Nietzsche: on the Self and the Arts

by

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ABSTRACT

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I focus on exploring Nietzsche’s conception of the optimal psychological structure of the self as well as his use of the arts to illustrate this ideal model of the self and to cultivate his ethical project. I explore Nietzsche’s drive theory by comparing the striking similitude it holds with Plato’s theory of the tripartite self. The theme of sublimation is crucial for grasping how Nietzsche envisages the positive expression of drives. I also show how Plato’s conception of thumos or the honour-loving drive may have influenced Nietzsche’s view of a regulatory mechanism based on one’s affective orientations. I then address the aesthetic notion of harmony that both Plato and Nietzsche use to express a unified self. Further exploration of the drives and affects is required to understand Nietzsche’s model of ideal self. I focus upon how Nietzsche is influenced by Spinoza’s ethics which prioritizes one’s affects as well as experience in the formation of values. I counter Katsafanas’s position in respect to drives, affects and their respective values to show that Nietzsche does not provide a prescriptive account of a specific relationship between drives and affects. I further demonstrate how Nietzsche uses the arts as a vehicle to show how one can overcome life-negating tendencies and embrace a life-affirming attitude. I specifically focus upon the topics of artistry, creativity and the creative struggle that Nietzsche depends on to create the groundwork for a more positive ethics. I address how Nietzsche turns to the notion of artistry in his portrayal of himself as a model of selfhood in Ecce Homo. Nietzsche turns to the arts to illustrate how to overcome our life-negating tendencies and embrace our drives and affects in so far as they promote self-flourishing. Nietzsche’s psychological structure of ideal selfhood further supports the possibility for life-affirmation.
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Academic Thesis: Declaration Of Authorship

I, Valentine Karsenty,

declare that this thesis and the work presented in it are my own and has been generated by me as the result of my own original research.

Nietzsche: on the Self and the Arts.

I confirm that:

1. This work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research degree at this University;

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7. None of this work has been published before submission.

Signed:

Valentine Karsenty

Date: July 3rd, 2017
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Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used in this thesis for the titles of writings by Nietzsche:

AC  The Antichrist
BGE  Beyond Good and Evil
BT  The Birth of Tragedy
CW  The Case of Wagner
D  Daybreak
EH  Ecce Homo
GM  On the Genealogy of Morality
GS  The Gay Science
HH  Human, All Too Human
NCW  Nietzsche Contra Wagner
TI  Twilight of the Idols
Z  Thus Spoke Zarathustra

The following abbreviation is used for Plato’s work:

Rep.  Republic

The following abbreviation is used for Spinoza’s work:

E  Ethics

The following abbreviation is used for Kant’s work:

CJ  The Critique of Judgment

The following abbreviation is used for Schopenhauer’s work:

WWR  The World as Will and Representation (I & II)
Introduction

This thesis focuses on exploring Nietzsche’s conception of the psychological structure of the self as well as his use of the arts to elucidate his conception of the self and cultivate his ethical project. Nietzsche has proven to be quite a harbinger when it comes to revealing the breadth and the depth of our genuine psychological nature. He redefined the structure of the self by highlighting the crucial role that our drives and affects play in our psychological constitution. In his diagnosis of the ailments that have arisen from our Judeo-Christian morality, he is critical of the values that we have thereby inherited which have degraded our view of basic drives as well as our affective tendencies over the past two millennia. I shall examine how Nietzsche seeks to reestablish positive valuations regarding our drives and affects that determine who we genuinely are and how they are structured within the self.¹

My project also involves drawing out a crucial parallel between Plato’s tripartite structure of the self and Nietzsche’s conception of drive psychology. The problem of self-mastery is examined from both standpoints. Plato and Nietzsche both analyse a ‘sick’ soul as a methodology for constructing what they deem to be a ‘healthy’ soul. The most illuminating contribution points to how Plato’s notion of the thumodeic or honour-loving part of the soul has influenced Nietzsche’s outlook in respect to his conception of self-mastery’s regulatory function.

As I delve further into Nietzsche’s ideal psychological structure, I draw out certain parallels with Freud’s therapeutic approach. One theme in particular which requires further attention is Nietzsche’s use of sublimation. I demonstrate how Nietzsche’s use of sublimation offers a therapeutic way to overcome the life-negating tendencies of internalization and subsequently enable drives to achieve full expression.

Nietzsche turns to aesthetic notions in order to elicit an ideal model of selfhood and to elucidate his ethical project. Although Nietzsche’s interest in the arts and its relationship to his broader ethical concerns has recently captured scholarly interest, I offer an account of how the arts are used as a vehicle to invoke his core ethical notions on shaping the self, the revaluation of values and his conception of life

¹ BGE, 238.
affirmation. Specifically, I turn to analyse how Nietzsche subscribes to Stendhal’s view of artistry. Nietzsche looks to Goethe as a model of selfhood in regards to his exemplification of a unified self. I show that the prospect of achieving unity is problematic in two respects. First, I address the question of how it is possible to have a unified self and simultaneously have a conglomeration of diverse drives? Secondly, I ask whether an achievement of unity would not conflict with Nietzsche’s view that the self is in a continual process of becoming. I reconcile these seeming inconsistencies by examining how Goethe exemplifies a vast number of facets of greatness whereby unity does not necessarily imply a kind of singularity. In addition, vis à vis artistic achievement, Nietzsche does not equate self-development to a finished work of art tout court. I demonstrate how Nietzsche’s notion of achievement appears plausible if understood from the perspective of the artist, who through the creative process, continually strives to express his/her master drives.

Nietzsche seeks to reveal how best we – or a certain elite few – may thrive. The question of how Nietzsche uses aesthetic themes to build a convincing ethical basis for life affirmation requires further analysis. Reginster offers a penetrating account of how Nietzsche turns to the ambivalence that one experiences in viewing a work of art. I elaborate on the theme of ambivalence that generates hope for encountering something beautiful in order to show how Nietzsche’s ethical project is aimed at learning to respect our drives and affects. Another theme that has not had enough exposure amongst Nietzschean scholars involves eros or love. Nietzsche refers to learning to love one’s self. I attempt to demonstrate how this crucial topic plays a fundamental role in understanding Nietzsche’s notion of life affirmation. Through the analysis of self-stylization, artistry and creative struggle, I have demonstrated how Nietzsche uses aesthetic means to construct a viable ‘positive’ ethical framework through which the self may thrive. Against the backdrop of life-negating tendencies, Nietzsche creates aesthetic parallels which pave the way to demonstrate how one can overcome our life-negating attitude by optimally managing the structure of their drives and affects, by the revaluation of values and finally life affirmation.

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2 Came (2014).
3 Reginster (2014), 125.
In Chapter I, I begin by suggesting how the wisdom-loving part of Plato’s tri-partite self entails self-control. The wisdom-loving part of the soul has two functions: first, involving the philosophical pursuit of truth, and second, controlling and managing the honour-loving and money-loving parts. It is debatable whether all parts of the self have the capacity to control the other parts. I understand Plato to be offering a descriptive account of the self with all three parts having the capacity to control the others. However, he also offers a prescriptive account of the self, ascribing the wisdom-loving part to the highest evaluative rank and claiming that its supremacy is optimal for the proper management of its other parts.

Upon first glance, Nietzsche appears to disagree with such a hierarchical formation of the self. I make the claim that Nietzsche would adhere to the notion that a higher individual could indeed endeavour in philosophical enquiries if and only if he/she approaches the subject with genuine individuality and courage whilst overcoming the modern approach that Nietzsche criticises as seeking ‘truth’ in a life-negating manner. I show how there is a rapprochement to be drawn out between Plato’s love for wisdom and Nietzsche’s endorsement of genuine philosophical discourse.

Nietzsche was also influenced by Plato’s ethics in so far as it involves self-mastery. Plato elicits the value of engaging in self-mastery or self-control as the better parts overpower the worse parts, and Nietzsche similarly advocates self-mastery as a crucial ethical feature. Furthermore, Plato conveys self-mastery in his discussion regarding ‘doing one’s own that involves satisfying varying drives in their respective parts of the self in such a manner that overall harmony of the self is achieved. I maintain that this view is compatible with Nietzsche’s idea that a cohesive structure of the self that allows for self-control involves the adequate management of the interplay and expression of drives in so far as it is conducive to the flourishing of the self.

I also claim that Nietzsche adopts Plato’s view that eros plays an integral part in motivation. One’s behaviour may be explained through one’s passion (or lack of passion) towards particular activities. Concerning the activity of philosophical

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4 Plato (1992), 431a-b.
enquiry Nietzsche adamantly maintains that one needs to bring back the passion to philosophy.\textsuperscript{5}

Nietzsche was influenced by Plato’s identification of a part of the soul called \textit{thumos} which can be described as a psychological regulatory capacity that discriminates detrimental drives from drives that promote self-perfection. \textit{Thumus} can be defined by features which range from discipline to courage and bestows onto one a feeling of honour or nobility. I claim that Nietzsche is influenced by Plato in this respect as the basis for his ethical theory. \textit{Thumos} functions as the seedling of morality due to a reactive tendency that either approves or disapproves of one’s appetitive drives. Nietzsche advocates this reflexivity largely because he equally praises the courage and strict rigour that is required to achieve the status of a higher individual. \textit{Thumos’s} regulatory function exemplifies one drive overpowering the other so as to keep an individual on the proper path.

I make the claim that the aesthetic notion of harmony serves to develop the concept of a unified self for both Plato and Nietzsche. Let us bear in mind that musical harmony during the age of the Greeks sustains a unity amongst a scale of differing notes. According to Plato, the self achieves harmony by doing one’s own which involves all three parts to be satisfied in their varying desires so that the optimal hierarchy of the soul may be attained. Plato states that tensions are unavoidable and necessary otherwise the call for proper management would not arise. Nietzsche also turns to harmony as a way of evoking an aesthetic notion of a unified total self. The unity of the self is a sign of great achievement whereby a higher individual’s master drive adequately manages the weaker drives.

In the final section, I address Nietzsche’s critical diagnostic of humanity’s current degenerative ill health. Optimal health is evoked in his notion of translating man back to nature. I claim that Nietzsche, like Plato, uses health as a vehicle for introducing an ethical theory that involves following one’s idiosyncratic values to achieve an overall psychological order that allows for the flourishing of one’s master drive with the use and support of one’s weaker drives. Just like Plato, Nietzsche advances the view that efficient management of one’s inner psyche establishes genuine selfhood.

\textsuperscript{5} GS, 3.
In Chapter II, I explore Nietzsche’s treatment of the primal drives and their sublimation. I shall address how Nietzsche focuses on these psychological tendencies to evoke a desirability of life or creativity regarding the sex drive and traits like strength and courage in regards to aggression. Some interpret Nietzsche as reducing creativity to the biological sex drive. I argue against such a claim by explaining that Nietzsche does not confine creativity to one particular basic drive. I begin by examining passages in which Nietzsche refers to sensuality and procreation in order to demonstrate how his use of these topics illustrate the significant role of our affects. Furthermore, I focus upon the theme of sublimation in order to show how this key psychological mechanism allows for weaker drives to be channeled and redirected towards higher ends by the master drive. Nietzsche further reveals how sublimation takes on an aesthetic propensity in that the master drive resembles an artistic activity of creating a work of art.

I then draw out certain significant parallels between Nietzsche and Freud’s discussion of humanity’s psychological ailments ranging from ressentiment and guilt to internalization and repression in order to expound their diagnoses of the modern individuals. I reflect upon how sublimation is treated by both Freud and Nietzsche to reveal their diverging ‘therapeutic’ approaches. I also address the problem regarding the extent to which Nietzsche allows for conscious engagement in regards to shaping one’s self. I question how Ken Gemes’s interpretation of sublimation that takes on a unifying feature impacts his view of the minimalist account of consciousness required in unifying the self. I offer another reading to the effect that unity of the self depends on how drives are appropriately sublimated and channeled, and simultaneously involves a minimal conscious awareness in achieving optimal human flourishing. In the last section, I maintain that one must consciously realise that life does indeed involve terrible suffering but that this does not preclude a viable way to life affirmation. Upon further reflection, life affirmation is a plausible ethical stance in so far as we counter the suffering with the strength and courage that the tragic artist represents.6

Chapter III explores the question of Nietzsche’s emphasis on understanding and embracing our affective dispositions. I consider how Spinoza and Nietzsche share similar views in regards to the psychological notions of endeavours and drives

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6 I address the theme of life affirmation and suffering in greater length in section 4 of chapter V.
respectively. I make the claim that Spinoza has influenced Nietzsche in respect to these psychological processes involving the concepts of endeavour, growth and most importantly, \textit{conatus}. Nietzsche’s conception of power which may be construed as a force that cultivates growth and individual thriving echoes Spinoza’s view of power as defined in his explanation that, “this is power, i.e. the endeavour, by which it strives to persevere in its being.”\textsuperscript{7} I proceed to demonstrate how they share a therapeutic approach vis à vis their condemnation of repressed natural tendencies or drives. A significant point that both philosophers embrace is the notion of striving towards a state of perfection which manifests both psychologically as well as through actual experience.

I then distinguish how Nietzsche conceives the roles of drives and affects in the psychological structure of the self. I turn to address how Katsafanás’s account of the relationship between drives and affects. I offer an alternative account maintaining that Nietzsche does offer substantial ideas on both drives and affects but there is no textual evidence whereby he explicitly or implicitly defines how they relate to one another within the psychological structure of the self. I proceed to consider how Katsafanás holds an alternate view to that of Richardson regarding reflexive and non-reflexive drives. I attempt to show that a more comprehensive general value of drives being life-affirming which Richardson terms the ‘ur-values’ allows for a compatible relationship amongst drives and their values (or negative values).\textsuperscript{8}

In Chapter IV, I look at the question of unity of the self. According to Nietzsche, it is essential to acquire this sense of unity in order to thrive through life. In this chapter, I shall explore how Nietzsche defines the notion of unity of the self as represented through the aesthetic notions of artistry, beauty, and creativity to convey the optimal orchestration of one’s extensive array of distinct drives. How does one successfully have a ‘master’ drive that appropriately controls an individual’s vast number of different drives? What are the implications behind the notion of continuity amongst one’s warring drives? Nietzsche often addresses the concept of a unified self in conjunction with an aesthetic context.

I shall examine Nietzsche’s references to particular exemplars in order to show how they achieve a unified self. I begin by focusing on Nietzsche’s portrayal of

\textsuperscript{7} Spinoza (2000), 3P7.
\textsuperscript{8} Richardson (2004), 97-104.
Stendhal in order to convey how one may attain this optimal kind of unity through a passionate attitude towards life. Stendhal holds parallel views to Nietzsche regarding key aesthetic notions that are founded in one’s affective response to works of art.

I also examine how Nietzsche turns to Goethe as a model of the higher self who accomplishes a unity of self through his ability to accomplish great feats in a number of varying disciplines. Nietzsche reveals how Goethe is able to exemplify the ability to successfully orchestrate his drives, and as a consequence, achieves greatness. I then draw out a comparative analysis of Nietzsche, Goethe and Heraclitus’s views of how a unified self may function whilst simultaneously considered to be in a continual state of becoming.

In Chapter V, I attempt to show how Nietzsche draws out his own literary self-portrait in *Ecce Homo*. He states that he achieves greatness but we must bear in mind that he sees life to involve a continual state of development towards perfection. I begin by addressing how he conceives the notion of genius and demonstrate to what extent it aligns with Kant’s own conception of artistic genius. I proceed to focus on the question of how Nietzsche’s appropriation of aesthetic themes of artistry informs his broader ethical project. I shall consider the topics of creative struggle, the artist’s perspective, and the notion of active engagement within the creative process and how they help contribute to acquiring a life-affirming attitude. The subject of how Nietzsche’s particular writing style that converges into literary and poetic tendencies is then articulated. Finally, the relationship between Nietzsche’s view of aesthetic notions and life affirmation shall be articulated. I explain what he means by being able to affirm life while simultaneously stating that life has an ‘inestimable’ value. I then consider how art is used as a vehicle for life affirmation. I focus on both Nehamas’s and Reginster’s interpretations of how the aesthetic experience involves a certain ambivalence which allows for an individual to hope for a positive encounter with beauty. Nietzsche suggests that the feeling of hope involved in an aesthetic experience functions in a similar vein to the hope one can have towards life. I elaborate on the theme of the tragic artist in order to demonstrate how overcoming resistance occurs at an unconscious level where the master drive overcomes the resistance of other weaker drives. I then advance the view of how Nietzsche envisions love to function congruently with the idea of hope for the life-affirmative attitude. Nietzsche highlights the importance of learning to love oneself which contributes to
developing a respect for our natural drives and dispositions. He also conveys how love works as a motivational force to generate creative endeavours. My project on showing the significant role that love holds according to Nietzsche functions in a twofold manner: as both crucial to forming a sense of self-love and as a force that equips us to fully affirm life.
Chapter I

What I Owe to Plato

Upon first glance, Plato and Nietzsche appear to hold philosophical views that are poles apart. Nietzsche has vehemently criticised Plato for his denigration of the body, for his split of the body and the soul and subsequently for his Idealism. Plato has cultivated Idealism embracing the notion of the True and the Good that one discovers in the realm of the Forms. He is known for splitting the self into two parts, that of the ‘psyche’ or soul and the body. However in the Republic, Plato shifts from a bipartite to a tripartite configuration of the soul: the wisdom-loving, honour-loving and money-loving parts. He sets them up in hierarchical formation with reason as the most noble, ‘thumos’ or the spirited type following after, and the appetites at the lowest rung. From the Phaedo to the Republic, Plato shifts his understanding of the self in order to work out the problematic issue of one individual holding opposing motivations.

There seem to be certain key ideas of similitude on the topic of the tripartite soul of Plato’s Republic and Nietzsche’s notion of the higher individual. To begin, I shall explore different interpretations of how Plato understands the wisdom-loving part, specifically analysing how it governs the rest of the self. Then, I address the issue of sublimation as a mechanism by which one can divert his/her drives towards a more valuable end and thereby develop into a thriving self. I move on to focus on the

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9 Nietzsche is known more for his admiration of Heraclitus who maintains that the universe is in constant flux which makes an individual’s life one of constant becoming.
10 TI, ‘What I Owe to the Ancients,’ 4.
11 This split was described in the Phaedo.
12 I shall use the term parts but as Fred Miller in ‘Plato on the Parts of the Soul,’ explains Plato uses several words to describe this feature including ‘forms’ and ‘kind’. He states that that all three terms are used interchangeably. It is important to understand a part as a distinct kind but not necessarily suggestive of a particular location of the self as Plato denotes in the ‘Phaedo’ (psyche, …). The term part signifies a kind of tendency, inclination, desire and/or drive that motivates the self to act or behave in a certain way. I use these terms mainly because they demonstrate how the feeling of love is an integral attribute of each part and furthermore evokes how each part involves a process of drives striving towards a kind of activity rather than a fixed and immutable category of the self. From this point on I shall refer to the rational part only as ‘wisdom-loving’; in regards to ‘honour-loving’ I also refer to it as thumoeides or spirited depending on the context; finally, in reference to ‘money-loving,’ I also use the term appetitive depending on the context of the subject matter.
13 Miller sees that the bipartite division of the soul renders the individual as too simplified but also admits that the tripartite configuration has its flaws in that, within the three parts of the self, there are also conflicting motivations which would leave open the possibility for many more parts of the self.
14 Nietzsche makes direct reference to the different kinds of rulings of the self in GM, III, 18.
topic of ‘thumos’ and how its characteristics are not only similar to Nietzsche’s portrayal of the higher self but may also shed light on its defining traits. Then, I shall analyse how both Plato and Nietzsche consider harmony as a unifying force binding the various ‘parts’ together to make up a healthy and life-affirming soul. Finally, I address the topic of health and illness according to Plato and Nietzsche.

1. The Wisdom-Loving Part of the Soul

In this section, the wisdom-loving part is examined in order to gain a better understanding of how it relates to the other parts and to what extent its superiority affects the control it has over the honour-loving and money-loving parts. First, let us turn to how Plato elaborates on the tripartite soul in the dialogue between Socrates and Glaucon in the fourth chapter of the Republic,

[i]n the fact that the soul of each individual is divided into three parts, in just the way that a city is, for that’s the reason I think that there is another proof…. This: it seems to me that there are three pleasures corresponding to the three parts of the soul, one peculiar to each part, and similarly with desires and kinds of rule…. The first, we say, is the part with which a person learns, and the second the part with which he gets angry. As for the third, we had no one special name for it, since it’s multiform, so we named it after the biggest and strongest thing in it. Hence we called it the appetitive part, because of the intensity of its appetites for food, drink, sex, and all the things associated with them, but we also called it the money-loving part, because such appetites are most easily satisfied by means of money…. What about the spirited part? Don’t we say that it is wholly dedicated to the pursuit of control, victory, and high repute?...Then wouldn’t it be appropriate for us to call it the victory-loving and honor-loving?...Now, it is clear to everyone that the part with which we learn is always wholly straining to know where the truth lies and that, of the three parts, it cares least for money and reputation….And doesn’t this part rule in some people’s souls, while one of the other parts – whichever it happens to be – rules in other people’s?15

Let us turn to what these ‘parts’ signify and how they to work together as a whole. Plato does state that each part has its appetites and controls from which one may deduce that within each part there is a first-order capacity to desire a certain goal or engage in a particular activity of interest and simultaneously a second order capacity to control or govern this desire. So the wisdom-loving part would rule in a reasonable manner, the honour-loving part would rule in a more disciplinarian fashion, whereas

the money-loving part would allow one’s appetites to take over impulsively thereby causing a kind of ‘akrasia’ in the soul. Now, if each part has the ability to control it may seem that an individual may be made up of three separate homunculi. This is not the case though since whichever part is the strongest controls the weaker parts. Plato explains that natural tendencies and a good education secure one’s ability for the wisdom-loving part to supersede the honour-loving and money-loving parts. I shall now address how the parts of the soul have not only their particular drives but also the capacity to regulate and control the other parts.

Vis à vis the wisdom-loving part of the soul its primary task consists of the pursuit of the True and the Good and yet it also holds the capacity to dictate the entirety of the soul. Early on in the Republic, Plato defines the soul as engaged in “management, rule, deliberation and the like.” This latter aspect reveals that one holds the capacity to govern his/her other weaker parts, that is to say, the honour-loving and the money-loving. For instance, if one’s appetitive drive spurs the following thought, ‘I should take a break from my work and go for a drink at the pub.’ If the wisdom-loving drive were indeed governing the rest of the soul, the appetitive drive would be superseded by the following thought, ‘I’ll have a sip of water from the drinking fountain around the corner and continue writing this paper.’ Here we see an instance of one’s wisdom-loving desires trumping his/her appetitive desires. Nietzsche would describe the latter usage of reasoning – the governing of the soul - as one’s conscience and would disagree that our reasoning faculty has much to do with it at all. Let us turn to an example in Book IV of the Republic. Here a man holds the appetitive desire to drink because he is thirsty and yet his reason trumps this desire because drinking water is harmful to his health. We have two opposing desires, the former to drink and the latter, not to drink. In other words, on one hand the man feels an urge to drink, and subsequently, thinks that it would be detrimental to his health to do so. Since this person appears to have the parts of his soul in the proper

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16 For more discussion on this topic please see Klosko (1988), Lesses (1987), Penner (1971), and Vlastos (1969).
17 Rep., 535d.
18 It is important to bear in mind that the honour-loving part of the soul may also regulate the appetitive part. See Rep., 428c-e.
19 In the article, ‘Thought and Desire in Plato,’ Terry Penner explains “reason’s injunction has the form ‘It is better [not to drink]’, we see that this desire to not drink is an intellectualized desire for the good – a desire for the good accompanied by a calculation which says that, in this situation, the good is to be achieved by not drinking” (107).
hierarchical setup, the wisdom-loving part intervenes with his desire to drink.\textsuperscript{20} There definitely seems to be a power struggle or a sense of governing occurring in one’s psyche, namely the master drive’s controlling of the weaker drives.

Nietzsche would oppose Plato’s hierarchically classified tripartite structure of the human soul. However, he would agree with Plato to the extent that there definitely is a more powerful component or set of drives within the self that rule and guide our weaker drives. Plato asserts that the superior wisdom-loving part of the soul should rule over the inferior parts whereas Nietzsche broadens this horizon for which drives may achieve their superiority. He claims that our instincts, drives and affects play a dominant role in individual agency. In other words, Plato gives a top-down hierarchical configuration of the psyche whereas Nietzsche endows this structure with more of a broader horizontal span. He would most probably agree with Plato that an individual governed by his/her money-loving drives will lack any unity and thereby will not be able to attain genuine selfhood. And it is important to bear in mind that one’s prominent drive may indeed involve the search for knowledge in so far as it is free from any surreptitious feelings of \textit{ressentiment}.\textsuperscript{21} Another crucial point to bear in mind involves both Plato and Nietzsche’s exploration of how a unified self is able to find a ‘harmonious’ state amongst opposing desires and drives.\textsuperscript{22} Nietzsche stresses the importance of our drives in the following section of \textit{Beyond Good and Evil},

Supposing that nothing else is ‘given’ as real but our world of desires and passions, that we cannot sink or rise to any other “reality” but just that of our impulses--for thinking is only a relation of these impulses to one another:--are we not permitted to make the attempt and to ask the question whether this which is ‘given’ is not \textit{sufficient}, by means of our counterparts, for the understanding even of the so-called mechanical (or ‘material’) world? I do not mean as an illusion, a ‘semblance,’ a ‘representation’…but as possessing the same degree of reality as our emotions themselves--as a more primitive form of the world of emotions, in which everything still lies locked in a mighty unity, which afterwards branches off and develops itself in organic processes (naturally also, refines and debilitates)--as a kind of instinctive life in which all organic functions, including self-regulation, assimilation, nutrition, secretion, and change of matter, are still synthetically united with one another--as a \textit{primary form} of life?--In the end, it is not only permitted to make this attempt, the conscience of \textit{method} demands it.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{20} Rep., 437c – 439d.

\textsuperscript{21} For further discussion on the topic of \textit{ressentiment} please see section 2 of Chapter II. Nietzsche emphatically criticises of our faculty for reasoning calling it a cloak that hides the ascetic ideal’s shaping of our blind will to truth.

\textsuperscript{22} Please turn to the next section for further discussion on the notion of a unified self.

\textsuperscript{23} BGE, 36.
Here, he is seeking to break down the hierarchical barriers between reason and one’s bodily appetites. Nietzsche criticises this very division of the self and attempts to recreate a bond between our bodily instincts, our affects and our cognitive faculties. He discounts the eternal and fixed characteristics present in our preconception of human consciousness by saying,

"[o]ne thinks that it constitutes the kernel of man; what is abiding, eternal, ultimate, and most original in him. One takes consciousness for a determinate magnitude. One denies its growth and its intermittences. One takes it for the ‘unity of the organism.’ This ridiculous overestimation and misunderstanding of consciousness has the very useful consequence that it prevents an all too fast development of consciousness. Believing that they possess consciousness, men have not exerted themselves very much to acquire it; and things haven't changed much in this respect. To this day the task of incorporating knowledge and making it instinctive is only beginning to dawn on the human eye and is not yet clearly discernible; it is a task that is seen only by those who have comprehended that so far we have incorporated only our errors and that all our consciousness relates to errors."

Nietzsche calls for the usage of a conscious agential force coupled with its even more powerful unconscious in order to help one thrive in his/her development of a higher individual. He further criticises the notion of conscious knowledge and calls for a new form of knowing – one with a much broader span that incorporates the instincts, drives and the affects.

Plato’s description of the wisdom-loving part of the soul which holds the capacity of governing or mastering needs further examination in order to demonstrate the striking parallels to Nietzsche’s understanding of self-mastery. To begin, the tripartition is better understood as encompassing three modes of being. The soul should not be considered as kind of pie chart that can be split into three sectors, so to speak. The term ‘mode of being’ denotes a type of action propelled by a desire or drive. So the wisdom-loving mode would have two defining attributes. First it would involve the intellectual activity of philosophizing, i.e. that of engaging with true Forms which is propelled by one’s strong desire to pursue knowledge. Secondly, it would entail controlling or ruling the other parts of the soul. George Klosko distinguishes these two facets of the wisdom-loving part by classifying them under

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24 GS, 11.
25 Please turn to Section 2 on thumos for further discussion on how one’s faculty of conscious reasoning may play a part in becoming a higher individual.
direct reason and normative reason: the former involving reason’s actual intellectual pursuit after the True and the Good; and the latter involving reason’s capacity to govern the soul as a whole by directing both the spirited and appetitive parts.\(^{26}\) This ‘parts – whole’ problem arises in the Nietzschean context with the question of how the master drive rules or controls the rest of the weaker drives. The tension is not so much seen as an obstacle for Plato but rather as a reality that may become problematic if an individual’s tripartite self is not managed adequately. Nietzsche rather views tension as something that keeps one healthy in that an individual must constantly be engaging in the process of harnessing drives and maintaining a diligent form of self-mastery.\(^{27}\) Francis Cornford aptly describes the conflictual relationship between a desire for wisdom and our bodily impulses as the following, “[t]he conflict of interests seems irreconcilable. While life lasts, the unwelcome task of the Spirit is to overmaster and enthrall its unruly associate; the key-word of morality is self-mastery – the control of the lower by the ‘true’ self.”\(^{28}\) He also suggests that the parts – whole problem collapses once we conceive the self not so much as one entity split into three different parts but rather as a ‘scheme’ whereby the three different parts are understood as drives aiming at different ends. He articulates this idea by explaining that, “[d]uring life on earth the energy must flow along all [three] channels, but with duly adjusted distribution. Some part must go to the preservation of animal life; some must flow into the interests and duties of the active citizen; some will be used in the exercise of wisdom. The ideal human virtue lies in the perfect balance of all these claims.”\(^{29}\) The notion of self-mastery also functions as a key element in cultivating one’s genuine self for Nietzsche.\(^{30}\) He would indeed agree with the notion of self-mastery but it would be one’s own idiosyncratic and highly individual master drive governing the rest of the self. He would equally agree with the idea of there being a kind of equilibrium of the drives in so far as an overall harmony is achieved amongst

\(^{26}\) Klosko (1988), 343.

\(^{27}\) However, Plato and Nietzsche may be on a similar footing here in that they both express the notion that whichever type governs the soul presides over the weaker types (appetitive and spirited) even if the spirited part in Nietzsche is not as evident. Please turn to section 3 for further discussion on this topic.

\(^{28}\) Cornford (1930), 210.

\(^{29}\) Ibid., 216.

\(^{30}\) In the following section I shall explore how sublimation serves as process by which one can channel ‘unruly’ drives/impulses for both Nietzsche & Plato.
the drives and that weaker drives contribute in maximizing the power of the master
drive. 31

I would like to address the topic of a certain energy or motivational force
that accompanies the parts of the self. Regarding the notion that the soul has a telos or
a pull towards a certain end, Thomas Robinson provides a seminal account regarding
Eros. He describes “the soul [as] akin to the Ideas, and [that] it cannot rest till it
contacts them. The relationship between soul and Ideas is one of love …Mental
contact is not enough; the sensation of presence, of total union with the beloved, is an
integral part of the experience.”32 So eros may be playing an integral role as a
motivating force pulling the individual towards this ideal metaphysical state.
Robinson chooses to use the terms referring to the components of the soul as wisdom-
loving, honour-loving and money-loving and goes so far as to claim that they “are
probably better described as drives.”33 This particular view resonates well with
Nietzsche’s aim to bring back the passion, emotion, and desire to philosophy, the
sciences and to life in general.34 Robinson refers to the following passage of the
Republic in which Plato describes the lover of knowledge:
[t]hat it is the nature of the real lover of learning to struggle toward what is,
not to remain with any of the many things that are believed to be, that, as he
moves on, he neither loses nor lessens his erotic love until he grasps the being
of each nature itself with the part of his soul that is fitted to grasp it, because
of its kinship with it, and that, once getting near what really is and having
intercourse with it and having begotten understanding and truth, he knows,
truly lives, is nourished, and – at that point, but not before – is relieved from
the pains of giving birth.35

Such a passage denotes an active exploration of the philosophical activity that is
triggered and sustained by the strong and intense affect of love. Upon further
consideration, if an individual’s ‘wisdom-loving’ part expresses itself through an
emotion, one may wonder how it may gel with a fixed realm of Ideals. Perhaps
Plato’s valorization of the emotion of love being embedded in all three parts of the
self’s psychological make-up has been overlooked and subsequently its inconsistency
with his theory of a fixed ideology of the forms. Furthermore, it seems as if many

31 Please turn to Section 4 for further discussion on the topic of a harmonious soul.
32 Robertson (1970), 50.
33 Ibid., 56.
34 BGE, 230.
35 Rep., 490b.
have also overlooked the ardent ‘life-energy’ that Plato deems as a necessary attribute if a soul is ever to attain Truth. Nietzsche also advocates this strong passion in the higher type. We may observe Nietzsche’s multitude of criticisms towards the “rational” objective of “Truth,” however this does not mean he refutes knowledge altogether. The kind of knowledge he adamantly praises involves a philosopher who is passionate about his intellectual exploits. He describes this higher individual as, [m]ore unreasonable, for those who are noble, magnanimous, and self-sacrificial do succumb to their instincts, and when they are at their best, their reason pauses…They have some feelings of pleasure and displeasure that are so strong that they reduce the intellect to silence or to servitude: at that point their heart displaces the head, and one speaks of “passion.” The unreason or counter reason of passion is what the common type despises in the noble…. But one cannot comprehend how anyone could risk his health and honor for the sake of a passion for knowledge. The taste of the higher type is for exceptions, for things that leave most people cold and seem to lack sweetness.

He later promotes a kind of love for knowledge that must be new and original, that needs to overcome general preconceptions of truth and break boundaries in an adventurous way. For instance, Nietzsche offers a piece of advice when he exclaims “believe me: the secret for harvesting from existence the greatest fruitfulness and the greatest enjoyment is – to live dangerously! Build your cities on the slopes of Vesuvius! Send your ships into uncharted seas! Live at war with your peers and yourselves! Be robbers and conquerors as long as you cannot be rulers and possessors, you seekers of knowledge!”.

Both Plato and Nietzsche extol the love, desire and passion that must be tapped into in order to successfully attain their respective views of genuine selfhood. The ultimate state of the higher self varies drastically. Plato’s philosopher achieves a heightened state of being in which the development of his soul has achieved its maximal state of perfection and ‘truly lives.’ Nietzsche, on the other hand, claims the higher self’s soul needs to constantly engage in a healthy tension of the drives moreover showing how he values the state of becoming. Furthermore, Plato’s

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36 GM, III, 24. In this passage Nietzsche points out the shaky foundations upon which our value for truth have been built.  
37 GS, 3.  
38 GS, 283.  
39 Nietzsche does indeed claim the more drives we have add to the richness and complexity of the soul. This does not go to say that a multiplicity of drives may indeed be swaying one’s self in many different ways thus causing one to lack unity of the self.
philosopher type seems to have reasoning mastering the appetitive and spirited types. Nietzsche does not necessarily specify which drives should rule. He rather focuses on how the master drive should rule to satisfy its ardent will whilst harmoniously unifying a variegated conglomeration of drives. In addition, for Nietzsche it is not so much our conscious understanding of our pursuit – whether it be intellectual, artistic or political – that matters but rather understanding that our unconscious drives and affects need to be given the opportunity to express themselves. I shall now turn to the notion of sublimation in which the drives and affects manifest themselves in a positive and stimulating way.

2. Sublimation

I would now like to address how sublimation functions in the *Republic*.\(^{40}\) Cornford offers an interpretation that sublimation is expressed in terms of knowledge rather than desire.\(^{41}\) Sublimation serves as a psychological mechanism through which one can channel and redirect drives towards a higher end. He identifies sublimation that occurs in Plato’s work by stating, “Plato is true to the Socratic thesis that Virtue is Knowledge: a true insight into the value of things will carry desire in its train. So he speaks not so much of the reorientation of desire as of the conversion of the eye of the soul from objects of lower worth to the highest object of knowledge.”\(^{42}\) He may be referring to the passage of Book IX in which Socrates describes the higher self as one that keeps his chin up high and his gaze towards things of a higher value. Plato continues by drawing a disparaging contrast of people who are ruled by their appetitive and bodily impulses by pointing out their ‘bovine-like’ characteristics.\(^{43}\) Plato explains that people who are ruled by their bodily desires

[t]hose who have no experience of reason or virtue, but are always occupied with feasts and the like, are brought down…and wander in this way throughout their lives, never reaching beyond this to what is truly higher up, never looking up at it or being brought up to it, and so they aren’t filled with that which really is and never taste any stable or pure pleasure. Instead, they always look down at the ground like cattle, and, with their heads bent over the dinner table, they feed, fatten, and fornicate. To outdo others in these things,

\(^{40}\) I analyse sublimation in a more Nietzschean context in section 4 of Chapter II.
\(^{41}\) He also draws the parallel between Platonic notion of sublimation and those drawn out by Freud, Adler, (whose discussion of the power-instinct was influenced by Nietzsche) and Young.
\(^{42}\) Cornford (1930), 218.
\(^{43}\) He may also be referring to the ‘Allegory of the Cave,’ but I shall not address this here.
they kick and butt them with iron horns and hooves, killing each other, because their desires are insatiable. For the part that they’re trying to fill is like a vessel full of holes.\textsuperscript{44}

Let us overlook Plato’s elitism for a moment and focus on how Plato suggests that a form of sublimation is at play here. This example actually offers criticism to those who do not sublimate their desire towards the higher ends of knowledge. He actually criticises those who are not “reaching beyond,” “never looking up”, nor “being brought up to it”. Is Cornford right to say that Plato’s sublimation in the \textit{Republic} is expressed as a visual reorientation rather than a reorientation of desire? Plato does express himself with a visual metaphor but the implication comes down to an individual redirecting less valuable drives so that they are controlled by better drives that aim towards a nobler end. In the above passage when a person looks down to satisfy his/her money-loving drives Plato implies that one’s drives are not being reoriented to higher ends – the wisdom-loving ones – but rather are directed by his/her appetites. So in this case, Plato actually conveys sublimation negatively through his description of the appetitive person who does not harness his/her drives to better ends.

When does a person guided by his or her money-loving drives look or rather redirect their attention to more enriching activities (i.e. honour-loving or wisdom-loving)? Plato is quite adamant that one’s early education and congenital traits determine what predominating part will take hold of the self. I would like to suggest that the sublimation at work in Plato’s \textit{Republic} functions within a more restrictive framework: sublimation may only occur for wisdom-loving and honour-loving individuals.\textsuperscript{45} For instance, the wisdom-loving type can sublimate his/her honour-loving drives into wisdom-loving ones due to the capacity for the honour-loving part to function in allegiance with the wisdom-loving part. Plato suggests that such a mechanism is at play in the soul by drawing up an analogy of the tripartite soul with the story of a human being holding within a multiform beast and a lion:

\begin{quote}
[f]irst, that words and deeds should insure that the human being within human being has the most control; second, that he should take care of the many-headed beast as a farmer does his animals, feeding and domesticating the gentle heads and preventing the savage ones from growing; and, third, that he
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{44} \textit{Rep.}, 586a-b.

\textsuperscript{45} I believe that Plato would allow for young children that tend to be more appetitive room for redress through good education.
should make the lion’s nature his ally, care for the community of all his parts, and bring them up in such a way that they will be friends with each other and with himself.\textsuperscript{46}

Here we may observe how the wisdom-loving part which is symbolized as the human being is able to control his various parts: whether it may be the appetitive drives (the multiform beast) that need to be repressed or tamed, or the spirited drives (the lion) which need to be considered as useful allies. These drives are sublimated when they are being used for a greater aim that of wisdom-loving pursuit thereby assuring one’s greatness or genuine selfhood. Plato also states that, “when the entire soul follows the philosophic part, and there is no civil war in it, each part of it does its own work exclusively and is just, and in particular it enjoys its own pleasures, the best and truest pleasures possible for it.”\textsuperscript{47} So sublimation functions in the tripartite soul in so far as either a wisdom-loving and honour-loving self engages in sublimating its weaker drives towards more virtuous ends.

Let us turn to how sublimation manifests in the *Symposium.*\textsuperscript{48} Here an individual harnesses a weaker erotic drive in order to redirect it to a love for True Beauty. Through the voice of Diotima, Plato maintains that one must overcome our sensual impulses and delve into the more valuable pursuit of “procreancy is of the spirit rather than of the flesh”.\textsuperscript{49} Diotima explains that love is a longing for immortality. She then argues that the greatest Beauty is the universal one which manifests as the philosophical pursuit of true wisdom. She adds that one must sublimate the impulse to procreate and ‘beget wisdom,’ so to speak. This ‘single fund of energy’ called Eros is redirected towards the search for true wisdom. She describes this process as, “[s]tarting from individual beauties, the quest for the universal beauty must find him ever mounting the heavenly ladder, stepping from rung to rung – that is, from… every lovely body, from bodily beauty to the beauty of institutions, from institutions to learning, and from learning in general to the special lore that pertains to nothing but the beautiful itself”.\textsuperscript{50} Nietzsche also expresses a similar line of thought in two respects. First, he promotes the channeling of our drives to strengthen one’s master drive, consequently opening the way to genuine selfhood. Secondly, an

\textsuperscript{46} Rep., 589 a- b.
\textsuperscript{47} Rep., 587.
\textsuperscript{48} I also address this passage of Plato’s *Symposium* in section 2 of Chapter II.
\textsuperscript{49} Plato (1997), 209a.
\textsuperscript{50} *Symposium*, 211 c-d.
individual strives for learning but not that of the ideal Forms propounded by Plato but rather as a passionate and adventurous intellectual pursuit coupled with a profound self-knowledge whereby one can fully live life according to his own singular value system.

3. Thumos

I would now like to address the honour-loving part of the soul, which Plato refers to as thumos. In Book IX, Socrates describes the spirited type as involving ‘honour, victory and courage’.

He also describes the spirited part as wholly dedicated to the pursuit of control, victory, and high repute. Thumos also spurs one to ‘feel anger’. Now if reason is not at the helm, so to speak, thumos may also sway one to behave dangerously. Plato gives an account of such a circumstance, ‘[d]oesn’t his love of honor make him envious and his love of victory make him violent, so that he pursues the satisfaction of his anger and of his desires for honors and victories without calculation or understanding’. Despite the regulatory role that thumos seems to hold, Plato considers our wisdom-loving part the master of all drives guiding them in the right direction. Despite this kind of ruling, it does not preclude the fact that thumos also has a regulatory function but within a more limited scope focusing on the pursuit of honour and victory.

The feeling of thumos involves a whole range of emotional states from anger to self-respect, esteem, and desire for recognition. The spirited type seeks some form of recognition and honour so in a sense he/she is constantly evaluating his/her actions according to a set of value standards. To a certain extent, thumos resembles Freud’s super-ego that regulates and rectifies the id’s more basic instincts. Nietzsche seems to have been inspired by this regulatory function of the soul involving a feeling of anger or forceful energy causing one to steer their action towards a better course.

Furthermore, it seems as if thumos, in so far that it involves the feeling of anger and imposes a set of value standards, may have been the precursor of shame and guilt

31 Rep., 582e.
32 Rep., 581.
33 Rep., 586d.
which equally have some regulatory weight upon an individual.⁵⁶ As Nietzsche’s principal project involves overcoming our Christian guilt, *thumos* comes across as an ideal drive that one may reconnect with and allow it take shape so as to provide one with the capacity for the revaluation of values. Nietzsche’s turn to the Greek drive of *thumos* adequately gels with his own project to prompt the potential higher individuals to feel anger towards our Judeo-Christian morality and take up the courage to overcome it.⁵⁷

Plato’s influence upon Nietzsche on the topic of *thumos* may have been understood as a type of force that one can instill upon oneself as a form of self-discipline, rigour and determination. Interestingly enough, the term *thumos* is described as a form of will-power by Richard Sorabji in an article in ‘Will and Action’.⁵⁸ Although Plato’s notion of *thumos* or spiritedness and Nietzsche’s notion of will to power have obvious differences they share such striking similarities that I shall now take into consideration.⁵⁹ I shall demonstrate how both Plato and Nietzsche (through his concept of will to power) articulate portraits of the optimal psychological configuration of the self that are alike in the following ways:

1. desire and drives involve the notion of self-motion;
2. the factor of strength endows one’s guiding force;⁶⁰
3. the quest for knowledge is valued
4. once a drive is expressed it brings forth self-satisfaction.

Regarding the first point, Plato describes one’s spiritedness as stirring up a force or even an agonistic drive with which one is moved to excel. For Nietzsche, will to power functions as the driving force at the root of every drive, as the stimulus behind every action and as persistently seeking to further its growth.⁶¹ Spiritedness’s active characteristic, which is instantiated through courageous and bold behavior, is

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⁵⁶ For further discussion on shame and guilt see Bernard Williams’s book entitled *Shame and Necessity*.
⁵⁷ Even though Nietzsche may be critical of Plato at times we should keep in mind that he does admire him at other times. Also, we should keep in mind that before becoming a philosopher, Plato was trained and worked as a classicist so he no doubtedly know all of Plato’s works very well and may indeed have been influenced by him as well as the Greeks in general. Even if Nietzsche is also critical of a wish to return to the age of the Greeks and their more simple way of being, this does not preclude him from retaining certain elements of their psychological advancements and implementing them into his ideal psychological make-up of the higher self.
⁵⁸ Sorabji (2003), 8.
⁵⁹ The conception of ‘will’ hadn’t been conceived as of yet during Plato’s lifetime. As Sorabji notes *thumos* does appear to be its ancestor – so to speak.
⁶⁰ It is a drive’s strength that allows it to control other drives and/or parts of the self.
⁶¹ BGE, 36; GM, II, 12; BGE, 259.
consonant with the Nietzschean sense of will to power that seeks to discharge itself through action rather than suppressing it like the man of *ressentiment* does. The spirited type would differ only in that he acts within a regimented military framework and thereby acts according to a strict social mandate with honour and victory as his main goals. The Nietzschean higher self would appropriate a drive akin to the spirited one and impose it on his own unique array of values. So, according to Plato the optimally functioning and harmoniously structured soul feels desires and is directed by an overarching desire for the True and the Good. Although the content of the drive differs it holds a striking resemblance to Nietzsche’s ‘master drive’ in kind. According to both Plato and Nietzsche, the superior parts of the self hold a position of strength upon its weaker drives and guide its weaker counterparts and/or lives. Plato very clearly lays out a hierarchical structure of the self optimizing the wisdom-loving part over the honour-loving and money-loving parts. Strength comes across as a critical characteristic in Nietzsche’s will to power and his conception of the higher individual. A drive’s force is what ultimately causes it to overcome the self’s weaker drives and potentially develop into a master drive. Plato’s wisdom-loving desire could be construed as a form of will to power at its climax in terms of its forcefulness.

Courage may also be understood as a kind of strength. Nietzsche hails courage as an instrumental virtue, and it appears that he very well may have been influenced by Plato’s *thumodeic* characteristic which is intimately linked to courage. Nietzsche designates courage the first of four key virtues whilst describing genuine selfhood by suggesting that one “remain master of one's four virtues, courage, insight, sympathy, and solitude.” Also, in the preface of *The Antichrist*, Nietzsche emphasizes the spirited like traits of hardness and courage.

The conditions required to understand me, and which in turn require me to be understood, - I know them only too well. When it comes to spiritual matters, you need to be honest to the point of hardness just to be able to tolerate my seriousness, my passion. You need to be used to living on mountains -- to seeing the miserable ephemeral little gossip of politics and national self-interest beneath you. You need to have become indifferent, you need never to ask whether truth does any good, whether it will be our undoing… The sort of predilection strength has for questions that require more courage than anyone possesses today; a courage for the forbidden; a predestination for the

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62 Now, if the spirited type of person were living under a just city-state he would be striving for honour and victory in noble ways. However, if such a person were living in an unjust city-state, he would strive for such ends in an unruly and unjust way.

63 BGE, 284.
labyrinth. The experience from out of seven solitudes. New ears for new music. New eyes for most distant things. A new conscience for truths that have kept silent until now. And the will to economy of the great style: holding together strength, its enthusiasm...Respect for yourself; love for yourself; an unconditional freedom over yourself....

This passage is imbued with force demanding and even taunting us to take on what resembles a spirited attitude. He asks of his readers to possess character traits such as ‘hardness,’ an extreme amount of ‘courage,’ and strength. This force evokes a certain bravura similar to the spirited type in search of victory. In this case, the victorious individual will have had to overcome Judeo-Christian morality, risen above it, so to speak. Furthermore, this higher individual attains a self-respect and love of oneself that is equally required of the spirited type. Nietzsche deems that an individual would need courage in order to affirm him/herself, to love him/herself as one is, but mostly to take the stance of a higher individual which requires overcoming morality to embrace one’s own idiosyncratic form of ethics.

I now would like to point out how the very characteristics of the spirited part of the psyche hold a striking semblance to this military-like individual that Nietzsche often alludes to as encapsulating the traits of the higher individual. In fact, Nietzsche does more than extol courage, fearlessness and hardness but goes so far as describing the tragic artist as holding martial aspects of the soul necessary to overcome the suffering in life. The main difference, of course, is that Plato’s spirited type is bound to a set social norm observed with military strictness whereas Nietzsche’s higher self possesses an internally circumscribed sense of freedom so as to create with ‘style’ his/her own set of values.

Doesn’t the [tragic artist] show his fearlessness in the face of the fearful and questionable? This in itself is a highly desirable state; anyone who knows it will pay it the highest honours...this victorious state is what the tragic artist selects, what he glorifies. The martial aspects of our soul celebrate their saturnalia in the face of tragedy.

The spirited-like characteristic also arises in the following passage from the Genealogy of Morals.

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64 AC, Preface.

65 Z, 8; EH, Preface, 3; EH, ‘Wise’, 7; TI, 24.

66 TI, Skirmishes of an Untimely Man, 24.
For this goal one would need a different kind of spirits than are probable in this of all ages: spirits strengthened by wars and victories, for whom conquering, adventure, danger, pain have even become a need; for this one would need acclimatization to sharp high air, to wintry journeys, to ice and mountain ranges in every sense; for this one would need a kind of sublime malice itself, an ultimate most self-assured mischievousness of knowledge, which belongs to great health.\textsuperscript{67}

At first glance, one may object to the parallel being made due to the fact that the characteristic of honour depends on the very behavior that society deems valuable, hence dependent on a moral code. Such an objection may be overcome upon considering the Nietzschean higher individual achieves this sense of honour and self-esteem through his own set of values. Nietzsche appears to have found the part of \textit{thumos} profoundly useful for his own understanding of genuine selfhood because the characteristics of the spirited type call to mind this ‘quantum of damned up energy,’\textsuperscript{68} this very life force which lies at the root of his notion of will to power. Furthermore, the spirited type necessitates a strict rigour that Nietzsche believes his higher type requires in order to satisfactorily harness and channel his/her drives.

In addition, will to power may also manifest into an individual’s love for wisdom. Nietzsche describes this passion for knowledge by provokingly posing the question, “[b]ut what is goodheartedness, refinement, or genius to me, when the person who has these virtues tolerates slack feelings in his faith and judgments and when he does not account the \textit{desire for certainty} as his inmost craving and deepest distress—as that which separates the higher human beings from the lower.”\textsuperscript{69}

According to Nietzsche, all individuals have will to power but only in its supreme form can it manifest into the strongest and most beautiful expression. Now the dominating drive in the ideal self for Plato seeks the highest good according to his theory of the Forms. The Nietzschean higher self seeks his own idiosyncratic kind of highest good in his continually evolving life-long project. According to both philosophers if a person’s psyche is optimally managed and structured one attains a sense of self-satisfaction whether it entails an individual’s sense of \textit{eudaimonia} or happiness once he/she accomplishes his/her task for society to the best of his/her ability for Plato or an individual’s sense of living life to the fullest for Nietzsche.

\textsuperscript{67} GM, II, 24.
\textsuperscript{68} GS, 360.
\textsuperscript{69} GS, 2.
In the aforementioned passage of Book IX, Plato claims that the three parts correspond to three pleasures. He explains, “it seems to me that there are three pleasures corresponding to the three parts of the soul, one peculiar to each part, and similarly with desires and kinds of rule”.\textsuperscript{70} Leaving aside Plato’s principal argument that it is better for a person to seek justice rather than injustice, it seems that every part – whether it be wisdom-loving, honour-loving and money-loving – gains pleasure from attaining what it strives for. For instance, the appetitive type engages in food, drink and love making for its sensory pleasures. Whereas, the spirited type seeks honour and victory because he enjoys the feeling of self-worth attained from this kind of behavior. Likewise, the wisdom-loving individual seeks true knowledge not just for the sake of the ‘True’ and the ‘Good’ but because he attains a kind of supreme pleasure once he attains the level of knowledge and encounters the Ideal Forms.\textsuperscript{71} Pleasure should not be viewed as an ultimate goal behind every part but rather a feeling that arises once a drive attains its expression. It cannot be reduced into a form of hedonism. Both Plato and Nietzsche conceive the model of the higher self as achieving a healthy, beautiful and affirmative sense of self on a general level. In regards to Plato, the wisdom-loving part would redirect or harness many of the appetite drives and keep them under control; regarding the spirited drives it would tend to guide them in the right direction. So the wisdom-loving drive would not only engage in its pursuit of the Good and the True, but would regulate its drives in order to establish a harmonious state which would then cultivate a more healthy and stable kind of pleasure. Nietzsche equally hopes for some sort of harmony in the soul in so far as one maintains a healthy tension amongst drives. Vis à vis the notion of pleasure, it seems that the discharging of a drive gives one pleasure. The amount of pleasure one feels equates exponentially in accordance to how forceful the drive is. Furthermore, he views will to power as a life-enhancing force making the argument that a drive’s expression gives one pleasure all the more plausible. Nietzsche does not judge the bodily pleasures under a negative light as Plato does but welcomes a vast array of drives that indeed could lead to a variety of different pleasures. The key factor to keep in mind is how one engages in self-mastery in order for the master drive to develop, thrive and beautifully express itself.

\textsuperscript{70} Rep., 580d.
Let us turn to what may be conceived as one of the most crucial attributes of *thumos* that appears to have inspired Nietzsche a great deal. Spiritedness as described by Plato involves a kind of self-reflexive feeling due to social norms from his/her surrounding environment. This ability to feel angry or proud about oneself functions reactively in conjunction with or against one’s values generated by social norms. As aforementioned the *thumos* part of the self appears as the seedling of an ethical feeling whereby one either feels pride or shame due to their initial impulse or feeling. Nietzsche sees the possibilities behind such a capacity as a way for the modern self to get in touch with another form of ethos above and beyond the Judeo-Christian morality. Nietzsche views an individual’s channeling through the spirited drive as a way in which to feel an affect that may spur a change in feeling, thinking and behaving. As Chris Janaway puts it, “[b]y provoking a range of affects in the reader, Nietzsche enables the reader to locate the target for revaluation, the ‘morality’ which comprises complex attitudes of his or her own, central to which are affective inclinations and aversions…If we were to find that the only way to reflect on the relevant affects was by first feeling them, then Nietzsche’s provocative rhetorical method could be seen not only as effective, but as essential to his task.”\(^72\) Just as Nietzsche implicitly values spiritedness he explicitly advocates one’s affective receptivity in order to instigate the successful project entailing the revaluation of values. Once an individual has reestablished his/her affective part as a legitimate and essential part of the self perhaps the rational part would shift from being controlling and suppressive to reflexive and flexible vis à vis our affective side. Just as Plato claims that the wisdom-loving part and the honour-loving part work in unison, Nietzsche also envisions them working together in so far as the affective part maintains the prominent role within the self.

Upon exploring Plato’s articulation of this new ‘part’ of the soul, the *thumos*, one may be surprised to see that its key features are endorsed by Nietzsche.\(^73\) Whether it involves one’s ability to feel anger towards oneself or to achieve a sense of honour, *thumos* functions as a seedling of morality. What Nietzsche extols in this primitive form of ethics is its naturalness that would involve a behaviour that is free of the burdens that manifest out of Judeo-Christian morality. Secondly, the spirited type is

\(^72\) Janaway (2007), 96.

\(^73\) Plato had initially described the soul as bipartite and introduces the third element of *thumos* in the *Republic*.
by definition military-like in that he functions as an auxiliary. Nietzsche not only makes certain acclamatory allusions to a militant type of individual but also frequently stresses the importance of courage that one needs to become a higher individual. Finally, the theory of will to power seems to work analogously to Plato’s tripartite soul in several respects. First the parts of the soul have this characteristic of self-motion that strives to seek expression. In addition, the ‘master’ drives so to speak may manifest as a love for wisdom.

4. *Harmonia* of the Self

This section explores how Plato and Nietzsche may have understood the parts or elements of the soul working together as a whole. Upon first glance the matter appears elusive as to how the different parts actually function successfully as a whole. Upon a closer look, Plato’s view of *harmonia* may help elucidate Nietzsche’s aesthetic allusions of the higher individual’s unified soul. Plato uses the aesthetic term *harmonia* to describe the very notion of a unified soul. Harmony is the effect of aesthetically beautiful sounds consisting of various pitches being played simultaneously. Robin Maconie provides insight into what Plato must have conceived of musical harmony by explaining that “[w]hen Plato speaks of a harmonious agreement among naturally superior and inferior elements of the population, the musical analogy is evidently not as we would understand it, as a harmony of chords and chord progressions made up of notes of equal status, but rather refers to pitch relationships within a scale of notes of variable status.” Maconie also interestingly shows how tension plays an integral part of harmony upon analysing C.J. Rowe’s examination of harmony: “[w]hat holds the body together, and so keeps it ‘in tension’, is the right mixture, or *harmonia*, of hot, cold, etc. – and this right mixture or *harmonia* is the soul.” So harmony is depicted as providing the necessary structure to unify as well as maintain a tension amongst its parts on both musical and

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74 From this point, I shall use the term harmony.
76 In his book, *What to Listen for in Music*, Copeland states that “[e]arly harmony was a reproduction of the melody line a particular interval above or below the music (an ‘interval’ in music is the distance in pitch between two notes). Known as ‘organum,’ it illustrates how harmony is achieved in music: by having a second melody occurring together with the first.” Copeland (2002), 47.
77 Maconie (1997), 135.
78 Rowe (1993), 205.
psychological levels. I shall demonstrate how both Plato and Nietzsche turn to this aesthetic notion as a way of describing how the higher self’s psychological parts and/or drives must work in unison.

Plato introduces the notion of harmony in Book IV of the *Republic* by commenting “[i]t seems, then, that a god has given music and physical training to human beings not, except incidentally, for the body and the soul but for the spirited and wisdom-loving parts of the soul itself, in order that these might be in harmony with one another, each being stretched and relaxed to the appropriate degree.”\(^7^9\) The key point here involves both the spirited and wisdom-loving parts working in unison. They seem to be functioning in an interactive manner in that various parts are ‘stretched and relaxed’ accordingly in order to maintain this harmony. By harmony Plato conveys that a. the whole self comes across as aesthetically pleasing or possessing the characteristic of ‘kalos’ (fine, beautiful and/or good); and b. that the self has a complex structure made up of three parts all seeking and/or fulfilling their own particular desires; and c. harmony allows the self to function successfully as a whole. Plato expands on the subject of harmony of the self by explaining,

‘[m]oderation is surely a kind of order, the mastery of certain kinds of pleasures and desires. People indicate as much when they use the phrase ‘self-control’ and other similar phrases. I don’t know just what they mean by them, but they are, so to speak, like tracks or clues that moderation has left behind in language. Isn’t that so?...Yet isn’t the expression ‘self-control’ ridiculous? The stronger self that does the controlling is the same as the weaker self that gets controlled, so that only one person is referred to in all such expressions.... Nonetheless, the expression is apparently trying to indicate that, in the soul of that very person, there is a better part and a worse one and that whenever the naturally better part is in control of the worse, this is expressed by saying that the person is self-controlled or master of himself. At any rate, one praises someone by calling him self-controlled. But when, on the other hand, the smaller and better part is overpowered by the larger, because of bad upbringing or bad company, this is called being self-defeated or licentious and is a reproach…. But you meet with the desires that are simple, measured, and directed by calculation in accordance with understanding and correct belief only in the few people who are born with the best natures and receive the best education….Then, don’t you see that in your city, too, the desires of the inferior many are controlled by the wisdom and desires of the superior few? – I do…Do you see then that our intuition was not a bad one just now that discerned the likeness between moderation and a kind of harmony”?\(^8^0\)

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\(^7^9\) Rep., 411e.  
\(^8^0\) Ibid., 431a – d.
The first point I would like to address involves what Plato precisely means by the term moderation.\textsuperscript{81} The word moderate or temperate suggests of a kind of attunement, blending and/or fitting together of parts. Rather than having a diminished or subdued connotation it seems that Plato would like to express this very idea of self-control as regulating, managing and organizing one’s desires in the best possible way. The phrase that really is most revelatory in defining moderation is when Plato approvingly describes the desires that are met with ‘simple, measured and directed with calculation.’ Plato remarks how contradictory it is to use the expression ‘self-control’ in that the self doing the controlling and being controlled are both parts of the same self.\textsuperscript{82} It is at this point that he introduces the idea that harmony resembles moderation in that it also is something that manages several parts so as to maintain its beauty. The harmony at play is the way in which one manages, orchestrates and regulates his/her desires in the best possible way. He proceeds to unfold his elitist view of the city and soul that has just ‘wisdom-loving’ desires or interests that hold power over a multitude of inferior base desires. Nietzsche would reject Plato’s strict classification in that the wisdom-loving part would not really be placed at the summit of the hierarchical set up of the self.\textsuperscript{83}

However, overall Nietzsche would agree with much that Plato expresses in the section above. He agrees that the self is not just one simple entity but is made up of many parts. In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche states that, “[t]he way is open for new versions and refinements of the soul-hypothesis; and such conceptions as mortal soul and ‘soul as subjective multiplicity,’ and ‘soul as social structure of the drives and affects,’ want henceforth to have citizens’ rights in science.”\textsuperscript{84} He expands on this idea in his notes in more of a suggestive tone,

\textit{[t]he assumption of one single subject is perhaps unnecessary; perhaps it is just as permissible to assume a multiplicity of subjects, whose interaction and struggle is the basis of our thought and our consciousness in general? A kind of aristocracy of ‘cells’ in which dominion resides? To be sure, an aristocracy of equals, used to ruling jointly and understanding how to command? My hypothesis: The subject as multiplicity.} \textsuperscript{85}

\textsuperscript{81} The word moderation is also translated as temperament. Plato’s four cardinal virtues are the following: wisdom, courage, moderation, and justice. \\
\textsuperscript{82} Other translations use the term ‘self-mastery’. \\
\textsuperscript{83} See notion of will to truth in GM, III, 24 -28; GS, 344. \\
\textsuperscript{84} BGE, 12. \\
\textsuperscript{85} WTP, 490 (1185).
Nietzsche conveys the notion of the subject as multiplicity as being founded on a struggle and interaction and Plato similarly emphasizes that there is an interaction between the parts so as to maintain a harmony. He also discusses a hierarchical set up in which command or control is necessary. The actual hierarchy isn’t strictly classified as Plato’s in that Nietzsche remains more open-minded about what kind of person and activity is necessitated for the overcoming of the Judeo-Christian morality. He requires that the master drive must exert its force, prove to be beneficial for the self’s own particular growth, promote one’s creativity thus contributing to a sense of overall self-satisfaction. Also, Nietzsche explicitly states that inferior drives that are controlled may also serve to help strengthen and develop the superior drive.\textsuperscript{86} Plato may also ascribe to such a view implicitly for if a superior part of the self controls its inferior parts, these inferior parts are ‘structurally’ valuable as their inferiority allow the superior part to have the dominant ‘status’.

Let us now explore how Plato uses the musical notion of harmony to convey a successful unity amongst different parts of the soul. On one hand, these parts (wisdom-loving, spirited and appetitive) are completely at odds as they are very different in nature. But on the other hand, there is another element that endows it with the capacity to function and thrive as a unified self. The aesthetic quality of harmony exemplifies this very function of self-control or self-mastery in that its laws maintain a particular structure which produces a beautifully sounding musical piece as a whole.

In their discussion on the development of the guardians, Plato explains that justice isn’t concerned with someone’s doing his own externally, but with what is inside him, with what is truly himself and his own. One who is just does not allow any part of himself to do the work of another part or allow the various classes within him to meddle with one another. He regulates well what is really his own and rules himself. He puts himself in order, is his own friend, and harmonizes the three parts of himself like three limiting notes in a musical scale – high, low, and middle. He binds together those parts and any others there may be in between, and from having been many things becomes entirely one, moderate and harmonious. Only then does he act”\textsuperscript{87}.

The parts of the self are described to function on two levels: 1. they function in an insular fashion in which they seek to accomplish a specific set of desires defined by its particular kind; 2. they are regulated so that they do not interfere with one another.

\textsuperscript{86} GM, II, 13; GM III 12.
\textsuperscript{87} Rep., 443d – 444a.
and also function harmoniously as a beautiful unity. Nietzsche’s passage from *Gay Science* 290, also exemplifies this very notion of the self that holds the capacity to mold himself, work on his tendencies and curb certain drives in order for other ones to develop and flourish into a beautiful aesthetic whole.

Gregory Vlastos provides an account of harmony that also supports the view that it serves to unify the various parts of our psychological makeup. He focuses on a later definition of justice in Book IV that has an entirely psychological slant. The definition goes as follows: “‘in the case of each one of us, whosoever is such that each of the three [psychic elements] in him *does its own*, he is a just man.’” He terms this kind of concord between all three parts (wisdom-loving, honour-loving and money-loving) ‘psychic harmony’ and explains that “in this condition the soul is healthy, beautiful, and in the ontologically correct hierarchic, inner order.” Vlastos emphasizes the fact that the term *kalos* was first introduced by Plato in the *Gorgias*. He describes how a soul attains a kind of beautiful order analogous to how a successful work of art has all its parts placed together into a harmonious composition. So for psychic harmony to be attained each part of the self must fulfill its particular needs in such a way as they avoid impeding or disrupting other parts and hence allow for a cohesiveness of the total self that is efficacious of health and beauty. Nietzsche also subscribes to such a notion in that he advocates the fulfillment and expression of one’s particular drives. If this is accomplished he believes that the self is not only healthy but attains a kind of harmony just like a beautiful piece of music but on an even more general note the totality of the self may come across as a beautiful work of art.

Now, Fred Miller’s analysis of harmony may shed some light on the extent to which one can monitor and regulate his/her drives in order to secure the harmonious state of the self. He deduces that an individual cannot achieve a harmonious state in Plato’s *Phaedo*. He explains that, “[t]he argument of the *Phaedo* has the following notable features: Desires and emotions are attributed to the body. The soul is understood as opposing the under goings of the body. Reason is attributed to the soul in distinction from the body.” Ultimately the soul cannot attain a harmonious state

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88 Rep., 441e - 442a.
89 Vlastos (1969), 506.
91 GS, 290.
92 Miller (1999), 90.
due to its opposition from the bodily parts. Miller believes that Plato may have
decided to create a tri-partite self because the soul is a ‘self-moving’ entity. He states
that “Plato is inclined in the Republic to attribute all desires, perceptions, and thoughts
to the soul because he is shifting toward the view that such movements or changes
must be due to the soul understood as a self-moving principle.”
Miller no longer
explores the issue of harmony any further but it is plausible to advance the view that
if the self is conceived as containing all the parts (the wisdom-loving, honour-loving
and money-loving) and that it used wisely, harmony is realisable. Plato aligns the
harmonious state of the soul to justice in his description of an exemplary person by
saying, “he believes that the action is just and fine that preserves this inner harmony
and helps achieve it, and calls it so, and regards wisdom the knowledge that oversees
such actions. And he believes that the action that destroys this harmony is unjust, and
calls it so, and regards the belief that oversees it ignorance…”
Even if the broader
topic of justice is not the focus here, it is key to acknowledge how the psychological
harmony manifests in ethical behavior.

In regards to Nietzsche, the higher self’s psychological make-up would clearly
allow one to ‘do’ and/or create amazing feats. He also adheres to the notion that on a
general scale the self functions in a harmonious manner. The degree to which the
self comes across as harmonious is difficult to set clearly defined delineations. What
aesthetic standards does Nietzsche refer to when he advances the view that the higher
individual functions as a harmonious unity? Let us turn to his discussion of Goethe as
a model for selfhood. He describes Goethe as one who

made use of history, science, antiquity, and Spinoza too, but above all he made
use of practical activity; he adapted himself to resolutely closed horizons; he
did not remove himself from life, he put himself squarely in the middle of it;
he did not despair and took as much as possible on himself, to himself, in

93 Ibid. He goes on to say, “The concluding argument of the Phaedo has the crucial premise that the
soul is a cause in the sense of a thing that brings the form of life with it and will not admit the opposite
form of death. However, the Phaedo leaves the connection between soul and life unexplained. The
Laws has an explanation for this: we call thing ‘living’ when it moves itself, and this implies that it has
a principle of self-motion within it; hence, if the soul is the cause of live, it must be identified with self-
motion. Because the movements of the soul are prior to those of the body, it follows that moods, habits
of mind, wishes, calculations, true judgments, purposes and memories will all be prior to physical
lengths, breadths, and depths, which are conditions of the body (896c).
94 Rep., 444a.
95 It is important to keep in mind how the musical concept of harmony must have evolved from the time
of Plato to the late 19th century. Although it is not an issue that I shall address at this point it would be
interesting to consider how the dissonance that Wagner introduces in his music may have possibly
influenced Nietzsche. Wagner may have pushed the boundaries of the laws of classical harmony but his
music achieved such aesthetic heights and fullness that its complexity simply added to its richness.
himself. What he wanted was totality; he fought against the separation of reason, sensibility, feeling, will (- preached in the most forbiddingly scholastic way by Kant, Goethe’s antipode); he disciplined himself to wholeness, he created himself. 96

Goethe is admired as a person who was full of endeavor yet maintained a particular focus with his limited horizons. This wholeness or totality was a goal he strived for theoretically and achieved on a practical level. Nietzsche highlights the fact that Goethe “made use” of various subjects that captivated him as well as making “use of practical activity”. 97 Goethe also achieved two kinds of wholeness: 1. involving the unity of his various drives within the self; and 2. acting as an opponent to the separation of the self advocated by philosophers such as Kant and seeking for a unity of our rational and affective elements. Goethe’s ability to harness his drives and exhibit self-mastery exemplifies a kind of self-control reminiscent of the very self-control that Plato’s model of selfhood ascribes to in order to establish a harmonious unity. Tension must exist amongst the drives but at a more fundamental subconscious level. On a more general level, Nietzsche would advance the view that a higher self needs to regulate, orchestrate, and mold himself into a beautiful totality. I would conjecture that Nietzsche would agree that the higher self possesses a harmonious aesthetic quality in so far as it functions at more general level making the self as a successfully functioning whole with all of its variegated drives at play on a deeper subconscious level.

I shall now address Jonathan Lear’s illuminating interpretation of the Republic that provides us with a way to bridge the analogy between the city and the self. In his article entitled, Inside and Outside the Republic, Lear suggests that if we take into account the psychological notions of internalization and externalization we may grasp how the individual psyche and the city function symbiotically with one another. 98 The concept of internalization involves the influence that society bears upon an individual. He explains that according to Plato, “humans need a socially grounded culture to internalize.” 99 Externalization evokes how particular individuals play a role in

96 TI, AC, 49. I address how Nietzsche portrays Goethe as an exemplar who achieves unity of the self in section 3 of Chapter III.
97 Ibid., 49.
98 Lear’s article is a response to Bernard William’s The Analogy of City and Soul in which he argues that there lies an irresolvable tension within the analogy of city and soul.
99 Lear (1992) 204-5.
influencing their society by their very character and behavior that is enacted within a wider social context. Lear articulates exactly how this process unravels by stating, “[f]or Plato suggests that cultural products in general are externalizations. Good rhythm, harmony, and diction for example, should follow and fit good speech; and speech, in turn, follows and fits the character of the psyche”. Ideally, a just person will contribute to his/her society by performing his/her own activity in life to the fullest.

Once we understand this isomorphism between the individual and society we may come to grasp how key the notion of harmony is for Plato. Due to Lear’s revelatory demonstration of strong correspondence between self and society, we can further extrapolate to what extent harmony of the self is crucial – namely, it isn’t just a good for the individual’s own wellbeing but also affects the wellbeing of a society. Upon his examination of Plato’s treatment of a sickly or ‘pathological’ person, Lear points out that, “for example, just as an oligarchy is not a polis, but two parts: a ruling part and a ruled. For Plato, there is not sufficient integration in the functioning of the parts for them to count as a genuine unity, a psyche”. An ideal self would entail the weaker parts functioning in allegiance with its stronger dominating part, namely the rational part. Anyhow, Lear points out that just as an ideal society needs unity, an ideal self equally requires unity.

As I have maintained above, Nietzsche highly valorizes the idea of a unified self whilst simultaneously acknowledging that a healthy tension must exist amongst the various competing drives. If we bear in mind that at one level various drives do indeed conflict with one another but at another level, both the weak drives and the stronger ones need each other for the hierarchical structure to exist. Moreover, at a general level in which Nietzsche questions whether a person functions as a totality or not, he ascribes unity as a necessary factor of genuine selfhood.

The question of the unity of the self has proved to be a topic of examination for both Plato and Nietzsche. Clearly, these two philosophers differ on many accounts with the most notable point of difference involving the role of formal wisdom. Aside from its hierarchical setup, Plato’s analysis of the human soul and its tripartite structure with the introduction of thumos or spiritedness may have indeed proved to

100 Ibid., 192.
101 Ibid., 188.
be quite influential for Nietzsche. Both philosophers provide us with a complex psychological portrait of the self but they also deem it crucial that the self is unified. They value this unity simply because it is precisely the whole self’s cohesiveness that generates a ‘beautiful’ being that acts in a successful way.

5. Plato & Nietzsche on Health

Plato uses the subject of health throughout the Republic as a way to illustrate a person’s optimal psychological configuration. My primary concern with the issue of health is not so much Plato’s focus on one’s physical health but rather to explore a general notion of physical and psychological health. In this section I shall first focus on Plato’s use of the term health and how he fleshes out the various psychological criteria for assuring one’s wellbeing. I then proceed to examine the parallels between Plato and Nietzsche on health. They both consider health as encompassing the physical and the psychological health that further supports the deep place they designate for the unity of the self. They also believe that health depends on how efficiently our psychological makeup is managed. They clearly differ on various points such as what the optimal hierarchy of the self involves or whether illness may have fruitful effects, however ultimately they both place the notion of health within an ethical framework advancing the view that optimal health is indeed a valid goal.

Towards the end of Book IV, Plato provides us with a definition of this broader version of health by explaining that, “[t]o produce health is to establish the components of the body in a natural relation of control and being controlled, one by another, while to produce disease is to establish a relation of ruling and being ruled contrary to nature”. He continues to state that, “[v]irtue seems, then, to be a kind of health, fine condition, and wellbeing of the soul, while vice is disease, shameful condition, and weakness.” Plato states that the components of the self are being controlled and/or are controlling in a specific relationship – that is to say in a way that

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102 This is not to say that bodily health isn’t a substratum of one’s general state of being since one’s general health depends of the very relationship between one’s three parts (bodily, spirited and rational). For instance, if one treats his physical self poorly through a complete debauchery in his appetitive side this is proof of a lack of control from both the spirited and rational parts. Thomas Robinsons points out how Plato makes a shift from a biological interest in one’s health to the notion of a ‘healthy soul’ from Book III to Book IV. For further discussion on this point see. Robertson (1970), 34-39.

103 Rep., 444d-e.
is ‘natural’. This control causes a positive relationship amongst an individual’s parts that is conducive to an individual’s overall wellbeing. When we turn to look at what disease involves we may observe that the relationship amongst the different parts of the self comes across as contrary to nature. The question that now follows is, ‘what is nature according to Plato?’ Nature may have two implications, a. congenital propensities or talents that an individual has, and b., our environment and the influence it has on individuals as they mature in a particular society. In other words, there is an inner and an outer nature. If the relationship between the three parts is poorly orchestrated then one will find himself ‘ill’ or diseased according to Plato. Jonathan Lear’s penetrating interpretation of the Republic is also congruent with the notion of nature in the sense that it is what an individual externalizes from his/her psychological makeup and what he/she internalizes from the society and surrounding environment. Plato’s claim that health depends on establishing the components of the body in a ‘natural relation’ demonstrates how his ethical theory really hinges on the efficient management of the self’s three distinct components.

Plato provides us with quite literal advice of how to attain health in which we may examine how critical the relationship amongst all three parts of the self truly is. Plato gives counsel on the topic of sleep by explaining that, someone who is healthy and moderate with himself goes to sleep only after having done the following: First, he rouses his rational part and feasts it on fine arguments and speculations; second, he neither starves nor feasts his appetites, so that they will slumber and not disturb his best part with either their pleasure or their pain, but they’ll leave it alone, pure and by itself, to get on with its investigations, to yearn after and perceive something, it knows not what, whether it is past, present, or future; third, he soothes his spirited part in the same way, for example, by not falling asleep with his spirit still aroused after an outburst of anger. And when he has quieted these two parts and aroused the third, in which reason resides, and so takes his rest, you know that it is then that he best grasps the truth and that the visions that appear in his dreams are least lawless.

Within a simple context of how best to fall into slumber, Plato articulates how beneficial it is for a person to have his/her wisdom-loving part aroused and for both the appetitive and the spirited parts toned down. And moreover, the self’s drives

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104 Please see discussion on Jonathan Lear’s interpretation of the Republic on pp 22-23.
105 In the opening part of section 1, I explain my position on how Plato considers the self is not external to one’s parts or drives.
106 Rep., 571e-572b.
whether they are appetitive or spirited, are not suppressed but satisfied accordingly so that the wisdom-loving part may function optimally.

Upon exploring the nature of true being, Plato also advances the view that this kind of knowledge produces health. He explains,

that it is the nature of the real lover of learning to struggle toward what is, not to remain with any of the many things that are believed to be, that, as he moves on, he neither loses nor lessens his erotic love until he grasps the being of each nature itself with the part of his soul that is fitted to grasp it, because of its kinship with it, and that, once getting near what really is and having intercourse with it and having begotten understanding and truth, he knows, truly lives, is nourished…

He then arrives at the conclusion that the person that goes through such an experience culminates as “rather a healthy and just character with moderation following it.”

Once an individual attains this heightened form of knowledge he/she will know precisely how best to judge and ascertain particular situations. For example, if a person is mistreated by a passerby on his way home he should react in the following way, ‘I shall ignore that rude comment made towards me and suppress my instinct to become angry, so that I may continue my walk home where I will be able to work at peace.’ Plato explains that one can attain the true forms implicitly denotes that an individual must see beyond ordinary behavior grasping its psychological nuances so as to truly understand a situation and behave in the best possible manner.

The sexual terminology in the above passage evokes one’s quasi-creative experience of attaining a new and heightened form of knowledge and self-knowledge. As aforementioned, Plato specifically recounts the importance of grasping “each nature itself with the part of his soul that is fitted to grasp it” and thereby highlights a person’s recognition of all three parts of the self and an understanding of how we come to know various parts of ourselves in distinct ways. Plato not only appears to be describing one’s path to true knowledge but also how one may attain a form of self-consciousness whereby the self becomes fully aware of the entirety of him/herself and its three components. Hence, in addition to proper regulation of the self, Plato identifies self-understanding as a prerequisite to securing one’s general health.

Plato further expounds on the subject of health in both a bodily sense and on a more general scale. He stipulates that, “neither will he make health his aim or assign

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107 Rep., 490b.
108 Rep., 490c.
first place to being stronger, healthy, and beautiful, unless he happens to acquire moderation as a result. Rather, it’s clear that he will always cultivate harmony of his body for the sake of the consonance of his soul.”¹⁰⁹ In this specific section, Plato claims that bodily health is a good but is first and foremost a good for a larger aim, that of the ‘consonant’ soul. Moreover, he explains that one’s overall health which depends on the relationship of all three parts and how they are managed is more important than one’s physiological health. Let us not misinterpret the above passage to convey Plato as advocating a ‘means-end’ account of health and moderation of the soul. A moderate, consonant and/or healthy soul is required to have all three parts to be functioning properly on their own but in conjunction with one another. Plato is not discounting our appetitive drives as only just a means to attain a ‘moderate’ soul but rather focuses on how each part relates to the other so as to assure a successfully unified being. For instance, if an individual’s appetitive parts are constantly swaying a person one way and his/her wisdom-loving part is pulling him/her towards another this individual will find himself constantly torn up. After the exegesis of the previous passages we may safely maintain that although there are indeed three distinct parts of the self, the well-balanced relationship amongst one another is paramount and therefore accounts for unified and healthy individual.

I would like to turn to an instance whereupon Plato analyses the warring between the honour-loving and money-loving drives. He introduces the example of Leontius who finds himself in a situation in which on one side his appetitive desire spurs him to look at dead corpses and simultaneously his spirited part feels a rush of anger and disdain towards this shameful desire. Plato recounts the story by stating, “[f]or a time he struggled with himself and covered his face, but, finally, overpowered by appetite, he pushed his eyes wide open and rushed towards the corpses, saying, ‘Look for yourselves, you evil wretches, take your fill of the beautiful sight!’…[Plato proceeds by arriving at the conclusion that i]t proves that anger sometimes makes war against the appetites as one thing against another.”¹¹⁰ In this case, the money-loving and honour-loving parts warring against each other is symptomatic of an unhealthy state. Plato actually concludes by stating that usually the honour-loving part of the

¹⁰⁹ Rep., 591b-e.
self allies itself with the wisdom-loving part, and as a result, one may achieve health if the spirited part is used appropriately.  

Plato places health on a similar footing with other virtues of the self such as ‘fine’, ‘good’, and ‘just’. All these positive traits ultimately invoke the notion of an individual living life according to what is naturally good for him/her as a whole. Of course, everyday tensions between an individual’s various parts are a reality, but on a general level if the individual succeeds in overcoming these tensions to live to the best of his/her natural inclinations then he/she will live a ‘just’, ‘fine’, ‘good’, and ‘healthy’ life. Ultimately these terms all denote Plato’s formulation of an ethical theory.

This broad conception of virtue is further explored during the last chapter of the Republic. In his story of the light and the spindle, Plato describes a scene whereby souls come to choose their next lives with the daughters of Necessity, Lachesis, Clotho, and Atropos. He recounts that,

there were of all kinds, for the lives of animals were there…[t]here were tyrannies among them…while others ended halfway through in poverty, exile, and beggary. There were lives of the famous men, some of whom were famous for the beauty of their appearance, others for their strength or athletic prowess, others still for their high birth and the virtue or excellence of their ancestors. And there were also lives of men who weren’t famous for any of these things. And same for the lives of women. But the arrangement of the soul was not included in the model because the soul is inevitably altered by the different lives it chooses. But all the other things were there, mixed with each other and with wealth, poverty, sickness, health, and the states intermediate to them.

The key point to be extrapolated here involves Plato’s claim that an individual must arrange his soul, or in other words, consciously govern himself/herself whilst living. The more adequately governed the soul is, the more virtuous it is. Plato concludes by explaining that, “from all this he will be able, by considering the nature of the soul, to reason out which life is better and which worse and to choose accordingly, calling a life worse if it leads the soul to become more unjust, better if it leads the soul to

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112 I shall address the quality of beauty or ‘fineness’ in the following section.
113 See T.M. Robinson’s ‘The Republic’ in which he points out that Plato describes the just man as ‘living well’ and that its implications include ‘blessed’, ‘happy’, and ‘profitable’. Although these adjectives vary from the ones stated above they all seem to be present once an individual is successfully lives as a unified self and/or on a general scale.
114 I also address the parallels between health and beauty in the section 2 of Chapter II.
115 Rep., 618a-b.
become more just, and ignoring everything else." Moreover, an individual who
chooses to have his/her appetitive and spirited parts work in alliance with his/her
wisdom-loving part will attain what Plato has called a ‘healthy’, ‘just’, ‘fine’, and
‘good’ soul. Throughout the Republic, Plato weaves together various instances that
illustrate each of these qualities not just to support his argument for justice but in
order to build an entire ethical foundation.\footnote{Rep., 618e.}

I shall now address Nietzsche’s conception of health and how he may have
turned towards Plato as a source of inspiration on his expansive reference to health
and sickness throughout his corpus. Nietzsche diagnoses the modern individual as
sick and degenerate but simultaneously abstains from offering a solution to the 19th-
century ailments. Nor does he suggest us to return to this golden Age of the Greeks.
He does believe that certain people may overcome the negative repercussions of
Judeo-Christian culture in order to attain a higher kind of persona. I shall focus on
specific passages in which Nietzsche treats the topic of health similarly to which Plato
has conceived health.

Upon our initial consideration of Plato’s treatment of health, we addressed the
notion of how an individual’s health depends on maintaining a natural relationship
with one’s various parts. Nietzsche concurs with this point simply because he holds a
deep respect for what comes across as natural for someone. Here, Nietzsche’s notion
of ‘translating man back to nature’ invokes one to overcome our degenerate
tendencies and embrace our more primary nature, that is to say the conglomeration of
drives and affects that lie deep in our unconscious.\footnote{BGE, 230.} Nietzsche’s hope involves
leaving behind the fragmented persona of modernity in order to become a higher
individual that creates his/her virtues according to his nature and thereby achieves a
healthy unity.

In this particular passage entitled, Health of the soul, Nietzsche amends the
stoic Ariston of Chios’s view of the healthy soul. He claims that

Ariston of Chios’s ‘virtue is the health of the soul’ would have to be changed
to become useful, at least to read ‘your virtue is the health of your soul’. For

\footnote{This passage may indeed add confusion as Plato describes a scene about the after-life experience in
which the soul is cut off from the physical body. This would naturally cause one to question to what
extent Plato’s conception of the soul changes after life. I shall not go into this topic in order to focus
on the issue of health of the living person and how it may have inspired Nietzsche’s interest of health
and disease in his own work.}
there is no health as such… Even the determination of what is healthy for your body depends on your goal, your horizon, your energies, your impulses, your errors, and above all on the ideals and phantasms of your soul… In one person, of course, this health could like its opposite in another person.\textsuperscript{119}

Nietzsche asserts that there is no sole ethical principle that all individuals may follow that guarantees a healthy soul. First, the notion of the healthy soul spans over a wider scope than its biological sense but furthermore encompasses the ethical questions: ‘what is virtuous?’ or ‘what will secure one’s personal well-being and happiness?’.

Nietzsche explains that one’s health depends on one’s own impulses, errors, goals and even ideals. One’s particular character coupled with one’s own experience in life helps construct one’s standard of what is deemed positive or detrimental to one’s overall health. I believe that this idiosyncratic ethical theory does in fact strike a chord with Plato’s view of a healthy soul to a certain extent. Regarding the individual on more particular level, he would ascribe to the notion that each person holds his/her own set of desires whether they may be based upon one’s congenital traits and whether they have been influenced by one’s upbringing. Plato describes justice as a kind of ‘doing one’s own’ which involves not doing what belongs to others or being deprived of his/her own.\textsuperscript{120} ‘Doing one’s own’ begins with one’s psychological makeup and then transfers over to a societal level. On a psychological level, Plato stipulates that an individual should do his/her utmost considering his/her natural propensities coupled with those acquired through education and culture. Stepping back to consider Plato’s description of the tripartite makeup of the self on a general scope, he is arguing for the primacy of the wisdom-loving part and claims that the appetitive and spirited parts should give allegiance to its superior part. An individual will flourish to the best of his capacities if one abides by this ethical formula.

Plato and Nietzsche advance a personal and even idiosyncratic ethical theory allowing the differences of particular drives and impulses that manifest in their respective ways depending on one’s natural propensities and particular experience through life. Nietzsche diverges from Plato in that his ethical theory does remain grounded on a more psychologically idiosyncratic level allowing the drives to determine one’s ethical values. Plato provides a much more top-down hierarchical

\textsuperscript{119} GS, 120.
theory that generates from the configuration of the tripartite soul placing rationality in a superior position over the other parts.\textsuperscript{121} Plato’s ethical theory in the \textit{Republic} functions on two levels: that of the particular and the general, and any conflict with later bears no effect on the parallels drawn by the former.

In the preface of \textit{The Gay Science}, Nietzsche elaborates on the role of the philosopher. Here he seems to evoke a similar portrait to Plato’s wisdom-loving self to a certain degree. Nietzsche does not commit himself to prescribing the philosopher-king model as an optimal way of life. In the following passage, he does draw out one of the rare portraits valorizing the philosopher type.\textsuperscript{122} He describes the philosopher as someone that,

\begin{quote}
has traversed many kinds of health, and keeps traversing them, has passed through an equal number of philosophies; he simply \textit{cannot} keep from transposing his states every time into the most spiritual form and distance: this art of transfiguration is philosophy. We philosophers are not free to divide body from soul as the people do; we are even less free to divide soul from spirit. We are not thinking frogs, nor objectifying and registering mechanisms with their innards removed: constantly, we have to give birth to our thoughts out of our pain and, like mothers, endow them with all we have of blood, heart, fire, pleasure, passion, agony, conscience, fate, and catastrophe. Life – that means for us constantly transforming all that we are into light and flame – also everything that wounds us: we simply can do no other”\textsuperscript{123}
\end{quote}

Here Nietzsche reveals his view on the ‘correct’ kind of philosophizing – one that is based on a receptivity of an individual’s affects, exploration, a state of becoming, as well as a subjective approach. Nietzsche depicts the philosophical work as a challenging enterprise that consists of a veritable struggle through which the philosopher goes through not just on an intellectual level but also on a physical and affective level. He uses emotionally tinged words such as ‘blood, fire, pleasure, passion, agony, conscience, catastrophe,’ in order to provoke an affective response but also to convince us that philosophy is much more than the sterile, objective and disinterested occupation that it has been depicted to be especially from the

\textsuperscript{121} Nietzsche generally is critical of philosophers and their pursuit for an overarching and ultimate truth.
\textsuperscript{122} In general, Nietzsche does advocate a particular line of activity over another. Along with artistic and political occupations that are often admired by Nietzsche, a certain kind of philosophy is considered praiseworthy. He would view a philosophical enterprise as valuable as long as our energies are increased to their maximum strength and our drives reach expression through extraordinary feats.
\textsuperscript{123} GS, preface 3.
Enlightenment and on. In this passage, Nietzsche reveals the kind of exceptional philosophical pursuit that he deems honourable.

Now let us turn to the similarity between Nietzsche’s words stated above and Plato’s view of the philosophical experience. In a section of Book VI of the *Republic* that we previously addressed, Plato describes the philosophical experience as a real challenge and simultaneously represents it through an erotic analogy. He describes the “nature of the real lover of learning to struggle toward what is, not to remain with any of the many things that are believed to be, that, as he moves on, he neither loses nor lessens his erotic love until he grasps it”.124 Plato conveys the philosopher’s search for knowledge as an arduous and demanding activity in which one must overcome certain ordinary preconceptions in order to discover true being. He ends this passage with phrases imbued with erotic innuendo as he explains that, “once getting near what really is and having intercourse with it and having begotten understanding and truth, he knows, truly lives, is nourished – and at that point, but not before – is relieved from the pains of giving birth”.125 Nietzsche uses a very similar language to evoke both a. the intellectual creativity that Eros signify, and also, b. the actual pains that the philosopher must endure in order to achieve these intellectual discoveries.

Philosophy for both Plato and Nietzsche may be understood as a journey of sorts through which one achieves a higher understanding of oneself and of existence. Concerning the kind of knowledge that the philosopher acquires, Nietzsche diverges from Plato in that philosophical exploits are limitless and they do not culminate in the fixed realm of True Forms. I am claiming that although the end result varies, both philosophers believe the actual genuine philosophical pursuits are given a place of deep value.

How does this journey toward higher knowledge relate to one’s health is now the question to pose. According to Plato, the individual that attains knowledge of the true Forms would have a healthy soul. Now for Nietzsche, the question of health is also deemed quite pertinent but it definitely develops into quite a complex ethical problem. As mentioned above the modern individual is ridden with ailments. One has to deal with this Judeo-Christian guilt that Nietzsche vehemently criticises and hopes for some sort of overcoming. Simultaneously, he does concede that we have become

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124 *Rep.*, 490b-c.
125 Ibid.
more interesting and more profound as a result since we have gained this ability to reorient our drives in a surreptitious manner. Nietzsche often takes the therapeutic stance as if he were a doctor prescribing a diagnosis. However, it is not clear whether he believes that a treatment will ever give back humanity its health. Let us return to the end of the passage from The Gay Science cited above in which Nietzsche explores the question,

Finally, the great question would still remain whether we can really dispense with illness – even for the sake of our virtue – and whether our thirst for knowledge and self-knowledge in particular does not require the sick soul as much as the healthy, and whether, in brief, the will to health alone, is not a prejudice, cowardice, and perhaps a bit of very subtle barbarism and backwardness.

Nietzsche is concerned about whether the ‘will to health’ is actually feasible in the modern age. He explains that one’s quest for knowledge and self-knowledge may indeed have ulterior motives hidden in our unconscious. For instance, a philosopher’s search for truth during the modern era may actually be fueled by power drives whether they involve control through understanding, status, or suppression his/her affective tendencies. It is worth pointing out how both Nietzsche and Plato investigate sickness in order to express their notion of health and moreover to formulate an ethical theory. Plato explains that, “the true city, in my opinion, is the one we’ve described, the healthy one, as it were. But let’s study a city with a fever, if that’s what you want.” Perhaps an analysis of a healthy soul and/or a healthy city would prove futile in a philosophical context. Rather, through the exegesis of a flawed individual or polis, a philosopher may build a case to improve the situation at hand whether it takes place within a psychological or political context.

Nietzsche actually introduces the topic sickness in the preface of The Gay Science as he maintains that,

\[126\] See passage on ressentiment in GM, I, 10. I address the topic of ressentiment in section 3b of Chapter II.
\[127\] GS, 120.
\[128\] BGE, 36.
\[129\] Nietzsche lists the philosopher’s ulterior motivations in the following citation. See fn 117.
\[130\] Nietzsche expands on the issue of sickness in the following section AC, 7, AC51.
\[131\] Rep., 372e.
\[132\] We must keep in mind that Nietzsche’s philosophical method is based on dialectics which is yet another point that he has in common with Plato and many of the Greek philosophers as they often would unfold their philosophical arguments through debate and moreover would be written out as a dialogue (Plato and Plato’s work on Socrates).
in some it is their deprivations that philosophize; in others, their riches and strengths. The former need their philosophy, whether it be a prop, a sedative, medicine, redemption, elevation, or self-alienation… Every philosopher that ranks peace above war, every ethic with a negative definition of happiness…every aesthetic or religious craving for some Apart, Beyond, Outside, Above, permits the questions whether it was not sickness that inspired the philosopher. The unconscious disguise of physiological needs under the cloaks of the object, ideal, purely spiritual goes to frightening lengths-and often I have asked myself whether taking a large view, philosophy has not been merely an interpretation of the body and a misunderstanding of the body….I am still waiting for a philosophical physician in the exceptional sense of that word – one who has to pursue the problem of the total health of a people, time, race or of humanity - …to risk the proposition: what was at stake in all philosophizing hitherto was not at all ‘truth’ but something else, let us say, health, future, growth, power, life.133

Nietzsche goes on for quite some length as to what exactly fuels the philosopher’s search for truth. Perhaps the philosopher does indeed need to paint a pretty picture of the self and the world so that as a crutch or ‘sedative’ that gives us comfort rather than make us face the actual intemperance and flux to which we are really faced with. Whether this feat is attainable remains questionable but Nietzsche certainly hopes for humanity to regain a new form of health. He provides us with a glimpse of what could be a new and great health as a virtue – i.e. not a negative definition of health. In a passage entitled, The great health, he describes free spirits as

[b]eing new, nameless, hard to understand, we premature births of an as yet unproven future need for a new goal also a new means – namely, a new health, stronger, more seasoned, tougher, more audacious, and gayer than any previous health….And now, after we have long been on our way in this manner, we Argonauts of the ideal, with more daring perhaps than in prudent, and have suffered shipwreck and damage often enough, but are, to repeat it, healthier than one likes to permit us, dangerously healthy, ever again healthy – it will seem as if a reward, we now confronted an as yet undiscovered country whose boundaries nobody has surveyed yet, something beyond all the lands and nooks of the ideal so far.134

This passage that had at one time concluded the preface of the original edition of the Gay Science gives a new sense of hope for the coming of an ideal individual who acquires this positive definition of health. Nietzsche looks towards health as a virtue through which he seeks to set up a new ethical framework. An individual that attains

133 GS. Preface 2.
134 GS, 382.
this new kind of health would generate attributes such as growth, life, energy and strength. When we turn back to Plato’s understanding of health, its implications take on a broader scope as the attributes vary from fine or ‘kalos’, just and good. However, the actual ethical principles are made much more explicit than Nietzsche’s in that Plato precisely stipulates that one should arouse his/her wisdom-loving part and ascertain its supremacy over the weaker spirited and appetitive parts. Ultimately, both Plato and Nietzsche are looking for an ethical formula that can guide an individual to live to one’s fullest potential.

Throughout this first chapter, I have examined Plato’s influence on how Nietzsche defines the optimal psychological make-up of the self. Plato structures the self in his rendition of the tripartite self in the Republic. I have highlighted how Plato claims that one achieves self-control in order to attain the highest fulfillment of selfhood. Nietzsche seeks to establish a new form of ethics that is quite flexible in that it involves a self-control applied to one’s genuine values. This ethical formula, so to speak, works similarly to Plato’s in that the sense of self-control or self-mastery serves as its cornerstone. Moreover, Nietzsche stipulates that one should recognize his/her genuine drives and overcome what has become life-denying Judeo-Christian moral code. The creation of a new value system is based on one’s own personal drives and affects. I attempt to reveal that after one’s initial glance at Plato’s hierarchy of one’s drives, especially the contrast between our appetitive drives and our drive for knowledge, the later would be considered as more valuable than the former. Nietzsche can be quite critical of one’s underlying drive to achieve power through intellectual prowess which he deems as life-denying. Ultimately however, Nietzsche approves of a genuine drive for knowledge that is expressed in an individual, original and adventurous way.

I proceeded onto focusing on how Plato’s use of sublimation has been adopted by Nietzsche especially in regards to how one’s sexual desire may be channeled into a love of knowledge. I then drew out the ethical attributes embedded in Plato’s conception of thumos. Nietzsche would agree that this form of ethics would allow an individual to flourish with its reactive mode that helps one to establish the rigour and discipline to follow through with his/her strongest and equally life-affirming drives. Subsequently, I have explored how both Plato and Nietzsche use the aesthetic topic of harmony to express their model of a unified or total self. This part is crucial to the
section of unity in which I address the problem of how Nietzsche envisions a higher individual’s vast amount of variegated drives and affects to be successfully bound together in a unity or totality in Chapter IV. Finally, I have shown how Plato and Nietzsche share common views of health and ill-health. Furthermore, both use the topic of health to illuminate as well as how to overcome the negative tendencies within an individual’s psychological make-up.
Chapter II
The Art of Molding One's Drives

This chapter is devoted to Nietzsche’s treatment of the primal sex drive and aggressive drive. I shall explore how Nietzsche focuses on these deep psychological tendencies to evoke a desirability of life or creativity regarding the sex drive and traits like strength and courage in regards to aggression. But more importantly, Nietzsche is able to flesh out the theme of sublimation through his analysis of these drives. He takes the aesthetic mechanism of sublimation as a way of expressing how the self can channel and co-opt certain drives just as an artist may shape and mold a work of art. Moreover, this process exemplifies the very notion of becoming which is integral to Nietzsche’s philosophy.

In this section, I question Nietzsche’s alleged claims concerning the sex drive and the artistic process. Gregory Moore’s biological reading of Nietzsche’s claim suggests that a creative endeavor requires a tapping into a sex drive. I question the validity of such an interpretation by exploring the numerous affective expressions of the Dionysian characteristic of intoxication (Rausch) of which sexual excitability is just one manifestation. I then proceed to examine how sexuality may be used rhetorically to support Nietzsche’s polemic against a ‘disinterested’ approach to art but more importantly towards life. When the task of overcoming our Judeo-Christian morality is taken into account, one can come to understand how Nietzsche may be intentionally exaggerating the role of the sex drive as a way of stressing the importance of the affects.

135 Although I am unsure of how and if Nietzsche clearly distinguishes ‘Instinkt’ from ‘Trieben,’ I shall treat instincts encompassing a more primal nature whereas drives tend to have more multifarious and complex characteristics and developed through modern times, i.e. as a form of second nature.
1. Moore’s Biological Interpretation

In his late work of *Twilight of the Idols* and the *Nachlass*, Nietzsche allegedly claims that the artistic sense of creativity is based on our primal sex drive to procreate. Nietzsche draws certain parallels with creativity and procreation but in general he uses sexuality as a vehicular means of exhibiting the negative repercussions of repression and the positive attributes of the flourishing of our drives and affects.\(^{136}\)

Gregory Moore, the author *Nietzsche Biology and Metaphor*, claims that “[i]n the aesthetic state, then, the organism experiences an irresistible feeling of superabundant energy which must be discharged and channeled into creativity. In this, it resembles – or rather is actually a species of – sexual arousal”.\(^{137}\) Moore seems committed to claiming that all aesthetic states are grounded in the sex drive. I shall demonstrate how this interpretation is too restrictive. Let us turn to what Nietzsche explicitly says about sexuality and creativity:

One physiological precondition is indispensable for there to be art or any sort of aesthetic action or vision: *intoxication*. Without intoxication to intensify the excitability of the whole machine, there can be no art. There are many types of intoxication conditioned by a variety of factors, but they are all strong enough for the job. Above all, the intoxication of sexual excitement, the most ancient and original form of intoxication. There is also an intoxication that comes in the wake of all great desires, all strong affects; an intoxication of the festival, the contest, of the *bravura* performance, of victory, of all extreme movement; the intoxication of cruelty; intoxication in destruction….finally there is the intoxication of the will, the intoxication of the glutted and swollen will… The essential thing about intoxication is the feeling of fullness and increasing strength.\(^{138}\)

In this list, Nietzsche does indeed say that sexual excitement is the ‘most original form of intoxication’ but this does not mean that all other forms are offspring of this primal instinct. For instance, the intoxication of cruelty and destruction seem derivative of an aggressive drive. It is key to bear in mind that Nietzsche describes a plurality of drives that manifest themselves in this state of intoxication. Furthermore, his portrayal of the self involves at very least a handful of drives at work.

\(^{136}\) For instance, ‘philosopher who is perhaps himself a storm pregnant with new lightnings’. BGE, 292 or ‘that the continuous development of art is bound up with the *Apollonian* and *Dionysian* duality – just as procreation depends on the duality of the sexes…(BT, 1; GS, Preface 3)

\(^{137}\) Moore (2002), 106. He adds that ‘the direction of [Nietzsche’s] thought tends more consistently and obsessively towards a reductive biologism’(87-88).

Moore goes on further by stating that Nietzsche maintains his view on creativity’s sexual origins throughout his work by linking his treatment of the Dionysian type in his early and mature work. He explains that, “the biological relationship between beauty and reproduction is a clear example of the continuity of his thought.”  

In respect to the Dionysian theme, no mention of it occurs until fifteen years after *The Birth of Tragedy*. And more importantly, Nietzsche’s late discussion of Dionysus and its treatment of intoxication, ‘rausch’ is quite distinct from his earlier portrayal of Dionysus. The mature form of Dionysian intoxication is rendered in a much looser fashion whereby “the entire system of affects is excited and intensified: so that it discharges all its modes of expression at once, releasing the force of presentation, imitation, transfiguration, transformation, and all types of mimicry and play acting, all at the same time.” This Dionysian type of intoxication allows for the operation of a wide variety of affects rather than a tapping into a single sex drive. And furthermore, this intoxication involves a transformative process of the self in comparison to the earlier Dionysian state in which one overcomes his/her individual sense of self and becomes at one with the world. So Moore’s reductive tendency of limiting the aesthetic experience to a sex drive or procreative instinct seems inconsistent with intoxication’s vast affective dimensions. Under certain circumstances, a creative drive may indeed generate from the sex drive. However, Nietzsche does not confine all creative endeavours to be founded on the sex drive. In much of his exegesis on the creative process, Nietzsche aims to reveal just how anchored human nature is in its affective propensity. A more cogent reading of the ‘physiological precondition’ would maintain that art is preconditioned by the state of intoxication in so far as intoxication is understood to involve an intense affective state.

Moore interprets Nietzsche as cultivating a form of ‘physiological aesthetics’ that is based on two claims from the *Nachlass*:

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139 Moore (2002), 105.
140 Moore asserts that Nietzsche resurrects the same concept that art requires a physiological precondition of intoxication that he had introduced in the first (BT). Also, Young and Ridley provide insightful discussions on the distinguishing features of the Dionysian type exemplified in *Twilight of the Idols* from the one in *The Birth of Tragedy*.
142 Nietzsche’s earlier conception of Dionysian shows an espousal of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics through which one overcomes the limitations set by the *principium individuations* and returns to a state of the universal will or what Nietzsche calls a ‘primordial unity’ (BT, 1).
1. ‘that aesthetic values rest upon biological values;’

But is Nietzsche’s goal to formulate a physiological aesthetics in and of itself? It seems that Nietzsche does not intend to argue that aesthetic values are literally grounded on biological values. Rather he seems to point out the similar life-enhancing features that can be teased out in both physiological and aesthetic contexts.

This may be discerned if we turn to his second claim:

2. ‘that aesthetic feelings of well-being are biological feelings of well-being’

Moore interprets this claim in a reductive manner by asserting that Nietzsche identifies an aesthetic value judgment to be biological. Even if this state of well-being (Wohlgefühl) may involve an excitation on a cellular level, there was no way of proving this nor does it really matter to Nietzsche. First and foremost, Nietzsche’s aim involves uncovering our affective propensity and how it becomes detrimental if sufficiently repressed and how it becomes beneficial if allowed to flourish. So Nietzsche focuses on both physiology and aesthetics in order to flesh out their similar life-enhancing and life-negating attributes. I will expound on how Nietzsche accomplishes this task in the next section.

Let us now return to the first claim that Nietzsche makes, viz., ‘that aesthetic values rest upon biological values.’ A biological value according to Nietzsche is described as whatever may be ‘useful, beneficial, life-enhancing.’

Moore contends that the will to power is at play here in that beauty equates to a life-enhancing feature; and ugliness is merely what is detrimental to life. I agree with him that this life-enhancing feature is indeed conducive to the notion of will to power. However, we differ on Nietzsche’s alleged claim that an aesthetic feeling may be reduced and singled out as purely biological. Nietzsche may be making an overstatement here in that both aesthetic values and the biological values may contribute to a state of well-being but not all aesthetic values are beneficial in the strict sense. For instance, if one visits the statue of Michelangelo’s David, one would probably not find it valuable in a biological sense. It seems more plausible to say that the enhancement we get from experiencing works of art involves the way in which they move us. So our appreciation for works of art seems to be couched in our affective propensity. The

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143 Nachlass, 3,16 {75}.
144 Ibid., 3,16 {75}.
145 The fact that Moore relies heavily on the Nachlass for textual evidence further weakens his argument.
146 Nachlass., 2, 10 {167}
following claim would appear more consistent with the Nietzschean corpus: ‘that aesthetic values rest upon affective values’.

2. The Role of the Sex Drive

I would like to address three points concerning Nietzsche’s treatment of the sex drive. The first two involve what Nietzsche seeks to accomplish rhetorically while the third point focuses on the deeper meaning that lies behind his references to sexuality. First, he seeks to shock us by overemphasizing the extent to which ‘sexuality’ is rooted in our behavior. This shock value enables Nietzsche to destabilize his audience by ascribing the extreme opposite of what society’s current view of sexuality is and thus instigates an introspection of not so much sexuality, tout court, but our evaluation of drives and affects in general. In the case of our artistic experience, he seeks to reclaim art’s affective groundings that have been overlooked in both Kant and Schopenhauer’s aesthetics. Secondly, Nietzsche contextualizes the sex drive within a historical framework. As aforementioned, Nietzsche articulates sexuality as a basic and/or primal instinct by calling it ‘the most ancient and original form of intoxication.’

Nietzsche places sexuality in a historical backdrop so as to remind us of our primal nature just as he reminds us of our cruel instincts in the second essay of The Genealogy of Morals. He harkens us back to our distant past where instinct once ruled and reason had not even dawned yet. The implications of such a historic stratagem are difficult to pin down because the precise extent of a sex drive’s force appears ambivalent. Is Nietzsche reminding us of whom we once were in order for us to embrace this primal part of ourselves? Or is the modern self just so much more complex of a persona that the sex drive has been overshadowed by the force of other more modern drives? Nietzsche introduces this notion of ‘second nature’ that humans acquire at the inception of culture making the task of solely expressing our primal drives impossible. He also unmistakably condemns any form of atavistic behavior. So on one hand, Nietzsche’s gesture towards our primordial self allows us to recognize our ‘animality’ – so to speak. And on the other hand, it remains unclear just how these primal instincts are to be used since he localizes it at the dawn of human history. Nietzsche remains elusive as to whether he considers the sex drive to be buried away in our most primal part of the self or that it still may have a

147 TI, Skirmishes of an Untimely Man, 8.
substantial influence on one’s creative enterprise. I would like to suggest that Nietzsche intentionally historically contextualizes the sex drive in order to contrast it to its current repressive state due to the scorn cast upon it by Judeo-Christian morality. 148

This leads me to address the third and final point, which I introduced earlier on, namely that Nietzsche’s reference to sexuality is a way to encourage the recognition and the use of our affective propensity. When Nietzsche alludes to sexuality and procreation and uses this sensualized language he seeks to communicate the sheer vigor of our drives and affects. Nietzsche highly valorizes a state of fullness or overflowing feeling that can be contrasted with his disapproval of an impoverished and frustrated affective state. He thus holds a prescriptive stance on a more general level by promoting the flourishing of our drives and affects. 149

Nietzsche’s treatment of beauty is similar to his treatment of artistry in general, that is to say it invokes a model upon which one can psychologically enhance him/herself. Moreover, Nietzsche sets up an analogy between the ‘interest’ triggered by a work of art’s beauty and the ‘interested’ attitude that one may adopt towards life in general. 150 Turning to the passage of *Twilight of the Idols*, in which he states “[n]othing is beautiful, only people are beautiful: all aesthetics is based on this naïveté, this is the first truth. Let us immediately add its second: the only thing ugly is a degenerating person, – this defines the realm of aesthetic judgment. – Physiologically, everything ugly weakens and depresses people. It reminds them of decay, danger, deadly stupors; it actually drains them of strength.”151 And to make this claim all the more interesting Nietzsche weaves in another metaphor dressed up in physicianary rhetoric aligning beauty with health and ugliness with sickness. One could easily interpret Nietzsche to be singling out the biological nature of the sexual instinct with an artistic practice at this point. I, however, pose the question: does Nietzsche confine his claim to a physiological dimension here? If we turn to the conclusion of this passage we can grasp Nietzsche’s driving point to be centered on

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148 John Richardson introduces an interesting quotation from WP, 312 “In the same way sexual love [has been refined] to amour-passion; the slavish disposition as Christian obedience.”
149 Ken Gemes brings to our attention Nietzsche’s quote on the affects: “Overcoming the affects? No, if that means their weakening and annihilation. But instead employing them; which may mean a long tyrannizing of them...At last they are confidently given freedom again: they love us as good servants and happily go wherever our best interests lie” (KSA, 12:39).
stressing the utter depth of our unconscious activity which involves the inner workings of our drives and affects. In describing ugliness as a symbol of hatred, he explains that people, “hate out of the deepest instinct of their species….it is the most profound hatred there is. Art is profound for the sake of this hatred…” So it seems that both aesthetic properties of beauty and ugliness as well as physiological effects of health and sickness are to be understood as symptoms of a more profound psychological state. In other words, these dichotomies of beauty/ugliness and health/sickness are meant to reveal our valuations as either life-enhancing or life-negating.

Nietzsche fleshes out just how the value judgment of beauty exhibits life-enhancing attributes over the next four sections. He delves into the polemic of l’art pour l’art and art’s affective history whilst militating against Kant and Schopenhauer along the way. Nietzsche particularly repudiates Schopenhauer’s postulation that art is able to give one a momentary respite in the will’s perpetual blind striving. He criticises Schopenhauer for his “ingenious attempt to use the great self-affirmation of the ‘will to life’, the exuberant forms of life, in the service of their opposite, a nihilistic, total depreciation of the value of life.” This further supports the claim that Nietzsche seeks to diagnose our deeper psychological valuations as either life affirming or life negating. If we skip to the next section, he develops this line of thought further in a mocking tone, “[Schopenhauer] thinks that the drive to procreate is negated by beauty…Bizarre saint! Someone is contradicting you, and I am afraid it is nature. Why are the tones, colours, smells, and rhythmic movements of nature beautiful in the first place?” Before turning to Nietzsche’s answer, I would like to take a step back for a moment to consider the larger context behind his attack on Schopenhauer’s aesthetics. He maintains that Schopenhauer adheres to this Christian ideal advocating a “[h]atred of ‘the world,’ condemnations of the passions, fear of beauty and sensuality, a beyond invented the better to slander this life, at bottom a craving for nothing, for the end, for respite…as the most dangerous and uncanny form

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152 Ibid, 20.
153 Although this language is suggestive the will to power, for the sake of this particular argument against a biological reading of the sex drive and/or procreation I do not think addressing the notion of will to power to be necessary here.
154 TI, Skirmishes of an Untimely Man, 21.
155 I am using Janaway’s translation of ‘Willens zum Leben’ as ‘will to life’ rather than ‘will to live’.
156 TI, Skirmishes of an Untimely Man, 22.
of all possible forms of a ‘will to decline’ – at the very least a sign of abysmal sickness, weariness, discouragement, exhaustion, and the impoverishment of life.”

Nietzsche’s critique of Schopenhauer’s aesthetics is part of his wider attack on the Judeo-Christian morality that is to blame for modernity’s course towards a dire state of nihilism. So Nietzsche aims to uncover our life-negating values behind this physicianary and aesthetic rhetoric. His motivation at the base of this project is to reveal our tendency to deaden the will, overcome our sickly state and to promote a ‘will to life’ that requires both a recognition and espousal our affective propensity.

And now to return to the question: ‘why does the perceptible world appear beautiful in the first place?’ Nietzsche cites Plato with the answer that, “all beauty is a temptation to procreate.” He explains that Plato advanced a view that *eros* is at the origin of all creative activity – philosophy included. It seems that Nietzsche may have intentionally exaggerated Plato’s claims or somewhat misinterprets him here on three accounts. First, it seems that the overall claim that Plato puts forth is that a love for knowledge is superior to erotic love because of the immortal esteem one attains for his philosophical feats. And secondly, even if Plato does concede that Eros does manifest on a physical level, the sexual aspect gets overtaken and transformed into ‘love of wisdom,’ through a process of sublimation or idealization. Diotima describes how one attains true ‘Beauty’ by redirecting sexual desire to love of wisdom. Contrarily to Nietzsche’s reading that Greek philosophizing involves both a physical and intellectual form of *eros*, it appears that Plato places a higher value the later. So the erotic factor seems to slip out of the equation in its maturation to a love for wisdom. The critical point that Nietzsche seeks to emphasize entails the Greeks’ desire or interested approach which is redirected to an intellectual aim. Nietzsche is right to highlight the forceful affects that the Greeks infused into their philosophical

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157 AC, 5.
158 TI, Skirmishes of an Untimely Man, 22.
159 Nietzsche refers to Plato’s *Symposium* 206 – 219.
160 Although I address the process of sublimation later on in the paper it may be helpful to bear in mind that the sex drive is overtaken and redirected by a stronger intellectual drive but it is able to discharge its energy nonetheless through an outward expression of the intellectual drive. John Richardson’s input on the self-overcoming aspect of sublimation is helpful here: ‘They aim at ends, but not so as to dissolve or release their own tensed effort by a full and lasting accomplishment of these ends; nor do they aim just to continue themselves. Rather, each such activity pattern wills its own ‘self-overcoming’: it wills to rise toward a new and higher level of effort – perhaps indeed a level at which its internal ends are also overcome and replaced by descendants – one that will then have to be overcome in turn. (Richardson (1996), 25 –6).
161 Nehamas (1989), 214c – 222c.
practice. In *Beyond Good and Evil*, he highlights the importance of our affective dispositions: “[i]n the end one loves one’s desire and not what is desired.”

Nietzsche does not so much valorize ancient Greek sexuality tout court but the continuity of a strong desire that is redirected towards the ‘love’ of wisdom. It seems then that Nietzsche is not literally claiming that a sexual instinct is at play in each and every creative endeavor.

Nietzsche concludes the passage by claiming that French literature and culture “also grew on the ground of sexual interest.” Here Nietzsche is yet again contextualizing sexual interest at the initial phase of a creative enterprise. Just as he earlier localized the sexual instinct within a historical framework, Nietzsche seems to articulate sexuality as a primal instinct. He is not suggesting that we act retroactively and harness this instinct in its basic and most ancient form. Nietzsche refers to the sexual instinct metaphorically to express just how profound the self is on an unconscious level ranging from our instincts and affects to our drives and desires. If we had to rephrase Nietzsche’s conclusion to correspond to the modern self, we could say ‘In order for an individual to flourish he/she needs to take on an ‘interested’ attitude towards life.’ Moreover, by highlighting the importance of *eros* which has been denigrated over nearly the last two millennia, Nietzsche hopes for a renewed respect not for ‘sexuality’ but for its strong affective quality and its relation to our sensorial mode of being. So Nietzsche uses beauty as a tool that serves to seduce us back to life – so to speak. Beauty acts as an impetus for the revaluation of the senses with which we can appreciate to hear the tones, see the colours, smell the smells, and feel the rhythmic movements. Nietzsche’s use of the aesthetic metaphor invites us to phenomenologically experience life as we experience a work of art, on both a sensory and affective level. I would like to conclude with a passage in which Nietzsche extols the arts for their affective underpinnings: He asks “[i]s the artist’s most basic instinct bound up with art, or is it bound up much more intimately with *life*, which is the meaning of art? Isn’t it bound up with the *desirability* of *life*? - Art is the great stimulus to life: how could art be understood as purposeless, pointless, l’art pour l’art?”

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162 *BGE*, 175.
163 *We should bear in mind the vast significance of the Greek word ‘Eros.’ It is not limited to the modern sense of the word eroticism but can manifest on an emotional and cognitive level as well.*
164 *TI, Skirmishes of an Untimely Man*, 20.
165 Ibid.
The question of whether the sex drive is at the origin of a vast array of creative activities is not what Nietzsche is addressing. I have attempted to show how Moore’s reductive account of Nietzsche’s allusions to creation and procreation seems overly constrictive. I have suggested that Nietzsche’s references to sexual instinct serve as a vehicular means to express our affective propensity. He seems to use physiology and aesthetics metaphorically to distinguish life-negating values from life-affirming ones. He also seeks to unearth the interested approach invoked by a sexual desire as a way to counter both Schopenhauer and Kant’s ‘disinterested’ approach to art and his charge against Judeo-Christian morality. Consequently, Nietzsche encourages a renewed appreciation for our affective propensity that leads to the flourishing of genuine selfhood.

3. The Aggressive Drive

I now shall address the role of the cruel instinct as it develops in modernity and how it functions in sublimated form. On one hand, Nietzsche uses cruelty’s negative connotations to destabilize our moral groundings by exhibiting our cruel origins. Simultaneously, he also attributes a positive aspect to our cruel instinct when suffering is understood as a state that stimulates its own overcoming. In the first section, I look at how Nietzsche uses the cruel instinct as a further manifestation of one’s will to power. Then, I focus on how it develops into a detrimental tool of self-infliction with the rise of the slave revolt and the emergence of ressentiment, guilt and ‘bad conscience’. I also analyse the similarities between internalization and the Freudian concept of repression. I then address the topic of sublimation that may serve as a therapeutic mechanism by which one can effectively counter the ills of internalization, and moreover, militate against Judeo-Christian morality. Finally, I focus on the role of the tragic artist whereby Nietzsche seems to cultivate warlike figure that encapsulates the sublimation of one’s aggressive drive.

i. The Aggressive Drive in On the Genealogy of Morals

In this section, I shall look at why and how Nietzsche introduces the cruel instinct in On the Genealogy of Morals. His main goal is to debunk our Judeo-Christian morality by pointing out that our notion of good was built on cruel foundations. Nietzsche’s narrative of the origins of guilt is meant to undermine the very foundations on which it rests. That is to say, Nietzsche aims to show us the
senselessness of such a feeling that bears no substantial weight due to its deceptive nature. Nietzsche maintains guilt to be rooted in a sense of indebtedness to our ancestors just as a debtor owes money to his creditor.

But why does Nietzsche seek to paint such a violently sordid portrait of man’s origins? For one, he intentionally exaggerates the manifestation of cruelty so as to shock us and destabilize our moral bearings.\(^\text{166}\) This affective stratagem achieved through Nietzsche’s rhetorical manipulation spurs us to question our Judeo-Christian morality that is anchored on the feeling of guilt. But in addition to this explanation, it seems that Nietzsche also wishes to explain that our ‘will to power’ does indeed manifest into some form of cruelty.\(^\text{167}\) One must be careful to make the distinction between the outward cruelty depicted at earlier stages in history and its modern derivative. Nietzsche is not advocating a return to our past tendencies that would encompass a natural physical and outward manifestation of the aggressive drive. He rather seems to embrace the modern self’s capacity to internalize this aggression and hopes for a more positive way of channeling it.\(^\text{168}\) Regarding the slave’s tendency for ressentiment, Nietzsche praises his creativity in making up new values and calls ressentiment the slave’s “first creative deed.”\(^\text{169}\) Now, in regards to the connection between our cruel instinct and our fundamental drive to ‘will to power,’ whether cruelty is expressed outwardly onto others or internally through self-infliction by the means of guilt, Nietzsche explains these instances as means of asserting power over others or over our own selves. Let us turn to a passage in which Nietzsche describes how cruelty and pain are exercised in the contractual relationship amongst people. He explains that,

the debtor made a contract with the creditor and pledged that if he should fail to repay he would substitute something else that he ‘possessed,’ something he had control over; for example, his body, his wife, his freedom, or even his life.

\(^{166}\) Chris Janaway provides a thorough discussion on this account in Chapter six, ‘Good and Evil’ in his book, Beyond Selflessness: Reading Nietzsche’s Genealogy. I would also like to add that although Nietzsche does give an exaggerated account of cruelty, this does not discount its existence and its continual manifestations throughout history up to the present day.

\(^{167}\) My treatment of ‘will to power’ here focuses on its development and manifestation in conjunction with the cruel instinct. My own view concerning ‘will to power’ tends to be on a similar footing with Clark’s theory that Nietzsche is more interested in its activity on a psychological scale rather than it involving the domination over other people in society.

\(^{168}\) I shall address how Nietzsche explains the sublimation of aggressive drive in the last section of this chapter.

\(^{169}\) GM, I, 10.
(or, given certain religious presuppositions, even his bliss after death, the salvation of his soul, ultimately his peace in the grave.\textsuperscript{170}

The will to power rhetoric is expressed by the usage of such words as ‘possessed’ and ‘control.’ Nietzsche continues to convey a clearer picture of the will to power that manifests in terms of social status in the concluding words of this section: “This enjoyment will be the greater the lower the creditor stands in social order, and can easily appear to him as a most delicious morsel, indeed as a foretaste of higher rank.”\textsuperscript{171} And an even more compelling description exhibiting the ‘will to power’ of man’s contractual relationship surfaces as Nietzsche finds the origins of guilt to be embedded in,

the oldest and most primitive personal relationship, that between buyer and seller, creditor and debtor: it was here that one person first measured himself against another… Setting prices, determining values, contriving equivalences, exchanging - these preoccupied the earliest thinking of man to so great an extent that in a certain sense they constitute thinking as such.\textsuperscript{172}

The act of cruelty enacted upon the debtor by the creditor is bound and regulated by this contractual relationship that comes about naturally – so Nietzsche seems to claim – in human society. Once the terms of contract are left unfulfilled or are transgressed, the creditor becomes entitled to act cruelly and thereby becomes more powerful with this new entitlement whether this manifests on a physical and/or moral level (for instance the actual infliction of pain, or the debtor’s loss of freedom). As Nietzsche states above it is our human nature to compare, measure and valuate ourselves amongst others. He explains that this very tendency is what brought forth the contractual relationship in society as a means to regulate human behavior through putative measures. The ‘will to power’ may indeed manifest in the outward display of cruelty but its more substantive essence lies in our natural inclinations to measure and evaluate ourselves vis à vis another. Nietzsche illustrates the human self as a social creature that naturally measures him or herself to such a degree that it forms our very way of thinking. In other words, it is our reactive nature that forms our very conception of knowledge. From this basis our value standards are set and consequently determines our behavior.

\textsuperscript{170} Ibid., II, 5 (my italics).
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid., II, 5.
\textsuperscript{172} Ibid., II, 8.
If we turn to Nietzsche’s concluding thoughts on the sovereign individual we may envision how ‘will to power’ can function in a healthier more positive way. Nietzsche seems to be admiring the sovereign individual’s “proud awareness of the extraordinary privilege of responsibility, the consciousness of this rare freedom, this power over oneself and over fate, has in his case penetrated to the profoundest depths and become instinct. What will he call this dominating instinct, supposing he feels the need to give it a name? The answer is beyond a doubt, this sovereign man calls it his conscience.” If we compare the two different ‘types’ of person, one at the dawn of history and the sovereign individual, who serves as an ideal of the future, we can understand Nietzsche to be making two claims about the past and future self: a. that people of the past naturally behaved in this largely unconscious and inter-subjective mode of being, and b. that a few select people in the future may be able to control and channel their selves in a conscious manner so as to form their own individual set of values. In other words, the sovereign individual is no longer bound to contractual relationships with others but creates a contractual relationship within himself/herself through a sense of responsibility. In addition, he consciously realizes his/her freedom and asserts a ‘will to power’ over him/herself on both a psychological scale (i.e. the harnessing of drives) and through everyday life (i.e. actively influencing the events in life). So, the evaluating that comes so naturally to man, now zeroes in on a highly individual scale. It almost seems that the sovereign individual stands far and beyond the rest of his surroundings and society for that matter. He/she has grown into an ideal self and no longer requires the comparison, the evaluating of himself vis à vis others in order to thrive. The units of measurement, so to speak, have exceeded the normal standards and now take place on a unique and idiosyncratic scale. The “measuring” now occurs at both conscious and subconscious levels whereby one is able to consciously maneuver and control certain drives over other weaker ones.

ii. The Calamities of the Modern Self

I would now like to focus on the modern state of self which Nietzsche diagnoses as sick. Let us turn to the slave type’s feeling of ressentiment that Nietzsche sees as the catalyst of the slave revolt and as the precursor of guilt and ‘bad

\[173\] I interpret Nietzsche to be conveying the sovereign individual as a model of selfhood. 
\[174\] Ibid., II, 2.
conscience.’ The slave type creates this feeling of *ressentiment* out of a deep desire to acquire some form of power. As Nietzsche says in the First Treatise, “slave morality from the outset says ‘No’ to what is ‘outside,’ what is ‘different,’ what is ‘not itself’; No is its creative deed.”

The morality that develops out of the cornerstone of guilt proves to be incredibly detrimental to the modern self according to Nietzsche. Although he does admire the slave’s very capacity to create new values, he is adamant to express the negative repercussions that hinge on the very content of these values. The slave attributes ‘goodness’ to values which were previously looked down upon, such as weakness, commonness, humbleness, and attributes an ‘evil’ quality to values that were previously honoured such as strength, pride and courage. The crux of the problem lies in the extremely deceptive nature of these new valuations. In other words, Nietzsche aims to uncover Judeo-Christian morality’s very foundations to be nothing more than a pack of lies cleverly orchestrated by the slave type. From this feeling of *ressentiment* grew the full-blown feeling of guilt that the modern self harbours as if it were the most natural of feelings.

Another point I would like to address is the slave’s reactive nature. As Nietzsche says in the above quote, the slave says ‘No’ to what is outside, different, not itself. The slave does not act but re-acts against others in order to lift himself out of this ‘weaker’ social position. Although he succeeds in attaining power through these surreptitious means he continues to live, think, and be in this reactive and equally passive mode.

Finally, the crucial point I would like to raise in connection with the slave type is the internalization of the cruel instinct. Nietzsche does acknowledge the positive consequences of internalization such as the modern self’s depth but he does not shy away from voicing his critique and condemnation of its all too negative effects. He defines the concept of internalization by the following words:

All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly turn *inward* – that is what I call the *internalization* of man: thus it was that man first developed what was later called his “soul.” The entire two membranes, expanded and extended itself, acquired depth, breadth, and height, in the same measure as outward discharge was *inhibited*. Those fearful bulwarks with which the political organization protected itself against the old instincts of freedom –

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175 Ibid., II, 16. I would also like to point out how Nietzsche characterizes the slave type as a ‘No-sayer’ and his ideal types as ‘Yes-sayers’. This further supports the pessimistic turn in history brought upon with guilt and the whole of the Judeo-Christian morality and the affirmative stance that Nietzsche hopes that a select few may adopt through the revaluation of values.

176 Ibid., II, 16.
punishments belong among these bulwarks – brought about all that those instincts of wild, free, prowling man turned backward against man himself. Hostility, cruelty, joy in persecuting, in attacking, in change, in destruction – all turned against the possessors of such instincts: that is the origin of ‘bad conscience.’

This ornate description of how our primal instincts become frustrated and are inflicted upon ourselves serves as the explanans for Nietzsche’s severe diagnosis of the modern self. Nietzsche depicts a picturesque rendition of just how trapped the human condition is by describing the modern man as an “animal that rubbed itself against the bars of its cage as one tried to ‘tame’ it; this deprived creature, racked with homesickness for the wild, who had to turn himself into an adventure, a torture chamber, an uncertain and dangerous wilderness – this fool, this yearning and desperate prisoner became the inventor of the ‘bad conscience.’” The ‘animal in cage’ and prisoner analogies illustrate how detrimental internalization is according to Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s story of how the slave type contracted ressentiment, developing into guilt and culminating as ‘bad conscience,’ reveals the dysfunctional state of modern selfhood.

4. Internalization & Repression

I would now like to address internalization’s striking resemblance to the Freudian concept of repression. Repression can be described as a defense mechanism that keeps certain desires as well as painful experiences out of the conscious mind to remain in our unconscious. They may resurface as bizarre thoughts or under the state of intoxication. Psychoanalytic treatment provides the possibility of bringing such painful experiences to consciousness and correcting them through various techniques. Both Nietzsche and Freud maintain that this bottling up of our primary instincts and/or negative experiences is not healthy for our psyche and necessitates some form of therapeutic action in order for one to overcome this condition.

Repression functions in a similar manner to internalization in several respects. First, both involve the inhibition of an instinct’s attainment of its objective. As a consequence, they remain blocked in the unconscious. Although Nietzsche does not

177 Ibid.
178 Ibid.
180 In the next section, I shall address how Nietzsche may view sublimation as a therapeutic way of overcoming man’s repressive tendencies.
literally state that internalization causes the instincts to remain in the unconscious he
definitely alludes to it by saying, “for the most part they had to seek new and as it
were subterranean gratifications.” Freud not only overtly states that repression
involves instincts being blocked up into the unconscious but actually describes it in a
surprisingly similar fashion to Nietzsche’s internalization by saying,

What happens in [the individual] to render his desire for aggression
innocuous? Something very remarkable, which we should never have guessed
and which is nevertheless quite obvious. His aggressiveness is introjected,
internalized; it is, in point of fact, sent back to where it came from – that is, it
is directed towards his own ego. There it is taken over by a portion of the ego,
which sets itself over against the rest of the ego as super-ego, and which now,
in the form of ‘conscience’, is ready to put into action against the ego the same
harsh aggressiveness that the ego would have liked to satisfy upon other,
extraneous individuals.

Here Freud uses the same wording as Nietzsche, by employing the word
‘internalization,’ and goes as far as explaining that one displaces and redirects their
aggressive drives towards oneself instead of aiming it at another. In addition, one may
deduce that the fact that Freud explains that the individual would have ‘liked’ to
externalize upon another signifies that the individual is in a ‘weaker’ position in
which he/she may not express this aggression. Nietzsche describes a similar tension
between the conscious and the unconscious (or man’s subterranean impulses) as he
explains how man first develops this concept of the conscious rational mind by the
following words:

all at once all of their instincts were devalued and ‘disconnected.’ From now
on they were to go on foot and ‘carry themselves’ where [men] had previously
been carried by the water: a horrible heaviness lay upon them. They felt
awkward doing the simplest tasks; for this new, unfamiliar world they no
longer had their old leaders, the regulating drives that unconsciously guided
them safely – they were reduced to thinking, inferring, calculating, connecting
cause and effect, they unhappy one, reduced to their ‘consciousness,’ to their
poorest and most unerring organ. …and yet those old instincts had not all at
once ceased to make their demands…for the most part they had to seek new
and as it were subterranean gratifications.

Although he views the birth of consciousness with an air of disapproval, Nietzsche is
nonetheless describing how the self develops into a more complex and refined being.

181 GM.II, 16.
182 Freud (1961), 84.
183 GM.II, 16.
Here he does admit that there are certain positive aspects that came along with the rise of consciousness.

Both Nietzsche and Freud claim that this phenomenon arises due to socialization. Freud explains how civilization has impinged on our natural urge to satisfy our primal instincts by saying, “it is impossible to overlook the extent to which civilization is built up upon a renunciation of instinct, how much it presupposes precisely the non-satisfaction (by suppression, repression, or some other means?) of powerful instincts.” When a person’s desire or drive is repressed/internalized by the social standards one faces a trauma of sorts. So it seems that one develops repressive/internalizing tendencies as forms of a self-defense mechanism so as to live in accordance with the socially acceptable standards set by society. On the one hand, the individual is adapting to his/her social environment but simultaneously undergoes a substantial psychological shock if the instinct or drive is a strong one. According to Nietzsche, internalization also develops as a defensive mechanism for the slave type but becomes somewhat self-destructive for the modern individual because of the bad conscience that results from it. So the slave feels powerful because he/she exerts his/her cruel instinct onto oneself (making it a reactive mode of being). Freud describes a similar procedure going on as one represses certain instincts that accumulate to such a degree that what had originally been a defensive mechanism results in detrimental psychological symptoms. Along with the adaptation that occurs on a social level, one must suffer on an individual scale due to these repressed instincts.

In addition, Nietzsche and Freud describe this condition as a crucial contributing factor of one’s feeling of guilt. Freud explains that it is his intention to represent “the sense of guilt as the most important problem in the development of civilization and to show that the price we pay for our advance in civilization is a loss of happiness through the heightening of the sense of guilt.” And Nietzsche equally draws out a direct development from the feeling of ressentiment growing into ‘bad conscious’ and culminating into guilt.

Finally, Nietzsche and Freud adopt more than a mere descriptive stance in that they both believe that these conditions deserve some form of therapeutic treatment.

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184 Freud (1961), 52.
185 Ibid., 97. He adds, “then an instincutal trend undergoes repression, its libidinal elements are turned into symptoms, and its aggressive components into a sense of guilt.”
They voice the concern for such conditions and propose different ways of treating them, (the later taking on a more prescriptive stance involving a clinical approach). As stated above, repression is most suitably dealt with through the help of psychoanalysis whereby one may become aware of such powerful instincts and communicate them. Clearly, Freud’s approach comes from a much more clinical and empirical standpoint. Nietzsche, on the other hand, only gestures towards the possibility of reverting the noxious effects of internalization by finding a way of externalizing these suppressed instincts. And the means by which one can overcome the adverse effects of internalization are even more elusively hinted at.

Repression and internalization also differ in certain respects and I shall now point out their main distinguishing factors. As stated above Freud and Nietzsche address the problem from different standpoints: the former aiming at treating the problem of repression, whereas the later, maintaining a more diagnostic stance towards the problem of internalization. Nietzsche describes the individual as acquiring depth thanks to the process of internalization. He describes the development of the human psyche in a more extreme manner by saying that internalization is the seed of the development of the soul. Freud does not seem to go as far as Nietzsche in this respect but focuses rather on the general upshot of repression, i.e., the flourishing of culture.

Both Freud and Nietzsche note that repressed drives may resurface during states of intoxication, and Nietzsche emphasizes the positive effects that the state of intoxication may instantiate, namely as a way of successfully discharging one’s frustrated drives. Rather than a substance induced intoxication, Nietzsche states that a naturally induced state of ‘Rausch’ or intoxication may allow the unleashing of these drives in a healthy process of sublimation. This particular topic shall now be discussed in the following section.

Finally, the major difference is that Freud makes the emphasis that repression is linked to one’s libidinal instincts whereas Nietzsche allows for more flexibility

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186 One key factor to keep in mind is that throughout the Genealogy, Nietzsche aims to diagnose a condition whereas in his later works (especially that of TI), he is more vocal about expressing how one may possibly overcome one’s tendency to internalize drives.
187 I address sublimation as a therapeutic resource in the following section.
188 GM, II, 16. Although Nietzsche asserts conflicting views on the nature of the human soul, in this particular context he seems to consider under a positive light.
allowing for the repression of several primal instincts. Although Freud does address the aggressive drive especially in terms of the death drive Nietzsche expounds a great deal more on this particular topic.

5. Sublimation

Nietzsche’s notion of sublimation involves a transference of aims that allow the expression of a drive rather than its internalization. Nietzsche also seems to maintain that sublimation may be a possible therapeutic tool that may adequately reverse the ills of internalization. Although sublimation may indeed be used to yield unfavorable effects if it is used adequately, i.e. in a way that is conducive to the healthy externalization of one’s dominating instincts or drives, it may help redirect the process of internalization. Nietzsche refers to sublimation, or by the usage of the words ‘sublime’ or ‘sublimieren’, spiritualization, idealization, overcoming or ‘Aufhebung’ and or ‘Erhaben.’ It can be described as a way of channeling and/or redirecting certain instincts and drives that cannot be satisfied towards a different situation or activity in which they may achieve some positive externalization. For instance, the sports of wrestling or boxing may serve as an outlet for an aggressive drive just as dancing may allow the channeling of the sex drive. In *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche provides a definition of idealization as follows: “[t]his feeling makes us release ourselves onto things, we force them to accept us, we violate them – this process is called idealizing. We can get rid of a prejudice here: contrary to common belief, idealization does not consist in removing or weeding out things that are small and incidental. Much more decisive is our enormous drive to force out the main features so that everything else disappears in the process.”

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189 Ken Gemes also notes that for Nietzsche notion of desexualization is not so much an issue.
190 Such as the sublimation of sensual love into the Christian amour-passion (BGE, 289), that of the ascetic priest (GM, III).
191 For use of the word ‘Sublimieren’ see DB, 202; DB, 558; GS, 1; GS, 80; GS, 290; GS, 346; BGE, 202; BGE, 230; TI, 6, 19, and for usage of the word ‘Erhaben,’ see GS, 4; GS, 5; GS, 77; BGE, 172; BGE, 211.
192 In her paper, Maudemarie Clark actually claims that the pre-societal being first exhibits an aggressive drive which then developed into cruelty with the rise of society. Her presentation of the issue seems convincing and I would only add that Nietzsche aims to overcome this ‘cruel instinct’ held by the modern slave type and sublimates it into a more positive aggressive drive. But this is not a form of atavistic throw back on man’s primal origins but rather a kind of translating man back to nature with the historical inheritance intact.
193 *TI, Skirmishes of an Untimely Man*, 8.
externalize it by transferring it onto a thing or through an activity. Here Nietzsche is describing a quantitative condition based on the force of the drive. In connection to this point, Nietzsche specifies that the most powerful drives and affects ‘force’ their way out in such a way that the other drives and affects are consequently overshadowed. The second point that he makes establishes what sort of content is idealized, i.e. not minor or insignificant aspects of our character but rather an essential instinct or drive within us. In this instance, Nietzsche makes the distinction between minor and more significant drives. The later would entail the likes of the aggressive drive, the sex drive, and possibly even more primal drives such as one’s survival instincts that triggers the feeling of hunger. Upon comparison with the process of internalization and its symptoms of frustration and self-infliction, we may come to understand how idealization provides the platform upon which one may externalize his/her most powerful instincts and drives. This very releasing of ourselves into an activity or experience can assist one to overcome the psychological phenomenon of internalization and may prove to be conducive to the flourishing of oneself.

Interestingly enough, Ken Gemes points out similar factors in Freud’s treatment of repression. He explains that in Freud’s essay on repression the claim is made that “a drive has both an ‘ideational’ component and an energetic component, what Freud calls ‘a quota of affect.’” Gemes continues to elaborate that sublimation involves the channeling of the energetic component whilst the ideational component is of an entirely different nature.

A more elusive portrayal of sublimation is evoked in the passage, ‘One thing is needful,’ but once compared to the above citation from Twilight of the Idols, it seems to strike a resonating chord. As Nietzsche explains how one may ‘give’ style to one’s character, he says that

[h]ere a large mass of second nature has been removed – both times through long practice and daily work at it. Here the ugly that could not be removed is concealed: there it has been reinterpreted and made sublime. Much that is vague and resisted shaping has been saved and exploited for distant views; it is meant to beckon toward the far and immeasurable. In the end, when the work is finished, it becomes evident how the constraint of a single taste governed and formed everything large and small.\(^{195}\)

\(^{194}\) Gemes (2009), 8. This may indeed prove to be yet another striking point in common between Freud and Nietzsche which needs further looking into.

\(^{195}\) GS, 290.
Nietzsche does make direct reference to sublimation by stating that an ugly trait gets reinterpreted and made sublime. He seems to suggest that something unappealing of one’s character whether it be an instinct, a drive or an affect, may be interpreted differently so as to lose its unattractiveness and subsequently obtain an alluring quality. His use of the word sublime refers both to the aesthetic phenomenon whereby one feels overpowered and in awe of a particular object or experience. But this process of being ‘made sublime’ is suggestive of the actual process of sublimation in which something gets reinterpreted in such a way that transforms any negative attribute into something positive, something powerful. Furthermore, this transfer consists of a movement from an internal feeling towards an external manifestation that is furthermore confirmed and concretised by its very externalization. The process of sublimation also resonates with Nietzsche’s theory of becoming which plays an important role in reevaluating values and life affirmation.196

The main parallel between the two passages involves the movement of one forceful and singular ‘master’ drive and the reinterpretation or retreat of small and insignificant drives and affects. Whether the small and ugly aspects of one’s character are reinterpreted or left in the distant background of the self, these weaker drives may either assist the master drive or are to be left behind. One might wonder if they could potentially become internalized and thereby cause one to regress to repressive tendencies. This concern may be resolved if we keep in mind that these drives and affects are weak, small, ugly and therefore insignificant to one’s overall psychological wellbeing. The fact that there are a series of weaker (ugly) drives that are left in the background of our psychological makeup proves that not all drives must be consonant or co-opted by the master drive for one to become a higher individual. And finally, the crucial point that Nietzsche seeks to drive forward is that sublimation/idealization involves a forceful feeling or drive which is released, expressed and externalized and consequently asserts its single and unique governing status.197

I shall now address Ken Gemes’s understanding of Nietzsche’s account of repression and sublimation. He distinguishes repression from sublimation by explaining that “[r]epression is what happens when a drive is denied its immediate aim and is then split off from other drives in the sense that its aims are not integrated.

196 Further discussion of the process of becoming in detail in the next section, ‘From Tragic Artist to Tragic Philosopher’.
197 I address how self-consciousness functions in Nietzsche’s model of genuine selfhood in Chapter III.
with the aims of other drives and it must battle, often unsuccessfully, for any opportunity to achieve expression. [And s]ublimation is what happens when a drive’s primary aim is substituted for by a secondary aim that allows for expression of the drive in a manner consonant with the master drive.”

One concern that arises from Gemes’s description of repression that a ‘drive is split off from other drives…that are not integrated with the aims of other drives.’ This would imply that a drive is sectored off from a well-maintained group of other drives. The pre-socialized self does indeed have a more integrated selection of drives but they are few in number and in such a simplified state that the issue of integration required at this elementary stage of the self does not appear to be problematic. In respect to the modern self – which I am assuming is precisely the state of the self which Gemes is addressing – Nietzsche does indeed regard one as sick due to the disintegration of his drives. Hence, one’s multiple and variegated drives are not settled in a unified or integrated fashion but rather are in need of a certain integration.

This leads me to my main question: why and how does Gemes interpret Nietzsche’s notion of sublimation (or sublimierung), overcoming (or aufhebung,) as possessing this unifying property? Gemes places a significant emphasis on this very unifying or gelling force of sublimation by which the master drive integrates all the drives together in a successful manner.

If the process of sublimation were to hold this unifying property, Gemes would then overcome the problem of having to concede that some form of agential force plays a role in the cooption of drives and instincts. Gemes states that “[f]or Nietzsche there is no ego that rejects and thus in some sense faces – to reject X is to be aware of the X-impulses it cannot face.” Without minimal conscious participation, how could one plausibly maintain the rigour, this strictness and controlling qualities with which the master drive co-opts ones numerous and variegated weaker drives?

Let us for a moment look further into the problem of unification. Gemes criticises both Freud and the post-Freudians for their insufficient explanation of

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198 Gemes (2009), 14.
199 Ibid., 19.
200 ‘Much that is vague and resisted shaping has been saved and exploited for distant views’ (GS, 290). So, some character traits or weaker drives may remain at odds with the rest of one’s drives. But even more importantly Nietzsche requires for a certain amount of consciousness or self-awareness in order for the higher individual to overcome the Judeo-Christian morality.
unification. However, it seems to be that apart from the notion of a master drive orchestrating the equilibrium of one’s multiple drives, Nietzsche also provides us with quite a foggy sketch of what exactly unification signifies. Gemes says that “[w]hat is missing from these post-Freudian accounts of sublimation as integration or unification, or a higher level of organization, is an account of what exactly is meant by integration, unification or higher organization. Nietzsche’s account of a master drive with a determinate aim of realigning the aims of weaker drives, which support rather than conflict with the aim of the master drive, at least provides a start to such an account.”

How does the master drive function as a higher organization according to Gemes? To what extent does consonance play a role in the flourishing of the self? And to what extent must weaker drives lose their ‘ideational’ content in order to be co-opted and function in harmony with the master drive? The problem of unification opens the doors to this ‘Pandora’s Box’ of questions. I do not assume that they need addressing whilst tackling this particular issue of sublimation however they do show how complex the relation between sublimation and unification proves to be. For instance, if we turn to the Leonardo da Vinci as an example both his scientific research and artistic creativity attained a level of excellence pretty much on par with one another. Could Leonardo da Vinci be proof of a self with two successful master drives? So the question arises whether Nietzsche would even consider that Leonardo’s repressed homosexuality necessarily played an integral part in his flourishing creative and scientific endeavors. In this particular example, it seems that Leonardo’s will to power was so abundant that he could both embrace his sexuality and excel in the arts and sciences. The unification and/or integration of our drives is indeed a necessary condition to becoming a greater being according to Nietzsche but I am not sure that it lies solely within the unconscious process of sublimation. And alongside the unification of one’s drives, a tension amongst a rich variety of drives is also necessary. Put in musical terms Nietzsche’s figure of a flourishing self evokes a

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201 Gemes (2009), 21. See fn. 10 where he does concede that not all uses of the term ‘sublimation’ connote the notion of united self however it seems crucial that most references to sublimation should convey this very idea.

202 I shall address my personal interpretation of how the master drive is not so much related to the particular content of a particular drive or interest but more how one uses his or her energy efficiently in order to actualize their drives and affects in a successful manner.

203 Apparently, Leonardo did not lead such a repressed homosexual life.
certain harmony on a general level whilst containing tension amongst various chords and musical lines.

6. From Tragic Artist to Tragic Philosopher

I would now like to turn to an example of how sublimation can transform the aggressive drive into positive ‘traits’ according to Nietzsche. In his treatment of the tragic artist in Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche seems to suggest that an aggressive drive is tapped into in order for this exemplar to become a full-fledged and affirmative self.

[Y]ou need to ask artists themselves. What is it about himself that the tragic artist communicates? Doesn’t he show his fearlessness in the face of the fearful and questionable? – This in itself is a highly desirable state; anyone who knows will pay it the highest honors. He communicates it, he has to communicate it, provided he is an artist, a genius of communication. The courage and freedom of affect in the face of a powerful enemy, in the face of a sublime hardship, in the face of a horrible problem – this victorious state is what the tragic artist selects, what he glorifies. The martial aspects of our soul celebrate their saturnalia in the face of tragedy; anyone who is used to suffering, anyone who goes looking for suffering, the heroic man praises his existence through tragedy, – the tragedian raises the drink of sweetest cruelty to him alone.204

If we compare the heroic portrait of the tragic artist to the modern self who habitually inflicts cruelty upon him/herself, we may infer that this frustrated self leads a life ridden with fear and that lacks freedom. Nietzsche often mentions that error is a form of cowardice and just about as frequently extols courage. Furthermore, he often refers to controlling one’s self with rigour and hardness. In later works, Nietzsche often refers to cruelty alongside these attributes of hardness, courage, pride and freedom.205 It seems that Nietzsche envisages an ideal under the guise of a warrior type who taps into the aggressive drive and channels it into hardness, courage and pride which are conducive to the flourishing of the self.

He uses the tragic artist’s relationship to ‘Tragedy,’ as a way to exemplify how a higher individual may relate to life – that is to say a life of suffering. But Nietzsche does not advocate suffering as such, but suffering in the sense of a creative struggle that stimulates one to thrive and flourish through the overcoming of

204 TI, Skirmishes of an Untimely Man, 24.
205 Z, 8; EH, Preface, 3; EH, Why I am so Wise, 7.
In other words, Nietzsche seeks to break our habit of self-infliction and advocates the honest approach towards our aggressive drive (i.e. its acceptance rather than its internalization), but he also proposes that we tap into it, redirect and channel it through the attributes of hardness, courage, pride and freedom. As one drops fear and takes up a courageous front, as one leaves behind a state of psychological imprisonment to a state of freedom, he/she extricates the antagonist from out of the self and into an existential challenge that awaits overcoming. Nietzsche describes the tragic artist as using the platform of ‘tragedy’ as a way in which one can release the aggressive drive in a beneficial manner. So the aggressive drive does not manifest itself in any acts of cruelty against others but manifests itself within this ‘grandiose project,’ so to speak, one that promises victory, one that involves the overcoming of this constant self-abasement, this cruel self-infliction and general state of pessimism. Sublimation, if used adequately, can revert the adverse effects of self-infliction by unleashing the aggressive drive to fuel these forceful warrior-like characteristics that promote the flourishing of selfhood.

Nietzsche elaborates on this precise topic of discussion involving the tragic art form and its beneficial aspects in *Ecce Homo* as follows:

[i]n *Twilight of the Idols* I discussed how this led me to discover the concept of the ‘tragic’ and finally come to understand the psychology of tragedy. ‘Saying yes to life, even in its strangest and harshest problems; the will to life rejoicing in its own inexhaustibility through the sacrifice of its highest types – that is what I called Dionysian, that is what I understood as the bridge to the psychology of the tragic poet. *Not* in order to escape fear and pity, *not* in order to cleanse yourself of a dangerous affect by violent discharge – as Aristotle mistakenly thought –: but instead, over and above all fear and pity, *in order for you yourself to be* the eternal joy in becoming, - *the joy that includes even the eternal joy in negating…’ In this sense, I have the right to understand myself as the first tragic philosopher – which is to say the most diametrically opposed antipode of a pessimistic philosopher. Nobody has ever turned the Dionysian into a philosophical pathos before: *tragic wisdom* was missing.

Nietzsche examines the concept of the tragic as an attempt to provide a way of affirming life that is compatible with living alongside pain and suffering. The appreciation of tragedy may appear paradoxical due to one’s enjoyment of an art form

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206 For more on this topic please see Bernard Reginster’s insightful discussion on the overcoming of suffering in Chapter Four of his book, *Life Affirmation*.

207 Nietzsche sets his readers up to the challenge of whether they are able to face a life of becoming or asking them how much truth they can handle.

208 *EH, Birth of Tragedy*, 3.
that involves characters that undergo terribly painful events. Nietzsche turns to this particular medium precisely because the conflicting emotions one experiences through tragedy serve as a parallel for the ethical dilemma of affirming a life that involves suffering. He suggests the resolution lies within the so-called ‘tragic wisdom,’ entailing the recognition that life is a constant state of becoming. When Nietzsche refers to the psychologically penetrating truth that both tragedy and ‘Dionysus,’ the tragic poet, reveal to us, he seems to be making the claim that understanding life as it truly is a necessary cognitive step to affirming it. Later in this very passage, Nietzsche explains that “[t]he affirmation of passing away and destruction that is crucial for a Dionysian philosophy, saying yes to opposition and war, becoming along with a radical rejection of the very concept of ‘being’ – all these are more closely related to me than with anything else people have thought so far.”

Tragedy serves as a metaphorical tool to illustrate how one can come to affirm life with the all its suffering. Just as one is able to obtain an aesthetic sense of pleasure from tragedy whilst at the same time feeling the pain and anguish that the characters must endure, so can Nietzsche’s ideal self affirm life whilst simultaneously facing the suffering that it involves. Let us now turn to two factors that require the active unleashing of the aggressive drive with regards to this state of ‘becoming’: 1. courage is required as a condition in order to live in this destabilizing and uncertain state of constant change; and 2. the necessary recognition that both productive and destructive processes generate from a state of becoming. From the point of view of the subject, one must have the courage to both face this ‘daunting’ truth and to live according to it. Concerning point 2., one’s recognition of destructive tendencies elicits the recognition and the use of one’s aggressive drive in order to attain these warrior-like qualities that further strengthen one’s self. And as aforementioned, the aggressive drive according to Nietzsche is tapped into and sublimated into forceful character traits that offer support in the acceptance of such a world view. Furthermore, it seems that it with this newly affirmed strength of character, one can have the necessary force to steer him/herself adequately through an existence of constant flux.

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209 EH, Birth of Tragedy, 3.
210 I would also like to suggest that aggressive drive may be some form of a precursor to the Freudian concept of the death drive. John Richardson’s lecture on Nietzsche’s focus on life in 07/08 has influenced my thoughts that both life, i.e. sex drive and death drive may be found in the Nietzschean corpus.
Another way in which Nietzsche weaves together the figure of the warrior type with that of the tragic artist involves the casting of this figure as a protagonist vis à vis the figure of the pessimistic self, whether he/she be a decadent artist or nihilistic philosopher. Nietzsche’s very method of philosophizing often displays a ‘for’ and ‘against.’ In other words, he frequently sets up dialectical relationships such as between different typologies (nobles & slaves, tragic and decadent artist), ontological theories (becoming and being), and world views (life affirmation and pessimism). For instance, in regards to the last example of a dialectic, Nietzsche states that “[k]nowledge, saying yes to reality, is just as necessary for the strong as cowardice and fleeing in the face of reality – which is to say ‘ideal’ – is for the weak, who are inspired by weakness…They are not free to know: decadents need lies, it is one of the conditions for their preservation. – Anyone who does not just understand the word ‘Dionysian’ but understands himself in the word ‘Dionysian’ does not need to refute Plato or Christianity or Schopenhauer – he smells the decay.” While discussing his work of the Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche admits that through the opposition of types like the Dionysian and Appollonian, “things never before confronted with each other are suddenly juxtaposed, used to clarify each other, and understood.” So in a way, Nietzsche has shifted from tragic artist to tragic philosopher in the sense that the tragic art form conveys a harsh yet profound truth about our existence. The tragic philosopher examines his very warrior-like attributes by proudly admitting, “I am warlike by nature. I have an instinct for attack. To be able to be an enemy, to be an enemy, perhaps that presupposes a strong nature, in any case it is part of every strong nature. Strong natures need resistance, that is why they look for resistance: an aggressive pathos is an essential component of strength in the same way that lingering feelings of revenge are an essential component of weakness.” Just as tragedy offers an affective tension, just as a life of becoming involves both productive and destructive processes, Nietzsche’s portrait of the higher individual channels aggression in order to thrive in life.

211 EH, Birth of Tragedy, 2.
212 Ibid.,1.
213 EH, Why I am so Wise, 7.
Chapter III
On Drives and Affects

In this chapter I shall explore Nietzsche’s account of drives and affects. I shall demonstrate that according to Nietzsche our affective tendencies play a crucial role for one to become a higher individual due to one’s ability to allow them to thrive through human expression. I continue by drawing out a comparative analysis of Spinoza and Nietzsche addressing their account of appetites/drives and affects, their ethical views and their ‘naturalistic’ approach. In the second section, I address Katsafanas’s view on Nietzsche’s account of the relationship between drives and affects. Nietzsche does indeed offer us an account on both the drives and the affects but does not offer to make a conclusive explanation of how they relate to one another within a psychological structure.

1. Nietzsche on Drives & Affects

I shall now provide a brief description of what drives signify to Nietzsche. A drive, ‘triebe,’ can be defined as an inclination towards a certain activity that develops in the unconscious seeking expression through action. A drive may equally signify an inclination, disposition and/or instinct. Nietzsche uses both the terms ‘drive’ and ‘instinct’ interchangeably. A drive may be described in two contexts: a. generally speaking, a drive always seeks growth, expression and a way in which it may discharge its strength; and b. in a particular context, a drive seeks to satisfy its own aim determining — a specific kind of activity. For instance, the act of eating satisfies the drive for hunger. Or if an individual feels the aggressive drive manifest itself one may express it through some form of violent action. Drives can be co-opted by other stronger drives which can then develop to become ‘master’ drives that guide a person to excel in a specific domain. Nietzsche advances the view that we have a complex set of drives that have developed over time. He often discusses how artistic creativity has generated out of the basic sex drive. He claims that the model of the

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214 In the previous chapter, I have addressed Nietzsche’s account of drives specifically focusing on the sex drive and aggressive drive. See sections 2 & 3.
215 GM, III 8, 9.
optimal self holds a vast number of drives because the strength of the master drive increases due to having overcome various weaker drives. As a drive grows in strength it involves perfecting itself in order to surpass other drives. So a drive’s power can increase both quantitatively as it co-opts the energy from different weaker drives and also qualitatively as it advances closer to perfection. Through the exploration of Nietzsche’s drive theory we may attain a better grasp of his view of the human psychological self as well as an insight into how to overcome the ailments that arise from the frustration of drives. Furthermore, this theory of drives ultimately reveals that our ethical groundings generate out of an individual’s idiosyncratic conglomeration of drives.

What is an ‘affect’ according to Nietzsche? We must take into consideration that an affect towards the end of the 19th century had a broader meaning than its present-day signification. Let us bear in mind that Nietzsche would clearly have been aware of its Latin etymology and its original significations of the Latin word ‘affectus’ which developed into the past participle ‘ad facere’ to instigate [from ad to + facere to do]. The word ‘affect’ signifies to act upon, to dispose, [and as a noun] constitution. It is also defined as ‘an inward disposition, feeling as contrasted of external manifestation or action, intent, intention.’ When defined within a psychological context, it is described as “the feeling antecedents of involuntary movements; as motives, including affects, are the inner acts of the will”. Nietzsche would have taken into account an affect bearing an emotional significance but also its connotation of having the power to instigate action. It is also defined as “1. to act upon or have an effect upon, to impress or influence; and 2. to touch or move emotionally. [In addition it may be conceived] as that which arouses emotion rather than cognition or thought and the resulting diffuse mental condition.” Nietzsche places great emphasis upon how our affective propensities shape our values and our ethical grounding in general. Affects influence our very actions in that we are either attracted or repelled from certain situations, objects and/or persons. It is important to bear in mind that Nietzsche values the way in which our affective dispositions directly relate to our actions as long as they are conducive to life-affirmation.

Let us now turn to a passage in which Nietzsche evokes the importance of the affects. In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche describes the various deleterious psychological contexts from which moralities have generated. He states,

\[\text{even apart from the value of such claims as ‘there is a categorical imperative in us,’ one can still always ask: what does such a claim tell us about the man who makes is? There are moralities which are meant to justify their creator before others. Other moralities are meant to calm him and lead him to be satisfied with himself. With yet others he wants to crucify himself and humiliate himself. With others he wants to wreak revenge, with others conceal himself, with others transfigure himself and place himself way up, at a distance. This morality is used by its creator to forget, that one to have others forget him or something about him. Some moralists, want to vent their power and creative whims on humanity; some others, perhaps including Kant, suggest with their morality: ‘What deserves respect in me is that I can obey – you ought not to be different from me.’ In short, moralities are also merely a sign language of the affects.}^{218}\]

In this passage, Nietzsche offers his diagnosis of morality and is especially critical of Kant’s morality. Nietzsche clearly aims to undermine morality’s high standing and shows that morality serves as a ‘sign language’ of our affects. Throughout his in-depth analysis Nietzsche reveals that various moral systems whether they are founded by Judeo-Christian and/or philosophical ideologies serve the purpose of satisfying the creators of such moralities. Furthermore, Nietzsche reveals how these moral systems develop from an array of individuals and their negative affective responses to life experiences. I shall provide an exegetical account of how Nietzsche demonstrates the affects’ central role in forging various moral constructs covering all the points listed in the above passage. Nietzsche classifies moralities as involving the means to: justify oneself, calm or satisfy oneself, humiliating oneself, allowing one to wreak revenge, hide oneself, transfiguring oneself, and/or vent one’s power.

First, Nietzsche introduces moralities ‘that are meant to justify their creator’ thereby providing him/her with an excuse for a particular stance or behavior. Then Nietzsche describes moralities has having a ‘calming effect’ which implies that the creator of such a moral standard seeks to subdue his/her agitated state. In his third description of morality he speaks of a creator that ‘seeks to crucify and humiliate himself’. In this instance, Nietzsche alludes to the Christianity and more specifically to the crucifixion of Christ. Nietzsche opposes a morality that praises humiliation.

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218 BGE, 187.
and self-abasing humility. Nietzsche continues by listing moralities that satisfy those who ‘wreak revenge,…conceal themselves, with those others that transfigure himself and place himself way up’. Here again, Nietzsche may be referring to Christianity, i.e. more specifically the First Testament’s moral stance of advocating revenge. Nietzsche moves onto describing a morality that serves to ‘conceal’ oneself which may be understood as a way to repress one’s negative affects in order to hold the appearance of propriety. He then mentions that one may use a morality to ‘transfigure’ oneself and place him/herself up high which denotes a way of asserting a form of superiority over others. Finally, Nietzsche criticises Kant’s categorical imperative stipulating that morality is founded on universal principals under which everyone ‘ought’ to adhere to. Furthermore, he opposes Kant’s moral theory in which an individual holds a sense of obligation to laws that are considered a priori. Nietzsche reveals to his readers the affective orientations and general psychological conditions of the individual behind the moralities they uphold. Such an individual is portrayed as harbouring negative affects that range from feeling wounded to seeking retribution and humiliating him/herself to venting his/her power on humanity. Ultimately, Nietzsche opposes moralities based on external ideologies and metaphysical structures by revealing they actually are cultivated from human affects and distinct life experiences.

Nietzsche argues that our ethical standards generate from our drives and affects. He characterises them as a sign language of the affects – a mode of expression much less clear than the written word – which represents our innermost affects. Our attractions or aversions to certain people, objects and circumstances cause us to value or disvalue them. These values that arise from the unconscious psychological self manifest through one’s actions. Rather than values coming from an outside authority be it a religious ideology or the Kantian ‘categorical imperative’, Nietzsche claims that our values arise from the subjective ‘I’ thereby allowing for a more comprehensive form of ethics founded on a conglomeration of an individual’s intrinsic and acquired values. So an affect resembles a drive in that it is a disposition that leads to an action. However, unlike a drive, an affect necessarily entails emotional states.

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219 GM, I 2, 17.
220 Kant (1997), 4: 421.
Nietzsche moves onto developing a naturalistic ethical theory that highlights the importance of the affects and all the meanwhile necessitates a firm structure. He states that every artist knows how far from any feeling of letting himself go his ‘most natural’ state is – the free ordering, placing, disposing, giving form in the moment of ‘inspiration’ – and how strictly and subtly he obeys thousandfold laws precisely then, laws that precisely on account of their hardness and determination defy all formulation through concepts….What is essential ‘in heaven and on earth’ seems to be, to say it once more, that there should be obedience over a long period of time and in a single direction: given that, something transfiguring, subtle, mad, and divine. The long unfreedom of the spirit, the mistrustful constraint in the communicability of thoughts, the discipline thinkers imposed on themselves to think within the directions laid down by a church or court, or under Aristotelian presuppositions, the long spiritual will to interpret all events under a Christian schema and to rediscover and justify the Christian god in every accident.221

Nietzsche offers his ethical outlook in which the model of the artist takes on a creative stance towards his/her affects. He illustrates the model of the artist as the counter-model of the philosopher as one who follows his/her own idiosyncratic laws that resist conceptualization. The artistic experience is not one of just completely free and haphazard actions but one that is determined by a ‘thousandfold laws’ which involve rigour, determination and commitment over a length of time. The model of the artist is described as involving a rigorous responsibility whereby he/she abides to these laws with ‘hardness and determination’ throughout a prolonged period of time.222 We must bear in mind that laws that the artist abides to do not come from an external form of authority – be it metaphysical or theological – but arise from within his own self. Nietzsche draws out a series of descriptions about this single direction that the artist must undertake: transfiguring, subtle, mad and divine. By ‘transfiguring’ he alludes to sublimation which is a key aesthetic process whereby an artist is able to channel certain drives into ever more valuable, more perfect manifestations. When Nietzsche evokes this model of the artist delving into his/her artistic activity ‘strictly and subtly,’ he seems to be referring to the aforementioned rigour involved in a creative endeavour. Regarding the later he seems to be referring to the discrete and lonely enterprise that the artist or the higher individual takes on in such an enterprise.

221 BGE, 188.
222 This is reminiscent of the sovereign individual’s task in GM II or that of the ‘free spirit’ evoked in GS, 347.
In the passage cited above he equally objects to a ‘laisser aller’ perspective of our moral standards. He adamantly advocates one’s own idiosyncratic collection of values that together coalesce to form one’s own ethical standard. This ties in with Nietzsche’s claim in the previous passage whereby he emphasizes the key role of our affects as the fundamental stuff upon which our ethics is formed. Nietzsche demonstrates the important role that affects hold within the psychological structure of the self and its influences upon our ethical perspectives.

2. Nietzsche & Spinoza

Spinoza and Nietzsche share parallel views on drives and affects, the psychological self as well as ethics. I shall provide a comparative study of Nietzsche and Spinoza’s theory of drives and conatus respectively, their treatment of the affects and their similar ethical outlook. Before exploring these topics, I would like to point out briefly that Nietzsche can appear to be quite critical of Spinoza. At times he may be misreading Spinoza and at others he diverges from Spinoza’s claims. He condemns Spinoza for his “laughing-no-more and weeping-no-more …, his so naively advocated destruction of the affects through their analysis and vivisection”. Spinoza’s deductive and rather scientific methodology does indeed provide quite a clinical portrayal of the affects. However, Spinoza does not aim to destroy the affects but aims to demonstrate their key role in human psychology. Nietzsche further admonishes Spinoza by inviting his readers to “consider the hocus-pocus power of mathematical form with which Spinoza clad his philosophy – really the ‘love of his wisdom,’ to render that word fairly and squarely – in mail and mask, to strike terror at the very outset into the heart of any assailant who should dare glance at that invincible maiden and Pallas Athena: how much personal timidity and vulnerability this masquerade of a sick hermit betrays!”.

Nietzsche contrasts this ‘hocus-pocus’ kind of philosopher with the type he truly extols: “[b]ut the genuine philosopher – as it seems to us, my friends? - lives ‘unphilosophically’ and ‘unwisely,’ above all

223 BGE, 187.
224 BGE, 198.
225 E, P9. David Wollenberg explains that this is probably a misreading of Spinoza but more importantly states that Nietzsche may not have read any of Spinoza’s primary texts. There is just proof that he has read Kuno Fischer’s book on Spinoza entitled ‘Geschichte der neuern Philosophie:Baruch Spinoza’.
226 BGE, 5.
imprudently, and feels the burden and the duty of a hundred attempts and temptations of life – he risks himself constantly, he plays the wicked game”. Nietzsche portrays this type of philosopher to be in tune with his/her emotions and affects whereby he ‘feels’ the duty as well as engages in the many opportunities that life has to offer. We may observe how he links the instrumental role the affects play in instigating actions that may involve risk taking. Aside from Nietzsche’s criticisms of Spinoza he admits in a letter to Overbeck, “I have a precursor and what a precursor!’ [He] found that ‘this abnormal and lonely thinker [Spinoza] had five points of affinity with him and they were both skeptical about free will, intentions, the world-order, altruism and evil. ‘My isolation, which how often made me gasp for breath, and lose blood, as if I were on a very high mountain, has at last become a solitude to be shared.’” Nietzsche appears ecstatic with his discovery of Spinoza and the beliefs they share causes Nietzsche to feel comforted at the prospect of being less secluded in his philosophical endeavours.

I shall begin by exploring Spinoza’s account of conatus. First and foremost, just as the conatus is a seminal part of Spinoza’s theory of human psyche and structure of the self, Nietzsche’s drive theory is a fundamental cornerstone to his conception of the psychological structure of the self. I would like to demonstrate how Nietzsche subscribes to as well as refines some key aspects of Spinoza’s conatus. Spinoza introduces the notion of conatus in Part Three of his Ethics through defining it as “a thing ‘endeavours, as far as it can and is itself to persevere in its being’. Spinoza underlines the centrality of conatus by stating, “the endeavour by which each thing endeavours to persevere in its being is nothing other than the actual essence of the thing.” He further expands on the definition of conatus by saying “[f]rom the given essence of each thing, certain things necessarily follow, nor can things do anything other than that which necessarily follows.” Here, Spinoza describes how the essence of a thing’s conatus involves a singular pull that necessarily develops towards its existence. Conatus may manifest through human and nonhuman activity. For instance, an individual’s hunger causes one to seek food in order to satisfy a basic desire which sustains one’s livelihood. Nietzsche would also be in accord in that

227 BGE, 205.
228 Hayman (1980).
229 E, 3P6.
230 Ibid., 3P7.
231 Ibid., 3P7D.
one’s basic survival instinct necessarily propels one to seek food. These endeavours naturally persevere and can only be overcome or circumvented by an external cause. Spinoza explains that, “[w]hilst… we attend to the thing itself alone, but not to external causes, we shall be able to find nothing in it which can destroy it.”

Spinoza’s theory of conatus is an all-encompassing descriptive theory covering the entirety of natural phenomena whether it can manifest as a stone’s essential defining features like its mass which affects its gravitational force to human appetites like that of hunger that affects one’s ability to survive. So each ‘thing’ naturally endeavours and thrives in its existence similarly to a Nietzschean ‘will to live’.

Nietzsche does appear to have taken into account Spinoza’s portrayal of conatus but solely within human psychological and ethical contexts. Nietzsche places more emphasis on a drive’s active behavior that seeks fulfillment and expression. A drive according to Nietzsche will not override itself but is only susceptible to be overcome by another stronger drive. Withstanding that Spinoza’s fundamental theory of conatus takes on a much more vast and metaphysical worldview, I am advancing the claim that Nietzsche’s drive theory holds parallels with Spinoza’s theory on conatus in so far as it relates to the psychological and ethical realms.

I shall now explore the relation between conatus and power according to Spinoza in order to show its parallels with Nietzsche’s notion of power within his drive theory. Spinoza places great emphasis on the role of power within the functioning of conatus. Spinoza says, “[s]o the power, i.e. the endeavour, of each thing by which, either alone or with others, if either acts or endeavours to act – this is the power, i.e. the endeavour, by which it strives to persevere in its being – is nothing other than the given, i.e. the actual, essence of the thing.”

He defines power as an endeavour to persevere in its being. Aurelia Armstrong explains how both Spinoza and Nietzsche share a similar conception of power. She states that “[i]t is because the essence of natural individuals is potentia agendi et patiendi that human power is expressed as conatus, that is, as the inherent striving of the individual for self-maintenance, expansion, and growth through exchanges with an environment”.

Nietzsche’s notion of power mirrors Spinoza’s in that they both describe human

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232 E, P4D.
233 Spinoza appears as a harbinger with the active characteristics in his theory of conatus when we look forwards Darwin’s focus of preservation and adaptation in his theory of evolution.
234 E, 3P7.
nature’s innate tendency to persevere, grow and thrive. Spinoza’s conception of perseverance does not mean that an endeavour maintains a static condition but rather involves a continually striving force. Armstrong also claims that power according to Spinoza instigates action. She states that “[t]his vital interplay between our capacity to act and be acted on, to affect and be affected, is one of the most strikingly original aspects of Spinoza’s ethics. For Spinoza, our receptivity, or openness to what can affect us, both leaves us vulnerable to those passions that undermine the striving for self-determination and increases our power of acting”. 236 Armstrong demonstrates that it is the very power of our affects that instigates us to act out these affects towards somebody or something. Furthermore, Spinoza and Nietzsche view power as functioning quantitatively to propel one to either a life negating or life affirming action.

Michael LeBuffe offers an interesting distinction between one’s desires and the power with which “[t]he intensity of desire…suggests, is something like urgency, or perhaps the degree to which I devote myself to attaining a desired end; the degree of power I have, however, is my ability to persevere.” 237 So LeBuffe is advancing the view that on one hand power is not directly part of one’s conatus or desire but rather something that adds to the desire enabling one’s ability to persevere. A crucial aspect to bear in mind involves Spinoza’s consideration that the affect of joy or sadness cause our power to increase or decrease. He claims that “pleasure or pain are passions by which the power, i.e. the endeavour, of each thing to persevere in its being is increased or diminished”. 238 As LeBuffe indicates joy and sadness are related to desire but not to be conceived as part of desire itself. 239 In this instance, Spinoza’s view of human psychology mirrors Nietzsche’s notwithstanding the effect that the emotions like those of joy and sadness have upon an endeavour or a drive’s power. Spinoza describes the passions of pleasure and pain to respectively increase or decrease one’s power to achieve a particular endeavour. For instance, if a person is generally feeling joyous s/he will be able to be more energetic and generally more apt to successfully

236 Ibid, 15.
238 E, 3P57D.
239 LeBuffe (2009), 206.
fulfill their activity.\textsuperscript{240} If indeed Spinoza believes that our emotions of joy and sadness either heighten or diminish our power that consequently affects our desires, Nietzsche’s standpoint maintains that every drive is necessarily bound to the endeavour of heightening its power regardless of an individual’s emotions of joy or sadness. However, he would concur with the idea that if one had a generally life-negating ‘moral’ perspective, this would indeed inhibit him/her from thriving as an individual. Power according to Nietzsche involves a developing, heightening, and perfecting of drives. He would be in agreement with Spinoza’s general claim that the power acquired from one’s affective orientation stimulates his/her capacity to strive however he would disagree with Spinoza’s claim that sadness could diminish one’s capacity to fulfill a drive’s expression.

Nietzsche’s theory of drives and its relation to power holds striking parallels with Spinoza’s conception of power. Nietzsche defines the drives as not so much an action of the mind but as an endeavour, desire, and pull towards a certain activity causing expression through action. Drives as well as affects according to Nietzsche are what define selfhood at a fundamental level. An individual’s prominent drives lead one towards engaging in particular activities as well as the possibility of weaker drives being taken over or destroyed by other more forceful drives.\textsuperscript{241} Power plays an instrumental role in functioning as the catalyst for the drive so as to successfully reach its goals and overcome other drives.\textsuperscript{242} Richardson draws out the role of power of the drives in that they “seek the ‘full achievement’ of their internal ends…[and] it is the will to maximally satisfy the given internal ends, at the expense, if need be, of all competing drives’ efforts”.\textsuperscript{243} Nietzsche states that, “[a] living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength – life itself is will to power”.\textsuperscript{244} In the Antichrist, he adds, “[w]hat is good? Everything that heightens in human beings the feeling of power, the will to power, power itself”.\textsuperscript{245} According to Nietzsche, power exists solely at a psychological level and instigates the expression of one’s drives. The role of power is

\textsuperscript{240} This claim regarding the passions affecting the strength or weakness of a particular endeavour appears unconvincing in that one’s sadness can lead one to forcefully persevere in his/her composition of a beautiful yet extremely sad piece of music.
\textsuperscript{241} BGE, 12.
\textsuperscript{242} Clearly, we can acknowledge that the role of power, and especially ‘will to power’ has been a topic of wide debate in the field. I would like to clarify my understanding of Nietzsche’s will to power to be limited as a theory that explains the human psychological structure.
\textsuperscript{243} Richardson (1996), 24.
\textsuperscript{244} BGE, 211.
\textsuperscript{245} AC, 2.
seem within Nietzsche’s drive theory and equally plays a crucial role in his portrait of a higher individual who thrives through the expressions of his/her forceful drives.

Stuart Hampshire’s analysis of Freud and Spinoza’s similar views further supports a congruence with Nietzsche’s drive theory. Hampshire makes a comparison between Freud’s libido and Spinoza’s conatus by stating,

[t]here is an evident parallel between Freud’s conception of libido and Spinoza’s conatus; the importance of the parallel, which is rather more than superficial, is both philosophers conceive emotional life as based on a universal unconscious drive or tendency to self-preservation; both maintain that any frustration of this drive must manifest itself in our conscious life as some painful disturbance. Every person is held to dispose of a certain quantity of psychical energy, a counterpart (for Spinoza at least) of his physical energy, and conscious pleasures and pains are the counterparts of the relatively uninhibited expression and frustration of this energy. Consequently, for Spinoza no less than for Freud, moral praise and blame of the objects of our particular desires, and of the sources of our pleasure, are irrelevant superstitions; we can free ourselves only by an understanding of the true causes of desires, which must then change their direction. According to both Freud and Spinoza, it is the first error of conventional moralists to find moral and a priori reasons for repressing our natural energy, our libido or conatus; they both condemn Puritanism and asceticism. 246

Nietzsche would concur with the main tenets drawn out in this passage outlining the parallel views between Spinoza and Freud. 247 Nietzsche subscribes to the notion that any form of frustrated energy whether it is psychical or physical consequently leads to particular conscious pleasures and pains. For instance, in the case of an ascetic, he/she may feel proud of his/her abstinence however unconsciously he/she is simply repressing a natural sex drive. 248 Hence a conscious pleasure may in fact be unconsciously painful as well as generally unhealthy and deleterious to the self. All three thinkers are adamantly critical of moral standards based upon a priori principles that may indeed instigate the repression of our natural drives and affects. Spinoza advances the view that moralists have a habit of making the judgment that something is either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ without realising that these moral judgments are just a consequence of our natural inclinations and aversions. In order to overcome these ‘moral’ and ‘superstitious’ errors, Hampshire points out that Spinoza and Freud both claim that one must understand ‘the true causes’ of our desires, instincts and/or drives.

247 In Chapter II, I drew a parallel between Nietzsche and Freud’s perspectives on drive theory and more specifically on internalization and sublimation.
248 GM, III, 22
Nietzsche is perhaps not so straightforward about the extent to which one comes to understand the complex and powerful role of our unconsciousness but we can certainly make the deduction that since his comprehensive project involves overcoming our current Judeo-Christian morals, the higher individual should understand his/her psychological structure in order to overcome current value standards and succeed in whichever human activity promoting optimal flourishing. Nietzsche is making the normative claim whereby he suggests that a certain few individuals should attain the state of self-awareness involving a combination of intuition of our unconscious drives coupled with a minimal amount of self-consciousness.

In conjunction with both Spinoza and Freud’s critical stances towards morality, Hampshire points out that they arrive to the same conclusion vis-à-vis achieving a state of well-being. He explains that, “[t]here can in principle be only one way of achieving sanity and happiness; the way is to come to understand the causes of our own states of mind.” Nietzsche equally subscribes to this notion to which he devotes considerable attention, portraying an optimal structure of the self in the form of a higher individual. More importantly, Nietzsche advances his views of the self in order for one to overcome this degenerate state and achieve a form of life affirmation. Hampshire continues by describing Spinoza and Freud’s view of ‘vice’ as “that diseased state of the organism, in which neither mind nor body functions freely and efficiently.” Nietzsche’s methodology may not come across as scientific nor as clinical as Spinoza’s nor Freud’s respectively, but nonetheless he clearly diagnoses the modern individual as being sick, degenerate and diseased. Nietzsche’s diagnosis is founded upon the analysis of psychological phenomena involving the frustration of one’s drives. So ‘vice’ according to Nietzsche arises from religious and social phenomena and he diagnoses the current state of humanity with medicalized terms like sick, diseased, degenerate… Nietzsche’s treatment of sickness is inextricably linked to his project of outlining the possibility of achieving optimal health by achieving a better understanding of who we are psychologically.

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249 Hampshire (1962), 142.
250 Ibid., 142.
251 GS, 120; BGE, 30; AC, 6; AC, 18; AC, 24; TI The Four Great Errors, 2, TI Morality as Anti-Nature, 2. I discuss Nietzsche’s account of sickness in the section on ‘Health and Sickness’ in Chapter II.
As Hampshire concludes this comparison between Spinoza and Freud, he emphasises how both thinkers focus on topics that culminate in the meaning and the depth of the human psyche. He articulates this thought by stating, “[t]he points of detailed resemblance between them follow from their common central conception of the *libido* or *conatus*, the natural drive for self-preservation and the extension of power and energy, as being the clue to the understanding of all forms of personal life.” Both encouraged a kind of exploration of the self as a means to overcome ailments whether it involved particular mental illness, for Freud, or simply overcoming a more general feeling of sadness for Spinoza. As previously stated, Nietzsche does not appeal to much of a scientific nor clinical approach, however in conjunction with his diagnosis of the ‘degenerate’ state of humanity he does claim that the higher individual may overcome the tendency of frustrating one’s drives through espousing a form of affective and intuitive process of self-knowledge. Hampshire’s parallel of Spinoza and Freud fits squarely along the lines of Nietzsche’s drive psychology which in turn illuminates the negative aspects of modern moral standards and paves the way towards their overcoming.

Both Spinoza and Nietzsche uphold a notion of self-perfection within their accounts of psychological structure of the self and its ethical implications. The idea of striving and/or endeavouring naturally leads to achieving perfection. Spinoza first describes human perfection as a model of selfhood. He later recounts that the emotion of joy helps to further his/her perfection. In one sense it can be understood as a general human achievement and within a more particular context, the emotion of joy increases one’s power thus prompting one to become more perfect. LeBuffe suggests that both these descriptions of perfection are compatible in the following sense: “[p]erhaps the formal account of perfection at IId6 and later at IIIp11 give Spinoza a means of reformulating the idea of perfection as a model of human nature in a way which reconciles the two senses of the term: the ideal we set before ourselves will be a person who possesses the greatest possible power of action”.

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252 Hampshire (1962), 143.
253 Nietzsche also turns to *Sublimation* as a form of channeling weaker and negative drives into ones that are more conducive to an individual’s thriving. Please turn to Chapter I., Section 2.
254 Spinoza, IId6.
255 Ibid., IIIp11.
256 LeBuffe (2009), 207.
develop into a more perfect being and simultaneously have a general ethical goal of self-perfection. The quest for self-perfection is quite prevalent throughout the Nietzschean corpus. Nietzsche often advances the view – on the psychological level of drives and on a wider scope of a general mind-set – that an individual naturally seeks to continually improve and surpass his/her current state in order to achieve a state of perfection.257

Spinoza and Nietzsche share similar views on the cohesive relation between bodily appetites and the will. Spinoza states that “[t]his endeavours, when it is related to the mind alone, is called ‘will,’” but when it is related to the mind and body simultaneously, it is called ‘appetite’.258 He develops this thought by claiming that desire is when one is conscious of his/her appetite.259 Here Spinoza distinguishes humans from other living beings that do not attain conscious recognition of their appetites. But more importantly he links all beings as having this fundamental capacity for appetites. He describes humans as endowed with appetites, desires and wills. This scholium culminates with Spinoza’s claim that it is out of our appetites that our ethical judgments are generated. He argues that, “we judge something, to be good because we endeavour, will, seek after, or desire it.”260 In this crucial claim he is debunking the very foundations on which morality stands. Spinoza counters a top–down hierarchical moral structure but moreover explains that our psychological makeup of various endeavours, appetites and/or will causes our behavior which is then judged as ‘good.’

Nietzsche would not explicitly adhere to such a distinction but would rather express that both conscious ‘wills’ and unconscious drives are naturally inclined towards some particular end.261 Nietzsche’s account of the drives resembles Spinoza’s account of the appetites because all drives whether intellectual or physiological relate to the mind and body according to Nietzsche. As Richardson points out, “[w]illing their own development leads drives in diverging directions. This point is the main metaphysical root for Nietzsche’s individualism in values: ‘The deepest law of

257 GS, 122; GS 290; TI, IX9.
258 E, SP9
259 Ibid., SP9.
260 Ibid.
261 We must take into account how that apart from Spinoza’s influence on Nietzsche, Schopenhauer’s theory of the will has equally proven to be instrumental to Nietzsche’s theory of drives. In his later corpus, Nietzsche dismisses Schopenhauer for his metaphysical view of ‘everlasting will’ and adopts a more empirical and flexible world view.
preservation and growth command…that everyone invent for himself his virtue, his categorical imperative”. So willing for Nietzsche occurs primarily at the level of one’s drives. Even if Spinoza does advocate conscious willing he implicitly would be in accord with Nietzsche’s view in that he believes that it is our endeavours/drives that cause us to behave a certain way which we subsequently judge as valuable. As aforementioned, Spinoza claims that, “we judge something, to be good because we endeavour, will, seek after, or desire it”. Now vis à vis one’s appetites, Nietzsche equally endorses Spinoza’s valuation for the appetites. Spinoza explains the appetites to be “nothing other than the very essence of man, from the nature of which there necessarily follow those things that contribute to his preservation, and so man is determined to do these things”. Nietzsche draws out a cohesive portrait of the self’s mind and body whereby he focuses extensively on the body’s affections actually having an impact on our consciousness. He does not name them appetites but ‘drives’ that are also willing towards a particular activity. Nietzsche would simply allocate these drives – those seeking to satisfy bodily desires – in a less valuable category since they do not guide one towards great achievements. We must take into account that Nietzsche does not lay out a hierarchical structure amongst the human psyche’s vast array of drives. One may however come to the deduction which drives he deems more valuable than others through the analysis of his model of an optimal selfhood. Richardson explains that Nietzsche “attributes to the drives a ‘reason’, a power of discernment, that makes them more trustworthy judges than we thought… If anything in us is active, it must be some among our drives. Moreover, these drives are also more educable than we’d thought.” Spinoza’s cohesive portrayal of the self’s natural psychological tendencies of will and appetite have been paramount in Nietzsche’s construction of his drive theory. Withstanding Spinoza’s view that the will’s consciousness is more valuable, we must bear in mind that Nietzsche seeks to reveal to us the extent to which our unconscious drives as well as the affects of the


My reading of Nietzsche allows for a limited of consciousness.

E, 3P9.

E, 3P9S.

BGE, 12.

Nietzsche’s model of a higher individual clearly revolves around both great artists and political figures with such likes as Stendhal, Renoir, Raphael, Wagner and Caesar, Napoleon, etc.. He also describes the figure of a philosopher in an admirable tone which can be found in BGE, 205; BGE

Richardson (1996), 206.
body and the mind play a major role in who we are as individuals. Both Spinoza and Nietzsche critique a moral system that dictates rules and value standards from an external ideology exemplified in Judeo-Christian morality and are determined to demonstrate that values evolve from a psychological source, that of our appetites, drives and affects.

3. Drives, Affects & their Values

In this section, I shall explore the relationship between drives, affects and their values drawing out a more comprehensive picture of the relationships of drives and affects within our psychological structure. I argue that Nietzsche explores both our psychological tendencies of drives and affects but does not set out a definitive formula as to which instantiates the other. We have certain drives that influence our affective dispositions towards a drive’s aims which further determines which drives are valuable. Likewise, we hold certain affective dispositions that can influence our drives. Force also plays a substantial role in the relationship amongst drives, affects and their corresponding values.269

Paul Katsafanas analyses Nietzsche’s drive psychology, its relation to the affects and questions exactly how they develop into values. He is concerned that there are fleeting affects which can be warranted but do not count as values.270 He considers a case in which an individual takes a liking to the idea of sky-diving and experiences approving affects towards this activity. The affect is justified by the thought that such an experience will prove to be exhilarating.271 Even if the activity is valued by an individual, Katsafanas does not consider it as a ‘value’ due to its transitory period of time. Let us give this example a different twist by considering an individual that actively partakes in sky-diving and goes onto branching out to a wide range of activities that generate an adrenaline surge like bungy-jumping and paragliding over a long duration of time. What we need to distinguish at this point is that the activity of sky-diving is not valued as such but it is the feeling of exhilaration that the activity instigates that is valued. If indeed a person is truly attracted to the idea of sky-diving he/she seems to have a proclivity towards activities that can produce the feelings of exhilaration. One goes through the physical rush that the adrenaline hormones release

269 BGE, 211: A, 5.
271 Ibid.
whether it be heart palpitations, cold sweats, an empty feeling in the gut, shaking limbs, etc.. Exhilaration manifests in the very mastery over the feeling of fear. We can deduce that valuing such an activity arises from the feeling of triumph by controlling one’s initial fear of these high-risk activities. Nietzsche would state that in this situation we have warring affects in which courage trumps fear. Although here the feeling of exhilaration is repeatedly sought over a prolonged period of time we must bear in mind that the value is justified because a person fulfills his/her desire to attain exhilaration through the action of sky-diving. First, the value could not manifest itself without the action carried out. Secondly, the affect could lead to a feeling of frustration if it is indeed strong enough and an action is not carried out. In addition, one may have a weak affective disposition and due to haphazard external circumstances engage in an activity that heightens their previously weak affective orientation. For instance, let us take into consideration somebody who had never been particularly interested in adrenaline inducing sports. If one day that individual is invited by a friend to give surfing a go and finds this sport surprisingly exhilarating, he/she may realise that he/she holds a positive affective disposition towards such an activity. So external circumstances may indeed play a part in instigating one’s affective dispositions to arise and seek full expression.

Katsafanas diverges from Richardson’s claim that values can be defined as the aim of a drive. He introduces the case of an alcoholic to support his view. An alcoholic can have a drive directed towards drinking alcohol but will not consider it a value. He reflectively disvalues alcohol and unreflectively values it. Katsafanas states that Nietzsche ‘accepts the view that unreflective values and reflective values are wholly distinct.’ However, it seems to be that Richardson would agree with this view but he highlights how unreflective values can explain reflective values either positively or negatively. Richardson also focuses on distinguishing the aim and the object involved in showing that our drives have a ‘plasticity’ in order to satisfy a powerful drive. The crucial aspect for Nietzsche is that values which are life-negating are often reflective and his overall project involves calling to his readers’ attention how detrimental some of our reflective drives may be and the extent to which there is a discrepancy between our unreflective and reflective values. In addition, Nietzsche

272 BGE, 200.
maintains the normative viewpoint that drives should be life-affirming. Nietzsche seeks to show us that drives need to follow their natural tendency to thrive in their ‘power’ as well as being life enhancing.

Katsafanas states that Richardson’s distinction between our reflective and unreflective values raises the problem of a discontinuity thus weakening our notion of what is truly valuable. He simultaneously claims that our conscious propensity for insight can influence our drives. We should bear in mind that Nietzsche’s overall project is to enlighten his readers to come to know themselves better which involves a conscious realisation. Through proper introspection amongst our conflicting drives and hence values, we may come to understand how Katsafanas’s apparent critique of Richardson’s reflective and unreflective values may be overcome. Nietzsche allows for a limited amount of conscious self-knowledge whereby an individual can consciously reflect as well as value his/her own drives and actions.

Let us turn to the case of the making of an oligarch in Plato’s Republic. Plato explains the oligarch’s conflicting drives between the thumodeic drive that values honour which is overcome by money-loving drive that values wealth overall. The reason for the oligarch’s money-loving drive’s domination over the honour-loving drive is due to the loss of wealth that his timocratic father undergoes thus instigating the son to prioritise the money-loving desire. Plato’s psychological structure of the self is hierarchically set up as follows: i. the intellectual pursuit of knowledge at the forefront, ii. then followed the thumodeic capacity to feel anger and pride serving as a basis of morality, and iii. the basic appetitive desires that are classified at the lowest rung. Bearing in mind that our complex psychological structure involves various parts that may conflict with one another the psychological construct of the self does not culminate to a mutually exclusive case of either reflective or unreflective values. Upon consideration that our more forceful parts manage and control its weaker parts, Katsafanas’s concern with the alcoholic’s unreflective value for drinking alcohol dissipates. The alcoholic may indeed reflect upon his/her addiction and judge it as disdainful. However, the question depends on whether or not she/he has the force to overcome the addictive urge to drink. So on one level the alcoholic values alcohol for

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274 I do think that Richardson’s reading of Nietzsche allows for a minimal account of consciousness.
276 Richardson (2008), 103.
277 GS, 290.
277 See Book IV of the Rep.
what can be a series of different reasons ranging from its numbing affect to a form of escapism from one’s ordeals and from general anxieties to past traumas. Ideally on another level one may overcome this destructive tendency by tapping into a general comprehensive kind of self-reflection whereby he/she may sustain a ‘will-to-live’ so to speak which encompasses the understanding that alcoholism is unhealthy and life-negating. Nietzsche equally claims that individuals have a complex drive system that often involves conflicts but needs constant rigour and self-discipline in order to be successfully managed. So just as Plato’s hierarchically structures the psychological self, Nietzsche also assumes that there are first order and second order drives in which the former stronger drives serve to master and regulate the other weaker drives. Richardson also discusses the issue of ranking which distinguishes our set of drives as either more or less valuable. Naturally, Katsafanas explores the relationship between values, drives, and affects attempting to convince us that valuing needs to have a continuity between “drive induced affective orientations that is unaware of having, or to which the agent devotes little thought. And we could use ‘reflective value’ to pick out drive-induced affective orientations that are accompanied by explicit thoughts about approval or justification.” How does the notion of continuity gel with one’s warring drives? Furthermore, does Nietzsche state that the reflective part of the self should trump the baser – and in this particular case self-destructive drive for alcohol? If we take into account the structure of the psychological self in which stronger drives and affects function in a regulatory manner as well as Nietzsche’s normative claim that drives should be life-affirming, one’s comprehensive value standards do not conflict with his/her drives, leaving us with Richardson’s notion of values and drives as compatible. Furthermore, Richardson later addresses the issue of regulation which he acknowledges as the notion of incorporating insight. He states that ‘a behavior is self-selected and free, not by what happens in the moment of choice by itself – in that microsituation – but in the macrohistory by which the dispositions producing the behavior were designed.’

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278 If we take into consideration the complexity of the human psyche, we may come to acknowledge that the effects of alcohol may alleviate or numb wounds deeply imbedded in one’s unconscious. So there may be an unreflective value for alcohol that simultaneously satisfies an unreflective drive to forget an equally unreflective pain.
281 Richardson (2008), 103.
Let us turn to another example that Katsafanas introduces to support his point that one can have reflective values that are deeply at odds with our unreflective values. He points out that the model of the ‘ascetic priest’ who disapproves of sex drives by viewing them as evil and consequently frustrates his own sex drive. Katsafanas explains that, “Nietzsche doesn’t accept the view that unreflective values and reflective values are wholly distinct... he often suggests that unreflective values – drives – explain reflective values.”  Here, we can recall how Spinoza also puts forth the same notion involving one’s *conatus* to instantiate a certain behavior which is then judged as valuable. And just like Spinoza, Nietzsche maintains that our drives have a direct impact on our value judgments. In the case of Spinoza our values positively reveal our affective dispositions whereas in the case of Nietzsche’s model of the ascetic the reflective values arise as a consequence of a repressed sexual drive. Let us bear in mind Nietzsche’s overarching project that involves diagnosing the modern individual as sick because his/her reflective evaluative judgments tend to be life-negating rather than life-affirming. Nietzsche seeks to demonstrate that we do indeed have values that conflict with one another and this would indeed be due to conflicting drives. If an individual is in a sickly state, his/her drives will prove to be life-negating whereas if an agent holds drives that are life-affirming he/she may thrive to become a higher individual.

Katsafanas defines the roles of the drives and affects and explores their relationship with one another, giving precedence to the former. Nietzsche has indeed made a crucial contribution to psychology by introducing the notion of ‘*trieb*’ or drive. However, it seems that he does not clearly distinguish whether the drive instigates or causes an affect to follow. Individuals may have drives with little or no involvement of the affects. For instance, if one feels a drive to eat arise and as a consequence goes to the corner shop to buy him/herself lunch such an experience may indeed prove to be free of an affect towards the drive to eat. Even if Nietzsche claims that our affects play a crucial role within the psychological structure of the self, he does not state that drives instigate affects nor does he prescribe a formula that a drive followed by an affect is followed by action. Nor does Nietzsche get himself into a

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283 See section previous section on Spinoza.
284 In the next chapter, I shall explore this very problem of how one may maintain a unified self with a vast amount of variegated drives that may indeed conflict with one another.
‘chicken and the egg’ problem stating whether drives cause affects to arise. As aforementioned, he generally focuses on the affects to reveal that our value standards are hinged on them rather than on a priori concepts of ‘good & evil’. Nietzsche’s project is to debunk the claim that our values generate from metaphysical and theological sources and to reveal that they arise from our drives and affects. His climatic phrase in which he exclaims that ‘moralities are merely a sign language of the affects’ serves to debunk the hierarchical moral structure but also flips the hierarchy the other way around to reposition the affects as adopting a crucial role in the creation of values. Let us recall that when he had criticised Spinoza alongside the Stoics for their suppression of the affects, Nietzsche’s aim was to reveal how crucial it is to embrace our affects.285

Nietzsche also explores the role of the affects as taking over certain situations due to forms of habituation. He explains how untrusting our affects tend to react be in new situations. He says, “[h]earing something new is embarrassing and difficult for the ear; …[w]hat is new finds our senses, too, hostile and reluctant; and even in the ‘simplest’ processes of sensation the affects dominate, such as fear, love, hatred, including the passive affects of laziness”.286 Nietzsche observes that humans can often be fearful or mistrusting of anything ‘new’. Consequently, we can make the deduction that Nietzsche believes that one’s affective dispositions influence our perspectives and judgments depending on varying contexts. This in turn makes one question what influential force do affects hold upon our drives? In this particular example, Nietzsche explains how our affects may repress certain drives from a ‘fear’ of the new or the unknown. Nietzsche also states that “[t]he will to overcome an affect is ultimately the will of another, or of several other affects.”287 Here he is equating the will to affects and he has also equated that the will is nothing other than a drive or a group of drives.288 Nietzsche does not wish to classify drives and affects into a set structure. He does not aim to affirm that either the drives or the affects cause the other to come into existence or fit into a precise formula to instantiate action. Just as Nietzsche’s optimal model of selfhood involves a flexible psychological structure that allows for the harnessing of a vast number of varying drives, he understands affects as an emotional

285 BGE, 198.
286 BGE, 192.
287 BGE, 117; See also GS, 127.
288 BGE, 36.
stimulus that can function alongside drives to promote human flourishing. For instance, if one endures deep sadness due to the separation of a long relationship, Nietzsche would advocate for an individual’s tapping into this affect of sadness that would feed into a creative drive which could result into a moving musical composition. In this example, the individual who suffers feels the affect of sadness and overcomes it through the expression of an art form. In conclusion, Nietzsche deems both one’s drives and affects as important in our psychological structure and as fundamental pillars in the formation of one’s ethical groundings.

4. First and Second Natures

Regarding his broader conception of ethics, Nietzsche introduces the notion of first and second natures of the self. Just as Spinoza places a strong emphasis of whether our affects and their concurring values arise from either internal and external sources, it is worth questioning how Nietzsche views our ethical grounding to arise from both our own inherent psyche and the external influences like surrounding environment and general upbringing. Nietzsche considers our first nature to be more of our inherited psychological and physiological traits and our second natures to encompass features that are inculcated from our experience and surrounding environment. Nietzsche views this concept of ‘second nature’ to encompass social and cultural influences ranging from aesthetic sensibilities to manners and from moral standards to behavioral habits. So this form of ‘second nature’ can be understood in both positive and negative respects. He understands individuals as having a flexible psychological structure who acquire their second natures with or without being consciously aware of it.

One can be influenced or can actually manage his/her own drives in order to ascribe to a more valuable ethical standard. Nietzsche dismisses the second nature that arises from our Judeo-Christian morality. He stipulates that the model of the higher self must channel his/her drives as well as overcome certain drives to achieve this optimal form of selfhood. He draws out his model of the ‘Anti-Christ’ who appropriates ascetic-like qualities in a positive light by describing these “most spiritual people, being the strongest, [who] find their happiness where other people

289 We must keep in mind that Nietzsche does state that some belief judgments or values are inherited traits. See GM, I 7.
would find their downfall: in labyrinths, in harshness towards themselves and towards others, in trials; they take pleasure in self-overcoming: asceticism is their second nature, requirement, instinct. They see Knowledge – a form of asceticism”.\textsuperscript{290} Nietzsche has largely been critical of the ‘ascetic’ typology and more specifically disapproves of the figure of the ‘ascetic priest.’ However, in this context Nietzsche extols a form of asceticism that will not show fear in the face of adversity and demonstrate a form of self-mastery and integrity by upholding his/her personal values. He concludes this passage by defining this form of asceticism as involving the perception of ‘knowledge’. Here and throughout the remainder of this section, Nietzsche draws out a very similar model of selfhood as Plato does in his political analogy of the tri-partite self encompassing the love for wisdom, followed by the love of honour and finally the love of the appetites. Nietzsche continues to call the next in rank, ‘noble warriors’ and those at the lowest rung the ‘mediocre’.\textsuperscript{291} Only the role of the ruler according to Nietzsche is able to engage in this self-overcoming and embrace this positive form of second nature.

Nietzsche explores this concept of self-overcoming on a more psychological scale whereby he describes the flexibility of the soul as well as the artistic activity involving the development of first and second natures. In the passage, \textit{One Thing is Needful}, he expounds on this notion of self-overcoming and/or sublimation by saying, “[h]e who surveys all that his nature presents in its strength and its weakness, and then fashions it into an ingenious plan, until everything appears artistic and rational, and even the weaknesses enchant the eye-exercises that admirable art. Here there has been a great amount of second nature added, there a portion of first nature has been taken away - in both cases with long exercise and daily labor at the task. Here the ugly, which does not permit of being taken away, has been concealed, there it has been re-interpreted into the sublime.”\textsuperscript{292} Here again, Nietzsche suggests that our second nature has taken over our first nature in that it has somehow been perfected, sublimated and made ‘sublime’. The model of selfhood sketched out by Nietzsche engages in a challenging task of becoming one who can master him/herself by overcoming shortcomings or weak attributes and developing instincts, drives and affects into a strong thriving individual.

\textsuperscript{290} \textit{TI}, AC, 57.
\textsuperscript{291} Ibid., 57. I address Nietzsche’s refinement of Plato’s structure of the psychological self in Chapter I.
\textsuperscript{292} GS, 290.
He further articulates his notion of second nature in his criticism of Judeo-Christian sin as well as free will. He explains that “[t]he concept of ‘sin’ invented along with the torture instrument that belongs with it, the concept of ‘free will,’ in order to confuse the instincts, to make mistrust of the instincts’ second nature! In the concept of the ‘selfless,’ the ‘self-denier,’ the distinctive sign of decadence”. Here, I shall address Nietzsche’s treatment of ‘free will’ as it is in this particular context that he introduces the term ‘second nature’. Nietzsche seeks to dismantle the concept of free will by explaining its purposes in order to demonstrate its mere usefulness for an individual’s self-image. He denies free will that only leads us to ‘confuse’ our instincts and ‘mistrust’ our instinct’s second nature. We can deduce that from the fact that one mistrusts his/her instinct’s second nature one thus harbours a negative judgment upon it. Furthermore, this mistrust would cause the repression and suppression of our ‘second nature’ rather than embracing it. Ultimately, Nietzsche does not lie out a causal relationship between the drives and affects but rather seeks to show their crucial role in both the psychological structure of the self and in the formation our values.

Nietzsche’s analysis of affects and drives is instrumental to his comprehensive project encompassing his criticism of modern value standards. He unveils the key role that both the drives and affects play in the structure of the psyche. He goes onto demonstrating how our drives and affects impact the formulation of our values. Nietzsche also emphasises their various functions and interactive relationship which opens the possibility to avoiding the deleterious effects of internalization. He further paves the way for certain individuals to overcome these life-negating tendencies and ascribe to life affirmation.

Nietzsche has brought to the forefront the crucial role that our drives and affects play on a psychological scale, its motivational role in action and their key impact in the construction of a naturalistic and empirically based ethical theory. We have explored Nietzsche’s understanding of drives and how they are distinct from the affects. I have also provided a comparative study between Spinoza and Nietzsche’s notion of the affects. I address how Nietzsche weaves together a cohesive way of attributing values to an individual’s vast array of drives and affects. Finally, I look at how he considers both internal and external values from his distinction of first

293 *Ti, Ecce Homo*, 8.
and second nature. These ethical questions of how to classify our values standards leads me to the problem of whether Nietzsche’s model of the ‘higher individual’ can successfully unify his/her drives and affects. In the next chapter, I explore how Nietzsche turns to artistic models of optimal selfhood to depict a cohesive portrait of human selfhood.
Nietzsche describes unity of the self as one of the attributes of a higher form of selfhood. According to Nietzsche, it is essential to acquire unity in order to thrive through life. In this chapter, I shall explore how Nietzsche defines the notion of unity of self that requires the optimal orchestration of one’s vast and variegated conglomeration of drives. How does one successfully have a ‘master’ drive that appropriately controls an individual’s vast number of differing drives? What are the implications behind the notion of continuity vis à vis one’s warring drives? Nietzsche often addresses the concept of a unified self in conjunction with an aesthetic context. He uses the aesthetic notions of artistry, beauty, and creativity to convey the optimal orchestration of one’s extensive array of distinct drives. In addition, he explains how an adherence to one’s strongest drives is cultivated and how the co-option of weaker drives into stronger life-affirming drives further demonstrates a way of unifying our drives.

I shall begin by exploring the French literary figure, Stendhal, whom Nietzsche uses as an exemplar in order to convey how one may attain this optimal kind of unity through a passionate attitude towards life. Stendhal, as an artist and thinker shares with Nietzsche certain key aesthetic concepts that are founded on one’s affective response to works of art. Nietzsche also turns to Goethe, as a model of selfhood, who exemplifies a ‘totality’ of the self as a historical event. In addition, he depicts Goethe as an exemplar through an aesthetic notion involving how the creative process aligns with the expression of strong master drives. In this section, I address how Nietzsche takes on two ways of showing ideal unified self, the first in which he fleshes out a more political and historical cohesiveness, and the later, in which he demonstrates how the creative process involves a balance between conscious shaping of the self as well as the unconscious expression of drives.294

294 Although I primarily focus on Nietzsche’s use of aesthetic notions to portray the optimal structure of the self as well as a life-affirming approach he does depend on political as well as moral contexts to articulate his view both regarding the self and his positive ethical project.
1. Stendhal on Love, Art & Happiness

Nietzsche often extols Stendhal calling him, “one of the best accidents in my life… with his anticipatory psychologist’s eye and his grasp of the facts.”\(^\text{295}\) I shall focus on examining Nietzsche’s similar aesthetical and ethical views with Stendhal. But before, I would like to return momentarily to the topic Plato and the function of love within the structure of his tripartite self. As I have addressed earlier, I maintain that Nietzsche shares parallel views with Plato in regards to the structure of the self. In the *Republic*, Plato names all three parts of the self by calling them ‘loving’ and distinguishes them by the object of the desire: wisdom, honour, and money.\(^\text{296}\) An individual self is defined by the act of loving, – s/he is a lover of varying activities. In most translations of the *Republic*, the three parts of the soul are translated as adjectives rather than the combination of the verb ‘to love’ with the ‘noun’ classifying each activity. When one grasps the parts of the self as classified into three kinds of desires and/or drives that involve the action of ‘loving’ one attains a better understanding of the motivational force that love plays in instigating an individual’s action. It is crucial to bear in mind that the self is fundamentally made up of desires/drives which love ‘something’ and the loving functions as a vehicle to externalize these desires/drives through a particular activity.

Nietzsche holds a similar position whereby he argues for an individual’s passionate and interested stance towards his/her life.\(^\text{297}\) He reminds us that we are made up of a conglomeration of drives that determine us to be interested towards particular activities. He asks us to consider whether “the artist’s most basic instinct is bound up with art, or is it bound up much more intimately with life, which is the meaning of art? Isn’t it bound up with the *desirability of life*?”\(^\text{298}\) A desirability of life promotes a deeply interested approach towards the activities that we experience through life. Just as Plato considers love an essential motivating factor in our psychological make-up, Nietzsche seeks to highlight how crucial it is to be passionate about our interests in life. He suggests that art’s foundation is couched on ‘desirability

\(^{295}\text{EH, Why am I so Clever, 3.}\)

\(^{296}\text{For further discussion on Plato’s analysis of the tri-partite self and his influence on Nietzsche’s conception please revert to Chapter I.}\)

\(^{297}\text{I use the term ‘interested’ to highlight Nietzsche’s aim to diverge himself from Kant’s endorsement of ‘disinterested’ approach.}\)

\(^{298}\text{TI, Skirmishes of an Untimely Man, 24.}\)
of life’. On one level this can be interpreted as alluding to our basic instinct to procreate, but in this instance, Nietzsche appears to articulate that one needs to passionately embrace and love life rather than say ‘no’ to it as the ascetic ideal does.

i. *Une promesse de Bonheur*

Let us turn to a passage in *On the Genealogy of Morals*, whereby Nietzsche is deeply critical of the ascetic ideal. In his description of the ascetic ideal, we can grasp what kind of artistry Nietzsche extols as he states, “we simply cannot conceal from ourselves what’s really expressed by that total will which received its direction from the ascetic ideal: this hate against what is human, and even more against animality, and even more against material things – this abhorrence of the senses, even of reason, this fear of happiness and beauty.” Nietzsche seeks to reveal the ascetic ethos that amounts to a life-denying attitude and counters both beauty and happiness.

Nietzsche argues that Kant espouses the ascetic ideal through his claim that judging something beautiful is required to be taken from a ‘disinterested’ point of view. Nietzsche adamantly criticises Kant’s stipulation that beauty is that which gives pleasure without interest, by scoffing “[w]ithout interest! Compare with this definition one framed by a genuine ‘spectator’ and artist – Stendhal, who once called the beautiful *une promesse de Bonheur*. At any rate, he rejected and repudiated the one point about the aesthetic condition that Kant had stressed: *désintéressement*. Who is right, Kant or Stendhal?” Nietzsche offers the contrast between these two viewpoints in order to argue against the possibility of appreciating beauty from an objective standpoint. He seeks to demonstrate that we are humans full of rich and diverse drives and that our actions and judgments vary according to our own subjective viewpoint. Nietzsche reminds us that we are all truly unique individuals equipped with a vast number of varying drives, and as a consequence, our world views adapt accordingly. Whilst admonishing Kant’s focus on the spectator’s concept of the beautiful he concludes his critique by saying that “[i]t would not have been so bad if this ‘spectator’ had at least been sufficiently familiar to the philosophers of beauty – namely, as a great personal fact and experience, as an

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299 GM, III, 28.
300 GM, III, 6.
301 BGE, 12.
abundance of vivid authentic experiences, desires, surprises, and delights in the realm of the beautiful!"³⁰²

I shall now address Stendhal’s statement about beauty serving as a *promesse de Bonheur* or a promise of happiness and the significance it bears on an ethical level.³⁰³ Stendhal recounts his view and more precisely the aesthetic experience of appreciating art and its relation to one’s general sense of well-being in his book entitled, *Love*. Stendhal states in his Chapter, ‘Beauty Usurped by Love’ that ‘beauty is a promise to happiness.’³⁰⁴ He introduces this definition of beauty within the context of an example of a man who loves a woman so intensely that he finds even her scars from smallpox beautiful. He states that, “[t]hus ugliness even begins to be loved and given preference, because in this case it has become beauty.” Stendhal elucidates this idea in the footnote, “[b]eauty is only the promise to happiness. The happiness of a Greek differed from the happiness of a Frenchman in 1822. Consider the eyes of the Medici Venus, and compare them with those of the Magdalen of Pordenone.”³⁰⁵ In Stendhal’s example of the pock marked woman, he makes the claim that beauty is much more than a person’s physical appearance. He argues that someone that may appear ‘ugly’ at first glance may prove to be beautiful. His explanation reveals that beauty shows one the ‘promise’, an invitation, or a possibility to happiness. He later states that if ‘[a] man may meet a woman and be shocked by her ugliness. Soon, if she is natural and unaffected, her expression makes him overlook the faults of her features.”³⁰⁶ Stendhal further examines the topic of beauty taking the case of a young lady whose opinion of a great actor, Le Kain, is transformed thanks to one of his brilliant theatrical performances. He describes the situation whereby a “young woman visiting the Théâtre Francais for the first time might easily find Le Kain repulsive throughout the first scene, but he would soon make her tremble and weep, and she would never be able to resist the characters of Tancred or Orosman….” And Stendhal concludes by reminding us,“[l]et us remember that beauty is the visible expression of character, of the moral make-up of a person.”³⁰⁷ The crucial point that Stendhal is articulating the idea that one’s true

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³⁰² GM, III, 6.
³⁰³ From here onwards, I shall use the English translation, ‘a promise of happiness’.
³⁰⁴ Stendhal (1957), 66.
³⁰⁵ Ibid.
³⁰⁶ Ibid., 67.
³⁰⁷ Ibid., 68.
‘beauty’ involves the expression of one’s character and moral make-up. For the perceiver, beauty opens up the prospect of happiness through love. Even if Stendhal does not state that love functions as a vehicle to happiness it can be implicitly understood since love is the subject of the entire book.

Let us take a step further into the implications behind Stendhal’s claim, ‘[b]eauty is only a promise to happiness’. He supports his claim by distinguishing a Greek and modern day conception of happiness, proving his point by asking his readers to ‘[c]onsider the eyes of the Medici Venus [with those] of the Magdalen of Canova.’ In this instance, Stendhal is drawing the parallel that just as our aesthetic judgments have changed over time, our value standards that pave the road towards happiness, have equally altered. He asks his readers to observe the differences in expression between these two female religious figures. How do they differ and furthermore how does this difference inform the way in which our aesthetic and our broader evaluative judgments have changed through time? The Venus de Medici that dates from the Hellenistic period is attributed to Kleomenes. Throughout history, this portrayal of Venus (or Aphrodite) has been revered as an exemplar of iconic beauty. She is depicted looking towards her left and slightly covering her exposed nudity. Some have interpreted the pose of Venus to convey a slight embarrassment of her nudity however other interpretations affirm that since the position of her hands do not cover her nudity, but ever so slightly evoke this gesture, it actually generates the contrary effect – of affirming and strengthening Venus’s role as a powerful female deity. The scholar on classical art, Christine Havelock, articulates the powerful position of Venus as well as another similar portrayal named the Capitoline Aphrodite by stating, “[r]ather than shielding or hiding their nudity, their gestures are intended to emphasize it. The gestures trace out and define their nude bodies…rather than exhibiting shame or self-consciousness, which so many writers think they see, these goddesses are indifferent to any audience and secure in their divine potency and autonomy.”

We must bear in mind that this portrayal of Venus recounts the narrative of being born out of the sea in adult form so it is pertinent that she is depicted nude. Her actual demeanor denotes a graceful composure coupled with an air of serenity emanating from the calm gaze revealing her profile as she turns towards

308 Havelock (1995), 79.
her left. Overall, the Venus de’Medici elicits grace, confidence and overall potency giving justice to the personification of the goddess of love.

The statue of Mary Magdalen by Canova, dating back to 1808 -1809, portrays her as a penitent figure seeking forgiveness for her sins. Mary Magdalen, who was once believed to have been one of Jesus Christ’s most devout followers became more of a controversial figure during the Middle Ages where people began to surmise that she had previously led the life of a prostitute. Stendhal has indeed taken this interpretation into account and is making the point that in the Romantic times, the female figure of Mary Magdalen is beautifully rendered, but simultaneously, is portrayed as feeling guilty as she kneels down, hunched forward and looking sadly downwards towards her open hands – a gesture indicative of a state of penitence. So, although, Mary Magdalen is portrayed as a beautiful and graceful woman, her posture and downcast eyes reveal her state of penitence. The figure of Mary Magdalen is covered in loosely fitting drapery tied around her waist by a rope further accentuating her forlorn state as she sought forgiveness by living the life of a hermit in the desert for thirty years. The rugged stone upon which she kneels and her rope belted around her waist are symbols exhibiting her life as a hermit. The skull may symbolize the brevity of life on earth and hint at an eternal after-life with Jesus in heaven. Mary Magdalen’s downcast gaze along with her bodily posture and adornments all contribute to the expression of a profound suffering. We can thereby come to the deduction that in this context the beauty conveyed in Canova’s sculpture of Mary Magdalen promises a happiness left for the after-life.
On one hand, the Medici Venus represents the goddess of love of Greek polytheism from the Hellenistic era whereas the rendition of Mary Magdalen, one of Jesus Christ’s most devoted followers, is representative of the Christian religion. So the two sculptures which are from two distinct religious contexts consequently represent two very distinct moral contexts. The Venus de Medici evokes an Apollonian kind of stoic perfection. The sculpture of Mary Magdalen, on the other hand, reveals how the Judeo-Christian values emphasize an individual’s guilt that may lead to psychological repression and life-denying qualities. Stendhal articulates the idea that these two works of art symbolize two very distinct contexts from which the spectator appreciates the beauty exuded from the Medici Venus of the Greek age, which captures the perfection of the human form and a strong and calm composure, and Canova’s sculpture of Mary Magdalen, of the Romantic era, which is of a beautifully executed human form that juxtaposes with her sad and dejected state of being. Stendhal contrasts the Greek idea of beauty and its notion of happiness with that of the Romantic in order to criticise the value standards that may inhibit the possibility of happiness.\(^{309}\) In a similar vein, Nietzsche is highly critical of the sense of guilt and the life-denying qualities that weigh upon the modern individual. Stendhal highlights how our aesthetic appreciation of beauty has evolved over time and how our conception of beauty is expressive of the values which either offer a promise of happiness or obstruct our path to happiness. Ultimately, Nietzsche has turned to Stendhal in order to emphasize his belief that we need to bring back the passion into our life’s activities. Nietzsche upholds Stendhal’s link between beauty and a ‘promesse de bonheur’ in order to show how the aesthetic notion of beauty is deeply intertwined with our affective dispositions as well as our ethical backgrounds.

ii. Crystallization of Love

I shall now address how Stendhal and Nietzsche both draw out the transformative processes within the self. Stendhal focuses on ‘crystallization’ playing a seminal role in love whilst Nietzsche explores sublimation in a more comprehensive psychological context. Both thinkers state how these developments involve attaining a

\(^{309}\) Later in the following chapter, Stendhal condemns the forced marriage of a young lovely lady to a much older sinister man because it is founded upon attainment wealth rather than love.
‘perfect’ state of being. Nietzsche also describes the process of sublimation to have the capacity to unify diverse drives.

Stendhal coins the term crystallization that he defines as a crucial stage in the process of falling in love. In his description of a scene at old salt mines in Strasbourg, he describes crystallization as such,

they throw a leafless wintry bough into one of the abandoned workings. Two or three months later, they haul it out covered with a shining deposit of crystals. The smallest twig, no bigger than a tom-tit’s claw is studded with a galaxy of scintillating diamonds. The original branch is no longer recognizable. What I have called crystallization is a mental process which draws from everything that happens new proofs of the perfection of the loved one.310

In a similar vein to what we have previously observed in his treatment of beauty, Stendhal now offers an example in which an ordinary twig develops something extraordinarily beautiful. He explains this process to express how the lover comes to perceive the perfection in the person of his/her loved one. He further develops his definition of crystallization as he states, “[t]he phenomenon that I have called crystallization springs from Nature, which ordains that we shall feel pleasure and sends the blood to our heads. It also evolves from the feeling that the degree of pleasure is related to the perfections of the loved one, and from the idea that ‘She is mine.’”311 Stendhal makes the claim that love generates from our physiological make-up in that it is ordained from ‘Nature’ and that we sense a ‘rush of blood to the head’. This process is coupled with one’s psychological capacity to imagine the other as an example of human perfection as well as the desire to feel loved in return. Stendhal further explains that the second stage of crystallization occurs after a sense of doubt that love is attainable. So, the crystallization that reoccurs serves to affirm that love is indeed mutual. He states that, “the second crystallization, which deposits diamond layers of proof that ‘she loves me’.”312 Stendhal portrays the process of falling in love by introducing the theme of crystallization which occurs twice in order to establish the reciprocal amorous feelings. The process of crystallization poetically described by Stendhal involves a transformative experience involving the transformation of

310 Stendhal (1957), 49.
311 Ibid., 46
312 Ibid., 47.
something ordinary into something beautiful, which symbolically expresses how an individual’s ordinary feelings for another develop into a strong feeling of love.

This kind of transformative process that Stendhal draws out highly resembles the process of sublimation of our drives which Nietzsche advocates. \(^{313}\) Whilst discussing how he decided to choose the term *crystallization*, Stendhal concedes that love involves a kind of madness,

> I intended to convey that although it was about love, it was not a novel, and was not entertaining in the way that a novel is. I beg the forgiveness of the philosophers from having chosen the word ideology… I am already quite annoyed enough at having had to adopt the new word *crystallization*, and it may well be that if this essay wins any readers, they will not forgive me the neologism…. In my opinion this word does express the principal process of the madness known as love, a madness which nevertheless provides man with the greatest pleasures the species can know on earth.\(^{314}\)

In his discussion behind the choice of words and the reasons for which he coins the new term, *crystallization*, Stendhal states that love can be understood as a madness, but one that endows onto humans their greatest pleasures. There is an interesting parallel to be drawn between Stendhal’s crystallization that involves love taking on the form of a kind of madness with Nietzsche’s process of sublimation described as intoxication. Nietzsche’s notion of sublimation occurs within the psychological context of our drives which are sublimated or ‘redirected’ towards a more perfect state in so far as the drives support an individual’s overall flourishing. In addition, it can be used in a therapeutic context in which weaker drives that would have been repressed or internalized may be harnessed towards a stronger master drive that seeks expression. In this circumstance, an individual thrives thanks to the successful sublimation of his/her drives. Nietzsche describes sublimation to transform a basic drive, for instance, the sex drive into an artistic drive. He also points out that the transformative process of sublimation involves a Dionysian-like frenzy of ‘intoxication’ that very much parallels Stendhal’s notion of madness of love that brings forth ‘the greatest pleasures the species can know on earth.’ I would like to return to the passage of *Twilight of the Idols*, where Nietzsche fleshes out how broadly the feeling of intoxication manifests itself,

> Above all, the intoxication of sexual excitement, the most ancient and original form of intoxication. There is also an intoxication that comes in the wake of

\(^{313}\) For more discussion on Sublimation, please turn to section 5 of Chapter II.

\(^{314}\) Stendhal (1957) 49.
all great desires, all strong affects; an intoxication of the festival, the contest, of the *braviura* performance, of victory, of all extreme movement; the intoxication of cruelty; intoxication in destruction…finally there is the intoxication of the will, the intoxication of the glutted and swollen will…The essential thing about intoxication is the feeling of fullness and increasing strength.  

Nietzsche’s description of intoxication, which is a form of sublimation, functions just like Stendhal’s description of a mad-like quality which love may engender that holds an equally transformative power. It is through this transformative process that the individual develops closer to perfection which elicits a sense of the unified self that Nietzsche vindicates.

Nietzsche discusses the topic of ‘loving’ in such a manner which strikingly parallels Stendhal’s description of love and its effects upon the individuals that fall in love. In one passage of the *Gay Science*, Nietzsche describes loving music as well as other things as a process that needs to be learned. We can assume that if one needs to learn to love, it would follow that an individual goes through a change from his/her initial state to one in which he/she loves. Let us turn to Nietzsche’s description of this transformative experience in which he explains,

how we have *learned to love* all things that we now love. In the end we are always rewarded for our good will, our patience, fairmindedness, and gentleness with what is strange; gradually, it sheds its veil and turns out to be a new and indescribable beauty. That is its thanks for our hospitality. Even those who love themselves will have learned it in this way; for there is no other way. Love, too, has to be learned.

He explains that things which may appear strange at first become appreciated as beautiful after the gradual process of learning to love. For instance, when one hears a new and perhaps bizarre sounding musical piece, Nietzsche suggests we be patient, fair and take-on an attitude of good-will which will allow for the feeling of love to arise. What was once considered as strange takes on a beautiful appearance. Here we can point out two points of similitude with Stendhal’s understanding of love, namely: a. that something which appears ordinary suddenly is perceived as a beautiful and as a symbol of perfection, and b. that love involves a transformative process in which one

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316 I shall address how Nietzsche addresses idea of achieving unity through the Dionysian rite through which one experiences a kind of intoxication or frenzy in the section on Goethe.
317 GS, 334.
attains an appreciation of the loved one or what is loved which was absent beforehand.

Another crucial point that arises in this passage regarding loving oneself necessitates further exploration. Nietzsche also adds that this is the case regarding one’s love for oneself. He specifies that ‘those who love themselves will have learned it in this way’. This deeply psychological claim elicits the idea that we need to have the proper mindset vis à vis ourselves in order to ‘learn to love’ ourselves. Nietzsche may be alluding to the idea that we need a form of open-mindedness, fairness and gentleness in our introspective endeavours so as to appreciate all of ourselves – even the parts that may seem initially strange. In this instance, Nietzsche’s viewpoint recalls his psychological ideas that he advances in the passage, ‘One thing is Needful’. He suggests that we need to transform our ‘traits’ which at first appear ugly into beautiful ones. He states that this transformative process of giving style to oneself prompts for ‘even the weaknesses enchant the eye.’ Just as Nietzsche explains that learning to love oneself requires much patience and open-mindedness, in this passage he shows how the individual undergoes ‘hard work and daily labour’ to achieve this sense of appreciation of oneself. Furthermore, this kind of appreciation involves making him/herself beautiful which leads to a sense of self-satisfaction. Nietzsche states that, ‘[i]t will be the strong imperious natures which experience their most refined joy in such constraint, in such confinement and perfection under their own law.’

How does this relate to Nietzsche’s notion of passion vis à vis the arts and on a more comprehensive scale towards life in general? Returning to the initial contrast he makes between Stendhal and Kant, Nietzsche is a proponent of harkening back the passion into our lives. He takes the stance that we need to fully affirm who we are on both physiological and psychological levels. In effect, Stendhal believes that crystallization continues on “through love without a break [and t]hus happiness never stays the same, except in its origin; every day brings forth a new blossom.” So the passion between two lovers is a continual process that engenders a “soften[ing of] hardships of life and gives a new interest to its enjoyment.” Nietzsche introduces the exemplar of Stendhal to show us that we can follow our passions in life and affirm

318 GS, 290.
319 Ibid.
320 Stendhal (1957), 51.
life in a way that ensures happiness rather than it being stifled by repressive tendencies. Nietzsche turns to love as a counter force to the life-denying will exemplified in Judeo-Christian morality. He defines love and the power that it holds by stating, “[t]he spiritualization of sensuality is called love: it represents a great triumph over Christianity.”\textsuperscript{321} Love can be used as a vehicle to reassert a life-affirming force that can overcome the life-denying one so prevalent modern society.\textsuperscript{322} As aforementioned with our discussion on \textit{eros} being the driving power behind the self’s three different types of drives, Nietzsche also seeks to highlight that the interested and passionate stance which serves as a driving force towards self-flourishing but also a unifying force amongst a wide spectrum of diverse drives.

2. Goethe

Nietzsche holds Goethe in high esteem as one may observe throughout his corpus. I shall explore the qualities that Nietzsche finds admirable in Goethe and how Nietzsche weaves together a portrait of Goethe to exemplify his honourable traits as well as the key characteristic, that of a unity of self. Nietzsche famously admires Goethe for accomplishing a ‘wholeness’. What does this wholeness signify? How might it be possible for an individual to successfully orchestrate a rich diversity of drives into a ‘whole’? Wholeness, totality, and unity may appear at first glance as vacuous notions but after an exegetical analysis of Nietzsche’s admiration of Goethe, we can attain an understanding of the crucial role that unity plays for Nietzsche.\textsuperscript{323} Unity is exemplified on a psychological scale when one’s drives are successfully managed so that the master drive can effectively thrive and seek outward expression. Once considered under the verb formation, ‘to unify,’ one can better grasp the process through which a dispersed multitude of varying drives coalesce to help a master drive successfully attain expression. I shall first address how Nietzsche articulates unity to a psychological phenomenon involving the harnessing of drives towards a master drive from which ensues human flourishing. Another way in which Nietzsche understands the idea of wholeness and totality is how individuals that hold such a characteristic may represent the breadth and the span of an epoch. Finally, Nietzsche considers a person to hold the characteristic of wholeness upon the achievement of greatness.

\textsuperscript{321} \textit{TI, Morality as Anti-Nature}, 3.
\textsuperscript{322} I expound on the topic of love in section 4 of Chapter V.
\textsuperscript{323} I shall be focusing predominantly throughout passages 49 – 51 of \textit{Skirmishes of an Untimely Man}. 

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This achievement is a task that involves the process of self-creation requiring dedication and active engagement. I finally address how Nietzsche extols Goethe as an individual who represents an organic form of unity which is based upon his naturalism.

Johann Wolfgang Goethe, was by far one of the most illustrious figures of the eighteenth century. Goethe’s literary works, ranging from his novels to poetry and dramatic works made a major impact on German culture paving the way for Romanticism. Nietzsche, who was clearly influenced by Goethe often extols Goethe’s works but even more so admires Goethe as an individual and all he represented. Nietzsche admires Goethe for ‘discipline[ing] himself to wholeness’\textsuperscript{324}, calling him ‘the last German I have any respect for’ (and calls him the ‘finest and brightest… [for he saw that contradictory part of our nature] made life more attractive’.\textsuperscript{325} So, what was it in Goethe’s persona that Nietzsche found so phenomenal?

Let us now explore more of Goethe’s life that may help shed light on how Nietzsche conceived him as achieving wholeness.\textsuperscript{326} We must clearly acknowledge the obvious reason that Goethe achieves the status of greatness for his formidable contribution to the domain of literature. As the son of a solicitor, he was compelled to follow in his father’s footsteps. Yet in the midst of his law studies, he found himself inspired by a group of friends, one of which, was Johann Gottfried Herder, who inspired him on both a literary and on a more general cultural level. At the age of twenty-four, he joined the court of Duke Karl August and Duchess Luise in Weimar where he took on quite a variety of different responsibilities ranging from management of nearby mines and forests, fulfilling his duties as exchequer, engaging in diplomatic missions and later accompanying Karl-August at the forefront of battle. Clearly, Goethe delved in his literary exploits throughout his life but proved to be more or less prolific depending on the time period. In 1786, he left to Italy where he lived as a painter in Rome. At the age of thirty-six, with a substantial amount of his literary endeavours left unfinished, he remained undecided as to which artistic path to undergo, that of the visual arts or literary arts. It was only towards the end of his two year trip throughout Italy that Goethe concluded he lacked the artistic ability to

\textsuperscript{324} TI, \textit{Skirmishes of an Untimely Man}, 49.
\textsuperscript{325} GM, II, 2.
\textsuperscript{326} For Goethe’s biographical references, I rely mostly on John R. Williams’s \textit{Life of Goethe} as well as Goethe’s autobiography.
become a full-fledged painter. Upon his return to Weimar, Goethe embarked upon a significant friendship with Schiller which proved to be inspirational for both men. They held a deep place in their hearts for Ancient Greece viewing it with, an extravagantly idealized perception, the highest cultural, political and intellectual achievement of civilization…It is astonishing that it was precisely during his collaboration with Schiller that Goethe was able, both in spite of and because of Schiller’s criticisms, to complete his work on what he now called his ‘witch’s product’, his ‘nordic phantoms’: Faust Part One. 327

It appears that their tight bond stimulated Goethe to complete the first part of his masterpiece, Faust. Strangely enough, it was only after Schiller passed away that Goethe completed the second and final part of Faust. Schiller would praise Goethe “as the great ‘naïve’ or unreflective genius on a level with Shakespeare and the Ancient Greeks”. 328 Nietzsche would have been on par with this accolade in that one of his well-known attributes of the higher individual involves a kind of unconscious, intuitive or natural approach towards creativity and vis à vis life in general. 329 Goethe and Schiller’s friendship involved a multitude of discussions spanning from dramatic and aesthetic theory to forms of poetic structure involving ballads and epic poetry, from views on art and culture to history. It was also during this time-period that Goethe delved into a long and passionate project to disprove Newton’s colour-theory. Ultimately, Goethe’s challenge against the Newton’s theory that the refraction of white light is made up of all colours of the rainbow remained unsuccessful. From this brief outline of Goethe’s activities in life, we may observe how multi-faceted and diverse his endeavours proved to be. Nietzsche values Goethe for his ability to say ‘Yes’ to many fruitful projects and to many different planes ranging from artistic, scientific and political spheres. Nietzsche’s analysis of Goethe as an exemplar of a higher individual demonstrates how the active living out of one’s passions is not limited by a single specific endeavor – be it artistic, scientific, political, or intellectual.

i. Goethe: A Historical Event

Nietzsche depicts Goethe as a historical event in order to both criticise or praise varying historical periods. In Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche begins his praise

327 Williams (1998), 36.
328 Ibid.
329 In passage 49 of Skirmishes, Nietzsche extols Goethe as a ‘yes-sayer’ and as one ‘who could dare to allow himself the entire expanse and wealth of naturalness’.
of Goethe by describing him as an event in order to portray him as a symbol of eighteenth century naturalism which he venerates. He emphasises the strength and breadth of Goethe’s persona by calling him ‘an event’, one which surpasses German borders sustaining an influential power throughout Europe. The fact that Goethe is understood as an event is explained as an “attempt to overcome the eighteenth century by returning to nature, by coming towards the naturalness of the Renaissance, a type of self-overcoming as part of that century.”

Nietzsche sets up the character of Goethe as a historically conceptualized counter-ideal to the ideology represented throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth century. He vehemently criticises two thinkers born out of the eighteenth century, namely, Rousseau and Kant. Nietzsche repudiates Rousseau’s idealism and undermines the supposed ‘return to nature’ that Rousseau famously advocated. Nietzsche also attacks Rousseau’s concept of equality and consequently the notion upon which it is couched, justice. Nietzsche is deeply cynical of the prospect of establishing equality most probably due to his firm conviction that we are all vastly different from one another due to psychophysiological constitution harbouring a vast array of distinct drives. We must bear in mind that Nietzsche is critical of Enlightenment ideals whether it be the democratic notion of embracing equality, the concept of objectivity, the separation between reason and our psychophysiological constitution, and a priori metaphysical concepts. Nietzsche portrays Goethe as a figurehead of a historical epoch to symbolise a naturalism that he contrasts with the Enlightenment ideals heralded by both Rousseau and Kant.

Nietzsche often opposes Kant throughout his corpus but in this context, he introduces Kant’s faults in juxtaposition to Goethe’s attributes. He positions Goethe against Kant by stating that the former “fought against the separation of reason, sensibility, feeling will (preached in the most forebodingly scholastic way by Kant, Goethe’s antipode).”

Goethe’s ‘return to nature’ is a way of overcoming the split from the rational part of the self with the affective and sensory parts. Nietzsche of course, dismisses the metaphysical idealism advanced by Kant and uses the exemplar of Goethe as the perfect foil. Nietzsche has turned the Kantian idealistic structure on

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330 TI, Skirmishes, 49.
331 Rousseau (1995), Book I. For more discussion on Nietzsche and Rousseau please see Keith Ansell-Pearson’s Nietzsche contra Rousseau: A Study of Nietzsche’s Moral and Political Thought.
332 TI, Skirmishes, 49.
its head – so to speak – in that rather than a set of categorical imperatives from which we may be epistemologically structured, he claims that our unconscious drives play the crucial role of defining who we are, how we think and our conception of values.

As aforementioned, Nietzsche explains that Goethe conveys a unity of reason, sensibility, feeling and will rather than the disjointed self who relies on *a priori* concepts and a transcendental ideology depicted in Kant’s philosophy. In his tirade of criticisms, he opposes Kant’s position of endowing precedence of the rational part of the self and therefore downgrading the affective and physical faculties of the self to a lower rung. In addition, Nietzsche contests the separation of the will in his aforementioned statement, that Goethe “fought against the separation of reason, sensibility, feeling, will.”

In this instance, Nietzsche is discounting the notion that one can have a ‘free will’ separated from our psycho-physiological drives. Upon articulating one of his main tenets – that the concept of a ‘free will’ is implausible – he does so by highlighting the significant role that our unconscious drives and affects play in our conscious awareness of a ‘will’. Furthermore, by the revelation of our complex psychological structures Nietzsche discounts the very possibility that we can have ‘free will’. Nietzsche adds that Kant is affiliated to unreality whilst Goethe is a proponent of reality. Here Nietzsche is again attacking the metaphysical underpinnings upon which Kant lays out his epistemological notions as well as the transcendental notion holding that an individual is determined by pure reason. Nietzsche is not just critical of Kant for upholding ‘unreality’ but for the negative repercussions that arise from holding such an ideology. Consequently, ‘life-denying values’ condemn a naturalistic and cohesive understanding of our psychological self. In addition, a blind eye is turned upon any form of dependency of our affective dispositions, our sensory experience and our general experience *tout court*.

He turns to Goethe, the ‘realist’ to highlight the naturalism through which one can understand the world, the self and the attainment of knowledge through

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333 Ibid.
334 The topic of free will or autonomy is one which Nietzsche gives much attention to throughout a number of his works. His overall project invokes highlighting the key role that our unconscious drives play in the conscious willing. Nietzsche discounts the possibility that we can have a ‘free will’ in this deterministic sense because of our complex psychological structure as well as the force of our unconscious drives that our conscious self is not aware of. However, he advocates a different kind of freedom of will that a higher individual is able to take on if she holds the adequate self-understanding, sense of responsibility, and the capacity to overcome our Judeo-Christian morals. Please see: GM, II, 1, 2; GM, III, 10; GS, 347.
335 BGE, 12.
Nietzsche portrays Goethe as a proponent of naturalism who takes an empirical and realistic view of the world in contrast to Kant and Rousseau whose idealistic and metaphysical worldviews depict an ‘unreal’ understanding of human nature. In addition to criticising Rousseau and Kant, Nietzsche sets out to admonish the eighteenth century as well as the nineteenth century and harkens back to the naturalness exhibited of the Renaissance era.

Nietzsche describes Goethe to be “coming towards the naturalness of the Renaissance…[and]he took as much as he could on himself, to himself, in himself”. Nietzsche’s reference to the Renaissance and its naturalness carries the implication that Goethe espouses the capacity to be a kind of ‘Renaissance man’ or humanist who thrived in a multitude of domains. The Renaissance is known as a period of abundant intellectual and cultural growth which involved the overlapping of a multitude of domains. For instance, Leonardo da Vinci exemplifies this period perfectly in that he achieved excellence in both artistic and scientific domains. His keen interest in the human body lead him to assist in human dissections in order to better understand the human morphology and simultaneously having an influential role in his studies on human proportions. His physiological findings heightened his artistic capabilities in his depiction of human bodies. And the same could be maintained of his sketches of birds which in turn influenced his invention of a ‘flying’ machine. The Renaissance period allowed for the flourishing of excellence in an all-encompassing manner whereby da Vinci flourished in artistic, scientific and engineering domains. Nietzsche esteems the way in which a Renaissance man could thrive in a multitude of different disciplines within this open and comprehensive context. In this instance, we may perceive how Nietzsche espouses the notion of becoming rather than that of a static form of being. If one holds a worldview of ‘becoming,’ it allows for an individual to develop and flourish in his/her endeavours in a continually evolving path which may include several different trajectories whether they are undertaken simultaneously or at different parts of one’s life.

336 Ibid.
337 I address the idea that da Vinci exemplifies a higher model of selfhood that sustains a plurality of master drives at the end of Chapter II.
ii. Wholeness as Achievement

We have now just covered Nietzsche’s idea of totality in the sense of portraying Goethe as a historical event and/or concept. On one hand, we have the idea of unifying psychological drives on a micro-level and the idea that an individual can represent philosophical principles at a macroscopic level. Now, I would like to address how Goethe exemplifies wholeness as both a kind of achievement exemplified by an individual’s successfully unified psyche as well as his/her strong master drives which are successfully expressed through action. Nietzsche states that through much discipline, Goethe constructs himself in such a way that denotes wholeness. In this respect, wholeness is defined by Nietzsche as an achievement. In other words, wholeness is the outcome of somebody who is engaged in disciplining and creating him/herself. In addition, attaining this form of selfhood elicits a kind of completion in a similar manner to an artist who completes a successful work of art. So, what does Nietzsche mean by praising Goethe because he ‘disciplined himself into wholeness [and furthermore] he created himself’? Nietzsche analyses the figure of an artist to demonstrate how creativity may be used in a psychological context. He also draws upon the notion of the creative process which highlights the action that involves the expression of one’s drives. Finally, Nietzsche holds in high esteem Goethe’s ability to master a wide range of endeavours.

Let us explore the idea of creativity and its use within a psychological sphere. Just as Nietzsche explains the idea of ‘disciplining oneself into a whole’, he draws out a similar process in the passage, ‘One thing is needful’,340 whereby an individual endows his/her unique law to overcome weaker drives and flourish through a ‘constraint of a single taste’ to a heightened and more perfect state of being. A singular taste does tie an individual down to stay committed to one unique master drive but implies that an individual all-encompassing taste promotes unity. Rather, it is the singular taste which elicits one’s personal ‘style’ that has an overall orchestration over one’s master drive or set of prominent drives. In the case of Goethe, we have seen the vast array of activities that he delved into aside from being a poet and dramatist. Goethe’s keen interest in the visual arts, in the sciences, and history made him what Nietzsche considers a ‘totality’. This process of self-creation that Nietzsche refers to is clarified by the psychological ‘molding’ or the process of

340 GS, 290.
perfecting exhibited in the key passage, One thing is needful. As aforementioned, I hold the position that there is a coordinated ‘teamwork’ amongst the ‘limited’ conscious endeavour of managing our drives with unconscious shaping executed by a master drive. Although Nietzsche emphasises the role of our unconscious drives he still leaves room for a limited amount of conscious shaping of the self. He explains how our strong drives are placed to the forefront or made sublime. He describes one’s weaker drives as those which he considers ‘ugly’ and maintains that should be overcome or hid away deep in our unconscious. One may ponder how this ‘orchestration’ of our drives is adequately arranged as to optimize the perfection of the self in a similar way to that of creating a beautiful work of art. Let us turn to Nietzsche’s exemplar, Goethe, and notice how he decides to relinquish his project to become a painter in 1790. Goethe allowed for his master drive directed towards literary expression to take the stronghold over one focusing on visual arts. Without the adequate introspection upon himself and his capacities, perhaps Goethe would have lived the life of a mediocre German artist, never achieving excellence on a literary scale. Beauty is no accident: “good taste needs to have provided you with a principle of selection for company, location, clothing, sexual satisfaction; beauty needs to have been given preference over advantage, habit, opinion, inertia. The highest guiding principle: you cannot ‘let yourself go’, even in front of yourself.”

Another manner in which Goethe exemplifies a beautiful ‘wholeness’ by the action of expressing his master drive. Nietzsche esteems the fact that puts himself right in the middle of life implying that he is fully immersed in life’s activities. Nietzsche seeks to underline the key attribute that is evoked by being in the middle of life which implies action. He praises action versus inaction first and foremost because action is an expression of our drives and most often that of our strongest drives. The creative process of writing poetry, drama and novels perfectly demonstrates the self-creation that Nietzsche addresses. Through the creative process of writing, Goethe successfully externalises his unconscious drives. Inactivity, which would involve the repression and frustration of drives, and consequently are turned back against the self, do not get expressed. This psychological phenomenon which that Nietzsche diagnoses most people of the nineteenth century as having is reSentiment. Nietzsche’s

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341 TI, Skirmishes, 47.
342 Ibid, 49.
conception of *ressentiment* is key to understanding that it needs to be overcome in order for an individual’s drives to adequately express themselves through externalized actions.\(^{343}\)

Another point that needs addressing is *how* the creative process helps one attain this kind of accomplishment or perfection. Nietzsche turns to Goethe and his poetic expressions to demonstrate how art serves as a vehicle to promote the development towards a state of perfection. Nietzsche conveys the signification behind the creative process by explaining,

*How meter beautifies.* — Meter casts a veil over reality; it causes various artificialities of speech and obscurities of thought; by the shadow it throws upon thought it sometimes conceals it, and sometimes brings it into prominence. As shadow is necessary to beauty, so the ‘dull’ is necessary to lucidity. Art makes the aspect of life endurable by throwing over it the veil of obscure thought.\(^{344}\)

Nietzsche specifically refers to a letter that Goethe addresses to Schiller in which he defines poetry as ‘casting a veil over reality’. Nietzsche appropriates this aesthetic notion of beauty which hides the terrifying or dark aspects of reality and becomes a leitmotif throughout his exploration of art and beauty. Nietzsche, who often sets up a dichotomy to make a claim, addresses illusion and reality, beauty and ugliness implicitly, dullness and lucidity, and culminates by positing a positive worldview *contra* a life-negating worldview. He explains that the poetic art form has a twofold effect: a. to conceal something perhaps too awful or terrifying to face or b. to reveal something of importance. The implications behind ‘shadow’ which Nietzsche introduces involve some complexities. Nietzsche explains that beauty needs a shadow in the analogous way in which lucidity needs ‘dullness’. Here, he may be alluding that the shadow is the opposite of beauty and thereby refers to it in order to signify ugliness. When one thinks of a shadow, it elicits the characteristic of darkness rather than light. On one level this could work since the beauty expressed through poetry may hide the ugliness by the beautiful poetic form. On the other hand, Nietzsche also claims that the poetic form may also communicate something crucial, the shadow functions as a foil to beauty in order express a key notion. Consequently, in unison the characteristics of beauty and ugliness evoked in the poem inform the reader with a concept of epistemological value. This leads one to the Plato’s reference to shadow

\(^{343}\) GM, I, 10-13; GM, III, 14-16.
\(^{344}\) HH, 15.1.
which he highlights in the *Allegory of the Cave* of the *Republic*.\textsuperscript{345} Plato builds his argument regarding the misconceived notion of true forms by providing the example of people viewing shadows of people projected upon the back wall of a cave are misconceived into thinking they are the shadows of real people when in fact they are merely puppets. His overall claim is that we are ignorant of true forms and that art can only serve as one step away from reality as it is only a *mere copy* of true forms. On one hand, Nietzsche does agree somewhat with Plato in that art is not the truth, but he maintains that the artifice created by the artist serves to veil the awful truth that the world is full of suffering.\textsuperscript{346} As aforementioned, art is conceived in a therapeutic sense, since it helps make ‘life endurable’. Now, on the other hand, Nietzsche does steadfastly oppose Plato’s debasement of art because he does claim that art has the capacity to show us something of crucial significance – something that does indeed have truth to it. In regards to the beautiful in the particular artistic medium of poetry, we can also distinguish the poetic form – whether it is composed in meter or verse – from the poetic content. The form should be executed with excellence within its structure, its rhyme and/or rhythm in order to be deemed beautiful. The content of the poetry may be considered beautiful in the sense it has a joyous or positive subject matter or it may elicit dark, sad and tragic content.

iii. Nature & Unity

Nietzsche, being a proponent of naturalism, is on par with Goethe’s naturalistic approach. Goethe not only exemplified a unified individual on a psychological level according to Nietzsche, but he explicitly laid his worldview of an all-encompassing natural domain spanning from the organic physical world, animal species and human beings. As we have already pointed out, Nietzsche has set up a ‘for and against’ situation in which he places Goethe against Kant in order to contrast a unified worldview with idealistic metaphysics that severs the rational ideal from the ‘lower’ human faculties of affective and sensory dispositions. This worldview splits up the rational humans from animals and the natural world. Nietzsche presents us with the figure of Goethe to *exemplify* his worldview. He explains that Goethe espouses naturalism by saying he demonstrated a “magnificent attempt to overcome

\textsuperscript{345} *Rep*. VII, 512a-518d.

\textsuperscript{346} I discuss the shift Nietzsche makes in his consideration of art making life bearable to a more positive stance in section 4 of Chapter V.
the eighteenth century by returning to nature, by coming *towards* the naturalness of
the Renaissance.” Nietzsche, who vehemently disagrees with such a position,
advocates an espousal of our human drives that contribute to the overall flourishing of
the self – whether they may be physiological, affective, creative or intellectual.
Furthermore, he explains that our drives – especially those from our unconscious –
interact with one another and are co-opted which makes it difficult to extrapolate how
a more refined or heightened drive may be isolated from lesser more basic drives. In
addition, Nietzsche does not discount our more basic drives and instincts but explains
them as crucial in the historical formation of human civilization. In this section, I
shall look at how Goethe’s understanding of a unified natural world overlaps with
Nietzsche’s understanding of naturalism. Nietzsche weaves naturalism into his
portrait of Goethe by referring him as encapsulating a naturalness in a Renaissance
every-man kind of individual. Nietzsche highlights this characteristic to Goethe in
order to show that a psychological whole is conducive to human flourishing, and in
addition, that a continuity is established between a harmonious inner psyche and
external action.

Goethe’s worldview did indeed embrace a naturalistic approach. He viewed
humans as part of a greater unified whole encompassing both an animal and natural
world. Aside from his unified view of the world being expressed in his poetry, his
keen interest in the sciences

was itself based on a quest for the wholeness and integrity of ‘God-Nature’,
for a unifying law or principle that would contain and explain the bewildering
diversity of forms and species in nature. His own cabinets of specimens, the
botanical, zoological and geological collections of the professional scientists,
and his own close observations of forms, were daily evidence of the protean
profusion of nature. But Goethe was enough a child of his own age to hold
almost desperately to the belief in a coherent order and unity in creation; he
was heir to the neo-Platonic doctrine of the Chain of Being, of a continuous
but graduated hierarchy of forms in which humanity had its place – a tradition
that was already under pressure in Goethe’s day, and which would before long
be swept away by a doctrine that also sought to impose unity and coherence,
but in a very different perspective: that of evolution in time.  

In one sense, Goethe’s naturalistic approach holds a striking parallel to Nietzsche in
that he adamantly believes in a link amongst all living beings on earth. Goethe’s
discovery of the intermaxillary jawbone in humans brought him much satisfaction

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347 *Skirmishes*, 49.
348 Williams (1998), 49.
since “he was able to suggest that the great unity of nature therefore applied to the anatomy of both humans and the animals; humanity was physically related to the animal kingdom, though distinct from it in moral, spiritual and intellectual faculties.” However, as it is pointed out in the above passage, Goethe’s neo-Platonist views shows that Goethe may have espoused a form of metaphysics conveyed in his worldview of one unified cosmos. If Goethe does indeed ascribe to a hierarchical notion of ‘forms’ placing human beings at a higher epistemological ranking due to their knowledge of true forms, this would indeed conflict with Nietzsche’s understanding of our psycho-physiological structure that is inclusive of all drives whether they be basic needs or more complex and refined drives. Of course, Nietzsche would maintain that human beings have a higher intelligence than animals but what is at stake for him revolves around the origin of our knowledge and how morals standards are shaped. Nietzsche discounts the metaphysical notion that pure forms or a priori concepts can form our knowledge and morality. Rather than relying on an external metaphysical source, Nietzsche turns within the depths of human psychology to demonstrate how our drives are the force that instigates all action, knowledge and value standards.

Another point regarding Goethe’s view on organic nature which requires further exploration involves the fact that Goethe did believe in pre-Darwinian evolutionary ideas. Upon the finding of bones of an extinct ‘Urstier’, Goethe claims that it is the “ancestor of the modern ox, and quotes with approval the suggestion of a fellow-anatomist that in the thousands of years of development from generation to generation, an ever stronger impulse (Verlangen) for better vision and hearing had led to the modification of the position and structure of the animal’s eye-sockets and ear channels.” In this respect, Goethe stands on a threshold with one foot lodged in the Neo-Platonist worldview and another foot placed in a naturalistic proto-Darwinian evolutionary theory that binds all living beings in unison developing over a prolonged span of time. A contradiction ensues because on one hand epistemologically speaking, one attains knowledge through understanding true forms; and, on another hand, if evolution occurs over time, both humans and animals evolve due to our interplay of physiological makeup and the surrounding habitat. Goethe’s naturalistic approach

349 Ibid.
350 Williams (1998) refers to it as ‘evolution in time.’
351 Ibid., 267.
would also encompass our assimilation of knowledge through sensory and first-hand experience.

Nietzsche also draws out Goethe’s naturalism to explain his position on the relationship between man and nature. Nietzsche asserts that religious ‘laws’ served the purpose of governing the fickle and unstable natural world. He then contrasts this with people of the modern age who have taken on a more lenient stance towards nature in that they are more willing to adapt to its laws. He describes Goethe as a model individual who views nature in this manner. Nietzsche describes this process by saying,

\[\text{[m]an is the rule, nature is irregularity: in this tenet lies the basic conviction that governs primitive, religiously productive ancient cultures. We present-day men experience precisely the reverse: the richer a man feels inwardly, the more polyphonic he is as a subject, the more powerfully nature's symmetry affects him. With Goethe, we all recognize in nature the great means of soothing the modern soul; we hear the stroke of the greatest clock with a longing to rest, to become settled and still, as if we could drink this symmetry into ourselves, and thus come finally to an enjoyment of our own selves…. \]

The meaning of the religious cult is to determine and constrain nature from the benefit of mankind, that is to say to *impress upon it a regularity and rule of law which it does not at first possess*; while in the present age one seeks to *understand* the laws of nature so as to accommodate oneself to them.\(^{352}\)

In this passage, Nietzsche does not go into detail on how Goethe understood nature nor precisely how it was conducive to alleviating one’s soul. He rather maintains that one should espouse nature’s constant state of flux rather than adopting a system of laws that impose a static monistic worldview. Moreover, if one accepts nature’s real state of becoming, Nietzsche claims that one will attain a state of relief. When Nietzsche refers to ‘drinking this symmetry into ourselves’, it is implied that a harmony between nature and the self is established.

Goethe actually expresses the importance of harmony between nature and humanity in his most renowned dramatic work, *Faust*. In the scene of Martha’s Garden of Part I, Gretchen asks Faust to explain to her his religious beliefs, whereby he recounts his own particular form of spirituality. He describes his understanding of God to be like a dynamic force which binds a human life full of feeling with the entire

\(^{352}\) HH, 111.
cosmos. Faust suggests that we need not commit to a particular belief system of the Christian faith but explains he is committed to earthly human feelings of love and happiness that bind us to an all-encompassing natural force.

As Faust questions the Christian God, he simultaneously offers his views of spirituality and nature’s vital forces,

And don’t all things press
On your head and heart,
And weave, in eternal mystery,
Visibly: invisibly, around you?
Fill your heart from it: it is so vast,
And when you are blessed by the deepest feeling,
Call it then what you wish,
Joy! Heart! Love! God!
I have no name
For it! Feeling is all:
Names are sound and smoke,
Veiling Heaven’s bright glow.  

Goethe articulates his view on spirituality through the mouthpiece of Faust to express his understanding of nature as the counterforce that overcomes the force bequeathed by Christian theodicy. Although Faust does not mention action, it is implied by dynamic force and vitality that arise from real life experience. An individual may grasp the nature’s force only through his/her individual experience of external action coupled with internal feeling. In this respect, Goethe and Nietzsche both stand in agreement vis à vis an individual’s experience out of which arise our value standards. Goethe envisions a harmonious whole in which humans are bound to the entire natural world. Nietzsche’s main focus on the question of unity manifests itself on an individual psychological level.

Goethe appears to remain committed to a form of metaphysics involving a natural force – whether it may be called love or care – that binds all humanity into a unified whole. Even if he relinquishes the idea of a Christian God, in this instance, Goethe is unable to forego the metaphysical presuppositions by his dependence on ‘eternal’ notions. Simultaneously, we must bear in mind that Faust may be intentionally evoking a quasi-religious portrait of himself in order to appear pleasing.

353 Faust, I. xvi.
354 Some commentators have criticised Nietzsche for not being able to completely sever himself from Judeo-Christian theodicy since he continues to use language which would imply religious innuendos. For further discussion on this topic, see Robert A. Williams chapter, ‘Nietzsche’s Aesthetic Theodicy’ in his book, Tragedy, Recognition and the Death of God.
to Martha. In regards to Nietzsche’s conception of naturalism let us turn to his idea of unity on a psychological scale. This unity is considered an achievement reserved for an elite few as it necessitates the difficult task of overcoming Judeo-Christian morality and espousing the project of creating one’s own values. Nietzsche’s naturalistic approach does encompass a normative task in so far as it involves seeking one’s individual drives and striving to express them in a manner that is conducive to an individual’s thriving. On the other hand, Nietzsche drops the metaphysical aspect that Goethe alludes to out of the equation – so to speak.

Let us now explore in further depth the question of how Nietzsche’s conception of naturalism is conducive to achieving a unified whole. The notion of unity involves a normative commitment to the acting out of one’s strongest drives in order to attain full flourishing. Other Nietzsche scholars have considered Nietzsche’s conception of will to power as a descriptive claim involving all beings. If this were the case though, Nietzsche would be slipping back to upholding a metaphysical stance that determines our human nature as well as his ethical theory. He has criticised Spinoza for having replaced the idea of ‘God’ with that of ‘nature’ which carries the implication that he remains committed to its metaphysical underpinnings. On the grand scheme of things, Nietzsche often declares his skepticism of any form of metaphysical beliefs but when it comes to the discussion of ‘will to power’ a grey area arises in that Nietzsche remains elusive in answering the question on whether or not ‘will to power’ functions as a substratum of all human drives. I would like to advance the idea that Nietzsche would agree to a psychological metaphysical stance since a. he claims that the self has a soul and b. he claims that our drives play a crucial role in who we are as individuals, in our behavior and our ethical beliefs. Nietzsche would take the position that Goethe faces the same problem as Spinoza, in that he deems nature to function as a force binding all living beings in unison culminating in ‘eternal mysteries.’ He actually agrees with the Spinozist notion of hen kai pen that holds that,

the inseparability of one and all, of God and universe; the eternal creative principle works dynamically through perpetual change, what is created is recreated, what is formed is transformed, stasis is illusory, destruction is a

355 Richardson (2006), 18. A number of scholars choose to leave the topic of ‘will to power’ aside as it mostly arises in Nietzsche’s unpublished notebooks.
condition of survival as the universe regenerates itself in the process of cosmic renewal.\textsuperscript{357}

Nietzsche’s emphasis on naturalism involving human beings as well as the natural world precludes any dependence upon external metaphysical principals but is rather based on empirical observation. Nietzsche’s naturalistic perspective influences his philosophical claims ranging from his theory of perspectival knowing as well as his theory on truth.\textsuperscript{358}

3. Nietzsche, Goethe & Heraclitus

Heraclitus’s notion of unity and multiplicity holds striking similarities to those of both Nietzsche and Goethe. As previously mentioned a tension between the idea of a single unity and advocating the multiplicity or flux may appear as incompatible. Heraclitus’s view on the topic may shed light on Nietzsche’s philosophical project of the recreation of values, his criticism of monistic metaphysics and his conception of the ideal psychological model whereby the optimal channeling of drives leads to human flourishing. On a broader level, Nietzsche draws out his understanding of how the world and human nature unfold in a natural developmental process which resembles Heraclitus’s view. Throughout his corpus, Nietzsche has proven to be a great admirer of Heraclitus. He espouses the Heraclitean worldview of continual flux that contrasts with a monistic form of metaphysics advancing universal principles which determine a rigid conception of the self and inflexible ethical standards. Upon addressing his worldview involving a constant state of becoming, Nietzsche demonstrates a naturalistic perspective of the individual self and his/her surrounding environment. Heraclitus is renowned for imparting a descriptive account of the world as holding a transformative nature, however we must bear in mind that he also places great emphasis upon its unity. How does this notion of one and the ‘many’ concord together in a logical way according to Heraclitus? First, we must bear in mind that at his epoch the metaphysical and the physical domains overlapped. In the time period of the Ancient Greeks metaphysical queries often subsumed the divine whether one

\textsuperscript{357} Williams (1998), 123.
\textsuperscript{358} I do not have room to go further on Nietzsche’s empirical stance which influences his philosophic theories however I do want to make clear that I am in disagreement with Brian Leiter’s reductionist stance on the topic that interprets Nietzsche to claim for a ‘valueless’ objective reality. For further discussion on the topic of Nietzsche’s use of empiricism please see Kail (2015), 212–216.
belonged to polytheistic theodicies or cults. Consequently, Heraclitus may be simultaneously addressing scientific questions on the natural world and its elements, the exploration of human nature, as well as enquiring into a metaphysical notion of a spiritual force which coalesces all nature’s fluctuating phenomena into a unified whole. I shall address how Nietzsche is also influenced by Heraclitus’s explorations on the naturalistic process of becoming ontologically speaking and how it shapes our understanding of the self on a psychological level.

Let us turn to how Heraclitus addresses this question of the multiplicity and how he conceives it to be unified. In Fragment 10, he claims, “[t]hings grasped together: things whole, things not whole; something being brought together, something being separated; something consonant, something dissonant. Out of all things comes one thing, and out of one thing all things." Here, Heraclitus is describing a process in which things can be perceived as multiple, distinct and variegated and simultaneously as one. At first glance, this fragment appears inconsistent yet once we take a birds-eye view which is all-encompassing – or once ‘everything is taken together’ – we may observe how that the natural world or what Heraclitus would call the cosmos is ‘one’, and within it, all living beings are subject to a life of continual change. In his example of eternal fire, Heraclitus also expresses how both the one and the many function together through a constantly evolving process. He defines eternal fire as “the ordered world, the same and all, no god or man made, but it always was, is, and will be, an everliving fire, being kindled in measures and being put out in measures.” Heraclitus considers fire to be one of earth’s primal elements and endows it with an immortal and quasi-formal characteristic. Fire according to Heraclitus held a crucial role of being the first and fundamental element alongside the three other elements of earth, air and water. He simultaneously explains its empirical nature as constantly changing shapes, predominantly either augmenting and diminishing in size. In this sense fire is not only a perceptible phenomenon but also holds a metaphysical force since it is classified as having an ‘immortal’ quality. Geldard clarifies how Heraclitus understood unity and multiplicity to function together in that the conception of the cosmos during that epoch was

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359 Plato belonged to the Orphic cult which was the first instance in Western civilization of the conception of an immortal soul. Plato’s beliefs were expressed in Book X of the *Republic.*


361 Heraclitus (1987), 10. This fragment is found in Aristotle’s *De Mundo* 6.401a10.

conceived as “unity of all that is,” thus revealing that the universe was an all-encompassing phenomenon. Heraclitus understood the relationship between unity and multiplicity as deeply interwoven especially in a naturalistic sense of the cycle of life. In this sense, no tension would have even been conceivable by Heraclitus because unity functions as an all-encompassing ‘one-ness’ which involves a constant state of becoming. Heraclitus elicits this notion by way of an analogy by introducing the bow or the lyre. He states, “[t]hey do not understand how, while differing from, it is in agreement with itself. There is a back-turning connection, like that of a bow or lyre.” Robinson offers an insightful analysis whereby he explains that, “Heraclitus is at pains to stress: the structure of the bow and the lyre, with their fine balance between wood and string, catches something of the balanced structure of the universe, the operation of the bow and the lyre something of the co-ordinated, ‘well-tuned’ operation of the universe.” In the case of the bow we have two forces due to its structure acting in two opposing forces out of which may surface beautiful sounds. If the bow or the lyre is too loose or if it too tight the sounds created are dissonant. However, when the lyre’s strings are appropriately tightened and the arch of the lyre is satisfactorily set up, the music played obtains harmony. Heraclitus explores the notion that harmony is achieved by attaining an equilibrium between varying tensions. The universe as a whole can be conceived in a similar fashion in that harmony is achieved by the coordination of the all its multifaceted and varying elements.

Another manner in which one may grasp the notion of multiplicity within a unified structure is through the analysis of the natural process of germination. One of Goethe’s essays in which he discusses the ‘metamorphosis’ of the leaf addresses the question of unity and multiplicity in quite a Heraclitean manner. In order to elucidate this concept, Goethe discusses how a tree engenders a single leaf. He explains the interrelatedness of singularity and multiplicity through the analogy of the tree and the leaf as such, “[t]he perfect leaf yields in space the imperfect tree, which must of necessity adapt to the flux of conditions to its particular circumstances. And yet, no matter its situation and appearance, it still manifests the perfection of its leaf…. The

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363 Ibid., 7.
364 Heraclitus (1987), F51.
leaf is the Logos of the tree.” Just as the tree naturally grows, so does a human being necessarily develop. The perfect leaf symbolises the potential engendering of a real tree that must grow in a particular environment with the sufficient water and sunlight to thrive. As previously noted, from Goethe’s scientific research in the fields of biology, anatomy, zoology and botany, one can make the assumption that, “[h]e believed as an article of faith there is an ordered harmony and unity in the natural world comprising humankind, the animal kingdom and the rest of organic nature, a harmony that allows the systematic description, categorisation and comparison of natural forms”. Goethe also raises two concepts that involve both a more general unifying principle and vast polarity exemplified throughout the natural world. He ascribed to these “guiding principles of his scientific assumptions [that] the belief in the universal validity of polarity… and of – ‘primal phenomenon,’ the *Urphänomen*.” This concept of *Urphänomen* functions in a way which unifies all the multifaceted and variegated facts of nature. Furthermore, these “certain ‘higher laws which do not reveal themselves through words and hypotheses to the understanding, but [are revealed] through phenomena to the perception. We call them primal phenomena, because we can perceive nothing higher than them. The *Urphänomen* is an observable phenomenon that demonstrates a universal law, it is at once an abstract principle and an empirical fact.” Perceivable phenomena demonstrate a multiplicity, however, once they are scientifically categorized and analyzed into principles they become universals. So, depending on which steps of the entire scientific process – spanning from observation to conceptualisation, an incompatibility between multiplicity and unity dissipates. Goethe’s passion for the sciences support his worldview that throughout the natural world full of rich diversity there lies an all-encompassing unifying power which he defines as primal. In his essay, *Metamorphosis of Plants*, Goethe’s analogy of the tree ties in nicely with Heraclitus’s idea of ‘eternal fire’ which functions through a process which serves as a symbol of unity yet its nature necessarily involves a constant flux involving the rising and subsiding of flames. Although Nietzsche definitely stays clear of allusions to immortality and metaphysical principles that Goethe and Heraclitus allude to, he

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366 Here Geldard is referring to Goethe’s essay *Metamorphosis of Plants* published in 1790.
367 Williams (1998), 264.
368 Ibid.
369 Ibid., 259.
highly praises the process of becoming which they both convey in a naturalistic framework. Nietzsche espouses this developmental process through his exploratory work on the psychological self that continually strives to channel a multiplicity of distinct drives towards a single avenue of perfection.

Nietzsche often praises Heraclitus’s worldview of ‘becoming’ rather than one of fixed ‘being.’ We must consider that Nietzsche turns to Heraclitus as a counter model that may help buttress his attack against the Enlightenment ideology upon which the fixed state of being is deeply engrained. Nietzsche recounts his admiration of Heraclitus by stating, “I had some doubts in the case of *Heraclitus*; I generally feel warmer and in better spirits in his company than anywhere else. The affirmation of passing away and destruction that is crucial for a Dionysian philosophy, saying yes to opposition and war, becoming along with a radical rejection of ‘being’ – all these are more closely related to me than anything else people have thought so far.”370 This worldview which espouses the notion of constant flux sits at the opposite end of the philosophical spectrum of that advanced by philosophers like Kant whose monistic worldview is founded primarily upon a fixed set of universal categorical principles. The idea that the world as well as the self are defined as continually changing may have quite an unsettling effect.371 Nietzsche holds no qualms in this respect and aims to show that the world and the state of humanity makes more sense when understood from a perspective of continual development. Moreover, Nietzsche takes on the similar stance to that of Heraclitus of probing and instigating his readers to accept a world – or cosmos for the later – that is in a continual state of becoming. In this context, Nietzsche tries to convince his readers to affirm a worldview which is grounded upon the ‘for and against’ and which functions in a strikingly similar vein to Heraclitus’s worldview.372 Both philosophers depend on this dialectical way of thinking in which the ‘for’ is determined by the ‘against’. In other words, the positive claim generates from the argument against a certain position. Nietzsche hails this process of dialectical tension as a more convincing and correct worldview involving continual flux. According to Nietzsche the field of philosophy itself holds the capacity to unify distinct and contrasting positions through its dialectic process.

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370 EH, BT 3
371 Perhaps the very impetus for which many philosophers have gravitated towards adopting fixed metaphysical principles involve the fact that it proves to be more reassuring than a worldview that involves constant change.
372 Heraclitus (1987), F10, F12, F26, F30, F52, F60, F86.
I would like to further elucidate the notion of how unification functions to coalesce a vast multiplicity by turning to another of Heraclitus’s fragments. He uses the metaphor of the river in Fragment 49 which further clarifies how diversity may be unified. He says that, ‘[w]e step and do not step into the same rivers; we are and are not.’ So the river – as part of the universe – remains a continually flowing body of water conceived as a river however one cannot step into the same river twice in that its waters are never exactly the same, that is to say that, it flows slower or faster, holds more or less minerals or appears cloudier or clearer, etc.. In other words, life is like a river in that it is a context through which we humans live. The river and life both have a kind of general uniformity. In the case of a river it is a flowing body of water flanked by land. Life is a natural biophysical process which is experienced by beings – encompassing multicellular organisms like humans, animals or plant life and/or unicellular organisms like protozoa or bacteria. Nietzsche clearly would agree with one of Heraclitus’s most renowned quotes as he ascribes to the worldview of continual flux. Heraclitus makes the implicit descriptive claim that the universe exists as a unified entity but within that concept is couched another descriptive claim: that the universe – its natural environment and its inhabitants – is in a state of continual becoming. Heraclitus is not only limiting his claim to the natural world but it equally encompasses the human psychological condition. Geldard states that Heraclitus was “less concerned with society and the laws of nature than with inner truth and the discovery of the ways in which human beings can affect a kind of alchemical transformation of their being into communion with the Supreme or Absolute Self.”
Nietzsche not only concurs with Heraclitus’ claim about the natural world but furthermore ascribes a continual development to the human condition whether it involves epistemological capacities or the psychological self. In a sense, Nietzsche would take Heraclitus’s fragment one step further by stating that it’s not just the river’s contents that are in continual flux but we, as individual selves, are equally continually developing. Nietzsche’s view of perspectivism allows for one to develop his/her knowledge building on previous worldview or principles in a cumulative sense. He states that, “there is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective ‘knowing’; and the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes,

373 Heraclitus (1987), F12.
374 Ibid., 9.
we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our ‘concept’ of this thing, our ‘objectivity,’ be.” In addition, Nietzsche’s outline of the psychological structure functions along similar lines in the sense that each individual’s unique set of variegated drives thus affects his/her experience in a unique way.

Nietzsche not only considers that the world is in constant flux to be true but as a positive attribute since it allows for the human condition to be conceived as a potential for development towards self-perfection. On a psychological plane, the human self is not defined by pre-fixed nor limited drives but rather as a conglomeration of drives that have the potential to be channeled in a way that promotes self-flourishing. Nietzsche’s position fits squarely with Goethe’s worldview in that he espouses naturalism. Let us turn to Goethe’s poem ‘Eins und Alles,’ – One and All – where he focuses on the subject of creation, destruction and the state of becoming. In the latter half of the poem, he relates his personal worldview as,

To take what’s made and then re-make it,
To fight rigidity and break it,
Eternal living action quest.
What never was grows real and fuller,
As pure clean suns, as worlds with colour,
And in becoming never rest.
It must all move, make new creations
First take form, then transformation;
For moments it just seems held fast.
In all thing’s life’s perpetuated,
And all must be annihilated
That existence strives to last.

Both creativity and destruction play a fundamental role in the world’s state of becoming. Action is also highlighted to be a dynamic engendering of the transformative process. Here Goethe demonstrates that the world unfolds in an energetic dialectic of creativity and destruction from which ensues all natural life as well as human activities through life. He depicts the human approach towards the process of becoming as involving a ‘quest’ or striving which further supports the notion of the self’s constant project of self-perfection through his/her endeavours. Goethe’s stance on the perpetual state of becoming shows a strong parallel to

375 GM, III, 12
Heraclitus’s worldview involving an incessant state of becoming that presupposes creation and destruction. We can further observe how Goethe’s naturalism manifests throughout his scientific studies. Goethe formulates the idea that all living beings were unified by one underlying natural law with his theory that humans were bound to the animal world.\footnote{Williams (1998), 266.} In the late eighteenth century, Goethe as well as other thinkers advanced some pre-Darwinian evolutionary ideas. Goethe has denied creationism and put forth the idea that “organic life originated from the water.”\footnote{Ibid.} He also stated that the extinct Urstier was the ancestor of the modern ox which also holds some pre-Darwinian notions of the evolution of species.\footnote{Ibid.} Goethe’s findings involve the observation of evolution but they do not explain the reason for which species evolve – i.e. through survival of the fittest coupled with adaptation to the surrounding environment.\footnote{Darwin (1869), 67-69, 186.} So development plays an instrumental role for Goethe who advances the notion that humans are in a state of continual flux that paves the road towards the development of self-perfection.

How does this notion of flux concord with Nietzsche’s and Goethe’s conception of psychological unity? This question broaches upon the general enquiry of this chapter that explores how Nietzsche conceives of a unity amongst such a vast group of diverse drives. Nietzsche’s and Goethe’s naturalistic worldviews influence their theory of development of the self in the determination of one’s potential to flourish just as he/she may stagnate in a degenerate state. Nietzsche claims that unity of the self is an achievement of a harmonious orchestration of a multitude of diverse drives. Goethe’s own life portrays the perfect exemplar of a self-endowed individual with a comprehensive set of varied interests and talents – spanning from poetry, painting, drama, and the sciences. We have also seen how he was able to master his artistic as well as scientific activities all the meanwhile fulfilling his duties required of the court of Weimar ranging from diplomatic missions to the management of surrounding lands. Nietzsche extols Goethe’s capacity to ‘create himself’ and uses him as an exemplar to inspire higher individuals to take on a similar feat of unifying their vast panoply of drives into a harmonious state of continual flourishing.
We have also seen how Nietzsche weaves Heraclitus’s notion of flux and unity throughout his notions of the self. Even if Heraclitus attributes unity to a grander cosmological context, I have demonstrated that his view that unity which harmonizes a world of continual flux has proven to be instrumental to Nietzsche’s philosophy. Not only does Nietzsche praise Heraclitus as a thinker but we may perceive how he attributes the Heraclitean formula of unity amongst ‘polarity’ to his understanding of human development on a psychological scale as well as regarding his notion of creativity. Through the examination of Nietzsche’s exemplars of Stendhal, Goethe and Heraclitus I show how Nietzsche uses these figures as a higher self but more importantly to pave the way for the evaluation of values.
Chapter V

Who am I? Nietzsche as his own Model of Selfhood

Throughout the autumn months of 1888, the year before his collapse in health, Nietzsche produced the autobiographical work entitled, *Ecce Homo*. In this chapter I shall be exploring how Nietzsche offers an introspective account of his personal experience as a thinker, poet and artist. His own self-analysis allows for the opportunity to further understand how he fleshes out the notions of creativity and artistry and particular aesthetic notions to evoke an ideal model of selfhood coupled with life affirmation. I shall offer an account of how Nietzsche weaves together an exemplar through his own introspective analysis. I shall then address how he views artistry and he uses it as a vehicle to illustrate both the revaluation of values and life affirmation. Then Nietzsche’s own expressive style which blurs the lines between philosophy and poetry shall be explored. The way in which Nietzsche communicates is crucial in that he does not need to tell his readers how and what they need to do, but since he has arrived at a point in his life where he feels like he has fully realized his potential, he is able to show readers that his own persona exemplifies ideal selfhood. I elaborate on Nehamas's stance that Nietzsche exemplifies an 'instance' of greatness through the autobiographical work of *Ecce Homo*, by taking the position that Nietzsche offers a prescriptive account of life-affirmation but also exemplifies it through his self-reflexive writings. Finally, I explore how Nietzsche uses aesthetic notions to ground his conception of life affirmation. He explores features of artistry to convey life-affirming ideas couched in the creative struggle, embracing our genuine psychological natures and cultivating a sense of self-love.

Early on in *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche states, “when I measure myself by what I can do, not to mention what will come after me, a revolution, a construction without equal, I have better claims to the word ‘great’ than any mortal.”

Aside from the ostentatious tone of Nietzsche’s declaration, we may capture the significance of his project on a general scale. His broader project involves overcoming the ‘modern’

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384 Nietzsche may sound shockingly confident of himself as he personifies a ‘super-human’ portrait of himself. Some have said that at this point in his life he had already portrayed some traits of insanity which were symptomatic of his probable case of syphilis. However, Nietzsche often attempts to shock
conception of Judeo-Christian morality as well as the revaluation of one’s values. When he underlines the oncoming ‘revolution’ and attributes ‘greatness’ to his own being, we may deduce that the sheer volume of such an enterprise can only be achieved by one who encapsulates such ‘greatness.’

As is often the case, Nietzsche goes onto portraying himself as a kind of counter-ideal of modern individuals who he deems as sick calling them ‘incurable non-humans who take revenge on life.’ But let us return to how he builds this counter-ideal by the positive characterisations of himself, elaborating that,

[anyone who saw me during the seventy days this fall when working without break, I created things of only the highest caliber, things that nobody will surpass — or anticipate — with a responsibility for all the millennia to come; nobody who saw me then would notice a single trace of tension, but rather an overflowing freshness and cheerfulness…I do not know any other way of handling great tasks then as play: a sign of greatness, this is an essential presupposition.]

Here again, Nietzsche’s self-portrait is evinced in the most attractive light to the point of declaring that his creations are unsurpassable. I would like to draw attention to how he describes his creative process as tension-free and having ‘overflowing freshness and cheerfulness.’ The theme of abundance and overflowing ‘energy’ is one that arises throughout his corpus, and in this instance, he exemplifies the very attitude that he has endorsed as an attribute of the life-affirming approach. Nietzsche invites his readers to visualise the attitude, his good health and the general atmosphere with which he delves into his creative endeavors.

1. Nietzsche as Genius

I shall now explore how Nietzsche’s introspective analysis holds many similar traits to his conception of genius. One crucial point in the above passage that I would like to draw upon involves Nietzsche’s approach towards ‘great’ tasks as ‘play’. Upon first glance, ‘play’ calls to mind a fun and enjoyable process that encompasses the

his readers by using ‘provocative’ language and in this case, I think it has the sought-after effect of highlighting the important task of overcoming the modern morality.

Some scholars counter this ‘Nehamasesque’ reading in that Nietzsche does not aim for himself nor his writing to be representative of a work of art. See, Leiter (2006) 92. EH, Why I am so Clever, 10

Ibid.

Upon his analysis on these questions of artistry, he often focuses on the importance of abundant and overflowing energy. See TI, What I Owe to the Ancients, 4 & 5. TI, Skirmishes of an Untimely Man, 20.
light and airy characteristics of a quasi-childlike game. However, if explored a bit further, this endeavor that is described as playful enterprise rather than an arduous task exemplifies a kind of genius. Nietzsche’s notion of genius is one who is armed with more than craft or much toil in order to successfully produce a substantial piece of work. Nietzsche’s understanding of genius is rather founded upon the strength of one’s drives and more importantly the master drive which arises from deep in the unconscious. He aligns genius with an artistic essence that is dependent upon inspiration which generates from amongst one’s innermost drives. Aaron Ridley draws out the comparison between Kant and Nietzsche’s conceptions of genius. He points out, that on one hand, there are certain aesthetic laws that one should follow in order to skillfully create a beautiful work of art. On another hand, there are the ‘unformulable’ rules that the genius holds whereby the achievement of beauty is realized through artist’s expression of his/her innermost drives. He explains how “more than merely competent artistry requires both conscious deliberation and whatever it is that allows the genius to go further. It is this ‘whatever it is,’ I suggest, that Nietzsche not implausibly glosses as the ‘secret work and artistry of [his] instinct.’ Nietzsche is in agreement with Kant’s notion that a ‘genius’ who is able to create a beautiful work of art according to unformulable laws – which he defines as ‘nature gives the rule to art’. Although he adamantly opposes Kant’s aesthetic concepts on frequent accounts, Nietzsche does agree with the single non-conceptual aesthetic explanation of genius specifically in that it is founded upon one’s natural abilities. Another key characteristic of Kant’s notion of genius which Nietzsche does support involves the idea that the genius functions as an exemplar. Kant explains that,

Genius, according to these presuppositions, is the exemplary originality of the natural endowments of an individual in the free employment of his cognitive faculties. On this showing, the product of a genius (in respect of so much in this product as is attributable to genius, and not to possible learning or academic instruction) is an example, not for imitation (for that would mean the loss of the element of genius, and just the very soul of the work), but to be followed by another genius-one whom it arouses to a sense of his own originality in putting freedom from the constraint of rules so

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389 Ridley (2013), 420. In this section, Ridley resolves the apparent tension between the conscious deliberate acts of the artist and the acts which are expressions of the artist/genius’s unconscious drives. 390 CJ, §46. 391 See BGE,188 whereby Nietzsche introduces these aesthetic laws that ‘defy all formulation through concepts’.
into force in his art that for art itself a new rule is won—which is what shows a talent to be exemplary.\textsuperscript{392}

Kant elaborates that a genius sets the stage for the development of future geniuses in the making. However, one must bear in mind that imitation and ‘following’ are made distinct. Kant condemns any type of imitation whereby an individual would need to ascribe to a set of required steps or approach the creative process with a formulaic methodology. Nietzsche subscribes to Kant’s defining feature of the genius as he too greatly depends on the use of exemplars throughout his corpus.

Nietzsche’s self-portrait of himself as genius is drawn out to show himself as an exemplar to his readers. His approach involves articulating a model of selfhood based upon an openness to our strongest drives, stemming from the depth of our unconscious, which is then coupled with the artistry of forming these drives into their successful and beautiful expressions. Nietzsche’s reference to himself exemplifying genius demonstrates how his persona embarks on ‘elevated tasks’ are set in a context to show how he has overcome life-denying ethics and embraces both the revaluation of values and life-affirmation. In a more political context, he declares that, “finally when on the bridge between two centuries of decadence, a force majeur of genius and will became visible, strong enough to create a unity of Europe.”\textsuperscript{393} Nietzsche encapsulates the qualities of a genius involving originality, strength and courage in order to incite his readers to embark a new and adventurous form of existence founded upon a more ‘positive’ ethical framework.

Let us explore further how Nietzsche considers himself as a genius. In the section, entitled \textit{Why I am a Destiny}, Nietzsche states in an ostentatiously grand tone how his form of genius functions,

\begin{quote}
But my truth is \textit{terrible}: because \textit{lies} have been called truth so far. — \textit{Revaluation of all values}: that is my formula for an act of humanity’s highest self-examination, an act that has become flesh and genius in me. My lot would have it that I am the first \textit{decent} human being, that I know myself to be opposing the hypocrisy of millennia…I was the first to \textit{discover} the truth because I was the first to see — \textit{to smell} – \textit{lies for what they are}…My genius is in my nostrils…I contradict as nobody has ever contradicted before, and yet in spite of this I am the opposite of a nay-saying spirit. I am a \textit{bearer of glad tidings} as no one ever was before.\textsuperscript{394}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{392} CI, §49.  
\textsuperscript{393} EH, \textit{Case of Wagner}, 2.  
\textsuperscript{394} EH, \textit{Why I am a Destiny}, 1.
In this case, the genius holds one of the most crucial criteria of holding the capacity to overcome the life-denying qualities of the past millennia by the revaluation of all values. He sees himself as achieving this incredibly challenging task. Another criterion for his definition of genius involves distinguishing truth from falsehood. For this particular enterprise, he explains that he makes the distinction by using his sense of sight and smell. Here we may view Nietzsche taking on a quasi ‘poetic license,’ with the use of intentionally embellished language. This expressive tone renders the form of his words into something beautiful in order to sway all his readers to respond affectively to his message. Finally, in this process of overcoming one must not only be a ‘nay-sayer’ nor a very astute criticiser but must simultaneously espouse the ethos of the ‘yes-sayer,’ carrying forth a positive attitude towards his/her new values and towards life in general. Moreover, Nietzsche is alluding to subscribing to the attitude of life-affirmation. Nietzsche elaborates on the topic by stating, “I am acquainted with incredibly elevated tasks, where even the concept of these tasks has been lacking so far.” Yet another feature that Nietzsche alludes to here and which is a generally accepted definition involves the fact that a genius is singled out through his/her originality vis à vis the rest of people as achieving ‘greatness.’

Let us conclude this section dedicated to Nietzsche’s analysis of the genius from a third-person perspective rather than a first-person perspective addressing the question of the genius’s potential as a source of inspiration for others. In Daybreak, Nietzsche enthusiastically explains that

the most beautiful still appear[ing] only in the dark, and sinks, scarcely born, into eternal night – I mean the spectacle of that strength which employs genius \textit{not for works} but for \textit{itself as a work}; that is, for its own constraint, for the purification of its imagination, for the imposition of order and choice upon the influx of tasks and impressions. The great human being is still, in precisely the greatest thing that demands reverence, invisible like a too distant star: his \textit{victory over strength} remains without eyes to see it and consequently without song and singer. The order of rank of greatness for all past mankind has not been determined.
Having been written seven years prior to *Ecce Homo*, we may discern how according to Nietzsche the revaluation of values remains a great project that awaits to be ‘determined,’ whereas in *Ecce Homo*, he depicts himself as achieving the rank of genius ‘in order to elevate mankind and embrace creation of values.’ In other words, as before the revaluation of values was still a project in the making, in *Ecce Homo* Nietzsche articulates his ethical project from the first-person perspective which further supports that he fulfills the role of exemplar for his readers. Nietzsche’s embodiment of the figure of genius functions as a way of communicating to his readers the way in which to pave the road towards greatness.

I would like to focus upon an example whose works are not aesthetic but involve the scientific genius, Albert Einstein. In this particular instance, we may observe how challenging it may be to overcome one’s preconceived ideas and their underlying values. In 1916, upon developing his theory of gravity Einstein noticed according to his calculations the universe should be expanding. Due to a preconceived notion that dated back to more than two thousand years, Einstein made the assumption that the universe should be static. As a consequence, he added the cosmological constant ‘Δ’ to his formula of the general theory of relativity. Some have called this Einstein’s ‘greatest blunder.’ Only in 1929, when Hubble was able to discern through the Hubble telescope that the universe is expanding, did Einstein strike the constant out of his formula. It is precisely the realisation that the universe is indeed expanding that I would like to align with Nietzsche’s project of the reevaluation of values. He vehemently criticises the fact that the Judeo-Christian morality has negatively influenced who we are as individuals, our values and how we perceive the world. Moreover, just like Einstein held a preconceived notion of a ‘static’ universe, Nietzsche deems that modern people are at a detrimental position due to their preconceived notions of the self, morality and consequently their general worldviews. To elaborate on this parallel, Nietzsche would also agree that a psychological telescopic apparatus – so to speak – would be required to overturn our conception of self and our value standards just as Hubble’s telescopic proved to right Einstein’s ‘blunder,’ instantiating a reversal back to his initial formula that the
universe is indeed expanding. Einstein is an example of a person who suffers from the very ailment that Nietzsche brings to light, that is to say, a preconceived notion that our universe is defined by a static and perfect state. In *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche announces to his readers that his revelatory writings shall expose our past misconceptions of ourselves and our ethical standards. He invites his readers to question their ‘misconceptions’ by probing them, ‘if you want a quick idea of the extent to which everything was standing on its head before I came along, just begin with this essay. What the word ‘idols’ on the title page means is quite simply what had been called truth so far. *Twilight of the Idols* - in plain language: the end of old truth.” In his last published works, Nietzsche has adopted the role of genius as a vehicular tool to exemplify the process of overcoming coupled with the characteristics of strong drives, courage, and originality.

2. Nietzsche and Artistry

The aesthetic notion of artistry co-relates to key features of Nietzsche’s positive ethics. I shall address how Nietzsche’s use of artistry informs his life-affirming ethical view. Let us consider how Nietzsche envisages himself adopting the role of the ‘artist’ in order to demonstrate greatness, and consequently showing his readers what it takes to revalue our values. He asks his readers whether,

anyone at the end of the nineteenth century ha[s] a clear idea of what poets in strong ages called *inspiration*? If not, I will describe it…You listen, you do not look for anything, you take, you do not ask who is there; a thought lights up in a flash, with necessity, without hesitation as to its form, - I never had any choice. A delight whose incredible tension sometimes triggers a burst of tears, sometimes automatically hurries your pace and sometimes slows it down; a perfect state of being outside yourself, with the most distance consciousness of a host of subtle shudders and shiverings down to the tips of your toes…

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400 Nietzsche’s frequent reference to a perspectival ‘distance’ that one needs to take in order to both achieve an adequate perception of oneself as well as realize the life-denying characteristic of modern morality.

401 EH, *Twilight of the Idols*, 1. I would like to add in a parenthetical commentary that the title in German, Gotzen-Dammerung, seems like a play on words on the last cycle Wagner’s ‘Ring Cycle’, Gotterdammerung, which means the Twilight of the Gods. We can make the assumption that Nietzsche is making a surreptitious criticism of Wagner who he attacks for embracing religion again. In regards to *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche is highlighting the end of era in which humanity unconsciously adopt Judeo-Christian values and calls for the revaluation of values.

402 EH, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 3.
Nietzsche evokes the poet’s inspiration as a passive ‘conscious’ stance which allows for feelings, drives and ideas to arise and trigger a reactive artistic response. Conscious deliberation is simply not permissible here when Nietzsche avows that he ‘never had any choice,’ and refers to a state of ‘most distant consciousness’. At first glance we may discern the opposing stances that Nietzsche takes when on one hand he claims that one must take on a passive stance in order to allow the expression of one’s unconscious drives and on the other hand, he clearly states that one must equally form and shape his/her drives in order to stylize himself or produce a ‘great’ work of art like that of giving style to one’s character.\(^{403}\) I take the position that even if he emphasises the role of the unconscious drives he ultimately endorses that both consciousness and unconsciousness play important roles in ‘becoming who you are’ or the ideal formation of the self in different respects. When discussing the overall unity of the self, he does indeed suggest that one have a minimal role in shaping and forming one’s self. However, in allowing for a genuine self to thrive in an optimal mode, one must allow for the innermost drives of our unconscious to develop in the way in which he describes poetic inspiration. In this description of the poetic ‘genius,’ Nietzsche calls for one to let go of consciousness in order for artistic inspiration to flourish through the expression of moving emotions, instinctive rhythmic relations, evocative word use, and the visual effects of the use of metaphor all amounting to beautiful poetry. He further adds, “Here you ride on every metaphor to every truth. Here words and word-shrines of all being jump up for your; all being wants to become a word here, all becoming wants to learn to speak from you – This is my experience of inspiration”\(^{404}\)

A significant factor to be explored involves the stance of the artist within the creative process. Nietzsche illuminates his readers with this crucial shift from the perspective of the ‘spectator’ to that of the ‘artist.’ He argues against the cool and distant position of the spectator upheld in Kantian and Schopenhauerian aesthetics. Nietzsche disagrees with Kant’s notion a work of art’s beauty can trigger pleasure from a disinterested point of view. Nor does he agree with Schopenhauer that beautiful art can help pause human suffering that generates the incessant striving of the will or the constant spinning of the ‘wheel of Ixion.’\(^{405}\) Nietzsche’s shift of

\(^{403}\) GS, 290; GS, 335; BGE, 188.
\(^{404}\) EH, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 3.
\(^{405}\) WWI I, 220.
perspectives highlights the key issue of what it means to genuinely appreciate a work of art. He does not ask of his readers to become artists but to place themselves in the position of the artist which is a necessary feature in order transfer artistic engagement to the ethical realm of revaluation of values. Reginster states that “[i]t suggests, in particular, that the significance of art is to be found less in its products than in the creative activity by which they are produced.”

An artist’s positive attributes reveal how crucial it is to adopt an artist’s perspective for a successful revaluation of values. As he explores the role of the philosopher, Nietzsche turns to the attributes of the artist in order to carry his point across on the question of freedom of will and necessity. In the creative process, Nietzsche claims that both freedom of will and necessity work together as one. He describes this process by saying,

[artists] seem to have more sensitive noses in these matters, knowing only too well that precisely when they no longer do anything ‘voluntarily’ but do everything of necessity, their feeling of freedom, subtlety, full power, of creative placing, disposing, and forming reaches its peak – in short, that necessity and ‘freedom of the will’ then become one in them.

Nietzsche is demonstrating the complex faculties of the psyche in which both unconscious drives sublimate and seek expression when he refers to artists not doing anything ‘voluntarily but out of necessity.’ In addition to stating that the artists feel free, Nietzsche provides the list of feelings ranging from: subtlety, full power, creative placing, disposing, and finally, forming. So, throughout the active engagement of creating art, the artist remains passive so that he/she no longer voluntarily – nor consciously – makes a clear-cut decision regarding each and every creative step in the process of the production a work of art. Yet at the same time, these feelings of ‘full power,’ ‘creative placing,’ ‘disposing,’ and ‘forming’ all point to the artist’s active engagement in the creative process. At first glance, Nietzsche’s claim appears implausible in that one can submissively accept ‘necessity’ as a governing principle and yet the artist does indeed actively shapes and forms the work of art. However, upon closer inspection it is the actual artistic process of engagement that paves the road through which both necessity and freedom of will both actively

407 BGE, 213.
functioning together. The feeling that is crucial in Nietzsche’s description of genuine artistry is termed as ‘creative placing,’ and reveals that within a creative context the agent does involve a kind of letting go to a certain extent which allows for unconscious drives to surface from their depth and seek expression. Another key point involves Nietzsche’s articulation of the importance of knowing how to be a philosopher from ‘experience.’ Experience – whether it occurs within a philosophical context or artistic – is absolutely crucial in the unified orchestration between the freedom of will and necessity. Nietzsche’s definition of artistry involves both a ‘letting go’ and passiveness for our unconscious drives to seek expression and simultaneously allowing for the artist to shape the work of art in conjunction with the ‘unconscious’ inspiration. It is worth expounding on how Nietzsche aims to restructure our conception of the self that involves a ‘letting go’ of our preconceived notions of ‘free will’ in order for our subconscious drives to be valued and enable their full expression, while simultaneously, allowing a limited amount of conscious engagement with our drives.

Schacht discusses how Nietzsche uses the theme of artistry to highlight his broader ethical project involving the creation of new values. Schacht states,

In sum: beyond all it has been and has meant in peoples’ lives and has done to sustain and stimulate life, and notwithstanding all that may be rudimentarily human in it and all-too-human about it, art has fostered and continues to promote the cultivation of human abilities and possibilities reaching beyond the confines of its established sphere of activity and experience. And in so doing it prepares the way for the emergence of this higher form of human life, which would be at once its supersession and its consummation.409

Schacht points to Nietzsche’s use of artistry not to focus on aesthetic questions tout court but to reveal the ethical problems embedded in modern society and help a certain few to overcome the societal ‘confines.’ Nietzsche often portrays himself as a quasi-artist with overflowing energy, who is both stimulated by artists and beautiful works of art and stimulates others through the creation of beautiful poetical philosophical works. Finally, Nietzsche’s focus on the figure of the artist reveals life enhancement from the innermost core of his/her being through the expression of the thriving master drives.

408 Ibid.
1. The Philosopher Poet

Nietzsche is often critical of how philosophy is conducted in modern times. He vehemently attacked the role of metaphysics that increasingly grew as a philosophical tendency since Plato. He rather sees himself a ‘free spirit’ or a philosopher who takes ‘thinking… as something light, divine, closely related to dancing and high spirits.’\footnote{BGE, 213.} He expresses himself in quite a unique fashion through an aphoristic format and often relies on drawing out analogies and metaphors to convey his ideas. I would like to explore Nietzsche’s writing style through which we may discern how he relies on ‘style’ to play an instrumental role in driving his philosophical point.

*Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, the most poetic of all his works, is written in such a fashion as to invite his readers into the midst of a poetic narrative and more easily captivate their attention towards Nietzsche’s project of overcoming Judeo-Christian morality. In this passage of *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche asks of his readers to reconsider *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* as if it were a piece of music. He reminisces, “[t]hat day I went through the woods to the lake of Silvapana; I stopped near Surlei by a huge, pyramidal boulder. That is where this thought came to me. – Counting backwards a couple of months from that day from that day, I see it was foreshadowed by a sudden and most profoundly fatal change in my taste, above all in music. Perhaps the whole of *Zarathustra* can be considered music; - certainly a rebirth in the art of *hearing* was one of its preconditions.”\footnote{EH, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, I.} Nietzsche’s *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is now being redefined as a form of music. Why would Nietzsche who already converges philosophy and poetry, now ask his readers to view his writings as if it were music?

In this particular context, he seeks to communicate to his readers that one must learn the art of *hearing*. Nietzsche often turns his attention to one’s senses in order to highlight the kind of subtle receptivity one can tap into in order to either cultivate their inner drives, revaluate values and/or overcome Judeo-Christian morality. When Nietzsche suggests that we need to cultivate the art of hearing he is implicitly asking his readers to experience *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* aesthetically. He asks of his readers to shift perspectives – from that of reading a philosophical work to experiencing a work of art. In a sense, Nietzsche is positioning us in an aesthetic context through...
which we may relax, appreciate and engage with his words ‘as if’ they were a musical piece. He clearly does not consider Zarathustra to actually ‘be’ music but takes his ‘poetic’ license – so to speak – in order to allow his readers to make this shift. He calls for his readers to imagine Zarathustra in a musical context rather than as a literary and philosophical narrative. If considered from a musical context, what more can it bring to his readers one may wonder? Again, we must ask why Nietzsche persuades his readers to understand Zarathustra as a musical art form? In a sense, he asks of his readers to make a shift from the preconceived notion of a ‘spectator’ into one that can engage with the work of art. Taking into consideration the deep place he designates to music, Nietzsche asks his readers to perceive his work as if it were a piece of music in order for it to be even more poignant and moving. The artistic medium of music has much to offer on that front in terms of its ability to particular effective manner of evoking emotions. Furthermore, Nietzsche seeks to provoke an even more poignant emotional response to his readers and by requesting to read the poetically rendered words of Zarathustra as if they were music he achieves just this. He isn’t so much interested in having his work received in a merely cognitive nor a ‘logically’ viable way but rather strives to convince his readers through getting them to also respond on an affective level. What can the art of hearing accomplish one may wonder? If Nietzsche asks of his readers to cultivate this auditory art it seems that he is asking of us to develop our perspective into a more intersubjective spectator. Nietzsche does not isolate aesthetics as a contained realm but explores the questions of beauty, artistry, and creativity in correlation to explore the broader ethical questions of revaluating values and life affirmation. Nor should Nietzsche’s request to develop this art of hearing in Ecce Homo may be limited to the reception of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, but it is relevant for many of the works throughout the Nietzschean corpus where his artistic style makes a strong impact upon to his readers’ affects.

Nehamas offers the interpretation that Nietzsche’s philosophy as well as the world should be understood as a work of art. He demonstrates how this unfolds vis à vis his view of perspectivism. Nehamas states that “[a]s in the literary case, so in the world, according to Nietzsche, to reinterpret events is to rearrange effects and therefore to generate new things. Our ‘text’ is being composed as we read it, and our
readings are new parts of it that will give rise to further ones in the future." 412 Perspectivism supports Nehamas’s claim that one must continually re-interpret the world as if it were a literary work of art with regards to Nietzsche’s project which calls for a reinterpretation of the Judeo-Christian worldview. However, it would not be cogent with Nietzsche’s shaping of a new positive ethics. Quite to the contrary, Nietzsche uses aesthetic notions to build a robust ethical foundation which should not be susceptible to continual reinterpretation. His ethical project is constructed to allow for a firm positive grounding upon which an individual may face life’s adversities with the necessary courage and strength to strive through his/her particular activities. In addition, Nehamas’s view that the Nietzschean corpus should be considered as works of art appears as a bit exaggerated. Came points out that Nehamas claimed that, “Nietzsche saw the whole world as a literary work….which relies very heavily on an exclusively literary model, a reliance which sits ill with Nietzsche’s enthusiasm for…the plastic and performing arts.” 413

Nietzsche’s philosophical writing style does indeed blur with artistic styles of literature and poetry, but is seems more plausible to claim that it is done so in order to seduce us back to life – so to speak. Nietzsche seeks to inspire his readers with literary use of various analogies and metaphors. His style tactfully shapes the form and content of his philosophical ideas with the technique of a rhetorician who deploys emotive language to invite the engagement of his readers. Furthermore, by provoking his readers on an affective level, he shows the crucial role that our affects play in one’s knowledge. 414

The view I offer of Nietzsche’s portrayal of himself in Ecce Homo should not be considered as a work of art but to elucidate how he uses these artistic attributes to exemplify a heightened model of selfhood. Nietzsche turns to the figure of the tragic artist who does not hold a passive state of resignation but rather a state of active expression. Nietzsche questions, “What is it about himself that the tragic artist communicates? Doesn’t he show his fearlessness in the face of the fearful and questionable? – This in itself is a highly desirable state; anyone who knows it will pay it the highest honours. He communicates it, he has to communicate it, provided he is

412 Nehamas (1985), 91.
413 Came (2014), 125.
414 GM, III, 12.
an artist, a genius of communication.” Communication is expressed by Nietzsche in order to voice both his concern of a life-negating worldview and put forth a new more positive ethical framework. Nietzsche’s writing style often blurs into poetic expression with his aphoristic structure, his frequent use of analogies and metaphors, as well as actual prose writing which plays a seminal role in not just the emotive response of his readers but in promoting the rightful value for one’s affects. And he shapes and cultivates his voice in quite an expressive and provocative style in order to reach out subtly to his readers rather than sound as a preacher would tell his audience what they should and should not do. Nietzsche’s idiosyncratic writing style that converges over into the artistic realm of poetry is tactfully rendered so as to sway his audience to embrace his ethical project. *Ecce Homo* is not only an expression of Nietzsche’s creative and intellectual endeavor but also literary proof that he too – like the many acclaimed exemplars he has praised – is an ideal model of selfhood. Let us now turn to explore how Nietzsche practices his art of communication to reveal his conception of life affirmation.

2. Life Affirmation

Early on in Nietzsche’s *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche describes art as a way of justifying life that involves suffering. In subsequent works, Nietzsche makes quite a number of shifts ranging from a departure from his espousal of Schopenhaurian metaphysics, to abandoning his aesthetic notion vis à vis the Apollonian persona who symbolises rationality and illusion, as well as diverging onto new aesthetic notions like that of creativity understood from the perspective of the artist. In this section, I shall address how the shift from art considered as justifying life to art being regarded as stimulus to life affects the question of life affirmation. In the concluding section of *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche claims that, “[h]ere it becomes necessary to take a bold running start and leap into a metaphysics of art, by repeating the sentence written above, that existence and the world seem justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon.” Nietzsche subsequently changes his position in his claim that “[a]rt is the great stimulus to life.” First of all, we must bear in mind that at that point in

416 BT, 5; BT, 24.
time, Nietzsche subscribed to Schopenhauer’s nihilistic worldview that life involves constant suffering. Nietzsche drops the Schopenhauerian principle that human life involves continual willing which thereby causes continual suffering, and hence concludes that life involves continual suffering.\(^{418}\) As part of his broader project Nietzsche also aims to rebuke Judeo-Christian morality. This affects his exploration on suffering in that he seeks to replace the redeeming aspect that Christian theodicy offers vis à vis the deliverance of earthly life for an eternal life of perfect bliss in the afterlife. Nietzsche endows a new aesthetic meaning to suffering. If suffering is conceived from a more general standpoint, one can envisage it much like an artist experiences the creative process which entails overcoming the difficult and arduous resistances that are inherent in the creation of beautiful works of art. So, Nietzsche claims that in spite of life’s painful and terrible events, if we take an artistic perspective towards life we can face suffering as ‘challenges’ that must be fought and overcome. From this standpoint, one subsequently holds the capacity for life affirmation. Before making the critical shift from nihilism to life-affirmation, Nietzsche conceives art to function like a type of ‘opiate’ that helps suppress the pain of life’s struggles. He develops a new perspective involving the ‘therapeutic’ stance that art upholds in which he invokes a new meaning to suffering. He points to the revaluation of values as this very ‘cure’ with which one can overcome the ailments of the modern individual. Nietzsche’s view of art as a way of justifying life’s ailments was founded within a quite sinister setting in which he subscribed to a Schopenhaurian life-denying world-view. However, Nietzsche subsequently makes a drastic shift regarding his position on what art can bring to one’s life but how he comes to terms with suffering remains problematic. Is it not paradoxical to espouse life that involves suffering? How Nietzsche comes to terms with this seeming paradox is the question that necessitates further exploration.

What causes suffering according to Nietzsche? Nietzsche is not suggesting that all of a sudden suffering \textit{tout court} dissipates but rather that our moral standards have had detrimental impact on how we view ourselves and life in general. In a sense, there are life’s sufferings which are the inevitable negative events along with the more positive ones that define an individual’s general experience through life. Then, Nietzsche offers a diagnosis of general suffering that arises from the Judeo-Christian

\(^{418}\) WWR, 56.
value standard generating a life-negating attitude that thereby sets the stage for unnecessarily heightened form of suffering. Nietzsche conceives life affirmation as a plausible solution to the life-denying tendencies of the modern individual in so far as one is able to engage in the revaluation of values.

Another problem which arises involves the implicit idea that one must make the judgment that life is worth affirming. The question of life affirmation according to Nietzsche simply cannot be conceived in adopting a judgment. Upon criticising Socrates and Plato, Nietzsche famously claims that they had to adopt – the same negative attitude towards life. Judgments, value judgments on life, for or against, can ultimately never be true: they have value only as symptoms, they can be taken seriously only as symptoms, - in themselves, judgments like these are stupidities. You really have to stretch out your fingers and make a concerted attempt to grasp this amazing piece of subtlety, that the value of life cannot be estimated.\(^{419}\)

How can the claim that 'the value life cannot be estimated' be cogent along with Nietzsche’s concept of the revaluation of values which paves the way for life-affirmation? Nietzsche seems to hold the position that an individual would never be able to fully know one’s life in order to be able to judge it. Reginster points out that in section 5 of Morality as Anti-Nature, Nietzsche raises the “problem of the value of life” and that we would have to “be both outside life and as familiar with life as someone, anyone, everyone who has ever lived.”\(^{420}\) However, I think it is worth mentioning that in both the above cases Nietzsche is yet again attacking a life-denying approach. In this sense, he seems to be stating that these thinkers have no way of making sweeping claims of whose life can be judged as good or evil. Nietzsche continues to say that, “life itself forces to posit values, life itself evaluates through us, when we posit values. It follows from this that even the anti-natural morality that understands God as the converse of life, the condemnation of life, is only a value judgment made by life – but which life?...it is the judgment of a declining, weakened, exhausted, condemned life.”\(^{421}\) Nietzsche is thereby revealing that valuations are unconsciously shaped by the life-denying attitude that has been inherited over the span two millennia. How to instigate a reversal from the life-denying approach to a

\(^{419}\) TI, The Problem of Socrates, 2.
\(^{420}\) Reginster (2015), 26-7.
\(^{421}\) TI, Morality as Anti-Nature, 5.
life-affirming approach is the problem that Nietzsche tackles by turning to the arts as a vehicle to make the switch into a plausible project.

Reginster unpacks this seeming paradox by turning to the notion of beauty. He agrees with Nehamas’s position that beauty incites the spectator with “hope or ‘desire to engage further with it, it also arouses a certain reluctance to do so.’”\(^{422}\) Reginster further elaborates on Nehamas’s claim regarding the uncertain, yet hopeful characteristic of engaging with a beautiful work of art. He explains that a beautiful work of art incites a twofold ambivalence, 1. involving hope that “motivates, but insofar as it cannot guarantee against disappointment, it also inhibits, it makes us hesitate to pursue its object” and 2. the kind of ambivalence “created by the fact that (part of) what is enjoyed in the experience of beauty is the element of mystery and uncertainty, or, so to speak, hopefulness itself.”\(^{423}\) The ambivalence couched within the process of evaluating a work of art is a convincing explanation of how Nietzsche uses arts as a vehicle towards life affirmation. The way in which he refers to art as being a stimulus implies that one finds him/herself in a position of uncertainty of whether or not a, as a spectator she/he will view the work of art as beautiful, b. as an artist whether she/he can create a beautiful work of art, and finally, c. as an individual whether or not she/he can view life as beautiful.

The topic of ambivalence functions as a key characteristic within the aesthetic experience since we may conceive the feeling of hope as an invitation for an individual to engage with creative experience and take on an active engagement in what life has to offer. In a way of countering both Kant and Schopenhauer, Nietzsche calls for the aesthetic experience to be from an ‘interested’ point of view – one that involves a genuine connection between the spectator and the work of art. Nietzsche does not think that one can view art – nor life – from an objective standpoint. He attacks Kant for upholding a ‘disinterested’ approach towards the appreciation of beauty and hails Stendhal for his approach which describes beauty as ‘a promise to happiness.’\(^{424}\) The promising of something inherently aligns with the idea of ‘hope’ in that therein lies in the beautiful object a desire paves the way for a potential happiness. It is this very position of uncertainty where the individual feels a desire of attraction (or repulsion) which Nietzsche points to as pivotal aesthetic moment that

\(^{422}\) Reginster (2015), 30.
\(^{423}\) Ibid.
\(^{424}\) GM, III, 6.
aligns so perfectly with life that is full of uncertainties. Moreover, Nietzsche calls for our response towards life to be one that is driven by our desires rather than from a position that strives for objectivity and a general disdain of our desires and innermost drives. Nietzsche further demonstrates how his objection towards this disinterested position vis à vis the arts by declaring, “[i]s the artist’s most basic instinct bound up with art, or is it bound up much more intimately with life, which is the meaning of art? Isn’t it bound up with the desirability of life? - Art is the great stimulus to life: how could art be understood as purposeless, pointless, l’art pour l’art?”. We may discern a stark contrast between art being perceived as a vehicle for making life ‘bearable’ for one who harbours a life-denying and nihilistic approach with that of art being used as a vehicle for ‘stimulating’ or enhancing one to thrive through life’s endeavours.

I shall now address how Nietzsche uses the arts as a vehicle to illustrate how on a psychological level one can overcome the struggle of disparate drives which is required for the master drives to strengthen, thrive and successfully seek expression. Understood within a psychological context, suffering can be conceived as part of the process through which the ‘master drive’ is challenged and seeks expression. Moreover, within this process lies also the feeling of uncertainty that has been addressed above. So, the master drive at the unconscious level is attracted towards a particular expression but it remains just a potential and is actualised only once the drive is expressed. On a psychological level, suffering arises from a state of excessive tension and disarray amongst the drives. Part of the process which necessitates suffering as a kind of resistance instigates an overcoming of the resistance and thereby generates the flourishing of a certain drive. Once perceived on a psychological level the problem of suffering and life affirmation no longer appears as conflictual.426

Another point that needs addressing is that even if suffering is considered to occur mostly through the challenge of overcoming resistances, Nietzsche does not isolate suffering solely to an unconscious occurring. Quite to the contrary, he realises that if one’s drives are not adequately orchestrated and/or frustrated it does manifest

425 TI, Skirmishes of an Untimely Man, 20.
426 Reginster define the tension amongst drives as a ‘resistance’ and claims that it is a fundamental cornerstone in understanding Nietzsche’s concept with ‘will to power’. For more discussion on this topic, see Reginster’s book, Life Affirmation.
to suffering throughout everyday life. The kind of suffering Nietzsche addresses involves a general world view that is weighed down by life-denying characteristics. He diagnoses the problem of modern humanity as generating from deep and complex mechanisms occurring at an unconscious level and that manifests itself in general life-negative attitudes which further has a negative consequence on behaviour.

Reginster weaves into his notion of beauty and life affirmation the figure of the tragic artist in order to show how the perspective of the artist involves more engagement than that of the spectator. He explains that, “Nietzsche’s new answer rests on a fundamental shift of perspective: he considers the tragic effect no longer from the perspective of the ‘spectator’ but from that of the ‘artist.’” 427 Reginster posits that Nietzsche shifts our perspective from that of the spectator to the creator in order to show how this exemplar copes with suffering in an optimal manner. As I have addressed earlier, the tragic artist is described as holding the significant characteristics of strength and courage to face adversity. Nietzsche portrays the tragic artist as holding ‘warring’ character traits with which he/she may counter the terrors that may be encountered through life. Moreover, the tragic artist exhibits the transformative experience within the creative struggle in order to overcome life’s adversities.428 Even if the portrayal of the tragic artist does demonstrate the crucial factor of having the capacity to overcome life’s adversities there are two equally crucial factors that have not been articulated by Reginster, that of altering a dysfunctional arrangement of drives as well as the key role that love plays in instigating the revaluation of values.

It is important to bear in mind how Nietzsche seeks to reveal the instrumental role that our drives play at an unconscious level. He articulates the importance of valuing oneself involves a respect for the vast array of drives we hold at an unconscious level. In a notorious passage, in which he questions, “[s]upposing that nothing else is ‘given’ as real but our world of desires and passions, that we cannot sink or rise to any other "reality" but just that of our impulses…. but [reality may possess] the same degree of reality as our emotions themselves--as a more primitive form of the world of emotions, in which everything still lies locked in a mighty unity, which afterwards branches off and develops itself in organic processes.” 429 Not only is Nietzsche revealing our complex and rich psychological structure but he seeks to

427 Reginster (2014), 34.
428 For more discussion on the topic of the tragic artist please see section 5 of Chapter II.
429 BGE, 36.
demonstrate how our drives, affects and emotions play an instrumental role in the construction of our worldview. Nietzsche attempts to show how drives that are repressed or misguided reveal nihilistic tendencies, and on the other hand, drives that are either channeled or allowed to seek expression in a successful manner, are conducive to a ‘yes-saying’ approach towards life. In addition, he attempts for us to respect our drives rather than look down upon them with disdain as is encouraged by our Judeo-Christian morals. In his preface of The Anti-Christ, Nietzsche calls for “[a] new conscience for truths that have kept silent until now. And the will to the economy of great style: holding together its strength, its enthusiasm…. Respect for yourself; love for yourself: an unconditional freedom over yourself….”

Here, Nietzsche shares with his readers how one needs to focus on valuing oneself. Nietzsche implicitly signals to a process of self-realisation, – at a psychological level – from which we then are required respect ourselves for our vast array of diverse and complex drives. He adds that we need to love ourselves which leads me to further discuss how crucial this affective disposition towards oneself and life in general is for understanding life affirmation.

Love or eros plays a seminal function in Nietzsche’s conception of life affirmation. Love is described by Nietzsche as a motivational force that is the fundamental basis from which one can engage in the creative activity of the revaluation of values as well as overcoming suffering. Love – whether construed as a drive or desire by Nietzsche – functions as a force which impels one to move forward and engage in a certain activity. Nietzsche often metaphorically uses the notion of sexual desire as a way of addressing artistic creation. For instance, he claims that, “all beauty is a temptation to procreate, - that this is precisely the praprium of its effect, from the most sensual all the way up to the most spiritual.” In the following section, he continues by adding, “I still remember, against Schopenhauer and in Plato’s honour, that the whole higher culture and literature of classical France also grew on the ground of sexual interest.”

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430 AC, Preface.
431 For more on this topic please revert to the closing passage of section 1 of Chapter I.
432 I have shown that Nietzsche has been influenced by Plato’s notion of the tripartite self and the instrumental role that eros plays as a motivational force. Tim Robinson has underlined how eros is defined as a force that instigates one to act according how strong his/her desire is towards a certain activity.
433 TI, Skirmishes of an Untimely Man, 22.
434 Ibid., 23.
natural sex drive, he also aims to show how it can sublimate into creative endeavours. In addition, once love is understood as a force that may instigate creative ‘action,’ it can thereby be valued as a pivotal and necessary part of life affirmation. Just as we have seen in the aforementioned passage regarding art being bound to the ‘desirability of life,’ Nietzsche reveals how the passion and the force inherent in the feeling of love is required into order to overcome life-denying approach as well as to embrace a life-affirming approach. Nietzsche also uses the topic of love as an antithesis to hate. In other words, the hate which humanity has instilled on itself with Judeo-Christian morals is set up dialectically with love as a counterforce portrayed as the necessary and foundational emotion to instigate a sense of self-respect and the possibility of life-affirmation. Furthermore, in the passage entitled, *One must learn to Love*, Nietzsche maintains that the beauty that arises from the act of loving is ambivalent in the very way which Reginster refers to. Nietzsche explains, “[t]hat is how we have learned to love all things that we now love. In the end we are always rewarded for our good will, our patience, fairmindedness, and gentleness with what is strange; gradually it sheds its veil and turns out to be a new and indescribable beauty.” Alongside Reginster and Nehamas’s notions regarding the ambivalence that beauty’s mystery offers as well as Reginster’s view of the tragic artist, I have attempted to show how love provides the motivational force to impel one to act upon the feeling of hope towards the creation of a beautiful life. In other words, the ambivalence in beauty’s potential coupled with the artist’s self-love and the ‘passionate’ desire towards achieving beauty are necessary components of affirming life.

I would like to conclude by addressing how the theme of love ties in perfectly with Nietzsche’s own self-portrayal provided in *Ecce Homo*. Nietzsche defines his “formula for human greatness is *amor fati*: that you do not want anything to be different, not forwards, not backwards, not for all eternity. Not just to tolerate necessity, still less to conceal it – all idealism is hypocrisy towards necessity, – but to love it.” Nietzsche’s ethical outlook expressed through *amor fati* – love of fate – supports Nietzsche’s understanding of life affirmation, in that he explains that all parts of his life whether they be the most joyful or the most arduous have contributed to who he is as a person. In this aesthetic interpretation of life, Nietzsche is able to

\[435\] GS, 334.
understand that the moments of suffering that he endured through life can be explained as hurdles that he had to overcome, that they were challenges that helped him become stronger and braver, and they have helped shape him into an individual who now exemplifies greatness.  

Another illuminating psychological revelation that Nietzsche elicits involving loving oneself can be found in the passage entitled, *On Love of One’s Neighbour*, in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Nietzsche points out, “[y]ou crowd around the neighbor and have beautiful words for it. But I say to you: Your love of the neighbor is your bad love of yourselves…. You cannot endure being with yourselves and do not love yourselves enough: now you want to seduce the neighbor into love and to gild yourselves with his error.” Nietzsche diagnoses the modern individual’s problem with the apparent love or empathy for others as symptomatic of the lack of love for oneself. Nietzsche highlights the importance of first and foremost learning to love oneself. He stipulates that only when one is able to love oneself with an ‘overfull heart’ can he/she strive to become an overman.

The force of love that Nietzsche extols is often described as having an abundant or overflowing energy. In his admiration of the Dionysian figure, we can further grasp how life affirmation is conceived with super-abundance rather than a weakened and life-negating approach. Upon admiring his work of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche declares, “[t]his work stands entirely on its own. Leaving aside the poets: perhaps nothing has ever been done with such an excess of energy. Here my concept of the ‘Dionysian’ became its highest deed”. He concludes the passage by stating, “how a spirit who carries everything that is most difficult about fate, a destiny of a task, can nonetheless be the lightest, spinning out into the beyond…how someone with the hardest, most terrible insight into reality…find one more reason in it for himself to be the eternal yes to all things”. According to Nietzsche the figure of Dionysus encapsulates the notion of fertility, frenzy and superabundance. The penultimate passage of *Skirmishes of an Untimely Man* reveal

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437 It is worth noting Aaron Ridley’s insightful commentary on how *amor fati* developed from *The Gay Science* to *Ecce Homo*. He demonstrates that previously, in GS, 276, Nietzsche leaves open just how much is necessary where as he later states that *everything* is necessary.

438 Z, I, 16.

439 Ibid.


441 Ibid.

to what extent Nietzsche sees himself as a ‘disciple’ of the Dionysus. He defines Dionysus by stating, “‘Dionysus’ means all of this: I do not know any higher symbolism than this Greek symbolism of the Dionysian. It gives religious expression to the most profound instinct of life, directed towards the future of life, the eternity of life, - the pathway to life, procreation, as the holy path.”

Throughout this last chapter I have addressed how Nietzsche weaves together a portrayal of himself as his own model of selfhood. In Ecce Homo he looks back at the work he has done over the years to show his achievements and furthermore to demonstrate how he has attained the status of ‘greatness’. I have first explored how he conveys his notion of genius and how he depicts himself as taking on the role of genius. I question how his model of genius informs his broader ethical project as well as his theory of life affirmation. I then broach how Nietzsche’s topic of artistry is used as a vehicular means to convey how one may come to the revaluation of values and embrace life affirmation. Nietzsche’s writing style is then explored in order to show how Nietzsche relies on the arts to support his ethical project. I finally turn to the topic of life affirmation in which Nietzsche provides another meaning to suffering. I show how this new signification involves a broader and more positive ethical basis that can only help support the terrible and difficult passages of life’s vicissitudes. I conclude by exploring how love plays a fundamental role in Nietzsche’s construction of a viable ethical project encompassing a life-affirming attitude.

443 TI, What I owe to the Ancients, 4.
Conclusion

Throughout this thesis, I have provided an account of Nietzsche’s conception of the psychological structure of the self as well as his use of the arts to illustrate his view of the ideal model of selfhood and his ‘positive’ ethics. Although the first two chapters focus on his psychological conception of the self, one may observe that he relies on aesthetic themes such as artistry, sublimation and the creative process to inform his ideal model of the self. I have examined his drive theory as well as his theory regarding our affective dispositions. A crucial point that I have illustrated encompasses a comparative analysis of Plato’s theory of the tripartite self and Nietzsche’s conception of the self out of which the striking similar conception of self-mastery has been drawn out. I have demonstrated how Plato’s *thumodeic* or ‘honour-loving’ part of the self, seems to have influenced Nietzsche’s psychological model of the self in that both advance the notion of a psychological regulatory mechanism based on our affective dispositions.

In Chapter II, I have addressed how Nietzsche’s drive theory relates to Freud’s drive theory in respect to how their therapeutic approach envisions the sublimation and the expression of one’s drives as the solution to the fragmented state of the modern individual psyche. I examined Nietzsche’s and Freud’s respective conceptions of internalization and repression. I have illustrated how their diagnoses of modernity’s ailments may be overcome through the adequate sublimation of our drives. I have focused upon Ken Gemes’s conception of sublimation in Nietzsche in order to show that the unification of the self is not confined to the appropriate function of the master drive, but that it can entail a limited amount of conscious involvement. This point is a matter of debate amongst Nietzsche scholars and the position I maintain allows for Nietzsche’s ideal self as involving an interplay of both unconscious drives and a conscious endeavour that sustains the development towards a flourishing self.

In Chapter III, I explored Nietzsche’s conception of drives and affects. I have begun by drawing out the parallel views shared by Spinoza and Nietzsche. I have shown how Nietzsche appears to have been influenced by Spinoza in that they both valorize our affective disposition, they conceive power to function as a key
motivating force, and they both offer to set the groundwork for a new ethical framework.

I then addressed Nietzsche’s conception of the key role that drives and affects play within the psychological structure of the self. In response to Katsafanas’s view of the relationship between drives and affects, I defend the position that Nietzsche does not state that our affective orientation necessarily arises from our drives. The question of whether drives and affects are distinct psychological phenomena has been a topic of contention. I have advanced the view that according to Nietzsche both drives and affects are both crucial parts of our unconscious self. In terms of a psychological definition of the precise role of drives and affects, Nietzsche remains inconclusive which thereby sets certain interpretative limitations. However, Nietzsche’s examination of our drives and affects has proven to be an insightful contribution to the conception of the psychological self as well as providing the fundamental groundwork for his ethical project of the revaluation of values and life affirmation.

In Chapter IV, I have examined the problem of unity of the self. On one hand, Nietzsche makes the claim that the self holds a vast number of variegated and warring drives. On the other hand, he claims that the ideal self requires unity. I have examined what unity signifies according to Nietzsche. I have focused upon the problem by taking into account two artistic exemplars, Stendhal and Goethe, in order to demonstrate how Nietzsche turns to aesthetic notions to reveal how they both exemplify unity. I have addressed the context of Stendhal’s notorious quote regarding beauty as a ‘promesse de bonheur’. Stendhal sought to reveal the ethical implications that are interwoven in our aesthetic appreciation by showing the contrast between the Venus de Medici and Canova’s Mary Magdalen. Just as Stendhal advances the view that within the Romantic context one can ascribe beauty to a work of art portraying a guilt-ridden woman, Nietzsche raises the point that Judeo-Christian morality has had a detrimental impact by inhibiting the possibility of a genuine ‘promise of happiness’. In addition, I have demonstrated how Nietzsche turns to Stendhal to explain the need for introducing an ‘interested’ and passionate stance towards life. Consequently, I have pointed out how this stance derives from eros or love that manifests as a unifying force that serves to successfully bind the tension amongst drives.

I proceeded onto demonstrating how the exemplar of Goethe conveys unity in three different ways. First, Goethe is described by Nietzsche as a historical totality to
convey how he represents a harmonious orchestration of numerous drives. Then, I have considered how Nietzsche likens Goethe’s unified self to a work of art that demonstrates achievement. Finally, I have focused upon the parallels between Nietzsche, Goethe and Heraclitus in order to show that the self’s state of becoming allows for a continual process of self-perfection ultimately leading to the unity of the self.

In Chapter V, I have sought to address how Nietzsche uses the arts as a vehicle to express his notion of the higher self as well as his conception of life affirmation. I have offered a reading of *Ecce Homo* that reveals how Nietzsche uses his autobiographical work to turn himself into an exemplar of ideal selfhood. The concept of genius is key in grasping how he conveys his natural gifts in a Kantian vein in that his achievements cannot be reduced to following a clear set of ‘formulable laws.’ I proceeded to fleshing out how Nietzsche sees himself as encapsulating key aesthetic features like artistry that elicits the psychological shaping of the self and the creative process that illustrates a continual development towards perfection. I then have turned to articulate how Nietzsche looks to the arts as a way to convey life affirmation. I have focused on the feeling of hope of encountering beauty that one experiences whilst engaging with a work of art. I elaborated on Nehamas’s and Reginster’s use of this ambivalence to show how it fits squarely with Nietzsche’s view of the expression of a master drive within a psychological context. The question of whether or not a drive is expressed also involves a certain ambivalence. Nietzsche looks to hope as an essential element of uncertainty that promotes the cultivation of a positive affective attitude. I proceeded to address how love plays a significant role in Nietzsche’s conception of life affirmation. An individual necessarily needs to learn to love oneself for life affirmation to be a viable ethical project. Nietzsche becomes who he is as a result of loving his natural drives and affects from which he adopts a life-affirming attitude. I have attempted to show that Nietzsche’s introspective account of his life may be conceived as an aesthetic means of revealing ideal selfhood and life affirmation.
Bibliography


