The role of squeezing in quantum key distribution based on homodyne detection and post-selection

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Abstract
The role of squeezing in quantum key distribution with continuous variables based on homodyne detection and post-selection is investigated for several specific eavesdropping attacks. It is shown that amplitude squeezing creates strong correlations between the signals of the legitimate receiver and a potential eavesdropper. Post-selection of the received pulses can therefore be used to reduce the eavesdropper’s knowledge of the raw key, which increases the secret key rate by orders of magnitude over large distances even for modest amounts of squeezing.

1 Introduction
Quantum cryptography or quantum key distribution was first proposed nearly two decades ago [1] as a method to exploit properties of small quantum systems to establish a secret key between a sender (Alice) and a receiver (Bob) which is provably secure against attacks by an eavesdropper (Eve). In recent years this field has attracted a lot of research and rapid progress has been achieved in the theoretical description and in experimental demonstrations. In particular, the range over which a secure key can be established has now been extended up to 101 km in optical fibres [2, 3, 4] and 23 km in air [5, 6]. However, most of these systems are based on the transmission of single photons and suffer from inefficient and slow single-photon sources and detectors. These technical restrictions lead to very low secret key bit rates, e.g. down to 15 bit/s in the case of [2], and to a maximum distance beyond which no secure key can be transmitted at all [7].

In order to overcome these limitations, a new class of quantum cryptosystems has been proposed, where information is encoded in continuous variables such as field quadratures [8, 9, 10, 11], photon numbers [12], or polarisation [13]. These schemes are based on the transmission of non-classical states of light, i.e. squeezed or entangled states, and are restricted to transmission lines with less than 50 % loss.

Very recently, however, it has been shown that quantum key distribution can operate over arbitrarily lossy channels using only classical, i.e. coherent, quantum states of light. This is achieved by reverse reconciliation techniques
or by post-selection [15, 16]. The first quantum crypto-system of this kind has already been demonstrated by Grangier and co-workers [17].

In this paper, the effect of squeezing on the performance of quantum key distribution with post-selection is investigated. For the schemes operating with transmission lines with less than 50% loss [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13], squeezing guarantees that the smaller part of the pulse lost in the transmission or intercepted by Eve has much larger quantum uncertainties and thus less information than the larger part received by Bob. One therefore might think that for losses larger than 50%, where Eve potentially has access to a larger fraction of the pulse than Bob, squeezing might act in favour of the eavesdropper. The main purpose of this work is to show that squeezing still is beneficial beyond the 50% loss limit in post-selection based schemes.

This work is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the quantum key distribution scheme [16]. Then two classes of eavesdropping attacks are investigated which clearly demonstrate the merits of using squeezed states. First, intercept-resend strategies are analysed in section 3, where Eve performs a measurement on the whole pulse sent by Alice and resends a pulse to Bob according to her measurement results. Two specific measurements based on quadrature detection and phase detection, respectively, are discussed as well as the optimal orthogonal state projection measurement. It is shown that squeezing reduces Eve’s chances of success with this attack. The second attack, discussed in section 4, is a superior channel attack, where Eve keeps that part of the pulse which would normally be lost in the transmission channel from Alice to Bob, and transmits the rest of the pulse through a lossless channel to Bob. This kind of attack cannot be detected by Alice and Bob. The maximum amount of secret information which can be obtained despite Eve’s presence is calculated for an Eve restricted to quadrature measurements and a lower bound is given for the case where Eve is allowed to perform arbitrary measurements. Also for this kind of attack squeezing can significantly enhance the secret key rate. Finally, the results are summarised in section 5.

2 Quantum key distribution with homodyne detection and post-selection

The scheme presented here is a generalisation of the recent proposal by Namiki and Hirano [16], where Alice sends squeezed states instead of coherent (classical) pulses. Without the post-selection process the scheme is also equivalent to the scheme by Funk and Raymer [12] which is based on the simultaneous transmission of two pulses in orthogonal polarisation states obtained from a parametric amplification process. It can be shown by a unitary transformation that the latter entangled state is equivalent to a product state of a weak amplitude-squeezed pulse (corresponding to the pulse sent by Alice here) and a strong (phase-squeezed) pulse (the local oscillator used for homodyne detection).

The scheme works as follows. First, Alice prepares a minimum-uncertainty squeezed pulse with field amplitude $\alpha_0$ and squeezing parameter $r$. Both $\alpha_0$ and $r$ are assumed to be real numbers, $r > 0$ corresponds to an amplitude-squeezed state, $r < 0$ to a phase-squeezed state, and $r = 0$ to a coherent state. Alice then applies a phase shift $\theta \in \{0, \pi/2, \pi, 3\pi/2\}$ to the pulse, where $\theta = 0$ ($\theta = \pi/2$)
is interpreted as a bit 1 in basis 1 (basis 2) and $\theta = \pi$ ($\theta = 3\pi/2$) as a bit 0 in basis 1 (2). The resulting state reads

$$|\psi_\theta\rangle = \exp(\alpha_0 e^{i\theta} a^\dagger - \alpha_0 e^{-i\theta} a) \exp((re^{-2i\theta} a^2 - re^{2i\theta} a^\dagger^2)/2) |0\rangle \quad (1)$$

where $a$ ($a^\dagger$) is Alice’s photon annihilation (creation) operator and $|0\rangle$ is the vacuum state.

Next, Alice sends this state to Bob. During this transmission the pulse experiences attenuation, that is, a fraction of the pulse is either absorbed by the environment or intercepted by Eve. In both cases the transmission is modeled by a beam-splitter of amplitude transmission $T$ and reflection $R$, where $T^2 + R^2 = 1$. The output mode operators $(b, b^\dagger)$ and $(e, e^\dagger)$ correspond to the modes in Bob’s and Eve’s detectors, respectively, and are related to the input mode operators $(a, a^\dagger)$ and the additional (vacuum) input mode $(v, v^\dagger)$ of the beam-splitter by

$$\begin{pmatrix} b \\ e \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} T & R \\ -R & T \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} a \\ v \end{pmatrix}. \quad (2)$$

For the following it is convenient to express the quantum state of the transmitted pulse $|\psi_\theta\rangle$ in terms of its Wigner quasi-probability function for Bob’s (complex) measurement variable $\beta$ and Eve’s variable $\epsilon$. One finds

$$W_\theta(\beta, \epsilon) = \frac{4}{\pi^2} \exp\left\{-2 \left[ e^{2r} R \{\alpha\}^2 + e^{-2r} I \{\alpha\}^2 \right]\right\} \times \exp\left\{-2 \left[ |R\beta + T\epsilon|^2 \right]\right\} \quad (3)$$

where $R$ and $I$ denote real and imaginary parts, respectively, and

$$\alpha = (T\beta - R\epsilon)e^{-i\theta} - \alpha_0. \quad (4)$$

In the next step of the quantum key distribution protocol, Bob randomly decides which of the two basis sets he uses for his detection. If he chooses basis 1 he measures the real part $\beta_r$ of his variable $\beta$ by homodyne detection, otherwise he measures the imaginary part $\beta_i$. His measurement results follow the probability distributions

$$P_0(\beta_r) = \int W_\theta(\beta, \epsilon) d\beta_r d\epsilon_r d\epsilon_i, \quad (5)$$

$$P_0(\beta_i) = \int W_\theta(\beta, \epsilon) d\beta_i d\epsilon_r d\epsilon_i. \quad (6)$$

If his measurement result fulfills $|\beta_{r,i}| < \beta_c$, where $\beta_c$ is a fixed threshold value, Bob tells Alice to disregard this bit. Otherwise he assigns value 1 to his bit if $\beta_{r,i} > \beta_c$, or value 0 if $\beta_{r,i} < -\beta_c$. This post-selection is the key to allow for quantum key distribution over, in principle, arbitrarily large distances [15, 16]. Alice and Bob additionally announce their used basis sets and disregard all bits where they used different sets.

After this step, Alice and Bob share a string of bits which in general contains some errors and about which Eve has a certain amount of information. Alice and Bob then use (classical) error correction and privacy amplification protocols which leaves them with an identical secret key about which Eve has only negligible information.
As an example let us assume that Alice sends the state $|\psi_0\rangle$, i.e. $\theta = 0$. In this case, Bob’s probabilities read

$$P_0(\beta_r) = \sqrt{\frac{2}{\pi}} \frac{\exp\left\{-\frac{2}{T^2 \exp(-2r) + R^2}\left(\beta_r - T\alpha_0\right)^2\right\}}{\sqrt{T^2 \exp(-2r) + R^2}},$$

(7)

$$P_0(\beta_i) = \sqrt{\frac{2}{\pi}} \frac{\exp\left\{-\frac{2}{T^2 \exp(-2r) + R^2}\beta_i^2\right\}}{\sqrt{T^2 \exp(-2r) + R^2}}.$$  (8)

For an amplitude-squeezed state ($r > 0$), Bob thus finds a Gaussian distribution with a narrow width if he measures the quadrature $\beta_r$, and a broad width for measurements of $\beta_i$. The probability of finding a bit 1 or 0 in the correct basis (basis 1 in the example here) is thus

$$P(1) = \int_{\beta_c}^{\infty} P_0(\beta_r) \, d\beta_r = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \Phi\left(\frac{\sqrt{2}(T\alpha_0 - \beta_c)}{\sqrt{T^2 \exp(-2r) + R^2}}\right),$$

(9)

$$P(0) = \int_{-\infty}^{-\beta_c} P_0(\beta_r) \, d\beta_r = \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2} \Phi\left(\frac{\sqrt{2}(T\alpha_0 + \beta_c)}{\sqrt{T^2 \exp(-2r) + R^2}}\right),$$

(10)

where $\Phi$ denotes the usual error function. For $r = 0$ equations (7)-(10) reduce to the results found in [16]. The fraction of accepted bits is

$$r_{acc} = \frac{P(1) + P(0)}{2},$$

(11)

where the factor 1/2 comes from disregarding all bits where Alice and Bob use different basis sets, and the bit error rate of accepted bits is

$$\delta = \frac{P(0)}{P(0) + P(1)}. \quad (12)$$

The expected amount of Shannon information shared by Alice and Bob per accepted bit is obtained by averaging over Bob’s measurement outcomes,

$$I_{AB} = \int_{\beta_c}^{\infty} d\beta_r \frac{P_0(\beta_r) + P_0(-\beta_r)}{P(0) + P(1)} \times \left\{1 + \delta(\beta_r) \log_2 \delta(\beta_r) + (1 - \delta(\beta_r)) \log_2(1 - \delta(\beta_r))\right\}$$

(13)

where

$$\delta(\beta_r) = \frac{P_0(-\beta_r)}{P_0(\beta_r) + P_0(-\beta_r)}$$

(14)

is the bit error rate conditioned on Bob’s measured value of $\beta_r$. Thus the average information gain per transmitted bit is

$$G_{AB} = r_{acc} I_{AB}. \quad (15)$$

An example for the quantities (11)-(15) as a function of the threshold value $\beta_c$ is shown in figure 1. For the chosen parameters and for $\beta_c = 0$, half of all transmitted bits are accepted, but the bit error rate is relatively large and thus the information $I_{AB}$ per accepted bit is low. Increasing $\beta_c$ reduces $r_{acc}$ but
also decreases the bit error rate. The figure shows that the average information gain $G_{AB}$ per bit decreases with increasing $\beta_c$. It therefore seems advantageous for Bob to set $\beta_c = 0$. However, in a realistic setup Alice and Bob will try to optimise the secret key bit rate, i.e. the difference between their shared information and the information leaked to Eve. This subject will be discussed later in section 4. Note that due to the form of the expressions (9), (10) the qualitative behaviour of the quantities plotted in figure 1 is the same for all squeezing parameters $r$ and transmission coefficients $T$.

3 Intercept-resend attacks

In this section I will investigate the security of the protocol against eavesdropping attacks where Eve intercepts each pulse, performs a measurement on it, and then sends a pulse to Bob in the state which she thinks was initially prepared by Alice. First, two specific eavesdropping strategies based on simultaneous measurements of both quadrature components and on phase measurement, respectively, will be analysed. In the third subsection the ideal intercept-resend attack will be constructed based on general quantum measurement theory.

In the following I will concentrate on Eve’s probability $p_{corr}$ to guess correctly the bit and the basis of Alice’s pulse. With probability $1 - p_{corr}$, Eve will thus transmit a pulse to Bob that differs from the original one, which Alice and Bob can detect by an increase of the bit error rate $\delta$ or, for example, by a change of the distribution of Bob’s measured quadrature components or the measured value of $r_{acc}$.

3.1 Simultaneous quadrature measurement

For the first attack investigated here let us assume that Eve splits each pulse into two parts on a 50-50 beam-splitter, measures one quadrature component in one output arm, and simultaneously the orthogonal quadrature component in the other arm.
Eve’s measurement results are described by the expressions derived in section 2 if $T = R = 1/\sqrt{2}$ and assuming that Eve performs measurements on both output arms of the beam-splitter (2). Specifically, let us assume that Eve measures $\beta_r$ and $\epsilon_i$. The joint probability distribution is given by

$$P_0(\beta_r, \epsilon_i) = \int W_0(\beta, \epsilon)d\beta_i d\epsilon_r$$

which for all parameters factorises into two independent probability distributions

$$P_0(\beta_r, \epsilon_i) = P_0(\beta_r)P_0(\epsilon_i).$$

For $\theta = 0$, $P_0(\beta_r)$ is given by equation (7) and

$$P_0(\epsilon_i) = \sqrt{2 \over \pi} \exp \left\{ -2 \left( {\beta^2 \over T^2 + R^2 e^{2r}} \right) \right\}$$

with $T^2 = R^2 = 1/2$.

If Eve’s measurement outcome is $(\beta_r, \epsilon_i)$ she will attribute the pulse to the value $\theta \in \{0, \pi/2, \pi, 3\pi/2\}$ for which $P_0(\beta_r, \epsilon_i)$ is maximum. For $r \leq 0$ this yields $\theta = 0$ for $\beta_r \geq |\epsilon_i|$, $\theta = \pi/2$ for $\epsilon_i > |\beta_r|$, $\theta = \pi$ for $-\beta_r \geq |\epsilon_i|$, $\theta = 3\pi/2$ for $-\epsilon_i > |\beta_r|$. For $r > 0$, which is the interesting case for the purpose of this work, finding the most probable value of $\theta$ is more complicated. Let us assume that Eve finds $\beta_r, \epsilon_i > 0$. She will then attribute this result to $\theta = 0$ if

$$\epsilon_i < \beta_r < \sqrt{2\alpha_0 \over 1 - e^{-2r}} - \epsilon_i \quad \text{or} \quad \sqrt{2\alpha_0 \over 1 - e^{-2r}} - \epsilon_i < \beta_r < \epsilon_i.$$  \hspace{1cm} (19)

The remaining areas in the quadrant $\beta_r, \epsilon_i > 0$ are attributed to $\theta = \pi/2$, and the results for the other three quadrants of $(\beta_r, \epsilon_i)$ follow by symmetry. Eve’s rate of success for this attack is thus given by

$$p_{\text{corr}} = 2 \int_{A_0} P_0(\beta_r, \epsilon_i)d\beta_r d\epsilon_i$$

where $A_0$ is the area defined by (19).

Figure 2 shows the efficiency of the simultaneous measurement attack for various parameters. For any given post-selection threshold $\beta_c$ and squeezing parameter $r$, Alice adjusts the mean amplitude $\alpha_0$ such that $\delta = 10^{-3}$ for lossless transmission and without Eve’s interference. The values for $\alpha_0$ for $r = 0$ and $r = 0.5$ are shown in figure 2(a) together with the resulting fraction of accepted bits $r_{\text{acc}}$ (the abscissa of the plot is scaled such that this curve is identical for all values of $r$). The dashed lines in figure 2(b) show Eve’s probability $p_{\text{corr}}$ of success for $r = 0$ and $r = 0.5$. For any amount of squeezing, Bob can decrease Eve’s success rate by increasing $\beta_c$. The reason for this is that larger post-selection thresholds allow for the use of weaker pulses, see figure (a), which in turn gives larger overlaps of the pulses corresponding to different values of $\theta$ in Eve’s measurement. However, larger thresholds also lead to lower bit acceptance rates and thus slower secret key generation. The use of squeezed pulses helps to reduce this problem, since in this case already low values of $\beta_c$ lead to a low probability of success for Eve’s attack. This is due to the lower intensity of the pulses sent by Alice and the increased uncertainty in the quadrature components measured by Eve because of the vacuum noise on the second input port of Eve’s beam-splitter.
3.2 Phase measurement

Using simultaneous quadrature measurement, Eve obtains estimates for the amplitude and phase of each pulse. However, in the scheme discussed here the amplitude of all states $|\psi_\theta\rangle$ is the same and Eve is in fact only interested in measuring the phase. A better eavesdropping attack might therefore be based on an adaptive phase measurement [18] which uses heterodyne detection with nonlinear feedback and which in certain limits can approach the optimal measurement of the phase of a single pulse.

The distribution of the phase $\phi \in [0, 2\pi)$ detected by an optimal phase measurement on a state $|\psi_\theta\rangle$ is given by

$$P_\theta(\phi) = \frac{1}{2\pi} |\langle \phi |\psi_\theta\rangle|^2$$

(21)

where

$$|\phi\rangle = \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} e^{in\phi} \frac{a^\dagger n}{\sqrt{n!}} |0\rangle.$$  

(22)

If Eve measures a certain phase $\phi$, she will attribute this result to that state $|\psi_\theta\rangle$ for which $P_\theta(\phi)$ is maximum. The success rate of this eavesdropping strategy is thus

$$p_{corr} = \int_{F_0} P_0(\phi) \, d\phi$$

(23)

where

$$F_0 = \{ \phi | P_0(\phi) > \max(P_{\pi/2}(\phi), P_{\pi}(\phi), P_{3\pi/2}(\phi)) \}.$$  

(24)

Evaluation of equation (21) in the Fock basis and subsequent numerical integration of (23) yield the results shown by the dash-dotted curves in figure 2. Compared to the simultaneous quadrature measurement discussed above the phase measurement leads to a larger success rate $p_{corr}$ for Eve. However, the qualitative behaviour is similar. In particular, squeezing is found to reduce the eavesdropping efficiency significantly also for phase measurements.
3.3 Orthogonal state projection

In the scheme presented here, each pulse sent by Alice is one of the four linearly independent and non-orthogonal states $|\psi_\theta\rangle$. For this particular case, Eve’s ideal measurement, i.e. the one which gives the largest value of $p_{\text{corr}}$, is known to be a projection measurement on four orthogonal states in the Hilbert space $\mathcal{H}_s$ spanned by the four states $|\psi_\theta\rangle$ [19]. Such a projection measurement is extremely difficult to realise experimentally, but theoretical proposals for situations involving only two coherent states exist, see e.g. [20].

In the following I will construct the optimal projection measurement. For this it is necessary to find four orthogonal states $|\varphi_\theta\rangle$, $\theta \in \{0, \pi/2, \pi, 3\pi/2\}$, which maximise

$$p_{\text{corr}} = \frac{1}{4} \sum_\theta |\langle \varphi_\theta | \psi_\theta \rangle|^2.$$  \hfill (25)

Since the states $|\psi_\theta\rangle$ are obtained from a single state by the phase shift operator $U = \exp(i\pi a^\dagger a/2)$, it can be assumed that the states $|\varphi_\theta\rangle$ obey the same symmetry, that is,

$$|\varphi_{\theta+\pi/2}\rangle = U |\varphi_\theta\rangle.$$  \hfill (26)

The operator $U$ has the eigenvalues $\pm 1$ and $\pm i$. Let $|u_\nu\rangle$, $\nu \in \{\pm 1, \pm i\}$, denote the corresponding orthonormal eigenvectors in $\mathcal{H}_s$. Then, the states $|\varphi_\theta\rangle$ can be written as

$$|\varphi_\theta\rangle = \sum_\nu q_{\theta,\nu} |u_\nu\rangle.$$  \hfill (27)

The orthogonality and normalisation of the states $|\varphi_\theta\rangle$ together with equation (26) implies $|q_{\theta,\nu}| = 1/2$. In order to maximise $|\langle \varphi_\theta | \psi_\theta \rangle|$ and therefore $p_{\text{corr}}$, the complex phases of $q_{\theta,\nu}$ are obtained (up to a global phase) as

$$q_{\theta,\nu} = \frac{1}{2} \frac{\langle u_\nu | \psi_\theta \rangle}{|\langle u_\nu | \psi_\theta \rangle|}.$$  \hfill (28)

The states $|u_\nu\rangle$, $|\varphi_\theta\rangle$ and therefore the optimal value of $p_{\text{corr}}$ can be obtained numerically for given parameters $\alpha_0$ and $r$. It has also been checked that the set of states $|\varphi_\theta\rangle$ constructed in this way yields the optimal orthogonal projection measurement even without the a priori requirement of the symmetry (26).

Results of this optimal intercept-resend attack for two values of $r$ are shown by the solid curves in figure 2(b). As expected, Eve’s rate of success $p_{\text{corr}}$ is larger for this attack than for either of the two attacks analysed above for all parameters. Increasing the post-selection threshold $\beta_c$ reduces $p_{\text{corr}}$ to below 70% for coherent as well as squeezed states for the parameters shown in the figure. Using squeezed states allows to use lower thresholds and therefore to obtain larger acceptance rates $r_{\text{acc}}$.

However, it is important to note that for too small values of $\alpha_0$, corresponding to larger $\beta_c$ in figure 2, squeezing increases $p_{\text{corr}}$ and thus helps the eavesdropper. This can be understood in the following way. Without squeezing ($r = 0$) and in the limit of $\alpha_0 \to 0$, all four states $|\psi_\theta\rangle$ become identical to the vacuum state. Eve’s probability of guessing bit and basis correctly thus approaches 1/4. For squeezed states, on the other hand, $|\psi_0\rangle$ and $|\psi_\pi\rangle$ approach the vacuum state squeezed by $r$ in the $a + a^\dagger$ quadrature, but $|\psi_{\pi/2}\rangle$ and $|\psi_{3\pi/2}\rangle$ approach the vacuum state squeezed by $r$ in the $a - a^\dagger$ quadrature. Thus, Eve can still detect the basis (but not the bit) in which a pulse was sent with large probability. For example for $r = 0.5$ this gives $p_{\text{corr}} \approx 0.4$. 


4 Superior channel attack

In the second class of eavesdropping attacks discussed in this paper, Eve is assumed to possess an ideal quantum memory and a lossless channel. She uses a beam-splitter to extract that part of the pulse which would normally be lost in the transmission channel from Alice to Bob, stores it in her quantum memory and sends the rest of the pulse through the lossless channel to Bob. She then waits for Bob’s public announcement which basis he used and afterwards she performs a measurement on her part of the pulse. This kind of attack cannot be detected by Alice and Bob since Eve’s interference is indistinguishable from the standard transmission loss.

Since Alice and Bob cannot infer Eve’s presence from their data, they have to assume the worst case and therefore attribute all of their transmission losses to Eve. In order to establish a secure key it is necessary to derive an upper bound of the information available to Eve, such that in the final stage of the protocol Eve’s knowledge about the key can be reduced to arbitrarily low levels using privacy amplification. Here I will derive such an upper bound following the lines of Lütkenhaus [21, 7].

4.1 Quadrature measurement

In a first step I will assume that Eve uses only linear optics for her measurement, that is, after Bob’s public announcement of his basis Eve uses a balanced homodyne detector to measure the correct quadrature component of her part of the pulse.

The fundamental quantity of the following derivation is the joint measurement probability $P_\theta(\beta_r, \epsilon_r)$

\[ P_\theta(\beta_r, \epsilon_r) = \int W_\theta(\beta, \epsilon)d\beta d\epsilon \]  

that Bob obtains the value $\beta_r$ and simultaneously Eve obtains $\epsilon_r$ when Alice sends a pulse $|\psi_\theta\rangle$. For $\theta = 0$ this can be evaluated as

\[ P_0(\beta_r, \epsilon_r) = \frac{2}{\pi} e^{\epsilon^2} \exp\left\{ -2 \left[ e^{2T} (T\beta_r - R\epsilon_r - \alpha_0)^2 + (R\beta_r + T\epsilon_r)^2 \right] \right\}. \]  

For coherent states, $\sigma = 0$, this can be factorised and hence Bob’s and Eve’s measurements are independent. For squeezed states, on the other hand, the joint probability distribution does not factorise and the two measurements are correlated. In particular, for $\sigma > 0$ as depicted in figure 3, the measurements are anti-correlated, that is, if Bob measures a relatively large value of $\beta_r$, Eve is likely to measure a small value of $\epsilon_r$. Hence, by choosing a larger post-selection threshold Bob can increase Eve’s bit error rate and thus reduce Eve’s information.

Assuming ideal error correction and privacy amplification, a lower bound for the gain of secret information per transmitted pulse is given by [21, 7]

\[ S_{AB} = r_{acc}(I_{AB} - \tau) \]  

where $r_{acc}$ is given by (11), $I_{AB}$ by (13), and the fraction $\tau$ by which the raw key is shortened during privacy amplification is

\[ \tau = 1 + \log_2 P_e. \]  

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Figure 3: Contour plot of the joint probability distribution $P_0(\beta_r, \epsilon_r)$ with $\alpha_0 = 1$, $r = 0.5$, $T^2 = 0.75$. The maximum of $P_0(\beta_r, \epsilon_r)$ occurs at $\beta_r = T\alpha_0 = \sqrt{3}/2$, $\epsilon_r = -R\alpha_0 = -1/2$.

Here, $P_c$ is the collision probability given by [21]

$$P_c = \frac{1}{2} \int d\epsilon_r \frac{P_0(\epsilon_r|\beta_c < |\beta_r|)^2 + P_\pi(\epsilon_r|\beta_c < |\beta_r|)^2}{P_0(\epsilon_r|\beta_c < |\beta_r|) + P_\pi(\epsilon_r|\beta_c < |\beta_r|)}$$

(33)

and

$$P_\theta(\epsilon_r|\beta_c < |\beta_r|) = \int_{\beta_c < |\beta_r|} d\beta_r \frac{P_0(\beta_r, \epsilon_r)}{P(0) + P(1)}$$

(34)

is Eve’s probability distribution under the condition that a pulse $\theta$ was sent and that Bob accepted the bit in his post-selection. Equation (34) can be evaluated analytically, yielding

$$P_0(\epsilon_r|\beta_c < |\beta_r|) = \frac{P_0(\epsilon_r)}{P(0) + P(1)} \left\{ 1 - \frac{1}{2} \Phi \left( \sqrt{\frac{2R^2(T^2e^{2r}) + \epsilon_r TR(1 - e^{2r}) - \alpha_0 Te^{2r}}{\sqrt{R^2 + T^2e^{2r}}} \right) \right\}$$

(35)

where

$$P_0(\epsilon_r) = \sqrt{\frac{\pi}{2}} \exp \left\{ -\frac{2\epsilon_r + R\alpha_0}{T^2 + R^2e^{-2r}} \right\}.$$  

(36)

For $r = 0$, this simplifies to $P_0(\epsilon_r|\beta_c < |\beta_r|) = P_0(\epsilon_r)$ due to the independence of Bob’s and Eve’s measurements. Equations (13) and (33) must be calculated numerically in order to get the secret key bit rate $S_{AB}$, equation (31).

Figure 4 shows the secret key bit rate $S_{AB}$ as a function of $\alpha_0$ and $\beta_c$ for coherent pulses ($r = 0$) and for squeezed pulses ($r = 0.5$). In contrast to the average gain of information $G_{AB}$ as shown in figure 1, the amount of secret information $S_{AB}$ assumes a maximum for finite values of $\alpha_0$ and $\beta_c$. Therefore, Alice and Bob can optimise their parameters to achieve the highest key bit rate once they have measured the transmission loss $R^2$. Moreover, comparing figures 4(a) and (b) one notes that the maximum of $S_{AB}$ can be increased by using squeezed light. This is due to the strong correlations between Bob’s and Eve’s measurements in this case as discussed above.
Figure 4: Secret key bit rate $S_{AB}$ versus mean pulse amplitude $\alpha_0$ and post-selection threshold $\beta_c$ for (a) coherent pulses and (b) squeezed pulses with $r = 0.5$. Channel transmission is $T^2 = 0.75$.

4.2 Lower bound on secret bit rate

If Eve is allowed to perform any kind of measurement permitted by quantum theory on her part of the pulse, the analysis of the achievable secret key rate is not so straightforward. In particular, if Alice sends a squeezed state and Bob performs a quadrature measurement, Eve’s part of the pulse is in a mixed state in an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space due to the entanglement created by her beam-splitter (30). For such a situation the ideal measurement is not known.

I will therefore derive an upper bound on Eve’s information of the bits shared by Alice and Bob by assuming that for each bit Eve knows (i) the basis set used, (ii) whether or not Bob has a bit error (Eve might learn this during Alice’s and Bob’s error correction procedure), and (iii) the modulus of the value measured by Bob for his chosen quadrature component.

Let us assume that Alice sends a state in basis 1, i.e. state $|\psi_0\rangle$ or $|\psi_\pi\rangle$, and that Bob measures the real quadrature component $\beta_r$. If there is no bit error (case I), Eve knows that her state is one of the two states

$|\chi_{I,+}\rangle = B\langle \beta_r |\psi_0\rangle, \quad |\chi_{I,-}\rangle = B\langle -\beta_r |\psi_\pi\rangle.$

(37)

where $|\pm \beta_r\rangle_B$ is the quadrature eigenstate corresponding to $\pm \beta_r$ in Bob’s Hilbert space. This occurs with probability $(1 - \delta(\beta_r))P(|\beta_r|)$, where $\delta(\beta_r)$ is given by (14) and $P(|\beta_r|)$ is the probability of finding $|\beta_r|$ in a post-selected sample of pulses,

$P(|\beta_r|) = \frac{P_0(\beta_r) + P_0(-\beta_r)}{P(0) + P(1)}.$

(38)

In case of a bit error in Bob’s detection (case II), Eve finds one of the two states

$|\chi_{II,+}\rangle = B\langle \beta_r |\psi_\pi\rangle, \quad |\chi_{II,-}\rangle = B\langle -\beta_r |\psi_0\rangle.$

(39)

The probability for this case is $\delta(\beta_r)P(|\beta_r|)$. In both cases, Eve is left with the task to distinguish between two non-orthogonal states. She thus can perform an ideal orthogonal projection measurement similar to the one discussed in section 3.3 which minimises her bit error rates $\delta_I(|\beta_r|)$ and $\delta_{II}(|\beta_r|)$, respectively, to [19]

$\delta_{I,II}(|\beta_r|) = \frac{1}{2} \left( 1 - \sqrt{1 - |\langle \chi_{I,II} |\chi_{I,II}^\perp\rangle|^2} \right).$

(40)
The collision rate $P_c$ for this kind of attack can now be obtained by averaging over all initial states and all measurement results [21]. The result is given by

$$P_c = \int_{\beta_c}^\infty d\beta_r \, P(|\beta_r|) \left\{ (1 - \delta(\beta_r)) \left[ \delta_I(|\beta_r|)^2 + (1 - \delta_I(|\beta_r|))^2 \right] 
+ \delta(\beta_r) \left[ \delta_{II}(|\beta_r|)^2 + (1 - \delta_{II}(|\beta_r|))^2 \right] \right\}. \tag{41}$$

Let us now investigate the maximum secret key bit rate (31) using the collision rate (41) as a function of the channel loss and the amount of squeezing. To this end $S_{AB}$ is optimised numerically with respect to $\alpha_0$ and $\beta_c$ for various values of $r$ and $R^2$.

Figure 5 shows the optimised values of $\alpha_0$, $\beta_c$ and $S_{AB}$ for three different values of $r$ as a function of the loss $R^2$. Generally, $\alpha_0$ is of the order of 1 and is slightly decreasing with increasing loss for coherent states ($r = 0$) and weakly squeezed states ($r = 0.5$). For strong squeezing ($r = 2$) there is a maximum of $\alpha_0$ at around $R^2 \approx 0.6$. The ideal post-selection threshold $\beta_c$, on the other hand, is always increasing from close to zero at low losses to values of approximately 3 at $R^2 = 0.96$. The maximum of $S_{AB}$ is close to 0.5 at low loss, decreases relatively slowly for moderate losses and drops dramatically for high losses of about 85-90%. Using weakly squeezed light increases $S_{AB}$, in particular for large values of $R^2$.

For strong squeezing and small $R^2$, the lower bound for the secret information derived here decreases below the result for coherent ($r = 0$) states. In this limit, the entanglement between Bob’s and Eve’s states becomes very strong and thus the additional assumption (iii), i.e. assuming Eve knows $|\beta_r|$, significantly enhances her detection efficiency and therefore reduces $S_{AB}$. By contrast, in the absence of squeezing Eve’s pulse is independent of Bob’s measurement result and always in one of two possible coherent states which she can discriminate efficiently by a two-state orthogonal projection measurement. Therefore, the above estimate of a lower bound on the secret information is in fact a tight bound for $r = 0$, but it over-estimates Eve’s information for large squeezing.

The effects of squeezing are even more apparent in figure 6, where $S_{AB}$ is plotted as a function of $r$ for fixed loss rates. In all cases, $S_{AB}$ increases with
Figure 6: Maximum secret key rate $S_{AB}$ versus squeezing parameter $r$. Solid curves show the lower bound for transmission losses of $R^2 = 0.5$, $R^2 = 0.75$ and $R^2 = 0.9$ (from top to bottom). Dashed lines show the corresponding results when the eavesdropper is restricted to quadrature measurements.

As $r$ increases, reaches a maximum for $r \sim 1$ and decreases again for large values of $r$ as discussed before. For 50% loss, $S_{AB} = 0.026$ for $r = 0$ and 0.085 for $r = 0.72$. For 75% loss, $S_{AB}$ increases approximately from 0.001 to 0.016 at $r = 0.92$, and for 90% loss from $5 \times 10^{-7}$ to $6 \times 10^{-4}$ at $r = 1.2$.

For comparison, the dashed curves in figure 6 show $S_{AB}$ provided that Eve is restricted to quadrature measurements as discussed in the previous section. As expected, $S_{AB}$ is always above the lower bound shown by the corresponding solid curves. However, it can be seen that the secure key rate is only increased by a factor of less than two for moderate squeezing with $r < 1$. Thus the comparably simple quadrature measurement appears to be a near-optimal eavesdropping strategy.

5 Summary and conclusions

In this work, I have investigated the effects of using squeezed pulses of light in continuous-variable quantum key distribution with post-selection [15, 16]. In this scheme, Alice prepares the pulses in one of four squeezed states corresponding to the bit values 0 and 1 in two non-orthogonal basis sets. Bob uses homodyne detection to measure one of the two orthogonal quadrature components and disregards all bits where his measured value is below a certain post-selection threshold.

In particular, two kinds of eavesdropping strategies have been investigated. The first is a capture-resend attack where Eve attempts to guess correctly which of the four states was sent by performing a measurement on the whole pulse. Linear as well as nonlinear measurements have been discussed and the optimal projection operator has been constructed. Using squeezed pulses renders the scheme more robust against this kind of attack, as it reduces Eve’s chances of guessing the correct state of the pulse. In principle, Alice and Bob can achieve a similar level of security with coherent pulses, i.e. without squeezing, by increasing the post-selection threshold but only at the cost of a smaller key bit rate.

The second eavesdropping strategy considered in this paper is a passive supe-
rior channel attack where Eve’s interference with the quantum communication is indistinguishable from the channel loss. A lower bound has been derived for the secure key bit rate which Alice and Bob can obtain by ideal error correction and privacy amplification. Here, squeezing introduces strong correlations between Bob’s and Eve’s measurement results. These correlations allow Bob to restrict Eve’s knowledge about the transmitted bits by the post-selection process. For a given channel loss, the secure key bit rate can be maximised by a proper choice of the pulse amplitude and of the post-selection threshold. The calculations show that already modest amounts of squeezing, such as a squeezing parameter of $r = 0.5$ (approximately 60% squeezing below shot noise), can increase the maximum secure key bit rate by over two orders of magnitude for transmission losses of 90%, corresponding to transmission through 50 km of optical fibre with losses of 0.2 dB/km.

These two classes of eavesdropping strategies are among the most frequently discussed attacks in the literature on quantum cryptography. The intercept-resend attack is the most ‘classical’ attack and one of the very few attacks which can be realised with present-day technology, while the superior channel attack has been shown to be the ideal eavesdropping strategy for some quantum cryptography schemes. I have proven that the scheme discussed here is secure against these two attacks. This, however, is no general proof of security. In particular active eavesdropping using, for example, an entangling cloner which has been suggested as an ideal attack for some continuous variable crypto-schemes [17] is not included here and requires further analysis.

In conclusion, this work shows that squeezing is not an essential requirement for secure quantum key distribution, in accordance with earlier results [14, 15, 16, 17]. However, it will increase the security of the scheme against several specific eavesdropping attacks and can thereby significantly increase the amount of secure information transmitted per pulse.

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References


