Confabulation and rational obligations for self-knowledge
Confabulation and rational obligations for self-knowledge
This paper argues that confabulation is motivated by the desire to have fulfilled a rational obligation to knowledgeably explain our attitudes by reference to motivating reasons. This account better explains confabulation than alternatives. My conclusion impacts two discussions. Primarily, it tells us something about confabulation – how it is brought about, which engenders lively debate in and of itself. A further upshot concerns self-knowledge. Contrary to popular assumption, confabulation cases give us reason to think we have distinctive access to why we have our attitudes.
Confabulation, philosophy of mind, rationality, reasons, self-deception, self-knowledge
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Keeling, Sophie
ec60b0cb-79d3-4ebb-be5f-7489fdb56307
Keeling, Sophie
ec60b0cb-79d3-4ebb-be5f-7489fdb56307
Abstract
This paper argues that confabulation is motivated by the desire to have fulfilled a rational obligation to knowledgeably explain our attitudes by reference to motivating reasons. This account better explains confabulation than alternatives. My conclusion impacts two discussions. Primarily, it tells us something about confabulation – how it is brought about, which engenders lively debate in and of itself. A further upshot concerns self-knowledge. Contrary to popular assumption, confabulation cases give us reason to think we have distinctive access to why we have our attitudes.
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Confabulation and rational obligations for self knowledge
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Accepted/In Press date: 2 March 2018
e-pub ahead of print date: 29 June 2018
Keywords:
Confabulation, philosophy of mind, rationality, reasons, self-deception, self-knowledge
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Local EPrints ID: 422113
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/422113
ISSN: 0951-5089
PURE UUID: 7d9b0a34-37fa-465f-8c5c-f185a5ca3954
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Date deposited: 17 Jul 2018 16:30
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 20:50
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Sophie Keeling
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