Judgements about thought experiments
Judgements about thought experiments
Thought experiments invite us to evaluate philosophical theses by making judgements about hypothetical cases. When the judgements and the theses conflict, it is often the latter that are rejected. But what is the nature of the judgements such that they are able to play this role? I answer this question by arguing that typical judgements about thought experiments are in fact judgements of normal counterfactual sufficiency. I begin by focusing on Anna-Sara Malmgren’s defence of the claim that typical judgements about thought experiments are mere possibility judgements. This view is shown to fail for two closely related reasons: it cannot account for the incorrectness of certain misjudgements, and it cannot account for the inconsistency of certain pairs of conflicting judgements. This prompts a reconsideration of Timothy Williamson’s alternative proposal, according to which typical judgements about thought experiments are counterfactual in nature. I show that taking such judgements to concern what would normally hold in instances of the relevant hypothetical scenarios avoids the objections that have been pressed against this kind of view. I then consider some other potential objections, but argue that they provide no grounds for doubt.
35-67
Geddes, Alexander
709fcd8a-e7a7-4b99-bab4-5ca59ac214d5
January 2018
Geddes, Alexander
709fcd8a-e7a7-4b99-bab4-5ca59ac214d5
Abstract
Thought experiments invite us to evaluate philosophical theses by making judgements about hypothetical cases. When the judgements and the theses conflict, it is often the latter that are rejected. But what is the nature of the judgements such that they are able to play this role? I answer this question by arguing that typical judgements about thought experiments are in fact judgements of normal counterfactual sufficiency. I begin by focusing on Anna-Sara Malmgren’s defence of the claim that typical judgements about thought experiments are mere possibility judgements. This view is shown to fail for two closely related reasons: it cannot account for the incorrectness of certain misjudgements, and it cannot account for the inconsistency of certain pairs of conflicting judgements. This prompts a reconsideration of Timothy Williamson’s alternative proposal, according to which typical judgements about thought experiments are counterfactual in nature. I show that taking such judgements to concern what would normally hold in instances of the relevant hypothetical scenarios avoids the objections that have been pressed against this kind of view. I then consider some other potential objections, but argue that they provide no grounds for doubt.
Text
Geddes (MS) - Judgments about Thought Experiments
- Accepted Manuscript
More information
Accepted/In Press date: 3 February 2017
e-pub ahead of print date: 7 November 2017
Published date: January 2018
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 415457
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/415457
ISSN: 0026-4423
PURE UUID: 4a98d458-cdef-4c5f-a55a-6caa524a88de
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Date deposited: 10 Nov 2017 17:30
Last modified: 16 Mar 2024 05:54
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