The University of Southampton
University of Southampton Institutional Repository

Expressions, looks and others' minds

Expressions, looks and others' minds
Expressions, looks and others' minds
We can know some things about each others' mental lives. The view that some of this knowledge is genuinely perceptual is getting traction. But the idea that we can see any of each others' mental states themselves - the Simple Perceptual Hypothesis - remains unpopular. Very often the view that we can perceptually know, for example, that James is angry, is thought to depend either on our awareness of James' expression or on the way James appears - versions of what I call the Expressive Hypothesis. The Expressive Hypothesis is intuitive. But in this chapter I argue that it does not allow us to do away with the thought that we sometimes perceive people's mental states. I take my arguments to provide some tentative support for the Simple Perceptual Hypothesis.
other minds problem, perceptual knowledge, expressions, perceptual experience
Oxford University Press
McNeill, William
be33c4df-0f0e-42bf-8b9b-3c0afe8cb69e
Parrott, Matthew
Avramides, Anita
McNeill, William
be33c4df-0f0e-42bf-8b9b-3c0afe8cb69e
Parrott, Matthew
Avramides, Anita

McNeill, William (2019) Expressions, looks and others' minds. In, Parrott, Matthew and Avramides, Anita (eds.) Knowing Other Minds. Oxford. Oxford University Press.

Record type: Book Section

Abstract

We can know some things about each others' mental lives. The view that some of this knowledge is genuinely perceptual is getting traction. But the idea that we can see any of each others' mental states themselves - the Simple Perceptual Hypothesis - remains unpopular. Very often the view that we can perceptually know, for example, that James is angry, is thought to depend either on our awareness of James' expression or on the way James appears - versions of what I call the Expressive Hypothesis. The Expressive Hypothesis is intuitive. But in this chapter I argue that it does not allow us to do away with the thought that we sometimes perceive people's mental states. I take my arguments to provide some tentative support for the Simple Perceptual Hypothesis.

Full text not available from this repository.

More information

Accepted/In Press date: 2018
Published date: 5 September 2019
Keywords: other minds problem, perceptual knowledge, expressions, perceptual experience

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 420433
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/420433
PURE UUID: 5d7f713a-4c77-4598-b33c-0732e4d7112b
ORCID for William McNeill: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0002-3647-0720

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 08 May 2018 16:30
Last modified: 18 Feb 2021 17:26

Export record

Download statistics

Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.

View more statistics

Atom RSS 1.0 RSS 2.0

Contact ePrints Soton: eprints@soton.ac.uk

ePrints Soton supports OAI 2.0 with a base URL of http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/cgi/oai2

This repository has been built using EPrints software, developed at the University of Southampton, but available to everyone to use.

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue without changing your settings, we will assume that you are happy to receive cookies on the University of Southampton website.

×