Enforcing EU Equality Law through Collective Redress: Lagging behind?

SARA BENEDI LAHUERTA*

Whilst the enforcement of EU law was initially based on individual and institutional ‘vigilance’, it has progressively expanded to embrace collective redress. However, collective redress mechanisms remain mostly nested in market-oriented areas, like competition law, consumer protection and data protection. Drawing on instruments such as Recommendation 2013/396/EU and Directive 2014/54/EU, this article contends that collective redress procedures should also be encouraged in more socially-oriented areas, focusing, in particular, on EU equality law. This is essential not only to address the rise of xenophobia in Europe, but also to ensure the substantive supremacy and uniform application of EU equality law, and to achieve more consistency within EU law.

Key words: collective redress; enforcement; effectiveness; actio popularis; legal standing; equality; discrimination

1. Introduction

In its early years the enforcement of EU law was mainly based on individual1 and institutional ‘vigilance’.2 Nevertheless, since the 1980s, the introduction of collective enforcement mechanisms has been increasingly encouraged.3 In 2013 the Commission even issued a horizontal recommendation to promote the development of coherent Collective Redress (“CR”) principles throughout the Member States for all areas where it might be relevant.4 In some fields, like environmental law, competition law, consumer protection or data protection, more specific CR requirements have also been introduced.5

The reasons for introducing CR mechanisms were wide-ranging. Firstly, breaches of competition law, consumer and data protection law may affect many individuals across different MS, and thus, distort the single market.6 Secondly, in these areas, claimants face considerable obstacles to pursue their individual court claims, which could be lessened through

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1 Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, EU:C:1963:1.


5 See infra section 2.a.

6 See e.g. Commission, “White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules”, COM(2008) 794 final, para 7. See also infra section 4.b. For environmental law, however, one of the main drivers was compliance with the Aarhus Convention, see e.g. De Sadeleer and Roller, “Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Final Report”, ENV.A.3/ETU/2002/0030.
the bundling of individual claims in a single procedure or by enabling a representative entity to bring a single claim on their behalf. For instance, in the field of consumer protection, individual litigation is not only complex and lengthy, but also risky and costly. Consumers are often unaware of the redress options available to them, and even if they are, it tends to be ‘uneconomic for a consumer to pay court, lawyer and expert fees that may exceed the compensation’. In other areas, like competition and environmental law, successful claims require very complex factual analysis and evidence tends to be inaccessible for individuals, which often creates an ‘unfavourable risk/reward balance for claimants’ and limits the effectiveness of one-off claims. Finally, CR is also seen as a tool that can contribute to ‘improving compensatory justice’, which inherently deters future infringements and leads to greater compliance. Accordingly, EU initiatives to develop CR seek not only to promote an efficient single market, but also to improve the accessibility and affordability of enforcement procedures and the overall effectiveness of EU law.

In other areas, however, there is no specific CR requirement at EU level. The Commission has noted that ‘careful consideration must be given as to whether and in which areas’ an EU initiative in CR should be developed. Arguably, such ‘careful consideration’ is required not only to respect MS procedural autonomy and the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, but also to ensure that the possible risks of CR procedures are not overlooked and do not outweigh the potential advantages. Some scholars have warned that US-style class actions could be difficult to introduce in Europe for conceptual and philosophical reasons, but there are also more practical concerns. For instance, this type of claims often bring large financial incentives for legal intermediaries compared to the size of the individual claimant recovery, which can lead to weak claims that can backlog the court system. Furthermore, the high transactional costs of litigation can be used to pressure

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9 Ibid, para 11. This argument could easily be applied in the area of data protection.
10 See e.g. Commission, White Paper, cited supra note 6; Blennerhassett, A Comparative Examination of Multi-Party Actions. The Case of Environmental Mass Harm (Hart 2016) p. 23, pp. 110-111.
11 Commission, cited supra note 6, at 2.
12 See e.g. ibid, 3. See also De Sadeleer and Roller, op. cit. supra note 6, at 33-34, and more generally, Cappalli and Consolo, “Class actions for Continental Europe. A Preliminary Inquiry” 6 Temp.Inf’l & Comp.L.J. (1992) 217, at 247.
14 Whilst the expression ‘procedural autonomy’ has received some critique (see Van Gerven, “Of Rights, remedies and procedures” 37 CMLRev (2000) 501; Bobek, ‘Why There is No Principle of “Procedural Autonomy” of the Member States’ in Micklitz and De Witte (eds), The European Court of Justice and the Autonomy of the Member States (Intersentia 2012) 305), it is favoured in this contribution due to its wide use in scholarly literature.
15 Art. 5(3)-(4) TEU; Commission, Public Consultation, cited supra note 7, para 14.
16 Cappalli and Consolo, op. cit. supra note 12, 263, 277, e.g. opt out class actions may lead to involuntary representation, which is against the principle of consent for legal representation.
20 Cappalli and Consolo, op. cit. supra note 12, at 255-257.
defendants to settle despite the little merit of some claims.\textsuperscript{21} There is also the possibility that dissent within the class will lead to satellite litigation\textsuperscript{22} and that conflicts of interest arise between intermediaries and claimants.\textsuperscript{23} Consequently, the Commission is keen to avoid US-style class actions and to introduce precautions so that CR mechanisms can be developed to improve access to justice, but abusive litigation can be prevented.\textsuperscript{24}

Given that EU equality law is one of the areas where there is no specific CR requirement, this contribution argues that there are robust normative reasons for EU action to encourage CR mechanisms. Those reasons outweigh the above-mentioned risks, which can be minimised through a range of safeguards,\textsuperscript{25} such as: establishing strict criteria for accepting the representativeness of legal entities,\textsuperscript{26} relying on the ‘loser pays’ principle, not allowing punitive damages\textsuperscript{27} or regulating the funding of actions.\textsuperscript{28} Some of these safeguards have already been discussed or implemented at national and EU level,\textsuperscript{29} and they could equally be considered and adapted to the specificities of EU equality law.

Against this background, the paper analyses the legal and socio-political reasons why judicial and/or administrative CR mechanisms are necessary to improve the effectiveness of EU equality law. Considering the increasing trend to incorporate collective vigilance into the existing EU enforcement tool-box, the piece also assesses whether, under the current framework, CR mechanisms are already required for equality law. This analysis highlights the fundamental contradiction that lies at the heart of EU equality law, namely, the fact that, on a substantive level, discrimination directed against certain groups is prohibited, but on a procedural level, MS are not required to provide enforcement mechanisms if an individual victim cannot be identified. Whilst this contradiction tends to be a classical trait of EU law, to ensure its ‘substantive primacy’ some degree of procedural primacy may also be required.\textsuperscript{30} The paper equally highlights the inconsistencies between EU equality law and other fields that bear notable similarities with the former, and for which CR requirements exist at EU level.\textsuperscript{31} This comparison also demonstrates—yet again—\textsuperscript{32} the dichotomy between the EU approaches to: (a) rights closely linked to the internal market, and (b) social rights, and suggests that, if European citizenship aspires to truly become ‘the fundamental status’\textsuperscript{33} of EU citizens, market and social

\textsuperscript{21} Hodges and Money-Kirley, op. cit. supra note 18, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{23} Hodges and Money-Kirley, op. cit. supra note 18, 2.
\textsuperscript{25} Safeguards are also controversial, see e.g. Valdes, “Procedure, policy and power: class actions and social justice in historical and comparative perspective” 24 Ga.St.U.L.Rev. (2007) 627-661.
\textsuperscript{26} Commission, op. cit. supra note 17, at 18.
\textsuperscript{27} Parliament, op. cit. supra note 24, at 15-20.
\textsuperscript{28} Voet, “The crux of the matter: funding and financing collective redress mechanisms”, in Hess, Bergström and Storskrubb (eds), EU Civil Justice: Current Issues & Future Outlook (Hart, 2016) 201.
\textsuperscript{29} See e.g. sources cited supra note 24.
\textsuperscript{31} E.g. consumer protection, data protection and nationality discrimination for mobile EU workers and their families.
\textsuperscript{32} See e.g. Barnard, “EU “Social” Policy: From Employment Law to Labour Market Reform” in Craig and De Burca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law, 2nd edn (OUP, 2011) p. 639; Schick, Liebert and Schneider (eds), European Economic and Social Constitutionalism after the Treaty of Lisbon (CUP, 2011).
\textsuperscript{33} Case C-184/99, Gręczyk, EU:C:2001:458, para 31.
rights should not be treated as being in different parts of oneself. For reasons of space, practical obstacles for an EU initiative in this field are only very briefly considered.44

Before embarking into deeper discussion, the concepts of ‘CR’ and ‘effectiveness’ need clarification. CR is defined as 'any mechanism that may accomplish the cessation or prevention of unlawful business practices which affect a multitude of claimants or the compensation for the harm caused by such practices'.35 This work focuses on ‘judicial and/or administrative procedures’ for compensatory relief. This expression mirrors the terminology of the Equality Directives, which establish that MS should provide ‘judicial and/or administrative procedures, including where they deem it appropriate conciliation procedures’.36 This requirement is generally interpreted in line with the EU right to an effective remedy37 and article 6 ECHR,38 so it is considered that judicial procedures are required in most cases, although quasi-judicial administrative procedures39 would also fulfil the Equality Directives’ standards.40 Accordingly, the expression ‘judicial and/or administrative procedures’ refers to judicial and quasi-judicial procedures that fulfil the general EU law and ECHR requirements for an effective remedy.41

CR may take the form of ‘actio popularis’, which enable citizens and/or certain organisations to pursue litigation in the public interest, even if there are no identifiable complainants.42 They are technically different to representative actions, which are initiated by interest organisations or public bodies on behalf of a group of individuals—and not simply to pursue the public interest in abstracto. Actio popularis and representative actions can be distinguished from joint actions, where multiple individual claims are grouped together into one single procedure, and each member of the claim can directly enforce his/her individual rights.43 Multiple individual claims can also be channelled through class actions, whereby ‘one or a few individuals, called “class representative(s),” sue on behalf of all who are similarly situated.’44 Given that joint actions are already available in most MS45 and that the introduction of US-style class actions at EU level

34 See infra section 5.
35 Commission, op. cit. supra note 7, at 7.
37 Art. 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFREU).
38 Tobler, Remedies and Sanctions in EC non-discrimination law (MPG, 2005) 33.
39 E.g. Procedures before the Irish Workplace Relations Commission (former Equality Tribunal) or the Bulgarian Protection Against Discrimination Commission.
41 Whilst administrative pre-litigation procedures may increase accessibility, they are out of the scope of this paper.
42 These actions have been traditionally used in administrative and criminal law, but they are being increasingly introduced in discrimination law, see e.g. Farkas, “Limited Enforcement Possibilities under European Anti-Discrimination Legislation – A Case Study of Procedural Novelties: Actio Popularis Action in Hungary” 3 Erasmus Law Review (2010) 181.
44 Cappalli and Consolo, op. cit. supra note 12, 224.
45 National procedural law usually allows to join several individual claims when they are based on the same set of facts, see e.g. UK Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2013, SI 2013/1237, s 9; and Spanish Laws 36/2011, of 10 October 10, Art. 25(3), and 1/2000, of 7 January, Art. 72.
seems more risky and controversial compared to *actio popularis* and representative actions,\(^{46}\) the subsequent discussion will mainly focus on these two latter.

The term ‘effectiveness’ is used narrowly. Whilst recognising that the best way to ensure the effectiveness of equality legislation is *preventing* discrimination, redress mechanisms are also necessary *ex-post*, when discrimination occurs.\(^{47}\) This paper focuses on improving *ex-post effectiveness* through CR, i.e. repairing damage and minimising moral, financial and time costs for victims.

The article starts by reviewing how EU law enforcement has evolved from focusing on individual and institutional mechanisms to increasingly include CR tools (subsection 2(a)). However, given that this is not the case for EU equality law, the following subsection explains why encouraging CR seems necessary to improve the effectiveness of equality legislation in a context of rising intolerance (subsection 2(b)). The paper then argues that, whilst under the current legal framework MS are not required to develop CR mechanisms in this field (section 3), there are normative reasons why the EU should take action to explicitly encourage so (section 4), and finishes with some concluding remarks (section 5).

2. The evolution of EU law enforcement procedures

a. The emergence of collective redress in the EU law enforcement tool-box

As is well-known, in *Van Gend en Loos* the Court stated that Community law ‘not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage’.\(^{48}\) Yet, *Van Gend en Loos*’s significance also lies in the acknowledgement that it is through the ‘vigilance’ of individuals and institutions that the enforcement of EU law is achieved.\(^{49}\) This suggests that, at that point in time, the ECJ considered that enforcement was to be conducted either at *institutional* level, by the Commission and the MS, or at *individual* level, by the right-holders.

Indeed, this was confirmed more explicitly by AG Capotorti in *Rewe*:

> a person who merely has an interest in the enforcement of a rule, or more precisely, a person who does not stand in a specific legal relationship based on the rule, is not entitled to rely upon that rule before the courts […] Any other view would entail allowing a kind of *azione popolare* [civil action serving as a test case on a matter affecting public interests] on the basis of directly applicable Community provisions; but that would be contrary to the legal traditions common to the Member States and would, moreover, threaten to give rise to serious practical difficulties in the administration of justice.\(^{50}\)

This case concerned unfair competition originated by customs duties exemptions granted by Germany to importers of goods sold during cruises. The plaintiffs were businesses who were adversely affected by these exemptions, but they were not claiming damages for direct losses


caused by the exemptions, they were simply requesting the observance of EU law. The ECJ confirmed that they did not have *locus standi* because they were not part of the specific legal relationship at stake *— they merely had an interest in the enforcement of EU rules.*

Traditionally, therefore, the enforcement of EU law has been based on ‘individual vigilance’ (i.e. natural persons pursing claims at national level based on alleged violations of their subjective EU rights) or *institutional* actions, initiated by the Commission or MS.

In practice, though, institutional and individual vigilance have limits to address certain types of wrongs. Individual litigation may be ill-equipped to stop mass harm and systemic unlawful practices. Furthermore, affected citizens may have little incentives to start an individual complaint if potential compensation awards are unlikely to cover litigation costs. In this regard, the Commission has recognised that:

> Individual lawsuits are often not an effective means to stop unlawful practices or to obtain compensation for the harm caused by these practices. Citizens and businesses are often reluctant to initiate private lawsuits against unlawful practices, in particular if the individual loss is small in comparison to the costs of litigation. As a result, continued illegal practices cause significant aggregate loss to European citizens and businesses.

This is quite obvious in areas like consumer protection, where ‘the smallness of each claim’ makes the defendant ‘immune from suit’, unless consumers can share costs by vindicating their rights through some sort of collective procedure. Similarly, environmental law claimants may struggle to prove causation individually due to this area’s technical nature, but they may have a better chance to establish causation collectively. When environmental breaches affect common resources, enabling interest organisations to take action against a polluting company may also be more effective than relying on individual claims from potentially uninformed dispersed or uncommitted citizens.

In some situations, prospective plaintiffs may actually be so vulnerable and under-resourced, that individual litigation is perceived as an intimidating process, or may not even be an option they would envisage due to resignation, lack of resources and/or knowledge. For instance,

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52 Dawson and Muir, op. cit. supra note 2, 751.
53 Whilst uncommon, individuals may also initiate proceedings against EU institutions before the ECJ (Arts. 263(4), 265(3), 268, 277, and 340 TFEU).
54 Art 258 TFEU.
55 Art 259 TFEU.
63 Dawson and Muir, op. cit. supra note 2, 756.
whilst Roma segregation and discrimination is well-documented in housing, education or employment, individual claims challenging these practices remain very limited.  

Institutional enforcement through infringement actions also has its own weaknesses. Firstly, infringement actions are rarely activated by MS to avoid diplomatic crisis or bringing attention to their own infractions, or because they favour political rather than legal solutions. Secondly, they are filed one by one for each specific MS breach, so, they, too, are unable ‘to address the structural problems that persistently noncompliant states pose’. Thirdly, the initial informal stages of the procedure may give rise to ‘political manipulation and “horse-trading”’. Finally, MS targeted by infringement actions may ‘create the appearance of norm-conform behaviour’ without fully aligning national law to EU law.  

These flaws are even more evident following the 1990s-2000s’ enlargements, which extended the territorial and substantive scope of application of EU law, and thus, ‘accentuated the need for a more decentralised enforcement’. Indeed, the need to introduce CR mechanisms, whereby a public body or an interest organisation can start proceedings on its own name or on behalf of a group of complainants, has been increasingly recognised by the EU legislator. This has been particularly the case for consumer law, where, since the 1980s, there have been attempts to empower non-governmental organisations to mobilise the law on behalf of consumers, and these efforts started to take even more prominence in the 1990s-2000s.  

In 2010-11 the Commission even launched an initiative for a ‘coherent European approach on collective redress’, which eventually led to the adoption of Recommendation 2013/396/EU (‘the Recommendation’), which recognises that ‘collective redress is of value’ in consumer protection, competition, environment protection, protection of personal data,  


64 See e.g. Liegeois, The Council of Europe and Roma. 40 years of action (Council of Europe 2012); FRA, Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey, Roma – Selected Findings (EUPPO 2016) 11.  
65 There are only few examples, see e.g. Cases 141/78 France v United Kingdom, EU:C:1979:225; C-364/10 Hungary v Slovakia, EU:C:2012:630.  
69 Dawson and Muir, op. cit. supra note 2, 758.  
71 Commission, Public Consultation, cited supra note 35, para 2.  
72 See e.g. Dir. 84/450/EEC, Art. 4(1).  
financial services legislation and investor protection. As discussed in section 4.b, several binding instruments develop in detail the Recommendation in some of these areas.

EU law has, therefore, evolved from its initial focus on institutional and individual vigilance to recognise, more recently, that collective vigilance, particularly CR and broader standing rules, are necessary to make the enforcement tool-kit more comprehensive and effective. Through recent legislative initiatives in consumer, environmental, competition and data protection law, this has become particularly obvious. However, the 2013 Recommendation also recognises, more generally, that its CR principles ‘should be applied horizontally and equally […] in any other EU law areas’ where they might be useful.

Through this Recommendation, the Commission sought to establish some ‘common principles which any potential future EU initiatives on collective redress in any sector would respect’ to ensure that they are in line with the EU and MS legal traditions and with existing procedural remedies. The door seems therefore open to further sectoral EU proposals to encourage the development of CR at national level in areas where this may be valuable. Should this be case of EU equality law?

b. Collective redress: signs that EU equality law should be included in the club?

From a sociological and psychological perspective discriminatory prejudices emerge at group level, i.e. due to the perceived differences between the majority (‘us’) and the minority (‘the others’). For these reasons, they need to be addressed not only at individual level, but also at collective level, both through adjudicatory and non-adjudicatory strategies. For instance, the factual scenario in the recent CHEZ case shows how individuals living in neighbourhoods predominantly inhabited by Roma in Bulgaria are put at disadvantage by not having electricity meters at an accessible height—because it is believed that if they were easily accessible, they would be tampered with. The applicant was only able to challenge this practice in her personal case, so the ruling in CHEZ did not directly affect all the other individuals subjected to the same practice. This suggests that, when equality promotion strategies fail, systemic

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75 Recital 7.
76 See infra section 4.b.
77 Recital 7.
80 Case C-83/14, CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria AD v Komisia za zaštita od diskriminacista, EU:C:2015:480.
81 CHEZ led to changes in the Bulgarian definition of ‘indirect discrimination’ (Protection Against Discrimination Amendment Act (22 Dec. 2016), State Gazette, Issue 105, 30 Dec. 2016), which may have had an influence on the electricity supplier’s decisions to introduce a smart meters (<https://www.cez.bg/bg/novini/1573.html>) and to lower the electricity meters, but only in the Montana district (<https://www.24chasa.bg/Article/6072637>), all last visited 1 Dec. 2017. I am indebted to Svetlana Chobanova for valuable assistance in locating this information.
discrimination rooted in group prejudices must be addressed not only through individual litigation, but also through CR strategies.\(^{82}\)

The need for adjudicatory collective vigilance is indeed clearly visible in the light of rampant structural discrimination still suffered by the Roma in many MS.\(^{83}\) In 2010, the EU started developing a multi-layered governance system to encourage Roma integration based mainly on non-adjudicatory collective enforcement (e.g. funding, monitoring and mainstreaming,\(^{84}\) largely managed through the EU Platform for Roma Inclusion and National Roma Integration Strategies). Nevertheless, discrimination against Roma prevails: in a 2016 survey, 41% of respondents had felt discriminated against at least once in the past five years.\(^{85}\) Discrimination is particularly high in the fields of access to employment, housing and access to services.\(^{86}\) Accordingly, non-adjudicatory collective enforcement is not being enough to address the systemic disadvantage that the Roma still endure. Yet, unlike EU consumer, data protection or environmental law, EU equality law has not introduced requirements to develop CR at national level.

In fact, besides Roma discrimination, CR may be useful to address discrimination in other fields, like systemic gender pay inequalities,\(^{87}\) or the high levels of housing discrimination and segregation suffered by certain ethnic and religious minorities.\(^{88}\) In these contexts, discrimination is not circumstantial, but structural;\(^{89}\) it is not the product of isolated ‘random intentional actions’,\(^{90}\) but rather the consequence of profoundly ingrained social patterns. Addressing these collectively-experienced phenomena only through individual litigation seems oddly inconsistent and merely provides one-off solutions – if it even does that –, leaving the underlying discriminatory patterns unchanged.

The need for collective vigilance in this field has also become more visible in connection with the recent rise of xenophobic populist movements. As the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) has pointed out, following years of uncertainty and austerity, “[a]n increasing dichotomy between “us” and “them” has developed in the public discourse

\(^{82}\) The analysis of strategic litigation based on individual cases is beyond the scope of this paper, but it may be another useful enforcement tool, see e.g. Panke, “The European Court of Justice as an Agent of Europeanisation? Restoring Compliance with EU Law” 14 JEPP (2006) 847, 852; Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law (HUP, 2009).


\(^{84}\) Dawson and Muir, op. cit. supra note 2, 767.


\(^{86}\) Ibid 38.

\(^{87}\) Class actions have been successfully used in sex discrimination and pay inequalities cases in the US (e.g. Equal Employment Opportunities Commission, “Walmart To Pay More Than $11.7 Million To Settle EEOC Sex Discrimination Suit”, <https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/3-1-10.cfm> (last visited 1 Nov. 2017)) and the UK (e.g. Asda Stores Ltd v Brierley and others UKCAT/0011/17).


\(^{89}\) See similarly Rey Martínez, “La discriminación racial en la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos” in Fundación Secretariado Gitano (FSG), Informe Anual 2012 (FSG, 2012) 75.

of many countries, which seeks to exclude people on the basis of their skin colour, religion, language or ethnicity. This has not only affected recently arrived migrants, but also minority groups that have been long-established in Europe.  

Non-adjudicatory collective vigilance based on self-regulation and codes of conduct may help mitigate this problem, but it is unlikely to be sufficient to eradicate it. Xenophobic speech is often directed at certain groups without targeting specific persons, so individual litigation is often ill-suited to address it. Whilst the worst forms of hate speech ought to be addressed through criminal law, milder everyday ‘speech acts’ may also be challenged through civil, administrative or employment law, but they are often not reported by disempowered individuals. Yet, claims in the public interest started by human rights watch-dogs or and interest organisations could facilitate enforcement and act as deterrent to avoid the further expansion of this phenomenon. In this line, the ECRI recommends providing standing not only for those directly targeted by hate speech, but also for ‘equality bodies, national human rights institutions and interested non-governmental organisations’. For instance, thanks to a case brought by a Roma NGO, a Bulgarian TV broadcaster was held liable for ethnic discrimination for failing to moderate anonymous comments against the Roma community on its website.

Overall, therefore, whilst the EU has started to acknowledge that, in areas like consumer protection, environmental protection or data protection, CR must complement existing individual and institutional enforcement mechanisms, this has not been the case in protection against discrimination. The EU has taken institutional action to improve the collective situation of some groups affected by long-lasting discrimination, especially the Roma, but this has not been coupled with an encouragement to develop national CR mechanisms. Yet, as this subsection demonstrates, there is a clear need to improve CR avenues in the field of EU equality law.

Against this background, the next two sections consider whether a requirement to develop CR strategies may arise from the combination of existing EU Equality Directives, general EU law principles and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (section 3), and what are the normative justifications for introducing an express obligation to develop national collective judicial redress mechanisms in this area (section 4).

91 ECRI, Annual Report on ECRI’s Activities, covering the period from 1 January to 31 December 2016, CRI(2017)35, paras 6-7.
95 ECRI, op. cit. supra note 92, at 8.e.
3. EU equality law and the right to effective judicial protection: a concealed duty to develop collective redress mechanisms at national level?

If, as argued earlier, CR is necessary for EU equality law to be more effective, one could consider whether, under the current legal framework, the EU principles of equivalence, effectiveness and effective judicial protection could have the effect of requiring MS to grant standing to legal persons (e.g. public bodies, trade unions or interest organisations), to initiate *actio popularis* and/or representative action proceedings.

In determining standing for private actors to enforce EU rights, Dougan has argued that the ECJ tends to focus first on defining the ‘protective scope’ of EU law ‘as a matter of Union law itself’. To do so, the ECJ undertakes a textual and teleological analysis of the substantive and procedural provisions of relevant EU instruments, while also factoring in the policy and regulatory context. In this interpretative exercise, the ECJ must keep a difficult balance between: a) ensuring the uniformity and effectiveness of EU law, and b) not requiring MS to do so at the expense of their own legal traditions (e.g. by introducing unusual ‘procedural creatures’ in their legal systems).

Once the protective scope of EU law is established, the ECJ considers the margin of discretion left to MS to exercise their own procedural autonomy. This determines the breadth of MS leeway to define *locus standi* according to their own legal systems, with the caveat that they must respect the well-known principles of equivalence and effectiveness, and the principle of effective judicial protection.

In what follows this section applies this two stage analysis to EU equality law to assess which position the ECJ would be likely to take regarding CR in this field, i.e concerning the standing of legal persons acting in the public interest (*actio popularis*) or representing groups of complainants (representative actions). The section starts by sketching the relevant EU law framework (subsection a), which is then considered to determine the protective scope of the Equality Directives (subsection b) and the margin of discretion left to MS (subsection c).

a. **The EU legal framework**

To investigate whether MS could already have a duty to allow CR procedures to enforce EU equality law, there are a range of sources to consider (Diagram 1).

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97 In the context of Brexit, the ‘independent national authority’ that will likely be created could potentially engage in CR mechanisms, see the Joint Report from the Negotiators (8 Dec. 2017), at 40 <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/joint_report.pdf> (last visited 20 Feb. 2018).
98 Dougan, op. cit. supra note 58, 82-100.
99 Cf. Dougan, op. cit. supra note 58, 87.
100 Ibid 90.
Diagram 1. Legal Framework to determine the protective scope of EU Equality Law.

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Source: Own elaboration.

To begin with, the right to equal pay between men and women and the right not to be discriminated against on the ground of nationality have always been recognised in primary law, currently under Articles 157 and 18 TFEU, respectively.102 These provisions have direct effect,103 so they are both considered to determine the protective scope of EU Equality Law under sub-section b.

Conversely, current Article 19 TFEU, introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, does not have direct effect. However, it has been extensively developed through the Equality Directives. Remarkably, the Directives include not only substantive provisions (e.g. definitions of the forms of discrimination) but also, for the first time in this field, procedural provisions on complaint mechanisms, equality bodies, burden of proof, sanctions, etc. Sub-section b, therefore, also analyses the substantive and procedural requirements of the Equality Directives.

The relevant legal framework is completed by the CFREU and some general principles of EU law. It will be recalled that the Lisbon Treaty gave the CFREU the same legal value as the Treaties, making it binding for MS when ‘they are implementing EU law’.104 This is significant for our purposes because the CFREU contains two provisions which could support the need to develop CR procedures for EU equality law. On a substantive level, Article 21(1) establishes that discrimination based on any of its grounds ‘shall be prohibited’. On a procedural level, Article 47 CFREU recognizes the right to an effective remedy as an expression of the more general EU principle of effective judicial protection. Whilst this principle originates from national constitutional traditions and Articles 6 and 13 ECHR,105 and it has indeed been present in the ECJ case law for a long time,106 the new binding character of the CFREU has reinforced its constitutional status within EU law.107 Since the Lisbon Treaty, this is also supported by Article 19(1) TEU, which, by creating a duty for MS to provide sufficient

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104 Art. 6(1) TEU, Art. 51(1) CFREU.


remedies to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law, can be seen as the counterpart of Article 47 CFREU.

Although there is some overlap between the principle of effective judicial protection and the so-called ‘Rewe mantra’, i.e. the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, they ‘serve different purposes and are driven by different rationales’. This is evidenced by recent case law, where the ECJ has applied them in a separate, yet complementary, manner. The Court relies on the equivalence/effectiveness test to define the boundaries of national discretion to develop remedies for the enforcement of EU law, whereas the principle of effective judicial protection safeguards the right to an effective remedy as a crucial human right in a rule of law system. Accordingly, the ‘Rewe mantra’ and the principle of effective judicial protection are considered separately in sub-section c.

b. Defining the protective scope of EU Equality Law

To define the protective scope of EU equality law this section focuses first on substantive law. Article 18 TFEU boldly states that ‘any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited’, which can be interpreted as encompassing both individual and group discrimination. Likewise, Article 157 TFEU, which requires that MS ensure that the principle of equal pay ‘for male and female workers’ (in plural) is applied, allows for an analogous interpretation. Article 21 CFREU similarly refers to ‘any discrimination’ based either on the open catalogue of grounds listed in paragraph 1 or on nationality (paragraph 2), which also supports the suggested interpretation. Following this simple textual analysis, EU primary law allows for a broad definition of the protective scope of EU equality law to potentially grant standing to: a) individual complainants, b) defined groups of complainants (acting in their own names or represented by a third party), and c) legal persons who start proceedings in the public interest when discrimination targets a specific group without any identifiable victim.

Nevertheless, the Equality Directives contain much more detailed provisions which are central to outline the protective scope of EU equality law. Regarding the substantive provisions, the ECJ recognised in Feryn that, although the RED’s definition of direct discrimination is framed in individual terms (‘one person is treated less favourably than another’), a public statement that discriminates against a certain group of prospective employees would also be covered by the Directive. Following a teleological interpretation, the ECJ found that ‘direct discrimination is not dependant on the identification of a complainant who claims to have been the victim.’ Accordingly, discriminatory conducts targeting or affecting a defined group (e.g. ‘immigrants’, or

108 Prechal and Widdershoven, ‘Redefining the Relationship between “Rewe-effectiveness” and Effective Judicial Protection’ (2011) 4 REALaw 31, 47.
109 ibid.
110 See e.g. Cases C-12/08, Mono Car Styling, EU:C:2009:466, para 49; C-317-320/08, Alassini, paras 47-66; ibid, 46-50.
112 Art. 2(2)(a) RED. On the definitions of indirect discrimination, harassment and instructions to discriminate see footnotes 115-116 and text to footnotes.
113 Case C-54/07, Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v Firma Feryn NV’, EU:C:2008:397, para 25.
114 ibid.
‘workers over 50 years old’) are covered by the Directives, even in the absence of an obvious victim. Arguably, then, despite the wording of the definition of direct discrimination, on a substantive level, the RED protects the rights of groups falling within their scope.

A few years later, the ECJ confirmed in Asociația that the same principle applies to direct discrimination in the context of Directive 2000/78/EC.115 It could therefore be also extended by analogy to all the other Equality Directives which contain identical definitions of direct discrimination.

In fact, the teleological justifications put forward by the Court to substantiate that interpretation of the concept of direct discrimination116 could easily be transposed to the concept of indirect discrimination. The latter requires the existence of a group-related disadvantage, which is normally exemplified in the claimant’s personal situation. However, indirect discrimination towards a certain group of individuals may exist whether one of them is willing to initiate a claim or not. Indeed, in the Equality Directives indirect discrimination is defined as a neutral provision, criterion or practice that would put ‘persons’ of a certain protected group at particular disadvantage compared to other persons,117 without specifically referring to an individual. For instance, suppose that a company has the policy of having staff meetings from 16h to 18h. This policy may be difficult to combine with childcare responsibilities that -still nowadays- tend to fall upon women’s shoulders more frequently. Whilst this internal rule may put women at disadvantage compared to men, affected female employees may not be willing to file a complaint (e.g. for fear of retaliation). Yet, the policy would still constitute indirect sex discrimination. Therefore, from a substantive perspective, groups of individuals targeted by direct or indirect discrimination have an EU right to be protected, even when individual victims cannot be identified.118

Nevertheless, in Feryn, the ECJ also noted that the substantive rights recognised under the RED ‘must be distinguished’ from the procedural obligations that the directive imposes upon MS, which only require that remedies are available ‘to persons who consider that they have suffered discrimination’.119 Indeed, Article 7(1) of the RED states that MS shall ensure that judicial and/or administrative procedures [... for the enforcement of obligations under this Directive are available to all persons who consider themselves wronged by failure to apply the principle of equal treatment to them’. Consequently, the RED, and the other similarly drafted Equality Directives, do not compel MS to introduce actio popularis.120 On the other hand, the wording of article 7(1) does not completely rule out class actions because it requires granting locus standi to ‘all persons’ who consider themselves victims –in plural. However, during the preparatory works several MS expressed strong opposition to class actions because ‘they were not foreseen

115 Case C-81/12 Asociația ACCEPT v Consiliul Național pentru Combaterea Discriminării EU:C:2013:275, para 37.
116 Namely, that the Directive seeks to foster a ‘socially inclusive labour market’, which can be undermined by discriminatory ‘speech acts’, Case C-54/07, Feryn, paras 23-25.
117 Art. 2(2)(b) RED.
118 Whilst this conclusion could also be easily extended to the concept of instructions to discriminate (Art. 2(2)(4) RED refers to ‘persons’), it would be more difficult to extend it to harassment, which requires that the unwanted conduct is towards ‘a person’ (art 2(2)(3) RED).
119 Case C-54/07, Feryn, para 26.
in their own judicial systems\textsuperscript{121}, and the Commission is also against US-style class actions\textsuperscript{122}. It is therefore likely that the ECJ will take a cautious approach to the interpretation of Article 7(1) to avoid requiring the introduction of procedural mechanisms, like class actions, that would be alien to many MS legal systems.\textsuperscript{123}

Nonetheless, Art. 7(2) RED also establishes that

associations, organisations or other legal entities, which have, \textit{in accordance with the criteria laid down by their national law}, a legitimate interest in ensuring that the provisions of this Directive are complied with, may engage, either on behalf or in support of the complainant, \textit{with his or her approval, in any judicial and/or administrative procedure} provided for the enforcement of \textit{[the obligations contained in the Directive]}\textsuperscript{124}.

This provision could be understood as requiring that legal entities with a legitimate interest are able to engage in judicial and/or administrative proceedings through \textit{actio popularis} and/or representative actions. However, on a careful analysis it becomes evident that this Article contains three ‘exclusionary’ provisos.\textsuperscript{125} Firstly, the criteria for determining which organisations have a legitimate interest are determined \textit{by national law}. Secondly, legal entities may \textit{only} engage in legal proceedings \textit{with the complainant’s approval}, which rules out \textit{actio popularis} in cases of ‘victimless discrimination’. Thirdly, the stipulation ‘on behalf or in support’ does not require MS to grant legal entities standing \textit{on behalf} of the complainant, which would be essential to enable representative actions.\textsuperscript{126}

Whilst from a \textit{substantive perspective}, the Equality Directives protect \textit{both individuals and groups} against discrimination, and this is supported by EU primary law and textual and regulatory considerations, from a \textit{procedural perspective}, MS have a wide discretion to exercise their procedural autonomy,\textsuperscript{127} so it is likely that the ECJ would consider that it is their choice to enable CR procedures or not.

\begin{references}
\textsuperscript{122} Commission, Joint information note, cited supra note 74, at 17. Similarly, see EESC, Opinion on the Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress, O.J. 2010, C128, at 5.2.3.
\textsuperscript{123} Cappalli and Consolo, op. cit. supra note 12, 217; Dougan, op. cit. supra note 58, 90. Only eight MS clearly allow class actions in the field of discrimination: Bulgaria, Denmark, France (only housing claims), the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, Chopin and Germaine, op. cit. supra note 46, 96.
\textsuperscript{124} Art 7(2) RED.
\textsuperscript{126} The initial Commission proposal for the RED clearly required that legal entities be entitled to pursue complaints ‘on behalf of’ individuals (COM(1999)0566), but several delegations expressed concerns about this broad wording, namely, Belgium, Denmark, Austria, Spain, France, Sweden and UK (Interinstitutional File: 99/0253 (CNS), Docs 6435/00, p.13; 7756/00, p.17). These were overcome through UK and Irish proposals to redraft the wording to ‘may engage, either on behalf or in support of the complainant’ (Docs 8857/00, p.9; 8967/00, p.13), despite the Commission’s reluctance (Doc 8857/00, p.9) and Parliament efforts to introduce amendments to allow organisations to ‘bring a case without the approval of a victim, in particular where the discrimination affects a group of persons and it may not be feasible to obtain the approval of each individual affected’ (Parliament (EU), Report AS-0136/2000, Amendment 41, pp. 21-22).
\textsuperscript{127} See e.g. Cases C-87-89/90, Verhoven v Sociale Verzekeringenbank Amsterdam, EU:C:1991:314; Dougan op. cit. supra note 58, 83.
\end{references}
c. Exploring the limits of Member States’ procedural autonomy in the field of EU Equality Law

In exercising their procedural competence, however, MS must observe the case-law based principles of effectiveness and equivalence, and the right to effective judicial protection, enshrined in articles 19(1) TEU and 47 CFREU. Traditionally, the principle of equivalence requires that the rules governing the enforcement of EU law in MS are not less favourable than those governing similar national actions, whereas the principle of effectiveness establishes that the enforcement of EU law must not be made virtually impossible or excessively difficult. The right to effective judicial protection, in turn, establishes a duty for MS ‘to provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by EU law’ (emphasis added).

The ECJ’s application of the effectiveness-equivalence test has been controversial and has led to unpredictable and contradictory case law. Nevertheless, in that body of case law, the effectiveness-equivalence test tends to take a ‘negative role’, i.e. ensuring that national law does not create excessive hurdles for the enforcement of EU law. Whereas some scholars have advocated that a ‘positive duty’ requiring MS to provide ‘adequate’ judicial protection should emerge from these principles, the ECJ has tended to require a minimum level of judicial protection only. For instance, MS would comply with these principles provided the criteria to determine which organisations have a ‘legitimate interest’ are not overly restrictive so as to nullify the effect of the Equality Directives and are comparable to criteria applicable to analogous national law. So, the ECJ would probably consider that allowing legal entities to ‘support’ complaints in legal proceedings would comply with the minimum standards (as opposed to granting standing to act ‘on behalf’ of complainants, which could be considered an adequate protection). It is therefore unlikely that reliance on these principles could have the effect of requiring MS to grant standing to legal persons in CR procedures.

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128 Case C-33/76, Rewe, para 5; C-45/76, Comet BV, paras 13- 16. More recently, the ECJ has favoured a ‘proportionality-based’ application of these principles, see e.g. Cases C-430-431/93, Van Schijndel v Stichting Pensioenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten, EU:C:1995:441, para 19; Craig and De Burca, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (6th ed, OUP, 2011) 439-240; Bobek, op. cit. supra note 14, at 312.

129 Ravo, op. cit. supra note 11, at 105.


131 Bobek, op. cit. supra note 14, at 312, 319.

132 See e.g. Cases C-120/97, Upjohn v The Licensing Authority EU:C:1999:14, paras 34-37; C-12/08 Mono Car Styling, paras 46-49; C-317-320/08, Alassini, paras 52-60; C-93/12, Agrokonsulting-04, paras 48-58; Reich, “Effective Private Law Remedies in Discrimination Cases”, in Schulze (ed), Non-Discrimination in European Private Law (Mohr Siebeck 2011) p. 74. See also Dougan, National Remedies before the Court of Justice (Hart, 2004) pp. 24-52.

133 Micklitz, “The ECJ between the individual citizens and the Member States” in Micklitz and De Witte, op. cit. supra note 14, p. 395; Reich, ibid, pp. 74-75. However, some authors consider that such duty or some sort of procedural primacy of EU law already exists, see respectively Accetto and Zleptnig, “The Principle of Effectiveness: Rethinking Its Role in Community Law” 11 EPL (2005) 375, at 389; Delicostopoulos, op. cit. supra note 30, at 603-604, 609, 612.

134 Except for compensation cases, where the CJEU has required ‘adequate’ compensation, see e.g. Cases 14/83 V on Colton and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, EU:C:1984:153, paras 23, 28; C-271/91, Marshall Southampnt and South West Hampshire Area Health Authority, EU:C:1993:335, para 26; Van Gerven, op. cit. supra note 14, 529; Adinolfi, op. cit. supra note 130, p. 292.

135 Case C-427/07 Commission v Ireland, EU:C:2009:457.
Yet, could the principle of effective judicial protection, enshrined in Article 47 CFREU, require that MS introduce CR mechanisms to give full effect to EU equality law? This principle is particularly relevant for the standing issues\(^{136}\) herein considered because it seeks to ensure that substantive rights do not become “an empty promise”.\(^{137}\)

The CFREU arguably aspires to become “the Court’s true guiding (written) norm”,\(^{138}\) so the next step in this inquiry is considering the potential of the right to an effective remedy in Article 47 CFREU – as an expression of the above-mentioned principle, and jointly interpreted with Article 21 CFREU - to require that MS develop CR mechanisms for EU equality law.

Whilst the binding nature of the Charter\(^{139}\) is limited by Article 51(1) CFREU,\(^{140}\) following Rauchegger, MS are compelled ‘to guarantee the effectiveness of a rule of EU law’ when two conditions are fulfilled, namely: (1) that a national measure affects the effectiveness of a provision of secondary EU law, and (2) that the effective implementation is clearly mandated by EU law.\(^{141}\)

Regarding the first proviso, national procedural law certainly affects the effectiveness of substantive EU equality law. In the same way that the CFREU applied in DEB to national procedural law which hindered access to justice to legal entities in the field of state liability,\(^{142}\) and it applied in Textdata to ineffective national penalties that hindered compliance with an EU directive requiring the disclosure of accounting documents,\(^{143}\) it may also apply to national procedural laws that impede access to justice to enforce EU equality law. Of course, MS may have their own procedural provisions which are applicable to the Equality Directives and may pre-date the latter. Yet, following DEB and Fransson,\(^{144}\) the Charter applies to national rules which have the function of directly or indirectly assisting the transposition EU law, even though they were not originally intended to transpose EU law.\(^{145}\)

The second proviso will normally entail the existence of a specific substantive EU rule governing that area of law.\(^{146}\) In this regard, under Fransson, it is now widely accepted that ‘the applicability of European Union law entails the applicability of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter’,\(^{147}\) that is, the CFREU applies to the MS not only when they are ‘implementing’ Union law,\(^{148}\) but also in any situation ‘where national legislation falls within the

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\(^{136}\) Prechal and Widderdshoven, op. cit. supra note 107, 47.

\(^{137}\) Lenaerts, ‘Exploring the limits of the EU charter of fundamental rights’ 8 ECLR (2012) 375, 381.


\(^{139}\) Art 6(1) TEU.

\(^{140}\) See further Lenaerts, op. cit. supra note 137; Sarmiento, op. cit. supra note 125.

\(^{141}\) Rauchegger, “The Interplay Between the Charter and National Constitutions after Åkerberg Fransson and Melloni: Has the CJEU Embraced the Challenges of Multilevel Fundamental Rights Protection?” in de Vries, Bernitz and Weatherill, op. cit. supra note 141, 93, 104.

\(^{142}\) Case C-279/09, DEB v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, EU:C:2010:811, para 33.

\(^{143}\) Case C-418/11, Textdata, EU:C:2013:588, paras 48-52, 74-76.

\(^{144}\) Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, EU:C:2013:280, para 21.

\(^{145}\) Sarmiento, op. cit. supra note 125.

\(^{146}\) Ladenburger, “Protection of Fundamental Rights post-Lisbon - The interaction between the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European Convention of Human Rights and National Constitutions”, (FiDE, 2012) 16.

\(^{147}\) Case C-617/10, Fransson, para 21.

\(^{148}\) Art 51(1) CFREU.
scope of European Union law.\textsuperscript{149} For our purposes, the \textit{Feryn} recognition that ‘victimless discrimination’ is prohibited under the Equality Directives could trigger Article 47 CFREU to determine whether, to ensure the full effectiveness of that prohibition, groups of complainants and/or legal persons representing their interests\textsuperscript{150} should be granted standing at national level. Nevertheless, if such claim ever reached the ECJ, the latter would probably argue that the narrow procedural stipulations of the Equality Directives are what Sarmiento calls ‘exclusionary rules’, which have the effect of ‘delimiting in the negative the areas of influence of EU law and, consequently, of the Charter’.\textsuperscript{151} In the light of the partial harmonisation achieved by the Directives, the ECJ could rely on \textit{Unibel}\textsuperscript{152} to claim that EU law cannot require the creation of CR procedures given that the collective rights derived from the Equality Directives may be \textit{indirectly} enforced through individual procedures.\textsuperscript{153} The Court could equally reject a potential duty to set up CR mechanisms on the basis of \textit{Pohotovost}.\textsuperscript{154} In that case, a claim that Articles 38 and 47 CFREU and Directive 93/13 required that consumer associations are allowed to intervene in arbitration procedures was rejected. Under Directive 93/13/EEC, consumer associations should be granted standing to act on behalf of consumers.\textsuperscript{155} However, since the directive did ‘not expressly’ provide for consumer associations to \textit{intervene} in individual disputes, the Court ruled that Article 38 CFREU could not, ‘by itself, impose an interpretation of that directive which would encompass such a right.’\textsuperscript{156} In our context, it is plausible to imagine a similar reasoning: since the Equality Directives do not expressly refer to CR mechanisms, Articles 21\textsuperscript{157} and 47 CFREU cannot, \textit{by themselves}, impose an interpretation requiring the development of those procedures.\textsuperscript{158}

To conclude, whilst following \textit{Feryn} the substance of the Equality Directives protects groups against discrimination, their narrow procedural provisions do not allow for an extensive interpretation, which, in conjunction with favourable primary law, could require the development of national CR mechanisms. Not even the Lisbon enhancements of the principle of effective judicial protection and its alleged preponderance over national procedural autonomy\textsuperscript{159} can make up for the weakness of the Directives’ procedural clauses. Whilst this may be considered an ‘externality’ inherent to the specificities of the EU legal order, the

\textsuperscript{149} Case C-617/10, \textit{Fransson}, para 21; see also Case C-256/11, \textit{Dereci v Bundesministerium für Inneres}, EU:C:2011:734, para 72; Sarmiento, op. cit. supra note 125, 1277-1278.

\textsuperscript{150} In \textit{DEB} the ECJ established that ‘it is not impossible for legal persons to rely on [the principle of effective judicial protection]’, Case C-279/09, para 59.

\textsuperscript{151} Sarmiento, op. cit. supra note 125, 1285.

\textsuperscript{152} I.e. that EU law does not require the creation of new national remedies, provided there is at least an indirect remedy to ensure respect for EU rights, Case C-432/05, \textit{Unibel v Justitiekanslern}, EU:C:2007:163, paras 40-41.

\textsuperscript{153} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{154} Case C-470/12, \textit{Pohotovost' s. r. o. v Miroslav Veluta}, EU:C:2014:101.

\textsuperscript{155} Art. 7(2)-(3); ibid, paras 54-55.

\textsuperscript{156} Ibid, para 52.

\textsuperscript{157} Although the ECJ has relied on Arts. 20 and 21 CFREU to interpret secondary law extensively and to require that national law is either set aside (Case C-441/14, \textit{Danik Industri}, EU:C:2016:278, paras 22, 27) or interpreted in conformity (Case C-149/10, \textit{Chatzi}, EU:C:2010:534, paras 62-63, 75),\textsuperscript{158} the exclusionary provisos of the Equality Directives severely limit that option.


\textsuperscript{159} Arnulf, ‘The Principle of Effective Judicial Protection in EU law: An Unruly Horse?’ (2011) 36 E.L.Rev.68; Mak, op. cit. supra note 107, 240.
following section argues that it is problematic from a normative perspective and creates inconsistencies within EU law.

4. Normative reasons to encourage collective redress for discrimination claims through EU Law

It has so far been argued that, largely due to the flimsy enforcement provisions of the Equality Directives, the ECJ is unlikely to conclude that MS should develop CR mechanisms to enforce EU equality law. In this section, however, the normative reasons why the EU legislature should overtly encourage CR at national level are explored. These reasons are grouped around two themes: ensuring a coherent and uniform application of EU law (subsection a) and overcoming the divide between economic and social rules (subsection b).

a. Ensuring a coherent and uniform application of EU law throughout the territory of the Union

The previous section has highlighted a disturbing contradiction. In theory, where EU law creates rights for individuals—and for groups of individuals—the principle of effective judicial protection requires the existence of effective enforcement mechanisms. Yet, in practice, through the combined effect of weak secondary law, national procedural competence and the CJEU requirement of minimum—not adequate—judicial protection, this principle can become a mere chimera because EU law may not require a particular form of judicial and/or administrative enforcement mechanism at national level. Effectively, therefore, ‘there can […] be EU rights without judicial protection’. As Feryn exemplifies, minority groups falling under the scope of the Equality Directives have the right not to be discriminated against, but EU law does not require that groups, as such, or legal entities representing them, have access to judicial and/or administrative procedures under national law, which seems paradoxically inconsistent.

Certainly, when EU law recognises a substantive right, it should also ensure that there are appropriate national procedures to enforce that right—even with no identifiable victim—because ‘[r]ights which cannot be enforced in practice are worthless’. Yet, due to this enforcement paradox, MS are not required to enable CR mechanisms for individuals whose anti-discrimination rights have only been wronged at group level.

Consequently, only some MS have developed these mechanisms: apart from Belgium and Romania—where Feryn and Asociația originated—just 11 other MS clearly allow actio popularis in the field of equality law. For instance, in Spain, trade unions are entitled to initiate a ‘collective conflict procedure’ to defend the interests of an abstract group of workers. This

161 Ruffert, op. cit. supra note 120, 332-333; see also Dougan, ibid, 104.
165 Bulgaria, Croatia, France, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain (only in criminal proceedings and in the field of employment, for trade unions). Austria and Germany only allow actio popularis for disability discrimination; Chopin and Germaine, A comparative analysis of non-discrimination law in Europe (MPG 2016) 94-95.
procedure can be used even when there is no identifiable victim because it may still be possible to identify the generic group of workers affected (by discrimination) through objective data which differentiate them from other groups.\(^{167}\) Thus, whilst a discriminatory recruitment policy may be challenged in Spain and few other MS even in the absence of an identifiable victim, this is not possible in many other MS. In other words, as it currently stands, EU equality law allows for different enforcement standards in different MS, depending on whether national law goes beyond the minimum requirements established in the Equality Directives or not.

This not only leads to a lack of uniformity and undesirable inequalities in the application of EU law in different MS,\(^{168}\) it also undermines the effectiveness and the ‘substantive supremacy’\(^{169}\) of EU (equality) law. The Commission itself has acknowledged that, given the diversity of national systems, ‘a lack of a consistent approach to collective redress at EU level may undermine the enjoyment of rights by citizens and businesses and gives rise to uneven enforcement of those rights’.\(^{170}\)

This lack of uniform enforcement is clearly linked to the classical EU law disconnection between rights and remedies, i.e. rights are granted by EU law, enforcement procedures are established by national law.\(^{171}\) Yet, as Delicostopoulos suggests, guaranteeing the effective enforcement and primacy of EU substantive rights may require some degree of EU ‘procedural primacy’, which can coexist with national procedural competence.\(^{172}\)

Indeed, in some areas –typically with strong economic implications or strategically connected to the internal market, e.g. consumer protection, data protection, competition law– EU law seems to be advancing in that direction. In those fields, EU legislation requires that natural and/or legal persons whose interests have been indirectly affected by a breach of EU law have *locus standi*.\(^{173}\) In those areas, the ECJ has also been more intrusive of MS procedural systems, often defining EU law’s protective scope more broadly,\(^{174}\) and even accepting that claimants act as ‘private policemen’\(^{175}\) in the enforcement of EU competition law.\(^{176}\) As the next subsection demonstrates, there is no normative reason for a different procedural approach between economic/internal market rules and more socially oriented rules,\(^{177}\) like equality law.

**b. Overcoming the divide between economic and social rules**

In the last years, the EU has taken sectoral measures to encourage MS to develop *actio popularis* or representative actions mechanisms. For instance, Directive 2004/35/EC requires that environmental non-governmental organisations are allowed to request competent authorities

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\(^{167}\) STS de 25 de enero 1999 (RJ 1999/897).
\(^{168}\) Accetto and Zleptnig, op. cit. *supra* note 133, 379-380.
\(^{169}\) Delicostopoulos, op. cit. *supra* note 30, 609-612.
\(^{171}\) See e.g. Beljin, op. cit. *supra* note 101, 91, 109-120.
\(^{172}\) op. cit. *supra* note 30, 609, 611-612; see also Adinolfi, op. cit. *supra* note 130, 292-294.
\(^{173}\) See section 4.b.
\(^{174}\) Dougan op. cit. *supra* note 58, 90, 92.
\(^{175}\) ibid 92-93.
\(^{176}\) For instance, companies operating in the relevant market have been granted standing when their interests were affected by anti-competitive practices, even when they were not directly affected (see Case C174/02 *Streekgezicht*).
\(^{177}\) Similarly, Dougan, op. cit. *supra* note 58, 94.
to act to avoid potential environmental damage. Directive 2005/29/EC establishes that ‘persons or organisations’ with legitimate interest should have standing to take action against unfair commercial practices. Directive 2011/83/EU requires that either public bodies, consumer organisations or professional organisations having a legitimate interest have *locus standi* before national courts or administrative authorities. Whilst Directive 2014/104/EU on antitrust damages does not introduce CR *stricto sensu*, it widens standing requirements by compelling MS to ensure that ‘any natural or legal person who has suffered harm’ caused by a competition law breach can claim full compensation, even in the absence ‘of a direct contractual relationship with the infringing undertaking’. Arguably, then, the old adagio of A.G. Capotorti in *Rewe* (i.e. that parties outside the ‘specific legal relationship’ could not have *locus standi*) is not true anymore for competition law. More recently, Regulation 2016/679/EU on data protection established that individuals shall have the right to mandate certain organisations to, *inter alia*, file complaints and receive compensation on their behalf, and MS may even provide for these organisations to lodge complaints without an individual’s mandate if the right infringed concerns the processing of personal data.

Certainly, competition law, consumer protection and data protection are determinant for the good functioning of the internal market, which has traditionally driven EU integration. The preambles of these instruments reveal that this was a key rationale for introducing broader standing rules in these fields. In contrast, market integration is not considered a central tenet of the Equality Directives. Whilst the economic/market rationale was the main driver behind early EU Equality Law, the preambles of the newest Equality Directives indicate that they were conceived as human rights instruments, rather than market integration tools.

Having said that, EU legislation in the field of consumer protection, data protection and competition law also has some underlying social objectives, such as achieving ‘social progress’ and ‘the well-being of natural persons’, reaching a ‘high level of consumer protection’, preventing the exploitation of vulnerable consumers (due e.g. to their age, physical or mental characteristics), and achieving greater ‘substantive effectiveness’ and legal certainty for

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178 Art. 12(1).
179 Art. 11(1).
180 O.J. 2011, L304/64, Art. 23(2).
181 Art. 3(1).
182 Rec. 13.
183 Capotorti, op. cit. *supra* note 50. Claimants would still need to demonstrate ‘harm’, which would be challenging without being part of the ‘legal relationship’. I am grateful to Hedvig Schmidt for bringing this to my attention.
184 Regulation 2016/679/EU (O.J. 2016, L119/1).
185 Art. 80(1).
186 Art. 80(2).
187 See e.g. Reg. 2016/679/EU, Recs. 2, 3, 5, 6, 13; Dir. 2014/104/EU, Recs. 1, 6 and Dir. 2011/83/EU, Recs. 4-6. Note, however, that they may also apply to static situations, see Reg. 2016/679, Arts. 1(1), 3; Dir. 2014/104/EU, Arts. 1, 2(2); Dir. 2011/83/EU, Art. 3(1)-(3).
189 See e.g. Bell, ‘Constitutionalization and EU Employment Law’ 149-150.
190 See e.g. RED, recitals 2-4; FED, recitals 1-6, Dir 2006, recitals 2 and 5; Reg. 2016/679/EU, recital 2.
191 Dir. 2011/83/EU, recital 4.
Accordingly, there are some clear overlaps between the objectives of: a) EU equality law, and b) competition, data protection and consumer law. One, therefore, wonders why individuals whose ethnic origin data have been unlawfully disclosed should enjoy wider CR opportunities\(^{194}\) than those who have suffered ethnic origin discrimination; or why elderly consumers subjected to exploitative practices in the access to some goods should have access to CR procedures\(^ {196}\) but not if they are discriminated against in the access to those same goods. Is it logic that EU law requires MS to provide locus standi for either interest organisations or public bodies to challenge aggressive/harassing selling practices,\(^ {197}\) but does not require so if employers harass their employees due to their religion or their sexual orientation?\(^ {198}\)

This seems even more contradictory considering that, in some areas, the internal market objectives are so intertwined with social objectives, that they cannot be clearly separated. For instance, Directive 2014/54/EU,\(^ {199}\) which seeks to facilitate enforcement of EU migrant workers’ rights, overtly links ‘anti-discrimination rights, gender equality and free movement of workers’.\(^ {200}\) And, at the same time, it recognises that ‘poor enforcement undermines the effectiveness of Union rules applicable in this area’.\(^ {201}\) Crucially, this directive expressly refers to ‘CR’ for the first time in the field of employment, and it invites MS ‘to examine the implementation of common principles for injunctive and compensatory collective redress mechanisms’.\(^ {202}\) This ‘invitation’, inspired by Recommendation 2013/396,\(^ {203}\) is further supported by a reference to national law on the right to take action on behalf of a collective interest in Article 3(3).

Whilst these references to CR are fairly timid, they somehow recognise the relevance of these procedures to increase the effectiveness of the EU prohibition of nationality discrimination for EU workers and their families.\(^ {204}\) If this is the case for workers being discriminated against on grounds of nationality, should it not be the case for any other type of discrimination? Certainly, Directive 2014/54/EU is aimed at improving the free movement of workers within the internal market,\(^ {205}\) so it could primarily be seen as an ‘instrument of integration’,\(^ {206}\) rather than a measure promoting equality as an autonomous goal,\(^ {207}\) which is the main objective the Equality Directives. However, as noted earlier, Directive 2014/54/EU itself recognises the


\(^{195}\) Reg. 2016/679/EU, Art. 9.

\(^{196}\) Dir. 2000/78/EC, Arts. 5, 6-8, 11.

\(^{197}\) Ibid, Art. 9.

\(^{198}\) Dir. 2000/78/EC, Art. 2(2)(a).


\(^{200}\) Ibid, Art. 9. See also Rec.13, which refers to Art. 21 CFREU.


\(^{202}\) Rec. 9.

\(^{203}\) Rec. 15; see also Art. 3(3).

\(^{204}\) Ibid, Art. 2, which has the same scope than Reg. 492/2011/EU.

\(^{205}\) Its legal basis is Art. 45 TFEU, see Recs. 1-5.


links with mainstream equality law instruments, and it could probably be characterised as a hybrid instrument, rather than a purely market measure. The references to CR within that Directive could then be seen as a small first step towards recognising and bridging the gap between: a) the progressive development of secondary legislation on CR mechanisms in areas closely connected to the internal market, and b) the lack of such legislation in areas like Equality Law, which have a stronger human rights/social focus.

In fact, the evolving nature of EU law provides several examples of cross-pollination between internal market law and equality law stricto sensore. For instance, the ECJ first introduced the concept of indirect discrimination in the context of the internal market, which it then borrowed for its sex discrimination case law before being eventually codified. The ball moved in the opposite direction with the adoption of Directive 2014/54/EU, given that its enforcement provisions are largely inspired by the Equality Directives. These examples illustrate that fundamental rights (e.g. equality law) and internal market freedoms do not stand in silos and ‘mutually affect each other’. It would be desirable that, following Directive 2014/54/EU’s novel reference to CR procedures, the ball bounces back again from this hybrid instrument to the neighbouring court of EU equality law, where CR mechanisms are also much needed.

Additionally, the different treatment on CR matters granted to: a) consumer and data protection law, and b) to equality law seems all the more inconsistent if we consider that these are all fundamental rights recognised under the CFREU. All three have been protected through an extensive corpus of substantive legislation, but anti-discrimination rights have been treated as ‘the poor cousin’ in terms of enforcement opportunities. There is no apparent good reason for this different treatment, except political pragmatism based on the fact that Article 19 TFEU requires the Council’s unanimity to adopt anti-discrimination legislation, whereas the legal basis for approximation of national laws in consumer and data protection only require an agreement by qualified majority.

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210 The first case on natural persons was 152/73, Sotgiu v Deutsche Bundespost, EU:C:1974:13, paras 11-12.
211 The first case on natural persons was 152/73, Sotgiu v Deutsche Bundespost, EU:C:1974:13, paras 11-12; 170/84, Bülke v Weber von Harré, EU:C:1986:204, paras 25-30.
216 See Arts. 95, 251 EC and Art. 114 TFEU for consumer protection, and art 16 TFEU for data protection.
Yet, in these three areas, when relevant rights are wronged, individually or collectively, public interests are negatively affected, and the market can be negatively affected too.\textsuperscript{217} For instance, in the field of consumer protection, one of the rationales for introducing CR mechanisms was preventing the continued use of unfair commercial practices or contract terms that can harm competitors and/or consumers.\textsuperscript{218} Similarly, structural discrimination can go on indefinitely, thereby harming workers and competitors, and ultimately, the EU labour market, unless it is effectively challenged. Indeed, there is extensive economic and sociologic evidence demonstrating that discrimination is anti-competitive and leads to an inefficient allocation of resources,\textsuperscript{219} and that improved working conditions created by equality laws enhance labour productivity and lessen ‘the onerousness of work’.\textsuperscript{220}

Individuals affected by wrongs in the field of consumer protection, data protection and equality law often have an additional trait in common: they tend to have less bargaining power,\textsuperscript{221} knowledge\textsuperscript{222} and resources than the usual respondents in those fields, e.g. large utility companies relying on pre-formulated standard contracts (consumer protection), giant high-tech corporations collecting data through complex internet algorithms (data protection) and affluent employers and landlords with influence over essential aspects of one’s life, work and home (equality law).

If we focus, in particular, on the similarities between consumers and discrimination complainants, A.G. Trstenjak’s description of the advantages of collective action for consumers in \textit{Invitel} can easily be transposed to equality law by replacing ‘consumer’ by ‘complainant’ and ‘consumer protection associations’ by ‘anti-discrimination associations’:

\begin{quote}
By means of collective actions, consumer protection associations give consumers a voice and a weight that they would often not have in this form in isolated proceedings because of their generally weaker position. […] Collective action helps to enhance the status of the consumer at the procedural level and relieves him of the risk of costs in civil proceedings if he is unsuccessful, which may deter a consumer from individually asserting his rights […]. The successful enforcement of rights by way of a collective action creates a just balancing of the interests of consumers and undertakings, ensures fair competition and shows that collective actions are just as necessary as individual actions in order to protect the consumer.\textsuperscript{223}
\end{quote}

For these reasons, requiring that some forms of CR are available for consumer and data protection but not for equality law creates enforcement inconsistencies within EU law, which do not seem justified from a normative perspective. In fact, at national level, there are examples of cross-pollination as regards CR mechanisms between consumer protection and equality law. For instance, in France, following the introduction of a representative action

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\textsuperscript{217} Adinolfi, op. cit. \textit{supra} note 130, 295-296.
\textsuperscript{218} See e.g. A.G Trstenjak’ Opinion in Case C-471/10, \textit{Invitel}, EU:C:2011:806, para 37, referring to Directive 93/13, Art 7(1).
\textsuperscript{221} Cases C-471/10, \textit{Invitel}, para 33, C-453/10, \textit{Pereniová}, para 27.
\textsuperscript{222} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{223} Trstenjak, op. cit. \textit{supra} note 218, para 41.
\end{flushright}
which allows consumer associations to start proceedings on behalf of groups of consumers,224 a bill was proposed in 2014 to create a similar action in the field of employment equality law.225

On the whole, different CR standards between different EU law areas lead to national divergences that ‘may undermine the enjoyment of rights by citizens’.226 To avoid this, the EU should foster advancement towards a comprehensive horizontal approach to CR that would include not only internal market areas stricto sensu, but also social policy areas, like equality law.227

5. Conclusion

This contribution has argued that CR mechanisms can be valuable to improve the effectiveness of EU equality law at national level and that there are socio-political and (normative) legal reasons why the EU should take measures to urge the introduction of these mechanisms in MS. In the last years, the EU has increasingly incorporated CR to its enforcement and supervision tools. The EU efforts to push for the development of CR mechanisms are particularly visible in the fields of, inter alia, consumer protection and data protection, where hard-law measures require so. These areas have notable similarities with equality law, i.e. their fundamental rights status, their relevance for both individual and public interests, and the weaker position of prospective complainants compared to the larger bargaining power of usual respondents. It seems logical, therefore, that these efforts are extended to EU equality law, and this is also necessary to ensure the uniform application228 and the substantive primacy of EU law.

Some may argue, however, that taking EU action in this field may be difficult. Indeed, it may be intricate, but not impossible. The Equality Directives already contain limited provisions allowing the introduction of CR mechanisms, and the hybrid Directive 2014/54/EU invites MS to develop CR to address workers’ nationality discrimination. These provisions could be expanded using the general legal base for judicial cooperation in civil matters (Art. 81(2) TFEU),229 in combination with the specific equality legal basis (Arts. 19 and 157 TFEU), which were already used to adopt the Equality Directives’ enforcement measures.230

Some have also claimed that the Commission will not propose new legislation in this field unless it can be justified that ‘collective redress is so politically important that it deserves

225 Proposition de loi instaurant une action de groupe en matière de discrimination e
227 See e.g. ibid, at 13; Farkas, op. cit. supra note 56, 39.
228 The uniform application of EU law is linked to the principle of equal treatment itself (ensuring equal rights across MS), cf Micklitz, op. cit. supra note 133, 400.
229 This provision refers to adopting measures ‘aimed at ensuring […] (e) effective access to justice; (f) the elimination of obstacles to the proper functioning of civil proceedings, if necessary by promoting the compatibility of the rules on civil procedure applicable in the Member States’.
230 The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality could be complied with by providing MS enough flexibility to decide, inter alia, which legal entities should be granted standing rights (e.g. equality bodies, NGOs, trade unions, or other), whether CR procedures should be judicial or administrative, etc.
action’. Yet, this contribution demonstrates that encouraging the development of CR for EU equality law is both legally important—to improve the effectiveness of legislation—and socio-politically important—to counter the rise of xenophobic movements in Europe.

This paper has also evidenced that the Lisbon Treaty constitutionalization of both equality law and the principle of effective judicial protection is at odds with the feeble enforcement provisions of the Equality Directives. Once hailed for their innovate character, these provisions are now lagging behind the latest EU constitutional and secondary law developments in areas like consumer or data protection.

Overall, the launch of the European Pillar of Social Rights is a good opportunity to reconsider the rights of EU citizens at a macro level, and not just at substantive level, but also at procedural level. In the aftermath of the financial crisis and unpopular austerity measures, if the EU really wants to address the existing dichotomy between economic and social rights and promote a ‘social Europe’ that is closer to its citizens, taking legislative measures to ensure a more uniform and effective enforcement of EU equality rights seems imperative.

Citizens always have the same face, whatever the ‘type’ of rights they are exercising. To elevate the concept of European citizenship to a truly ‘fundamental status’ beyond its mere economic function, better integrating market and social rights seems essential. Developing a more horizontal EU approach to CR and extending it to equality law is one of the key fronts where improvements are needed.

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232 See e.g Bell, Anti-Discrimination Law and the European Union (OUP, 2002) 78-79.


234 See e.g. Barnard, “EU “Social” Policy: From Employment Law to Labour Market Reform” in Craig and De Burca, op. cit. supra note 9, 639.

235 This links with the ideas of Kochenov (op. cit. supra note 102) and Comandé, “The Fifth European Union Freedom. Aggregating Citizenship…around Private Law” in Micklitz, op. cit. supra note 107, 61.

236 Case C-184/99, Gręgleczyk, para 31.