Epistemic worth
Epistemic worth
It is right for a person to believe a proposition if and only if that proposition is true. On this view, truth is a norm for belief. Some, myself included, go further and suggest that truth is the fundamental norm for belief, relative to which other norms governing belief are derivative. Call this the truth view. In a recent paper, Clayton Littlejohn objects to the truth view on the grounds that it cannot explain why epistemic evaluation has an ‘inward-looking focus’, that is, why it concerns a person’s reasons for believing. He takes this not only to undermine the truth view but also to motivate the knowledge view, associated with Timothy Williamson, according to which knowledge is the fundamental norm for belief. In this paper, I show that the truth view can account for the 'inward-looking focus' of epistemic evaluation. In doing so, I draw on some ideas from ethics, specifically, ideas about moral worth. This provides a defence of the truth view and blocks a route to the knowledge view. In addition, it also delivers an account of epistemic evaluation which reveals it to mirror - in structure, not substance - moral evaluation.
Whiting, Daniel
c0847bb4-963e-470d-92a2-5c8aae5d5aef
Whiting, Daniel
c0847bb4-963e-470d-92a2-5c8aae5d5aef
Whiting, Daniel
(2018)
Epistemic worth.
In,
Floweree, Amy and Reed, Baron
(eds.)
Towards an Expansive Epistemology: Norms, Action, and the Social Sphere.
Routledge.
(Submitted)
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Abstract
It is right for a person to believe a proposition if and only if that proposition is true. On this view, truth is a norm for belief. Some, myself included, go further and suggest that truth is the fundamental norm for belief, relative to which other norms governing belief are derivative. Call this the truth view. In a recent paper, Clayton Littlejohn objects to the truth view on the grounds that it cannot explain why epistemic evaluation has an ‘inward-looking focus’, that is, why it concerns a person’s reasons for believing. He takes this not only to undermine the truth view but also to motivate the knowledge view, associated with Timothy Williamson, according to which knowledge is the fundamental norm for belief. In this paper, I show that the truth view can account for the 'inward-looking focus' of epistemic evaluation. In doing so, I draw on some ideas from ethics, specifically, ideas about moral worth. This provides a defence of the truth view and blocks a route to the knowledge view. In addition, it also delivers an account of epistemic evaluation which reveals it to mirror - in structure, not substance - moral evaluation.
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Epistemic Worth Whiting
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Submitted date: 2018
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Local EPrints ID: 421581
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/421581
PURE UUID: 91085de5-329c-45c9-96d8-a495106e39e0
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Date deposited: 15 Jun 2018 16:30
Last modified: 24 Feb 2025 17:36
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Editor:
Amy Floweree
Editor:
Baron Reed
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