, 2006).

A common challenge to this model is that classic democracy was exclusive. According to Held (2006), Athens' democracy was one of the patriarchs. Women, children and non-citizens (i.e. foreigners and slaves) had no voting rights and their civil rights were strictly limited. The proportion of the population that actually engaged in political affairs was later calculated as roughly 20% of the people; only a small portion of people ruled the mass of it. Nevertheless,

Athenian democracy has inspired many democratic thinkers, and its critiques remind me of the risks of democratic politics.

### **2.1.2 Participatory democracy**

In the same vein, participatory democracy is direct democracy. It means that every citizen can vote, be elected as a representative and directly control the process. In this mode, the principle is to provide people with an equal right to liberty and self-development in order to achieve a 'participatory society'. This cultivates a feeling of political efficacy, raises concern for collective interests and leads to the formation of a competent citizenry with a lasting interest in the governing process (Pateman, 1970; Held, 2006).

Participatory democracy sheds light on citizens' involvement in politics and recalls their requirement of sharing power with government in order to achieve more transparent and efficient ways of governing. According to the findings of the Commonwealth Foundation (1999), in more than forty countries participants considered that a good society is one in which they are able to participate politically to make their own contribution towards the public good, and can be heard and consult on a regular basis rather than merely at the time of an election. The participatory mode supports broad participation and trains citizens to be competent through the self-government process. Meanwhile, citizens are likely to feel a sense of belonging to the community or state when they think that their participation is worthwhile. Then civic responsibility, promoted by the state (through education programmes) or citizens themselves (through a self-government process), enables them to pursue the public good rather than private interests.

Moreover, participatory democracy not only develops active citizenship, but also offers learning opportunities for citizens. A significant number of scholars, such as Aristotle, Rousseau or Pateman, supported the educational effects of participation. Merrifield (2001) highlights the nature and extent of this 'educative effect'. In participatory discourse, democracy is effectively learnt by citizens through the approach of doing it. In a meta-study, Berry et al. (1993) suggests that a participatory mode provides opportunities for meaningful engagement in politics, in which ordinary individuals make decisions about the allocation of goods and services in their neighbourhoods. They tend to be more knowledgeable and more tolerant, and believe more in government. Similarly, in Halvorsen's (2003) study on public land management meetings in three rural communities in the US Mid-West, he found that meaningful involvement positively transformed participant beliefs.

However, critiques about participatory democracy are often framed in light of the relative advantage of the dominant alternative paradigm of public decision-making; that is, representative democracy. The representative mode of democracy often claims that a participatory mode is time consuming. Citizens may not have the time, knowledge or political interest to be involved in civil society activities (Moote et al., 1997). In terms of this, individuals may have less understanding of complex political issues and little time or motivation to learn about these issues, and consequently may be less likely to understand the alternatives associated with their preferences than experts (Heberlein, 1976). Furthermore, citizens may demonstrate more interest in decisions made at a local rather than a national level. As Held (2006, p.213) asserts, 'people are most interested in and likely to have a better grasp of those problems and issues which immediately touch their lives'.

### **2.1.3 Civic republicanism**

Among Western democracies, the development of the notion of citizenship sometimes stems from civic republican traditions (Crick, 2003). The feature which distinguishes civic republicans from other citizenship discourse is their emphasis on civic membership of the political community. Civic republicanism places a heavy emphasis on citizens' participation: playing a key role in achieving the common good. According to Lovett (2010), civic republican discourse makes high demands of citizens in maintaining democratic processes and institutions and, in turn, greater political freedom.

Civic competence focuses on both civic responsibility (civic virtues) and civic literacy (Abowitz and Harnish, 2006). The notion of civic responsibility is habitually expressed by the values of public spiritedness, solidarity, and the responsibility to achieve a common good. The civic republican approach stresses the role of civic responsibility because of its relationship with the common good. Without the constraints of civic responsibility, there would be too much self-interest and corruption would occur.

Civic literacy, as defined by Milner (2002), includes both political knowledge and the willingness to utilise this through political participation. The civic republican approach highlights the need to prepare citizens with better civic knowledge, and emphasises this crucial role in good citizenship. According to Held (2006), eligible citizens are able to participate actively in political spheres, freely and fairly elect or eject officeholders, use their rights in order to prevent corruption and thereby maintain the legitimate process of democracy. In conclusion, civic responsibility is based on self-sacrifice, loyalty and respect, while civic literacy enables citizens to be involved in productive dialogue around public issues, building consensus and working cooperatively (Zaff, 2003).

However, in the context of civic republicanism, at times the common good can override individuals' rights. As Abowitz and Harnish (2006) note, among civic republicans there is some consensus that citizens' rights are meaningless without the presence of values that stress civic responsibilities. Therefore, when civic republicanism is compared to liberal democracy, this mode places more emphasis on the duty and value of political participation than political decision-making. The critique here might be that overly emphasising the common good might lead to an individual sacrifice or even the erosion of individual freedom.

#### **2.1.4 Liberal democracy**

Liberalism, which works as another influential discursive force in forming contemporary meanings of citizenship, is actually a discourse of individual liberty (Abowitz and Harnish, 2006). The liberal model of citizenship is typically considered as the least demanding of its citizens. National identity is built around 'thinner' notions of a political community than is articulated in civic republican and participatory modes. According to Strike (1994), 'thinner' notions of citizenship react to the belief that there is much less social agreement on values, chosen identities and types of democratic involvement than is assumed by civic republican texts. Given this, citizens' democratic engagement in a liberal system is essentially expressed through their vote.

Moreover, liberalism stresses the rights of individuals to govern, regulate and pursue their own definition of the good life rather than the common good (Abowitz and Harnish, 2006), within some constraints, forcing them to promote respect for and consideration of others' priorities and rights (Hoskins et al., 2012). The political system protects and respects individuals. However, it defines them and their rights in social terms. Certain studies suggest that liberalism builds a healthier balance between the individual and the community than civic republicanism, which is primarily distinguished by its view of individuals' subordination to the community. However, in liberal discourse, minority rights are easily repressed by the majority and the former tend even not to notice due to their lack of access to general information and experience of participation.

In liberal discourse, education in civic competence places more emphasis on creating free, autonomous citizens and developing political knowledge and skills in order to enhance deliberations and critiques on political issues (Hoskins et al., 2012; Abowitz and Harnish, 2006). The greatest concern of liberal scholars in exercising universal suffrage relates to citizens' lack of ability to understand decisions in terms of both the public interest and self-interest (Hoskins et al., 2012). This is also why, in this model, citizenship education focuses on civic knowledge and skills.

Table 1 Comparisons between different models of democracy in the West

Type	Principles	Citizenship	Education for civic competence	Limits
Athenian democracy	Common good; Patriarchy democracy	Active	Focus on developing citizens' disposition of acting justly towards others by active learning/habits that promotes empathic understanding <sup>1</sup> .  By infusing sufficiently powerful feelings of empathic understanding, civic virtue can be tightly related to individualism.	Exclusive  Women, children, foreigners and slaves had no political rights and limited civil rights
Participatory democracy	Common good; Inclusive democracy;  The whole body of citizens fairly and equally participate in political community	Active	Focus on rising citizens' political interests, civic knowledge and skills through broad participation.	Time consuming
Civic republican democracy	Common good;  Civic engagement;  Civic virtues	Active	Focus on shaping both citizens' civic virtues and civic literacy in order to achieve common good through meaningful civic engagement.	Duty  The common good sometimes can override rights of individuals
Liberal democracy	Self-definition of 'good life';  Individual liberty takes precedence over common good	Representative	Focus on developing citizens' political knowledge and skills in order to raise their deliberations and critiques around political issues.	Small individualism  Limited understanding of common good

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<sup>1</sup> Empathic understanding refers to putting oneself in the other's shoes and feeling how the other sees, experiences and interprets the world (Dahl, 1992, p.53).

### **2.1.5 Asian-style democracy**

Recently, there has been an increasingly significant discussion around so-called 'Asian-style democracy' or soft authoritarianism. The core of this controversy is that East Asia is a very different place from the West and has built its political regime on the basis of its own unique culture (Hood, 1998; Kim, 1997). For example, unlike the free market in the West, market economies in East Asia were developed by government and business working together (Hood, 1998). Moreover, politics has always represented the group willingness or communitarian concerns of Asia's Confucian culture (Hood, 1998).

Additionally, some East Asian countries such as Singapore or Malaysia may restrict certain liberties, such as freedom of speech, assembly and competition for political office. In turn, government intervention in individual interests may have helped to preserve the East Asian culture. On the other hand, other East Asian societies such as Japan, Chinese Taipei or South Korea adopt a more Western culture, with immediate implications for their democratisation (Hood, 1998). To summarise, there are distinctive differences within East Asian democracies, some with more Western-style democracies and some that are not seen as a democracy by the West.

Pertinently, Huntington (1991) suggests that there are two barriers to democracy in East Asian societies, and that this is the key to the distinctive differences among East Asian democracies. First, there is a lack of experience of democracy in most societies that maintained authoritarianism up to 1990. Only Japan and the Philippines had any experience of democracy before that point. Although absence of experience is apparently not a fundamental impediment to becoming a democracy, it does increase the difficulty of transition (Huntington, 1991). In my opinion, an earlier taste of democracy would generate common ground for nurturing democratic rules and moulding democratic citizens. Japan is a living example. Ikeda and Kohno (2010, p.161) draw on the findings of the Asian Barometer (1979–2003) and state that the Japanese people almost universally support 'the fundamental transition of the political regime that occurred after World War II and see the present regime as democratic'. The second barrier is that the political incumbents who rule authoritarian regimes for a long period might be fierce opponents of democratisation (Huntington, 1991). This prerequisite requires me to consider briefly some East Asian countries' historical backgrounds. In general, the Japanese argued for democracy as a political system and demonstrated little interest in authoritarian alternatives (Ikeda et al., 2010). The East Asian Barometer (1979–2003) found that democracy is consolidated in Japan not only because it works effectively, but also because it is the default position of most citizens (Ikeda and Kohno, 2010).

However, South Korea's classical culture incorporates dimensions of mobility and egalitarianism, accompanied by Confucian elements that are hostile to democracy, as well as a tradition of authoritarianism and 'strong man' rule (Huntington, 1991). Yet, in the late 1980s, Korea began its transition from military rule to representative democracy. A potential reason is that 'urbanization, education, the development of a substantial middle class, and the impressive spread of Christianity all weakened Confucianism as an obstacle to democracy in Korea' (Huntington, 1991, p.25).

In similar vein, Chinese Taipei also successfully transformed its political system from an authoritarian party-state, one lasting for four decades, to a democracy. Chinese Taipei had been colonised by Japan from 1895 to 1945 and then appeared as a provincial-level unit of China's authoritarian regime from 1945 onwards (Ikeda and Kohno, 2010). Chinese Taipei's successful transition is likely to be attributable to the emergence of a sizeable middle class that mostly consisted of well-educated native Chinese Taipei people (Yun-han et al., 2010). They provided a source of power and wealth, allowing Chinese Taipei to make a fundamental change to its political culture (Huntington, 1991). The two key points here are that Chinese Taipei's authoritarian history was short and that native citizens were less influenced by Confucianism.

These three successful examples display obvious overlap in terms of less interest in authoritarianism and a weakened Confucian culture. What, then, is the relationship between authoritarianism, Confucianism and democracy? And is Confucianism/authoritarianism compatible with Western democracy?

Singapore and China have long been perceived as staunch opponents of democracy. In fact, the spectacular economic growth in Singapore, Chinese Taipei and South Korea in the late 1980s created a precondition for democracy (Huntington, 1991). Yet, while Singapore became a 'high-income' country (as defined by the World Bank), it did not become a democracy. Singapore's leader remained faithful to the spirit of Confucian culture, as opposed to Western democracy (Huntington, 1991). Lee Kuan Yew condemned the ills of the West and advocated Asian approaches of doing politics and economies. He argued that Asia's communitarian values protected it against the West's problems such as economic stagnation and general social ills (Hood, 1998). As little has changed in Singapore's authoritarian system up to now, authoritarianism/Confucianism remains at the heart of its political system.

By the late 1980s, Chinese economics, as distinct from Singapore, Chinese Taipei and Korea's spectacular growth, 'reinforced culture in holding back democracy' (Huntington, 1991, p.25). Primarily, China faces two obstacles to becoming a democracy: it has long been ruled by authoritarianism; and it has a long tradition of Confucianism.



Now, let me explore definitions of Confucianism, authoritarianism and their connections, and evaluate whether these are compatible with democracy.

### **Confucianism**

In common with democratic ideology, Confucianism is a corresponding product of its times (Shaohua, 1997). It is necessary to interpret this concept on different layers. When traced back to the past, Confucian doctrine was split into two dimensions. Mencius (372–289 BC) considered that human nature is fundamentally good, and declared that rulers are not as important as the people who are ruled by them. However, Hsun Tzun (298–238 BC) held that ‘human nature is evil and goodness results from conscious activity’ (Shaohua, 1997, p.349).

Hsun’s conception of Confucianism was as a state ideology, and it was used to dominate China for more than two thousand years. Confucianism’s ideological function was used to serve rulers’ interests (Shaohua, 1997). It had to suit itself to changing realities, which resulted in a very different conception of Confucianism to that of Mencius (Shaohua, 1997).

A third conception is more modern and approachable: using Confucianism to represent Chinese civilization itself (Shaohua, 1997). Traditional Chinese Confucianism and its derivatives in most East Asian societies, such as Korea, Singapore, Chinese Taipei and Japan, stress the community over the individual, authority over liberty and obligations over rights (Huntington, 1991). Harmony and cooperation take precedence over disagreement and competition. The principle of Confucianism is to ask citizens to retain social order and respect for authority. Conflicting perceptions and political parties are risky and even illegitimate, in this context (Huntington, 1991). Most importantly, Confucianism constructs a society without providing any legitimacy for autonomous social institutions at a national level (Huntington, 1991).

However, no consensus has been arrived at over whether traditional Confucianism requires governance that is democratic, undemocratic or anti-democratic. Shaohua (1997) argues that Confucianism is closely connected to the ideal insight of ‘oriental despotism’. For this reason, it makes sense that Confucianism stands in the way of democratisation or slows down the shift from authoritarianism to democracy in East Asian societies. Many Western commentators would agree. Huntington (1991, p.24), for example, argues that ‘Confucianism societies lacked a tradition of rights against the state; to the extent that individual rights did exist, they were created by the state’. As I have noted, only two Asian countries – Japan and the Philippines – experienced democracy before 1990, and their successful transitions may have owed more to American influence and their lack of Confucianism than other Asian states.

Fukuyama (1995) argues that Huntington (1991), to a large extent overstated the barriers of Confucianism to a political system that is recognisably democratic in a Western sense. He did, though, note Confucianism's lack of defence for individualism or any transcendent laws that stand above all social relationships. This in turn provides the basis for individual conscience as the substantial source of authority (Fukuyama, 1995). In order to overcome these obstacles, Fukuyama (1995) focuses on the significance of social relations, such as 'familism', but did not take into account the long tradition of political Confucianism in Confucian societies. This makes his conclusions very different from those of Huntington (1991) or Shaohua (1997).

Fukuyama (1995) speculates on Confucianism's emphasis on education. Confucius believed that education should be provided without regard to social class, family background, geographic regions or even age; both the ruling class and broad masses have the right to be educated (Fukuyama, 1995; Wang, 1999). Although there is a less direct relationship identified between education and democracy, Fukuyama (1995) notes that education tends to bring about affluence and makes people aware of some non-economic issues, such as political engagement. In other words, Fukuyama (1995) considers that the barriers of Confucianism are not as high as assumed by Huntington (1991) or Shaohua (1997).

### **Authoritarianism**

Authoritarianism is a type of government. It means blind and unquestioning obedience to authority, as opposed to individual freedom of thought and action (Henderson, 1991), or obedience to traditionally constructed authorities based on an attitude of acceptance (Arendt, 1958). It features highly concentrated centralised power, political repression and the exclusion of potential opponents. Citizens are inspired behind the targets of the regime by political parties and mass organisations (Linz, 1964). It also seems to embrace the unofficial and unregulated practice of executive political power: the leadership is 'self-appointed and even if elected cannot be displaced by citizens' free choice among competitors', and has limited tolerance for meaningful opposition (Krieger, 2012). It is defined by 'indefinite political tenure' of the ruler (mostly a single ruler) or other authority, which fundamentally differs from the idea of 'political pluralism' in a democracy. The authoritarian regime is construed as a necessary evil against certain social problems, such as underdevelopment and insurgency (Linz, 1964). Countries such as China, North Korea and Vietnam are currently characterised as authoritarian, whereas historically South Korea, Spain and Chinese Taipei were marked by authoritarianism.

## **Authoritarianism and democracy**

Authoritarianism and the key concepts of democracy were introduced above. These definitions will be used as a basis for discussing their relationship. Are these two concepts fundamentally contradictory, or can they actually work together? Kim (1997) suggests that many authoritarian societies tend to use some of democracy's features in order to achieve legitimacy and acceptability. Many East Asian societies are marked by soft authoritarianism (half-democratic and half-authoritarianism), emphasising maintaining social order and political stability rather than individual rights and freedom (Kim, 1997). A Confucian culture supersedes Western values in realising an orderly society and resolving economic problems. However, it also incorporates features such as democracy, human rights, freedom and periodic free elections, which originally came from the West (Kim, 1997).

A critique here is that there are basic contradictions in the East Asian model of development (Kim, 1997). Political authoritarianism will be incompatible with rapid economic development, in the long run, and problems in the industrial age will become even more severe in the coming post-industrial age (Kim, 1997). Those problems are likely to be a consequence of excessive groupism, communitarianism, lack of flexibility and political autonomy (Kim, 1997). Pertinently, Japan and South Korea have been able to accommodate a greater degree of political engagement and individual liberty without undermining their own fundamental cultural values, and Chinese Taipei is also moving quickly in the same direction (Fukuyama, 1995). These countries have more Western-style democracies and will find it easier to consolidate democratic values in future.

Yet authoritarianism could become problematic if communitarianism is either based on abandoning individuals or fails to empathise with those particular groups (Henderson, 1991). Selnick (1987, p.454) points out that 'a communitarian morality is not at its core a philosophy of liberation. The central value is not freedom or independence but belonging'. Belonging to communities is vital to the whole body of citizens, but the 'community' here will only encompass new people after a process of conflict and struggle (Karst, 1997). If the community's values greatly overlook liberal concerns for individual rights and dignity, this will lead to an increase in substantive authoritarianism (Henderson, 1991).

Henderson (1991) notes that civic republican discourses become dangerous in several ways. First, the civic republican ideal exalts the good of the community beyond that of its individual members (Sherry, 1986). If the common good is misused, individuals' rights tend to be harmed to some extent. Second, it is associated with encouraging civic virtue. The term 'public life', in which all participate in discussing political issues, posits a common discourse and attitude that can be

exclusionary (Henderson, 1991). That is to say, those who stay away from politics will be increasingly marginalised and overwhelmed, disrupting long-term social cohesion.

#### **2.1.6 Regimes of social cohesion**

The above sections help us to understand the concepts of democracy and how education affects citizenship in very different models. I will introduce Green et al.'s (2009) regimes of social cohesion, which assisted my grouping of countries into five categories, in Chapter 3. The following paragraphs will: (a) define social cohesion; (b) analyse the reasons for choosing regimes of social cohesion; and (c) describe different social regimes and explore how they reflect different models of democracy.

Social cohesion is defined as 'society's ability to secure the long-term well-being of all its members, including equitable access to available resources, respect for human dignity with due regard for diversity, personal and collective autonomy and responsible population' (Council of Europe, 2005, cited in Zavaleta et al., p.15). The strong defence of choosing regimes of social cohesion is based on a close link with active citizenship. In other words, active citizenship is argued to be a sub-section of social cohesion (Hoskins et al., 2008).

Green et al.'s (2009) regimes of social cohesion have similarities in that they group countries by work that focuses on welfare capitalism, for example Esping-Andersen's (1990) theory of three worlds of welfare capitalism. The criticism of his work is that he does not agree on the notion of an East Asian model of welfare, though other scholars do state a distinctive East Asian model (Green et al., 2009). Moreover, regimes of social cohesion represent widespread, diverse concerns about the impact of social change on the social fabric. This may stem from the increasing inequality and social diversity accompanying globalisation (Green et al., 2009). These were intensified by the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent high unemployment.

Additionally, regimes of social cohesion recall the different models of democracy presented above. Inter alia, the core values of the liberal regimes of social cohesion place most emphasis on the benefits of opportunity, individual freedom and interest. They also embrace high levels of civic participation (particularly at a local level) as a necessary social cement and higher levels of tolerance towards cultural diversity (Green et al., 2009). These core values are in line with the principles of a liberal model of democracy. Also, in this context, social cohesion seems not to depend on economic equality. The individual usually comes before the state, and freedom plays a more important role than equality (Green et al., 2009).

The social market regime of social cohesion differs from others in its greater focus on the importance of shared values and active participation in national political affairs, and in greater dependence on the state helping to develop social cohesion (Green et al., 2009). It has been characterised by its unique attitudes towards the state and the significance of the public realm, nationhood and the ideology of participatory democracy (Green et al., 2009). The social market regime is state-led and highly institutionalised, and is affected by republicanism.

The social democratic regime particularly refers to Nordic countries, which place most emphasis on equality as part of their social philosophy in line with the principles of participatory democracy. For example, according to the Gini coefficient<sup>2</sup> measure (Esping-Andersen, 2005), Nordic people experience relatively low variation in income. This is potentially because Nordic education systems are among the most egalitarian among developed countries (OECD, 2007). According to Green et al. (2009), promoting social solidarity has always been a core target of public education in Nordic countries, and this has an impact on both the curricula and structures of their education systems. This is also the main characteristic that makes the social democratic regime different from its liberal (individual interests over equality) and social market (state-led and highly institutionalised) counterparts.

The Romantic conservative social regime includes elements that overlap with both the social market and social democratic regimes (Green et al., 2009). However, it takes communities as the foundation and places heavy emphasis on how social groups affect values and behaviours that match the principles of communitarianism (Hoskins et al., 2012). This regime has been affected by both Christian theology and moral philosophy, and has focused on the responsibilities and duties of individuals relating to other counterparts in their community, and the demands of working towards the collective interests of the whole group (Etzioni, 1973). In comparison with the liberal and social market regimes of social cohesion, the Romantic conservative regime is more closely related to hierarchical and top-down decision-making.

Although East Asian countries are too diverse to be captured by a particular model, I can still refer back to their predominantly Confucian cultural backgrounds in order to identify commonalities. This helps to obtain a better understanding of these societies in terms of one particular regime of social cohesion, namely the East Asian social regime. Similar to the social democratic and Romantic conservative models, the East Asian one highlights the significance of the family unit and the state in supporting and sustaining social cohesion.

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<sup>2</sup> The Gini coefficient is the most commonly used measure of inequality. It refers to a measure of statistical dispersion intended to demonstrate the income distribution of a country's residents. A Gini coefficient of zero means perfectly equal (all values are the same); whereas a Gini coefficient of one means maximum inequality (all values are dominated by one person, and all others have none) (Gini Coefficient, 2016).

However, the level and characteristics of civic participation and the ways in which these affect social cohesion differ from those in the West (Green et al., 2009). For example, empirical results from the East Asian Barometer show a relatively weak association between associational membership and social trust, as well as a weak correlation between associational membership and attachment to democracy (Park and Lee, 2007). Moreover, patriotic and moral education in most East Asian societies is substantially intended to mould children into the values that contribute to these distinctive types of collectivism, social discipline and social cohesion (Green et al., 2009). This particular model also claims that constant economic growth is of significant importance to the maintenance of state legitimacy in these societies; and both economic growth and social cohesion are state-led and are strongly reliant on state authority (Green et al., 2009).

In summary, the characteristics of a liberal regime echo those of the liberal model of democracy. In similar vein, the social market regime matches the principles of republicanism; the social democratic regime reflects participatory democracy; the Romantic conservative regime seems to be affected by both republicanism and communitarianism; and the East Asian regime mirrors Asian-style democracy (Confucianism and authoritarianism).

The main regime types (Western developed countries and East Asian countries) identified by Green et al. (2009) are labelled as:

- The liberal regime (e.g. UK)
- The social market regime (North-West continental Europe, e.g. Germany, Spain)
- The social democratic regime (Nordic countries: Sweden, Finland, Norway)
- The Romantic conservative (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary)
- The East Asian regime (Mainland China, Japan)

#### **2.1.7 Conclusions**

This section focused on the definition of citizenship and democracy in different models. The 'civic republican' and 'liberal' theoretical frameworks are still the most powerful in cultivating current citizenship education in the West, whereas 'participatory' and 'consensus' models are relatively new forms of democracy, inspired by shifts in society, economy and politics.

To explore the specific disposition of Asian-style democracy, I chose a cultural approach and argue that democracy, Confucianism and authoritarianism are not fundamentally opposed to each other. In principle, both Confucianism and democracy stress 'civic virtue' and 'common good', and are based on fostering citizens' sense of belonging to their own countries. But Confucianism heavily stresses community interests rather than individual rights and freedom, and morally binds

its citizens' individual interests to the targets of the political community. I argue that this means that their citizens have to defend their authority out of respect or moral duty, rather than the 'blind obedience' suggested by authoritarianism.

While Confucianism plays a major role in slowing down and preventing democratisation, education is able to promote democratic views by fostering economic development, and making more people aware of non-economic issues such as political participation and individual freedom (Inglehart, 1997; Lipset, 1959).

Various traditions and meanings of citizenship also help us to understand citizens' behaviour over political issues and attitudes towards their governments, political incumbents and political institutions. In addition, the significant link between civic participation and democracy provides a precondition to discuss the interplay between democracy and political trust. The relationship between civic engagement and political trust is subtle and intriguing. More details are provided in the next section.

I have introduced Green et al.'s (2009) regimes of social cohesion as a theoretical guide through which to group the sample countries in practice, to reflect the philosophical implications of various models of democracy.

Overall, this section introduced the first core concept to be used as a philosophical foundation for the research: democracy. The next concept explores the second core concept: trust.

## **2.2 Trust**

This thesis explores the impact of different economic contexts (economic crisis and economic development) on citizens' support for democracy and their trust in government. As the definition of democracy in a variety of models has been introduced, this section introduces the second core concept of trust and its categories, and discusses the interplay between trust and democracy.

The relationship between democracy and trust has moved from the periphery to the centre of the debate (Cohen, 1999). Trust links ordinary citizens to their governments on the basis of their willingness to accept those representing them (Bianco, 1994). Trust, in this regard, is one of the most significant factors that strengthen both the legitimacy and effectiveness of democratic government (Blind, 2006; Mishler and Rose, 2011). Trust is vital to democracy (Mishler and Rose, 2011). On the other hand, the democratic progress is frequently associated with distrust of authorities (Warren, 2006). Distrust is essential both to democratic progress and the healthy suspicion upon which the vigour of democracy relies (Warren, 2006). However, if suspicion and scepticism among citizens, to a certain degree, promote the conditions conducive to a healthy

democracy (Blind, 2006), why is trust so critical to good governance? What is the relationship between political trust and democracy, especially in today's globalised societies and governments? This section highlights these questions and begins by examining theoretical definitions of trust. It then focuses on the main variants of trust, as well as exploring how trust and democracy are closely related to each other.

### **2.2.1 The concept of trust**

Trustworthiness, the capacity to commit oneself to fulfilling the legitimate expectations of others, is both the constitutive virtue of, and the key causal precondition for the existence of, any society.

Dunn (1984, p.287)

Trust is conceived of as problematic and elusive (Levi and Stoker, 2000), but is used in many ways in the social science and psychological literature (Hardin, 1996; Luhmann, 2000). Many scholars depict the conceptual development of trust as poorly developed. In some cases, a concept of trust is presented and, in others, it is simply implied without further verification (Lewis and Weigert, 1985; Blomqvist, 1997). Although the term 'trust' is always interpreted vaguely, it has the effect of shaping all dimensions of human life (Barbara, 1996). Bok (1978, p.31) states that 'trust is the atmosphere in which it thrives... When it is damaged the community as a whole suffers; and when it is destroyed, societies falter and collapse'. Meanwhile, trust is also analysed as a public good, important in sustaining an economic boom (Hirsch, 1977). This thesis will develop a literature review of political trust and its theoretical relationship with democracy. Before embarking on an exploration of political trust, the concept of 'trust' has to be defined.

Why is a conceptual clarification of trust important? Luhmann (2000) found that an empirical analysis of trust and distrust in politics depended on hollow and unspecified ideas that confuse a battery of issues relating to trust with either positive or negative attitudes towards political incumbents or political institutions, expectations or worries, or belief. His work stresses the demands and difficulties of specifying the definition of trust for empirical research (Kaase, 1999). Moreover, Luhmann (2000) distinguishes between three terms: familiarity, confidence and trust. In terms of familiarity and trust, Luhmann (2000) suggests that their dispositions are different, and that 'familiarity is an unavoidable fact of life; trust is a solution for specific problems of risk'. Put another way, familiarity and trust are different concepts but have some similarities. Familiarity can be seen as a good precondition of trust. A fortiori, a sufficient number of changes occurring in familiar features of the world will inevitably impact on the possibility of developing trust in human relations (Luhmann, 2000). Thus, both the conditions and limits of familiarity need attention when I seek to explore the conditions of trust (Luhmann, 2000).



Luhmann (2000) further distinguished between confidence and trust by relying on perception and attribution. He provides the simple example that if someone does not need to consider alternatives, for instance he leaves home every day without a weapon, it can be considered that he is in a situation of confidence. Yet Luhmann (2000) relates the possibility of disappointment to normative expectations whereby internal attribution is added to the base of confidence. In the case of confidence, I can react to disappointment by external attribution (risks, accidents); when it comes to trust, I have to take both our external and internal attribution into consideration. The latter case (normative expectation) leaves us regretting having trusted in the first place (Luhmann, 2000).

Gambetta's perspective is quite independent of Luhmann and has achieved some fresh momentum recently (Kaase, 1999). He argues that trust is an issue of monitoring. According to Gambetta (2000, p.216), trust refers to 'a particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action, both before he can monitor such action (or independently of his capacity ever to be able to monitor it) and in a context in which it affects his own action'. To put it more simply, if A trusts B, or B is trustworthy, the probability that B will behave beneficially, or at least in a way not detrimental to A, is high enough for A to have a range of cooperation with B and vice versa (Gambetta, 2000).

Several other points are worth noting here. Gambetta (2000) highlights that complete distrust and complete trust are frequently assigned to represent extreme values of possibilities, which may inevitably maintain them over and above the evidence. In this sense, Gambetta encourages seeing trust as a threshold point; to take a number of values suspended between blind distrust (0) and blind trust (1), located around a mid-point (0.50) of uncertainty (Gambetta, 2000).

Gambetta's definition perceives trust as future actions based on present decisions, rather than future actions in general. This reminds me that trust is predictable to some extent, and may require normal citizens to act competently by using skills and knowledge in making wise decisions. It is innovative to suggest that trust can be considered as a result rather than a precondition of cooperation. This is a completely fresh idea (Gambetta, 2000).

Additionally, both Luhmann (1979) and Barber (1983) point to trust as belonging to the social fabric of a given society; it cannot be fully examined either at the psychological level or at the institutional level, as it completely permeates both. This may suggest that an appropriate sociological definition of trust should bridge interpersonal and institutional analysis. In the following section, institutional trust (political trust), interpersonal trust (social trust) and the relationship between the two will be explored in detail.

### 2.2.2 The concept of political trust and its categories


Political trust emerges when people evaluate if the government and its institutions, policy-making and individual political incumbents, are efficient, fair and honest (Blind, 2006). Due to concern for its practical meaning and implications, political trust is referred to here as 'a basic evaluative orientation toward the government' (Stokes, 1962), grounded in how well the government is leading in line with citizens' normative expectations (Coleman, 1990; Hetherington, 1998), increasing the degrees of legitimacy and the efficiency of good governance (Mishler and Rose, 2001). In this fashion, political trust can be seen as a core predictor of the public's underlying feelings about its polity (Newton and Norris, 2000).

More specifically, as shown in Figure 1, political trust can be categorised on the basis of the object towards which the trust is directed; accordingly, it has been divided into two categories: 'target-based' and 'motivation-based' (Blind, 2006, p.4). Target-based political trust comprises 'macro-level or organizational trust' and 'micro-level or individual political trust' (Blind, 2006, p.4). Organisational trust is summarised as 'an issue-oriented perspective', which means that citizens will change their attitudes towards government according to their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with policy alternatives (Miller, 1974, p.951).

Moreover, macro-level trust has been sub-divided into two dimensions: 'diffuse or system-based trust' and 'specific or institution-based trust' (Blind, 2006, p.4). The former is directed towards citizens' assessment of the performance of the whole political system and the regime, while the latter focuses only on certain political institutions, such as the Congress (Blind, 2006). Moreover, the second category of political trust, individual political trust, can be understood as incumbent-based perception only (Bean, 1999; cited in Blind, 2006). Citizens will change their attitudes based on approval or disapproval of various political incumbents (Citrin, 1974).

Additionally, as Blind (2006) points out, both organisational and individual political trust rely on credible policy-making. Credibility can be conceptualised as 'an unquestioned criterion of a good policy' (Blind, 2006, p.4). It is easy to find the term 'credibility' in the literature on political economy; it is tightly associated with macro-economic policy, highlighted by disinflation programmes. The emergence of the definition of credibility is derived from monetary policy actions operated by the central banks of different states, and how these actions coordinate or control asset prices and interest rates (Blind, 2006). Thus, central bankers and economists regard credibility in an institution as achieving the expectations set by ordinary citizens by 'living up to its word' (Blinder, 1999, p.1431).

Figure 1 Categories of trust



(Blind, 2006, p.4)

Based on this, credibility has a direct relationship with political trust because, when government agencies implement policies that continually bring about successful results, trust develops over time. In contrast, if a government agency or an organisation pursues policies that consistently result in loss of credibility, this will lead to citizens' distrust of government (Blinder, 1999). This suggests that every institutional action and policy can potentially block the path to building trustworthiness (Porte and Metlay, 1996, p.345).

According to Figure 1, political trust also has determinants based on the various forms of motivations that citizens have when trusting their national institutions or leaders (Blind, 2006). Political trust can be generalised as based on 'rational and psychological models of meaning'. Many scholars have noted that the psychological model of trust tends to be captured as a moral notion, and refer to it as meaning that it is moral to trust and immoral to distrust (Blind, 2006; Warren, 2006). Since the moral notion of trust has been regarded as a purely normative account, I will not pay further attention to it in this section.

Rational political trust comprises an interest-based calculation, when people assess whether the government and/or the political leaders operate in an appropriate way. Hardin (1991) considers trust as an expression of encapsulated interest, which has a common formula: '*A trusts B to do X (or with respect to X)*'. This is used to depict people who trust another individual, which refers to the social trust discussed later in this thesis (Warren, 2006). Nevertheless, this formula can also be applied to people's trust in government (Warren, 2006). That is: A trusts B because A knows his interest is covered in B's interest. On the other hand, B will become trustworthy to the extent that his action reaches A's expectations (Warren, 2006).

In this sense, people who hold a belief in rational trust are thus willing to trust the political institutions and political incumbents with whom they identify (Blind, 2006). However, some have argued that the emergence of rational trust is based on the maximisation of individual interest, hence it is insufficient to produce genuine political trust (Blind, 2006).

### **2.2.3 The concept of social trust**

The significance of trust has long been stressed by social and political scholars, from Locke and Tocqueville to Putnam and civil society thinkers (Newton, 2001, p.201). Social trust is defined here as people's willingness to feel confident about a wide range of other individuals, including the people they know and those they do not know (Green et al., 2011). Regarding the relationship between political and social trust, a few scholars posit that 'social trust between citizens is not at all closely related to political trust between citizens and political leaders' (Newton, 2001, p.201). Nevertheless, according to the formula mentioned above (A trusts B to do X), trust requires a basis of broad, ongoing relationships such as 'love, friendship, or mere exchange, as in business – a relationship with A that B wants to maintain. Or it could be some other interest B has that A somehow influences' (Hardin, 1996, p.26; Putnam, 2000). For example, A may have an influence on B's prospects of re-election (Hardin, 1996).

Moreover, social trust also positively and directly links to a range of social and economic factors, such as wealth (Knack and Keefer, 1996; Inglehart, 1999; Putnam, 2000; Delhey and Newton, 2005) and education (Knack and Keefer, 1996; Delhey and Newton, 2005; Uslaner, 2002).

### **2.2.4 Trust and democracy**

A large volume of literature claims that citizens have to trust government if it is to work effectively, and a loss of political trust is a major problem for many contemporary democracies (Hardin, 1996; Warren, 2006). However, this perspective may be somewhat contrary to the principle of traditional liberalism (Hardin, 1996), which holds that citizens are suspicious and wary of government (Hardin, 1996). Nevertheless, as Hardin (1991) notes, although liberals do not wish government to interfere in managing the economy or overriding their freedoms, they still want it to sustain social order. It may, therefore, be possible to hold a perception in which both are present. This section analyses the theoretical relationship between political trust and democracy. Their connections in terms of the different contexts of the economy are developed further later in this chapter.

E. M. Forster (1965, p.70) provided 'two cheers for democracy': 'One because it admits variety and two because it permits criticism. Two cheers are quite enough: there is no occasion to give

three.' 'Only Love and Beloved Republic deserve that' (Uslaner, 20003, p.170). Uslaner (2003) provided a third cheer, because democratic societies are equivalent to trusting societies; he also highlights democracy's promotion of variety and admission of criticism. Thus Uslaner (2003) considers that democracies are a good precondition for generalising trust. In similar vein, someone living in a democracy is more likely to trust others or be trustworthy (Levi, 1996; Muller and Seligson, 1994).

Clearly, this all suggests there to be a mutual relationship between social trust and democracy, without taking political trust into consideration. In terms of the latter, 'democratic governments do just fine with either high or low degrees of trust in government' (Inglehart, 2003; Uslaner, 2003; Warren, 2006, p.353). That is to say: democracy cannot generalise political trust, as well as be independent of political trust.

This helps clarify the view that the relationship between political trust and democracy is weak and patchy. It also reminds that it is reasonable to retain both stable support for democracy and a sharp loss of political trust in the same context, as seen in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis. Both the literature and empirical evidence suggest that people universally pay lip service to democracy, no matter whether the democratic system in question is old or new, so it is necessary to consider 'how solid is mass support for democracy?' rather than 'overt support for democracy' (Inglehart, 2003). Secondly, as Hardin (1996, p.4) highlights, trustworthiness of government might be crucial for some citizens, whereas it might count only by default for the majority. From Hardin's (1996) definition of 'trust as an encapsulated interest', it is easier to summarise that distrust comes easily, but trust needs people's deep understanding of others' motivation for it to come easily to many citizens (Hardin, 1996). Thus the government has to be based on trust to be legitimate, yet less governance is legitimate in modern times (Hardin, 1996).

Nevertheless, a large amount of literature supports the idea that interpersonal rather than political trust plays an important role in democratic government (Warren, 2006; Norris, 1999; Inglehart, 2003). I noted earlier that social trust is more dependent on various socio-economic factors, such as wealth, than its counterpart: trust in government (Knack and Keefer, 1996; Inglehart, 1999; Putnam, 2000; Delhey and Newton, 2005). An economic boom seems to legitimise democratic institutions, to a large extent (Inglehart, 2003).

Moreover, Delhey and Newton (2005) find that a higher level of political trust can be a precondition in welfare states which redistribute resources towards the poor and needy. This is mainly because, if ordinary people trust their national government/political leaders, they will be more willing to pay their taxes to support others in need (Delhey and Newton, 2005). This suggests that a higher degree of political trust is significant in the long run, particularly in the

context of economic recession. The hypothesis that political trust and economy may jointly affect democracy will be evaluated in Chapter 4.

## **2.3 Economy and individuals' civic attitudes**

The 2008 economic crash precipitated a major recession (Gamble, 2010); nearly all developing and emerging-market economies were affected by it (Diamond, 2011). The impact of the resulting economic crisis on citizens can already be viewed as a loss of confidence in political institutions and a substantial reduction in trust in national institutions (Hetherington, 2005; Hoskins et al., 2012). Conversely, as in all past crashes, 'at the root of the problem is a loss of confidence by investors and public in the strength of key financial institutions and markets' (Bernake, 2008, p.1).

Here are three confusing concepts: economic trust; social trust; and political trust. Due to the collapse of the speculators' bubble, investors demonstrate lower levels of trust in the economy (economic trust). Meanwhile, because economic performance is a widely studied part of system performance that shapes the reputation of political institutions (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003), citizens display negative attitudes towards both political institutions and incumbents. This causes their political trust to decrease dramatically. Additionally, as less social resources can be redistributed in harsh times, people's trust in others declines (social trust). Although economic and social trust differ from political trust, they can still be used to predict a nation's political trust level, as all significantly relate to each other.

However, despite the sudden drop in trust in political institutions, levels of satisfaction with democracy remained stable (Diamond, 2011). Some attribute this to the resilience of democratic accountability (Diamond, 2011): if democracies experience economic recession with initially high levels of public support, they will be able to resist even harsher, prolonged crashes (Steven et al., 2009).

While most Western democracies suffered the harsh impact of the economic downturn, East Asia remained prosperous (Green and Janmaat, 2011; Stiglitz, 2010b). It appears that if the economy remains stable, and continues to be positive, the level of political trust in East Asian countries is likely to remain high (Wang, 2005): 'Increasing wealth in absolute terms may lead to changes in attitudes about democratisation; it is also conceivable that the preference for democracy may be a function of increases in relative wealth' (Dowd et al., 2007, p.365).

This section begins with the 2008 global financial crisis and subsequent debt crisis in the Eurozone before exploring the relationship between economy, political trust and democracy. Given the examination of the two different economic contexts, Western and East Asian regions, the changes

in political trust and democracy will be explored in both countries that are sinking into recession, and those that are enjoying growing economies.

### **2.3.1 From the 2008 financial crisis to the European debt crisis**

The word 'crisis' has a very important definition in both economic and political science. From an economic perspective, crisis involves a dramatic rise in prices and job losses, a sharp decline in income and a threat to distribution of wealth while, in political science, it causes a great many social ills and conflict, and even generates a gap between government and normal citizens (Azar and Mansoori, 2011). The 2008 financial crisis was regarded as the most severe crisis of capitalism since the Great Depression of 1929, much more so than, for example, the Asian recession in 1997 or the bursting of the dotcom bubble in 2000 (Arestis et al., 2011; Gamble, 2010).

It is generally accepted that the crisis originated in falling American housing prices (Azar and Mansoori, 2011). This can be traced back to the early twenty-first century: housing prices experienced a fast period of growth from 2000 to 2006. To make more profit from buyers, the banks triggered massive credit expansion through a range of new financial instruments such as 'subprime loans', 'securitisation' and 'derivatives' (Arestis et al., 2011; Stiglitz, 2010b), which instead resulted in higher default levels, specifically among less credit-worthy borrowers (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008). With the collapse of this bubble, a sudden drop in housing prices occurred, leading to more and more being unable to repay their loans (Azar and Mansoori, 2011). This crisis impacted negatively upon other economic sectors tremendously and spread worldwide in only a few months.

Through 2008 and 2009, there was little attention paid to the European debt crisis. Instead, the emphasis was on how European Central Bank reacted to the global recession. Since late 2009, a debt crisis has taken place in the Euro area. A number of Eurozone countries – Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Cyprus – were incapable of repaying or refinancing their government debt or bailing out over-indebted banks under national supervision without the help of third parties such as other European member states, the European Central Bank or the International Monetary Fund (Dottisani and Magistro, 2016). The crisis has put the survival of the Eurozone at risk and has led to unprecedented uncertainty in Europe about the sustainability of living standards (Ellinas and Lamprianou, 2014).

The European debt crisis provides a useful background from which to study citizens' civic attitudes across Europe, as its impact has been uneven among European countries: 'In May 2010, Greece was the first country to be priced out of the bond market as its sovereign credit rating was downgraded to junk status, closely followed by Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus' (Dottisani and

Magistro, 2016, p.248; Lane, 2012). In order to improve national competitiveness and fiscal sustainability, Greece, Ireland, Cyprus and Portugal joined economic adjustment programmes to implement economic and financial policies. In 2012, Spain entered into a financial assistance programme that reconstructed its financial system. Additionally, Spain and Italy had to work on a more implicit form of conditionality and faced unprecedented levels of intrusion by the ECB into their national affairs (Sacchi, 2015; Dottisani and Magistro, 2016).

By contrast, most of northern Europe – Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark and Finland – seemed to avoid the economic problems that troubled southern Europe and Ireland. The recession hit Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries in different ways. Banking and currency crises happened almost at the same time in the CEE bloc in 2008 (Dottisani and Magistro, 2016). Countries that rely on exports, such as Slovakia, Slovenia and Estonia, were most affected. Slovakia and Estonia experienced a deep but short recession in 2009, and recovered quickly in 2010 (Fidrmuc et al., 2013). Poland almost escaped entirely, and was one of the best-performing countries in terms of real economic growth in the OECD (Guardiancich, 2012).

The crisis, then, hit southern European countries more deeply than northern, western and CEE countries. More significantly, austerity measures conducted from 2010 to 2012, ‘consisting of legislative decisions and new intergovernmental treaties... were nevertheless unable to promote effective and legitimate solutions for dealing with the financial crisis’ (Fabbrini, 2013, p.1003). Periods of negative economic performance and perceptions of the incompetence of governments in meeting fiscal challenges might further lead to citizens’ distrust in government (Blind, 2006; Dottisani and Magistro, 2016).

### **2.3.2 What is the relationship between economy and citizens’ civic attitudes?**

In stark contrast to Europe, most East Asian countries are highly competitive and have lower wages (Green et al., 2011). Arguably, they are more cohesive and disciplined societies, able to maintain social stability and economic success even when encountering the global recession (Green et al., 2009).

The lessons from past experience are that economic crises detrimentally and directly affect citizens’ civic attitudes (people’s belief in democracy, their participation in politics and their confidence in other people, agents and even national governments) (Hetherington, 2004). Researchers also speculate that increasing levels of wealth might lead to higher levels of social and political trust and even positive attitudes towards democratisation (Dowd et al., 2007). This provides a window of opportunity through which to explore the role of the economy on citizens’ civic attitudes in Western and East Asian societies.



In this study, citizens' civic attitudes refer to people's belief in democracy and their trust in government-related institutions. Economic recession or political shifts are frequently treated as temporary issues (Norris, 1999), while constant economic growth or essential beliefs in democracy are supposed to be stable factors. To fulfil the aim of this thesis and highlight variances of citizens' civic values within/between different economic contexts, the issue of how the economy affects citizens' trust in government will first be analysed, followed by how the economy impacts on people's support for democracy.

### **2.3.3 How did the economic crisis affect citizens' political trust?**

The literature here paints a picture of dramatic increases in unemployment, excessive national debt and zero or negative gross domestic product (GDP) growth after the financial crisis and during the ongoing European debt crisis (Pagoulatos and Triantopoulos, 2009; Ellinas and Lamprianou, 2014). One of the most costly results of the recession could involve a dramatic fall in citizens' trust in national institutions and continued declining rates of approval of the free market economy.

During harsh times, citizens show less concern about inflation, and more about jobs and the impact of a recession (Roth et al., 2011). Falling levels of political trust were associated with an increase in job losses across 15 European countries (Roth et al., 2011); moreover, an EU-21 country sample found that reduced levels of political trust during periods of crisis seem to be related to an increase in national debt. Citizens' negative evaluations of their national economy and concerns over the government's ability to react served to trigger even more distrust amid an environment of globalisation (Easterly, 2000; Nye, 1997).

Recovery of political trust is of great importance (Greenspan, 2008; Earle, 2009; Gurria, 2011, Bursian et al., 2015). Bernanke (2008, p.1) argues that 'the crisis will end when comprehensive responses by political and financial leaders restore that trust, bring investors back into the market and allow the normal business of extending credit to households and firms to resume'.

Trust is also expected to play a prominent role in the field of monetary policy. Bursian et al. (2015, p.664) posit that 'fiscal reputation and trust in the prudence of the political process may give a government important leeway when reacting to fiscal shocks'. More specifically, a government with low levels of political trust may find itself pressed to respond firmly to fiscal shock by raising taxes and reducing expenditure (Bursian et al., 2015). In contrast, a trustworthy government can postpone fiscal corrections to a later time, when the macro-economic situation is more appropriate and the cost of austerity is less severe (Bursian et al., 2015).

A point worth noting here is that citizens' trust in government (political trust) and their confidence in the free market economy (economic trust) are always discussed together. So, are political trust and economic trust the same? They are two different terms, yet overlap significantly. Political trust stresses citizens' normative evaluation of political legitimacy and government performance, whereas economic trust mainly refers to citizens' expectations of their national financial system and relevant economic policies (Roth, 2009b). In this regard, what is the relationship between political trust and economic trust?

Roth et al. (2011) demonstrate that inflation reduces people's trust in government only when the economy runs badly. Put simply, people do not worry particularly about economic inflation but about job stability or home ownership (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Stiglitz, 2010b; Roth et al., 2011). Economic trust might appear to be a key causal factor of political trust, especially in harsh times.

It seems credible to use economic trust as a vehicle to analyse how political trust associates with economic depression. In addition, political trust is affected by both the performance of and citizens' perception of the economy; individuals' negative evaluations causes greater distrust, and vice versa (Feldman, 1983; Hetherington, 1998; Chanley et al., 2000).

All in all, the reasons for the decline in citizens' political trust can be summarised and categorised as: (a) a rise in unemployment (Roth, 2009b; Roth et al., 2011); (b) an increase in government debt or government waste (Cheema, 2010; Roth et al., 2011; Bursian et al., 2015); and (c) ineffective economic policies, that is, the imposition of austerity policies (Dottisani and Magistro, 2016).

#### **2.3.4 How did economic development affect political trust?**

While the majority of European countries suffered economic downturns, Asia, particularly East Asia, enjoyed continued economic growth. Compared with falling levels of trust in European institutions, the level of political trust in East Asia was commonly regarded as higher than in many other parts of the world, and therefore not demanding of more attention (Cheema, 2010). Many suggest that the relationship between levels of political trust and economic boom is reciprocal. It is easy to bring about higher levels of political trust in affluent areas, while poor areas tend to go hand in hand with falling levels of political trust (Leigh, 2006).


Societies with higher levels of political trust are capable of promoting economic booms, increasing jobs and job stability, providing access to education and dealing with essential services in a transparent way at lower cost (Mackuen et al., 1992). Conversely, 'if trust is too low in a society,

savings will be insufficient to sustain positive output growth' (Zak and Knack, 2001). Sufficient political trust is also important for political incumbents to make binding decisions, empowering them to allocate resources in order to reach common targets (Gamson, 1968) and retaining citizens' support without coercion (Barber, 1983; Chanley et al., 2000; Scholz and Lubell, 1998).

Abundant empirical data shows a strong connection between political trust and economic development (Inglehart, 1997). This section will focus on one significant approach: social trust. The definition of social trust has been analysed earlier. It refers to the willingness of individuals to trust their fellow citizens (Hall, 1999). Zak and Knack (2001) point out that higher levels of social trust are crucial in lowering transaction costs and producing more output. Moreover, North (1990, p.54) attributes both 'historical economic stagnation and contemporary underdevelopment' to low levels of social trust. In sum, a great amount of social trust appears to bring about successful economic development (Zak and Knack, 2001).

Figure 2 provides a preliminary image of the associations between economic performance and social trust calculated by Whiteley (2000), who aimed to compare GDP per capita in 34 sample countries in 1992, with the average percentage of respondents to WVS who trust their fellow people. Clearly, Figure 2 suggests a significantly strong correlation between participants' income level (GDP per capita) and social trust (percentage trusting other people) in 34 countries. Although it measures the associations between social trust and levels of income, rather than social trust and economic growth, it is apparent that economic performance is closely associated with social trust (Whiteley, 2000).

Figure 2 GDP per capita and trust in 1992



(Whiteley, 2000, p.455)

Moreover, social trust is vital to national economic growth, as it is a useful vehicle for lowering transaction costs (Easterly, 2000; Easterly and Levine, 1997; Knack and Keefer, 1996; Zak and Knack, 2001). Easterly and Levine (1997) suggest that ethnic heterogeneity weakens economic growth, while there are simple correlations between heterogeneity and other policy measures that have associations with economic growth. Easterly (2000) added another source of polarisation: income inequality. The empirical findings demonstrated that, in standard Barro-type growth regression models, the relationship between economic growth and income inequality is weakened significantly by controlling 'levels of interpersonal trust', in line with a transactions cost-based explanation for the heterogeneity-growth link (Zak and Knack, 2001). Knack and Keefer (1996) also conclude that higher social trust is important in economic growth, via analysis of market economies in 29 sample countries.

The use of social trust is a mechanism for linking political trust and democracy. It is acknowledged that political trust and support for democracy are two different concepts that link to different factors, for example political trust is related to a number of political factors such as political interests and participation and so on, whereas support for democracy is more likely to be associated with social and economic factors such as wealth and education, similar to social trust. This means that, although I pointed out that political trust and support for democracy are two independent things related to different factors, both of them, in fact, are associated with social trust (Delhey and Newton, 2005; Putnam, 1993; Uslaner, 2002).

There is a long-standing argument, closely related to this research, that considers that political trust in authoritarian societies is higher than in democratic countries. To reinterpret this perspective, I compare two similar countries with different types of polities: Taiwan and the People's Republic of China (PRC). The empirical evidence based on WVS datasets suggests that citizens in the authoritarian PRC trust their political institutions more than those in democratising Taiwan. This result might be because democratic culture teaches citizens to retain a certain amount of suspicion towards their political authority. Another reason also seems credible: namely, that participants in the PRC may not dare to express their true opinions in a survey, owing to their fear of political persecution (Inglehart, 1997).

### **2.3.5 How did the economic crisis affect citizens' belief in democracy?**

A main principle of empirical democratic theory is that hard economic times are supposed to be detrimental to democracy (Diamond, 2011). However, compared with the sudden falls in trust in government now, levels of satisfaction with democracy remained stable (Diamond, 2011). Why

does democracy survive while political trust suffers greatly in the environment of economic crisis? Some attribute this to the resilience of democratic accountability (Steven et al., 2009; Diamond, 2011). If democracies encounter recession with initially high levels of public support, they will be able to resist prolonged crashes more strongly (Steven et al., 2009). However, as regards political trust, voters tend to punish political leaders and parties who govern poorly, because they had performed badly in meeting expectations of good governance (Diamond, 2011).

However, Basora (2013) finds that if the crisis is prolonged, its severe and negative pressure on both the economy and political trust may take its toll on public belief in democracy, even in some better-consolidated democratic societies. Armingeon and Guthmann (2013) support Basora's (2013) perspective: continued negative economic performance is detrimental to support for democracy in Europe. In particular, they point out that the way that the recession has been handled politically appears to erode support for democracy (Armingeon and Guthmann, 2013), all of which requires me to examine the impact of the economic crisis on democracy in the long run.

#### **2.3.6 How did economic development affect citizens' belief in democracy?**

Modernisation theory has long been set as a main approach of analysing the relationship between economic development and people's support for democracy. The modernisation hypothesis, which describes the relationship between economic growth and democracy as positive, is considered one of the most reliable in social science research (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). It stems from Lipset's (1959, p.75) famous statement: 'the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy'. During the last half century, this hypothesis has been constantly checked and proven by ample research, applying it to different time spans and regions (Coleman, 1990; Hyden and Elgstrom, 2002).

This project supports modernisation theory from several dimensions. With the development of the economy, the average level of education and universities entry rates will rise. Here, I presuppose that certain components in education will breed democratic values and produce more democracy-supporting citizens. However, Przeworski and Limongi (1997) argue that democracy is not an inevitable result of economic growth. I question the reliability of their refutation of the endogenous impact of economic growth.

Theoretically, Przeworski and Limongi (1997) fail to establish a powerful, incontrovertible theory (Boix and Stokes, 2003). In practical terms, Przeworski et al. (2000) observe the experiences of 135 countries between 1950 and 1990 – yet the survey span, to a greater or lesser extent, affects the robustness of the findings. Boix and Stokes (2003) find that Przeworski and Limongi's work

had a particular focus on post-1950s cases, which showed an attenuated endogenous impact but ignored the large endogenous effect in the earlier wave of democratisation in Western societies.

Boix and Stokes (2003) examine two separate periods – 1950 to 1990 and 1850 to 1949 – to identify whether democracy was particularly endogenous to economic development. The results were different: during 1850 to 1949, per capita income strongly and significantly affected transitions to democracy, although income growth did not contribute to the probability of a democratic breakdown. This was reversed for 1950 to 1990, when per capita income slightly enhanced the possibility of democratisation and significantly reduced the chances of democratic breakdown.

The power of economic development has been weakened by prevailing postmodern values in most developed countries since 1950. Przeworski and Limongi's (1997) work has been criticised from both theoretical and empirical dimensions. Nevertheless, the causal impact of economic growth on democratisation has long been questioned. Huntington (1991) argued that almost all affluent countries are democratic and nearly all democracies are affluent, but this correlation itself tells me nothing about a causal effect. Moreover, if societies were affluent for a considerable length of time before they turned to democracy, then wealth, by itself, is probably not a sufficient reason for their transition from non-democratic to democratic politics (Huntington, 1991).

Taking this into account, this project places heavy emphasis on the impact of education, rather than economic development, on democracy. Lipset's (1959) hypothesis, that increased education causes more democratic politics, has received much empirical support (Barro, 1999; Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008). The intriguing point, though, is that the theoretical links between education and democracy remain missing.

When I look at societies with successful transitions, well-educated people have played the most important role. For example, Taiwan's successful transition can be attributed to a group of well-educated native middle-class citizens. Additionally, Glaeser et al. (2007) explain the correlation between education and democracy, their interpretation relying on the interplay between education and the costs and benefits of political engagement. In this view, education enhances society-wide support for democracy because democracy hinges on providing individuals with high participation benefits (Glaeser et al., 2007). Better-educated societies are more likely to sustain democracy and protect it from coups (Glaeser et al., 2007).

Existing datasets now allow this thesis to look at how education impacts on individuals' support for democracy during times of economic growth and recession.

### **2.3.7 Conclusion**

This section sets out the story of the 2008 economic crisis and ongoing European debt crisis, followed by the relationship between different economic contexts and citizens' individual attitudes. The third important indicator, education, has been stressed by interrogating the changes in citizens' trust in government and their support for democracy in different economic situations. Education remained at the heart of citizens' trust in their governments during economic crisis, as well as teaching citizens about democracy and government and nurturing more democratic values in either democratic or non-democratic countries. The function of education will be explored in more detail in the next section.

## **2.4 Education**

This section investigates the relationship between education and citizenship learning theoretically in order to help to answer the second research question: is there a relationship between education and civic attitudes? In order to establish what education means, it is necessary to understand different theories of learning. Miller and Shanks (1996, p.580) state that 'we simply need a better understanding of the many ways in which education makes such a difference to rates of turnout on election day'. Clearly, then, this section is not limited to considering the relationship between education and voting turnout. It also covers the explanatory linkage between education and a set of citizenship characteristics: political engagement; democratic enlightenment; and political trust.

I select two main political socialisation agents: the education system and constructionist approaches to learning. The former emphasises how formal education forms citizenship characteristics associated with 'cognitive competence' (Nie et al., 1996), whereas the latter, which comprises Lave and Wenger's CoP theory and Dewey's theory and practice, demonstrates a more comprehensive view of learning through social practice.

Formal education is commonly used to measure the relationship between education and citizenship learning (Nie et al., 1996), whereas constructionist approaches to learning have only recently been adopted to articulate this relationship (Biesta et al., 2009; Hoskins et al., 2012). Although both argue for the positive relationship between education and citizenship learning, they focus on different dimensions, and each is thus meaningful for different purposes. To some extent, they are also complementary. The education system, founded in school, creates or at least is related to 'cognitive competence' (Nie et al., 1996; Meeusen et al., 2013). In comparison, constructionist approaches are more comprehensive and situate learning in a wider range of contexts. For example, we are all part of the cement of CoP. At home, at work and in our hobbies

we are nested in several CoPs at any given time and able to learn almost everywhere (Wenger, 1998). Indeed, in the field of citizenship learning, shifting the focus from cognitive theory to constructionist approaches helps us to understand the role of education in a broader perspective.

The structure of this section is as follows: (2.4.1) Nie et al. 's cognitive theory; (2.4.2) constructionist approaches to learning, sub-divided into Lave and Wenger's CoP theory, meaning-making and Dewey's theory and practice; (2.4.3) different contexts for citizenship learning.

#### **2.4.1 Nie et al. 's Cognitive Theory**

Nie et al.'s (1996) conceptualisation of the explanatory linkage between formal education and citizenship takes the form of 'cognitive competence'; formal educational attainment boosts citizens' verbal cognitive proficiency and related intellectual skills, and this enables citizens to understand the political world around them. Further, as the cognitive knowledge and skills of citizens' increase, they know what their own interests are, how to defend them, and how to balance their self-interest and the interests of the wider public.

Nie et al. (1996) argue that formal educational attainment facilitates people's citizenship learning mainly through two channels: political engagement and democratic enlightenment. Both characteristics will be explored via two different educational models in the following sections.

Here, 'educational attainment' refers to how many years of formal schooling have been completed. This has a positive impact on civic competence, including attitudes (Almond and Verba, 1989; Nie et al., 1996; Hoskins and Mascherini, 2009; Hoskins et al., 2008, 2012); political knowledge (Milligan et al., 2004); and associational engagement and volunteering (Putnam, 2000; Campbell, 2006) in both American and European contexts. As formal education is an integral part of most people's learning experiences, the perspective that formal educational attainment is an important mechanism behind citizenship learning is uncontested (Hoskins et al., 2008; Nie et al., 1996).

Previous research suggests three different models in which education could facilitate the development of democratic citizens (Campbell, 2006). One is the absolute education model, which places emphasis on each individual's educational attainment. Another is the sorting model, which involves each individual's level of educational attainment, as compared to their competitive counterpart, which boosts engagement. Finally, the cumulative education model highlights the effect of the educational environment on citizens' democratic enlightenment.



### **Absolute education model (AEM)**

The AEM claims that each individual's own level of education is the driving mechanism, without concern for their educational environment (Campbell, 2006). Converse (1972, p.324) describes the absolute impact of education on social and political engagement as follows: 'Education is everywhere the universal solvent, and the relationship is always in the same direction'. Almond and Verba (1989) confirm this and claim that the empirical evidence in many studies of political attitudes demonstrates that educational attainment is the most powerful demographic indicator of attitudes. In comparison with the demographic variables usually examined, such as gender, place of residence, occupation, income and age, educational variables indicate the most important effects on political attitudes. As a consequence, well-educated people and their counterparts are assigned as different political actors (Almond and Verba, 1989).

Similarly, there are many hypotheses on why education is the key in preparing citizens for democracy. Education develops the skills necessary to become politically engaged, with both the knowledge to understand democratic values and an interest in politics, which facilitates increased participation (Dewey, 1916; Nie et al., 1996).

### **Sorting model**

With rising average levels of education, each individual requires ever more education in order to reach the top of the social and political hierarchy (Nie et al., 1996; Campbell, 2006). That is to say, education is subject to inflation. Campbell (2009, p.772) notes that 'just as price inflation decreases the value of a dollar, so has education inflation decreased the "value" of a year of education'; and claimed that this has an impact on political engagement. In this regard, another notion, 'relative education', appears, referring to people's education levels compared to the average. This is the fundamental difference between the AEM and sorting model, as the former does not consider the influence of the social environment.

Education works as a sorting mechanism: more education brings higher status (Nie et al., 1996; Galston, 2001, Campbell, 2009). People who possess higher status in the social and political hierarchy are assumed to find it easier to engage in different forms of participation; therefore, education and engagement are seen to have a strong, positive correlation (Nie et al., 1996; Campbell, 2009).

The sorting function of education matters because the political system has an inherently limited capacity to place emphasis on inputs. For example, if information technology allows ever more

citizens to communicate with their representatives, the impact of each piece of information tends to be counterbalanced (Galston, 2001), as reflected in zero-sum game theory.<sup>3</sup> The critique here is that the sorting model should only apply to the activity often driven by competitive relationships, as not all activities are equally competitive (Campbell, 2009).

### **Cumulative model**

In addition, Nie et al. (1996) suggest that the educational environment has a distinguishable impact on democratic enlightenment. This effect is emphasised in the cumulative model, which holds that the educational environment matters, but in the opposite way to that indicated by the sorting model (Campbell, 2006). Nie et al. (1996) assume that a well-educated environment promotes enlightenment (political tolerance and knowledge) for everyone, regardless of an individual's own level of education.

### **Conclusions**

This section explored the relationship between educational attainment and the characteristics of democratic citizenship through three functions of education (AEM, sorting and cumulative models). The AEM is refuted by Nie et al. (1996), as it focuses only on individual education levels, and lacks consideration of the educational environment. This finding is particularly important, as it explains an old puzzle regarding why an increase in the average education level fails to bring about a rise in political engagement.

Nie et al. (1996) confirm the sorting function of education. The critiques could be analysed from two aspects; one, central to this model, is the definition of relative education level. Practically speaking, measuring such a variable means answering the critical question 'relative to whom?' The answer is problematic: different comparison groups lead to very different empirical results (Campbell, 2006). The other is that this model can only be applied narrowly: it is only appropriate for activities driven by competitive relationships (Campbell, 2006).

Three different theories have provided a background from which to explore how formal education affects an individual's civic attitudes. I should also pay heed to selecting the appropriate theory through which to interpret the empirical results set out in Chapter 4.

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<sup>3</sup> Zero-sum game theory is a term used in game theory and management games. It is a mathematical representation of a situation in which each player's gain/loss of utility is completely balanced by the losses/gains of the utility of other players. When the total gains are added up and the total losses are subtracted, the sum is zero (Encyclopedia).

#### **2.4.2 Constructionist approaches to learning**

##### **Lave and Wenger's communities of practice (CoP)**

CoP theory is defined as a specific form of context, with three shared characteristics: 'mutual engagement'; 'joint enterprise'; and 'shared repertoire' (Wenger, 1998, pp.72-85). 'Mutual engagement' means that people are engaged in diverse actions, the meanings of which are negotiated among members. 'Shared repertoire' refers to 'routines, words, tools, ways of doing things, stories, gestures, symbols, genres, actions or concepts' that members of the community have created and adopted over time (Wenger, 1998, p.83). 'Joint enterprise' refers to participation in mutual accountability, negotiated local response and collective negotiated action. Inter alia, enterprises are conceptualised as worth pursuing and our engagement is seen as competence in this context (Wenger, 1998).

According to Wenger (1998), learning in practice includes the above three characteristics. More simply, a practice includes mutual engagement in a joint enterprise using a shared repertoire, which is closely interwoven and engaged.

Hoskins et al. (2012, p.420) claim that community of practice means 'a social grouping and at the same time to the practice of the individual members, who have a sense of identity and of belonging to that group'. The key to bridging the concept of CoP to citizenship learning is that members' engagement in the process of meaning-making is indeed a process which is situated and particularly linked to members' individual trajectories (Jewson, 2007; Biesta et al., 2009).

In addition, CoP learning theory established an analytical approach to learning that is understood to occur in forms of social participation in various communities of practice, such as in the classroom, at school, in the home and in any social communities (Wenger, 1998; Lave and Wenger, 1991, Hoskins et al., 2012). Each community can be seen as a curriculum, while members are learners and teachers. An individual may belong to many different CoPs at any one time: for them, learning is not a single action but a mutual engagement that develops through 'relationships, interactions and conflicts that occur in the process of reproducing and adapting communities' (Hoskins et al., 2012, p.421).

Lave and Wenger's conceptualisation of CoP broadens the general meaning of education. As I present in more detail below, adolescents' citizenship learning is not simply a cognitive function; the CoP approach allows me to demonstrate the significance of the actual condition of adolescents' citizenship in their citizenship learning. Next, I will explain the notion of negotiation of meaning and Dewey's theory and practice, followed by an analysis of different contexts of citizenship learning.

## **Meaning-making**

Based on Hoskins et al. (2012), the interpretation that I apply to the CoP concept is that of 'meaning-making = learning as experience' (Wenger, 1998, p.5). The community makes up the context where meaning is actively produced between different members (meaning-making). For example, when young people have a discussion with their parents regarding recent news, they may understand this very well by exchanging ideas and listening to their parents' past experience. In this situation, meaning is produced through the interactions between children and parents. This is only one simple example. The negotiation of meaning can occur everywhere, as people are constantly adapting and reproducing new social networks through their relations and interactions with other members.

According to Hoskins et al. (2012), meaning often occurs because of past interactions and extends through new patterns of interactions. Therefore, this model places heavy emphasis on social participation in communities and the interactive development of meaning, rather than instruction and transmission by cognitive acquisition (Hoskins et al., 2012).

## **Dewey's theory and practice**

Similar to Lave and Wenger's CoP theory, Dewey emphasises the balance of knowledge and practice, and suggests that the interactions of people's first-hand experience and wider societal experience cause them to make more informed decisions. This section will first analyse Dewey's work, then consider how it relates to the CoP approach.

According to Dewey (1925), the explanatory linkage between theory and practice is that people are encouraged to engage with knowledge not by referring to it blindly but by testing ideas in practice. Dewey does not simply give priority to practice over theory; for him, reliance on first-hand experience without concern for knowledge is as dangerous as deference to tradition (Dyke, 2013). In Dewey's world, the concept of experience relates to an individual's mental thinking, and this relationship can be empirically or experimentally tested in practice. He claims that individuals' first-hand experiences sometimes cause them to make poor decisions, yet the interactions between these and their wider experiences of society lead them to engage in more productive thinking: 'Abstract thought is imagination seeing familiar objects in a new light and thus opening new vistas in experience' (Dewey, 1925; 1933, p.278).

Dewey's approach provides a precondition for understanding the importance of people learning from practice, and the interactions between the raw experience and wider social experience; strongly related to Wenger's (1998) approach to understanding citizenship learning in everyday practice and experience (meaning-making).

### **2.4.3 Diversity social networks/contexts and citizenship learning**

Inspired by Wenger's (1998) CoP and Dewey's theory and practices, I argue that formal education may not be sufficient to guarantee young people's citizenship learning, as most educational experience becomes less directly related to daily life. The teaching of citizenship is required to be supplemented with a more encompassing understanding of the approaches in which young people learn democratic citizenship via their engagement in the communities and everyday practices (Biesta et al., 2009).

An emphasis on youth citizenship learning in everyday life settings offers opportunities to understand the approaches in which citizenship learning is situated in the unfolding lives of the young, and assists them in clearly understanding how their lives are involved in wider social, cultural, political and economic environments (Biesta et al., 2009). This section will adopt an easy, understanding approach: embedding young people in several social networks, such as the home, organisations (inside and outside school) and the school classroom, investigating how these networks offer opportunities to become democratic citizens, and to garner learning from the actual 'condition of citizenship' (Biesta, 2005; Biesta et al., 2009; Faulks, 2006, p.137).

One reason why I choose family, peers, organisations and the democratic school classroom is that they are all important explanatory variables in testing the influence of CoP on young people's citizenship learning (Torney-Purta et al., 2010; Hoskins et al., 2012). Hoskins et al. (2012) suggest that talking with parents and friends about politics is positively associated with young people's learning of active citizenship.

Biesta et al. (2009, p.13) characterise the contexts of citizenship learning in four broad groupings: 'unavoidable'; 'compulsory'; 'voluntary'; and 'ambiguous'. In the research, family reflects the unavoidable grouping. Parents are always our first teachers, and all individuals need to be fostered in some ways through their early family life. The school classroom reflects the compulsory grouping, because there is a formal requirement of attendance. Youth participation mirrors the voluntary grouping whereby the young have many flexible choices in terms of their interests and engagement. As the ambiguous context is outside the scope of this research, it is not referred to in this section.

In this project, I viewed the CoP perspectives from two aspects: social participation in communities and the interactive development of meaning. Specifically, in terms of the former, examples can be found in Chapter 3, such as the scale of youth participation inside school: 'voluntary participation in school-based or drama activities outside of regular lessons; active participation in a debate and so on'; the scale of youth participation in wider communities,

including 'youth organisation affiliated with a political party or union'; environment organisations and so on (Schulz, Ainley and Frallion, 2010).

The interactive development of meaning mainly refers to the scale of family, peer and open classroom discussions, and the example question items are: 'talking with parents/friends about political or social issues; teachers encourage students to make up their own minds and so on' (Schulz, Ainley and Frallion, 2010)

## **Family**

Family provides adolescents with an important early years learning and apprentice context. It is a main context where early socialisation happens, and is the most influential place for learning about moral and social values (Grusec, 2011). Plutzer (2002) notes that parents' impact falls as children grow older but, as Abendschon (2013) highlights, as most 21-year-olds still live with their parents, notable socialisation effects can still be expected.

In the literature, direct and indirect socialisation is explored. The parent-to-child transmission of attitudes can be viewed as a relatively direct mechanism: for example, young people may support the same political parties as their parents or engage in the same activities. Parent-to-child transmission can also occur in a more indirect manner; particular patterns of decision-making within the family and approaches of communicating with the outside world will affect someone's political attitudes (Jaros, 1973).

Parents and families directly affect their children's political socialisation (Hyman, 1959; Jennings et al., 2009). Parental influence has been documented in relation to certain attitudinal and behavioural outputs, such as party identification (Achen, 2002; Niemi and Jennings, 1991); voting (Jennings and Nimei, 1981); and voting preferences (Banks et al., 1994; Westholm and Niemi, 1992). This sort of direct impact may be a result of parents offering their children information, talking or debating politics with them (Eveland and Scheufele, 2000; McIntosh et al., 2007).

Indirect impact within the family has also been examined in many studies. Adolescents will show more willingness to join in civic and political life if their parents engage in elections (Martikainen et al., 2005), electoral campaigns (Roker et al., 1999) or politics (McFarland and Thomas, 2006), or are active members of voluntary activities (Chan and Elder, 2001). Here, this can be regarded as an indirect effect, because 'it is evident that the behaviour of parents is not designed explicitly to influence the behaviour of their children' (Abendschon, 2013, p.141).

Parents are seen as critical role models/masters for civic behaviour for adolescents; and young people tend to foster their own actions by observing and copying their behaviours (Bandura,

1971). Adolescents have greater potential to adopt their parents' political orientations if the family is highly politicalised and if parents provide stable political attitudes over time (Jennings et al., 2009).

In Wenger's view, the indirect parental impact can be seen as an apprenticeship model of learning. Jordan (1989) describes how a Maya girl finally becomes a midwife after many years, and relates this to her mother and grandmother's profession, as midwifery is handed down along family lines. Girls growing up in such environments, even without being identified as apprentice midwives, still have greater opportunities to obtain the substance of midwifery practice, as well as relevant and specific knowledge about many procedures (Jordan, 1989). Through this kind of apprenticeship model of learning, families build a habitable way of life. They develop their own routines, symbols, practices and stories (Wenger, 1998), while learning is blurred into everyday life and occurs implicitly. From this perspective, neither teaching nor learning may always be at the centre of forming the identities of midwives, as there is no clear separation between everyday social activities and political learning (Jordan, 1989; Lave and Wenger, 1991).

To tackle the impact of family on students' citizenship learning, an important approach is to repeat the same survey over a wide time span. The youth-parent socialisation panel study conducted by the University of Michigan's Survey Research Centre (Jennings et al., 2005) began in 1964. The first round comprised 1,700 interviews (student-parent pairs). Subsequent studies took place in 1973, 1982 and 1997, producing a panel of nearly a thousand participants in each of the four waves. The key findings suggest that parents continually play a determined role in the political education of their children (1973, 1982, 1997), while transmission rates vary in light of the kind of political trait, being higher in terms of electoral behaviour and party preference (Jennings et al., 2005).

Moreover, Jennings and Niemi (1974) found that, in comparison with party preference, the degree of similarity within families was weaker for other types of political traits including trust, continued support for the political regime and personal positions on single political issues.

## **Peers**

Peers are also expected to have a major impact on others, because they are main players in the political socialisation of adolescents and help to form the political attitudes of the latter (Abendschon, 2013). They communicate on an almost equal footing with each other and share similar social status (McLeod et al., 1999). In general, the impact of peers is understood within the context of schools (Campbell, 1980; Yates and Youniss, 1998), as classmates are most likely to form important parts of the peer group (Abendschon, 2013).

Some research has focused on the impact of the size of the network and the political diversity of close friends and classmates. Granovetter (1983) posits that, compared to close friends, casual acquaintances are able to offer more information and resources than that which already exists in the immediate network of intimate friends and kin. This could be because casual acquaintances are likely to bridge peers to social networks beyond their own, bringing them into interaction with fresh or different ideas, and information that they might not otherwise be faced with (Abendschon, 2013).

The more closely knit a circle, the less likely it is that anyone in this community will come up with new and different information. Such information is vital in people's participation, because political discussion with those with different perspectives causes people to 'constantly rethink and refine their issue stance as a result of potentially being challenged in their opinions by non-likeminded others' (Scheufele et al., 2003, p.316), which in turn makes people more likely to participate.

Abendschon (2013) shows that young adolescents (16- and 17-year-olds) do not explicitly require chances for discussion in schools, as they seem to reduce the school's role to providing information, but they continually have informal discussions among classmates and formal discussions in class.

### **Discussion of controversial issues in the school classroom**

This section moves on to the question of discussing controversial issues in the classroom, and how an open classroom serves as a unique context: offering different opportunities for citizens acting and shaping the situation. Students rarely engage in classroom discussions (Goodlad, 1984).

According to Alvermann et al. (1996, p.138), one high school participant reported, 'talking is one of the things we are pretty deprived of at school'. Similar ideas can be found in Biesta et al. (2009): Matt, a participant aged 16-17, described school as a place where 'you just can't say what you think'. In addition, Hahn (1991) points out that even when students participate in classroom discussion, they are rarely offered opportunities to emphasise controversial issues.

Current definitions of citizenship increasingly favour public engagement in open dialogue on controversial issues (New Economics Foundation, 2003; Outlon et al., 2004). The inclusion of controversial issues in the curriculum not only contributes to positive educational achievements for students (Hahn, 1996) but to the maintenance of a healthy democracy (Barber, 1989; Harwood and Hahn, 1990). It helps to prepare future citizens to engage in a pluralistic democracy, form critical thinking skills and improve their interpersonal competence (Cross and Price, 1996; Harwood and Hahn, 1990).



A discussion on controversial issues is conceptualised as reflective dialogue among peers, or between teachers and students, around an issue on which there is disagreement (Harwood and Hahn, 1990). The classroom is assumed as a context that ensures a safe, open environment for students to discuss a wide array of social and political problems with peers and teachers. During this process, for each individual, other peers and teachers in the classroom play the teacher's role. Many learning relationships are implicitly formed through discussion. Young people also develop important attitudes and interpretation skills, such as listening carefully, responding reasonably, speaking persuasively and cooperating readily with other members in the classroom (Harwood and Hahn, 1990). Well-organised discussions also increase young people's tolerance of different perspectives of issues (Harwood and Hahn, 1990).

Explorations of the impact of discussing controversial issues show that students who engage in classroom discussions often present more positive feelings about political interests, efficacy, trust and increased levels of participation in political activities (Harwood and Hahn, 1990; Hahn et al., 1988, Patrick, 1967). Moreover, discussion also increases students' civic and political tolerance and interest in social issues (Curtis and Shaver, 1980).

### **Youth participation inside and outside school**

Youth participation is important in organisations both inside and outside school, as it offers unique training in civic practices (Youniss and Yates, 1997). Participation in groups shows adolescents how to engage in a group effectively, respecting and balancing others' roles to achieve collective results. Young people directly experience the virtues of distributing their talents and focusing these on a common target, for example when they spend time producing a year book or weekly newspaper (Youniss and Yates, 1997). These direct experiences implicitly teach young people how to engage in an organisation, and how to balance self-interest and the common good.

The experience of joining youth organisations not only enables learning but influences participatory attitudes in future. Youniss and Yates (1997) state that adults who actively participate in organisations or groups have potentially done so because of their past experience of joining youth organisations. Moreover, Hoskins et al. (2012) find that school council participation strongly and significantly affects participatory attitudes in five European Union (EU) countries (England, Germany, Finland, Italy, Poland), based on multilevel results.

## Contexts and connections

This section has analysed the function of three main contexts. Each provides opportunities for young people's citizenship learning and helps them to develop their individual political attitudes and behaviours in daily life. Nevertheless, every context has its drawbacks:

- a) The unavoidable context (family) not allowing choice. This means that different family contexts offer students different opportunities to act and shape the situation, with the results varying in accordance with the conditions of families (i.e. parents' education level, family income).
- b) Voluntary contexts (a wide range of community activities) offer many different forms of engagement. However, this may differ, because the quality of young people's participation varies around the extent to which they can have a say and influence decision-making, and is closely linked to an individual's family and school background.
- c) The compulsory context (school) should ensure a supportive, open environment for discussing controversial issues. Many teachers believe they are underprepared and are worried about their ability to hold controversial discussions in the classroom (Outlan et al., 2004).

Nevertheless, I argue that the effect of different contexts can be substantially mediated by the connections within them. In Biesta et al.'s (2009) work, the participant, Matt (aged 16-17) is a living example; although he was dissatisfied with the often-bureaucratic rules of school, outside of school, voluntary experience and democratic family relationships helped to counterbalance this. Biesta et al. (2009) argue that Matt's democratic family relationships represented a significant and crucial factor in his learning. The understandings that he obtained were enhanced by his democratic experiences in learning in other (sporting and leisure-related) aspects of his life. Throughout Matt's story, learning is assumed to be a broad conception through its cognitive function. It can be found everywhere in our daily lives. In addition, contexts form and enable learning, which is to say context matters. In articulating the differences between and overlapping of different contexts, it helps to understand the essence of CoP and situated learning.

Moreover, when young people are offered opportunities for citizenship learning, their gender, ethnicity and class are as important as different contexts and connections. All these social categories have been underexplored in CoP by researchers (Biesta et al., 2009; Hoskins et al., 2012).

## **2.5 Theoretical framework: bridge to the Methodology**

In the above sections, I reviewed a wide range of literature on three main components: individual civic attitudes (which refers to political trust and support for democracy); the economy (referring to the economic crisis and economic development); and education (referring to formal education and the CoP learning theory). This section aims to display how related concepts and constructs are operationalised in research in the existing literature, as well as to guide the design of the methodology in Chapter 3. It begins with identifying the research questions, followed by determining what theories and ideas will be used to frame this research.

This project intends to answer two research questions: (1) what are the effects of the economy on political trust and democracy? (2) Is there a relationship between education and civic attitudes?

### **2.5.1 Research question one**

RQ1: What are the effects of the economy on political trust and democracy?

Figure 3 presents the theoretical framework of this project, including the main theories used in order to answer the research questions. The first research question involves three components: the economy; political trust; and support for democracy. At the very start of this chapter, the definition of democracy was analysed (section 2.1). In all these forms of democracy, two important aspects are highlighted: political participation, which stresses the competence of citizens to participate in self-rule and includes behaviours and cognitions necessary for recognising political orientations, understanding political issues, and pursuing political interests (Nie et al., 1996); and democratic enlightenment, which emphasises understanding of democratic rules via cognitive knowledge, and acceptance of the norms and procedure of democracy (Nie et al., 1996).

In addition, support for democracy is said to be a multidimensional concept (Armingeon and Guthmann, 2013). Based on Nie et al. (1996), it emphasises understanding of democratic rules via cognitive knowledge, and acceptance of the norms and procedure of democracy. The operational components of 'support for democracy' can therefore be split into two aspects: the attachment to support for democratic values; and the support for democracy as a governing system (Inglehart, 2003; Armingeon and Guthmann, 2013). The instruments used to reflect these two aspects are the WVS and IEA International Civic and Citizenship Education 2009 Study. The former measures adults' diffuse support for democracy as a governing system, while the IEA ICCS 2009 study measures young adolescents' attachment to basic democratic values.

The second-most important component in the first research question is that of political trust, defined here as a basic assessment of the government and its institutions, based on how well these institutions are governing with regards to citizens' normative expectations (Blind, 2006). I support Gambetta's view that trust is a threshold point, that is, to take a number of values suspended between blind distrust (0) and blind trust (1), located around a mid-point (0.50) of uncertainty (Gambetta, 2000). Therefore, when we talk about political trust, this does not refer to blind distrust or blind trust. I agree with Gambetta (2000), and view trust as future actions on the basis of present decisions. Political trust is predictable and largely conditional on normal citizens acting competently by using information and skills to make wise decisions.

The third important component necessary to frame the first research question is that of economy. Above, I analysed the impact of a nation's economic status on individual civic attitudes by drawing on both theoretical and empirical evidence. The lesson is that economic recession is detrimental to people's democratic participation and their trust in institutions (Hetherington, 2005). Meanwhile, researchers also posit that the influence of increasing wealth may bring about higher levels of social and political trust and even positive attitudes towards democratisation (Dowd et al., 2007). Taking this into account, this is a good opportunity to test the impact of the economy on citizens' civic attitudes by observing two completely different economic situations in Western and East Asian societies.

Compared with the sudden dips in trust in government-related institutions, the level of satisfaction with democracy has remained stable (Diamond, 2011). Some suggest that this is due to the resilience of democratic accountability (Steven et al., 2009; Diamond, 2011). However, another argument is that democracy is largely conditional on materials. Basora (2013) asserts that, if the crisis is prolonged, its severe and negative pressure on both the economy and political trust may take its toll on people's support for democracy, even among better-consolidated democratic societies. Nevertheless, economic slowdown or political shifts are often regarded as temporary issues (Norris, 1999); while continued economic development or essential beliefs in democracy appear to be stable. Based on this assumption, I expect that the fall in support for democracy would not be as severe as that in political trust at times of economic crisis.

In addition, according to Lipset's modernisation hypothesis, democracy tends to occur and be consolidated in wealthy, educated societies (Lipset, 1959). This causal effect of economic growth on democratisation has long been criticised (Huntington, 1991; Przeworki and Limongi, 1997), but Lipset's (1959) hypothesis that increased education leads to more democratic politics has received much support (Barro, 1990; Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2005). However, to the best of our knowledge, the theoretical links between education and support for democracy remain

missing. This research has a particular interest in the relationship between education and support for democracy, rather than in the causal impact of economic development on democracy. More details will be provided in the next section.

### **2.5.2 Research question two**

RQ2: is there a relationship between education and civic attitudes?

As shown in Figure 3, this project attempts to understand the relationship between education and individuals' civic attitudes via two mechanisms: formal education (education's cognitive function); and constructionist approaches to learning. As suggested in the literature review, these are two different but supplementary learning theories. Schooling enables citizens to understand civic and political topics and access useful information. In turn, as the cognitive knowledge and skills increase, they know their own interests, and learn to defend them and balance their self-interest with interest in the common good. Formal education is significant, as it is integrated into the majority of people's learning experiences. Nevertheless, young people's learning of citizenship is argued to be not merely a cognitive function, but a learning process blurred in their daily lives and linked to their life trajectories (Biesta, 2009). Therefore, the adoption of the CoP learning theories targets social participation in a wide range of communities and believes that participation makes active and experiential learning happen effectively.

#### **Formal education, support for democracy and political trust**

As mentioned above, I place heavy emphasis on how formal education affects civic attitudes through its cognitive function (Nie et al., 1996), while the effects of education's cognitive function can be accessed through the AEM, sorting model and cumulative model.

Since the data used to analyse the relationship between formal education and civic attitudes in Chapter 4 is the WVS, I have to focus on education's absolute function rather than sorting and cumulative models. This is particularly because the variable on education in the WVS dataset reflects the definition of absolute education that aims to measure an individual's own level of education. Besides, the sorting model stresses the significance of relative education, while the cumulative model is that the educational environment fosters democratic enlightenment, regardless of the individual's own level of education. Based on this, both the sorting and cumulative model seem contradictory about the variable of education in the WVS data.

In previous empirical studies, Lipset's (1959, 1960) modernisation theory that higher education brings more democratic politics has received much empirical support (Barro, 1991; Glaeser et al., 2004; Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008). Moreover, the model of Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer

(2006) also empirically supports the perspective that there is a high correlation between education and democracy. In the model, they suggest that schooling educates people to interact with others and raises the benefits of civic participation, such as voting and organising. Because education raises the benefits of civic participation, it raises support for democratic regimes relative to dictatorships (Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer, 2006).

The evidence and theory for the relationship between formal education and democracy are more clear-cut than that between education and political trust, as the latter is more complex and more clearly regime dependent. Nie et al. (1996) argue that people's trust towards their national institutions is not strongly associated with educational attainment. However, Morin (1996) suggests that the more political knowledge people have, the more diffuse is the support for regimes that they tend to express. Although, as a concept, political knowledge differs from education, all the theories and evidence above suggest that education boosts citizens' political knowledge, to a greater or lesser extent.

In addition, Torney-Purta et al. (2004) posit that cognitive understanding of political affairs bears a complex relationship to trust in life, and that adolescence is an important period in which to confirm this. Helwig's (1998) study in Canada, as well as analyses of IEA data (Torney-Purta and Amadeo, 2004), show that some young people have failed to understand topics such as how elected representatives undertake the process of governing. This leads many young people to believe that direct democracy, in which each citizen has a say on every single issue, is the only 'real democracy'. Regarding this, Torney-Purta et al. (2004) point out that, in consolidated democratic societies in which there is a reasonable degree of trustworthiness and transparency, conceptual knowledge about how government operates should have a positive impact in terms of students' trust towards it.

As young people's political trust is associated with their civic and political knowledge, this thesis is encouraged to explore and discover the most efficient way of promoting their political learning. Young people are assumed to learn by observing the practices of adults, thereby developing their own sense of political efficacy. Moreover, through the observation process, discussions and interactions between adolescents and adults also serve to broaden the former's knowledge and understanding (Torney-Purta et al., 2004). Rogoff et al. (2003) argue that, in many countries, young people prefer to observe independently, without explicit teaching from adults. In this situation, 'young people observe and listen and then gradually become incorporated into an activity, much as an apprentice might' (Torney-Purta et al., 2004). This strongly correlates to Wenger's (1998) CoP.

## **The CoP learning perspectives, support for democracy and political trust**

Formal education has been commonly used to analyse the connections between education and civic attitudes theoretically and practically. In comparison, Lave and Wenger's CoP theory is still an evolving approach to citizenship learning. The CoP learning perspective is one of the social learning theories that theoretically supports the fact that young adults develop civic and political attitudes and behaviours through their participation in communities and practice that make up their daily lives (Lave and Wenger, 1991; Wenger, 1998). Why, then, does this thesis choose it as the target theory to answer the second research question?

The rationale for choosing the CoP learning perspectives can be analysed from two aspects. First, as with the CoP learning theory, there are some similar theories, for example political socialisation theory and situated learning theory. The main difference between the CoP learning theory and political socialisation theory is that the former has been used in the education and business fields for more than twenty years and in the clinic sector recently, while the latter has been particularly used in the field of political science. Besides, political socialisation theory focuses on both the influence of micro, that is, individual social economic background and macro-level factors, that is, social, economic and political factors in the development of political beliefs and opinions. The CoP learning theory emphasises the development of learning relationships between CoP members and a feeling of belonging to a community. Moreover, in Wenger's (1998) work, he used situated learning theory as the building block to expand the definition of the CoP. Inter alia, he borrowed theoretical aspects from education, sociology and social learning theory to refine the CoP definition, emphasising socialisation and learning, and the individuals' identity development (Li et al., 2009).

Second, this project adopts a quantitative approach to investigating the impact of the constructionist approach to learning on young adolescents' civic attitudes, which indicates the importance of adopting an operational definition. According to Wenger (1998), the CoP learning theory is defined as a specific form of context, with three interrelated dimensions: mutual engagement; joint enterprise; and a shared repertoire. In relevant empirical studies, for example Hoskins et al. (2012) state that the CoP theory established an analytical approach to learning that is understood to occur in forms of social participation in various communities of practice, such as in the classroom, at school, in the home and in any social communities. Inspired by this, the operational components of CoP learning perspectives can be divided into five dimensions: families; peer groups; open classrooms; and inside and outside school communities. The emphasis is on social participation in communities and the interactive development of meaning.

As suggested earlier, compared to formal education, the CoP learning theory is an evolving approach to citizenship learning. Previous studies placed heavy emphasis on its impact on facilitating young people's cognitive knowledge on democracy, participation and participatory attitudes and so on. Yet, its influence on civic or political attitudes has been underexplored in previous studies. This, in turn, means that the literature and empirical studies on this topic are sparse. In this thesis, I tend to address the literature gap by looking at the impact of CoP perspectives on political trust and support for democracy. Nevertheless, it is still meaningful to review how the CoP learning perspectives were operationalised by previous qualitative and quantitative studies and learn from them.

Evidence using CoP theories of learning demonstrates that young people form civic attitudes by participating in the communities and practices that reflect real-world contexts, that is, the learning is situated (Biesta et al., 2009; Biesta, 2011). They place heavy emphasis on the significance of role models in the learning process, as they embody the form of practice, combining the knowledge, skills and attitudes required for successful performance (Lave and Wenger, 1991). Young people within the communities learn through observations or the role models, that is, peers and parents, and then practising by acting out these competences by themselves in a similar environment. Learning, here, is said to be a social process that takes place through interactions with other CoP members in the communities that they live in (Hoskins et al., 2012).

Longitudinal qualitative work by Biesta et al. (2009) noted that learning is situated in multiple communities, that is, home, schools and sports and so on, and occurs through different social relationships within these communities. Biesta et al. (2009) found that young people's prior experiences affected their learning within the adapted (new) communities. An exemplar case, for instance Matt's democratic family relationships, importantly and crucially play a role in his learning, and then this part of understanding that he gained was consolidated by his democratic experiences in participating in other (sports) communities in his life. This is to say, Matt, in fact, transported his learning from the relationships with his family to his relationships in wider communities. Through studying participants' life trajectories, Biesta et al. (2009) conclude that all learning contexts (home, schools, sports and leisure-based) offer young adolescents opportunities and experiences that are essential to the process of citizenship learning, 'But they differ strongly from context to context, are crucially mediated by relationships, and influenced by dispositions that young people bring to such situations' (Biesta et al., 2009, p.21).

Moreover, another longitudinal research by Kerr (2005) has also identified young people's development of citizenship dimensions, such as knowledge, skills, understanding, attitudes and behaviours, is sophisticated and affected by various factors and influences. Inter alia, these



influences comprised contextual characters or 'sites' of citizenship education, such as, school, family, peer groups and communities, as well as the diverse actors, such as, teachers, parents and friends that facilitate the educational processes (both formal and informal) at these diverse 'sites' (Kerr, 2005). This evidence supports my perspective that CoP learning is clearly one way to make socialisation happen.

Quantitative studies adopting the IEA CIVED data in five different countries in Europe (Hoskins et al., 2012) have explored the relationships between some specific aspects of CoP with lower secondary students' cognition about democratic institutions and their participatory attitudes.

In their work, two CoP-related explanatory variables are meaning-making and practice indexes. For the meaning-making index, the variables comprise: (1) talking with parents and friends about national and international politics; (2) classroom climate (open); (3) talking with teachers about national or international politics; and (4) reading newspaper articles about what is happening, and listening and watching the news. The scale of meaning-making (open classroom climate) was directly adopted from the IEA CIVED 1999 and the overall Cronbach's alpha is .77 for international pooled data: for England, it was .80, for Germany, .78, for Finland, .80, for Italy, .79 and for Poland, .82, which indicates that the cross-country reliability of this scale is satisfactory. The next meaning-making scale is developed on items represent engagement with news in different media. The Cronbach's alpha for international pooled data was .68: for England it was .75, for Germany .67, for Finland, .65, for Italy .62 and for Poland .71, which shows cross-country reliabilities. As for the scale of 'talking with parents and friends about national and international politics', Cronbach's alpha is .82 for international pooled data, .845 for England, .804 for Germany, .868 for Finland, .791 for Italy and .829 for Poland. Moreover, Cronbach's alpha, for the scale of talking with teachers about national or international politics, is .84 for pooled data, .83 for England, .87 for Germany, .89 for Finland, .81 for Italy and .87 for Poland, which indicates high cross-country reliability for these scales (Hoskins et al., 2012).

The index of practising includes items asking about students' participation in student councils, volunteering to help the community, collecting money for a social cause, engagement in an organisation sponsored by a religious group, and participation in an art, music or drama organisation. Similar to the meaning-making scale, the Cronbach's alpha for different aspects of practice scale ranged from satisfactory to high levels, which demonstrated high levels of reliabilities that can be adopted for the scale's use (Hoskins et al., 2012; Schulz et al., 2010).

The empirical findings from Hoskins et al. (2012) work are that there is a highly significant positive association between meaning-making activities and cognition on democracy and participatory attitudes, whereas practice variables are positively and strongly associated with students'


participatory attitudes. In turn, the knowledge and cognition on democratic institutions promotes support for democracy values (Glaston, 2001; Hoskins et al., 2012; Popkin and Dimock, 2012). Similarly, the more knowledge citizens have of their political institutions and civic affairs, the less likely they are to experience alienation from public life (Glaston, 2001).

The above evidence suggests that previous empirical research has demonstrated reliable evidence on the positive relationship between the CoP learning theory and support for democracy.

However, the relationship between it and people's political trust has remained underexplored. Here, I try to understand this relationship via the role of CoP learning perspectives in the political socialisation of young people. Glaston (2001, p.219) states that 'noneducational institutions and processes – families, ethnic groups, voluntary associations, and concrete political events, among others – are crucial influences on civic formation.' Students' participation in such communities enables active and experiential learning to occur, which in turn improves their civic and political knowledge, and enhances the skills required to participate effectively.

Furthermore, the role of schools in the socialisation process has to be considered. For example, in Conover and Searing's (2000) work on political socialisation of young people in four communities, they explore the significance of high schools in shaping civic understanding and practice. Inter alia, four elements of the school experience were included: 'the sense of the school as a community; the students' level of civic engagement in school and extra-curricular activities; the level of political discussion in school; and the formal academic curriculum' (Conover and Searing, 2000). Their empirical results (2000) suggest that all four elements significantly affect young people's civic consciousness and practice, although in different ways.

Figure 3 The theoretical framework





## Chapter 3: Methodology

Chapter 3 introduces the methodology adopted in the research, serving as a bridge to link the theory to the data analysis. It helps to articulate the philosophical paradigm underlying the research questions and form the appropriate research methods. The structure of this chapter is as follows: (3.1) philosophical paradigm and research design; (3.2) secondary data analysis; (3.3) WVS datasets; (3.4) IEA ICCS 2009 datasets (for each dataset, I check the quality of the survey on the basis of a set of standards, including questionnaire design, data collection, sampling errors, sampling size and sample design, variables and methods, and limitations); (3.5) data analysis; (3.6) ethical issues; (3.7) conclusion.

### 3.1 Philosophical paradigm and research design

In this project, I intend to answer two research questions: What are the effects of the economy on attitudes/values towards political trust and democracy? And is there a relationship between education and civic attitudes? To answer them, this study adopts a quantitative approach, mainly drawing upon the WVS, European Social Survey (ESS) and ICCS (IEA ICCS 2009). Additionally, I also use datasets from the World Bank, OECD and Chinese Taipei's national statistics, to measure the level of the current economic crisis.

The justification for the selection of the methodological approach is influenced by the choice of research paradigm, research questions and research objectives. The research paradigm works as the foundation of the research, as it helps to formulate the philosophical intent, motivation and expectations (Mackenzie and Knipe, 2006; Cohen et al., 2011). The adopted paradigm is positivist, essentially because the study assumes that social phenomena can be observed objectively and empirically (Bryman, 2012; Mackenzie and Knipe, 2006; Oldroyd, 1986).

A scientific method has the advantage of helping me to achieve reliable and replicable results, and the interpretivist approach, associated with qualitative research, is not utilised. According to Cohen et al. (2011), the interpretive paradigm articulates the physical world of human experience, making efforts to get inside the individual and understand within. The implication here is that the adoption of quantitative methods has the advantage of understanding certain social phenomena, though it may lose certain insights from each participant in the process (Cohen et al., 2011).

The selected paradigm, which stems from the research questions, guides how I make decisions and do research. The first research question explores the impact of the economy on individuals' political trust and support for democracy in Europe and East Asia. A qualitative method is not

suitable for answering this, as it is not designed to test hypotheses and theories with large participant samples (Cohen et al., 2011), whereas quantitative methods allow us to collect numerical data and generalise the trend across a large participant pool in exploring a particular phenomenon.

The second research question looks at how education affects civic attitudes in five democracies. It is important to clarify that the effects of education examined in the thesis are average effects, so I looked at aggregated data and made broad findings across many people, rather than being able to say anything about a particular individual participant. This is also the key reason why this project prioritises quantitative over qualitative methods.

As this research is developed on the basis of secondary data analysis, it is necessary to take the advantages and disadvantages of using secondary data into account. In general, secondary data is either collected by other researchers or by government departments as part of their work (particularly for statistical purposes) (Bryman, 2012). The advantages of secondary analysis, to draw upon Bryman (2012) and Muijs (2011), include saving cost and time. In a doctoral study, the use of good-quality secondary data reduces the costs entailed by travel, translation and printing. Moreover, data collection is time consuming, so secondary data analysis allows the researcher more time for data analysis. Another advantage is to provide high-quality data. Many datasets offer extremely high-quality data that cannot be achieved by a single researcher. For example, samples are often nationally representative. A broad extent of geographical spread and sample size requires substantial resources, and it is inconceivable that a student project could come close to such coverage without considering secondary data. Another is to offer opportunities for cross-cultural analysis. For social scientists, cross-cultural research presents barriers in terms of the huge costs and practical difficulties of conducting it in a different country. An analysis of comparable secondary data from two or more nations offers one possible model for conducting cross-cultural research. More importantly, coordination is necessary to ensure that the questions asked are comparable in different countries. A final advantage is to generate new insights through re-analysis. According to Bryman (2012), once a set of data has been analysed, to a greater or lesser extent further interpretations are limited. Indeed, data can be analysed from various approaches. Researchers can be innovative through new emerging methods or theoretical directions (Bryman, 2012; Muijs, 2011).

Secondary data analysis also involves many limitations, such as loss of variables. Secondary data is usually designed and collected for particular purposes, and this may cause the loss of one or more key variables for other studies. If researchers collect primary data, such absence of key variables is less likely. Another limitation is a lack of familiarity with data. Researchers naturally feel less

familiar with existing datasets than their own primary data. Thus they are required to know the variables, the complex sampling design, the way that the variables have been coded and the potential limitations (Bryman, 2012).

For this project, I assume that the data covered by the WVS, ESS and ICCS 2009 cannot be collected within a limited period or by an earlier researcher. The adoption of existing data allows us to assess changes in citizens' attitudes and the impact in a group of countries. Nevertheless, secondary analysis is not straightforward. When I examined which dataset would be more suitable for this study, I spent a long time comparing WVS and ESS, looking at data collection time, variables and participant pools. Moreover, as secondary data is collected for its own theoretical and analytical purpose, this required me to plan carefully and consider the use of data in terms of our own research aims, and ensure that it would answer our research questions. In other words, I needed to explore the secondary analysis, and discuss its potential pitfalls and rationale with experienced advisers (Procter, 1996; Punch, 2009).

In the next section, the main datasets adopted by this project are introduced, including the questionnaire design, sampling size and errors. This is followed by the data analysis, which describes the methods designed to solve the research questions.

## **3.2 European Social Survey**

### **3.2.1 Overview**

When I selected the WVS dataset for this study, I first compared it with similar datasets such as ESS. This section introduces the ESS and then compares it to the WVS dataset in the following sections.

Similar to the WVS dataset, the ESS is a cross-national survey, and aims to measure the attitudes and behaviours of citizens across European countries. It has conducted surveys since 2001 and face-to-face interviews every two years. To make the WVS and the ESS data comparable, the analysis draws upon five rounds of the ESS data spanning 2002 to 2012.

#### **Questionnaire design**

The survey employed strict random sampling, a target response rate of 70% or over and rigorous language translation principles (ESS Sampling Expert Panel, 2016). The ESS was designed as a time series that could observe changing attitudes and values across European countries.

The questionnaire in the ESS consists of the core section and a section of rotating modules. The former allows change and continuity across a variety of social variables to be monitored, while the

latter increases the scope of the survey, as the modules place emphasise on a specific topic in depth (ESS, no date). For the purpose of the analysis, this project is interested in demonstrating the trends in political trust, thus this project only draws upon the core section.

### **Collection procedures**

One of the main proposes of the ESS is ‘to chart stability and change in social structure, conditions and attitudes in Europe’ (ESS, no date). To achieve the maximum data comparability, essential survey conditions are conducted as similarly as possible among ESS sampling countries. Following this rule, all ESS participating countries are required to collect face-to-face data.

### **Sample size and design**

The ESS is an academically driven cross-national dataset conducted in over thirty EU countries. With regard to sampling, to ensure comparability between participating countries, the following main principles work as a guideline for the ESS:

- The use of probability samples;
- The best possible coverage of the ESS target population;
- Similar statistical precision between countries. (ESS Sampling Expert Panel, 2016, p.4)

The aim of these principles is to ensure that high-quality data is collected in a workable and comparable approach in participating countries. In each participating country:

participants must be representative of all persons aged 15 and over (no upper age limit) resident within private households in each country, regardless of their nationality, citizenship or language; Individuals are selected by strict random probability methods at every stage; Sampling frames of individuals, households and addresses may be used; All countries must aim for a minimum ‘effective achieved sample size’ of 1,500 or 800 in countries with ESS populations of less than 2 million after discounting for design effects. Quota sampling is not permitted at any stage; Substitution of non-responding households or individuals (whether ‘refusals’, ‘non-contacts’ or ‘ineligibles’) is not permitted at any stage. (ESS, no date)

### **Sampling error and bias**

The ESS is a new and academically driven social survey designed to demonstrate the trends in attitudes, beliefs and behaviours of Europe’s diverse population (ESS, no date). It covers 23 countries and aims to assert the most rigorous methodologies (ESS, no date).

The aim of the sampling work package refers to the ‘design and implementation of workable and equivalent sampling strategies in all participating countries’ (ESS, no date). Theoretically, it means random samples with comparable estimates; practically, full coverage of the population, low non-



response rates and consideration of design effects are significant for the comparability of unbiased or minimum biased estimates. The possible sampling bias is that people who are committed or more interested in citizenship politics could be more likely to participate than their counterparts.

### **Limitations of the WVS dataset for this particular study**

The ESS data is a high-quality dataset with methodological rigorous. Nevertheless, it has some limitations for this particular study. The first is a lack of variables. There are question items on democratic values only in some rounds of ESS datasets, and these are inconsistent across time. This means that if the ESS dataset is selected by this project, it is not possible to provide the same ground for examining changes in democratic values over time as measuring the levels of political trust. This is potentially the biggest limit in using the ESS dataset. The second is the age of participants. As stated very early in this project, this research looks at the impact of the economic crisis on adults' political trust and support for democracy. However, the participants in the ESS data are people who are aged 15 and over. From this point view, the ESS data may not be as good as the WVS data. It is worth noting that the ESS data is representative, which means that it includes only a small portion of people who are aged under 18, so that it may not affect the result. Nevertheless, when I examine the trends in political trust by using the WVS and ESS data, it is necessary always to bear this in mind.

## **3.3 World Values Survey (WVS)**

### **3.3.1 Overview**

This research, designed to operationalise theoretical concepts, is mainly derived from the WVS and ICCS 2009 studies. WVS is an academically driven cross-national study that aims to evaluate changes in individual citizens' attitudes and behaviours, and their impact on social, economic and political life, across almost a hundred countries. It is a suitable data source for this research as it allows us to investigate changes in trust in national institutions before and after the economic recession. For the analysis, I selected waves of the WVS spanning 1999 to 2004 and 2010 to 2013.

When I selected WVS for this study, I first compared it with similar datasets, such as the ESS. The ESS is also a cross-national survey, and aims to measure the attitudes and behaviours of citizens in more than thirty European countries. Through comparison, I finally adopted the WVS data because of the list of reasons provided in Chapter 4.

## **Questionnaire design**

For each country, a representative national sample of participants is interviewed through a standardised questionnaire. For each wave, advice on questions is coordinated by internationally recognised social scientists and a final master questionnaire is built in English (WVS, no date). In non-English speaking countries, the questionnaire is translated into different languages and translated back into English, in case meaning is lost in the process of later translation. In the majority of countries, the questionnaire is pre-tested to check whether the translation is problematic.

## **Collection procedures**

The approach to data collection for WVS surveys draws upon face-to-face interviews. Other approaches, such as telephone, mail and Internet, are not acceptable apart from very particular circumstances and only on an occasional basis (WVS, no date).

## **Sample size and design**

The dataset includes nationally representative studies conducted in 97 countries, which host almost 90% of the world's population. This makes it the largest non-commercial, cross-national, time series exploration of human attitudes ever conducted, and currently includes interviews with around 400 thousand respondents (WVS, 2010).

The samples for the WVS are drawn from the population aged 18 years and older. The sampling population is at least a thousand in each participating country. There is no upper age limit, and some types of stratified random sampling are applied to garner representative national samples (WVS, no date). The use of stratified sampling is effective in representing the whole adult population. For each country, there is a sample design document attached on the website. It offers detailed information such as sample type, fieldwork methods, sample stratification, household selection and data quality for each participating country.

## **Sampling error and bias**

Sampling error could occur as, while WVS surveys attempt to represent the whole population, they do not survey the whole population (Biemer and Lyberg, 2003). Also, the application of national probability sampling to a public attitudes survey in some authoritarian countries may not work well. People living under authoritarianism are taught to obey authority. Consequently, they may feel hesitant about expressing their perspectives fully. Also, there are some subjective questions involved in the survey, for example asking for respondents' income groups. Participants may not want to expose their true income or may unintentionally eliminate some sources of

income in their response to the survey, for example, tips, gifts and winnings (Biemer and Lyberg, 2003). Additionally, although most countries involved have a willingness to follow strict scientific procedures, non-sampling errors may also occur here, generated by interpretation, questionnaire design, definitional differences or misunderstanding (Biemer and Lyberg, 2003; Bryman, 2012).

### **Limitations of the WVS dataset for this particular study**

Although the WVS is a high-quality dataset, it retains certain limitations for this particular study, such as losing nuance. The economic recession is perceived to be temporary, but the data is collected by the WVS study every five years. As a result, when I attempt to examine the economic trends and/or trends in individual civic attitudes, I may lose some nuances. In Chapter 4, I look at the trends by using the WVS and ESS data and identify how the latter can fill this gap. A second limitation is not having key variables in the dataset. Only one variable about education is included in the WVS questionnaire. The variable (educational attainment) is commonly used to represent people's education but, to some extent, it may limit the perception of the meaning of education. Moreover, a limit is the time series, rather than longitudinal data. This allows me to explore only the correlations between dependent and independent variables, rather than causal effects. Thus I should be careful when generalising the results.

### **3.3.2 Variables and methods**

The WVS dataset will be used to answer the two research questions: what is the impact of the economy on political trust and democratic values? And is there a relationship between education and civic attitudes? To measure the changes in the real economy, I am also open to combining other datasets, such as OECD data and Taiwan's national statistics. To visualise the impact of the economy on individual civic attitudes, I look at trends in civic attitudes as this allows for attitudinal changes (political trust and support for democratic values) over the years of the economic crisis to be investigated. To answer the second research question, is there a relationship between education and civic attitudes, I then run a two-step model (multiple linear regression analysis).

### **Trend analysis of the economy**

The objective of this sub-section is to provide a comprehensive picture of the 2008 economic recession and ensuing European debt crisis by constructing an economic crisis index. Before moving on to analysing the components of the economic crisis index, some words of caution are necessary. The choice of the variables that construct the index is somewhat subjective. However, care was taken to base the selection on a set of standards related to the characteristics of the

current economic crisis, the specific nature of the sample countries, and suitability for international comparisons and transparency (Briguglio et al., 2009).

### **Background behind the economic crisis index**

The economic crisis index proposed is used to measure the microeconomic effects of the 2008 economic crisis on a state. A considerable number of studies use economic indicators – including unemployment ratios, government debt rates and real GDP growth – as central explanatory variables for declining civic attitudes during crisis periods (Roth et al., 2011; Bosco and Verney, 2012; Armingeon and Guthmann, 2014). However, these studies commonly use these macro-economic indicators separately. In this project, I develop a composite index with the aim of summarising the definition of the economic crisis into a single figure that incorporates all the key and different dimensions. It is assumed that the variables that capture the impact are:

- real GDP growth (annual %)
- youth unemployment rate (% of total labour force age 15–24)
- government debt (annual %).

GDP growth is defined as annual percentage growth ratios of GDP at market prices on the basis of constant local currency, commonly used to represent a nation's economic performance (OECD, no date).

Youth unemployment means the share of the labour force aged 15 to 24 who are not in work but are available for and seeking it (OECD, 2013). The severe impact of the current economic crisis is often gauged by unemployment rates. The reasons behind choosing the youth unemployment rate instead can be analysed from two dimensions. First, it is acknowledged that young adults have suffered the most severe impact from the economic downturn (EISTAT, 2013; Petmesidou, 2013). For example, the ACEVO/Miliband Commission (2012) on youth unemployment in Britain recorded a level of 10% of youth job losses, and the figure is four or five times greater in southern Europe. Second, according to Williamson (2014, p.15), 'what distinguishes the current crisis from its predecessors are both its scale and the anticipation that it will visit on the young generation a worse set of life-course prospects than was experienced by the previous generation'. Youth policy seems unable to meet the requirements of engaging proactively and responsively with groups of young adults and supporting their aspirations (Williamson, 2014). Thus, young people are more likely to become excluded and marginalised.

Government debt refers to 'general government gross financial liabilities as a percentage of GDP' (OECD Economic Outlook). Roth et al. (2011) explored the relationship between debt and political trust, and the empirical results, based on 27 European countries, show that increases in

government debt reduce trust in political institutions. In general, higher government debt is often associated with lower spending, and when countries tighten budgets and banks are less likely to grant loans, economic activity falls. This normally occurs when growth is already low and unemployment is high (Regjeringen, 2012).

More importantly, the rationale for putting these different factors into a single index is that broad perspective allows me better to measure those aspects of the crisis that actually impact people's daily life, and then potentially their civic attitudes. Some factors, for example the GDP in itself, does not necessarily affect individuals so much. A person hardly notices a 1% growth/drop in GDP in his life, but if he loses his job he might have strong feelings about the impact of the economic recession. So the fact is that the index includes those other elements that allow me to create an index that potentially has more impact on people and even their civic attitudes.

Table 2 Summary statistics (mean and standard deviation) for three components (raw scores)

<b>Government debt (% of GDP)</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2012</b>
England	47.2	57.4	82.2	97.2
Spain	42.3	47.7	67.1	77.2
Sweden	49.3	49.6	49.1	45.3
Poland	51.7	54.4	62.4	65.4
Chinese Taipei	33.3	34.7	38.3	41.0
<b>Youth unemployment rate (% of youth labour force)</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2012</b>
England	14.2	14.1	19.5	21.1
Spain	18.1	24.5	41.5	52.9
Sweden	19.2	20.2	24.8	23.7
Poland	21.7	17.3	23.7	26.5
Chinese Taipei	14.5	23.3	24.4	23.0
<b>GDP growth (annual %)</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2012</b>
England	2.6	-0.3	1.9	0.7
Spain	3.8	1.1	0	-2.1
Sweden	3.4	-0.6	6.0	-0.3
Poland	7.2	3.9	3.7	1.8
Chinese Taipei	5.9	0.7	10.8	1.3

Note: (a) The government debt resource: ([http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/government-debt-2014-1\\_gov-debt-table-2014-1-en](http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/government-debt-2014-1_gov-debt-table-2014-1-en), 2014); (b) Youth unemployment rate resource: ([http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/employment/youth-unemployment-rate\\_20752342-table2](http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/employment/youth-unemployment-rate_20752342-table2), 2013); (c) GDP growth resource: (<https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=60702>, no date); (d) There is no available data for Chinese Taipei in OECD data resource, so we download its data from Chinese Taipei's national statistics (<http://eng.stat.gov.tw/mp.asp?mp=5>, no date).

All economic factors used in the construction of the economic crisis index are measured annually. The summary of descriptive statistics based on raw data on government debt, youth unemployment rates and GDP growth for 2007, 2008, 2010 and 2012 in England, Spain, Sweden, Poland and Chinese Taipei are set out in Table 2. Both government debt and youth unemployment increased following the economic slowdown. The higher the percentage of government debt, the more loans these countries had. The higher the youth unemployment rate, the more young people lost their jobs. Lower scores for GDP growth suggest greater levels of impact from the economic crash. This reminds me to pay attention to the direction when I compute the index of the economic crisis.

I also found that figures for government debt were much larger than those for youth unemployment and GDP growth. This could be because these factors are frequently related to different metrics; the factors with larger standard deviations tend to be weighted more in the composite (Pallant, 2007). Hence, I intend to weigh these three factors equally, to avoid flawed results in the subsequent analysis. The figures in Table 2 are based on raw data while in Table 3 they are standardised scores.

Table 3 Summary statistics (mean and standard deviation) for three components (z-scores)

<b>Government debt</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2012</b>
England	-0.46	0.17	1.72	2.65
Spain	-0.77	-0.43	0.78	1.4
Sweden	-0.33	-0.31	-0.34	0.58
Poland	-0.18	-0.015	0.48	0.67
Chinese Taipei	-1.33	-1.24	-1.02	-0.85
<b>Youth unemployment rate</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2012</b>
England	-1.04	-1.05	-0.44	-0.26
Spain	-0.6	0.12	2.04	3.32
Sweden	-0.47	-0.36	0.16	0.33
Poland	-0.19	-0.69	0.03	0.35
Chinese Taipei	-1	-0.01	0.12	-0.05
<b>GDP growth</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2012</b>
England	0.01	-0.95	-0.22	-0.62
Spain	0.4	-0.49	-0.85	-1.54
Sweden	0.27	-1.05	1.13	-0.95
Poland	1.52	0.43	0.37	-0.26
Chinese Taipei	1.09	2.7	2.7	-0.42

Note: (a) The government debt resource: ([http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/government-debt-2014-1\\_gov-debt-table-2014-1-en](http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/government-debt-2014-1_gov-debt-table-2014-1-en), 2014); (b) Youth unemployment rate resource: ([http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/employment/youth-unemployment-rate\\_20752342-table2](http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/employment/youth-unemployment-rate_20752342-table2), 2013); (c) GDP growth resource: (<https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=60702>, no date); (d) There is no available data for Chinese Taipei in OECD data resource, so the data download from Chinese Taipei's national statistics (<http://eng.stat.gov.tw/mp.asp?mp=5>, no date).

## Computation of the composite index

This sub-section demonstrates the procedure for transferring the three macro-economic factors of real GDP growth, youth unemployment rates and government debt into a composite index of the economic crisis. Given that the problem with this approach is that the three factors are often associated with different metrics, this means that those with larger standard deviations will be weighted more in this composite (Pallant, 2007). In this situation, I intend to weight all the indicators equally to avoid arbitrary results. A common procedure is thus to change the raw variable scores to z-scores, then add them up.

The formula for a z-score is:

$$Z\text{-score} = (\text{score} - \text{mean}) / \text{standard deviation}$$

As the composite index of the economic crisis includes three components, the formula should be applied three times: to obtain the z-scores for GDP growth (annual %); youth unemployment rates (annual %); and government debt ratios (annual %) respectively. As this study covers four points in time (2007, 2008, 2010 and 2012), I use a common mean and standard deviation for standardised variables at these four points. If the variables are standardised within a point in time, any change in scores over time will be ignored. The summary of descriptive statistics for these three variables (z-scores) is presented in Table 3.

In the next step, the z-scores are added up to create the new composite index. Generally, the function of computing a composite index is:

$$\text{The composite index of the economic crisis} = \text{GDP growth} + \text{youth unemployment rate} + \text{government debt ratios}$$

The above function is adjusted, as the composite index comprises reversed variables. For example, lower scores for GDP growth indicate a worse impact from the economic crash, whereas higher scores for youth unemployment rates and government debt ratios indicate a worse impact. In order to ensure that lower scores indicate a worse impact, I therefore place a minus sign for the last two variables before creating the composite. The above approach can be transformed to the function below:

$$\text{The composite index of the economic crisis} = \text{GDP growth} - (\text{youth unemployment rate} + \text{government debt ratios})$$

For example, according to Table 3, the Z-scores for England in 2007 should be:  $0.01 - \{-1.04 + (-0.46)\} = 1.51$ . Following the same function, Spain:  $0.4 - \{(-0.6) + (-0.77)\} = 1.77$ ; Sweden:  $0.27 - \{(-0.47) + (-0.33)\} = 1.07$ ; Poland:  $1.52 - \{(-0.19) + (-0.18)\} = 1.89$ ; Chinese Taipei:  $1.09 - \{(-1) + (-$

1.33}} = 3.42. So if I choose the Z-scores for England in 2007 as the baseline, then Spain is  $1.77 - 1.51 = 0.26$ ; Sweden:  $1.07 - 1.51 = -0.44$ ; Poland:  $1.89 - 1.51 = 0.38$ ; Chinese Taipei:  $3.42 - 1.51 = 1.91$ .

This part of the data analysis is performed in Microsoft Excel; summary statistics (mean and standard deviation) for the composite index are illustrated and discussed in Section 4.1.

### **Trend analysis of civic attitudes**

This sub-section aims to illustrate the trends of the individuals' political trust and support for democracy during the last decade.

- *Trust in political institutions*

This scale asks about citizens' attitude/value towards a list of political institutions in the WVS database:

Could you tell me how much confidence you have in them, is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?

- The police
- The government (in your nation's capital)
- Political parties
- Parliament

1 = a great deal, 2 = quite a lot, 3 = not very much, 4 = none at all

- *Support for democracy*

This scale measures citizens' attitude towards democracy as a way of governing the country:

I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?

- Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections
- Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country
- Having the army rule
- Having a democratic political system

1 = very good, 2 = fairly good, 3 = fairly bad, 4 = very bad



## Two-step model

To explore education's impact on civic attitudes, a two-step model is adopted. It includes two parts of data analysis based on Multiple Linear Regression (MLR). Initially, I ran MLR (the function is displayed below) on the basis of pooling data (combined files from all participating countries) at pre- and post-crisis points in time. It provides general information about how education affected individuals' civic attitudes before and after the crisis. Afterwards, I adopt the same function and run MLR for each participating country to demonstrate more nuance, as the literature suggests that the impact of the economic crisis is uneven across countries.

Before presenting the variables, I will briefly analyse why I chose multiple regression modelling as a data analysis method. As well, I explain how I used IBM SPSS to run this. Pallant (2007) asserts that the primary target of regression analysis is to explore how well a group of variables is able to forecast a particular outcome. A more sophisticated target might be to investigate which variable is the most powerful predictor of the outcome and whether a particular predictor variable can still predict the outcome when the impact of another variable is statistically removed. This makes it ideal to help to answer the research questions, as it helps to explore whether the education variable is still able to indicate an individual's civic attitudes when the impact of other variables (e.g. gender, employment status, etc.) is eliminated.

I used data from the WVSs of 2005 to 2007 and 2010 to 2013 to study the relationship between education and individuals' political trust and support for democracy. The study used a sample of 9,029 participants aged 18 and over. A sequential multiple regression strategy was adopted, whereby gender, employment status, income group and an individual's satisfaction with the financial situation of their household were entered as Model 1. Model 2 added the highest education level attained. In Model 1, these social-demographic variables were significant predictors of the relationship with an individual's civic attitudes. In Model 2, these indicators remained, and education was added as a powerful predictor.

The regression models look like this:

$$\text{Political trust} = \alpha + \beta_1 * \text{female} + \beta_2 * \text{employed} + \beta_3 * \text{income group} + \beta_4 * \text{financial satisfaction} + \beta_5 * \text{education} + e \quad [1]$$

$$\text{Democratic values} = \alpha + \beta_1 * \text{female} + \beta_2 * \text{employed} + \beta_3 * \text{income group} + \beta_4 * \text{financial satisfaction} + \beta_5 * \text{education} + e \quad [2]$$

Here, I created a new dummy variable for gender and employment status, with males coded '0' and females coded '1' (gender), and unemployed people coded '0' and employed people coded '1'. Dummy coding provides an approach of adopting categorical predictor variables in the

subsequent linear regression model. It uses only '0' and '1' to deliver all useful information on group membership. The category '0' is known as the reference group, which in our example comprises the unemployed and males. I will explain exactly what this refers to after I work on the regression analysis result. Descriptive statistics for all these variables can be found in Table A (results based on merged files) and Table B (results based on the separate participating country) in the Appendices.

### ***Dependent variables***

In this thesis, trust in political institutions and support for democracy are treated as dependent variables to represent individual citizens' civic attitudes (Hetherington, 1998; Nie et al., 1996).

### ***Control variables***

Guided by previous research (Hoskins et al., 2012; Armingeon and Guthmann, 2013), a number of demographic variables, such as gender, employment status and income group, may have an impact on individuals' civic attitudes, so are included as controls in our models.

- *Gender*

Code respondents' sex by observation:

- male = 1
- female = 2
- *Employment status*

Are you employed now or not? If yes, about how many hours a week? If more than one job, only for the main job (code one answer):

Yes, has paid employment:

- full-time employee (20 hours a week or more) = 1
- part-time employee (less than 30 hours a week) = 2
- self-employed = 3

No, no paid employment:

- retired/pensioned = 4
- housewife not otherwise employed = 5
- student = 6
- unemployed = 7
- other = 8

- *Income group*

We would like to know in what group your household is. Please, specify the appropriate number, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in.

Lowest group = 1 to highest group = 10

- *Satisfaction with the financial situation of the household*

How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household?

- Completely dissatisfied = 1 to completely satisfied = 10

### **Independent variable**

This phase explores how well education predicts individuals' civic attitudes at two different points in time, 2005 to 2007 and 2010 to 2013, by using the WVS datasets. As mentioned earlier, the WVS dataset targets participants who are aged 18 and over. Considering adults' learning experiences, it allows us to examine the impact of education's three functions, such as the absolute model, sorting mechanism and cumulative model, on their attitudes towards political trust and democratic values. Nevertheless, there is only one variable, educational attainment, representing education in the WVS data. This variable is about the highest educational level that participants have attained, which meets the definition of the AEM rather than sorting and cumulative model. Therefore, when I interpret the results, it is important to draw upon the theory on education's absolute function.

- *Educational attainment*

What is the highest educational level that you have attained?

- no formal education = 1
- incomplete primary school = 2
- complete primary school = 3
- incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type = 4
- complete secondary school: technical/vocational type = 5
- incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type = 6
- complete secondary: university-preparatory type = 7
- some university-level education, without degree = 8
- university-level education, with degree = 9

### **3.3.3 Missing data treatment**

To solve the missing data problem in the MLR, I chose pairwise deletion: a missing value treatment method with the purpose of retaining as much information as possible. It only excludes the case (person) when they are missing the data needed for the analysis (Pallant, 2007).

### **3.3.4 Selection of countries**

The WVS dataset is used to answer two of my research questions: what is the impact of the economy on political trust and democratic values? And is there a relationship between education and civic attitudes?

The criteria of the selection of countries depend on two factors: regimes of social cohesion; and the uneven impact of the recent economic recession. At the beginning of this project, I planned to undertake this research for around twenty countries, including both Western and East Asian countries, to represent five regimes of social cohesion. But due to the time limits of the PhD study, only one country was selected from the WVS datasets loosely to represent a regime of social cohesion for each single time point, such as UK (liberal), Spain (social market), Sweden (social democratic regime), Poland (Romantic conservative) and Chinese Taipei (East Asian regime) (Green et al., 2009).

These countries were chosen because they represent a range of fortunes in terms of the recent economic recession, according to the literature. Spain has been assumed to experience a dramatic contraction in its national economy and a surge in youth unemployment, and is marked as the most crisis-ridden country; Sweden and Poland were hardly impacted by the crisis in respect of the macro-economy and youth unemployment; and England was suggested to be located in a middle position (Janmaat, 2016). Moreover, Chinese Taipei is geographically away from the centre of the 2008 economic crisis and ensuing European debt crisis, therefore this country is likely to be less affected than other four countries. From recent empirical studies, I note that countries such as the UK, Spain, Sweden and Poland have also been used to test values in times of austerity (Janmaat, 2016), which proves that these countries are representative (see Table 4).

The reason of investigating the said relationships in the five selected countries was introduced in Chapter 1 (p.2, 4<sup>th</sup> paragraph):

the severe economic crisis in Western countries offered an excellent moment to examine the impact of the crisis on people's support for democracy and their trust in political institutions. Moreover, the continued economic boom in East Asian societies is an opportunity to examine the impact of economic growth on education and citizens' civic and political attitudes (i.e. basic democratic values, civic and political participation, participatory attitudes, political trust, etc...).

This means that the background provides a window of opportunity to observe the impact of the economy on political trust and support for democracy in England, Spain, Sweden, Poland and Chinese Taipei, as well as to explore the relationship between education and individuals' civic attitudes in different economic environments.

Since these five democracies were chosen loosely to reflect five regimes of social cohesion, this project can be seen as a starting point for my future work on investigating the impact of the prolonged crisis on civic attitudes, as well as researching the topic along this pathway. Based on this, this study is a comprehensive and timely response to threatened citizenship at the time of the economic crash in Europe. I identify the implications and future work in Chapter 6 (pp.165-169).

Nevertheless, considering that for each regime I select only one country as a representative, it is dangerous to say that the empirical results in subsequent analyses (Chapters 4 and 5) reflect the theory of regimes of social cohesion. Therefore, it seems more reasonable to analyse the cultural differences in terms of the empirical results by building some links with the theory of regimes of social cohesion.

It is worth mentioning that England did not participate in the wave of 2010 to 2012 (see Table 4), which not allow us to perceive the changes before and after the crisis occurs. This may be challenged, as US could be a better choice than England. However, in this particular research, I laid heavy emphasis on how the 2008 global financial crisis became to the European debt crisis in the literature. This is a strong justification for why I selected the UK rather than the US for the use of this project.

Table 4 Selection of countries (WVS data)

Survey time	1999–2004	2005–2007	2010–2012
<b>Liberal</b>	England	England	N/A
<b>Social market</b>	Spain	Spain	Spain
<b>Social democratic</b>	Sweden	Sweden	Sweden
<b>Romantic conservative</b>	Poland	Poland	Poland
<b>East Asian</b>	N/A	Chinese Taipei	Chinese Taipei

(Green et al., 2009)

### **3.4 ICCS 2009 Datasets**

The previous section introduced the WVS dataset that was used to answer the research questions. The use of WVS data puts particular emphasis on how formal education forms citizenship characteristics. To establish what education means requires us to understand different theories of learning. This section adopts the IEA ICCS to demonstrate a more comprehensive perspective of learning through social practice and its relationship with citizenship characteristics.

It is important to note that the WVS and ICCS 2009 studies focus on different age groups: the former targets people aged over 18, while the latter focuses on 14-year-olds. The selection of ICCS 2009 is driven by two main reasons: it allows me directly to compare which political socialisation agents (family, school, peers and wider communities) contribute to developing young teenagers' civic attitudes and which are most effective. The empirical results may offer practical implications on how to get isolated young adults back into civic life. Moreover, it is a suitable dataset with which to explore the relationship between students' experience/practice in diverse social networks and their formation of civic attitudes. As Biesta et al. (2009, p.9) note, 'young people's citizenship learning is not just a cognitive function; it rather is a process that is situated, that is relational and that is uniquely linked to young people's individual life-trajectory'.

This study develops five scales: family; peers; open classroom discussion; inside school participation; and outside school participation, to represent a student's main social networks/political socialisation agents. However, these are heavily dependent on participants' ages. For example, one of the main contexts for students learning citizenship is that of home, yet the influence of parents tends to diminish when children grow older (Plutzer, 2002). As the significance of early attitudes is regarded as hugely important in the education arena (Hamilton and Zeldin, 1987; Morgan and Streb, 2001), it is vital to investigate what education really means in the development of young people's early political predispositions.

#### **3.4.1 Overview**

The ICCS 2009 (ICCS 2009) was based on the IEA surveys of CIVED study undertaken in 1999. It aimed to investigate the approaches in which countries prepare their adolescents to practise their roles as future citizens (Schulz et al., 2010 a, b). It collects and analyses data about adolescents' dispositions and attitudes associated with civic and citizenship education (Schulz et al., 2010a). In this project, ICCS data is adopted to measure students' learning through social practice, as well as explore its impact on cultivating citizens' civic attitudes.

## **Questionnaire design**

IEA ICCS 2009 consists of four types of questionnaires, targeting students, teachers, schools and national research centres respectively. The student questionnaire was used to measure adolescents' learning outputs and their background information; the teacher questionnaire was designed to collect teachers' perceptions on the general school and community environment, teaching approaches, and civic and citizenship education; the school principal's questionnaire was designed to gather information on the school context for learning, school composition and ethos; and an online questionnaire for national research coordinators (NRCs) was used to garner information at country level about the characteristics of education systems, purposes, contexts, implementation of civic and citizenship education, and the associated reforms (Schulz et al., 2010a).

With regards to the targets of the research, this project only uses student and school principal questionnaires. The other two (teachers' and online NRC questionnaires) may be adopted for future use in order to provide more detail on how contexts such as school and country affect students' learning of citizenship.

The ICCS study adopts high-quality translations and strict assessment standards. This ensures international comparability by enabling students from various countries to be asked exactly the same questions.

## **Data collection**

The data collection varies a little in terms of different types of data. The student data contains the following: (a) an international student cognitive test covering 80 items measuring civic and citizenship knowledge, analysis and reasoning; (b) an approximately 45-minute international student questionnaire built to uncover adolescents' civic attitudes, as well as background information; and (c) a set of regional instruments that aim to explore the particular issues related to civics and citizenship in Asia, Europe and Latin America (Schulz et al., 2010a).

ICCS also includes a range of instruments designed to collect information from and about teachers, principals, schools and education systems. These comprise two aspects. One is a 30-minute teacher questionnaire. Participants offer information about their perspectives of civic and citizenship education in their classrooms and schools, and their schools' organisation and culture, as well their own teaching backgrounds. The other is a 30-minute school questionnaire. Principals offer information about the school context and ethos, and the provision of civic and citizenship education (Brese et al., 2014).

The ICCS international research team endeavours to create standardised materials and operation procedures in order to ensure that, to the greatest possible extent, data collection in each country is comparable (Brese et al., 2014). Quality assurance includes an internal mechanism developed in each step of the data collection process, as well as external reviews managed by experienced, trained monitors (Brese et al., 2014).

### **Sampling errors and bias**

Hierarchical sampling, which refers to lower-level units nested in higher-level units, is commonly used to collect educational data. In the case of IEA ICCS 2009, students belonging to lower-level units are nested in higher-level schools; schools are nested in countries; and countries are nested in regions. Inter alia, the teacher and school questionnaire collects information on the contexts in which young people learn about civics and citizenship; a national context survey provides information on the development of civic and citizenship education in every participating nation; and three regional modules for countries in Asia, Europe and Latin America place emphasis on issues of civic and citizenship education in these regions (Schulz et al., 2010a).

In this kind of data, people in countries are more similar than people in regions. This may cause standard errors to be overestimated or modelling errors; the structure of reality is not necessarily represented (Schulz et al., 2010a). This project adopts statistical methods to deal with these issues, ensuring that they do not pose a major problem.

### **Sample size and sample design**

ICCS 2009 involves 38 countries; data was collected from more than 140,000 Grade 8 students, 62,000 teachers and 5,300 school principals (Hoskins et al., 2012). Among these sampling countries, there were five from Asia, one from Oceania, 26 from Europe and six from Latin America. Compared to similar citizenship datasets (for example, the IEA Civic Education Study (CivEd)), ICCS 2009 involves more participating countries and individuals, making it the largest international surveys of its kind (Hoskins et al., 2012).

The international sample design adopted by ICCS was that of stratified two-stage sampling. In the first stage, schools were sampled with probability proportional to size; in the second stage, one intact class of Grade 8 students and a fixed number of Grade 8 teachers were randomly chosen (Brese et al., 2014; Schulz et al., 2010a).

### **Limitations of the IEA ICCS 2009 dataset**

The ICCS dataset does have some limitations that should be acknowledged when interpreting the results. First, both individual and school-level data are obtained from questionnaires from



students and school principals who engaged in the IEA ICCS 2009 study. Thus, the study is exploratory in nature and unable to offer direct evidence of causal impact. Second, due to the time constraints of this doctoral study, I am only able to work on ICCS 2009 and provide results based on cross-sectional data. The upcoming wave of the programme, ICCS 2016, will be considered in future work. This project is limited to comparing the differences in the effects of education on students' civic attitudes before and after the crash.

### **3.4.2 Variables and methods**

IEA ICCS 2009, as a complement to the WVS dataset, was chosen to investigate the impact of learning process (Lave and Wenger's CoP learning theory) on young people's civic attitudes. The ICCS 2009 data includes separate file types for each participating country (Brese et al., 2014). In order to conduct cross-country analyses and achieve the full potential of the data, I need to combine data for analysis.

This analysis involves: merging multiple countries from different levels by using IEA IDB Analyser; testing two hypotheses by using Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) with AMOS; and examining the relationship between practice in learning communities and young people's trust in institutions and support for democracy via multilevel analysis (MLA) with MLwin.

#### **Merging multiple countries from different levels**

This section explains the use of an aggregated dataset and the software chosen to clean and merge data, as well as introducing the IEA IDB Analyser software.

#### **Why IEA IDB Analyser?**

The ICCS 2009 data is very sophisticated in terms of its complex multi-stage sample design and use of plausible values. To achieve accurate and representative samples, the ICCS adopted a two-stage sampling procedure: 'A random sample of schools is selected at the first stage and one or two intact target grade classes in the case of students or a random sample of teachers from the target grade is sampled at the second stage' (Brese et al., 2014, p.8). This sampling approach is effective; however, it causes the student sample to have a complex structure that has to be considered when I analyse the data. In this situation, sampling weights should be applied. A variance estimation technique – for example, the jack-knife<sup>4</sup> repeated replication – is also used to estimate sampling variances accurately (Brese et al., 2014).

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<sup>4</sup> Jack-knife, in statistics, is an automatic and widely applicable technique for estimating the standard error of an estimator nonparametrically (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).

Moreover, ICCS 2009 adopts Item Response Theory (IRT) scaling to summarise student outcomes in assessments and to provide correct measures of change from previous assessments. For instance, the ICCS 2009 IRT scaling approach adopted multiple imputation or 'plausible values' methods to obtain proficiency scores in civic knowledge from all student participants (Schulz et al., 2010a; Brese et al., 2014). Each imputed score is predicted on the basis of limited information, so includes some errors. In order to include these errors into analyses of the ICCS 2009 achievement data, the ICCS 2009 International Database offers five separate imputed scores (plausible values) for the scale of civic knowledge (PVICIV-PV5CIV) (Brese et al., 2014). Each analysis is replicated five times by using a different plausible value, and the results combined into a single result that contains information on standard (both sampling and imputation) errors (Schulz et al., 2010a; Brese et al., 2014).

Given the complex sampling design, the International Database (IDB) Analyser software (IEA, 2010) was developed to examine ICCS 2009 international data files. It helps users to examine 'the ICCS 2009 achievement data by conducting each analysis separately on each plausible value, averaging the resulting statistics, and applying the jack-knife algorithm to provide appropriate standard errors for each statistic' (Brese et al., 2014, p.9). It also makes management of the ICCS 2009 International Database easier by offering a module for choosing subsets of countries and variables (Brese et al., 2014) then merging files for analysis by particular studies.

For this particular study, if I attempt to work with aggregated data (more than one level), I have to be cautious in choosing the correct weight. That is to say, before I perform MLA, I need to compute the appropriate weights manually. For each country:

At level 1 (student level), the analyst should apply a 'within-school student weight' as the product of the class and student level weight factors ( $WGTFAC2S * WGTADJ2S * WGTADJ3S$ );

At level 2 (school level), the user should calculate a 'school weight'. Users should ensure that the software used for multilevel analysis normalises the weights, that is, make the sum of the weights equal to sample size. (Brese et al., 2014, p.31)

Then, when I move on to perform analyses of a group of countries, an international average would be calculated as well. If computed directly, adopting TOTWGTS, TOTWGTT or TOTWGTC, the countries with a large sample size will provide more for the average than their counterparts (Brese et al., 2014). In light of this, instead of applying weighted analyses across groups of countries, I would be required to conduct weighted analyses separately for each country and then calculate an average of the results (Brese et al., 2014). Choosing the IEA IDB Analyser helps to solve the issue of international averages, as the software performs the correct calculations automatically. To calculate an international average, the IEA IDB Analyser calculates national

means using the TOTWGT variables and averages the results over the sampling countries thereafter (Brese et al., 2014).

Student senate weights (SENWGT), always preferred in calculating the international average by many ICCS users, were also part of the ICCS 2009 International database. However, I did not use senate weights here as it also causes problems. As Brese et al. (2014) note, ICCS does not encourage adopting SENWGT variables in calculating international means, as this may yield incorrect results in two potential situations: (1) if an analysis works on sub-groups of the population (for example, boys and girls), the use of senate weights may cause incorrect results; and (2) if data is missing from a variable of analysis, use of SENWGT will lead to incorrect results.

### **IEA IDB Analyser**

Developed by the IEA Data Processing and Research Centre (IEA DPC), the IEA International Database Analyser (IEA IDB Analyser) is independent software that works with the Statistical Package for the Social Science (SPSS) (Schulz, 2010b). It allows users to combine SPSS data files from IEA's large-scale assessments and performs analyses using SPSS in a simple way: it does not need to write the programming/syntax code. The generated syntax takes information from the sampling design in the computation of statistics and their standard errors into consideration (Brese et al., 2014). Moreover, it uses plausible values in calculating estimates of achievement scores and their corresponding standard errors, combining both sampling and imputation variance (Brese et al., 2014).

Additionally, it includes two modules: the merge module and the analysis module. These work as independent applications (Brese et al., 2014). This project makes use of the merge module to create analysis datasets by combining data and selecting subsets of variables from the two file types (school questionnaire and student questionnaire) from five countries, and from two different levels (student level and classroom/school level). This module is able to be accessed via the START command in Microsoft Windows:

Start⇒All programs⇒IEA⇒IDB Analyser⇒Merge Module⇒School  
questionnaire⇒Student questionnaire

### **Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA)**

Before multilevel analysis (MLA), CFA should be performed with the aim of statistically confirming or rejecting the underlying scales about individuals' civic attitudes and CoP learning theory. Here, I intend to test whether: (1) individuals' civic attitudes are a two-factor structure, comprising young adolescents' political trust and support for democratic values; (2) CoP learning theory can be

hypothesised as a five-factor structure, including family discussion, peers' discussion, open classroom climate and youth participation outside and inside school.

### **Why CFA?**

Inspired by theoretical work, CFA is selected here to confirm or reject the theoretical predicted dimensions and to examine the underlying dimensional structure. Since the ICCS 2009 technical report has also adopted CFA, its scales and results are compared with ours.

### **Hypothesised two-factor CFA model of individuals' civic attitudes**

Guided by Dahl (1998) and Ekman and Zetterberg (2011), democratic values and political trust are significant predictors of citizenship competences in a democratic polity. The political trust scale involves six question items, assessing the level to which students trusted or did not trust the political institutions. The support for democratic values scale includes five question items that evaluate students' degrees of agreement with the statement about what a society should be.

- *Trust in government-related institutions*

How much do you trust each of the following groups or institutions?

- National government
- Local government of your town or city
- Courts of justice
- The police
- Political parties
- National parliament.

1 = Completely; 2 = Quite a lot; 3 = A little; 4 = Not at all

- *The support for basic democratic values*

There are different views about what a society should be like. I am interested in your views on this. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

- Everyone should always have the right to express their opinions freely.
- All people should have their social and political rights respected.
- People should always be free to criticise the government publicly.
- All citizens should have the right to elect their leaders freely.
- People should be able to protest if they believe a law is unfair.

1 = Strongly agree; 2 = Agree; 3 = Disagree; 4 = Strongly disagree

The question items used to represent young people's political trust and support for democracy are exactly those selected by the IEA ICCS 2009 technical report. Nevertheless, this project has a particular interest in identifying the relationship between the scale of political trust and democratic values, which is not explored in the IEA ICCS technical report.

### **Hypothesised five-factor CFA model of learning contexts**

Guided by both Lave and Wenger's CoP learning theory and previous empirical studies (Biesta et al., 2009; Hoskins et al., 2012), classrooms, schools, homes and friends seem to be the most important political socialisation contexts in forming young adolescents' civic attitudes. As a result, five scales – family discussions, peer discussions, open classroom climate and youth participation inside and outside of school – are created to reflect the CoP theory.

- *Family discussion*

How often are you involved in each of the following activities outside of school?

- Talking with your parent(s) about political or social issues
- Talking with your parent(s) about what is happening in other countries.

1 = Never or hardly ever; 2 = Monthly (at least once a month); 3 = Weekly (at least once a week); 4 = Daily or almost daily

- *Peer discussion*

How often are you involved in each of the following activities outside of school?

- Talking with your friend(s) about political or social issues
- Talking with your friend(s) about what is happening in other countries.

1 = Never or hardly ever; 2 = Monthly (at least once a month); 3 = Weekly (at least once a week); 4 = Daily or almost daily

- *Open classroom climate*

When discussing political and social issues during regular lessons, how often do the following things happen?

- Students are able to disagree openly with their teachers
- Teachers encourage students to make up their own minds
- Teachers encourage students to express their opinions
- Students bring up current political events for discussion in class

- Students express opinions in class even when their opinions are different from most of the other students
- Teachers encourage students to discuss the issues with people having different opinions
- Teachers present several sides of the issues when explaining them in class.

1 = Never; 2 = Rarely; 3 = Sometimes; 4 = Often

- *Youth participation outside school*

Have you ever been involved in the activities of any of the following organisations, clubs or groups? (7 items)

- Youth organisation affiliated with a political party or union
- Environmental organisation
- Human rights organisation
- A voluntary group doing something to help the community
- An organisation collecting money for a social issue
- A cultural organisation based on ethnicity
- A group of young people campaigning for an issue.

1 = Yes, I have done this within the last 12 months; 2 = Yes, I have done this but more than a year ago; 3 = No, I have never done this.

- *Youth participation inside school*

Have you ever been involved in activities of any of the following organisations, clubs or groups? (6 items)

- Voluntary participation in school-based music or drama activities outside of regular lessons
- Active participation in a debate
- Voting for <class representative> or <school parliament>
- Taking part in decision-making about how the school is run;
- Taking part in discussions at a <student assembly>
- Becoming a candidate for <class representative> or <school parliament>.

1 = Yes, I have done this within the last 12 months; 2 = Yes, I have done this, but more than a year ago; 3 = No, I have never done this.

## Conclusions

By comparing the scales for this project and the ICCS 2009 technical report, the most significant differences were found in their construction. This is also why this project would not directly apply the dimensions derived from the IEA. This study has placed particular emphasis on the effects of students' social practice in different communities in formulating their civic attitudes, so certain specific observed variables were chosen according to the theoretical framework. For example, 'family discussion' and 'peer discussion' work as separate scales in this project because, although these two scales are highly correlated to each other, they may lead to a different impact on students' learning about civic attitudes.

According to Schulz et al. (2010a), the IEA ICCS 2009 technical report combined 'family discussion' and 'peer discussion' items into one index, 'political discussion', which differs from our scales. In Tables C and D (Appendices), I provide a comparison between the scales, reflecting the learning contexts in this project and those used in the ICCS 2009 study.

Another difference between this project and the ICCS technical report lies in how I deal with raw data. The IEA built some dimensions that combine IRT (Schulz et al., 2010a). The procedures used to scale the ICCS data and the indices therein were explicitly described by the ICCS technical report. Generally, two kinds of indices stemmed from the ICCS data:

1. Simple indices constructed through arithmetical transformation or recoding, for example, ratios between teachers and students;
2. Scale indices derived from scaling of items, a process typically achieved by using item response modelling of dichotomous or Likert-type items. (Schulz et al., 2010a, p.157)

In contrast, this project took raw data of chosen variables (all ordered categorical items) into consideration. Items were not rescaled when performing CFA. The main preliminary step that I have performed is to check the means of these items in order to capture what is going on with the distribution. For example, if I found an item with a mean towards either extreme, it would be necessary to consider whether it is adequately grouping participants. This sort of item should not be removed, but requires me to reflect on what it is contributing. It is meaningful to build an understanding of how respondents have used the response scale, and I should always take this into consideration when performing the CFA and MLA.

It is also important to think about why the ICCS technical report rescaled all predicted variables before applying them in CFA. Will this bring about a different result compared to our work on the raw data? To perceive the actual differences between this project and the ICCS 2009 technical report, I borrowed some comparable results from the latter to compare with ours.

As I have selected the same question items to represent the scales of political trust and democratic values as those of IEA ICCS 2009, there is no difference found in terms of Cronbach's alpha. For 'political trust' for England, it is 0.81; for Spain, 0.80; for Sweden, 0.89; for Poland, 0.83; for Chinese Taipei, 0.86. Cronbach's alpha for 'democratic values' for England is 0.73; for Spain, 0.63; for Sweden, 0.75; for Poland, 0.71; for Chinese Taipei, 0.67. All of these demonstrate the cross-country scale reliabilities (Schulz et al., 2010a).

As this project constructs different scales from those in IEA ICCS, the scale reliabilities were thus compared to the IEA in Table E (Appendices). Overall, there are no great differences in terms of Cronbach's alpha values, apart from the first two scales: family discussion and peer discussion. The scale reliabilities ranged from 0.63 to 0.73 for family discussion, compared with 0.55 to 0.74 in this project. Although the range for our separate scales of 'family discussion' and 'peer discussion' is narrower than that for 'political discussion' in IEA ICCS 2009, it is still sufficient for them to serve as different scales in this project (Pallant, 2007).

### **Multilevel analysis (MLA)**

To explore how different CoPs affect young people's learning about political trust and democratic values, I performed multilevel analysis (MLA) with MLwin (version 2.26).

### **Why MLA?**

The reasons behind selecting MLA are mainly three aspects: (a) the nested structure of the ICCS 2009 questionnaire data: students nested in classrooms/schools, and classrooms/schools nested in countries call for the application of MLA; (b) this project aims to perform a cross-country comparison; MLA allows to look at the variances explained at different levels (Level 1=student; level 2=classroom/school) for each country, then perform further vertical comparisons between the countries; (c) MLA has advantages over single-level methods, such as MLR (Lee, 2000). One perhaps more significant benefit of using MLA is that it tells me how much unexplained variance is due to differences between the individual students, and how much because students attend different schools (Muijs, 2011, p.229).

I adopt a two-level model and perform it in each participating country. Level 1 is student level and Level 2 is classroom/school level. For each participating school, there is only one classroom, which means that classroom level is equivalent to school level (Schulz et al., 2010a). I do not include the country as a level mainly because multilevel analysis places heavy demands on the number of participants at the highest level (Hox, 2002). The sample size of five is not sufficient for the highest level in this project.




Besides, when adolescents are offered opportunities for citizenship learning, social categories such as gender, ethnicity and class are all considered to be important as different contexts; and all have been underexplored in CoP by researchers (Biesta et al., 2009; Hoskins et al., 2012). This research will accordingly take them into account.

Additionally, the impact of the school is associated with the approaches adopted by a country in educating their future citizens: with students learning about political issues through their teachers and peers; and the state controlling the way in which schools teach students about political issues and democracy, as well as offering relevant democratic education in practice: for example, by increasing deliberative discussion, or offering more opportunities to engage in civic activities etc. (Guttman, 1999; Englund, 2000; Ekman and Zetterberg, no date).

Ekman and Zetterberg (no date) suggest that school climate and composition matter in terms of students' citizenship competence (democratic values, political trust, political efficacy, political literacy, civic engagement and political participation). Thus, I add open school climate (school-level variables) and school's social economic status (aggregate parents' educational attainment to a school mean) to our model, in the expectation that they will have a positive impact on students' civic attitudes.

The construction of the full model is illustrated in Figure 4. As detailed information about dependent variables – political trust and attachment to basic democratic values – as well as explanatory CoP-associated variables has already been presented, this section only provides details of individual and school-level control variables.

Figure 4 Full model



## Dependent variables

This project selects students' trust in political institutions and attachment to basic democratic values to be dependent variables. More detail about these two variables has been analysed in previous sections: 'Trust in government-related institutions' and 'Attachment to basic democratic values'.

## Individual-level variables

At the individual level, this project mainly involves a list of demographic variables as displayed below.

- *Ethnicity (immigration background)*

What language do you speak at home most of the time?

- 1 = language of test
- 2 = other language 1
- 3 = other language 2
- 4 = another language

- *Family cultural capital (how many books are at home)*

How many books are there in your home?

- 0 – 10 books = 1
- 11–25 books = 2
- 26 – 100 books = 3
- 101 – 200 books = 4
- 201 – 500 books = 5
- More than 500 books = 6

- *Gender*

Are you a girl or a boy?

- 1 = Girl
- 2 = Boy

## School-level variables

As suggested, this project also adopts some school-level variables, such as a school's social economic status (SES) and ethos. The variables used to measure these are listed below.

- *School's SES (aggregated individual-level variable – parental highest educational level to school level)*

What is the <highest level of education> completed by your parents?

- <ISCED level 5A or 6> = 1;
- <ISCED level 4 or 5B> = 2;
- <ISCED level 3> = 3;
- <ISCED level 2> = 4;
- <ISCED level 1> = 5;
- She did not complete <ISCED level 1> = 6.

- *Students' opportunity to participate*

During the current school year, how many <target grade> students in this school have had the opportunity to take part in any of these activities?

- Activities related to the environment, geared to the local area
- Human rights projects
- Activities related to underprivileged people or groups
- Cultural activities (for example, theatre, music, cinema)
- Multicultural and intercultural initiatives within the <local community>
- Campaigns to raise people's awareness, such as <aids world day, world no tobacco day>
- Activities related to improving facilities for the <local community> for example, public gardens, libraries, health centres, recreation centres, community hall>;
- Participating in sports events.

All or nearly all = 1; Most of them = 2; Some of them = 3; None or hardly any = 4; Not offered at school = 5.

- *Students' shared decision-making on how school is running*

In this school, how much are students' opinions taken into account when decisions are made about the following issues?

- Teaching/learning materials

- The timetable
- Classroom rules
- School rules
- extra-curricular activities

To a large extent = 1; To a moderate extent =2; To a small extent = 3; Not at all = 4.

### **Variables of interest**

To investigate the impact of CoP theories on forming individuals' civic attitudes, the CoP-associated variables will be adopted as the explanatory variables:

- Family discussion
- Peer discussion
- Open classroom climate
- Youth participation outside school
- Youth participation inside school.

### **3.4.3 Missing data treatment**

The ICCS 2009 dataset is a large dataset with missing data. The ICCS 2009 technical report suggests that there are two types of entries – valid data values and missing data values – that are applied during the ICCS data capture (Schulz et al., 2011). Moreover, missing codes are used by the IEA DPC to assign the data to facilitate further analyses, and five different forms of missing data are labelled in the International Database:


- Omitted: the respondent had a chance to answer the question but did not do so; the corresponding question or item was thus left blank;
- Not administered: the respondent was not administered for the actual item or question and therefore could not read and answer the question;
- Invalid: this code was used in both the questionnaire and the achievement files for responses that were not interpretable;
- Logically not applicable: the respondent answered a receding filter question in a way that made the following dependent questions not applicable to him or her. (Schulz et al., 2011, p.126)

However, some cases that are missing data for at least one or even all variables (except ID variables) still leave a blank in the combined dataset. This suggests that missing data still need to be handled as incomplete data, posing problems for my subsequent data analyses (i.e. CFA and MLA).

It is well known that the use of inappropriate methods for dealing with missing data can cause bias in parameter estimates (Jones, 1996), bias in standard errors (Glasser, 1964) and insufficient use of the data (Allison, 2003). For example, methods such as listwise or pairwise deletion generally do a poor job of using all the available information (Allison, 2003). Taking these issues into consideration, missing value analysis is selected here for direct modelling of incomplete data. The reason why I choose missing value analysis is it not only allows us to observe the pattern of 'missingness', but also offers proper estimates of the parameters of interest in spite of the incomplete data (Hox, 1999).

Figure 5 displays a panelled pie chart that describes the number and percentage of analysis variables, cases or individual data values that have one or more missing values. Inter alia, the left-hand pie chart clearly shows that all 29 variables described in Chapter 3 have some missing data. The central pie chart indicates how many subjects are missing at least one value, that is, 6,949 out of 55,470 subjects or around 11.13% of the whole subjects include at least one missing value. The right-hand pie, labelled values, indicates that around 1.704% of all values are missing. Although only a small percentage of values are missing (1.646%) in a super-size dataset, it still demands our attention as there are 29,798 missing values and this indicates some patterns here.

Figure 5 Overall summary of missing values in the combined dataset



After I investigated the pattern of missing data and compared the means of all variables in sub-group data (boys=0/girls=1) by independent t-test, I obtain the result that the missing data in my selected countries are missing completely at random.

As acknowledged, multilevel analysis is more subject to missing data issues than other forms of analysis (Hox, 2002). If the analysis adopts only those participants with complete information for all items, a considerable number of cases tend to be excluded. According to the ICCS 2009 technical report, there are two main types of missing data: '(1) no questionnaire data for either

the student or their school, and (2) missing data for individual variables’ (Schulz et al., 2010a, p.270).

To solve the missing data problem, the IEA initially excluded the small proportion of students who did not provide any questionnaire information from the analysis and a ‘dummy variables adjustment’ was used for the remaining participants (Schulz et al., 2010a). Second, mean or median values were added to students or schools with missing data, and dummy indicator variables (with 1 suggesting a missing value(s) and 0 representing non-missing value(s)) were assigned to the analysis (Schulz et al., 2010a).

In light of this, this project followed the approach that has been conducted by the IEA ICCS technical report, excluding no questionnaire data for either the student or their school in calculating the first kind of missing data. This study uses mean values to replace missing data for individual items (IEA) thereafter.

#### 3.4.4 Selection of countries

As a complement, the IEA ICCS 2009 study is chosen to help to answer the second research question: namely, is there a relationship between education and civic attitudes? I adopt the same countries as those chosen by the WVS dataset in (section 3.3.4) to ensure continuity of the data analysis. More importantly, this also allows me to identify country differences. This question has been explored both qualitatively and quantitatively in the West (Biesta et al., 2009; Hoskins et al., 2012; Torney-Purta, 2010), yet has remained less explored in the majority of Asian countries.

Table 5 Selection of countries (IEA ICCS 2009 data)

<b>Social Regimes</b>	<b>Countries</b>
<b>Liberal</b>	England
<b>Social Market</b>	Spain
<b>Social Democratic</b>	Sweden
<b>Romantic Conservative</b>	Poland
<b>East Asian</b>	Chinese Taipei

(Green et al., 2009)

### 3.5 Data analysis

This section introduces the research methods; and to what extent the research questions can be answered. The first research question is: What are the effects of the economy on political trust and democratic values? It is necessary to establish any association between the economy and

individual civic attitudes. To explore this, I need to describe what I would expect the data on individuals' civic attitudes in each country to look like if there was an association between the economy and civic attitudes. I need to examine and summarise where there appears to be an association and where there does not. This uses trend data analysis (both the economic trend and trends in individual civic attitudes), and aims to offer a basis for exploring the second research question.

The second research question is: Is there a relationship between education and civic attitudes? To perceive the effects of education on students' formation of civic attitudes, this question is initially answered by using multiple regression modelling, based on the WVS datasets. However, the variable used to measure education in the WVS data is about formal learning, which may to some extent limit the meaning of learning. As a complement, the IEA ICCS 2009 study is adopted to investigate the relationship between situated learning and individuals' civic attitudes.

### **3.5.1 Research question one – Investigating the impact of the economy on political trust and support for democracy**

To look at the impact of the economy on attitudes/values towards political trust and democracy, two parts of trend data analyses are required in order to build an association between them. In part one, to help readers become more aware of the changes in the actual economy before and after the economic crisis, I present changes in the actual economy in England, Spain, Sweden, Poland and Chinese Taipei at a macro-level in pre-and post-crisis times. In order to provide a comprehensive picture of the economic crisis, three macro-economic factors (youth unemployment ratios, government debt rates and real GDP growth) are chosen and combined in an Economic Crisis Index. As the literature suggests that the impact of the 2008 EU crisis has been uneven, it is necessary to categorise and define countries according to the patterns of change in the index.

In Chapter 4, the mean levels of political trust and support for democracy will be displayed in graphs to indicate clearly how people's civic attitudes change in tandem with economic change at national level. This will tell whether there is indeed an association between the economy and individual civic attitudes.

### **3.5.2 Research question two – Is there a relationship between education and civic attitudes**

To answer the second research question, I use Multiple Linear Regression (MLR) to look at the relationship between education and individual civic attitudes at different time points (2005–07

and 2010–13 waves of WVS data). It can tell how well a group of social-demographic variables predict an individual's civic attitudes, as well as suggest how the explanatory variable – education – is able to predict civic attitudes after the statistical impact of another variable is removed. I do not include the economic crisis index in the regression analysis, because this project only involves four countries: Spain, Sweden, Poland and Chinese Taipei (England is absent, as there is no available data from the 2010–12 WVS wave). However, both the multivariate analysis at country level and the multilevel analysis are heavily dependent on the sample size of the highest level (Hox, 2002).

The proposed relationship between education and individual civic attitudes (regression model) is described below:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Political trust} = & \alpha + \beta_1 * \text{female} + \beta_2 * \text{employed} + \beta_3 * \text{income group} + \beta_4 * \\ & \text{financial satisfaction} + \beta_5 * \text{education} + e \end{aligned} \quad [1]$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Democratic values} = & \alpha + \beta_1 * \text{female} + \beta_2 * \text{employed} + \beta_3 * \text{income group} + \beta_4 * \\ & \text{financial satisfaction} + \beta_5 * \text{education} + e \end{aligned} \quad [2]$$

These two functions are run in the merged files (pooling the data for all countries) and each country file separately at two different time points: 2005 to 2007 and 2010 to 2012. Conducting them in the merged files has the purpose of offering a general trend on how well a set of individual-level factors is able to predict political trust and democratic values. Running them in the separate country file aims to provide a more detailed analysis for each country.

Young people's citizenship learning is not merely a cognitive function (Biesta et al., 2009); rather, it is a learning process blurred in their everyday lives through a form of social practice (Lave and Wenger, 1991; Wenger, 1998; Hoskins et al., 2012). Given this, the IEA ICCS 2009 study is also selected to explore the relationship between situated learning and individuals' civic attitudes.

Initially, five scales – family discussion, peer discussion, open classroom climate, inside school participation, and outside school participation – are created, to reflect Wenger's (1996) CoP learning theory. The items used to construct these scales are driven by CoP learning theory, and will be statistically verified by the CFA in Chapter 5.

These scales will be used in subsequent multilevel analysis (two levels) to answer how learning process predicts individual civic attitudes. Multilevel modelling is a suitable approach with which to answer the research question. It is a statistical method particularly appropriate for data of a nested nature (e.g. students nested in class, classes nested in school), which allows for observing variances and simultaneous estimation of impact under levels (Muijs, 2011).



The two-level model is performed in each participating country: level 1 is student level; and level 2 is classroom/school level. In each country there is one classroom, meaning that classroom level is equivalent to school level (Schulz et al., 2010a). I do not treat country as a level because a multilevel analysis demands a number of participants from the highest level (Hox, 2002). The sample size of five countries is not sufficient for the highest level in this analysis.

### **3.6 Ethical issues**

This study is designed as a secondary data analysis. Two datasets are used: (1) the WVS data, which can be downloaded from the Data files section from:

<http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp>. In addition, the ESS will be compared with the WVS dataset in chapter 4. Its data and documents can be found at:

<http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>; (2) the International Civic and Citizenship Education Study 2009 (IEA ICCS 2009), which can be downloaded from: [http://www.iea.nl/iccs\\_2009.html](http://www.iea.nl/iccs_2009.html).

These websites require users to fill in their registration information with their name, organisation name, a brief introduction of the project (only for non-commercial use) and email address. With regards to data protection regulations in sampling countries in these datasets, only anonymous data can be downloaded. I believe that the most appropriate approach to protect participants is that of anonymised data. After personal information is anonymised, it is not possible to link new information to individuals within a dataset or to send results back to respondents. This avoids the risk of identifying an individual in the procedure of analysing data. All used data in this project should be suitably cited and the data source completely referenced. The details of this project will be shared with the organisations holding the data in the proper way.

The secondary data will be analysed by political, social and economic sectors, although findings tend to be challenged by researchers on this pathway. I will always bear this in mind, read as much material as possible and remain as self-critical as possible. I will avoid subjective statements or over-interpretation of the results.

### **3.7 Conclusion**

This chapter set out how we formed the research methods on the basis of philosophical paradigms, research questions and objectives. It highlighted the essential links between the research method and research questions: the former is designed to answer the latter. Analysing various variables in datasets provides the opportunity to compare them with their definitions. This helps to bridge theory and practice, and leads me on to the data analysis in Chapter 4.



## Chapter 4: The effects of formal education

Through the use of WVS datasets, this chapter answers two research questions: (1) What are the effects of the economy on attitudes/values towards political trust and democracy? (2) Is there a relationship between education and civic attitudes?

It mainly consists of two types of data analysis: (a) a trend data analysis includes both the economic trend and individuals' civic attitudinal trends, which are used to establish any association between the economy and individual civic attitudes. The results, based on the trend data analysis, are that an individual's political trust and democratic values are related to a state's economic status. This provides me with a basis for looking at 'Is there a relationship between education and adults' civic attitudes at different times in Europe and East Asia'; (b) a two-step model (MLA). Step 1 pools data from all the national surveys to investigate a general trend in how far a group of social-demographic variables (i.e. gender, income, etc.) affect an individual's civic attitudes, as well as explore whether education is still able to indicate political trust and democracy after the impact of these variables is removed. To demonstrate more nuance, in Step 2 I fit separate models for each country: to provide detailed analysis of the individual determinants of people's civic attitudes.

### 4.1 Trend analysis of the economy


As mentioned in Chapter 3, I selected three macro-economic factors in order to construct a composite indicator to represent the current economic crisis, including real GDP growth (annual %), youth unemployment rate (% of total labour force aged 15–24), and government debt (annual %). This section demonstrates the changes in the composite index of the economic crisis across England, Spain, Sweden, Poland and Chinese Taipei, with the aim of identifying the impact of the crisis in these countries.

#### 4.1.1 Results: the changes of the composite index across countries over years

Figure 5 illustrates the changes in the index in England, Spain, Sweden, Poland and Chinese Taipei from 2007 to 2012. For clarity, the data for each country has been plotted in a different colour. Drawing on the general literature about the current economic crisis, the data for England in 2007 is used as the baseline for the international comparison. The index can be used to evaluate the levels of the economic crisis, which means that the index will either increase or decrease depending on the extent of the crisis in any particular country.

Overall, Chinese Taipei is the best-performing country, followed by Poland and Sweden. England and Spain achieve similar results, although the scores in Spain dropped much more dramatically than in England from 2008 to 2012.

Figure 6 Changes in the index from 2007 to 2012



Note: (a) The data for England in 2007 works as the baseline.

(b) Source: OECD Economic Outlook No. 95 (database)

At the start of the time period, the score for England (2007) is 0, as England in 2007 is used as the baseline for the comparison. Scores for Chinese Taipei, Spain and Poland exceeded this (1.91, 0.26 and 0.38 respectively), while the score in Sweden was lower (-0.44 in 2007, before the economic crisis began). Over the following four years, the patterns in the five countries were different, which might indicate that the impact of the economic crisis was uneven. The score for Spain dipped quite sharply to -5.18 in 2010, then -7.77 in 2012; while England also dropped to over -3 in 2010, and -4.52 in 2012. A similar trend can be found in Poland between 2010 and 2012; but its decline was less severe than in Spain and Sweden: from around -1.6 in 2010 to -2.79 in 2012. Interestingly, the score for Sweden recovered to -0.2 in 2010 then dropped to -3.37 in 2012. The score for Chinese Taipei fluctuated between 2.44 and -1.03 from 2008 to 2012.

The above evidence provides nuances about the economic climate in participating countries. I am also able to allocate different names to different trajectories: Spain is marked as the country that

has suffered the highest levels of the crisis, England has experienced a medium level, while Poland and Sweden have been less affected by the crisis and thus are regarded as experiencing a low level. With studies suggesting that the 2008 economic crisis centred mostly upon the Euro area (Diamond, 2011), Chinese Taipei was least affected initially (zero level); but the subsequent fall in its score may be a result of the interconnectedness of the world economy.

## **4.2 Trend analysis of individuals' civic attitudes**

Many studies suggest that the continuing crisis in the Eurozone is imposing not only economic costs but also substantial political consequences, as a result of the way that the crash has been handled (Hetherington, 2005; Gamble, 2010; Roth, 2009a, b; Armingeon and Guthmann, 2013). These studies document that people's trust in other people, agents and even national governments and their attitudes towards democracy has been severely shaken (Roth, 2009a, b; Gurria, 2011; Roth et al., 2011).

Nevertheless, the evidence and theory for political trust are more clear-cut than the relationship between the economic recession and democracy. Based on this, I assume that from before the beginning of the economic recession until after, levels of political trust decreased more sharply in the crisis-ridden country in this study here (Spain) than where economic problems hit less severely.

A number of studies have highlighted democracy's survival, despite an environment of economic crisis (Steven et al., 2009; Diamond, 2011); but some recently published works (Basora, 2013; Armingeon and Guthmann, 2013) confirm that people's support for democracy strongly depends on both economic and political performance. The following sections set out the trends of support for democracy to provide some clues about its relationship with the economy.

### **4.2.1 Comparing the WVS and the ESS dataset**

To visualise the effects of the economy on individual civic attitudes in Europe and East Asia, it is necessary to select some suitable datasets according to a set of standards. These reflect the characteristics of the economic recession and the specific nature of participating countries, and are appropriate for cross-country comparisons. This section adopts the two most relevant such datasets – the WVS and ESS – to test the impact of the 2008 economic downturn on individual civic attitudes over the past decade. They represent two very different but complementary datasets. It is very hard to distinguish which is more suitable for this project, as both have their own advantages and limitations. This section compares their advantages and disadvantages in order to clarify the choice of the dataset.

Table 6 Selected countries and time of data collection in WVS and ESS datasets

Selected countries	WVS		ESS	
	Spain, Sweden, Poland Chinese Taipei		England, Spain, Sweden, Poland	
Time of collection				
WVS 4 (1999- 2004)	England: 1999		ESS 1	England
	Spain: 2000		2002	Spain
	Sweden: 1999			Sweden
	Poland: 1999			Poland
	Chinese Taipei (n/a)		ESS 2	England
WVS 5 (2005- 2007)			2004	Spain
				Sweden
				Poland
	England: 2005		ESS 3	England
	Spain: 2007		2006	Spain
WVS 6 (2010- 2013)	Sweden: 2006			Sweden
	Poland: 2005			Poland
	Chinese Taipei: 2006			
			ESS 4	England
			2008	Spain
WVS 6 (2010- 2013)	England: (n/a)			Sweden
	Spain: 2011		ESS 5	Poland
	Sweden: 2011		2010	England
	Poland: 2012			Spain
	Chinese Taipei: 2012			Sweden
			ESS 6	Poland
			2012	England
				Spain
				Sweden
				Poland

As mentioned in Chapter 3, the comparison between the WVS and ESS consists of two parts. To ensure my selection of the dataset is clearer, here, I will give some details on these two datasets. It begins by comparing participating countries at the time of data collection by the two datasets; then compares the items used to determine the dependent variables: political trust and democratic values. Five countries – England, Spain, Sweden, Poland and Chinese Taipei – were chosen for this project. As shown in Table 6, England participated in WVS 4 and WVS 5, but was absent from WVS 6. Moreover, the data for Chinese Taipei was not available in the ESS study: which only looks at countries in Europe. Yet, combined, the two datasets provide a more thorough picture than any single dataset.

The time of data collection differed greatly. WVS data is collected every five years; but biennially in the case of the ESS. The latter features reliable, cross-country data of a high and consistent quality rarely found in other large-scale cross-national datasets (Koch et al., 2009). From this point of view, the ESS offers a better basis for observing the changes of individual's civic attitudes (especially for political trust) in countries over time.

Next, the questions on individual's civic attitudes, including political trust and democratic values, were compared in these two datasets. In the WVS, 'political trust' was measured by asking participants how much confidence they have in institutions such as the police, the government, political parties, parliament, major companies and banks (see Table 7). The answers ranged from 'None at all = 1' to 'A great deal of confidence = 4'.

Similarly, the ESS measured 'political trust' through questions about public trust towards institutions including parliament, the legal system, the police, politicians and political parties (see Table 7). The possible answers scale from 'No trust at all = 1' to 'Complete trust = 10'.

Additionally, questions on democratic values in the WVS evaluate whether people believe in democracy or not: 'Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections'; 'Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country'; 'Having the army rule' and 'Having a democratic political system'. The answers range from 'Very bad = 1' to 'Very good = 4'.

However, questions about democratic values are only found in certain rounds of ESS datasets, and these are inconsistent over time. This means that, if the ESS dataset is selected by this project, it would not offer the same basis for examining changes in democratic values over time. This could be the biggest limitation in using the ESS dataset.

This leads to the conclusion that I should choose the WVS survey rather than the ESS study, because the latter does not allow me to examine the shift in people's democratic values across countries over time. However, given that the ESS has a methodological rigour that is uncommonly strict for comparative datasets (Koch et al., 2009), the trend data analysis on political trust in the ESS dataset is considered in order to validate the reliability of the WVS survey. It is a necessity to compare both.

Table 7 A comparison between the items reflecting individual's civic attitudes in the WVS and ESS

Items in the WVS dataset			Items in the ESS dataset		
Category		Summary description	Category		Summary description
Political Trust	WVS 4	Police	Political Trust	ESS 1 2002	Country's parliament
	(1999-2004)	Political parties Government Major companies			Police Legal system Politicians
	WVS 5 (2005-2008)	Country's parliament Police Political parties Government Major companies Banks		ESS 2 2004	Country's parliament Police Political parties Legal system Politicians
	WVS 6 (2009-2014)	Same as WVS 5		ESS 3 2006	Same as ESS 2
				ESS 4 2008	Same as ESS 3
				ESS 5 2008	Same as ESS 4
				ESS 6 2008	Same as ESS 5
Democratic Values	WVS 4	Having a strong leader who does	Democratic Values	ESS 1-	N/A
	(1999-2004)	not have to bother with parliament and elections Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country Having the army rule Having a democratic political system		ESS 6	
	WVS 5	Same as WVS 4			
	WVS 6	Same as WVS 5			

#### 4.2.2 Results: the attitudinal shift of political trust across countries over years

Before presenting the empirical results, a few words on recoding variables should be noted. The key principle of recoding is to use a higher score to denote a positive attitude. The question about 'political trust' in the WVS is:

'Could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence, or none at all?'

1 = A great deal; 2 = Quite a lot; 3 = Not very much; and 4 = None at all.



An example is provided in Table 8 of how I recoded variables by applying the principle of using a higher score to indicate a positive political attitude.

Table 8 Example of the recoding of variables by using a higher score to indicate a positive attitude

<b>Country's parliament</b>	<b>Label</b>
1	A great deal
2	Quite a lot
3	Not very much
4	None at all
<b>Country's parliament</b>	<b>Label</b>
1	None at all
2	Not very much
3	Quite a lot
4	A great deal

In the ESS dataset, the question used to ask about people's political trust is:

'Please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out'.

0 = You do not trust an institution at all; 10 = You have complete trust.

The ESS dataset always uses a higher score to present a higher level of political trust, which means that there is no need to recode 'political trust' variables. But I should note that the WVS and ESS datasets adopt different answer scales towards the question used: the WVS has a maximum of four scales, while the ESS has a maximum of 10 scales.

### **Results: individual question items on political trust in WVS study**

The mean level of people's trust towards a list of institutions based on the WVS dataset is displayed in Table 9. The answers range from 1 to 4, with a higher score predicting a higher degree of political trust. Some large country variances appeared in terms of people's trust in institutions. As expected, in Spain there was a rapid fall in people's trust in nearly all institutions from 1999 to 2014. Referring to the literature, mainland Europe has been involved in this crash since the end of 2009, whereas Spain was a later participant. As shown in Table 6 (section 4.2.1), the data for Spain was collected in 2011 in the WVS; therefore the figures in Table 9 allow us to see the Spanish delay on the effects.

In Sweden, there has not been much variance in people's trust in institutions over the past 15 years. In Poland, at the beginning of the period 1999 to 2004, people's trust in the country's parliament was 2.21. This fell to 1.81 in 2005 to 2007 and rose slightly in 2010 to 2013. There was a rise in people's trust in institutions from 2006 to 2012 in Chinese Taipei. These results show that

citizens' political trust seems dependent on their nation's economic situation, which means that there could be an association between the economy and an individual's level of political trust.

Table 9 Parameter estimates and standard errors for the analysis of political trust by using WVS dataset on a max 4 scale

Political trust		1999–2004	2005–07	2010–13
Spain	country's parliament	<b>2.45(0.80)</b>	<b>2.65(0.74)</b>	<b>2.21(0.78)</b>
	police	2.64(0.78)	2.47(0.75)	1.92(0.67)
	government	2.39(0.82)	2.37(0.78)	1.93(0.76)
	political parties	2.11(0.72)	2.15(0.70)	1.86(0.68)
	major companies	2.37(0.74)	2.22(0.77)	<b>2.15(0.81)</b>
	banks	N/A	N/A	<b>1.77(0.75)</b>
Sweden	country's parliament	<b>2.50(0.70)</b>	<b>2.54(0.66)</b>	<b>2.66(0.71)</b>
	police	2.86(0.66)	2.87(0.63)	2.91(0.69)
	government	N/A	2.34(0.70)	2.65(0.77)
	political parties	N/A	2.27(0.61)	2.39(0.67)
	major companies	N/A	2.45(0.63)	<b>2.51(0.69)</b>
	banks	N/A	N/A	<b>2.54(0.81)</b>
Poland	country's parliament	<b>2.21(0.88)</b>	<b>1.81(0.68)</b>	<b>1.85(0.63)</b>
	police	2.64(0.88)	2.44(0.78)	2.50(0.74)
	government	N/A	1.94(0.73)	1.92(0.67)
	political parties	N/A	1.66(0.63)	1.70(0.62)
	major companies	N/A	2.17(0.67)	<b>2.41(0.68)</b>
	banks	N/A	N/A	<b>2.37(0.75)</b>
Chinese Taipei	country's parliament	N/A	<b>1.73(0.72)</b>	<b>2.09(0.77)</b>
	police	N/A	2.29(0.75)	2.69(0.69)
	government	N/A	2.16(0.81)	2.39(0.81)
	political parties	N/A	1.68(0.68)	2.05(0.70)
	major companies	N/A	2.19(0.72)	<b>2.76(0.64)</b>
	banks	N/A	N/A	<b>2.91(0.58)</b>

Note: the data for Chinese Taipei was not available in WVS from 1999–2004 (WVS 4)

The items 'major companies' and 'banks' only appeared in the latest wave of the WVS dataset (2010–12). As shown in Table 9, on the question of people's trust in the financial sector, Chinese Taipei has the highest level, followed by Sweden and Poland, with Spain at the bottom. These results demonstrate an association between economic situation and economic trust. This is another indicator that the financial crisis was less severe or the blame was less focused on the financial sector. The critique here is that these items (i.e. major companies and banks) have been included only in the latest round of WVS data, meaning that, potentially, this is because the scores have always been this way. Accordingly, when future data becomes available, it may be worthwhile checking the results.

## Results: individual question items on political trust in the ESS study

Table 10 demonstrates the mean level of people's political trust in England, Spain, Sweden and Poland from 2002 to 2012, using six rounds of ESS datasets. Unlike the WVS data (max 4 scale: complete distrust 0 – complete trust 4), items in the ESS data are scaled from Complete distrust = 0 to Complete trust = 10.

Table 10 Parameter estimates and standard errors for the analysis of political trust by using the ESS dataset on a max 10 scale

Political trust		2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012
England	country's parliament	<b>4.64(2.34)</b>	<b>4.23(2.35)</b>	<b>4.16(2.39)</b>	<b>4.27(2.45)</b>	<b>4.05(2.44)</b>	<b>4.21(2.37)</b>
	legal system	5.04(2.40)	5.03(2.37)	4.99(2.40)	5.14(2.43)	5.19(2.41)	5.52(2.33)
	police	6.07(2.41)	6.06(2.36)	6.03(2.38)	6.22(2.41)	6.23(2.36)	6.53(2.22)
	politicians	3.77(2.21)	3.52(2.22)	3.37(2.19)	<b>3.51(2.22)</b>	<b>3.40(2.27)</b>	3.58(2.22)
	political parties	N/A	3.61(2.13)	3.48(2.12)	3.58(2.17)	3.50(2.23)	3.61(2.12)
Spain	country's parliament	<b>4.85(2.36)</b>	<b>5.07(2.24)</b>	<b>4.99(2.28)</b>	<b>4.97(2.23)</b>	<b>4.30(2.33)</b>	<b>3.43(2.54)</b>
	legal system	4.30(2.43)	4.70(2.41)	5.00(2.38)	4.32(2.39)	4.38(2.43)	3.70(2.58)
	police	5.49(2.44)	5.88(2.30)	6.02(2.28)	6.06(2.21)	6.23(2.24)	5.88(2.47)
	politicians	3.41(2.32)	3.66(2.28)	3.49(2.29)	<b>3.32(2.28)</b>	<b>2.72(2.25)</b>	<b>1.91(2.17)</b>
	political parties	N/A	3.65(2.32)	3.46(2.26)	3.26(2.28)	2.70(2.20)	1.88(2.19)
Sweden	country's parliament	<b>5.92(2.26)</b>	<b>5.35(2.34)</b>	<b>5.62(2.23)</b>	<b>5.74(2.21)</b>	<b>6.28(2.05)</b>	<b>5.93(2.30)</b>
	legal system	6.06(2.27)	5.77(2.32)	6.04(2.18)	6.09(2.09)	6.53(2.04)	6.27(2.15)
	police	6.76(2.08)	6.49(2.20)	6.54(2.14)	6.55(2.07)	6.98(1.93)	6.72(2.04)
	politicians	4.72(2.12)	4.19(2.18)	4.46(2.08)	4.62(2.05)	5.04(1.93)	4.74(2.10)
	political parties	N/A	4.40(2.12)	4.62(2.06)	4.77(1.93)	5.11(1.90)	4.86(2.01)
Poland	country's parliament	<b>3.48(2.19)</b>	<b>2.41(2.14)</b>	<b>2.67(2.20)</b>	<b>2.99(2.14)</b>	<b>3.44(2.28)</b>	<b>2.96(2.35)</b>
	legal system	3.66(2.30)	3.00(2.30)	3.75(2.27)	3.88(2.26)	4.26(2.34)	3.66(2.38)
	police	4.92(2.46)	4.56(2.52)	4.99(2.49)	5.12(2.44)	5.38(2.39)	5.25(2.52)
	politicians	2.71(1.98)	1.92(1.92)	2.10(1.97)	2.28(1.90)	2.66(2.10)	2.21(2.01)
	political parties	N/A	1.90(1.89)	2.13(1.96)	2.31(1.92)	2.55(2.07)	2.21(2.02)

Overall, people's trust towards institutions varies substantially (Table 10). On the one hand, trust towards the legal system and police remained high throughout this time in all countries; on the other hand, from 2002 to 2012 trust in participating countries' parliaments, politicians and political parties went up rapidly, with a few exceptions. Specifically, the major shift was from 2008 to 2010. Over these two years in England, there was a fall of 0.22 regarding the country's parliament, a 0.11 drop regarding politicians and a 0.08 fall regarding political parties. Since 2010, English trust in the country's parliament, politicians and political parties has risen to 4.21, 3.58 and 3.61 respectively. In similar vein, there was a dramatic fall in trust towards the Spanish parliament, politicians and political parties from 2008 to 2010, which continued for a further two years.

Swedes' trust in their country's parliament reached its peak in 2010, but dipped slightly for all institutions from 2010 to 2012. 2010 was a peak year for trust in the Polish parliament; similar to the Swedes, Poles' trust in all institutions declined from 2010 to 2012.

## **Conclusion**

In the above sections, the results about individual question items on political trust in the WVS survey and ESS study are displayed. As mentioned earlier, the time for data collection, the answer scales and the sampling participants differ in these two surveys. The data was collected at different times as seen in Table 6, and the question items are max 4 scales in the WVS data while they are max 10 scales in the ESS data. Representative participants are aged 18 and older in the WVS data, whereas they are aged 15 and older in the ESS data. These differences should be considered when I interpret results.

Considering the differences, I suggest that the older age group may develop more knowledge, and participate more in organisations than the younger age group, which is all about cognitive consequences. It is necessary to mention that the ESS data is representative, which means that only a very small portion of people aged under 18 were included in each round of the study. As a result, I should not worry too much about this difference.

Moreover, WVS and ESS adopt different answer scales for variables: the question items are max 4 scales in the WVS data and max 10 scales in the ESS data. This means that I cannot compare the values on the two graphs as they are based on datasets using different scale lengths, so I cannot say how far trust has declined. Nevertheless, it is important to remind readers that the WVS data is selected as the key dataset to display the trends in individuals' political attitudes in different participating countries. Due to the data collection for the WVS study happened every five years, therefore the ESS data is selected as a complement to give more nuances and validate the WVS

data as the ESS data was collected biennially in this study. Unless the trends in national economies in these two datasets are divergent, there is no need to compare variables in two different surveys.

In all countries, participants' political trust fluctuated before the onset of the economic crisis (2007/2008) in these two datasets, while some cross-country differences appeared after the crash. The results from the most crisis-ridden country in this study, Spain, confirm an association between the economic crisis and political trust. For example, in the WVS dataset, Spanish participants displayed lower levels of trust in all political institutions between 2010 and 2013 than 2005 to 2007. Similarly, the ESS data displays a continued decline in trust in all institutions in Spain from 2008 to 2012.

According to the ESS dataset, England was also hit by the economic climate, but less severely than Spain. The data indicates a dip in political trust in England, but not as dramatic a fall as in Spain, which matches the economic trend. England assumes a middling position. Specifically, there was a decline in English trust in the country's parliament, politicians and political parties from 2008 to 2010, and levels of trust in parliament continued to fall over the subsequent two years.

Moreover, the ESS dataset shows that the Swedes' political trust increased from 2008 to 2010 then declined from 2010 to 2012, which exactly matches the changes in the index for the economic crisis in Sweden. The index score in Sweden peaked in 2010, but fell over the following two years. These nuances further suggest an association between the national economy and political trust.

The evidence in Poland and Chinese Taipei, however, seems to stand against the idea of an association between economic slowdown and political trust. It is important to note here that, of the five participating countries, Spain experienced the most severe impact from the economic crisis, England a medium level, while Poland and Sweden were hit less and Chinese Taipei encountered zero impact.

In the case of Poland, it seems that political trust is not always associated with the economy. Many studies suggest that the majority of Poles tend to avoid political parties or political movements: anti-party sentiment remains widespread (Figarska, 2012). In light of this, I suggest that the Poles' case cannot be used to rebut the association between economic crisis and levels of political trust as Poland has a long tradition of scepticism towards its political institutions.

On Chinese Taipei, the WVS data shows that participants' political trust rose substantially between 2005 to 2007 and 2010 to 2013, but fell from 2010 to 2012. Does this reject the association between economic crisis and political trust? My answer is no. The data for political

trust in Chinese Taipei was collected in 2012, while the data for real GDP growth, youth unemployment rate and national debt was generally collected by the end of 2012. This means that when participants reported their political trust, they may not have felt that the economy was declining. The Chinese Taipei case means that we are not able to reject the association between economic performance and trust in political institutions.

#### **4.2.3 Results: the changes of people's endorsement of democratic values across countries over time**

This section sets out the changes in support for democratic values from 1999 to 2013, based on the WVS dataset. As noted earlier, the greatest limitation of the ESS is that its question items about democratic values are inconsistent. Consequently, here I present only results based on the WVS data.

The question items used to deliver participants' support for democratic values are:

For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?

- Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections;
- Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country;
- Have the army rule;
- Having a democratic political system.

Very good = 1; Fairly good = 2; Fairly bad =3; Very bad =4.

It is important to note that the first three items are negatively associated with democratic values, and only the last item is positively related. Consequently, when I create a scale of democracy, I need to recode variables: I select everything important for democratic values. As shown in Table 11, a 'Very bad' value equates to very important for democratic values for the first three items; whereas a 'Very good' value equates to very important for democratic values for the last item. Therefore, only the polarity of responses to the last item was reversed, with the aim of using a higher score to predict a positive attitude towards democratic values.

Table 11 Democratic values

	Very good	Fairly good	Fairly bad	Very bad
<b>strong leader</b>	1	2	3	4
<b>experts</b>	1	2	3	4
<b>the army rule</b>	1	2	3	4
<b>democratic political system</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>

The descriptive statistics for individual items of democratic values are illustrated in Table 12. Overall, participants displayed higher support levels for democratic values than trust levels in political institutions in all countries from 1999 to 2014. England did not participate in the 2010 to 2013 wave and for Spain, the participating country widely considered to have suffered most severely, I place heavy emphasis on identifying whether Spanish participants behave differently from their counterparts.

As shown in Table 12, Spanish people do behave slightly differently. In terms of separate questions on democracy: support for a strong leader and experts running the country is bad for democracy. Remembering that our coding principle is to use a higher score to indicate a positive attitude towards democracy, I would expect the score to decrease in difficult economic times. As shown in Table 12 it dips, suggesting a decrease in Poles' positive attitudes towards democracy.

Table 12 Parameter estimates and standard errors for items on democratic values (a max 4 scale) by using the WVS dataset

Democratic values		1999–2004	2005–09	2010–14
Spain	Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections	3.04(0.73)	<b>2.96(0.91)</b>	<b>2.68(0.92)</b>
	Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country	2.79(0.83)	<b>2.79(0.98)</b>	<b>2.54(0.91)</b>
	Having the army rule	3.46(0.66)	3.47(0.79)	3.53(0.67)
	Having a democratic political system	3.49(0.63)	3.55(0.61)	3.56(0.62)
Sweden	Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections	3.25(0.89)	3.33(0.86)	3.19(0.92)

	<b>Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country</b>	2.73(0.87)	2.83(0.89)	2.83(0.88)
	<b>Having the army rule</b>	3.56(0.63)	3.64(0.59)	3.50(0.68)
	<b>Having a democratic political system</b>	3.69(0.52)	3.74(0.50)	3.68(0.59)
	<b>Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections</b>	3.06(0.89)	2.89(0.88)	3.10(0.81)
<b>Poland</b>	<b>Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country</b>	1.90(0.68)	1.93(0.69)	2.01(0.67)
	<b>Having the army rule</b>	3.22(0.78)	3.12(0.79)	3.12(0.77)
	<b>Having a democratic political system</b>	3.04(0.71)	3.06(0.68)	3.02(0.68)
	<b>Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections</b>	N/A	2.36(0.86)	2.12(0.89)
<b>Chinese Taipei</b>	<b>Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country</b>	N/A	2.28(0.70)	2.28(0.73)
	<b>Having the army rule</b>	N/A	3.23(0.70)	3.22(0.70)
	<b>Having a democratic political system</b>	N/A	3.26(0.59)	3.23(0.57)

#### 4.2.4 Results: the changes of the index of civic attitudes

This section creates a separate index (means of the selected question items) for political trust and democratic values, based on the individual variables examined above. These two indexes are also used in the subsequent analysis (a two-step model). After comparison of the WVS and the ESS datasets, the WVS data is finally selected to answer the research questions. Accordingly, the index of political trust and democratic values is built on the basis of the WVS database.



There were three waves of WVS datasets (1999–2004; 2005–07; 2010–13) involved in presenting the trends in individuals’ civic attitudes (based on individual question items). Here, the descriptive statistics for political trust and democratic values index are illustrated based on 2005 to 2007 (pre-crisis) and 2010 to 2013 (post-crisis) WVS waves.

### **Index of political trust**

To measure political trust, use a 4-item index which measures the mean level of confidence in a group of government-related institutions: parliament, police, political parties, and the government. Table 13 displays the average levels of trust observed in different societies (the index of trust in political institutions), for both the 2005–07 and 2010–13 waves.

Table 13 Descriptive statistics for the political trust index

<b>Political trust</b>	<b>2005-09 wave of WVS</b>	<b>2010-14 wave of WVS</b>
<b>Spain</b>	<b>2.41(0.56)</b>	<b>2.15(0.57)</b>
<b>Sweden</b>	2.51(0.50)	2.65(0.56)
<b>Poland</b>	1.99(0.58)	2.00(0.54)
<b>Chinese Taipei</b>	1.96(0.59)	2.32(0.61)

The index is computed as the mean between the level of trust in parliament, police, political parties, and the government. It starts from 1 (no trust at all), to 4 (suggesting a great deal of trust). Cronbach’s alpha for the whole sample is 0.745/0.743, 0.769/0.796, 0.792/0.793 and 0.799/0.810 for Spain, Sweden, Poland and Chinese Taipei, for the two waves of WVS data respectively. This means that, to a large extent, the variables which make up the scale of political trust measure the same thing (Muijs, 2011).

Overall, the results are in line with those regarding the question items on political trust. We highlight the scores for Spain (the crisis-ridden country). It drops more than other participating countries from 2005 to 2007 to 2010 to 2013, which suggests that Spanish people display lower levels of political trust since the crisis. Meanwhile, participants’ political trust remains stable in Poland and increases in Chinese Taipei and Sweden.

### **The index of democracy**

The index used to measure individuals’ attachment to democratic values takes both mass support for other forms of regimes and assessment of democracy as a type of government into account. The index is constructed by the following four question items in the WVS dataset: (1) having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections; (2) having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country; (3) having the

army rule; (4) having a democratic political system. The coding principles were explicitly analysed in section 4.2.3, that is, to use a higher score to denote a positive trend, yet the polarity of responses to the last item is reversed.

Cronbach's alpha for the combined dataset is 0.658 for wave 5 (2005–07), and 0.603 for wave 6 (2010–13) of WVS dataset. The alpha for Poland and Chinese Taipei is lower than that of other countries. I found that the 'having experts' item posed some challenges; on the basis of the 'remove 1' rule, I took out one variable – 'having experts' – to increase the internal consistency of the scale.

Table 14 Descriptive statistics for the democracy index

Democratic values	2005-07 wave of WVS	2010-13 wave of WVS
<b>Spain</b>	3.33(0.63)	3.26(0.54)
<b>Sweden</b>	3.57(0.50)	3.46(0.58)
<b>Poland</b>	3.02 (0.48)	3.08(0.45)
<b>Chinese Taipei</b>	2.95(0.42)	2.86(0.46)

The means and standard errors of the democratic values index are illustrated in Table 14. The empirical results for the index of democracy are in line with the results based on individual question items about democracy (Table 12).

Overall, the relationship between support for democracy and the economy is not conclusive. All participating countries have experienced an economic decline from 2007 to 2012, due to the interconnectedness of the world economy. Therefore, I expect to see all participants' support for democracy drop from the onset of the crisis until after the beginning of the recession. As shown in Table 14, there was a decrease in support for democracy from 2005 to 2007 (pre-crisis) to 2010 to 2013 (post-crisis) in all countries, with one exception: Poland. Nevertheless, I may be able to find answers to this by drawing upon the literature. The literature suggests that Poland escaped almost entirely, and was one of the best-performing countries in terms of real economic growth in the OECD countries (Guardiancich, 2012). In Poland's case, the increase in support for democracy and the rise of real economic growth go hand in hand and may predict the existence of association between the economy and democracy. Despite this, the amount is very small, with probably insignificant falls and rises, meaning that it may be difficult to predict the relationship between the economy and support for democracy.

### **4.3 Two-step model**

Substantial literature indicates that education plays an important role in helping countries, creating economic competitiveness (Green, 2011), protecting against unemployment, increasing political engagement (Nie et al., 1996) and promoting a more democratic society (Dewey, 1916; Nie et al., 1996). This section identifies whether education (referring to formal learning) plays a mediating role between the economic status and civic attitudes by adopting two waves of WVS datasets (2005–2007 and 2010–2013).

The trend analysis of the economy has helped to distinguish which country was most severely affected by the recession (Spain), which assumed a middle position (England), which was not initially affected (Chinese Taipei) and which were barely affected (Sweden and Poland). As UK data is not available in the 2010 to 2013 WVS wave, in this part of data analysis Spain is the only country severely impacted by the economic crisis.

Yet even in Spain, the economic crisis did not affect everyone in the same way. Who is most likely to pay the price of the economic recession? The economic approach to political trust predicts that both subjective economic outcomes (e.g. family satisfaction with economy) and objective economic outcomes (e.g. occupational status) affect political trust. Consequently, this study expects that those with high-level qualifications and skills are best able to avoid the worst impact of the economic crisis, and retain trust in political institutions and support for democratic values, whereas those with few qualifications and skills are more likely to pay the price.

#### **4.3.1 Pooling the data for all countries: The individual-level determinants of individual civic attitudes**

This sub-section interrogates the individual-level determinants of people's civic attitudes for four sampling countries (a merged file including Spain, Sweden, Poland and Chinese Taipei) at two time points: 2005 to 2007 and 2010 to 2013. It offers a general trend on how well a group of individual-level variables is able to predict individual civic attitudes.

In this thesis, five particular countries were chosen because each of them is said to loosely to represent a typical representative of the social regime, as well, they represent a range of fortunes in terms of the recent economic recession. In this case, why don't have a quick look about is there any difference in different countries?

## Empirical results – political trust

In Table 15, two models are listed. Model 1 refers to Block 1, which includes a list of demographic variables – gender, employment status, income group and satisfaction with the financial situation of a household. Model 2 refers to Block 2. In Block 2, I place heavy emphasis on the correlation between participants' schooling and political trust after the effects of all variables in Block 1 are statistically removed.

In Block 1, I shed light on the contribution of each independent variable, so adopt the beta values. The column labelled B (beta values) highlights which variable contributes the most to the outcome variable of political trust. Overall, all beta values make a statistically significant contribution to political trust in 2010 to 2013, with the exception of employment status.

In addition, gender is negatively (albeit not significantly) related to citizens' political trust in pre-crisis times (2005–07), whereas in post-crisis times (2010–13) I found a positive and significant association. Gender is recoded as a dummy variable: 0 = male (reference group), 1 = female. This suggests that, after the recession, female participants displayed higher levels of political trust than males.

Table 15 Individual-level determinates of political trust in merged files at two time points

Political trust		2005-07 wave of WVS		2010-13 wave of WVS	
Block1	Model	B	Std. Error	B	Std. Error
	Constant	1.947***	0.03	1.803***	0.032
	Gender (ref: male)	-0.001	0.019	0.053**	0.018
	Employment Status (ref: employed)	-0.059**	0.02	0.003	0.019
	Income group	0.026***	0.005	0.033***	0.006
	Satisfaction with the financial situation of household	0.029***	0.005	0.050***	0.004
	Adj R <sup>2</sup>	0.028		0.063	
Block2	Constant	2.007***	0.033	1.743***	0.034
	Highest educational level attained	-0.019***	0.004	0.020 ***	0.004
	Adj R <sup>2</sup>	0.032		0.067	
	N	4403		4564	

Notes: \*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001.

The variables indicating an individual's objective economic outcomes, including income group and employment status, are positively related to higher levels of political trust in post-crisis times, although the latter is not significant. Specifically, the association between political trust and income groups became stronger after the recession.

On employment status, the figures show that its correlation with political trust is negative and significant in pre-crisis times, but positive (albeit not significantly) in post-crisis times. As employed people are the reference group here, this means that unemployed people expressed higher levels of political trust before the onset of the recession, and that this positive association vanished in harsh times.

Satisfaction with the financial situation of a household measures an individual's subjective economic outcome. From before until after the beginning of the recession, this was always positive and related to political trust. More importantly, this relationship has been strengthened after the economic crisis, which is similar to the income group variable.

Moreover, the results for Model 2 show that, after removing the statistical effects of the control variables, 'an individual's highest educational level attained' was negatively but significantly correlated with political trust during 2005 to 2007; and positive and significant during 2010 to 2013. The results may suggest that, in pre-crisis times, well-educated people are more likely to criticise the political system in which they live, which is in line with Nevitte (1996) and Inglehart's (1990) work. In tough times, poorly educated people pay the biggest price while well-educated people are able to remain in work and may display relatively higher levels of political trust as a result. However, this is suggested on the basis of aggregated data. As the impact of the recession is uneven among participating countries, I should be cautious in interpreting these results.

In addition, I use the adjusted R square to identify how far these independent variables explain the levels of political trust. After the socio-demographic variables in Block 1 are entered, the overall model explains 2.8% and 6.3% of the variance in 2005 to 2008 and 2010 to 2013 respectively. This suggests that socio-demographic variables explain more variance in post-crisis periods.

After the statistical impact of Block 1 variables is removed and the Block 2 variable – highest educational level attained – is entered, the model explains 3.2% and 6.3% of variance respectively. Thus, 'formal education' explains more variance in post-crisis times. Nevertheless, the variations explained are low, and we need to avoid over-interpreting the results (Cohen et al., 2011).

## Empirical results – support for democracy

Of the factors measuring democratic values, the variables measuring socio-demographic characteristics are generally non-significant, with a few exceptions. As shown in Table 16, an exception is the variable indicating gender in 2010 to 2013 whereby males show greater attachment to democratic values than females. The other is that of income group, which displays positive signs in both 2005 to 2007 and 2010 to 2013, meaning that support for democratic values is always higher among advanced income groups, although the relationship has been weakened in post-crisis times.

Table 16 Determinants of democratic values in combined files at two time points

Democratic values		2005-07 wave of WVS		2010-13 wave of WVS	
Model		B	Std. Error	B	Std. Error
Model1	Constant	2.792***	0.029	2.801***	0.030
	Gender(ref: male)	-0.015	0.018	-0.049**	0.017
	Employment Status (ref: employed)	0.048	0.19	0.01	0.018
	Income group	0.037***	0.005	0.032***	0.005
	Satisfaction with the financial situation of household	0.007	0.004	0.009	0.004
	Adj R <sup>2</sup>	0.029		0.018	
Model2	Constant	2.735***	0.032	2.717***	0.032
	Highest educational level attained	0.019***	0.004	0.028***	0.004
	Adj R <sup>2</sup>	0.034		0.029	
	N	4403		4564	

Notes: \*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001.

The figures for Model 2 show that, after controlling for the impact of a group of demographic variables, measures of education seem positively and significantly associated with support for democracy at two time points. This means that well-educated people were more likely to support democracy than their counterparts. More importantly, the association between educational attainment and support for democracy has been stronger after the crisis.

The Adj R<sup>2</sup> is used to compare models with different numbers of variables. The figures in Table 16 show that, after entering variables in Block 1, 2.9% and 1.8% of variance is explained for 2005 to 2007 and 2010 to 2013 respectively. After adding socio-demographic variables, less variance is explained in support for democracy. Moreover, 3.4% and 2.9% variances are explained after entering the education variable in 2005 to 2007 and 2010 to 2013. Similarly, the adjusted R square suggests that, after adding the variable of formal education, less variance can be explained in support for democracy.

## **Conclusion**

In general, the empirical results on the basis of the merged files suggest that female participants become more trusting but less supportive of democratic values than males in post-crisis times. People who come from advantaged social economic backgrounds expressed more trust in institutions and support for democracy after the start of the economic crisis.

Interestingly, unemployed people expressed higher levels of political trust than employed people before the recession. This may be because unemployed people were used to gaining more from social programmes, many of which were cut or curtailed as the crisis took hold. Following the crisis, the better educated became more trusting and the less educated less trusting, with the better educated expressing higher levels of support for democracy in both pre- and post-crisis times.

### **4.3.2 Separate models for each country: The individual determinants of individual civic attitudes**

As the impact of the economic crisis has been identified as uneven among participating countries, it is necessary to fit a separate model for each country for each time point to show the nuance of the relationship between education and individuals' civic attitudes. England did not participate in the 2010 to 2013 wave of the WVS, so this section only looks at Spain before and during the crisis, while Sweden, Poland and Chinese Taipei are simply controlled for general trends. Following this logic, I expect to see Spanish people behaving differently from their counterparts in other countries. Descriptive statistics for all related variables can be found in Table B in Appendices.

The functions for the sequential regression models ([1] and [2]) explained in the previous section were applied here to fit the models for each country. This began with entering a group of socio-demographic variables into Model 1: gender (0=male, 1=female), employment status (0=employed, 1= unemployed), income group (lowest group = 1, highest group =10) and people's satisfaction with the financial situation of a household (completely dissatisfied = 1, completely satisfied =10). Then the explanatory variable – highest educational level attained – was entered into Model 2 with the aim of assessing the impact of education on dependent variables after the statistical impact of some variables (social-demographic variables) is controlled for.

### **Empirical results – individual-level determinants of political trust**

Table 17 illustrates the individual-level indicators of political trust in Spain, Sweden, Poland, and Chinese Taipei for 2005 to 2007 and 2010 to 2013. The beta value for each independent variable

is presented, with the standard error in brackets. A beta value predicts if a variable makes a greater or lesser contribution to indicating the dependent variable.

According to Model 1, only 'gender' and 'satisfaction with the financial situation of household' were positively and significantly related to Spanish political trust in 2010 to 2013. In terms of the former, the female participants became more trusting than the males in difficult times, which suggests that the effects of the crisis were felt particularly by men. EurWork (2013) highlighted that the economic sectors most affected by the crash in Spain were male dominated. Interestingly, gender does not play any role in predicting political trust in Sweden, Poland and Chinese Taipei in either time point. This may indirectly confirm that Spain was indeed the most crisis-affected country of our sample.

Moreover, Spanish people's satisfaction with the financial situation of their household positively but not significantly (0.003) affected their political trust during 2005 to 2007, and while this positive correlation became significant (0.042\*\*\*) during 2010 to 2013. This means that those Spanish people satisfied with their family's financial situation continued to display political trust during the recession.

Interestingly, there was a negative but significant association between employment status and political trust in pre-crisis times (2005–07); whereas this negative association is no longer significant for 2010 to 2013. This could be because unemployed people were most likely to benefit from social programmes in pre-crisis times; and have paid much of the price of constrained budgetary policies during the recession (Dottisani and Magistro, 2016).

In Sweden, Poland and Chinese Taipei, the impact of variables measuring economic outcomes became stronger in 2010 to 2013 than 2005 to 2007. The empirical results in Table 17 indicate that Swedish and Chinese Taipei people from advantaged income groups had higher levels of political trust than others during 2010 to 2013, whereas the association between income group and political trust was not significant in 2005 to 2007. The association between satisfaction with the financial situation of the household and political trust is positive and significant for 2005 to 2007 and 2010 to 2013 for all countries apart from Spain.



Table 17 The individual-level determinants of political trust across countries at two time points.

Political trust		Spain		Sweden		Poland		Chinese Taipei	
		2005-07	2010-13	2005-07	2010-13	2005-07	2010-13	2005-07	2010-13
Model		B (std. Error)		B (std. Error)		B (std. Error)		B (Std. Error)	
Model1	Constant	2.38*** (0.066)	3.03*** (0.061)	2.22*** (0.058)	2.08*** (0.064)	1.90*** (0.056)	1.84*** (0.57)	1.84*** (0.61)	2.00*** (0.67)
	Gender(ref: males)	-0.031 (0.035)	0.91** (0.035)	0.17 (0.032)	0.046 (0.032)	0.034 (0.038)	-0.001 (0.036)	-0.037 (0.034)	0.059 (0.036)
	Employment Status (ref: employed)	-0.092* (0.036)	-0.061 (0.037)	0.053 (0.038)	0.056 (0.033)	-0.054 (0.040)	0.019 (0.037)	-0.007 (0.036)	-0.067 (0.036)
	Income group	0.017 (0.012)	-0.018 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.007)	0.045*** (0.010)	-0.006 (0.012)	0.013 (0.010)	0.002 (0.01)	0.025* (0.012)
	Satisfaction with the financial situation of household	0.003 (0.011)	0.042*** (0.010)	0.038*** (0.008)	0.039*** (0.008)	0.023* (0.009)	0.018* (0.008)	0.023** (0.009)	0.033*** (0.008)
	Adj R <sup>2</sup>	0.04	0.023	0.028	0.074	0.009	0.008	0.005	0.030
Model2									
	Highest educational level attained	-0.031*** (0.009)	-0.007 (0.009)	0.032*** (0.008)	0.038*** (0.009)	-0.007 (0.011)	0.000 (0.009)	-0.026*** (0.007)	-0.026** (0.008)
	Adj R <sup>2</sup>	0.014	0.028	0.041	0.088	0.010	0.007	0.015	0.038
	N	1187	1179	1003	1179	1000	963	1227	1237

Notes: \*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001.

Model 2 (Table 17) demonstrates the relationship between education and political trust after all the variables of statistical impact of Model 1 are eliminated. In Spain, the variable measuring an individual's education is negatively associated with levels of political trust in pre- and post-crisis times, although the association became less negative and no longer significant during crisis periods (2005–07: -0.031\*\*\*; 2010–13: -0.007).

In stark contrast to the situation in Spain, education plays a positive and important role in predicting Swedes' political trust from 2005 to 2007 (0.032\*\*\*) and 2010 to 2013 (0.038\*\*\*). In Poland's case, education negatively, but not significantly, affected political trust during 2005 to 2007 (-0.007); the negative association disappeared for 2010 to 2013 (0.000). In Chinese Taipei, there was a negative and significant association between education and political trust during 2005 to 2007 (-0.026\*\*\*), but this correlation became weaker for 2010 to 2013 (-0.026\*\*). On this basis, I found that the variable used to predict education actually helps to eliminate individuals' negative attitudes towards political trust. This means that, after the start of the crisis, well-educated people became more trusting and poorly educated people less trusting, or both became less trusting but the poorly educated more so.

Table 17 also indicates that the years that a country has had a democracy are more important in predicting levels of political trust than anything else. For example, political trust in societies under transformation, such as Poland and Chinese Taipei, is lower than that in other countries, while education in such societies has an essentially positive impact on economic performance and support for democratic values, but a negative effect on political trust (Johnson, 2005; Timothy et al., 2009). There is a negative correlation between political trust and education during 2005 to 2007 and 2010 to 2013 in Chinese Taipei; Shi (2001) notes that the Taiwanese are likely to display distrust of all formal institutions, which suggests a serious problem with political trust. In contrast, political trust in Sweden is high, because it is one of the most consolidated democracies. Well-educated people in such societies often display higher levels of political trust as they receive more benefits from the government than their counterparts in other countries.

The Adj R<sup>2</sup> in Table 17 tells how much of the variance in the dependent variable can be explained by individual-level indicators. Overall, less than 10% of the variance is explained in all countries at the two time points of 2005 to 2007 and 2010 to 2013.

### **Empirical results – individual-level determinants of democratic values**

Table 18 displays the individual-level indicators of support for democracy across participating countries in both pre- and post-crisis times. As shown in Model 1, gender had a significant positive effect (0.009\*) on Spanish support for democracy in pre-crisis times, and remained positive

(0.008), albeit not significantly, in post-crisis times. Conversely, the effects of gender on support for democracy became negative in post-crisis times in Sweden (-0.065), Poland (-0.003) and Chinese Taipei (-0.108\*\*\*). Spain behaves differently: education is the only factor significantly predicting Spanish support for democratic values after the economic crisis. Nevertheless, the relationship between education and Spanish support for democracy has actually decreased in post-crisis times.

After the crisis, those with low qualifications and skills, especially the young, were substantially affected. According to EurWork (2013), 3.3 million jobs were lost from 2008 to 2012 in Spain, one of the highest such drops in Europe. This in turn increased the number of people in danger of poverty and social exclusion (EurWork, 2013). Accordingly, social dialogue and democratic participation also fell among these people, which means that support for democracy in Spain has been eroded post-crisis (Armingeon and Guthmann, 2013; EurWork, 2013).

In the case of other participating countries, variables measuring an individual's SES, such as their employment status, income group and education, are vital in their support of democratic values, with few exceptions. The data set out in Table 18 suggests that employed, wealthy and well-educated people are more likely to display greater support for democracy than their counterparts, which exactly matches the theoretical expectation.

The Adj  $R^2$  shown in Table 18 allows me to perceive how much of the variance in the dependent variable is explained by gender, employment status, income group, financial satisfaction and highest educational level attained. Overall, less than 10% of variance is explained in all countries at two time points: 2005 to 2007 and 2010 to 2013, with an exception – Sweden. Figures in Table 18 suggest that, after adding the variable of education in Model 2, 12.6% of variance is explained in terms of support for democracy.

Table 18 Individual-level determinants of democratic values across countries at two time points.

Democratic values		Spain		Sweden		Poland		Chinese Taipei	
		2005-07	2010-13	2005-07	2010-13	2005-07	2010-13	2005-07	2010-13
Model		B (std. Error)		B (std. Error)		B (std. Error)		B (Std. Error)	
Model1	Constant	3.38*** (0.074)	3.06*** (0.060)	3.23*** (0.058)	2.94*** (0.067)	2.63*** (0.047)	2.76*** (0.48)	2.71*** (0.044)	2.75*** (0.052)
	Gender(ref: males)	0.009** (0.039)	0.008 (0.034)	-0.031 (0.032)	-0.065 (0.034)	0.004 (0.032)	-0.003 (0.030)	-0.079** (0.025)	-0.108*** (0.027)
	Employment Status (ref: employed)	0.096* (0.041)	-0.013 (0.036)	0.158*** (0.038)	0.113** (0.034)	0.029 (0.033)	0.094** (0.031)	0.039 (0.026)	-0.017 (0.028)
	Income group	-0.044** (0.003)	0.009 (0.012)	0.013 (0.007)	0.025* (0.011)	0.037*** (0.010)	0.002 (0.009)	0.011 (0.007)	0.020* (0.009)
	Satisfaction with the financial situation of household	-0.003 (0.012)	0.002 (0.009)	-0.002 (0.008)	0.027** (0.008)	-0.009* (0.008)	-0.003 (0.007)	0.006** (0.006)	-0.011 (0.007)
	Adj R <sup>2</sup>	0.012	0.001	0.038	0.041	0.014	0.006	0.013	0.016
Model2									
	Highest educational level attained	0.032** (0.010)	0.018* (0.009)	0.054*** (0.008)	0.093*** (0.009)	0.039*** (0.009)	0.044*** (0.008)	0.011* (0.005)	0.018** (0.006)
	Adj R <sup>2</sup>	0.020	0.005	0.081	0.126	0.033	0.041	0.015	0.022
	N	1187	1179	1003	1179	1000	963	1227	1237

Notes: \*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001.

## **4.4 Discussion**

This section has four main purposes; (a) interpreting and explaining the results based on the trend data analysis and two-step model; (b) analysing how far the methods used have helped answer the research questions; (c) justifying the approach; (d) critically evaluating our study. The WVS data has been used to answer two research questions: What are the effects of the economy on attitudes/values towards political trust and democracy? Is there a relationship between education and civic attitudes?

### **4.4.1 The impact of the national economy**

Initially, I constructed a composite index in order to summarise the definition of the economic crisis into a single number that includes three key dimensions: real GDP growth; the youth unemployment rate; and government debt. The results in Figure 5 (section 4.2.1) provide the nuances about when economic difficulties hit participating countries and show that its impact was uneven in England, Spain, Sweden, Poland and Chinese Taipei.

I used different terminologies to categorise different countries: Spain as the most crisis-ridden country, England assuming a middling position, Poland and Sweden being hit less, and Chinese Taipei being little affected, at least at the onset of the crisis.

Our empirical results confirm the literature on the 2008 global economic crisis and ongoing European debt crisis. In section 2.3.1, the literature suggests that Sweden seemed to avoid the recession, the UK attempted to recover from the economic crisis, Poland almost escaped the effects of the recession and has been one of the best-performing countries in real economy growth across the OECD, Spain was a late participant in the European debt crisis and hit deeply than the other participants in this study, and Chinese Taipei was geographically removed and thus less likely to have been affected (Dottisani and Magistro, 2016).

The above suggests that the index that I have created has the capacity to reflect the unique characteristics of the crisis and present the nuances better than any single macro-economic factor. This is one of the original contributions made by this project.

Nevertheless, the factors (real GDP growth, the youth unemployment rate and national debt) used to construct the index are somewhat subjective and may have a time lag. In consequence, if I want to apply this index to future research, it is necessary to test its reliability by examining it in more countries.

#### **4.4.2 The association between the economy and political trust**

To understand whether there is an association between the economy and political trust at a national level, I analysed the WVS and the ESS question items on trust regarding a number of political institutions. I found that in Spain, the most crisis-riven country, there was a sharp decline in trust in nearly all political institutions from before until after the beginning of the crisis. By contrast, in England trust fell slightly from 2008 to 2010 and recovered a little from 2010 to 2012. In Chinese Taipei, trust in political institutions generally increased during the post-crisis period. Taken together, the above findings suggest that people's political trust is highly responsive to the state of the national economy.

#### **4.4.3 The association between the economy and support for democracy**

To test the association between the economy and support for democracy at national level, I examined it merely on the basis of WVS data, as there are no consistent question items on support for democracy in the ESS dataset. The question items used to measure support for democracy more precisely pertain to the rejection of undemocratic alternatives, such as having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections; having experts, not the government, making decisions according to what they think is best for the country; having the army rule; and having a democratic political system. After testing for Cronbach's alpha, 'having experts' was removed before creating the index of support for democracy.

The literature anticipates that citizens' support for democracy will fall in economically difficult times, but not as much as their levels of political trust. The empirical evidence in Table 12 suggests that Spain's support for a strong leader and experts running the country fell gradually from 2005 to 2007 to 2010 to 2013. Here, it is important to mention that the coding principle is to use a higher score (Very good = 1; Very bad = 4) to suggest a positive attitude towards democracy, meaning that a fall in support for these represents a dip in positive attitudes towards democracy.

In a similar vein, the index of democracy in Table 14 suggests that support for democracy dipped in Spain, Sweden and Chinese Taipei, but increased slightly in Poland. Poland, as I have noted, has been the best-performing country across European participants, which could help explain the rise that has been identified, while Basora (2013) highlights its successful response to the challenges of the global financial crisis and its commitment to democracy.

More importantly, the dips and increases in Table 12 and 14 are relatively small, which reminds me to avoid over-interpreting the results. Nevertheless, the results suggest that support for

democracy is not completely immune to external factors, as it well may be affected by local conditions, to some extent.

#### **4.4.4 Formal education's effects**

The results based on the aggregated data confirm the theoretical confirmation that there is a positive correlation between formal education and adults' political trust and support for democracy as a governing system.

For aggregated data, it shows that highly-educated people have become more trusting, and poorly educated people less trusting, during the post-crisis period. With regards to the association between education and support for democracy, I find that educated people are always associated with higher levels of support for democracy, although the association has fallen following the crisis.

According to Campbell (2006), among the three education models, the absolute function and sorting mechanism models seem able to interpret the empirical results, and the cumulative model has been observed to contribute significantly to interpersonal trust by drawing upon the ESS data (Campbell, 2006). With regards to sorting mechanism, a relevant perspective is that trust largely depends on social origins, and is thus affected by individuals' socio-economic status. In other words, the higher social position that you have, the more reason you have to be trusting (Campbell, 2006). In contrast, if trust is primarily a psychological predisposition that is immune to one's social status, then the absolute function would apply.

In this particular study, the absolute function, rather than the sorting model, is chosen to interpret the results. Reflecting the theoretical framework and the methodology, the education variable in the WVS dataset is about an individual's education levels, which determines the selection of the AEM. The difficulty of applying sorting model is that it focuses on relative education. However, in the dataset, it is hard to find out the question of 'relative to whom' as the data is completely anonymous.

Referring to the literature, the impact of the economic crisis is uneven among countries. It worth mentioning that as England was be a part of the 2010 to 2013 WVS data, Spain is thus the only participant that has suffered greatly from the crisis. Taking this into consideration, I laid heavy emphasis on how differently Spanish people behaved from their Swedish, Polish or Chinese Taipei counterparts.

I find that gender positively and significantly contributes to trust in political institutions only in the case of Spain. Female Spanish were more trusting than males in harsh times, which indicates that,

in accordance with the theory, male-dominated industries have been severely affected by the crisis (EurWork, 2013).

Moreover, the variable measuring an individual's employment status is negatively and significantly related to political trust in pre-crisis times, and becomes less negative and no longer significant during post-crisis times in Spain. This finding suggests that unemployed Spaniards who used to benefit from social programmes before the crisis have paid a much heavier price than their counterparts (Dottisani and Magistro, 2016). The function of gender in employment status applies exclusively to Spain, among our participating countries, again confirming that Spain was worst affected by the economic problems.

As expected, the variable measuring education has eliminated individuals' negative attitudes towards political trust in all participating countries overall. This suggests that, after the crisis, well-educated people became more trusting and their counterparts less trusting, or both became less trusting but the poorly educated more so.

Additionally, in Spain, the association between education and political trust was negative and significant in pre-crisis times, and remained negative but insignificant post-crisis. This reminds me that although this generation in Spain has the highest level of education, it is still facing unprecedented unemployment rates.

When it comes to the relationship between education and democratic values, Spanish people also behave differently from their counterparts. Education is the only variable that makes a unique and positive contribution to the support of democratic values. Even so, when comparing the beta values in Table 18, I found that the relationship between education and support for democracy has been eroded, suggesting that democracy is not completely immune to economic conditions.

The results of the analysis (separate countries) show that education plays an important role in educating adults' political trust and support for democracy in post-crisis periods. Referring to the AEM, 'formal education works as an additive mechanism: the higher the level of education, the greater the amount of political behaviour or cognition' (Nie et al., 1996 p.97). According to Nie et al. (1996), as formal education goes up, so should individual participation in political events, interests in politics, political knowledge and tolerance. In turn, higher levels of political participation, greater political knowledge and more tolerance are usually invoked as normative goals for democracy (Nie et al., 1996). These arguments are fully supported by Galston (2001), who specifically points out that the level of political knowledge promotes a range of core values of democracy such as tolerance, attitudes towards immigrants, and the balance of self-interests and the common goods. Moreover, Delli and Keeter (1996) support the hypothesis that specific



knowledge of civil rights and civil liberties promotes tolerance for unpopular minorities. All this evidence supports my empirical result that education plays an important role in shaping adults' support for democracy.

In terms of the relationship between education and political trust, it remains debated. For instance, Nie et al. (1996) argue that people's trust in their national institutions is not strongly affected by their educational attainment. Another, different, voice stems also from education's cognitive function: education matters for individuals' political trust. This is in line with the empirical results in this project. Reflecting the literature review, Morin (1996) notes that the higher levels of political knowledge promote higher levels of diffuse support for political institutions. Galston (2001) also argues that higher levels of political knowledge make citizens less likely to experience a generalised mistrust of or alienation from public life. He (2001) regards that 'ignorance is the father of fear, and knowledge is the mother of trust'. He gives an example: 'more knowledgeable people tend to judge the behaviour of public officials as they judge their own – in the context of circumstances and incentives, with due regard for innocent oversights and errors as well as sheer chance' (Galston, 2001, p.224). The converse is that less knowledgeable people tend to view public officials' blunders as signs of bad character (Popkin and Dimock, 1999).

Furthermore, it seems that there is no direct connection between political participation and political trust, as an individual participates due to his/her trust or distrust in political institutions. But from the other viewpoint, participation enables active and experiential learning to happen in an effective way and, in turn, the boost of civic and political knowledge promotes citizens' political trust and support for democracy. This is more relevant to the other learning theory – the CoP learning perspectives in Chapter 5. I intend to explore more insights along this pathway.

In this project, there are some potential control variables missing from the analysis, such as age, ethnicity, religiosity and place of residence. These seem also to be significantly associated with adults' civic attitudes. Undoubtedly, as suggested by the existing theories and empirical evidence, they are, to a certain degree, associated with my outcome variables (political trust and support of democracy). However, they were not my research interest, so these variables were excluded from the multivariate models.

## **4.5 Limitations**

There are some limitations to the trend data analysis. First, the selection of macro-economic indicators is a little subjective. Although the composite index tells a more complete story than any single macro-economic indicator, it is imperfect because of, for example, a time lag in real GDP growth. Spain is regarded as a late participant in the European debt crisis, yet the results in Figure

5 show that Spanish people have felt the effects of the crisis since 2008. Second, there are no consistent question items measuring participants' support of democratic values in the ESS dataset, leaving me unable to compare its trend with the WVS data.

To answer the other research question: Is there a relationship between education and adults' civic attitudes? I adopted a two-steps model. The first step was simply to pool the data from all the country studies in order to examine if education is still able to predict political trust and democratic values after the impact of some social-demographic variables is removed. However, this approach disregards that individuals nested in a country share unobserved characteristics, which causes an underestimation of standard errors because the within-group correlation across individual units is not taken into consideration (Moulton, 1986; Bryan and Jenkins, 2013).

To consider the hierarchical nature of the WVS data, I fit separate models to each country in Step 2, so providing more detailed analysis on individual correlates of individuals' civic attitudes. This approach has the advantage of allowing estimates of the coefficients on individual-level characteristics to vary among countries (Bryan and Jenkins, 2013). But any country's effect is included in the intercept term in each country's regression model (Bryan and Jenkins, 2013). The small size of the highest units (there are only four participating countries) does not encourage me to use either multivariate analysis at country level or multilevel modelling to investigate countries' effects on individual's civic attitudes.

Additionally, as England did not participate in the 2010 to 2013 wave of WVS dataset, Spain is the only participant country in the data that has suffered heavily from the economic crisis. After the latest data is released in 2016, it would be better to involve more countries affected by the crisis in testing my research questions.

In section 4.3, the two step model, the R square values seem very low in both the aggregated and separate country models, which may be challenged by readers and researchers. It is important to mention that the R square values are normally small in the area of citizenship learning. Using the literature, I have analysed how formal education facilitates adults' attitudes towards democracy, as well as promotes the level of political trust via its cognitive function, by drawing upon a number of theoretical and empirical studies. This means that there are strong theoretical and empirical reasons to test the said relationship by using multivariate models, although the R square values are not as good as expected.

## Chapter 5: The effects of learning contexts

This chapter tests the effects of the CoP learning theory on young adolescents' civic attitudes by analysing the ICCS 2009 dataset. It mainly includes three parts of data analysis: (a) descriptive statistics based on original variables, as well as new variables; (b) CFA; (c) MLA.

### 5.1 Descriptive information on students (original variables)

Descriptive information illustrates how young adolescents look in general at a group of measures. It helps me to understand at the outset how participants differ across participating countries. In this section, descriptive statistics calculate and compare English, Spanish, Swedish, Polish and Chinese Taipei students' means on civic attitudes, demographic and CoP-associated measures.

#### 5.1.1 Young people's political trust and support for democracy

First, I had to recode some variables, such as those reflecting students' political trust and endorsement of democratic values. The order/value of these variables' response (decreasing order) were not in line with other variables (increasing order). The principle of recoding is to use a higher score to indicate a positive trend.

Below is an example of how I recoded variables. The values in 'political trust' range from 1 to 4, indicating four levels of students' attitudes towards a number of political institutions as:

IS2G27A	Label
1	COMPLETELY
2	QUITE A LOT
3	A LITTLE
4	NOT AT ALL

After recoding variables, the variable was changed into:

R_IS2G27A	Label
1	NOT AT ALL
2	A LITTLE
3	QUITE A LOT
4	COMPLETELY

The same procedure was then applied to other required items, including students' support for democratic values and youth participation, both inside and outside school, in order to simplify the interpretation of the results.

Table 19 Means and standard deviations of the dependent variables

Scales/items		England	Spain	Sweden	Poland	Chinese Taipei
Political trust (1not at all-4completely)	The national government	2.82 (0.74)	2.68 (0.82)	2.80 (0.72)	2.22 (0.79)	2.41 (0.72)
	The local government of your town or city	2.71 (0.73)	2.81 (0.82)	2.71 (0.70)	2.50 (0.78)	2.54 (0.71)
	Courts of justice	2.87 (0.77)	2.71 (0.80)	2.94 (0.76)	2.72 (0.82)	2.82 (0.77)
	The police	3.02 (0.87)	2.86 (0.88)	2.95 (0.89)	2.39 (0.93)	2.75 (0.78)
	Political parties	2.36 (0.75)	2.30 (0.79)	2.60 (0.74)	1.99 (0.75)	2.13 (0.71)
	National parliament	2.55 (0.82)	2.52 (0.83)	2.81 (0.76)	2.17 (0.78)	2.54 (0.78)
Democratic Values (1strongly disagree-4strongly agree)	Everyone should always have the right to express their opinions freely	3.57 (0.56)	3.78 (0.48)	3.63 (0.57)	3.69 (0.52)	3.77 (0.45)
	All people should have their social and political rights respected	3.41 (0.63)	3.60 (0.63)	3.48 (0.63)	3.50 (0.63)	3.71 (0.52)
	People should always be free to criticise the government publicly	3.04 (0.74)	3.14 (0.79)	3.10 (0.77)	3.25 (0.73)	2.99 (0.83)
	All citizens should have the right to elect their leaders freely	3.44 (0.64)	3.64 (0.58)	3.52 (0.63)	3.55 (0.57)	3.62 (0.58)
	People should be able to protest if they believe a law is unfair	3.25 (0.70)	3.52 (0.61)	3.51 (0.62)	3.37 (0.59)	3.14 (0.78)

To achieve a basic image of how individuals' civic attitudes are distributed across countries, the mean level of students' attitudes towards civic institutions and basic democratic values is displayed in Table 19. The items are scaled from 1 to 4, with a higher score suggesting a positive attitude. The figures demonstrate that all participants showed a strong endorsement of democratic values, that is, that everyone should always have the right to express their opinions freely; all people should have their social and political rights respected; and so on.

Compared to their support of democratic values, students demonstrated low levels of trust of political institutions, especially political parties. Moreover, I found that there were cross-country differences in young adolescents' trust in political institutions: Sweden displayed the highest level of trust in all political institutions, followed by England, Spain and Chinese Taipei; while Poland had the lowest level of trust.

### **5.1.2 Learning communities**

To provide a basic sense of students' behaviours in some important CoP – such as in families, peer groups, in the classroom, inside and outside school (the wider communities) – by country, the mean levels of a series of items reflecting these five scales is shown in Table 20. For the first three scales, the answer ranges from 1 to 4, with a higher score predicting more frequent engagement in family, peers and classroom discussions in terms of social and political issues. Overall, in all participating countries, students were more often involved in classroom discussions, followed by family discussions, whereas they seem to engage in peer discussion less frequently. Specifically, with regard to an 'open classroom climate', the data shows that teachers are still playing the dominant role: students bringing up current political events for discussion in class happens least often in an open classroom.

On students' participation both inside and outside school, the answers ranged from 1 to 3, with a higher score meaning greater engagement in out-of-school and in-school activities. Through comparison, I found that young people participated more often in school-based organisations than outside school communities.

The places that successfully encourage young people to participate or discuss with other CoP members are the most influential socialisation agents in developing citizenship characteristics. I believe that open classrooms are powerful than families; while families are more influential than peer groups, our participants are more likely to be affected by school-based participation than wider community participation.

Table 20 Descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) of learning contexts

		England	Spain	Sweden	Poland	Chinese Taipei
Family discussion (1 Never or hardly ever – 4 Daily or almost daily)	Talking with your parent(s) about political or social issues	1.67 (0.94)	1.72 (0.97)	1.67 (0.90)	1.99 (0.97)	1.85 (0.96)
	Talking with your parent(s) about what is happening in other countries	2.09 (0.95)	2.22 (0.97)	1.68 (0.81)	2.22 (0.90)	2.20 (1.00)
Peer discussion (1 Never or hardly ever – 4 Daily or almost daily)	Talking with friends about political or social issues	1.50 (0.84)	1.32 (0.65)	1.42 (0.73)	1.57 (0.80)	1.55 (0.80)
	Talking with friends about what is happening in other countries	1.67 (0.83)	1.64 (0.82)	1.68 (0.81)	1.84 (0.85)	1.82 (0.92)
Open classroom climate (1 Never - 4 Often)	Students are able to disagree openly with their teachers	3.02 (0.88)	2.94 (0.94)	3.29 (0.80)	2.98 (0.88)	2.59 (0.93)
	Teachers encourage students to make up their own minds	3.37 (0.82)	2.73 (1.05)	3.27 (0.83)	3.25 (0.89)	3.00 (0.89)
	Teachers encourage students to express their opinions	3.42 (0.79)	3.37 (0.87)	3.36 (0.81)	3.32 (0.88)	3.35 (0.86)
	Students bring up current political events for discussion in class	2.42 (0.88)	1.98 (0.87)	2.52 (0.88)	2.35 (0.90)	2.11 (0.82)
	Students express opinions in class even when their opinions are different from most of the other students	3.07 (0.83)	2.94 (0.91)	3.02 (0.82)	2.98 (0.87)	2.94 (0.93)
	Teachers encourage students to discuss the issues with people having different opinions	2.89 (0.89)	2.47 (0.99)	2.68 (0.90)	2.39 (0.96)	2.84 (0.96)
	Teachers present several sides of the issues with people having different opinions	3.06 (0.90)	2.89 (0.95)	2.68 (0.83)	3.07 (0.90)	3.05 (0.91)
YP outside school (1. No. I have never done this – 3. Yes, I have done this within the last 12 months)	Youth organisation affiliated with a political party or union	1.23 (0.58)	1.08 (0.34)	1.11 (0.41)	1.06 (0.32)	1.79 (0.79)
	Environmental organisation	1.23 (0.53)	1.23 (0.51)	1.11 (0.39)	1.66 (0.75)	1.23 (0.54)
	Human rights organisation	1.11 (0.40)	1.17 (0.47)	1.10 (0.39)	1.23 (0.55)	2.11 (0.87)
	A voluntary group doing something to help the community	1.54 (0.75)	1.33 (0.61)	1.18 (0.49)	1.53 (0.78)	1.26 (0.56)
	An organisation collecting money for a social issue	1.64 (0.77)	1.46 (0.70)	1.30 (0.59)	1.69 (0.81)	1.64 (0.81)
	A cultural organisation based on ethnicity	1.17 (0.49)	1.10 (0.37)	1.09 (0.38)	1.19 (0.49)	2.44 (0.74)
	A group of young people campaigning for an issue	1.23 (0.54)	1.29 (0.59)	1.19 (0.51)	1.38 (0.67)	1.45 (0.70)
YP inside school (1. No. I have never done this – 3. Yes, I have done this within the last 12 months)	Voluntary participation in school-based music or drama activities outside of regular lessons	1.96 (0.85)	1.93 (0.78)	1.80 (0.75)	1.87 (0.80)	1.05 (0.28)
	Active participation in a debate	1.74 (0.83)	1.78 (0.85)	1.66 (0.84)	1.46 (0.73)	1.12 (0.40)
	Voting for <class representative> or <school parliament>	2.27 (0.79)	2.58 (0.70)	2.30 (0.70)	2.77 (0.52)	1.04 (0.24)
	Taking part in decision-making about how the school is run	1.81 (0.81)	1.72 (0.83)	1.79 (0.82)	1.85 (0.83)	1.24 (0.57)
	Taking part in discussions at a <student assembly>	1.50 (0.71)	1.58 (0.80)	1.79 (0.82)	2.10 (0.87)	1.13 (0.43)
	Becoming a candidate for <class representative> or <school parliament>	1.56 (0.75)	1.82 (0.83)	1.54 (0.72)	1.89 (0.84)	1.08 (0.34)

### 5.1.3 Demographic variables

When it comes to demographic variables, students in Sweden have more books at home.

Students in all sampling countries scored highly on the ICCS international cognitive test, compared with the ICCS average of 500 scale points (Schulz et al., 2010b).

Table 21 Descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) of geographic variables

Variables		England	Spain	Sweden	Poland	Chinese Taipei
Ethnicity (0 Other language, 1=language of test)		0.93 (0.26)	0.81(0.40)	0.85 (0.36)	0.99 (0.12)	0.83 (0.38)
Family cultural capital (books at home) (1-10 books=1, 11-25=2; 26-100=3;101-200=4; 201-500=5; More than 500 books =6)		3.41 (1.45)	3.56(1.30)	3.72 (1.33)	3.63 (1.27)	3.30 (1.38)
Gender (0=male, 1=female)		0.52 (0.50)	0.51(0.50)	0.50 (0.50)	0.50 (0.50)	0.48 (0.50)
PV1CIV (civic score)		519 (103.1)	507 (86.7)	537 (99.8)	539 (97.9)	562 (94.0)
Parental highest educational level (did not complete level 1=1 – ISCED level 5A or 6 =6)		3.78 (1.03)	3.37 (1.44)	4.17 (1.02)	3.64 (0.89)	3.48 (1.01)
Students' opportunity to participate (Not offered at school=1, All or nearly all =5)	Activities related to environment, geared to the local area	3.58 (1.00)	3.84 (1.18)	3.06 (1.30)	3.76 (0.71)	3.28 (0.79)
	Human rights projects	3.51 (1.06)	3.55 (1.32)	2.45 (0.69)	3.58 (1.10)	3.07 (0.82)
	Activities related to underprivileged people or group	4.03 (0.97)	3.32 (1.34)	3.24 (0.62)	3.60 (0.89)	3.33 (0.71)
	Cultural activities (for example, theatre, music, cinema)	4.46 (0.68)	4.42 (1.34)	3.23 (0.63)	4.35 (0.69)	3.59 (0.82)
	Multicultural and intercultural initiatives within the <local community>	3.36 (1.02)	3.11 (1.21)	2.94 (0.71)	3.14 (1.06)	3.13 (0.91)
	Campaigns to raise people's awareness, such as <AIDS World Day, World no Tobacco Day>	3.90 (1.01)	3.95 (1.12)	2.78 (1.29)	4.43 (0.68)	3.66 (0.80)
	Activities related to improving facilities for the <local community>	2.95 (0.98)	2.39 (1.17)	2.64 (1.20)	2.80 (1.10)	3.10 (0.96)
	Participating in sports events	4.73 (0.53)	4.11 (0.89)	4.29 (0.97)	4.43 (0.62)	4.07 (0.75)
Students' shared decision-making on how school is running (Not at all=1, to a larger extent =4)	Teaching/learning materials	2.82 (0.75)	1.54 (0.66)	2.32 (0.59)	2.59 (0.72)	2.39 (0.80)
	The timetable	2.47 (0.82)	1.59 (0.71)	2.44 (0.66)	2.67 (0.88)	2.20 (0.84)
	Classroom rules	3.14 (0.74)	2.96 (0.77)	3.24 (0.61)	3.79 (0.46)	3.58 (0.58)
	School rules	3.14 (0.71)	2.59 (0.72)	3.22 (0.62)	3.56 (0.50)	2.96 (0.70)
	<Extra-curricular activities>	3.38 (0.66)	2.73 (0.84)	2.97 (0.69)	3.55 (0.56)	3.26 (0.61)

Civic score (Schulz et al., 2010a, p.75)

## 5.2 Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA)

### 5.2.1 Results: political trust and support for democracy


Figure 6 illustrates the hypothesised two-factor CFA model of individuals' civic attitudes. In general, it displays a fairly good model fit for the two-factor CFA model. In this project, the model-data fit was tested by using a range of fit indices. Table 22 sets out the selected AMOS output for a hypothesised two-factor model able to provide a model-fit summary. The fit indices in Table 22 demonstrate that although the Chi Square value (4319.871) did not suggest the model fit, alternative fit indices (for example, CFI (.924), NFI (.924)) do predict that the model fits the data fairly well. Moreover, a RMSEA of .0743 falls in the range of expected values although it is still tolerable in the large size dataset (N=18,023) (Byrne, 2010).

Table 22 Selected AMOS output for hypothesised two-factor model: goodness-of-fit statistics

Chi Square	Df	RMSEA	CFI	NFI
4319.871	43	.0743	.924	.924

Below, Figure 6 demonstrates how selected items construct the scales. As noted earlier, the 'political trust' scale is comprised of six question items. These questions assess the level ('1 = Not at all, 2 = A little, 3 = Quite a lot and 4 = Completely') to which students trusted or did not trust the political institutions. All six items fit this dimension very well.

Figure 7 Hypothesised two-factor CFA model of individuals' civic attitudes



Similarly, the 'democratic values' scale consists of five question items which allow me to evaluate students' degrees of agreement ('1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Agree and 4 = Strongly



disagree’) with the statement about what a society should be. The data shows that all five variables fit the scale properly.

Figure 6 also displays the correlations between the two latent variables – political trust and democratic values – indicating that they are correlated badly, with a value of 0.08. This empirical result supports our theoretical expectation: although students’ political trust and support of democratic values are two dimensions of an individual’s civic attitudes, they are essentially two different things, and are associated with different factors.

### 5.2.2 Results: learning communities

Figure 7 illustrates the hypothesised five-factor CFA model of learning contexts. Overall, it shows that the data fits the model fairly well.

In this project, the model-data fit was tested by using a group of fit indices. The fit indices in Table 23 demonstrate that, although it is not strictly fitting in terms of the Chi square test, the alternative fit indices (i.e. CFI, NFI and RMSEA) do predict that the model fits the data fairly well. Specifically, values for both NFI and CFI are around .90, which means that the model satisfactorily fit the data; while the RMSEA value of .0491 – less than .05 – also indicates a good model fit (Byrne, 2010).


Table 23 Selected AMOS output for hypothesised five-factor model: goodness-of-fit statistics

Chi Square	Df	RMSEA	CFI	NFI
10785.851	242	.0491	.881	.878

To some extent, the above fit indices may be challenged by researchers, therefore it is important to compare and contrast fit indices in the IEA ICCS 2009 study. According to Ainley et al. (2011, p.167), the results of the CFA of scales reflecting students’ behaviours, such as political discussion, community participation and school participation, are: ‘the RMSEA indicated a close model fit whereas NFI and CFI suggests some lack of fit’. In comparison, the fit indices in the IEA ICCS technical report is quite similar to my result. Considering the high quality and the methodological rigour of the IEA ICCS 2009 study, I have a strong theoretical reason to include them in my research.

As shown in Figure 7, two questions were selected to measure family discussion. These evaluated how frequently students were involved in family discussion around social and political affairs which had recently happened (‘Never or hardly ever; Monthly; Weekly; and Daily or almost daily’). Both items fit ‘family discussion’ well, displaying factor loadings of 0.66 and 0.77.

Figure 8 Hypothesised five-factor CFA model of learning contexts



Similarly, two questions were chosen to represent ‘peers’ discussion’. These assessed how frequently young adolescents were engaged in peer discussions about social and political affairs which had recently happened. The factor loadings ranged from 0.66 to 0.76, indicating that they fit the scale fairly well.

Next, seven questions were used to measure ‘open classroom climate’, requiring students to answer how frequently (‘Never; Rarely; Sometimes; and Often’) they thought that social and

political affairs were discussed during normal classes. The factor loadings ranged from 0.39 to 0.68. There is a weak but positive correlation between ‘family discussions’, ‘peer discussions’, and ‘open classroom climate’. In Table C and D in the Appendix, it is easy to see that the scale of ‘open classroom discussion’ developed by this project is slightly different from the similar scale in the IEA ICCS 2009 study: the latter did not include the question item IS2G16A, whereas the other question items were the same as mine. As suggested by Ainley et al. (2011), removing this question item ensures a good model fit. Nevertheless, this project includes it, as the question item IS2G16A (students are able to disagree openly with their teachers) is a crucial indicator reflecting student-led open classroom discussions (Gniewosz and Noack, 2008; Godfrey and Grayman, 2014).

The latent variable ‘youth participation outside school participation’ comprised seven questions that asked students if they had participated in civic-related activities outside school (‘within the last 12 months; More than a year ago; Never done this’). The range of factor loadings was from 0.42 to 0.61

Finally, the latent variable ‘youth participation inside school participation’ included six questions asking students if they had participated in civic-related activities inside school (‘Within the last 12 month; More than a year ago; Never done this’). The factor loadings ranged from 0.40 to 0.58.

For these two latent variables – ‘youth participation outside school participation’ and ‘youth participation inside school participation’ – the questions items covered in these two scales are exactly the same as those developed by IEA ICCS 2009, which provides a strong rationale to keep all the question items, although the factor loadings for certain question items were a little low.

Furthermore, Table E in the Appendix displays the reliabilities of students’ participation in a range of communities, such as family, peer groups, open classroom, and youth participation inside and outside school contexts. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the reason for developing these scales by myself, rather than directly using the existing scales in IEA ICCS 2009, is the different structure of the scales. One of the most important differences is that the scale ‘political discussion’ in IEA ICCS 2009 was split into two new scales – family discussions and peer discussions – in my work.

According to Table E in the Appendix, the country reliabilities for ‘political discussion’ range from 0.68 to 0.81, which suggests a satisfactory to high level of internal consistency. In comparison, the reliabilities of the new scales developed in this project seems lower than ‘political discussion’. For instance, the reliabilities of family discussion range from 0.63 to 0.73 among five participating countries, whereas the country reliabilities of peer discussion range from 0.55 to 0.74. Here, it is important to analyse the reasons behind the lower scores of reliabilities for these two new scales, as well as mentioning the potential problems that I might meet when I interpreted the results in

the subsequent analysis. One of the key factors affecting a scale's reliability is the number of question items. Referring to the new scales, each of them include only two question items. In a future study, their reliabilities can be larger or lesser, and improved by increasing question items. The other thing that should be noted here is that, although the Cronbach's alphas are expected to be above .70 to ensure the reliability, a value of .55 should be tolerated. For certain scales, country reliabilities of around .50 can always be found in the IEA ICCS technical report, which suggests that this can be tolerated in large sample size data (Ainley, 2011). Moreover, when I interpret the results later in this project, I need always to bear this in mind and think about methods to improve the reliabilities in future studies.

Pertinently, Figure 7 also demonstrates the statistical relationship between learning communities. Overall, five different CoPs all positively correlated with each other and worked well together according to the model-fit indices. The correlation varies between different CoP because, at any one time, an individual student belongs to various such communities, which are interlinked, overlapped, nested and even contradictory each other (Hughes et al., 2007, p.172; Hoskins et al., 2012).

The quantified relationship among contexts reflects the finding in the literature that there are connections among learning contexts. As Figure 7 shows, there is a positive and strong correlation between 'family discussion' and 'peer discussion', which suggests that students who are most likely to talk with parents also always participate in peer discussion. There is also a positive, moderate correlation between 'youth participation inside school' and 'youth participation outside school'; between 'family discussion' and 'youth participation inside school'; between 'peer discussion' and 'youth participation inside school'; and between 'open classroom climate' and 'youth participation inside school'. These positive, moderate correlations predict that young people's experience of joining any communities may lead them to participate more in practice.

However, as the nature of the analysis is quantitative, I am unable to provide explicit reasons for how people's experience in a community affects their practice in others. I can, though, borrow some lessons from the literature to understand the connections. In Biesta et al. (2009), participant Matt (aged 16–17) is a living example. Although he was dissatisfied with the bureaucratic rules in his school, his outside-school voluntary experience and democratic family relationships helped him to counterbalance the negative impact of school, and played an important role in his learning. In another words, Matt's negative experience in school largely reduced his democratic experiences in his family and his voluntary experiences in clubs (sporting and leisure-related). By looking at Matt's story, I can also enhance our understanding of the connections among learning

contexts. In the future, it may be worth performing some mixed-method research that allows for more nuances about the relationships among communities.

### **5.3 Overall descriptive information on students (new variables)**

This section presents descriptive statistics based on new created variables. Seven scales were built thanks to a self-defined theoretical framework, and statistically confirmed via confirmatory factor analyses. Before I put these variables into multilevel models, I created seven new scales out of old variables (new scales are created by computing the means of old variables) by using SPSS. To demonstrate a clear picture of the variables adopted in the following multilevel analysis, I also present the following descriptive statistics in the case of newly created scales.

The dependent variables included in Table 24 are students' political trust and their support of basic democratic values. Overall, participants' political trust is not as high as their support for democratic values. Swedish students expressed the highest level of trust (2.80); English students were second (2.72); Spanish students were third (2.65); Chinese Taipei students fourth (2.53); and Polish students last (2.33).

The general trend of support for democratic values seems relatively high in all countries; Spanish students show the highest levels of support (3.54); followed by Polish students (3.47); Swedish students (3.44); Chinese Taipei students (3.45); and English students (3.34). Unsurprisingly, I found that young adolescents' political trust is country-specific, whereas the support for democratic values seems universally high.

The variables of our interest are family discussion, peer discussion, open classroom climate and youth participation outside and inside school. I found that in all countries, students have more positive perceptions of openness in classroom discussion, in comparison with their experience in family and peer groups. Additionally, young people were more likely to participate in school-based activities than wider community activities in all countries.

The control variables in Table 24 include both student and school-level indicators. No large differences were found regarding gender and ethnicity across countries. Swedish students, as expected, come from more advantaged family backgrounds (they had more books at home and had well-educated parents) than other countries. In similar vein, schools' SES in Sweden is greater than in the other four countries.

Table 24 Descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) for variables

Variables			England (N=2901)	Spain (N=3292)	Sweden (N=3432)	Poland (N=3247)	Chinese Taipei (N=5151)
Dependent variables	Political trust		2.72 (0.56)	2.65 (0.58)	2.80 (0.61)	2.33 (0.60)	2.53 (0.58)
	Democratic values		3.34 (0.46)	3.54 (0.40)	3.44 (0.46)	3.47 (0.42)	3.45 (0.42)
Geographic variables/ control variables	Level 1 (Student)	Ethnicity (0=Other language, 1=language of test)	0.93 (0.26)	0.81 (0.40)	0.85 (0.36)	0.99 (0.12)	0.83 (0.38)
		Family cultural capital (1-10 books=1 – More than 500 books =6)	3.41 (1.45)	3.56 (1.30)	3.72 (1.33)	3.63 (1.27)	3.30 (1.38)
		Gender (0=male, 1=female)	0.52 (0.50)	0.51 (0.50)	0.50 (0.50)	0.50 (0.50)	0.48 (0.50)
		PVICIV (civic knowledge score)	519 (103.1)	507 (86.7)	537 (99.8)	539 (97.9)	562 (94.0)
		Highest parental educational level (did not complete level 1=1 – ISCED level 5A or 6 =6)	3.78 (1.03)	3.37 (1.44)	4.17 (1.02)	3.64 (0.89)	3.48 (1.01)
		Level 2 (School)					
		Social economic background of school (did not complete level 1=1 – ISCED level 5A or 6 =6)	3.77 (0.41)	3.37 (0.79)	4.17 (0.37)	3.64 (0.43)	3.48 (0.46)
		Students opportunity to participate (Not offered at school=1, All or nearly all =5)	3.82 (0.46)	3.59 (0.64)	2.68 (0.75)	3.77 (0.53)	3.41 (0.58)
		Students shared decision-making with school (Not at all=1, to a larger extent =4)	2.99 (0.58)	2.28 (0.48)	2.16 (0.44)	3.23 (0.42)	2.87 (0.51)
Explanatory variables	Family discussion (1never or hardly ever – 4Daily or almost daily)		1.88 (0.82)	1.97 (0.83)	1.85 (0.81)	2.11 (0.81)	2.02 (0.85)
	Peer discussion (1never or hardly ever – 4Daily or almost daily)		1.59 (0.72)	1.48 (0.62)	1.55 (0.68)	1.71 (0.72)	1.69 (0.75)
	Open classroom climate (1 Never-4 Often)		3.03 (0.60)	2.76 (0.60)	2.97 (0.57)	2.90 (0.58)	2.84 (0.59)
	Youth participation outside school (1. No. I have never done this – 3. Yes, I have done this within the last 12 months)		1.31 (0.37)	1.24 (0.34)	1.16 (0.31)	1.39 (0.39)	1.13 (0.25)
	Youth participation inside school (1. No. I have never done this – 3. Yes, I have done this within the last 12 months)		1.81 (0.50)	1.90 (0.47)	1.81 (0.49)	1.99 (0.47)	1.78 (0.46)

## 5.4 Multilevel analysis (MLA)

### 5.4.1 Results: Political trust

This section investigates the impact of CoP theory associated variables: family discussion, peer discussion, open classroom climate, and youth participation outside and inside school, on individual students' learning about civic attitudes; or alternatively, whether underlying factors, such as a school's SES determines young adolescents' civic attitudes. To achieve the first aim, I conducted MLA with each participating country and explored how different CoPs shape students' learning about political trust by controlling a group of demographic variables (i.e. gender, ethnicity, etc.). To achieve the second aim, I revised the order of models and observed whether the underlying factors played a significant role in fostering young teenagers' learning about political trust.

Furthermore, this thesis also interests in exploring how much of the variance in political trust is explained by the CoP and school associated factors across these five countries. Referring to the third research question, this study initially calculated the intraclass correlation coefficient for an unconditional model. In the unconditional model, the total variation in outcome was divided between variation over students and variance on a school level. This model works as baseline for comparison with subsequent models:  $\sigma^2$  refers to the total variance in outcomes within school that can be explained, while  $\tau_{00}$  represents the total explainable variation at level 2 (schools). Thus, the function of the intraclass correlation coefficient represents the explainable variance explained at level 2 is:

$$\text{Intraclass correlation coefficient} = \frac{\tau_{00}}{\tau_{00} + \sigma^2}$$

The value after calculation is the variances explained at school level, while the remaining at individual level.

Secondly, the proportion of variance explained by the conditional model was calculated via subtracting the total variance in conditional model from the total variance in the unconditional model and then dividing by the total variance in the unconditional model. The function of the proportion of variance is:

$$\text{Reduction} = \frac{\tau_{00}(\text{Unconditional}) - \tau_{00}(\text{Conditional})}{\tau_{00}(\text{Unconditional})}$$

The data analyses in all five countries were in a similar fashion to ensure cross-country comparisons by using two-level MLM.

#### 5.4.1.1 Variation in political trust: individual level vs. school level

According to the unconditional MLM results in Table 25, explainable variances over students in five countries were larger than between-school variance. Specifically, most of the variance was within schools (classrooms): 97% of the variance explained at the individual level in Chinese Taipei, 96.7% in Sweden, 96.2% in England, 94.7% in Spain and 91% in Poland. Overall, it shows that most of the variation in political trust was among young adolescents within schools (i.e. 97% in Chinese Taipei), which means that characteristics among students within a school were more diverse than the characteristics across schools.

Table 25. Proportion variance explained at two levels across countries (political trust)

Political trust		England	Spain	Sweden	Poland	Chinese Taipei
Unconditional Model (M1)						
N	L1	2916	3309	3464	3249	5167
	L2	124	148	166	150	150
Intraclass Correlation Coefficient	L1	96.20%	94.70%	96.70%	91.00%	97.00%
	L2	3.80%	5.30%	3.30%	9%	3.00%
M1 with control variables (M2)						
Variance explained (%)	L1	2.30%	1.20%	3%	2.80%	0.60%
Variance explained (%)	L2	16.70%	11.10%	50%	12.10%	0%
M2 with explanatory variables (M3)						
Variance explained (%)	L1	6.90%	5.20%	7.70%	7.70%	2.80%
Variance explained (%)	L2	33%	22.20%	58.30%	30.30%	10%

The unconditional model (M1) serves as a baseline that is used to do comparisons with following complex models. In M2, the unconditional model is extended to include control variables at both student and school level. As shown in Table 25, there was a small reduction in the level 1 residual variance: 2.3% (England), 1.2% (Spain), 3% (Sweden), 2.8% (Poland) and 0.6% (Chinese Taipei) of the level 1 variance in outcome was accounted for by the control variables added; but the reduction is relatively large in the level 2: 16.7% (England), 11.1% (Spain), 50% (Sweden), 12.1% (Poland) and 0% (Chinese Taipei) of the variance is explained by the control variables added. These indicated that political trust seems to be a school-related attitude as after the school-level control variables were added, the results became less homogenous: for example, 50% of variance was explained in Sweden, but 0% in Chinese Taipei.

To perceive the variances explained by the CoP-associated variables, M2 is extended to include explanatory variables (M3). The results in Table 25 demonstrated that after added explanatory variables, i.e. family discussion, peer discussion and etc. a small proportion of variance explained at level 1 in all countries, whereas a significant amount of variance was explained at level 2.



#### **5.4.1.2 The effects of control variables**

As shown in M2 in Table 26, ethnicity was positively and significantly associated with political trust in all countries except in England. This predicts that in England, English who compared to participants from other ethnicities were more inclined to show lower levels of political trust. The relationship between gender and political trust is inconsistent across countries. There was a negative and significant correlation between gender and political trust in England, this indicates that compared to boy, girls tended to show lower levels of political trust. In contrary, girls had higher levels of political trust in Spain, Sweden and Poland than boys. This relationship is not significant in Chinese Taipei, and this means there was no much difference between boys' and girls' attitudes towards political institutions.

With regards to the family cultural capital and political trust, it showed that the more books have at home, the higher political trust young adolescents tended to obtain. However, it worth mentioning that when young adolescents' home has more than 500 books, the correlation still remains positive and significant in England, Sweden and Chinese Taipei, whereas the correlation is no longer significant in Spain and Poland.

Moreover, what school-level factors are significantly related to political trust at the eighth-grade level in England, Sweden, Poland and Chinese Taipei. There were three school-level variables added as control variables in M2 in Table 26: schools' SES, students' opportunities to participate inside and outside school activities and students share decision-making with school. The results showed that their effects on students' political trust vary among countries. A school's SES positively and significantly affect English and Swadesh's political trust, but negatively and significantly impact on Polish's.

The more often schools offered students opportunities to participate in civic-related activities, the more prone Spanish and Chinese Taipei students were to display higher levels of political trust. But in the same situation, Swedish tended to display lower levels.

Another school-level indicator – students sharing decision-making on how a school is running – also matters. In Sweden, the more that students' voices were heard by the school, the more likely they were to display higher levels of political trust, whereas this correlation is negative but significant in Chinese Taipei.

### 5.4.1.3 The effects of the CoP-associated variables

The standardised estimates set out in M3 in Table 26 demonstrate that all CoP-associated variables were positively and significantly related to political trust in all countries, with few exceptions. One such exception was peer discussion. The data shows a negative and significant relationship between peer discussion and adolescents' levels of political trust in all participation countries, entirely contrary to our expectations. The other is that youth participation outside school plays a negative and significant role in affecting students' political trust only in Sweden.

Specifically, students who participated more in family discussion, open classroom discussion, inside school activities and wider communities were more likely to show higher levels of political trust in five countries. We found that open classroom climate demonstrates the most positive and significant impact on political trust among five political socialisation agents. According to Table 26, with the increase of one unit of open classroom discussion, there will be an increase of 0.175/0.163/0.171/0.129/0.114 of level of political trust in England, Spain, Sweden, Poland and Chinese Taipei respectively. In contrary, the empirical results also show that with the increase of one unit of peer discussion, students' level of political trust will decrease 0.016/0.024/0.036/0.034/0.035 accordingly in these five countries.

Referring to the relevant literature, the political socialisation effects of peer group is usually studied within schools/classrooms. Yet, the empirical results in this study argued that peer discussion and open classroom discussion were significantly related to political trust, but in different directions. The most significant difference between them is that former has teachers serving as safeguard of the knowledge, whereas the latter has no trustworthy people to play the same role. By way of reminder, this study targeted 14-year-olds in all participating countries, our participants may be young enough for trustworthy role models to help develop their knowledge and steer them away from cynicism.

The above evidence work together to help fill in the research gap as previous studies has rarely done research on the impact of the CoP perspectives on political trust. The empirical results in this study suggest that political trust can be learnt in the same way as students learn other civic competence, i.e. cognition on democracy, voting and so on, through interaction, debate, discussion and conflict with other CoP members in the real world.

Table 26 Parameter estimates and standard errors for the analysis of political trust.

Factor	England			Spain			Sweden			Poland			Chinese Taipei		
	M1	M2	M3	M1	M2	M3	M1	M2	M3	M1	M2	M3	M1	M2	M3
Fixed effects	2.721	2.465	1.928	2.648	2.514	1.920	2.800	1.489	1.246	2.334	2.196	1.594	2.528	2.212	1.836
constant	(0.006)	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.006)	(0.063)	(0.066)	(0.005)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.007)	(0.103)	(0.099)	(0.005)	(0.101)	(0.102)
Ethnicity (reference: other)		-0.080	-0.038		0.060	0.081		0.029	0.098		0.318	0.306		0.025	0.031
		(0.017)	(0.017)		(0.012)	(0.012)		(0.013)	(0.013)		(0.036)	(0.035)		(0.009)	(0.009)
11-25 books		0.091	0.053		0.133	0.110		0.111	0.106		0.146	0.094		0.093	0.076
		(0.017)	(0.017)		(0.021)	(0.20)		(0.023)	(0.022)		(0.025)	(0.024)		(0.013)	(0.013)
26-100 books		0.168	0.107		0.150	0.119		0.108	0.093		0.150	0.082		0.107	0.074
		(0.016)	(0.016)		(0.019)	(0.019)		(0.021)	(0.020)		(0.023)	(0.023)		(0.012)	(0.012)
101-200 books		0.185	0.113		0.128	0.086		0.110	0.085		0.111	0.032		0.107	0.065
		(0.017)	(0.017)		(0.020)	(0.020)		(0.022)	(0.021)		(0.024)	(0.023)		(0.013)	(0.013)
201-500 books		0.212	0.129		0.094	0.044		0.122	0.090		0.133	0.047		0.118	0.076
		(0.019)	(0.019)		(0.022)	(0.021)		(0.022)	(0.022)		(0.025)	(0.025)		(0.015)	(0.015)
More than 500 books		0.109	0.034		NS	NS		0.049	NS		NS	-0.062		0.053	NS
		(0.021)	(0.021)					(0.024)				(0.026)		(0.016)	
Gender (reference: boy)		-0.029	-0.068		0.043	NS		0.041	NS		0.121	0.062		NS	-0.023
		(0.009)	(0.009)		(0.008)			(0.009)			(0.008)	(0.009)			(0.007)
ISCED LEVEL 1		-0.218	-0.219		NS	NS		0.450	0.341		NS	NS		0.413	0.387
		(0.067)	(0.066)					(0.063)	(0.062)					(0.092)	(0.091)
ISCED LEVEL 2		-0.244	-0.250		NS	NS		0.285	0.160		0.274	0.217		0.343	0.321
		(0.037)	(0.036)					(0.053)	(0.052)		(0.065)	(0.063)		(0.089)	(0.088)
ISCED LEVEL 3		-0.167	-0.183		0.074	0.090		0.281	0.175		0.144	0.098		0.340	0.308
		(0.034)	(0.033)		(0.035)	(0.035)		(0.051)	(0.050)		(0.045)	(0.043)		(0.088)	(0.087)
ISCED LEVEL 4 OR 5B		-0.198	-0.214		NS	NS		0.309	0.204		0.226	0.180		0.370	0.332
		(0.035)	(0.034)					(0.051)	(0.050)		(0.046)	(0.045)		(0.088)	(0.088)
ISCED LEVEL 5A OR 6		-0.148	-0.170		0.125	0.143		0.331	0.213		0.162	0.112		0.382	0.352
		(0.034)	(0.033)		(0.036)	(0.035)		(0.050)	(0.049)		(0.045)	(0.044)		(0.088)	(0.088)

Factor	England			Spain			Sweden			Poland			Chinese Taipei		
	M1	M2	M3	M1	M2	M3	M1	M2	M3	M1	M2	M3	M1	M2	M3
Schools' social economic background		0.097 (0.015)	0.087 (0.014)		NS	NS		0.107 (0.015)	0.090 (0.014)		-0.164 (0.017)	-0.162 (0.016)		NS	NS
Students are offered opportunities to participate		NS	0.025 (0.011)		0.021 (0.009)	0.021 (0.009)		- 0.016 (0.007)	- 0.016 (0.007)		NS	NS		0.017 (0.008)	NS
Students share decision-making with school		NS	NS		NS	NS		0.038 (0.012)	0.049 (0.011)		NS	NS		-0.028 (0.009)	-0.028 (0.009)
Family discussion			0.039 (0.006)			0.050 (0.006)			0.087 (0.007)			0.093 (0.006)			0.034 (0.005)
Peer discussion			-0.016 (0.007)			-0.024 (0.008)			-0.036 (0.008)			-0.034 (0.007)			-0.035 (0.005)
Open classroom climate			0.175 (0.008)			0.163 (0.008)			0.171 (0.008)			0.129 (0.008)			0.114 (0.006)
YP_outside school			0.078 (0.013)			0.096 (0.013)			-0.117 (0.014)			0.163 (0.012)			0.093 (0.014)
Yp_inside school			0.075 (0.010)			0.050 (0.010)			0.081 (0.010)			0.059 (0.010)			0.061 (0.008)
-2loglikelihood	29101.509	27280.259	26426.016	34396.218	33899.822	33000.386	37911.581	36068.767	35089.031	34409.993	33652.834	32502.502	53343.123	52459.379	51760.452

#### **5.4.1.4 Results based on the reversed models (Table 27)**

As I have noted, the empirical results show that a significant amount of variance is explained at school level: which predicts that students' political trust is a school-related variable. Moreover, after adding school-level variables, the result became less homogenous. This requires me to examine the effects of school, after removing the statistical impact of all CoP theory variables from the model. Following this rationale, in Table 27, the CoP variables work as control variables, while the school-level variables become variables of interest.

After controlling the CoP variables, I found that a school's SES strongly and positively affects Swedes' and English's political trust; and positively but not significantly affects Chinese Taipei students' political trust. Schools which offered more opportunities to participate in civic-related activities were more likely to educate students with higher levels of political trust in England and Spain; Schools which shared decision-making with students tended to bring about higher levels of political trust among English students, but lower levels among Chinese Taipei students. Thus after removing the impact of the CoP theory associate variables, schools were still found to be important. The -2 Log Likelihood fell consistently in all countries: indicating that the model fit was improved.

Table 27 Parameter estimates and standard errors for the analysis of political trust.

Factor Political trust	England			Spain			Sweden			Poland			Chinese Taipei		
	M1	M2	M3	M1	M2	M3	M1	M2	M3	M1	M2	M3	M1	M2	M3
Fixed effects constant	2.721 (0.006)	1.963 (0.027)	1.928 (0.084)	2.648 (0.006)	1.962 (0.026)	1.920 (0.066)	2.800 (0.005)	2.115 (0.028)	1.245 (0.081)	2.334 (0.007)	1.471 (0.027)	1.594 (0.099)	2.528 (0.005)	2.020 (0.022)	1.836 (0.102)
Family discussion		0.044 (0.006)	0.039 (0.006)		0.043 (0.006)	0.050 (0.006)		0.087 (0.007)	0.087 (0.007)		0.084 (0.006)	0.093 (0.006)		0.029 (0.004)	0.034 (0.005)
Peer discussion		-0.015 (0.007)	-0.016 (0.007)		-0.026 (0.008)	-0.024 (0.008)		-0.040 (0.008)	-0.036 (0.008)		-0.041 (0.007)	-0.034 (0.007)		-0.032 (0.005)	-0.035 (0.005)
Open class climate		0.159 (0.007)	0.175 (0.008)		0.156 (0.007)	0.163 (0.008)		0.188 (0.008)	0.171 (0.008)		0.139 (0.007)	0.129 (0.008)		0.103 (0.006)	0.114 (0.006)
YP_outside school		0.087 (0.012)	0.078 (0.013)		0.113 (0.013)	0.096 (0.013)		-0.133 (0.014)	-0.117 (0.014)		0.179 (0.011)	0.163 (0.012)		0.117 (0.013)	0.093 (0.014)
Yp_inside school		0.057 (0.009)	0.075 (0.010)		0.037 (0.010)	0.050 (0.010)		0.100 (0.010)	0.081 (0.010)		0.053 (0.010)	0.059 (0.010)		0.043 (0.008)	0.061 (0.008)
Schools' social economic background			0.087 (0.014)			-0.002 (0.008)			0.090 (0.014)			-0.162 (0.016)			0.021 (0.011)
Students are offered opportunities to participate			0.025 (0.011)			0.021 (0.009)			-0.016 (0.007)			0.017 (0.013)			0.010 (0.008)
Students share decision-making with school			0.004 (0.009)			-0.020 (0.012)			0.049 (0.011)			0.003 (0.017)			-0.028 (0.009)
Ethnicity (reference: other)			-0.038 (0.017)			0.081 (0.020)			0.098 (0.013)			0.306 (0.035)			0.031 (0.009)
11-25 books			0.053 (0.017)			0.110 (0.020)			0.106 (0.022)			0.094 (0.024)			0.076 (0.013)
26-100 books			0.107 (0.016)			0.119 (0.019)			0.093 (0.020)			0.082 (0.023)			0.074 (0.012)
101-200 books			0.113 (0.017)			0.086 (0.020)			0.085 (0.021)			0.032 (0.023)			0.065 (0.013)
201-500 books			0.129 (0.019)			0.044 (0.021)			0.090 (0.022)			0.047 (0.025)			0.076 (0.015)

Factor		England			Spain			Sweden			Poland			Chinese Taipei		
Political trust		M1	M2	M3	M1	M2	M3	M1	M2	M3	M1	M2	M3	M1	M2	M3
Gender	More than 500 books			0.034 (0.021)			-0.025 (0.023)			0.020 (0.024)			-0.062 (0.026)			0.002 (0.016)
	(reference: boy)			-0.068 (0.009)			-0.002 (0.008)			0.006 (0.008)			0.062 (0.009)			-0.023 (0.007)
	ISCED LEVEL 1			-0.219 (0.066)			0.017 (0.036)			0.341 (0.062)			0.000 (0.000)			0.387 (0.091)
Parents' highest educational level	ISCED LEVEL 2			-0.250 (0.036)			0.048 (0.034)			0.160 (0.052)			0.217 (0.063)			0.321 (0.088)
	ISCED LEVEL 3			-0.183 (0.033)			0.090 (0.035)			0.175 (0.050)			0.098 (0.043)			0.308 (0.087)
	ISCED LEVEL 4 OR 5B			-0.214 (0.034)			0.045 (0.036)			0.204 (0.050)			0.180 (0.045)			0.332 (0.088)
	ISCED LEVEL 5A OR 6			-0.170 (0.033)			0.143 (0.035)			0.213 (0.049)			0.112 (0.044)			0.352 (0.088)
Random part (variances)																
School/classroom			41.7%	33.3%		16.7%	22.2%		33.3%	58.3%		12.1%	30.3%		10%	10%
Individual																
Explained in %			4.3%	6.9%		4.0%	5.2%		5.5%	7.2%		5.8%	7.7%		1.9%	2.8%
-2loglikelihood		29101.509	28144.422	26426.016	34396.218	33529.569	33000.386	37911.581	36527.982	35089.031	34409.993	33139.090	32502.502	53343.123	52684.856	51760.451

## 5.4.2 Results: democratic values

### 5.4.2.1 Variation in attachment to democratic values: individual level vs. school level

As shown in Table 28, explainable variances at an individual level were larger than between-school variance, which is similar to the results of the other outcome variable – political trust. Most of the variances were explained within schools/classrooms: 96.2% in Spain, 95.6% in Chinese Taipei, 94.2% in Poland, 93.8% in Sweden, and 92.8% in England. To summarise, the most of the variation in democratic values was among students within schools, and this is in line with the result of political trust.

Table 28 Proportion variance explained at two levels across countries (democratic values)

Democratic Values		England	Spain	Sweden	Poland	Chinese Taipei
Unconditional Model (M1)						
N	L1	2916	3309	3464	3249	5167
	L2	124	148	166	150	150
Intraclass Correlation Coefficient	L1	92.80%	96.20%	93.80%	94.20%	95.60%
	L2	7.20%	3.80%	6.20%	5.80%	4.40%
M1 with control variables (M2)						
Variance explained (%)	L1	4.30%	4.00%	5.50%	5.80%	1.90%
Variance explained (%)	L2	41.7%	16.70%	33.30%	12.10%	10%
M2 with explanatory variables (M3)						
Variance explained (%)	L1	6.90%	5.20%	7.20%	7.70%	2.80%
Variance explained (%)	L2	33.30%	22.20%	58.30%	30.30%	10%

Moreover, M1 can be seen as a baseline that can be used to compare with following models. I add both individual and school-level variables in M2, which demonstrates there was a small reduction in the level 1 residual variance: 5.8% (Poland), 5.5% (Sweden), 4.30 (England), 4.00 (Spain) and only 1.9% (Chinese Taipei) of the level 1 variance in outcome was due to the control variables added. However, the reduction is relatively large in the level 2: 12.10% (Poland), 33.30% (Sweden), 41.7% (England), 16.7% (Spain) and 10% (Chinese Taipei) of the variance is explained after adding the control variables. These suggested that democratic values, similar to political trust, is a school-related attitude. But, the results in Table 28 shows that the results remained homogenous after adding the school-level variables. As a result of this, I will not further explore the relationship between schools and students' attachment to democratic values.



#### **5.4.2.2 The effects of control variables**

The results for democratic values are presented in Table 29. Among the control variables, only ‘civic knowledge score’ and ‘schools shared decision-making’ demonstrated the expected positive relationship with students’ attachment to democratic values. With regard to ethnicity, immigrant students expressed stronger attachment to democratic values than their counterparts in all countries except Spain. The association between family cultural capital and students’ support for democracy varied among participating countries: positive and significant in England and Spain; negative and significant in Sweden and Poland; while in Chinese Taipei, students with less than 200 books at home were more likely to express support for democracy, while this negative association become positive (albeit not significant) when students had more than 200 books at home.

Gender was negatively and significantly associated with support for democracy in Spain, Sweden and Chinese Taipei: which suggests that boys in these countries are more likely to express high levels of support for democracy. The impact of a student’s SES (parents’ highest educational level) is mixed when it comes to young people’s support for democracy. It is negative and significant in England and Spain; positive and significant in the remainder of participating countries.

In terms of school-level control variables, a school’s SES was negatively associated with all participant countries’ support for democracy, although only significant in England, Spain and Poland. Additionally, Spanish and Chinese Taipei students were more prone to show high levels of support for democracy when they had been offered opportunities to participate. English and Swedish students expressed greater attachment to democracy when they shared in decision-making with schools.

Table 29 Parameter estimates and standard errors for the analysis of democratic values

Factor Democratic values		England			Spain			Sweden			Poland			Chinese Taipei		
		M1	M2	M3	M1	M2	M3	M1	M2	M3	M1	M2	M3	M1	M2	M3
Fixed effects constant		3.334 (0.006)	2.474 (0.085)	2.209 (0.064)	3.531 (0.004)	2.886 (0.038)	2.836 (0.040)	3.443 (0.005)	2.518 (0.063)	2.312 (0.062)	3.467 (0.004)	2.605 (0.058)	2.492 (0.059)	3.441 (0.004)	2.286 (0.068)	2.230 (0.069)
Ethnicity (reference: other)			-0.093 (0.013)	-0.070 (0.013)		0.030 (0.008)	0.033 (0.007)		-0.115 (0.010)	-0.073 (0.010)		-0.067 (0.024)	-0.075 (0.024)		-0.014 (0.006)	-0.012 (0.006)
	11-25 books		0.120 (0.013)	0.097 (0.013)		0.064 (0.014)	0.055 (0.014)		-0.040 (0.016)	-0.040 (0.016)		0.013 (0.016)	0.000 (0.016)		-0.036 (0.009)	-0.040 (0.009)
	26-100 books		0.100 (0.012)	0.062 (0.012)		0.080 (0.013)	0.071 (0.013)		-0.056 (0.015)	-0.065 (0.014)		-0.004 (0.015)	-0.019 (0.015)		-0.037 (0.008)	-0.045 (0.008)
	Family cultural capital															
	101-200 books		0.103 (0.013)	0.058 (0.013)		0.064 (0.013)	0.055 (0.013)		-0.043 (0.015)	-0.058 (0.015)		-0.017 (0.016)	-0.035 (0.016)		-0.001 (0.009)	-0.010 (0.009)
	201-500 books		0.089 (0.014)	0.037 (0.014)		0.081 (0.014)	0.074 (0.014)		-0.047 (0.016)	-0.067 (0.016)		-0.040 (0.017)	-0.056 (0.017)		0.003 (0.010)	-0.007 (0.010)
	More than 500 books		0.122 (0.016)	0.077 (0.016)		0.098 (0.015)	0.087 (0.016)		-0.044 (0.017)	-0.059 (0.017)		-0.025 (0.018)	-0.045 (0.018)		0.020 (0.011)	0.010 (0.003)
Gender (reference: boy)			0.001 (0.007)	-0.022 (0.007)		-0.023 (0.005)	-0.043 (0.006)		-0.040 (0.006)	-0.064 (0.006)		0.000 (0.006)	-0.015 (0.006)		-0.054 (0.004)	-0.061 (0.005)
	ISCED LEVEL 1		0.273 (0.051)	0.274 (0.050)		-0.061 (0.024)	-0.060 (0.024)		0.134 (0.045)	0.059 (0.044)		0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)		0.149 (0.062)	0.145 (0.062)
Parents' highest educational level	ISCED LEVEL 2		-0.038 (0.028)	-0.043 (0.028)		-0.089 (0.023)	-0.091 (0.023)		0.357 (0.038)	0.275 (0.037)		0.058 (0.043)	0.049 (0.043)		0.139 (0.060)	0.135 (0.060)
	ISCED LEVEL 3		-0.083 (0.026)	-0.096 (0.025)		-0.067 (0.023)	-0.066 (0.023)		0.289 (0.036)	0.222 (0.035)		0.095 (0.030)	0.085 (0.029)		0.158 (0.060)	0.151 (0.060)
	ISCED LEVEL 4 OR 5B		-0.097 (0.026)	-0.110 (0.026)		-0.067 (0.024)	-0.060 (0.024)		0.330 (0.036)	0.263 (0.035)		0.103 (0.031)	0.095 (0.030)		0.157 (0.060)	0.148 (0.060)
	ISCED LEVEL 5A OR 6		-0.062 (0.026)	-0.077 (0.025)		-0.058 (0.023)	-0.055 (0.023)		0.323 (0.035)	0.248 (0.035)		0.128 (0.030)	0.120 (0.030)		0.160 (0.060)	0.153 (0.060)

Factor Democratic values	England			Spain			Sweden			Poland			Chinese Taipei		
	M1	M2	M3	M1	M2	M3	M1	M2	M3	M1	M2	M3	M1	M2	M3
Schools' social economic background		-0.027 (0.011)	-0.034 (0.011)		-0.026 (0.005)	-0.026 (0.005)		-0.011 (0.012)	-0.021 (0.011)		-0.021 (0.009)	-0.019 (0.009)		-0.001 (0.007)	0.001 (0.007)
Students are offered opportunities to participate		0.003 (0.009)	0.005 (0.009)		0.010 (0.005)	0.010 (0.005)		-0.035 (0.006)	-0.035 (0.005)		0.000 (0.007)	0.003 (0.007)		0.013 (0.006)	0.012 (0.006)
Students share decision-making with school		0.037 (0.007)	0.032 (0.007)		-0.005 (0.007)	-0.007 (0.007)		0.026 (0.009)	0.030 (0.009)		0.007 (0.009)	0.006 (0.009)		-0.003 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.006)
Family discussion			0.033 (0.005)			0.022 (0.004)			0.048 (0.005)			0.023 (0.004)			0.011 (0.003)
Peer discussion			-0.019 (0.005)			-0.024 (0.005)			-0.006 (0.006)			-0.026 (0.004)			-0.005 (0.004)
Open classroom climate			0.106 (0.006)			0.083 (0.005)			0.122 (0.006)			0.042 (0.005)			0.032 (0.004)
YP_outside school			0.008 (0.010)			-0.078 (0.009)			-0.052 (0.010)			0.015 (0.008)			-0.028 (0.009)
Yp_inside school			0.061 (0.008)			0.011 (0.006)			0.041 (0.007)			0.021 (0.007)			0.022 (0.005)
-2loglikelihood	21623. 303	17800. 659	17245. 779	19449. 314	17498. 202	17049. 203	25662. 067	22222. 331	21407. 634	20675. 326	17703. 826	17534. 570	34245. 938	28674. 527	28495. 337

### **5.4.2.3 The effects of the CoP-associated variables**

Similar to political trust, CoP theory associated variables had a positive and significant impact on students' support for democracy, with a few exceptions. As shown in Table 29, the more peer discussion that was had, the more English, Spanish and Polish students expressed lower support for democracy. Moreover, youth participation outside school had a mixed impact on students' attachment to democracy: positive but not significant in England and Poland; negative and significant in Spain, Sweden and Chinese Taipei.

## **5.5 Discussion**

This section does four main things: (a) interprets and explains the descriptive statistics, CFA and MLA results; (b) analyses how far the methods used have answered the second research question; (c) justifies our approach and (d) critically evaluates the study.

The IEA ICCS 2009 study is adopted to help answer the second research question: Is there a relationship between education and civic attitudes?

### **5.5.1 Young adolescents' political trust and support for democracy**

Through looking at the descriptive information on young people's political trust and support for democratic values, I find that young people normally have strong endorsement of democratic values, but express relatively low levels of political trust in all participating countries. The CFA model of political trust and democracy predicts a positive, albeit weak association between these two factors (.08). This suggests they are in fact two different things related to different indicators, which matches our theoretical expectation.

Nevertheless, I should note that the result is derived from the aggregated IEA ICCS 2009 data (merged data from England, Sweden, Spain, Poland, Chinese Taipei), and the participants were year 8 young adolescents. The next round of IEA data will be available online at the end of 2016, which can provide with more information on youth civic attitudes.

### **5.5.2 Young adolescents' participation in Communities of Practice (CoP)**

The descriptive statistics on learning contexts also provide useful information on the distribution of young people's participation in different learning contexts. This project creates five scales to represent Wenger' CoP learning theory: family discussion, peer discussion, open classroom climate, and youth participation inside and outside school. The first three dimensions place

emphasis on students' discussion with parents, peers, classmates and teachers; while the last two dimensions focus on students' participation inside and outside school.

I find that, when compared with discussing political issues with parents and peers, students are more motivated to engage in an open classroom discussion. Young people also felt more likely to engage in school activities than outside community activities.

In the following analysis, I test the connections between learning contexts by using aggregated data. Based on Figure 6, I find that all learning contexts positively correlate with each other and were quite high. For example, the correlation between the scale of 'family discussion' and 'peer discussion' was strong and positive (0.77), and the correlation between 'youth participation inside school' and 'youth participation outside school' was positive (0.47) too. These positive correlations predict that an individual student belongs to various CoPs at any one time. Additionally, they suggest that students' positive experience in any of these communities will lead them to join other communities.

As this part of research was completed through CFA, I am unable to provide explicit reasons for how these contexts work together or contradict each other. Nevertheless, I borrowed some empirical evidence from Biesta et al. (2009), which helps better to understand the links between contexts via participants' stories. That is to say, negative experience of a community can be negated by positive experiences from other communities, which suggests that the connection between communities is of greater importance.

On the basis of the CFA model, I go further and explore the impact of CoP theories on adolescents' learning of political trust and democratic values by using MLA. Studies of CoP theory have become more common recently in the education arena, but research has mainly focused on how it develops certain types of young students' citizenship competence, for example democratic values and political participation, such as voting (Hoskins et al., 2012). Research focusing on how CoP theory affects the learning of political trust is rare. This means that the literature on this relationship is sparse, yet also that this contribution is unique and meaningful.

### **5.5.3 The effects of the CoP learning perspectives**

The empirical evidence based on the multilevel analysis confirms that all CoP-related variables matter for young people's civic attitudes – political trust and attachment to democratic values in England, Spain, Sweden, Poland and Chinese Taipei, although the impact of contexts (i.e. family, peer groups etc.) varies. Its success in five democracies suggests the applicability of the CoP learning theory to shaping youth civic learning in a wide range of countries that are associated with diverse cultures.

Moreover, the crucial roles of sites, that is, family, peer groups, schools and their members, that is, parents, friends and teachers, in shaping young people's citizenship learning have also been documented and confirmed by a number of studies. For instance, through an eight-year longitudinal study into citizenship learning in England, Kerr (2005, p.88) demonstrates some insightful perspectives on the nature and character of citizenship learning:

Young people's development of citizenship dimensions (knowledge, skills, understanding, attitudes and behaviours) is complex and influenced by a range of interrelated factors and influences. These influences include contextual characteristics... or factors, 'sites' of citizenship education (school, family, peer groups, community) and the various actors (teachers, parents, friends) that take part in the (formal and informal) educational processes at these different 'sites'.

It is interesting to find that these sites are in line with the scales representing the CoP learning theory, while teachers, parents and friends resemble the possible CoP members in communities. Galston (2001) also mentions that non-educational institutions and processes, for example families, voluntary associations and concrete political events, among others, are matters for civic formation.

Considering the fact that the CoP perspectives are crucial for young people's civic learning that renders more support for core democratic values and trust in political institutions, it is important to understand how young people improve their knowledge, skills, attitudes and behaviours through the CoP learning approach.

The findings in a longitudinal study by Biesta et al. (2009) provide us with an understanding approach: young people learn by way of the experiences that they bring into any sites (their prior learning), as well as from the different relationships and contexts that they find themselves in. This approach matches the core concepts of the CoP learning theory, which suggests that learning is not a single action but a mutual engagement that develops through 'relationships, interactions and conflicts that occur in the process of reproducing and adapting communities' (Wenger, 1998; Hoskinset al., 2012, p.421). It also guides me to think about the relationship between the CoP learning theory and young people's civic attitudes; that is, young people learn from parents, peers (classmates and friends) and all possible CoP members in both inside- and outside-school communities. Through participating in these communities, they constantly build up knowledge, refine knowledge and are confronted with completely different views, which in turn enables them to boost their civic and political knowledge through real-life experiences. Referring to the literature, greater civic and political knowledge positively affects adults' support for democracy, and avoids them feeling mistrust of and alienation from public life (Galston, 2001), and generates young adolescents' political trust (Torny-Purta, 2004). In brief, this evidence suggests that the CoP

learning theory is an effective learning approach in developing young people's citizenship learning and civic attitudes.

The other understanding approach used to comprehend the relationship between the CoP learning theory and young people's civic attitudes is through the impact of an open classroom climate on young people's political trust and support for democratic values.

Drawing upon the MLA results, I found that students' experience in a democratic classroom, in comparison with other contexts, affects civic attitudes the most. Similarly, the descriptive statistics show that students' open classroom discussions were more frequently encouraged and happened more often than discussions with parents or peers.

Drawing upon the existing literature, there are two potential theoretical approaches to analysing how an open classroom climate affects individual students' civic attitudes. On the one hand, an open classroom allows students a safe public place to express their views, as well as debate and disagree with other peers and teachers. The more opportunities they have for doing this, the more they are likely to feel a sense of belonging to the community. As school is a formal institution, students tend to become more trusting of other institutions. This could demonstrate how empathy works in students' lives.

On the other, an open classroom not only facilitates students' acquisition of civic knowledge (Torney-Purta, 2002; Torney-Purta et al., 2004; Campbell, 2008), but also helps to develop more insightful knowledge of political institutions. Torney-Purta et al. (2014) highlight that in consolidated democratic societies in which there is a reasonable degree of trustworthiness and transparency, knowledge about how a government operates should positively affect students' trust towards the government and support for democratic values. Through discussing and debating current affairs nationally or internationally with peers and teachers in the classroom, young teenagers tend to have a better understanding of how the government actually works, rather than merely the conceptual norms.

Together, the findings on political trust and democracy support my theoretical expectation that the CoP learning theory is an efficient approach for shaping young people's citizenship learning and civic attitudes. Moreover, as suggested by the literature, in past studies the impact of CoP perspectives on young people's cognition of democracy and participatory attitudes have been tested empirically. However, its impact on political trust has been underexplored. The above evidence fills this gap and suggests that political trust can be learnt in the same way as students learn other civic attitudes (support for democracy) and practices (voting behaviours) through interaction, debate, discussion and conflict with CoP members in the real world. This is one of the most important contributions of this study. Research focusing on how CoP theory affects the

learning of values and attitudes is sporadic, even though students' participation in communities of practice directly or indirectly fosters them. Again, this makes the empirical contribution unique and meaningful.

As I have noted, peer discussion was negatively and significantly associated with participants' political trust in all participating countries, as well as negatively and significantly related to English, Spanish and Polish support for democratic values. The literature suggests that young people show less interest in politics and seem withdrawn from the democratic process. Discussions with their peers may therefore cause them to become more cynical about political affairs and trigger negative attitudes towards formal institutions.

By way of reminder, this study targeted 14-year-olds in all participating countries. Our participants may be young enough for trustworthy role models to be able to help to develop their knowledge and steer them away from cynicism.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that the Cronbach's alpha for the scale of family discussion is .67, and for peer discussion is even lower (0.55). As acknowledged, the Cronbach's alpha is an important indicator of measuring the internal consistency of a scale; lower than .65 or .70 is normally regarded as not satisfactory. One of the potential reasons for this is that each of them (family discussion and peer discussion) contains only two question items. In general, with the increase of the question items, this scale can hopefully be improved to a satisfactory level. Also, there is a strong theoretical reason to include them. The question items adopted for these two scales are normally used to represent the definition of peer discussion and family discussion respectively. Nevertheless, it is necessary to take these lower scores into consideration, particularly in challenging the scale of 'political discussions' created by IEA ICCS 2009. Moreover, according to the IEA ICCS 2009 technical report, the country reliabilities (from .50 and over) are always lower than the reliabilities for the international pooled data (.70 and over), and this may suggest that .55 for peer discussion and .67 for family discussion can be tolerated by considering the sample size of the research (Ainley et al., 2011). Based on this, my data analysis predicts that family discussion and peer discussion affect young people's civic attitudes in different directions, which suggests that these two scales cannot be used together to form a unidimensional definition, for instance the scale of 'political discussion' in IEA ICCS 2009.

#### **5.5.4 The effects of schools**

The findings from multilevel models suggest that students' political trust and support for democracy are school-related variables: a large amount of variance is explained at school level in both cases. Schools matter in shaping young people's civic attitudes. That said, I also find that



schools themselves are not universally beneficial or detrimental to young people's political trust and support for democracy. Due to this, it is important to make the best use of CoP theories to help to negate students' negative and undemocratic experience from schools.

The data shows that a school's SES (student SES was aggregated at school level to compute the mean for school SES) positively and significantly affects English and Swedish students' levels of political trust; it negatively and significantly influences those of Polish students; and negatively but not significantly affects those of Spanish and Chinese Taipei students. With regard to the other two school-level indicators, the impact of 'students are offered opportunities to participate' and 'students sharing decision-making with school' is mixed. The former positively and significantly predicts Spanish and Chinese Taipei students' levels of political trust, whereas the latter positively and significantly contributes only to Swedish students' political trust.

When it comes to the relationship between school-level variables and adolescents' support for democracy, the results are again less conclusive. There was a negative relationship identified between a school's SES and students' support for democracy in all countries; but this was only significant in England, Spain and Poland. The data showed that students from advantaged family backgrounds are more likely to criticise or challenge democracy. The other two school-level factors – 'students are offered opportunities to participate' and 'students share decision-making with school' – also contribute to students' support for democracy. The former positively and significantly affects Spanish and Chinese Taipei students' support for democracy, and the latter positively and significantly influences English and Swedish students' support.

Moreover, after adding school-level variables, the results become less homogenous in terms of political trust. This indicates that going to different schools affects young people's trust in institutions. The data shows that, after removing the impact of CoP-associated variables, a school's SES significantly and positively affects English and Swedish students' levels of trust. The more that English and Spanish students are offered opportunities to participate, the more likely that they are to express high levels of political trust. The more that Swedish students shared decision-making with schools, the more they expressed high levels of political trust. This tells us that a school's intake plays an important role in the formulation of political trust, reinforcing the argument that 'school matters'.

## **5.6 Limitations**

The selection of countries was inspired by Green et al.'s (2009) regimes of social cohesion, with the aim of representing cross-country differences. Due to limitations of time, this project only selected five countries, representing five different regimes. Future work calls for the addition of

more countries and regimes in order to provide more solid findings. The number of participating countries (sample size = 5) also limits our capacity to explore the impacts on young people's civic attitudes, as the MLA makes heavy demands in terms of numbers of participants at the highest level.

Finally, IEA ICCS 2009 is a cross-sectional data set, rather than a longitudinal one. The latest data set will be published in 2016. Again, owing to limitations of time, I am unable to check the MLA results in the forthcoming data sets. Future research on these data is likely to have interesting and important findings.

## Chapter 6: Conclusions

This study begins with two particular research questions: (1) What are the effects of the economy on adults' attitudes/values towards political trust and democracy?; (2) Is there a relationship between education and civic attitudes? To answer them, this project drew upon two main datasets – the WVS and ESS datasets – and demonstrates the empirical results and findings in Chapters 4 and 5. In this section, the conclusions will be written around four dimensions: (6.1) an overview of the main original contributions; (6.2) discussing the most important findings thematically; (6.3) reaching out to practice by introducing Brexit and its implications; and (6.4) limitations.

### 6.1 Original contribution

#### **The development of an index of economic crisis**

To investigate the effects of the economy on adults' attitudes/values towards political trust and democracy, the project originally developed an index of economic crisis in order to measure different levels of the crash in five democracies. Reflecting upon the literature on the transfer from the 2008 financial crisis to the European debt crisis, there were three particular characteristics accompanying the economic crash, which have been explained and charted in sections 3.3.2 and 4.1.1. They are real GDP growth (annual %), the youth unemployment rate (% of total labour force aged 15–24) and government debt.

In practice, previous studies on this topic have usually analysed trends in certain macro-economic factors, such as inflation rates, GDP growth and so on separately to represent the impact of the actual national economy. However, this approach is not suitable for this particular study as focusing on any single aspect of the economic shock gives only a single dimension of the story about the economy. To a larger and lesser extent, some results may contradict each other, for example a country that has suffered a drop in real GDP growth due to the strong connectedness of the world economy but can deal well with job losses.

Due to these practical considerations and the unique characteristics of this current economic crisis noted by the existed literature, I decided to make a composite index of the economic crisis with the aim of providing a comprehensive picture of the 2008 economic crisis and ensuing European debt crisis. The development of the crisis index helps in summarising the definition of the current economic crisis into one number that targets all the key and different dimensions.

Nevertheless, the choice of variables that forms the index is somewhat subjective. To avoid or at least minimise this effect, care was taken in grounding a list of standards related to the characteristics of the crisis, the specific nature of the sampling countries, and comparability of unbiased or at least minimum biased estimates. In the future, if the crisis is prolonged, it will provide a good opportunity further to check the reliability and validity of the index of the economic crisis over years and across a number of countries.

### **The application of communities of practice theory to the topic in the context of diverse cultures**

The CoP learning theory is still an evolving approach within the area of citizenship learning. This project tests its impact in England, Spain, Sweden, Poland and Chinese Taipei, and predicts its unique and significant contributions to educate adolescents' civic attitudes through young people's everyday participation in families, peer groups, open classrooms, and inside school and wider communities.

Nevertheless, I find that the application of CoP theories should take some outside factors, such as participants' age group and the broad socio-cultural environment, into consideration. The empirical findings in Chapter 5 suggest that the scale of 'peer discussion' is negatively associated with the two outcome variables (young people's political trust and their attachment to democratic values). This could be interpreted as two potential reasons: first, in political socialisation theory, peer groups are observed to have an impact on lifestyle issues rather than civic/political issues; second, for young people, a lack of political interest, knowledge and trust may cause the social and political discussions between them to trigger misunderstanding and negative feelings about government and politics.

Among five CoP scales, the scale for 'open classroom discussion', to some extent, is similar to peer discussion. The empirical results indicate that open classroom discussion is positively and significantly related to young adolescents' civic attitudes, which seems completely different from 'peer discussion'. In terms of these two scales, the most significant difference between discussing controversial issues and peer discussion is that the former has teachers serving to safeguard the knowledge. Based on these empirical results, this project suggests the necessity of considering age groups when scholars/educators attempt to apply the CoP learning theory in practice.

Furthermore, due to the significant success of the CoP learning perspectives in England, Spain, Sweden, Poland and Chinese Taipei, I am interested in knowing whether one size fits all or, to put it simply, will the success of CoP theories in citizenship learning in five democracies (each

representing a type of regime of social cohesion) also be achieved in other countries? Here, I speculate that the success of CoP theories in citizenship learning is largely reliant on the socio-cultural environment. For instance, in some authoritarian countries, the general social-cultural environment overwhelmingly stresses the community over the individual. For instance, some government-led communities may ask their members to obey authority and be less likely to raise different perceptions. In such a context, it is necessary to take the impact of the broader social and political environment into consideration.

### **A challenge to the ICCS technical report and its use of a single combined indicator by the development of separate scales for family and peer discussion**

In this project, the use of CoP theories provides vast resources that many adolescents possess in their voluntary citizenship learning, such as parents, peer groups, and all other possible CoP members. The empirical evidence based on the MLA results in Chapter 5 confirms that all CoP-related variables positively and significantly correlated to youth political trust at the 0.01 level, with few exceptions. I find that peer discussion was negatively and significantly associated with young people's political trust in all participating countries. Researchers note that peer groups invariably chat about lifestyle issues, rather than social and political issues.

This is one of the most important and original contributions to empirical study of the topic of CoPs. In the IEA ICCS technical report, the scale for 'political discussion' is comprised of the question items of 'family discussion' and 'peer discussion'. Considering the methodological rigour of the IEA ICCS data, most researchers tend to adopt directly the scales created by the IEA rather than build their own. The empirical results from this work demonstrate that the correlation between 'family discussion' and 'peer discussion' is high (0.77), which means that these two scales were highly correlated with each other. However, the results also showed that these two factors are associated with young people's political trust in different directions, which challenges the construct validity of the scale of 'political issues' that was created by the IEA ICSS technical report. Due to this, I encourage researchers and scholars to examine their impacts separately, rather than treating them as a uniform definition of 'political discussion'.

## **6.2 The key findings**

As suggested at the beginning of this chapter, this section aims to discuss the most important findings thematically. It is therefore comprised of three sub-sections: (6.2.1) the relationships between the economy and adults' civic attitudes; (6.2.2) the effects of formal education and situated learning; and (6.2.3) the effects of school on young adolescents' civic attitudes.

### **6.2.1 The associations between the economy and adults' civic attitudes**

This project responds to the 2008 global financial crisis and ongoing European debt crisis.

Although the thesis is not able to examine the full impact so far, it is possible to examine the political consequences, as well raise awareness and develop policies to resist the negative effects of the current economic recession.

In Chapter 4, the thesis computed an index of the economic crisis by composing three macro-economic factors – real GDP growth, youth unemployment rates and national debt size – to map the effects of the current economic recession. The data provides the nuance about when the economic problems hit the countries participating in this study. Considering that the impact of the recession was uneven, I classified countries by assessing the level of the recession. For instance, Spain was marked as the most crisis-ridden country, England had a middle point, Poland and Sweden seemed to have largely avoided the economic problems and are regarded as having a low level of crisis, and Chinese Taipei was the least affected by the crisis and, at least initially, was regarded as having a zero level of recession.

Reflecting section 2.3.1, the literature documented how the recession evolved from the 2008 financial crisis to the European debt crisis, which offered a significant background to understand the economic environments for EU countries. Since the above findings are in line with the literature and current available empirical evidence, the index of the economic crisis seems reliable and can be involved in future study. It is one of the contributions, as the index of the economic crisis is able to capture the characteristics of the current recession and provide more nuances than any single macro-economic factor.

As stated in the literature, one of the most costly results of the recession involves a dramatic decrease in citizens' trust in national institutions and the continued decline of rates of approval for the free market economy (Roth, 2009; Roth et al., 2011). The findings in Chapter 4 show that citizens' political trust is highly responsive to the national economy, which proves many researchers' work (Diamond, 2011; Janmaat, 2016).

Reflecting the literature, the Lipset's modernisation theory was adopted to set up a framework to understand the relationship between the economy and adults' support for democracy, finding that wealthy and educated societies can cause societies to become more democratic (1962). The empirical evidence about the relationship between the national economy and support for democracy is less clear cut than the other outcome variable – political trust. Nevertheless, the findings in Chapter 4 suggest that support for democracy is not completely immune to the

national economy and, to some extent, depends on a country's local condition. Therefore, I suggest that the findings cannot fully prove Lipset's modernisation theory.

The above findings mainly draw upon two high-quality datasets – WVS and ESS. This project adopted a dual approach that examined the trends of political trust (democracy variables were not available in the ESS data) by using these two datasets. The data collection for the ESS dataset is every two years, which means that it is able to provide more nuances than the WVS dataset (data is collected every 5 years), so the ESS is used to verify the WVS results. This approach is able to make the best use of both datasets, as the ESS and WVS datasets have their own advantages and disadvantages.

Moreover, the other main dataset used by this study is IEA ICCS 2009. Although it was not possible to examine the trends in young adolescents' trust in national institutions and support for democracy, I find that adolescents' civic attitudes were similar to adults'. They expressed high levels of support for democracy and relatively low levels of political trust. Why are adolescents' early civic attitudes similar to adults? Do young adolescents inherit their civic attitudes from their parents? To answer these questions, the effects of formal education, situated learning and schools are to be investigated.

### **6.2.2 The effects of formal education and situated learning**

I find that formal learning and situated learning are two different, but complementary, learning approaches for shaping young people's civic/political attitudes. In this thesis, Nie et al. (1996) provided the framework to education's cognitive function, laying the groundwork for understanding how cognitive knowledge and skills help people to develop civic attitudes, while Wenger's CoP theory (1998) stresses the development of civic attitudes/behaviours via the practice, identity and relationships in real life contexts. In fact, these two learning approaches are interwoven when people are challenged by problems. For instance, the cognitive knowledge and/or skills from school are always used, and reconstructed to help us to answer real life questions, and new knowledge/skills are produced in the participating/learning process.

Recalling the literature, I discuss absolute, sorting and cumulative models within formal education, suggesting that it is important to choose a suitable model to interpret the results. In Chapter 4, the findings generated from the aggregated data predict that people who possess higher social and political status are more likely to express higher levels of political trust and support for democracy than their counterparts, which substantially mirrors the theory of the sorting model. However, I find that during the harsh times, individuals' SES, that is, their employment status, income group, satisfaction with the financial situation of household and

educational attainment, explained more variance in predicting participants' political trust, and less variance in indicating their support for democracy.

Considering that the impact of the recession is uneven across participating countries, I also give more information for each sampling country in terms of the relationship between educational attainment and civic attitudes. I found that the relationship between educational attainment and support for democracy was positive and significant at two time points in all countries.

Nevertheless, I find that in the most crisis-ridden country, Spain, this association decreased in post-crisis times, which is significantly different from the results in Sweden, Poland and Chinese Taipei.

Reflecting the literature review, there were few qualitative and quantitative studies available that examine the impact of the CoP theory on citizenship learning. One of the most relevant quantitative studies is by Hoskins et al. (2012), exploring the relationships of certain aspects of CoP with civic knowledge and participatory attitudes by using the IEA CIVED study. Inspired by this research, this thesis used the most recent dataset – IEA ICCS 2009 – to investigate associations of some aspects of the CoP learning theory with support for democratic values and political trust. By examining the associations between the CoP and support for democratic values, my empirical results prove Hoskins et al. (2012) work as the rise of civic knowledge on democracy and participation levels are crucial to support for democracy. By examining the associations between the CoP and political trust, the empirical findings suggest that young adolescents' political trust can be learnt in the same way as other civic competences (cognition about democracy and participatory attitudes) by participating in diverse communities of practice. This is one of the most important contributions of this research, as well filling the research gap, since previous studies have underexplored the associations between the CoP perspectives and political trust.

Furthermore, Hoskins et al. (2012) have shown 'the usefulness of situated learning theory in the field of civic learning, and its applicability in large-scale, quantitative studies'. This perspective is supported by my research. Moreover, I notice that the selection of country in their work is within the European Union, whereas my thesis also suggests the potential usefulness of CoP in Chinese Taipei. Using this logic, this research indicates that applicability and use of CoP in broader social contexts.

Moreover, as noted in the literature review, previous research operationalised the concepts of CoP. For instance, In Biesta's et al. (2009) qualitative research, although they identified that learning is situated in multiple communities, they pointed out the effects vary in different contexts that are substantially mediated by relationships, and are influenced by the dispositions that young adolescents bring to such situations. This thesis takes these into account. For instance,



the associations between contexts have been explored empirically (see section 5.2.2), which shows that participating in any of the communities – such as family, peer groups, classrooms and communities – tends to make young adolescents participate more in other communities. Moreover, the MLA results (see sections 5.4.1. and 5.4.2) also reflect Biesta's et al. (2009) findings that different CoPs may have different impacts on young people's civic attitudes.

Another longitudinal qualitative study by Kerr (2005) supported that young people's development of citizenship dimensions, like knowledge, skills and attitudes and so on, is complex and impacted by diverse factors. These include contextual characters or 'sites' of citizenship education, that is, school, family, peer groups and communities, as well as diverse actors, that is, teachers, parents and friends to help in the educational process. This thesis also proves Kerr's qualitative findings by using empirical results: young adolescents' social participation in family, peer groups, democratic classroom and inside school and wider communities matters to the development of civic attitudes. Some sub-scales reflecting the CoP perspective, such as family discussion, peer discussion and open classroom climates, also help us to understand the roles of parents, peers and teachers in developing citizenship learning.

The work by Hoskins et al. (2012) also provides explanatory analyses on how parents, peers and teachers affect young people's development of cognition about democracy, as well as stating that participating in school councils and so on helps student participation. Nevertheless, their work does not focus on the associations between different contexts. This part of the work can be found in this thesis as a complement to the existing research in this field.

The use of CoP theories provides vast resources that many adolescents possess in their voluntary citizenship learning, such as parents, peer groups and all other possible CoP members. The CoP theory is still an evolving approach in the field of citizenship learning. Its success in England, Spain, Sweden, Poland and Chinese Taipei contributes to knowledge in diverse civic cultures. Each community can be perceived as a curriculum/resource that offers opportunities to allow young people to participate to learn or vice versa. The application of CoP theories has assisted adolescents to span their social worlds, both in and out of school. Nevertheless, I find that when we apply CoP theories in the learning of political socialisation, it is imperative to pay attention to its drawbacks in use in a different social-cultural environment. For instance, the community is overwhelmingly stressed about individuals in authoritarianism countries, and the success of CoP theories may be at risk as it emphasises individuals' relationship, practice and identity in the community.

### **6.2.3 The effects of schools**

In Chapter 5, when I examined the MLA results I found that both students' support for democracy and political trust are school-related variables, as most of the variance was explained at school level. Additionally, it is worth mentioning that, after adding school-level variables, the results of political trust and support for democracy diverged. The former became less homogenous across participating countries, which significantly differs from the results for the latter. Inspired by this, I posit that going to different schools affects young people's trust in national institutions, and confirm my hypothesis by testing the impact of schools after removing the statistical impact of the CoP-associated variables.

Nevertheless, I found that the impact of school-level variables on students' political trust and support for democracy was mixed. The variables measuring 'students are offered opportunities to participate' and 'students share decision-making with school' did not always positively affect students' political trust and support for democracy across participating countries. Moreover, a school's SES positively and significantly affects English and Swedish students' political trust, and negatively and significantly influences Poles' trust. A school's SES negatively affects all participants' support for democracy, although it is significant only in England, Spain and Poland.

### **6.2.4 The effects of cultural differences**

This thesis selected England, Spain, Sweden, Poland and Chinese Taipei as countries for the multivariate and multilevel analyses, because these varied considerably in terms of welfare regime and economic performance during the economic recession (Green et al., 2009; Janmaat, 2016).

Initially, I found that the history of democracy matters for civic attitudes. The empirical results in Chapter 4 demonstrate that the associations between educational attainment and citizens' political trust are largely dependent on the years of democracy in a country. For instance, in a consolidated country – Sweden – educational attainment plays an important role in predicting Swedes' political trust even when the economy encounters economic problems. In countries under transformation, such as Poland and Chinese Taipei, education in these countries had an essentially positive impact on support for democracy but a negative impact on political trust. In Spain, the relationship between education and political trust was negative and significant in pre-crisis times, and remained negative but not significant in post-crisis times. This suggests that although education helps to relieve the negative impact of the crisis on participants' political trust, it does not play a determined role in predicting citizens' political trust. This reminds me that

the fact is that this generation in Spain has the highest level of education, but they are still facing unprecedented job losses.

Second, analyses of the trends in the national economy and civic attitudes in five democracies confirmed the following findings: Spain has been severely hit by the recession, and recorded sharp decreases in political trust and support for democracy; England has been assumed to locate a middle position, and recorded a fall in certain types of political trust (country's parliament); Sweden and Poland have been less affected by the recession, whereas Chinese Taipei was the best-performing country in terms of the economy, as well as demonstrating an increase in political trust (see Figure 5, Tables 9 and 10).

According to Janmaat (forthcoming), 'a country's welfare regime is important as it says something about the degree of social protection offered to citizens who become unemployed during a recession'. In countries with a free-market regime, such as England, individuals are more subject to fluctuations in the economy than societies with a universalist regime, like Sweden, which offer relatively high levels of social benefits for unemployed people both with and without employment history (Green et al., 2009; Janmaat, forthcoming). This confirms the empirical findings that Sweden performed well during the economic crisis, but that England is subject to fluctuation, with English people demonstrating worry/anger about certain types of political institutions. Moreover, Chinese Taipei belongs to the East Asian mode, highlighting the significance of the state in supporting the national economy and sustaining social cohesion, which explains why its flourishing national economy will bring high levels of political trust. In countries with a traditional regime, such as Spain, the family pays the price of the recession and helps to absorb the social pitfalls of market economy turbulence (Janmaat, forthcoming).

Third, multilevel analyses of political trust and support for democracy in five countries confirmed that usefulness of informal learning in the field of citizenship learning and its applicability to large-scale, quantitative studies. Nevertheless, it is imperative to point out that the impact of CoP learning theories varies considerably across countries. The empirical results in Chapter 5 demonstrate that, after adding five CoP-related scales, a large proportion of variance was explained at school level in Sweden (58.3%), England (33%), Poland (30.3%) and Spain (22.2%), and only 10% in Chinese Taipei. The substantial cross-country differences may reflect the fact that different regimes are associated with special and durable characters (Green et al., 2009). For instance, Spain has been portrayed as the state with education systems characterised by uniform curricula and encyclopaedism, while Poland and Chinese Taipei have been characterised as societies with exceptionally low levels of civic engagement as a result of decades of communist rule (Rose et al., 1997; Schoepflin, 2000). Therefore, going to different schools has a less powerful

influence on young people's political trust in Spain, Poland and Chinese Taipei than in Sweden and England.

Those unique regional traditions loosely represented by the five participating countries could largely affect the approaches by which young people learn active citizenship. According to Hoskins et al. (2012), learning through social participation is more effective than the teacher-centred approach in countries labelled as liberalism, individualism and egalitarianism (England and Sweden). In contrast, Hoskins et al. (2012, p.426) note that formal and traditional approaches of teaching may be more powerful in promoting 'active citizenship in countries with uniform curriculum and a marked sensitivity for social hierarchies' (Spain, Poland and Chinese Taipei).

This section attempts to analyse the impact of cultural differences on the empirical results by building a link with the theory on regimes of social cohesion. However, it is imperative to mention that regimes of social cohesion needs to be addressed with caution, as this project only selected one country loosely to represent each regime. The explanatory power, to some extent, may be limited.

### **6.3 Brexit, the economic crisis and the implications for citizenship education**


This section is developed to reaching out to practice by introducing Brexit, its relationships with the economic crisis and the implications for citizenship education. It begins by answering the question 'who voted to leave the European Union' and then bridging Brexit with the feeling of economic insecurity after the economic recession. To conclude, it gives the implications for citizenship education.

Brexit can be treated as an example of how the economic crisis is associated with political and social uncertainty. Similarly, for countries that have been severely affected by the crisis, such as Spain, I have seen the development of new political parties such as Podemos. It is an anti-austerity movement born during the economic crisis, and is confirmed as a new and powerful political force. It has been observed potentially to form a part of a left-wing alliance. Nevertheless, due to the time limits, this section will pay attention only to Brexit to remind readers to rethink the research questions raised in this thesis by looking at practice.

**Who voted to leave the European Union?** What can be achieved from the early analysis of the data on voting is that the areas and people in the UK most affected by the economic shock and austerity policies were the most likely to support Leave (Hoskins, 2016; YouGov, 2016). More


specifically, the result of the 2016 referendum is said to be split along lines of age, education, class and geography.

**Age.** It is acknowledged that, although young people did not turn out to vote in great numbers, unlike older generations they did want to remain in the European Union. Goodwin and Heath (2016, p.7) support this idea by drawing on aggregate-level data. Their empirical result demonstrates the association between the percentage of people in a local authority aged 18- to 30-years-old and the percentage that voted to leave, as well as the association between the percentage aged 65-years-old and over, and the Leave vote. They also find that in the majority of university towns and authorities that have a large proportion of young people were more likely to vote Remain. For instance, Oxford and Cambridge are the two authorities that consist of the largest proportion of people aged 18 to 30 years old, and both recorded that over 70% voted to Remain. In their survey, 16 out of 20 youngest authorities voted to Remain.



Source: Goodwin and Heath, 2016, p.8

**Education level.** Education was seen to be a particular dividing line for voting Leave or Remain. As suggested by Bowden (2016, p.2), support for Leave was 30% points higher among those with educational qualifications at or below GCSE level. In a particularly stark finding, over 70% of people with no qualification voted for Brexit, whereas 70% of those with a postgraduate degree voted to remain (Bowden, 2016). Moreover, the majority of scholars agreed on the perspective that education was a key differentiator between people who voted to remain and leave (Bowden, 2016; Unwin, 2016; Goodwin and Heath, 2016).



Source: Bowden, 2016, p.4

**Income.** Income played a huge role. Figure xx shows that 66% of people whose salary lower than 1,200 pound per month supported Leave, but with the increase of the salary, less people voted to Leave. Bowden (2016) supports this idea and further suggest that job security and type of job also matter, with people in low-skilled, not-decent, precarious jobs were more inclined to vote ‘Leave’, as were people who were under employment.



Source: Bowden, 2016, p.2

**Housing.** In addition, another factor, housing matters: 70% of those living in rented council properties voted to leave, whereas for private rental residents the figure dropped to 50%.



Source: Bowden, 2016, p.3

**Geography.** The significance of geography cannot be neglected, although there is little direct empirical evidence to support this. Most research suggests that people who live in affluent cities were more inclined to vote Remain, including London (Goodwin and Heath, 2016). In Bowden’s work, he stated that an economic crash often hits the poorest hardest. People with the lowest incomes suffered the most as a much higher proportion of their salaries was taken up by essentials such as food, energy bills and rent. All of these were influenced by the economic shock. Moreover, separate Joseph Rowntree Foundation (JRF) research has demonstrated that some of the least affluent cities and areas of the UK, many of which supported Brexit, will lose a large amount of aid money from the EU.

It is necessary to pay attention to these divisions, as they reflect the phenomenon that a considerable number of people felt unrepresented and therefore the EU referendum could be thought of as a protest, for them. The anger of those negatively affected by austerity policies and poor working conditions across the UK was triggered to vote against the EU, against mainstream

politicians who advocated remaining in the EU and against the entry of migrants (EU immigrants and Syrian refugees) (Hoskins, 2016).

Hoskins' et al. (2016, p.249) work it shows that, during the harsh times:

the European Union (EU) was seen to take a leadership role championing austerity and neoliberal economic policies whilst many of its citizens suffered and began to lose trust in the EU, its institutions and leaders'. However, the EU took a strong leadership role during the crisis and the decisions on financial austerity were seen to be imposed against the will of the people in Southern Europe' (Hoskins, blog).

Besides, national political leaders successfully shifted the blame to the EU for domestic policies that let citizens and public services suffer in the name of austerity for post-crisis recovery (Hoskins et al., 2016).

In Hoskins' interview on Brexit, she suggested that the migrant was seen as a scapegoat for many of the social ills across the UK. The low-skilled/low-qualified British were more likely to feel that EU migrants took their job opportunities. As mentioned in earlier analysis, their benefits from social programmes were cut, and these people were most affected by the austerity measures. Although the EU attempted to protect workers' rights, the UK had led the way in Europe on reducing workers' rights (Hoskins, 2016). Moreover, the Leave campaign argued that EU migrants caused pressure on public services, especially in healthcare and local schools. But Hoskins noted that public services have been insufficiently invested in by successive UK governments, and this is not the fault of the EU or migrant workers. In summary, the Remain campaign targeted the issue of economic insecurity and triggered people's anger at the EU and mainstream politicians, which led the majority of voters to become less tolerant of migration and of support for European citizenship.

Most empirical findings have argued for democracy's resilience in times of the economic crises, but they also give rise to concern for the endured shocks and impact on democracy. As mentioned in most of these works, it is worth examining the most recent data, such as the ESS, Eurobarometer or WVS, as it may give us more accurate information about the impact of the economic recession on citizens' attitudes towards democratic characteristics. Nevertheless, through exploring the factors leading to Brexit, I suggest that a rise of xenophobia and nationalism occurred in the UK. I found that those who were affected most by the crisis and were feeling disconnect with the society were more inclined to vote for Brexit. This indicates the necessity of supporting these marginalised people in a number of aspects:

(1) Education. On the one hand, we need to keep an eye on early school leavers, as formal education enables people to be competitive in the job market, and provide them knowledge and skills to assess the information about civic and political life. On the other hand, continuous

training opportunities and professional development can offer useful support more people to join the job market. For those less-educated and skilled people, the more practical way of teaching (or teaching from real-life experience) should be encouraged as they may not have enough knowledge and skills to understand dragons or technical issues. The training classes should be recorded to be learnt or reviewed by them after class. Also, for those who were living in the negative economic condition, it is worth paying attention to their psychological development. While they are worrying about 'bread and butter' issues, they are not able to obtain real benefits from the training, as they may spend too much time and energy on their current issues.

(2) After the crisis, the recovery of economy took the place of citizenship and occupied the top priority of policy. However, it is urgently needed to bring citizenship back to the top and engage people civically and socially at all levels of society. Such civic and social engagement promotes a society's social cohesion, contributes to the health of democracy and brings all people back to the social dialogue and avoids them feeling disconnected with the society after the economic crash and its accompanied austerity policies.

(3) What may be deduced from Brexit is the gap between public perspectives and empirical reality. In the opinion polls, immigration and sovereignty really matter. For the former, most narratives suggest that there is huge public misinformation and misunderstanding about the nature of immigration. The majority of Leavers wanted to take back control of their own lives and felt underrepresented by the politicians. For the latter, 'the EU took a strong leadership role during the crisis and the decisions on financial austerity were seen to be imposed against the will of the people in Southern Europe' (Hoskins, blog). Accordingly, the economic crisis also brought large-scale migration from southern and Eastern Europe to Western Europe, which made more and more of the least wealthy British feel less open and tolerant towards migration. Therefore, the voting has actually become a protest vote for many who felt that nobody represented them. Such voting actually teaches us the lesson that social participation matters. This project encourages more participation across diverse communities and the provision of more exchange programmes at all social levels. It is important to let people meet with people whom they do not know and whose perceptions they might not necessarily agree with. To achieve this aim, Wenger's CoP learning perspectives deserve people's attention.

(4) As suggested by the literature, learning through participation is one of the main characteristics of Wenger' CoP perspectives. More importantly, it places heavy emphasis on learning through relationships, negotiations and discussions with other CoP members in daily life. Therefore, people who felt unengaged with mainstream society may find easier to learn through local communities.



## 6.4 Limitations

In this project, three international well-known datasets – the WVS, the ESS and IEA ICCS 2009 – have been used to answer the research questions. This study employed a cross-sectional design and therefore causal relationship cannot be implied. Neither can the direction of any documented relationship. Besides, one of the major limitations of such data is that it does not allow researchers to address selection effects. When I worked on the cross-sectional data, I faced non-response, but I looked at the descriptive analysis of demographic variables, for example gender, for both datasets. As shown in the descriptive statistics in the thesis, nearly 50% of are males, while the rest are females, in both the WVS and ICCS data. This enables us to say that our response in demographic terms is similar to the whole population. Nonetheless, I do not know whether people who are committed to or interested in citizenship politics are more likely to participate in the WVS and ICCS study, and so on.

Moreover, for the CFA models in section 5.2, the empirical results demonstrate that fit indices are on the low side, which suggests that the model does not fit particularly well. As for the low R square in regression models in section 4.3, one possible explanation is that, again, the model does not explain the dependent variables particularly well. Nevertheless, for both analyses there are strong theoretical and empirical reasons to look at the said relationship. But it does raise a couple of questions about the validity and reliability of those models. It is typical in the field that researchers have limited explanatory power from models.

Also, these two studies are surveyed by focusing on different age groups: the sample for the WVS survey was drawn from the population aged 18 years and older, while the sample for the ESS study had participants who must be representative of all persons aged 15 and over. Considering the difference, I suggest that the older age group may develop more knowledge and participate more in organisations than the younger age group, which is all about cognitive consequences. It is also necessary to mention that the ESS data is representative, which means that only a very small portion of people aged under 18 were included in each round of the study. As a result, I should not worry too much about this difference.

Moreover, WVS and ESS adopts different answer scales for variables: the question items are max 4 scales in the WVS data while they are max 10 scales in the ESS data. This avoids me to compare the results between these two datasets. However, it is important to remind readers that the WVS data is selected as the key dataset to display the trends in individuals' political attitudes in different participating countries. Due to the data collection for the WVS study being every five years, ESS data was selected as a complement to give more nuance and validate the WVS data, as

it was collected biennially in this study. Unless the trends in national economies in these two datasets are divergent, there is no need to compare variables.

The greatest challenge of this study was to build a bridge to link the theory and data together. For example, in Chapter 4, the WVS datasets were chosen to answer the research questions.

However, the main limitation of this dataset is that there is only one variable about education (referring to formal learning), which may to some extent narrow down the meaning of learning. To fill this gap, ICCS 2009 was used in Chapter 5 to explore further how situated learning shapes young people's civic attitudes through their practice in some main social networks.

ICCS 2009 also has its own limitations. The new round of IEA ICCS was published at the end of 2016 – too late for this project. This meant that I was unable to look at countries in terms of pre- and post-crisis periods, as with the WVS datasets, due to the time limitation. In future work, it may be worth continually checking the results of MLA. Moreover, it should be noted that the WVS and ICCS 2009 data are focused on different participants; specifically, the participants in WVS are people aged 18 years and older, whereas in ICCS 2009 are young people aged around 14 years old (Year 8). Can this cause difficulties in answering research questions? The answer is probably not. The literature has suggested that young adults with low qualifications and skills are actually paying the price of the economic crisis. Some young people have chosen to go back to school and some remain neither in work nor study, which means these young adults are more likely to be marginalised after the crisis. Therefore, it is necessary to explore the extent to which education plays an important role in shaping young people's civic attitudes and pay more attention to providing youth policy to support these young people. ICCS 2009, as a quality dataset, is thus the best dataset available to explore how young people's experience and practice in diverse social networks affect their political trust and support of democratic values.

The approach used to represent CoP theories in this thesis is to create scales of learning communities based on question items in the questionnaire. This may cause readers overwhelmingly to focus on the communities themselves rather than the practice, identity and relationships in these contexts. Here, we should remind readers that the latter is of greater importance than the former.

Moreover, the number of participating countries is only five in this project (only one heavily affected by the crisis), which makes it difficult to analyse a country's effect on individuals' civic attitudes in both WVS and ICCS 2009 datasets. Further research is needed in future to include more countries in order to explore the topics further.

## Appendices



## Appendix A

Additional information for Chapter 3.

Table A. Summary statistics (means and standard deviation) for variables based on merged files at pre-crisis and post-crisis times.

	2005-07 wave of WVS	2010-13 wave of WVS
	Mean (std. Deviation)	Mean (Std. Deviation)
<b>Dependent Variables</b>		
<b>Political trust</b>	2.21 (0.61)	2.70(0.62)
<b>Democratic values</b>	3.03 (0.58)	2.99(0.57)
<b>Control variables</b>		
<b>Gender</b>	0.50(0.50)	0.52(0.50)
<b>Employment status</b>	0.57(0.49)	0.54(0.50)
<b>Income groups</b>	4.74(2.21)	4.79(1.81)
<b>Satisfaction with financial situation of household</b>	6.06(2.27)	6.21(2.36)
<b>Explanatory variable</b>		
<b>Highest educational level attained</b>	5.72(2.40)	6.03(2.38)
<b>N</b>	4403	4564

## Appendix A

### Additional information for Chapter 3.

Table B. Summary statistics (mean and standard deviation) for variables for separate countries

	Spain		Sweden		Poland		Chinese Taipei	
	2005-07	2010-13	2005-07	2010-13	2005-07	2010-13	2005-07	2010-13
<b>Dependent Variables</b>								
	2.41	2.15	2.51	2.65	1.99	2.00	1.96	2.32
<b>Political trust</b>	(0.56)	(0.57)	(0.50)	(0.56)	(0.58)	(0.54)	(0.59)	(0.61)
	3.22	3.11	3.38	3.30	2.75	2.80	2.78	2.71
<b>Democratic values</b>	(0.63)	(0.54)	(0.50)	(0.58)	(0.48)	(0.45)	(0.42)	(0.46)
<b>Control variables</b>								
	0.50	0.51	0.50	0.52	0.49	0.54	0.49	0.52
<b>Gender</b>	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)
	0.51	0.50	0.67	0.60	0.44	0.51	0.67	0.61
<b>Employment status</b>	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.47)	(0.49)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.47)	(0.49)
	4.50	4.48	6.07	5.42	4.03	4.45	4.45	4.72
<b>Income groups</b>	(1.68)	(1.62)	(2.89)	(1.85)	(1.86)	(1.93)	(1.82)	(1.69)
<b>Satisfaction with financial situation of household</b>	5.89	5.54	7.06	7.09	5.13	5.74	6.16	6.37
	(1.80)	(2.03)	(2.33)	(2.40)	(2.36)	(2.37)	(2.21)	(2.29)
<b>Explanatory variable</b>								
	4.61	4.70	6.97	7.06	5.12	5.59	6.26	6.65
<b>Highest educational level attained</b>	(2.22)	(2.18)	(2.08)	(1.95)	(1.87)	(2.14)	(2.56)	(2.45)
<b>N</b>	1187	1179	1003	1179	1000	963	1227	1237

## Additional information for Chapter 3.

Table C. A comparison between the developed scales reflecting learning contexts in this project and the scales used in ICCS 2009.

Scales developed in this project		ICCS 2009 scales	
Category	Summary description	Category	Summary description
Family discussion (1 never or hardly ever – 4 Daily or almost daily)	a. (IS2G13A) Talking with your parent(s) about political or social issues  b. (IS2G13F) Talking with your parent(s) about what is happening in other countries	Political discussion (1 never or hardly ever – 4 Daily or almost daily)	a. (IS2G3A)  b. (IS2G13D) Talking with friends about political and social issues  c. (IS2G13F)  d. (IS2G13G) Talking with friends about what is happening in other countries
Peer discussion (1 Never or hardly ever – 4 Daily or almost daily)	a. (IS2G13D) Talking with friends about political and social issues  b. (IS2G13G) Talking with friends about what is happening in other countries		
Open classroom climate  (1 Never-4 Often)	a. (IS2G16A) Students are able to disagree openly with their teachers  b. (IS2G16B) Teachers encourage students to make up their own minds  b. (IS2G16C) Teachers encourage students to express their opinions  c. (IS2G16D) Students bring up current political events for discussion in class  d. (IS2G16E) Students express opinions in class even when their opinions are different from most of the other students  e. (IS2G16F) Teachers encourage students to discuss the issues with people having different opinions  f. (IS2G16G) Teachers present several sides of the issues when explaining them in class	Open classrooms  (1 Never-4 Often)	a. (IS2G16B) ; b. (IS2G16C)  c. (IS2G16D); d. (IS2G16E)  e. (IS2G16F)  f. (IS2G16G)
YP_outside school  (1. No, I have never done this – 3. Yes, I have done this within the last 12 months)	a. (IS2P14A) Youth organisation affiliated with a political party or union  b. (IS2P14B) Environmental organisation  c. (IS2P14C) Human rights organisation  d. (IS2P14D) A voluntary group doing something to help the community  e. (IS2P14E) An organisation collecting money for a social issue  f. (IS2P14F) A cultural organisation based on ethnicity  g. (IS2P14H) A group of young people campaigning for an issue	Community participation  (1. No, I have never done this – 3. Yes, I have done this within the last 12 months)	a. (IS2P14A); b. (IS2P14B)  c. (IS2P14C); d. (IS2P14D)  e. (IS2P14E); f. (IS2P14F)  g. (IS2P14H)

Table D. (Continued)

Scales developed in this project		ICCS 2009 scales	
Category	Summary description	Category	Summary description
YP_inside school  (1. No. I have never done this – 3. Yes, I have done this within the last 12 months)	a. (IS2G15A) Voluntary participation in school-based music or drama activities outside of regular lessons.  b. (IS2G15B) Active participation in a debate  c. (IS2G15C) Voting for <class representative> or <school parliament>  d. (IS2G15D) Taking part in decision- making about how the school is run  e. (IS2G15E) Taking part in discussions at a <student assembly>  f. (IS2G15F) Becoming a candidate for <class representative> or <school parliament>	School participation  (1. No. I have never done this – 3. Yes, I have done this within the last 12 months)	a.(IS2G15A); b. (IS2G15B)  c. (IS2G15C); d. (IS2G15D)  e. (IS2G15E); f. (IS2G15F)



## Additional information for Chapter 3.

Table E. Reliabilities for scales reflecting students' behaviours in a range of contexts

Countries	Scales developed in this project					Scales developed in the ICCS 2009 technical report			
	Family Discussion	Peer Discussion	Open class	YP outside school	YP inside school	Political discussion	Open classroom	Community participation	School participation
England	0.65	0.63	0.82	0.72	0.70	0.74	0.81	0.73	0.71
Spain	0.63	0.55	0.74	0.75	0.62	0.68	0.72	0.74	0.62
Sweden	0.73	0.74	0.81	0.79	0.69	0.81	0.81	0.80	0.69
Poland	0.67	0.67	0.77	0.71	0.65	0.74	0.76	0.71	0.65
Chinese Taipei	0.66	0.67	0.77	0.68	0.66	0.74	0.80	0.68	0.66



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