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Imagination and Inner Intuition

Imagination and Inner Intuition
Imagination and Inner Intuition
In this paper I return to the question of whether intuition is object-dependent. Kant’s account of the imagination appears to suggest that intuition is not object-dependent. On a recent proposal, however, the imagination is a faculty of merely inner intuition, the inner objects of which exist and are present in the way demanded by object-dependence views, such as Lucy Allais’s relational account. I argue against this proposal on both textual and philosophical grounds. It is inconsistent with what Kant says about how the imagination functions and is ultimately incompatible with the relational account it is supposed to support. Kant’s account of the imagination remains a serious obstacle for the view that intuition is object-dependent.
Kant, Imagination, Intuition, object-dependence, memory, hallucination, Presence, Perception, consciousness
104-123
Oxford University Press
Stephenson, Andrew
b8c80516-d835-4479-bee0-869d771af0cf
Stephenson, Andrew
Gomes, Anil
Stephenson, Andrew
b8c80516-d835-4479-bee0-869d771af0cf
Stephenson, Andrew
Gomes, Anil

Stephenson, Andrew (2017) Imagination and Inner Intuition. In, Stephenson, Andrew and Gomes, Anil (eds.) Kant and the Philosophy of Mind: Perception, Reason, and the Self. Oxford University Press, pp. 104-123. (doi:10.1093/oso/9780198724957.003.0006).

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Abstract

In this paper I return to the question of whether intuition is object-dependent. Kant’s account of the imagination appears to suggest that intuition is not object-dependent. On a recent proposal, however, the imagination is a faculty of merely inner intuition, the inner objects of which exist and are present in the way demanded by object-dependence views, such as Lucy Allais’s relational account. I argue against this proposal on both textual and philosophical grounds. It is inconsistent with what Kant says about how the imagination functions and is ultimately incompatible with the relational account it is supposed to support. Kant’s account of the imagination remains a serious obstacle for the view that intuition is object-dependent.

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e-pub ahead of print date: July 2017
Published date: 2017
Keywords: Kant, Imagination, Intuition, object-dependence, memory, hallucination, Presence, Perception, consciousness

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Local EPrints ID: 417837
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/417837
PURE UUID: 6fd730e6-debd-449f-8d8b-b69f3964bdd9
ORCID for Andrew Stephenson: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0003-4590-1307

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Date deposited: 15 Feb 2018 17:30
Last modified: 13 Sep 2024 01:54

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Editor: Andrew Stephenson
Editor: Anil Gomes

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