Kant on the Object-Dependence of Intuition and Hallucination
Kant on the Object-Dependence of Intuition and Hallucination
Against a view currently popular in the literature, it is argued that Kant was not a naïve realist about perceptual experience. Naive realism entails that perceptual experience is object-dependent in a very strong sense. In the first half of the paper, I explain what this claim amounts to and I undermine the evidence that has been marshalled in support of attributing it to Kant. In the second half of the paper, I explore in some detail Kant's account of hallucination and argue that no such account is available to someone who thinks that veridical perceptual experience is object-dependent in the naïve realist sense. Kant's theory provides for a remarkably sophisticated, bottom-up explanation of the phenomenal character of hallucinatory episodes and is crucial for gaining a proper understanding of his model of the mind and its place in nature.
hallucination, intuition, Kant, naïve realism, object-dependence
486-508
Stephenson, Andrew
b8c80516-d835-4479-bee0-869d771af0cf
25 June 2015
Stephenson, Andrew
b8c80516-d835-4479-bee0-869d771af0cf
Stephenson, Andrew
(2015)
Kant on the Object-Dependence of Intuition and Hallucination.
Philosophical Quarterly, 65 (260), .
(doi:10.1093/pq/pqu100).
Abstract
Against a view currently popular in the literature, it is argued that Kant was not a naïve realist about perceptual experience. Naive realism entails that perceptual experience is object-dependent in a very strong sense. In the first half of the paper, I explain what this claim amounts to and I undermine the evidence that has been marshalled in support of attributing it to Kant. In the second half of the paper, I explore in some detail Kant's account of hallucination and argue that no such account is available to someone who thinks that veridical perceptual experience is object-dependent in the naïve realist sense. Kant's theory provides for a remarkably sophisticated, bottom-up explanation of the phenomenal character of hallucinatory episodes and is crucial for gaining a proper understanding of his model of the mind and its place in nature.
Text
c3663408361f10d1fd77fe1400c25034
More information
e-pub ahead of print date: 19 February 2015
Published date: 25 June 2015
Keywords:
hallucination, intuition, Kant, naïve realism, object-dependence
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 416170
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/416170
ISSN: 0031-8094
PURE UUID: 19e1fa16-fa9c-47cc-9f46-96c6fff376d3
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Date deposited: 06 Dec 2017 17:30
Last modified: 16 Mar 2024 04:32
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