UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON

FACULTY OF SOCIAL, HUMAN and MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES

Social Statistics and Demography

Cohabitation and Nonmarital Fertility in the Philippines

by

Bernice Kuang

Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

January 2018

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON

ABSTRACT

FACULTY OF SOCIAL, HUMAN and MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES

Social Statistics and Demography

Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

COHABITATION AND NONMARITAL FERTILITY IN THE PHILIPPINES

Bernice Kuang

Cohabitation and nonmarital fertility have been emerging worldwide. While these family behaviours are well studied in Western countries, less is known about Asian contexts, where cohabitation is usually less common and nonmarital fertility is highly stigmatized. In the Philippines however, cohabitation and nonmarital fertility have increased rapidly. Paradoxically, other family behaviours remain persistently conservative, such as high fertility and early childbearing, and divorce is illegal. This thesis uses mixed methods to examine cohabitation and nonmarital fertility in the Philippines.

The first paper considered a mixed methods approach. Quantitative data from the Demographic and Health Surveys 1993-2013 (DHS) were used to examine age patterns of marital and nonmarital fertility, and the analysis showed a young pattern of nonmarital fertility. Qualitative findings suggest that childbearing remains highly valued, while attitudes toward cohabitation and nonmarital childbearing have liberalized, leading to the postponement of marriage without a concurrent postponement of relationships and childbearing.

The second paper applied a competing risks hazard model to the most recent DHS to study the educational gradient of cohabitation, demonstrating that lower levels of education are significantly associated with a higher risk of cohabitation. This suggests that the rising cohabitation in the Philippines is more linked to socioeconomic disadvantage than the devaluing of marriage among educated elites.

The third paper used qualitative data from focus groups to examine how people view cohabitation compared with marriage, and their benefits and disadvantages in order to understand social norms around partnership behaviours and whether they reflect more individualistic or family-centric orientations. Results revealed emphasis placed on love and personal fulfilment in relationships, and a level of ambivalence toward marriage, suggesting an individualistic approach to relationships. Nonetheless, childbearing remains central to self-actualization, and relationships were often viewed from a family and child-centric perspective.

The case of the Philippines demonstrates that while family systems may evolve over time in tandem with global trends, country and context specific interdependencies are important to consider. The emergence of new family behaviours and attitudes in the Philippines are not solely products of modernization or liberalization but instead represent the competing and interrelated influences of religion, policy, social and cultural norms.

Table of Contents

Table of Tables

Table of Tables

Table of Figures

Table of Figures

Academic Thesis: Declaration Of Authorship

I, Bernice Kuang declare that this thesis and the work presented in it are my own and has been generated by me as the result of my own original research.

Cohabitation and Nonmarital Fertility in the Philippines

I confirm that:

1. This work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research degree at this University;
2. Where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or any other qualification at this University or any other institution, this has been clearly stated;
3. Where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly attributed;
4. Where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given. With the exception of such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work;
5. I have acknowledged all main sources of help;
6. Where the thesis is based on work done by myself jointly with others, I have made clear exactly what was done by others and what I have contributed myself;
7. None of this work has been published before submission

Signed: .....

Date: .....

Acknowledgements

This thesis is dedicated to Art, for moving our lives across the Atlantic to an exotic and foreign land in its pursuit, and for grinding, brewing, and pouring a lot of coffee.

Thanks to the University of Philippines Population Institution for their support and input, and to John Casterline and Midea Kabamalan for their comments on earlier drafts of Chapters 5 and 6.

I would also like to acknowledge the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) for funding this research, especially the fantastic and supportive DTC team in Southampton — Glenn Miller, Prof. Pauline Leonard and Dr. Amos Channon.

I also sincerely thank my PhD supervisors Sabu Padmadas and Brienna Perelli-Harris for their guidance and input for both the thesis and the journal articles written based on the thesis. A condensed version of Chapter 5 has been submitted for publication consideration in the journal *Demography,* with myself as the lead author and Brienna Perelli-Harris as a co-author. As the lead author, I conducted all analyses for the paper and wrote the entirety of the manuscript while Brienna provided analytical guidance and editorial support. Additionally, a condensed version of Chapter 6 has been accepted for publication in the journal *Asian Population Studies*, with myself as the lead author and Sabu Padmadas and Brienna Perelli-Harris as co-authors. As the lead author, I conducted all analyses for the paper and wrote the entirety of the manuscript. My supervisors provided analytical guidance and editorial support.

Definitions and Abbreviations

ARMM	Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
CPR	Contraceptive Prevalence Rate
DHS	Demographic and Health Surveys
EA	Enumeration Area
FDT	First Demographic Transition
FP	Family Planning
NCR	National Capital Region
SDT	Second Demographic Transition
TFR	Total Fertility Rate
UPPI	University of the Philippines Population Institute
YAFS	Young Adult Fertility and Sexuality Study

Chapter 1 Introduction

Transitions in fertility, union formation, and family structure have been emerging worldwide. Many scholars of family demography have argued that these demographic changes are indicative of important ideational change concomitant with modernization and industrialization - a systematic shift referred to as a "Second Demographic Transition" (SDT) (Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa 1986; Sobotka 2008; Lesthaeghe 2010). Among these changes are postponement of marriage and childbearing, a growing pattern of nonmarital cohabitation, nonmarital births, voluntary childlessness or other alternate family structures, and a rise in divorce. While marriage is a legally recognized union between two people as intimate partners, nonmarital cohabitation or simply, cohabitation, refers to a co-residential relationship between intimate partners who are specifically not married to each other. Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa (1986) first linked these changes to the increasing importance of post-materialist "higher order needs," individualism, secularization, and gender equity. From this perspective, ideational change diffuses through higher or prolonged education among elites and more educated individuals are considered the forerunners of value change, adopting liberalized attitudes toward new family behaviours.

While these shifts in family behaviours are relatively mainstream and well-studied across Europe, in the United States, and in parts of Latin America, less is known about Asian contexts, where transitions have occurred more recently and data are often less comprehensive. Features associated with the SDT common to countries in East and Southeast Asia include below replacement fertility and postponement of marriage and childbearing, leading scholars to explore the possibility of the SDT spreading to Asia (Atoh et al. 2004; Lesthaeghe 2010; Yu and Xie 2015; Ghosh 2016). However, in most Asian countries, cohabitation is still a relatively uncommon but growing practice and nonmarital fertility extremely taboo. This PhD research examines the unique case of the Philippines —an Asian country where there is rapid uptake of cohabitation and nonmarital fertility, comparable in scale to many Western countries (Casterline and Kabamalan 2010; Ogena 2015), but where there is simultaneously little evidence of the types of family change experienced by other Asian countries. In particular, this thesis seeks to understand whether cohabitation and nonmarital fertility may be evidence of SDT related liberalization, and also explores what other factors may also be important in understanding and explaining these developments.

Unlike both its neighbouring countries and other countries that have experienced majors shifts related to the SDT, the Philippines has not progressed fully through the First Demographic

Transition (FDT), and neither a precipitous drop in fertility or large scale postponement of marriage and childbearing have occurred (Jones 2007; Jones 2010; ICF 2014), despite marked strides in development indicators and a relatively high level of female educational attainment and female labour force participation (Bryant 2007). While fertility in the Philippines has declined steadily in recent decades, the total fertility rate (TFR) remains both well above replacement level at 3.0 (ICF 2014) and considerably higher than that of neighbouring Southeast Asian countries (UN 2015). Moreover, teenage pregnancy has actually increased two fold in the last decade, with nearly 14 percent of 15-19 year olds having begun childbearing as of 2013 (YAFS 2014) and childbearing is nearly universal (DHS 2014). Marriage has not been postponed to the extent observed in many other Asian countries (Jones 2007, Jones 2011), and the dramatic increase in cohabitation suggests limited postponement of union formation as well. While divorce is on the rise in some neighbouring Asian countries, the Philippines is the only country in the world where divorce is illegal. Abortion is also illegal and family planning is not readily available throughout the country, especially for young unmarried women, which undoubtedly has bearing on reproductive behaviour and partnership formation.

In contrast to countries which have progressed through the stages of an SDT, the changes occurring in the Philippines stand out in several ways. For one, both cohabitation and nonmarital fertility have emerged very rapidly and simultaneously, appreciably changing the landscape of family structure in just the last two decades (Casterline and Kabamalan 2010; Ogena 2015). Secondly, because cohabitation and nonmarital fertility more conspicuously challenge religious and sexual mores, they are often lagging features of an SDT (Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa 1986; Lesthaeghe 2010) and typically gain prevalence after other attitudes and practices liberalize — such as postponement of marriage and fertility, low fertility levels, and divorce — which has not been the case in the Philippines. Finally, the concurrent threads of both dramatic change and persistent conservatism represent a paradoxical puzzle of family demography, calling for an in-depth examination of the fertility and partnership patterns unfolding in the Philippines.

1.1 Importance of Studying the Philippines

The family demography of the Philippines is germane from both an academic research perspective and a policy and development perspective. To date, Western countries — and more recently, Latin America and East Asia — have dominated the theoretical debate about the SDT and ideational versus economic drivers of modern family change, such as cohabitation and nonmarital fertility. This has partly been due to a longer history of such family changes or wider data

availability in the well-studied regions. Despite being a densely populated country of over 103 million with a large and highly visible international diaspora, the family demography of the Philippines has not been as well represented in the international academic literature, especially when compared to other countries in the region. Philippine family behaviours, values, and norms are complex, interwoven with indigenous Malay and Chinese influences, Spanish Roman Catholic and American post-colonial legacies, and a highly global culture wrought by both centuries of foreign occupation and an extremely mobile population. Moreover, the family demography of the Philippines is rapidly and dramatically changing along many dimensions typically associated with the SDT, many of which have yet to be explored in-depth or in comparative perspective to other theories or regions' transitions. As a diverse and densely populated nation with a large global diaspora, the family demography of the Philippines deserves particular attention as it may have substantial impact on the future global landscape as one of the most populous countries in the world.

The study of partnership and fertility in the Philippines is also salient from a policy and development perspective. It is important for policymakers to know how current family laws, including those regarding divorce, may affect people's partnership behaviours and decisions. Family policies currently do not comprehensively protect cohabiting couples and families, leaving cohabiters and their children vulnerable. Public family planning outreach services are often offered in premarital counselling, to the exclusion of unmarried women and couples, including cohabiters. Furthermore, persistently high fertility is linked to the slow progress in maternal and reproductive health in the Philippines. Although a landmark national reproductive health bill was passed in 2012, comprehensive family planning services are still not widely supported throughout the country, unintended fertility is high (Darroch et al. 2009; Hussain and Finer 2013), and nearly half of all births are high risk births [1] (ICF 2014). Alarmingly, the proportion of teenagers who have begun childbearing has doubled in the last decade up to nearly 14 percent (YAFS 2014) and maternal mortality has not improved in recent decades (WHO 2014), estimated at 221 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births (2011).

The high rates of unintended pregnancy and fertility and the resulting rapid population growth are of great concern to the national government, not only from a reproductive health and maternal mortality perspective, but also as both a potential hindrance to economic development

[1] Here, high risk births refer to births that are spaced within less than 24 months of a preceding birth, births to women under 18 or over 34, and births of order four or higher

and a strain on space and natural resources. A better understanding of how and among whom fertility and partnership have changed, as well as the reasons for and meaning of these changes can help to identify the needs of women and families and better inform reproductive health services and family policies. Moreover, this research explores how different family behaviours relate to socioeconomic disadvantage, which is relevant to the Philippines where inequalities are staggering.

In summary, this PhD research provides better understanding of family change in a unique and underexplored Asian context, contributing to both demographic transition research in a non-Western context and the evidence base for population, reproductive health, and family policies and programs in the Philippines. It challenges existing theories of family change which are heavily influenced by empirical evidence from Western countries, and explores behaviours conventionally associated with liberal Western culture in an otherwise conservative and religious non-Western context. In doing so, this PhD research contributes an important case study of an understudied country which can provide new theoretical insight into family demography transition.

1.2 Research Aims

This PhD research examines cohabitation and nonmarital fertility in the Philippines — trends that challenge the established patterns of family change in both Western and Asian countries based on their rapid emergence and paradoxical concurrence with more conservative family behaviours.

Specifically, this thesis aims to describe both current patterns and recent trends in fertility and union formation in the Philippines, with special attention to the increase in cohabitation and nonmarital fertility, the age pattern of childbearing by union type, the delinking of marriage and fertility, and the values and attitudes underpinning these trends and patterns. It will articulate the most salient changes occurring in the Philippines and which subgroups are experiencing these changes, while drawing links to the SDT, and reflecting on the importance and bearing of other theories of family change and behaviours. By exploring and analysing the developments unfolding in the Philippines, we can better understand family change in an underexplored Asian context and evaluate it against global family changes and family change theory.

1.3 Research Questions

This thesis uses a mixed methods approach and is structured around three research papers that separately examine nonmarital fertility and cohabitation using a variety of methods. The first

paper is a mixed methods paper examining the interdependencies between nonmarital fertility, attitudes toward childbearing, and age patterns of fertility. The second paper uses quantitative methods to examine the socioeconomic gradient of cohabitation. The third and final paper is a qualitative study investigating views of how cohabitation compares with marriage, and how relationship norms relate to individualistic or family-centric tendencies.

1.3.1 Paper 1: How have pro-natalist values and rising nonmarital fertility shaped fertility trends? A mixed methods exploration

The TFR in the Philippines has decreased steadily from 6.0 in 1973 to 3.0 in 2013 (ICF 2014). However, its current level is still well above replacement level and considerably higher than the regional average in Southeast Asia of 2.2 (UN 2015). Surprisingly, although fertility has declined, the age pattern of childbearing has actually shifted younger and teenage childbearing has increased markedly, suggesting an unusual and intriguing pattern of overall fertility decline but increased earlier childbearing. At the same time, large shifts in partnership have occurred, and the prevalence of both nonmarital cohabitation and nonmarital fertility have dramatically increased (Casterline and Kabamalan 2010; Ogena 2015). It is unexpected that the slow but consistent fertility decline in the Philippines has not seen attendant changes in the age pattern of childbearing. Conversely, it is also unexpected that partnership behaviours have shifted so dramatically. This paradox of fertility decline concomitant with a younger age pattern of childbearing, along with the emergence of liberalized family behaviours begs further investigation, which the first paper of this thesis undertakes using a mixed methods approach. This paper addresses the following questions:

1) *How has the age pattern of first order fertility changed in the last two decades?*
2) *Does the age pattern of first order fertility differ by union status?*
3) *Does the sequence of first birth and entry into first union differ by union type?*
4) *How do attitudes toward childbearing and partnership help reconcile the paradoxical patterns?*

Examining this puzzle can help shed insight on an unusual and possibly unprecedented pattern of fertility transition, not observed before in other Asian regions. This study also has significant development implications as the Philippines is in the singular position as the most populous high fertility Southeast Asian country. National concern about high fertility and teenage pregnancy also point to the importance of better understanding these trends, how they relate to each other, and how they have developed over time.

1.3.2 Paper 2: The unexpected rise of cohabitation: Evidence of socioeconomic disadvantage?

Cohabitation has increased rapidly in the Philippines, quadrupling in prevalence among young adults from 6% in 1993 to 24% in 2013. This increase is dramatic and surprising given the slow change in other family behaviours — such as low divorce rates and continued high fertility — and the persistent influence of the Catholic Church. Few recent studies of the Philippines examine union formation at a national level among women of all ages, and even fewer within the larger context of family change theory. Existing studies of union formation often do not distinguish cohabiters from married people or cohabiters from single people, or else focus solely on youth using descriptive or cross sectional models (Kabamalan 2004; Jones 2007; Williams et al. 2007; Xenos and Kabamalan 2007; Abalos 2014). However, cohabitation has grown rapidly and markedly beyond a teenage phenomenon, calling for a broader exploration of those who marry and those who cohabit without marrying, across all age groups.

The second paper of this thesis examines the socioeconomic pattern of cohabitation in the Philippines. This paper addresses the following questions:

1) *What is the relationship between socioeconomic disadvantage and cohabitation?*
2) *What is the educational pattern of entry into a cohabiting union that does not convert to marriage?*
3) *Does the educational pattern of union formation differ by union type?*

Investigating how different socioeconomic subgroups— and thus subgroups with different resources, opportunities, constraints, and priorities— differ in union formation is key to understanding why and among whom cohabitation has increased. Moreover, examining the relationship between socioeconomic disadvantage and cohabitation can offer insights to inform family policies and programs, particularly important in the Philippines where there are vast socioeconomic inequalities.

1.3.3 Paper 3: Is marriage 'just a paper'? : Focus group perceptions of cohabitation and marriage

While cohabitation and nonmarital fertility are common across Europe, the United States and parts of Latin America, in most Asian countries, cohabitation is relatively uncommon and nonmarital fertility a taboo, purportedly due to more conservative attitudes toward nonmarital sex, and stronger, traditional family-centric values. The third paper of this thesis examines views

of cohabitation and marriage to understand the perceived meanings, advantages, and disadvantages of these family forms, complementing the quantitative findings of the first two papers. Specifically, this paper examines:

> *1) What are the perceived benefits or disadvantages of cohabitation compared with marriage?*
> *2) How do people's views of relationships reflect individualistic or family-centric priorities?*
> *3) Why has cohabitation become so prevalent in a family-centric culture?*

In doing so, I shed further light on why such family behaviours have emerged so rapidly in the Philippines, what they reveal about shifting priorities and norms, and how they relate to existing theories about the meaning of cohabitation. Family patterns in the Philippines have shifted very rapidly in both a high fertility context and a conservative policy environment, raising questions about the notion of cohabitation and nonmarital fertility as inherently liberal, individualistic, Western behaviours. Although qualitative data are not nationally representative, analysis of qualitative data may still provide useful insight into social values and illuminate the connections between attitudes, preferences and family behaviours, which survey data alone cannot (Knodel et al. 1984; Hukin 2014; Perelli-Harris et al. 2014).

1.4 Thesis Structure

The remainder of this document is organized into seven chapters, based on a three paper thesis format. Chapter 2 presents the Philippine context, including a brief history of the colonization of the Philippines and its state of development. It also presents context on religion, reproductive health and family planning, marriage systems, divorce, and family policy.

Chapter 3 presents the theoretical considerations and empirical evidence relevant to this PhD research. Chapter 3 begins with a brief overview of literature regarding fertility decline and the FDT, specifically focusing on fertility decline in Southeast Asia. It goes on to explore theoretical considerations regarding the growth of cohabitation and nonmarital fertility, introducing the SDT and reviewing the extent to which the SDT may have spread to Asian countries and parts of Latin America, both of which are instrumental for understanding the Philippine situation. Following this, is a theoretical background of the concepts and meanings of cohabitation. Chapter 3 concludes with a reflection of how the literature relates to the Philippines, drawing connections to how the FDT and SDT may apply in the Philippines.

Chapter 1

Chapter 4 describes the data sets used in this thesis, including the limitations related to data quality, and the process of data collection for the qualitative data. Additional details regarding the data sets used in this PhD research may be found in the data and methods sections of the individual paper chapters (Chapter 5, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.)

Chapter 5 contains the first paper, "How have pro-natalist values and rising nonmarital fertility shaped fertility trends? A mixed methods exploration." A condensed version of this paper was submitted to Demography in January 2018. This work was presented in 2017 as a poster at the Population Association of America conference in Chicago and as a poster at the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population conference in Cape Town.

Chapter 6 consists of the second paper, "The unexpected rise of cohabitation: Evidence of socioeconomic disadvantage?" A condensed version of this paper was submitted to Asian Population Studies in June 2017 and was invited in December 2017 for minor revisions and resubmission. This work was presented in 2016 at the Philippine Population Association conference. It was also presented as a poster in 2016 at the Population Association of America conference in Chicago and in 2017 as a poster at the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population conference in Cape Town.

Chapter 7 consists of the third paper "Is marriage 'just a paper'? : Focus group perceptions of cohabitation and marriage." This paper is intended for submission to the Journal of Family Issues by April of 2018.

Chapter 8 contains the thesis conclusion.

Chapter 2 Social and Family Context in the Philippines

This chapter provides a brief context of family and society in the Philippines relevant to understanding the family formation processes explored in this thesis. The chapter begins with a short history of the Philippines from the colonial era until the present day, focusing on insights regarding the origin and nature of contemporary family systems and the forces which have shaped them, such as the racial hierarchy of colonial society, the pervasive influence of the Catholic Church, and the weak and unstable central government. It also provides background information on the Filipino family, and recent patterns of partnership dynamics and childbearing. The chapter concludes with an explanation of the relevant policy environment, specifically divorce and family policies, and the reproductive health and family planning situation.

2.1 Historical Overview

2.1.1 General

The Philippines is a collection of over 7,000 islands which comprise three main island regions — Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao — in Southeast Asia. It is inhabited by a diverse set of ethnic groups among whom many different languages are spoken. The Philippines is one of the most populous countries in the world and also one of the fastest growing countries in Asia. In 2011, the Philippines was selected by the United Nations as the country of the 7 billionth birth, in a move to highlight the global issue of rapid population growth (Coleman 2011). Located in the Pacific on the Ring of Fire, the Philippines was traditionally an agricultural economy based on rice cultivation, and today is increasingly shifting toward global services and manufacturing, exemplified by a rapidly urbanizing socio-geographic landscape and due in part to the educated population's wide fluency in English. In addition to Filipino — the official national language based on the Tagalog dialect, the native language of the majority ethnic group — English is also an official language in the Philippines, leading to a vast workforce with global mobility. The other major languages in the Philippines, in addition to Filipino and Tagalog, are Cebuano, Hiligaynon and Waray, which are spoken in Visayas, and Ilocano and Bicol which are spoken in Luzon. Cebuano and Hiligaynon are also spoken in Mindanao. Interestingly, unlike the former Spanish colonies of Latin America, Spanish has never been widely spoken in the Philippines. During the colonial era, Spanish was primarily spoken among colonial leadership, Spanish clergy, and later, also among the educated elite.

Chapter 2

The Philippines consists of seventeen sub-national administrative regions, Regions I through XIII, the Cordillera Administrative Region, the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, and the National Capital Region or Metro Manila (Figure 1). Region VI is divided into Region IVA and IVB. Regions are further divided into provinces, cities and municipalities, and finally barangays. According to the 2014 Census Report, the Philippines has 80 provinces, 143 cities, 1,491 municipalities, and 42,028 barangays. The barangay is the smallest unit of local governance and dates back to pre-colonial times, originally referring to the seafaring vessel a family clan travelled on. Sub-national administrative divisions are collectively referred to as local government units (LGUs) and policy implementation is typically rolled out at the sub-national level.

Figure 1- Map of the Philippines, by region



Source: 2010 National Statistics Office Census of Population and Housing Report

Prior to Spanish colonization in the 16th century, there was no concept of a unified country or a central government and the Philippine islands were inhabited by communities ranging from isolated tribal villages to Islamic city states ruled by sultans. The main unit of geo-political

organization was the barangay, and blood ties were a very important component of political and social cohesion since kinship guaranteed fealty to the barangay. Because the people who lived on a unit of land were all related, private landownership was not a concept and social class had a somewhat fluid nature. For example, people's social status within a barangay could rise and fall depending on if they fell into economic hardship and needed to rely on wealthier relations or vice versa. This fostered a strong reliance on family ties and on the clan, instead of on public institutions (Francia 2010).

2.1.2 Colonial era social hierarchy

When the Spanish arrived in the 15th century, the Philippines was fragmented and thus, vulnerable to invasion and occupation (Karnow 1989). Without a sense of connection beyond immediate kinship ties, family clans did not rally to resist colonial Catholic infiltration and the weak public institutions posed little challenge to religious authority and power. Parts of the Philippines in the South where Islam was already established were more resistant to Spanish control, as religion acted as a unifying force to galvanize a resistance. To this day, a Muslim minority exists in the province of Mindanao. Other more mountainous areas, such as Northern Luzon, also resisted Christianisation until American occupation because they were too remote to infiltrate. Though the Spanish had hoped to exploit the Philippines for natural resources — such as spices, gold, and silver — they soon found that the islands did not have the natural wealth of their other colonies. Instead, the location of the Philippines presented an opportunity to open trade with China, which at the time was closed to European trading, ushering in an era of galleon trade between China and European markets, by way of the Philippines and Mexico. In this way, the Philippines was ruled indirectly by the Spanish crown through the viceroyalty of Mexico.

During this era, the social hierarchy in the Philippines contained several strata, with the *peninsulares,* or resident Spanish people from Spain, at the highest social stratum. They were followed by resident Spanish people born in Latin America or the Philippines, or *criollos,* then mestizos, Chinese and people of mixed Chinese heritage, and finally the *indios,* or indigenous Filipinos (Karnow 1989). Intermarriage was tolerated, with wealth and lightness of skin tone facilitating upward social mobility through marriage, which especially favoured the Chinese residents of the Philippines, many of whom immigrated to the Philippines and gradually became their own elite class of traders, merchants, and artisans. While Chinese migration was initially very restricted and sometimes met with violent backlash, the Spanish eventually eased migration and settlement rules for those who intermarried with Filipino women or converted to Catholicism.

Many Chinese migrants did both, establishing the Chinese as a Philippine community and a key part of the economy, and also entrenching Catholicism as a pathway to assimilation among wealthier sub groups (Karnow 1989). In 1894, a new policy requiring farmers to hold a title to their land led to a major shift of landownership into the hands of Chinese communities who had the resources and knowledge to acquire the titles. Suddenly, people whose families had farmed the same land for generations saw their ancestral lands claimed by others. Chinese mestizos accumulated large swathes of arable land into *haciendas,* or large estates, for cash crops and former native landowners became tenant farmers, further cementing the affluence of the Chinese mestizo population and also creating a non-Spanish, elite Asian class.

2.1.3 The power and influence of the Catholic Church

Without a prerogative to find gold or spices for the Spanish empire, religion became the justification for the Spanish presence in the Philippines. With permission from the pope, the work of converting natives came under royal supervision (Karnow 1989). The colonial governor of the Philippines was the Spanish king's representative and had the power to control appointments to office, effectively merging religious and civil leadership. Governance and leadership during the colonial era consisted essentially of a decentralized system of village level Catholic friars, priests and bishops. Native Filipinos were not permitted in higher clergy positions. The long distance of the Philippines from Spain led to scarcity of colonial administrative staff, meaning religious leaders also acted as civil servants. Due to the lack of appropriate supervision, priesthood in the Philippines became a lucrative calling, prone to corruption with clergy illicitly charging fees for religious rites that were traditionally free of cost (Francia 2010). The church also became a major landowner through both the purchase and inheritance of land, and land acquisition through royal bequest. Some friars and priests sired children with local women and to this day, Spanish heritage is perceived as a mark of social distinction among upper class Filipinos (Karnow 1989; Francia 2010).

At first, an economienda system was put in place to attract Spanish settlers. This system provided Spanish people with land and income from the land's taxes in return for looking after the native residents of the land, essentially a medieval European feudal system. The economienda system was eventually discontinued due to extreme abuse and eventually, the only Spanish people allowed into native villages were periodic tax collectors and inspectors, and most importantly, friars (Francia 2010). The power of the governor was also heavily restricted outside of Manila and Spanish provincial administrators were kept on a rotating roster. This further cemented the

power and influence of the local friar who learned the local languages and customs, and performed a large array of community functions. Contemporary testimonies recalled the power of the friar in the following terms:

> "He was inspector of primary schools, president of the health board and board of charities, president of the board of urban taxation… certified tax certificates…the board of statistics… certified the civil status of persons.
>
> The local authorities took no step, obeyed no superior orders and did not perform the duties of their office without previous advice, permission, or knowledge of the friar curate…" (Francia 2010).

The introduction of the male dominated Roman Catholic Church and its patriarchal values also shifted notions of pre-colonial gender equality. In the pre-colonial era, women held religious leadership roles, acting as spiritual mediums, healers, and performing deathbed rites, and sexuality was not strongly policed among women (Francia 2010). However, during the colonial era, Filipina women were expected to uphold Catholic virtues, such as modesty and subjugation to husband, son, and Christ (Francia 2010).

Friars also often tolerated pagan, animistic customs and beliefs alongside their Christian teaching, and religious practices among the native people were often a hybrid of both traditional Filipino and Western beliefs and customs. Historical accounts indicate the coexistence of indigenous animist beliefs and practices alongside Catholicism, yielding a fusion of "traditional and Hispanicized mores… a syncretic, personalized belief system" (Francia 2010). This allowed Catholicism to be more expediently ingrained into the lives of ordinary people. Over time, Catholicism may have maintained its strong influence in the Philippines partly because of the adaptive attitudes of its adherents, including the approach taken to marriage and family systems.

Although attempts were made by the Spanish Crown during the 18th and 19th century to establish a free primary education system, including the teaching of Spanish, education was dominated by the religious orders who avoided teaching Spanish to preserve their exclusive ability to mediate between the civil government and the indigenous population (Karnow 1989; Francia 2010). Higher education was also dominated by the religious orders, and the oldest universities in the country were established by the Jesuits and the Dominicans. Unsurprisingly, the emphasis at educational institutions was on "religious tutelage, allowing Catholicism to be deeply entrenched … at the expense of the secular pursuit of knowledge" (Francia 2010). With the Educational Decree of 1863, free school instruction for children aged 7-12 was declared and the

government took charge of primary education. In 1898, the last year of Spanish occupation, 2,143 state schools existed across the islands, leaving an infrastructure in place for the Americans to implement a countrywide education system (Francia 2010).

For centuries, religious leaders held power as major landowners, controllers of the education system, and leaders in local governance. However, native Filipinos were largely shut out of the clergy and therefore also excluded from positions of authority and influence, as well as opportunities for social and economic advancement. Eventually, the movement to allow Filipinos into all levels of clergy became intertwined with the movement for independence as both resulted from dissatisfaction with colonial rule.

2.1.4 The Philippine independence movement and American occupation

During an economically prosperous period in the nineteenth century when the Philippines was opening to foreign trade and investment, a new wealthy class developed, many of whom sent their sons abroad to study in Spain. There, these young men were exposed to Western ideas of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution regarding nationalism and liberalism. Referred to as the *ilustrados*, or "the enlightened ones," these were an intelligentsia of doctors, lawyers, artists, scholars, writers, and many of them Chinese mestizos. The most prominent of the *ilustrados* were Jose Rizal, the most famous nationalist leader, and Emilio Aguinaldo, the first proclaimed leader of the independent Philippines. With the spread of these new ideas, together, the affluent Chinese and Chinese mestizos, the upper and middle class natives, and the *criollos* — the Spanish born in the Philippines — first lobbied for equal rights with the *peninsulares* and equal status with citizens of Spain, which eventually led to a call for full independence from Spain. Controversially, this included the removal of the Spanish friars and priests and replacement with native clergy. United by a common Hispanicized background, this group began to call themselves *Filipinos*, a term that had previously only been used by *peninsulares* to condescendingly refer to *criollos.*

In 1896, a revolution began in earnest. By 1898, revolutionary forces held most of the Philippines and the United States had also become involved on account of the Spanish American war. An independent Philippines Republic was created, headed by Aguinaldo who was declared the head of the new Philippines Republic (Karnow 1989). The United States however, although interested in ousting the Spanish, did not support Philippine independence and made a deal with Spain in the Treaty of Paris, which ceded Spain's remaining colonies to the United States — the Philippines, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Guam. The fledgling Philippine nation was not included in

treaty negotiations, leading to a conflict between the Philippines and the United States which lasted from 1899 to 1902, called the Filipino American War, with the United States gaining control in the end.

The United States' occupation was referred to by President McKinley as "benevolent assimilation," an enterprise to "educate…uplift… civilize… Christianize" the Filipino (McKinley 1903), to such an extent that Rudyard Kipling's poem "The White Man's Burden" specifically referred to the United States' presence in the Philippines (1899). However, beyond this altruistic, albeit Eurocentric guise, the true objectives were similar to those of the previous colonizer — access to a source of raw materials and proximity to the Chinese market (Francia 2010).

During the American occupation, English was established as the official language and the country was further developed based on existing colonial infrastructure (Karnow 1989). For example, the education system was expanded based on the colonial public school system. School teachers called *Thomasites* — in reference to the name of the US Army Transport ship many travelled on — arrived from the United States in order to expand and reform the public school system, establish teaching institutions, and train native teachers in English. Similarly, middle and upper class Filipinos were sent to universities in the United States through a government program seeking to train future civil administrators, reaffirming close ties between the local elite and the occupiers, as in the Spanish era (Francia 2010). The Organic Act of the Philippine Islands (1902) established a constitution for the colonial government and importantly, a separation of church and state. After negotiations, the Catholic Church sold a major portion of its land back to the United States government, which in turn sold it to Filipino natives, mostly large estate holders, perpetuating the Spanish colonial pattern of a narrow base of landownership and further entrenching socioeconomic inequalities.

In 1934, the Philippines won sovereignty and the right to self-governance as a Commonwealth of the United States, with the aim of eventually transitioning to full independence. The Commonwealth Constitution was modelled on the United States' bicameral congress and three branches of government— legislative, executive, and judicial. Unsurprisingly however, the agreement gave the United States an economic advantage even after projected independence, ensuring the Philippines' dependence on and indeed even a preference for, American imports and subsequently undermining domestic development (Francia 2010). During World War II, the Philippines was invaded and occupied by Japan from 1942 to 1944. In 1946, the Philippines achieved independence from Japan.

2.1.5 The Philippines today

The Philippines gained independence in 1946, resurrecting the Republic of the Philippines. Since then, the Republic has been dominated by a tight knit class of ruling elite — referred to as "traditional politicians" on account of large scale nepotism — and suffered from a wide range of instability. From independence until 1972, the Philippines was governed with a political system based on the United States'. In 1972, President Marcos implemented martial law, suspending congress, arresting opposition leaders, shutting down and censoring the press, and rewriting the constitution. During Marcos' reign, the prominent opposition leader Benigno Aquino was assassinated by military officials. In response, in 1986, a popular uprising called the People Power Revolution, led in part by the Catholic Church, ousted Marcos and seated the opposition leader Corazon "Cory" Aquino, widow of Benigno Aquino, into presidency (Karnow 1998). Later in 2001, another People Power Revolution would demand the resignation of President Joseph Estrada, a populist film star turned politician, on grounds of corruption and abuse of power. Estrada's vice president Gloria Arroyo took office as the president in his stead, and would later also face several attempted coups d'état (Karnow 1989). Following Arroyo, Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, the son of assassinated Benigno Aquino and Corazon Aquino, would win the next presidential election.

Today, the Philippines is still characterized by a weak central government and strong family ties. A few elite families continue to dominate government and industry, and socioeconomic inequality is rated among the highest in the region (Zhuang et al. 2014). Although on a development scale, the Philippines is considered to have medium human development, it is nonetheless a country of stark contrasts. The level of education and literacy are both relatively high (Table 1), yet 12 percent of the population live in extreme poverty on less than 1.20 US Dollars per day (PSA 2015). Life expectancy at birth is relatively low at 68.3 years, attributable in part to high infant and child mortality rates.

Table 1 - Development indicators in the Philippines

Indicator	Value
Total Population	103,320,222 (2017)
Gross Domestic Product per Capita	2,951 Current USD (2016)
Gross National Income per Capita	3,580 Current USD (2016)
Gini Coefficient (0 = income equality)	43.04 (2016)
Population in extreme poverty (less than 1.20 USD/day)*	12.1 percent (2015)
Population living below national poverty line*	26.3 percent (2015)
Human Development Index	0.68 (2016)
Literacy Rate (ages 15 and above)	96.62 percent (2016)
Average Expected Years of Schooling	11.7 (2016)
Mean Years of Schooling	9.3 (2016)
Life Expectancy at Birth	68.3 (2016)
Total Fertility Rate	3.0 (2013)
Infant Mortality Rate (deaths per 1,000 live births, prior to age 1)**	22 (2011)
Under Five Mortality Rate (deaths per 1,000 live births, prior to age 5)**	30 (2011)

Sources: United Nations Human Development Report, World Bank, Philippines Statistics Authority*, Family Health Survey 2011**

The Philippines is also the only Christian country in the Southeast Asian region besides Timor-Leste, with the vast majority of Filipinos still identifying as Roman Catholic. Despite a lack of official state religion and purported separation of church and state, government agencies cite religious values in mission statements and use religion to justify policy positions. Catholic Church leaders actively influence policy directly through statements of support or censure, or indirectly through national and local level politicians. Church services are held in both religious and secular spaces, such as market places and shopping malls, and are highly integrated with secular community events, allowing religion to blend seamlessly into everyday life and social spaces. Religiosity is also very high in the Philippines. For example, the World Values Survey indicates that across ages, over 80 percent of Filipinos report that religion is very important to them and

describe themselves as a religious person, and more than half of Filipinos report attending church services one or more times per week (WVS 2012).

Vestiges of both Spanish and American occupation endure in the culture and the official languages of the Philippines are both Filipino (based on the dominant Tagalog dialect) and English. Billboards and radio ads are in English, and American music, television, and film are widely consumed. Because English is widely spoken among the educated classes, Filipinos have the language skills to be an extremely mobile population and to live and work around the world. The resulting widespread international and internal migration has also led to enduring channels of cultural exchange and the emergence of transnational families and mobile populations, introducing another layer of complexity to fertility and family formation.

2.2 The Filipino Family

The Philippines has a very family oriented culture, with strong emphasis on family ties (Miralao 1997; Alesina and Giuliano 2013). Identities are strongly family-centric (Miralao 1997) and family membership is a key component of class distinction, placing one within a social hierarchy (Medina 2015). This position within the social hierarchy is reaffirmed by marrying within your class into a family of similar standing (Medina 2015). In addition to the role of family in demarcating social status, mutual support and reciprocity between kin are also crucial family functions. The expectation of mutual support and assistance between kin has been criticized as giving rise to nepotism, corruption, and dependency. Unsurprisingly, businesses and government agencies are often organized along family ties, sometimes with better off family members employing their poorer relatives, echoing traditional barangay economics and social mobility dynamics (Miralao 1997; Medina 2015).

Even with modernization, the family remains very important. Although urbanization and internal migration has led to people moving away from the natal home, urban households are more likely to be extended in structure than rural households because people who move into the city tend to live with relatives, both to exploit existing social networks and also because the cost of setting up a new household is high in urban areas; this is especially the case among urban households in upper socioeconomic classes who can afford to house poorer relatives (Medina and de Guzman 1994). Moreover, even when families are residentially nuclear, they remain functionally extended and mutual reliance between extended family members remains implicit (Go 1993; Asis 1994). Internal rural to urban migration has also been linked to depressed fertility, likely due to

disruption of family formation through spousal separation, delayed entry into union, or diversion of resources toward migration (Padilla 1994; Jensen and Ahlburg 2004).

International labour migration in the Philippines is widespread among both men and women, with as many as one million workers migrating to work abroad each year, altering the composition and structure of Filipino families in the sending country (Battistella and Asis 2013). These labour migrants are often temporary workers who migrate without their families because of temporary work contracts (usually two years) and migration policies in the destination country prohibiting family reunification. As a result, an estimated 2-6 million children 0-14 years of age are left behind in the Philippines by migrating parents (Zosa and Orbeta 2009), possibly eroding family ties and negatively impacting children. However, because family ties are so strong, extended family members of labour migrants often work together to help with childcare and housekeeping, and as a result, migrant households are generally larger than non-migrant households because they are more likely to be extended or multigenerational (Battistella and Asis 2013). Due to the strong kinship ties and normalization of migration and migrant households, child well-being has not been found to suffer in Filipino migrant households compared to non-migrant households, unlike migrant households in other Southeast Asian countries where left behind children do experience emotional and behavioural issues (Graham and Jordan 2011). Moreover, the decision to migrate is a household decision, motivated by the financial benefits to the whole family (including extended members, i.e. nieces, nephews, grandchildren etc.) that migrant worker remittances could provide, not motivated solely by personal gain on the part of the migrant (Asis 1994). Although migration may weaken family ties in some ways, from a different perspective, labour migration may also reaffirm and strengthen the bond between family members through the reciprocal exchange of remittances (from migrant to family), and childcare (from family to the left behind children of migrants). In this way, families retain their traditional, central function of reciprocity and interdependence, even in the face of geographic separation and non-traditional modalities.

Emotional closeness and security within a family is also very important (Bulatao 1975; Bulatao 1978). In fact, the emotional dimensions and meanings of family may arguably be growing in importance as a counterbalance to the compositional and structural shifts in family forms (Tarroja 2010; Medina 2015). This notion posits that family is no longer defined by a prescribed structure of co-residential members but is instead shaped by the emotional connections and psychological dimensions of love, support, warmth, and closeness (Tarroja 2010). Medina (2015) also describes

the function of family shifting away from its role as an economic or commercial unit and toward an emotional function.

2.3 Marriage and Cohabitation

The marriage system in the Philippines is a "system under considerable tensions" (Xenos and Kabamalan 2007), having been shaped by multiple forces and continuing to evolve with modernization and globalization. Different facets of Philippine culture have played a role in shaping the marriage systems — from Malay bilateral kinship ties, to Catholic and Spanish culture, to Chinese influence from the elite Chinese-Filipino population (Williams et al. 2007; Xenos and Kabamalan 2007). As a result, the Filipino marriage system has similarities and also important differences from other low-land Southeast Asian, European, and Sinic marriage practices (Xenos and Kabamalan 2007).

Traditionally, marriage in the Philippines was marked by a series of ritualized events that symbolize increasing levels of commitment (Choe 2002). The process began with *pamanhikan*, an engagement ceremony where the groom and his family formally obtain permission from the bride's family to marry and the details of the wedding are ritualistically negotiated, including the issue of the gift given by the groom's family to the bride's family, which was traditionally a piece of land or a sum of money (Medina 2015). In the colonial era, marriages were sometimes arranged before birth to secure alliances between families (Medina 2015). The betrothed couple would then be expected to pay formal visits to each other's kinsmen and godparents, as a demonstration of willingness to become assimilated into each other's families (Medina 2015). Engagement is eventually followed by the formal church ceremony or in some cases, a civil ceremony (Xenos and Kabamalan 2007). While both church ceremonies and civil ceremonies are legally binding, couples often perceive church ceremonies as more significant and prestigious (Williams and Guest 2005) and many who opt for a civil ceremony later go on to marry in a church ceremony (Kabamalan 2004). Church weddings may be prohibitive in cost for some couples, presenting a financial obstacle to marriage. To address this, civil mass weddings (*kasalang bayan*) are periodically offered by churches and municipalities to couples as a low cost alternative.

Traditional courtship involved a young man visiting the woman in her parental home and doing chores for the household to demonstrate worthiness and capability (i.e. chopping firewood, drawing water). The courting couple would always be chaperoned by parents or relatives. Starting from the 1950s, urbanization shifted the locus of social control and entertainment, moving courtship and dating outside of the home away from parental supervision. Although

marriages were traditionally arranged by parents between families, in the modern era, the influence of parents in choice of partners has weakened (although has not disappeared altogether) as marriage shifted to focus less on family alliance and more on couple compatibility and romantic love (Williams and Guest 2005; Medina 2015). For men, marriage also reportedly serves the welcome function of encouraging a moral and wholesome lifestyle, free of womanizing and drinking (Williams and Guest 2005). In contrast to marriage as a social obligation to perpetuate the family lineage, modern marriage is meant to be a "personally satisfying and pleasurable relationship" (Medina 2015).

> "This notion of romantic love is reinforced by another Western idea also introduced primarily through mass media. This is the modern concept of marriage: that marriage exists primarily for the personal happiness of husband and wife" (Medina 2015).

A qualitative study of attitudes toward marriage in Southeast Asia demonstrated that while older people felt marriage was a duty to your parents and family in order to form alliances and have children for old age support, younger Southeast Asians tended to have less family-centric views, although having children for old age support and company remained important (Williams and Guest 2005). Furthermore, with marriage less commonly framed as a compulsory obligation to one's family, people may also have reasons to postpone or forgo marriage, such as financial hardship or unemployment (Williams and Guest 2005; Arguillas and Williams 2012).

Non-marriage, though uncommon, has been historically higher in the Philippines than in other East and Southeast Asian countries (Costello and Casterline 2002; Jones 2005). In the 1960s, in countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and Southern Thailand, fewer than one percent of women in their 40s had never married , compared to 7.6 percent in the Philippines (Jones 2005). The historically high level of non-marriage in the Philippines has been attributed to the prestige of celibacy and taking holy orders in the Catholic Church (Jones 2005). As of 2013, approximately 6.3 percent of women in their late 40s reported never having been married or lived with a man (ICF 2014). Currently, non-marriage has a positive educational pattern for women, with the most educated being the most likely to remain single; however, women in lower skilled jobs are also less likely to marry, possibly because poor economic prospects negatively impact their chances on the marriage market , which indicates that non-marriage and socioeconomic status may have a complex relationship (Arguillas and Williams 2012). Non-marriage may also be related to the recent surge in cohabitation.

Chapter 2

Historically, cohabitation has been noted in the Philippines in several different forms — the consensual union, *tanan* or elopement*,* and *querida* or having an extra-marital second wife or family (Choe 2002; Kabamalan 2004; Xenos and Kabamalan 2007); however, due to limited data, it is not clear how pervasive these practices were. In particular, traditional cohabitation may have prevailed in more remote locations farther away from Western colonization and Christianization (Kabamalan 2011). A consensual union is typically viewed as a longer term arrangement that couples without the resources to marry may resort to (Xenos and Kabamalan 2007; Kabamalan and Ogena 2013). In contrast, elopement or *tanan* refers to a "run-away love match" (Williams et al. 2007) where a couple leave their respective family homes to cohabit without parental approval, in order to force their parents' acceptance of the match. Although all forms of cohabitation are opposed by the Catholic Church and have traditionally been stigmatized, pragmatic considerations — such as an unplanned pregnancy or economic concerns— may take priority when partnership decisions are made; consequently, people may express ideals that they do not meet in reality, especially lower income classes among whom sexual mores may be more relaxed (Williams et al. 2007; Xenos and Kabamalan 2007). More recently, the increase in cohabitation among youth has also raised questions about whether the meaning of cohabitation has broadened beyond its traditional functions to become a distinct step in the increasingly diverse family formation pathways between single to formally married (Kabamalan 2004; Xenos and Kabamalan 2007). Cohabitation could also be perceived by some as a way to test a relationship before marriage, which is especially important since legally dissolving a marriage is very difficult and divorce is not legal (Williams and Guest 2005).

At the same time, pregnancy precipitating both marital and cohabiting partnerships (Gipson et al. 2012) could suggest a degree of convergence between marriage and cohabitation, wherein reproductive behaviours in cohabitation and marriage become more similar. For example, previously, in the event of a nonmarital pregnancy, marriage was an important step to take to protect the child from stigma of illegitimacy and to legally ensure support from the father of the child (Williams and Guest 2005). However, current levels of nonmarital fertility suggest that nonmarital pregnancy as a motivation for marriage is weakening, and cohabitation may instead be another acceptable or perhaps preferred response. As cohabitation grows in prevalence among people of all ages, it is important to examine its correlates to better elucidate its meaning and role in family formation, recognizing that the rapid rise of both cohabitation and cohabiting families could also yield rapid changes in their meaning (Seltzer 2000).

2.4 Fertility in the Philippines

Currently, the TFR in the Philippines is 3.0 (ICF 2014) and higher than nearly all Southeast Asian countries, where the regional average TFR is 2.2 (UN 2015). Several Southeast Asian countries have reached replacement or close to replacement level fertility but Filipino women have yet to indicate a clear two child preference. The mean ideal number of children for all women is 2.8 (ICF 2014) and more than one third prefer a family of four or more children (Pedroso 2008). Moreover, a quarter of women from less advantaged backgrounds report an ideal family size of 5 or more children (Lai and Tey 2014). Despite the relatively high fertility rate in the Philippines, the TFR has declined steadily over the last four decades from 6.0 to 3.0 (Figure 2), reducing quickly in the 1970s and 1980s, around the time other Southeast Asian countries were also experiencing rapid fertility declines, and slowing down in the past two decades. More detailed explanation of demographic transition in Southeast Asia may be found in Chapter 3 in section 3.2. Furthermore, additional details regarding the age patterns of fertility decline in the Philippines, as well as how they compare with other Asian countries may be found in Chapter 5, in section 5.2.

Figure 2 - Trends in total fertility rate



Source: Demographic and Health Surveys 2013 Report

Currently, regional differences in TFR are clear throughout the country, with the lowest fertility in the National Capital Region (NCR) at 2.3, and the highest fertility on the southern island in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) at 4.2 (Figure 3).

In addition to TFR, another measure of fertility is the mean number of children ever born. While TFR takes into account the exposure time in each age group and synthesizes fertility rates across the reproductive lifespan (further explanation of TFR and age specific fertility rates may be found in the data and methods section of Chapter 5, in section 5.4.1.2), the mean number of children ever born describes the average completed family size of women in a specific age group at one point in time, and is therefore more useful to evaluate among women who have reached the end of their reproductive years. However, the downside of evaluating women who have completed childbearing is that rapidly changing current trends among younger cohorts are not captured, and in the context of fertility decline, completed family size is likely to be higher than TFR.

Nevertheless, based on either metric, fertility differences exist by residence, wealth, and education. Urban areas have markedly lower average fertility than rural areas and there are also negative wealth and educational gradients of fertility (Table 2). Women aged 15-49 living in urban areas have a TFR of 2.6 compared to 3.5 for women in rural areas, and urban women aged 40-49 have an average family size of 3.3 versus 4.2 for rural women. The 15-49 year old women of the poorest wealth quintile have a TFR of 5.2, and the 40-49 year old women of the same wealth quintile have an average completed family size of 5.6. In contrast, the wealthiest quintile of women aged 15-49 and 40-49 have a TFR of 1.7 and an average family size of 2.5, respectively. Educational patterns are similar, with the most educated women at a TFR of 2.1, compared to those with primary education only who have a TFR of 4.6. Women with no education have a slightly lower TFR than those with primary education only but they are a very small proportion of the population, whereas women are more evenly distributed between primary, secondary and higher education. These large subgroup differences in fertility may reflect the wide ethno-cultural diversities and socioeconomic inequalities pervasive in the Philippines.[2]

---

2 In media and art depictions, the Philippines is associated with high fertility. Motherland, a documentary directed by Ramona Diaz which premiered in 2017 at the Sundance Film Festival, features the Dr. Jose Fabella Memorial Hospital, one of the biggest and busiest public hospitals in the world. Fabella Memorial Hospital provides obstetric care to poor women at heavily reduced fees, and is referred to locally as “the baby factory” Diaz, Ramona (2017). Birth Place. New York Times.

Elena Consentino directed World’s Busiest Maternity Ward, for a BBC 2 series on population, focusing on the same hospital and highlighting the social inequalities throughout the Metro Manila areas, exacerbated in part by rapid population growth among the impoverished.

Figure 3- Total fertility rate by geography, 2013



Source: STAT Compiler

These two film pieces represent international media and art examples of the portrayal of the Philippines as a developing country with fair economic prospects but stark contrasts in inequalities and continued rapid population growth. Moreover, the child selected by the UN in 2011 to symbolize the world population reaching 7 billion was born in Fabella Memorial Hospital. Even in popular discourse, the image of the Philippines is a country famous for its high fertility levels.

Table 2- Fertility by background characteristics 2013

	Total fertility rate women aged 15-49	Mean number of children ever born to women aged 40-49
Residence		
Urban	2.6	3.3
Rural	3.5	4.2
Education		
No education	3.8	6.1
Elementary	4.6	4.9
High School	3.3	3.7
College	2.1	2.6
Wealth Quintile		
Lowest	5.2	5.6
Second	3.7	4.6
Middle	3.1	3.8
Fourth	2.4	3.0
Highest	1.7	2.5
Total	3.0	3.7

Source: DHS Report 2014

2.5 Divorce and Family Policy

Divorce is another important dimension of family change in the SDT, and is often framed as an indication of heightened individual autonomy over prescribed religious and moral codes. The Philippines is the only country in the world where divorce is illegal for most of the population and the only recourse to marital dissolution is either legal separation without the possibility of re-marriage in the future, or a costly and complicated annulment procedure inaccessible to most. Divorce is legal, although difficult to obtain, for the Muslim and foreign born population of the Philippines; however they are a small minority compared to the Catholic population. In this way, the poor access to legal divorce undoubtedly has bearing on partnership and union formation. Given the extremely high obstacles to dissolving a marriage, couples with fewer resources could prefer to cohabit. Furthermore, married people who separate from their wives or husbands and re-partner without legally divorcing would not be able to transition to marriage, affecting both the rates of cohabitation and marriage.

Divorce has not always been illegal. In pre-colonial Philippines, various native communities in the Philippines practiced divorce (Gloria 2007) and women benefitted from relative gender equality

such that they could independently obtain a divorce and remarry by returning the dowry and paying an additional fine (Miller 2008). After colonization, indigenous practices were supplanted by Western institutions and Roman Catholic standards, changing the landscape of both marital law and gender equity; divorce was prohibited and legal separation was allowed only under a limited set of circumstances (Miller 2008). During the American occupation, divorce became legal and then increasingly more liberal with the Japanese occupation. Following the establishment of an independent Philippine Republic in 1946, a new Civil Code was enacted in 1949 with marriage and divorce laws echoing the colonial Roman Catholic legacy, making divorce illegal and legal separation the only recourse for marital dissolution (Miller 2008). In 1988, divorce laws would be revised with the "Family Code of the Philippines" and the "Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines," allowing — under a certain set of circumstances— legal separation for the majority non-Muslim population and legal divorce for the Muslim population. The Family Code of 1987 was initially signed by Corazon Aquino and is also known as Executive Order No. 209. Although the legal age of marriage is 18, couples under the age of 21 must demonstrate written parental approval of the marriage (1987 Family Code, Article 14) and couples between age 21 and 25 must also either demonstrate parental approval or else be subject to a three month waiting period between filing for a marriage license and obtaining it (1987 Family Code, Article 15). For couples who are young enough to require parental consent, they must also demonstrate having gone through either religious or government marriage counselling, or else be subject to a three month waiting period (1987 Family Code, Article 16).

Several attempts to pass a divorce law and increasing public support for legalizing divorce suggest that public attitudes may be liberalizing (Miller 2008; Laranas 2016). Nevertheless, support for legalizing divorce is still nowhere near universal, according to recent findings from both the World Values Survey (2011) and Social Weather Stations Survey (SWS 2015). Even supporters of legalizing divorce emphasize the specific importance and dignity of the Filipino marriage (Miller 2008; Parrenas 2010). And while public support may be on the rise, implementing effective legislation legalizing divorce would be vastly difficult in the face of opposition from powerful religious groups. While divorce is associated with the SDT as an indication of individualization, the Philippines is markedly distinct in both practice and values, although values are evolving.

In contrast to the strict divorce laws, the family policies do recognize cohabiting couples and have recently liberalized to extend additional rights to the children of cohabitating parents. Article 147 of the Family Code indicates that the property of a man and woman who live together as though married and who could theoretically marry (i.e. one person is not already legally married to

someone else) is viewed as communal property, which includes wages. If property is acquired during the relationship by one person, their partner is nonetheless considered a co-owner or joint contributor in the acquisition if said partner cared for the family and household, which seems to speak to the direct protection of women.

> "Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
>
> In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household."

Since the Family Code was signed in 1987, republic acts have been passed to amend the Family Code, specifically to allow for more protection of children born outside of marriage. The terms of illegitimacy were set previously by the Civil Code. According to the Civil Code, "children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate" (Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 225). This meant that children born outside of these circumstances were illegitimate and did not enjoy the protections and rights afforded to legitimate children.

Legitimated children are illegitimate children whose parents *eventually* marry, thereby conferring legitimacy on children born prior to marriage. Furthermore, based on Article 179 of the Family Code, if a formerly illegitimate child becomes legitimate by their parents marrying, the child has the same rights as child who was born legitimate. In 2009, Article 177 of the Family Code was amended with Republic Act 9858 to provide specifically for the legitimation of children born to unmarried teenage parents. The way the article was previously written did not permit children born to unmarried teenagers to become legitimated even if their parents married. The Republic Act 9858 amends Article 177 of the Family Code to read:

> "Article 177. Children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, or were so disqualified only because either or both of them were below eighteen (18) years of age, may be legitimated."

Another amendment, Republic Act 9255 first circulated in 2004 and updated in 2014 to amend Article 176 of the Family Code, permits illegitimate children to use the surname of their father. This amendment allows illegitimate children to have their father's surname on their birth certificate if the father files an affidavit of admission of paternity. This does not legitimate the child but does allow for formal paternal acknowledgement, which is necessary for illegitimate children to claim any of the same rights as legitimate children. However, even if a child carries the surname of their father, their rights are still not the same as the rights of legitimate children, although they are improved. With paternal recognition, illegitimate children may also now contend with rights of legitimate kids and relatives:

> "Art. 176. Illegitimate children … shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime [entitlement] of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force."

Finally, in recognition of single parents, the Republic Act 8972 is the Solo Parents Welfare Act which aims to extend flex hours, parental leave, government assistance with housing and healthcare, and welfare programs to solo parents. Solo parents are not necessarily unmarried parents but parents who have sole responsibility of caring for a child, whether through spousal death, spousal incarceration, separation, mental or physical disability of spouse, or abandonment. Family members tasked with providing primary care to orphaned or abandoned children may also be solo parents. To avail of benefits, solo parent status must be evidenced through proper documentation and verified by a social worker. Although the Solo Parents Welfare Act is written into the law, to date it is not very well implemented and solo parents continue to experience disproportionate levels of poverty.

2.6 Family Planning and Reproductive Health in the Philippines

As a developing country, the availability and use of family planning may have an important impact on fertility and partnership in the Philippines. Due in part to the influence of the Catholic Church, family planning use in the Philippines lags behind other Southeast Asian countries (Hull 2012) at

around 55 percent of all partnered women (married and cohabiting), nearly a third of whom rely on less effective traditional methods (ICF 2014). Those who do use modern contraception are most likely to use oral contraceptive pills which are more subject to human error and contraceptive failure than more effective long acting reversible methods, such as intrauterine devices and implants. Table 3 below details the recent trends in method mix of contraceptive use in the Philippines based on the DHS, based on partnered women.

Although reportedly disapproved of, nonmarital sex among young people is common, with the majority of young men and a substantial minority of young women experiencing their first sexual encounter outside of marriage (Choe et al. 2001; Upadhyay and Hindin 2007; Gipson et al. 2012). Contraceptive use among unmarried sexually active young people is low and only 22 percent of men and women aged 15-24 who have had premarital sex reported using a form of family planning (either condoms or withdrawal) during their first sexual encounter (YAFS 2014). Gender differences in sexual mores and norms persist, with young women more likely to be concerned about protecting their reputation as a chaste woman and hesitant to demonstrate knowledge of or discuss contraception (Gipson et al. 2012). Moreover, women are viewed as having more to lose in case of sexual transgressions since they are more vulnerable in the situation of an unintended pregnancy, especially to the risks of being abandoned or having their pregnancy unacknowledged by their partners (Gipson et al. 2012). Rape and coerced sex are also major issues among young people, with 15 percent of sexually experienced young women identifying their first sexual encounter as non-consensual, further highlighting the gendered differences in sexual relationships (Natividad and Marquez 2004; Gipson et al. 2012).

Political support and commitment for public sector family planning services within the country is weak and decentralized, owing in part to the strong influence of the Catholic Church at all levels of policy and the withdrawal of USAID funding for family planning in 2008. The recently passed and highly controversial Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012, referred to as the Reproductive Health Bill, calls for universally accessible family planning services countrywide but relies on LGUs and personnel of varying levels of support to implement said services. Currently, the Supreme Court has implemented a Temporary Restraining Order preventing the distribution of contraceptive implants and has also stopped the Food and Drug Administration from “granting any and all pending applications for registration and/or recertification for reproductive products and supplies, including contraceptive drugs and devices” (Cabato 2017), which would drastically reduce the availability of contraceptive supplies on the market in the next year and could potentially affect women of all socioeconomic levels.

Per the national Commission on Population, "Responsible Parenthood – Family Planning" classes are offered in premarital counselling sessions and local community centres which are conducted by the local government and teach couples about family planning. While some LGUs may have supportive local level leaders, other areas face substantial obstacles to implementation. Premarital counselling classes are also offered by religious leaders who may have a different stance on family planning than that espoused by the Reproductive Health Bill, and some religious leaders may not support modern methods. Quality and accessibility of family planning supplies, counselling, and services are thus highly variable throughout the country (personal communication with director of Commission on Population, Juan Perez, 2016).

As a result of poor family planning use, many births and pregnancies are unintended, especially among vulnerable populations such as lower income, lower educated women, adolescents, and young adults (Juarez et al. 2005; Darroch et al. 2009; Gipson et al. 2011; Abada and Tenkorang 2012; Gipson and Hicks 2016). While the preference for larger families is strong in the Philippines, actual fertility nonetheless still surpasses wanted fertility, especially among less wealthy subgroups whose family planning use is poorer (Orbeta 2006). Overall, more than a quarter of women report their last birth as unintended: 11 percent unwanted and 17 percent mistimed (ICF 2014). By some estimates, more than half of all pregnancies in the Philippines are unintended, 90 percent of which occur to women who do not use family planning or who rely on less effective traditional family planning methods (Darroch et al. 2009).

Chapter 2

Table 3 - Family planning and reproductive health indicators

	1993	2003	2013
Contraceptive Prevalence Rate (in union women)	24.2	48.9	55.1
Contraceptive method mix (%)			
Pills	21.2	27.0	34.7
Female Sterilization	30.3	21.5	15.4
IUD	7.5	8.4	6.4
Condoms	2.5	3.9	3.4
Injectables	0.0	6.4	6.7
Other Modern	1.2	1.0	1.6
Traditional or Folklore	37.3	31.8	31.8
Abortion Rate per 1,000 women	25 per 1,000 (1995)	27 per 1,000 (2000)	-
Prevalence of unintended births (as percentage of all births in five years preceding survey)			
Unwanted	15.9	20.3	10.7
Mistimed	28	24	17.1
Prevalence of unmet need			
Limiting	13.8	9.4	6.7
Spacing	12.4	7.9	10.8
Median age at first sex (25-49 year olds)	21.5	21.9	21.5
HIV incidence rate (per 1,000 population)	<0.01 (UN AIDS 1994)	0.02 (UN AIDS 2004)	0.2 (UN AIDS 2016)
Infant Mortality Rate (deaths per 1,000 live births, prior to age 1)	33.6	29	23
Under Five Mortality Rate (deaths per 1,000 live births, prior to age 5)	54.2	40	31
Maternal Mortality Ratio (maternal deaths per 100,000 live births)	209 (DHS)	162 (Family Health Survey 2006)	221 (Family Health Survey 2011)

Sources: Demographic and Health Surveys, Family Health Survey, UN AIDS aidsinfo.org

Abortion is illegal under all circumstances in the Philippines, punishable by up to six years in prison for doctors and midwives who perform an abortion and two to six years for a woman who obtains one (Hussain and Finer 2013). However, although abortion is illegal, it is nonetheless

widespread in the Philippines with an estimated 473,000 occurring each year, a rate of 27 per 1,000 women (Juarez et al. 2005). Abortion estimates are based on hospital cases of post-abortion maternal morbidities. These clandestine abortions are often practiced in unsafe, unsanitary conditions without proper equipment or appropriately trained personnel, leading to morbidity and mortality (Gipson et al. 2011; Hussain and Finer 2013). An estimated 100,000 women are hospitalized for abortion related causes yearly (Juarez et al. 2005; Hussain and Finer 2013) and 1,000 maternal deaths each year are attributed to abortion complications (Darroch et al. 2009).

With low levels of modern family planning use, high levels of unintended pregnancy, and the pervasiveness of unsafe illegal abortion, maternal mortality in the Philippines is extremely high at 221 per 100,000 live births (2011) and has actually increased from 162 in 2006 (2011). This not only far exceeds the maternal mortality ratios in other Southeast Asian countries (WHO 2014) but is also more than quadruple the Millennium Development Goal of lowering the maternal mortality ratio to 52 deaths per 100,000 live births by 2015. Infant and under five mortality are also relatively high in the Philippines at 23 and 31 deaths per 1,000 live births respectively, although both have consistently improved in the last two decades.

2.7 Summary

This chapter described how the history of the Philippines helped to shape the Philippines' society and family systems and values. The first part discussed how the colonial era laid the foundation for a hierarchical social system determined by racial lines and assimilation, fraught with vast socioeconomic inequalities further exacerbated by nepotism. It then discussed how the weak central leadership, the strong influence of the Catholic Church, and strong family ties are interrelated and have mutually reinforced each other over time. The independence movement and American occupation underscore the pervasive influence of Western culture and its association with society's elite. Recently, the unstable government further emphasizes how in the absence of a strong central state, the family and Church remain the most dominant institutions. Lastly, the chapter provides a summary of the role of family in Filipino culture, the history and current state of marriage and cohabitation, relevant family policies, and background on fertility and family planning, which together with the historical background provide the national context of the thesis and a review of the Philippines-specific extant literature.

Chapter 3 Theoretical Background and Empirical Evidence

This chapter comprises six sections providing an overview of the relevant theoretical background and empirical evidence for this thesis. The first and second sections begin with a review of fertility decline and the FDT, and a brief summary of fertility transition in Southeast Asia. The third section describes the theory of the SDT and touches on the strengths and weaknesses of the theory for explaining family change in a variety of contexts. The fourth section examines the applicability of the SDT in regions culturally relevant for understanding the Philippines — East and Southeast Asia, and Latin America. Finally, the chapter ends with a more in-depth dive into meanings and concepts of cohabitation and an introduction to sociological perspectives of family and relationships from individualistic and collectivistic lenses, which is further expanded upon in Chapter 7.

Overall, this chapter provides the relevant theoretical background and regional context for the analysis of family change in the Philippines of the thesis.

3.1 Fertility Decline and the First Demographic Transition

Fertility decline is a demographic process that is simultaneously well-studied and yet continually challenging to established theories, as new data and additional puzzles emerge. Theories describing the patterns of fertility decline, the drivers of fertility decline, and how changes are effected over time are debated, compared, contrasted, and may shift in importance depending on national, social, cultural, and economic contexts. Analyses of fertility transition often frame fertility decline as attributable to changes in two components – 1) the timing of entry into marriage and subsequently, first birth, or 2) the quantum and tempo of marital childbearing, during which fertility decisions are parity based (Hirschman and Guest 1990). Subsequently, important drivers of fertility decline are often discussed based on how they impact age at marriage and marital fertility. Essentially, fertility can change via its two main components of quantum/parity and tempo/timing, and changes in either component can lead to declines in period fertility.

Fertility transitions common to developing countries may be characterized by a quantum decrease in fertility across age groups as the preference for larger families weakens. For example, Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa are two regions at different points in their fertility

transitions but where fertility decline in women over 30 was dominant compared with decline across all age groups (Bongaarts and Casterline 2013). In contrast, decreases in fertility can also be concentrated at the oldest or also youngest age groups — which are typically the highest risk groups for maternal morbidities — such that the relative proportion of childbearing in the middle age groups increases, condensing the reproductive lifespan. In more developed countries that have completed their fertility transitions, such as in East Asia and Southern Europe, further fertility decline to below replacement levels may be due to postponement of fertility among younger women, causing tempo changes which can additionally lead to quantum decreases in completed cohort fertility if postponed births are not recuperated at older ages (Frejka and Sobotka 2008; Frejka et al. 2010)

Fertility decline can be measured or described from a quantum or tempo perspective but why such shifts in the timing and level of fertility occur has generated extensive and long running research and debate. The classical theory of fertility decline references the FDT, where the development and modernization that lead to declining mortality also eventually dis-incentivize large families (Notestein 1953). The FDT asserts that populations move through three phases of fertility and mortality regimes. In the first phase, both fertility and mortality are high, leading to low rates of population growth. Mortality is high due to poor health care and sanitation, infectious disease, vulnerability to famine and pestilence, and high rates of infant and child mortality. Fertility is high because larger families are more economically and socially advantageous (Coale 1973). In the second phase, mortality declines as modernization and industrialization improve health care and living standards, but fertility remains stable until social norms and values regarding childbearing recalibrate in response to the changes in the mortality regime. During this phase, there is high population growth. In the third and final phase of transition, fertility declines as smaller families become both advantageous and the accepted norm, ending the period of rapid population growth. For this to occur, modernization alone is not sufficient but fertility must be perceived as something within one's control, smaller families must be perceived as advantageous, and effective techniques for fertility control must be available (Coale 1973). While the FDT from high mortality and fertility regimes to low mortality and fertility regimes occurred gradually over two centuries in Western countries, fertility transition in the rest of the world, especially in East and Southeast Asia, has been more rapid, sometimes taking place in a few decades.

Although modernization alone may not be sufficient for sustained fertility decline, fertility behaviour is impacted by the changes in social structures, opportunities, constraints, and

normative context that result from modernization. While a purely economic demand theory of fertility emphasizes the actual changing cost of children and frames parental decision making as a purely rational, fiscal decision, it is important to note that economic changes may also lead to social, cultural and idea changes which influence fertility among married couples. For example, the implementation of mass education may change the actual economic cost of children within a household as well as their perceived economic role, decreasing the demand for large families (Caldwell 1980). Compulsory mass education means children are no longer available to work to contribute economically to the family, and may instead require investment in the form of school fees, uniforms and books. This has been observed in modernizing Southeast Asian contexts (Knodel et al. 1984; Hukin 2014) where families expressed preference for smaller families because children were increasingly viewed as costly investments instead of economic assets and fewer children were desired in the interest of economic well-being.

Moreover, the social and cultural change in children's perceived roles prompted by economic development can also indirectly lead to the development of different reproductive strategies to ensure well-being. Increased investment in children to promote intergenerational social mobility has also been pointed to as another incentive to decrease fertility, as parents may opt for "quality over quantity" as a strategy to maximize the chance of future support from children (Becker 1960). For example, fertility declined markedly from 1960 and onward in Northern Vietnam partially because married couples were incentivized to provide their children with the higher education necessary to secure employment in the rapidly growing public sector (Bryant 1998). In Thailand in the 1980s, smaller families were much more likely to have children who attended secondary school than larger families, due to dilution of family resources and parental investment for larger families (Knodel and Wongsith 1991).

Social changes, such as the improvements in women's status — from female education to household decision making— may also change fertility preferences and behaviours by providing women additional occupational, educational, or social opportunities which can dis-incentivize or delay fertility (Mason 1987). Additionally, improvements in gender equity may impact fertility in different ways, depending on the stage of fertility transition and in what institutions improved gender equity materializes. Improved gender equity within family-oriented institutions has been associated with transition from very high fertility to replacement level fertility, as in the FDT (McDonald 2000). In populations that have progressed through the FDT and where there is already a high level of gender equity, further improvements can actually raise fertility by enabling working women to better balance occupational or educational tasks with childbearing

(Goldscheider et al. 2015). Such progress in gender equity may occur through improved social policies or normative changes in the gendered division of domestic labour, thereby making larger families more manageable.

Increased female education and labour force participation typical of development and modernization can lead to changes in men and women's relative economic importance within the household, as theorized in Becker's microeconomic model of family as a basis for gender-based division of labour (Becker 1991). If women are more educated and more likely to engage in wage earning labour outside of the home, they may be less inclined to fulfil traditional gender roles within the family due to their focus on economic activity, weakening the economic incentive to marry and devote time and energy to raising large families. Moreover, women's education in is strong predictor of fertility at the individual level (Jejeebhoy 1995) and may lead to lower levels of fertility through a variety of mechanisms. Higher education can improve women's occupational prospects, raising the opportunity costs of childbearing and depressing fertility (Becker 1991). Prolonged education may positively influence women's age at marriage if marriage and education are seen as incompatible, implicitly postponing fertility, which has been observed across low and middle income countries (Jejeebhoy 1995). Finally, highly educated women may have different values and expectations regarding family life compared to their less educated counterparts (Cleland 2002) or they may be more likely to use family planning and able to negotiate their fertility preferences (Martin 1995). In this way, changes in fertility may be operationalized through changes in perceived roles within marriage and changes in age of entry into marriage and family life in general, underscoring the important role of marriage in fertility change.

Another theory of fertility transition emphasizes the spread of new ideas through innovation diffusion, namely that fertility decreases because new knowledge, attitudes, and values diffuse throughout communities through social learning in a social effects model (Casterline 2001). The social effects model supports the idea that changes in individuals' knowledge and behaviour will affect the likelihood of others experiencing similar changes and that this social learning may both expedite and hinder change. In the case of fertility decline, the innovation of fertility regulation can spread through mechanisms such as information flow from person to person, normalization of behaviours within social groups, and normative changes in context (Casterline 2001). For instance, family planning use or delayed marriage are both innovative ideas and behaviours often linked to fertility decline, both of which can diffuse through social learning. The diffusion of new ideas may explain why fertility decline sometimes occurs among populations that have not experienced the expected level of modernization or socioeconomic progress. In such cases, ideas

about children and marriage or behaviours around family planning may have changed due to diffusion of new ideas from other communities before marked improvements in socioeconomic circumstances. For example, fertility is unexpectedly low in places with poor socioeconomic circumstances such as parts of South Asia, possibly due to diffusion of ideas from more affluent places (Jones 1990).

3.2 The First Demographic Transition and Fertility Decline in Southeast Asia

In the 18th and 19th century, Southeast Asia was sparsely settled, compared to South and East Asia. The 20th century saw major population growth in the region as Southeast Asia progressed through the FDT. Over the late 19th and early 20th century, mortality declined only modestly but enough to kick off population growth and importantly, fertility remained high (Hirschman and Bonaparte 2012). The persistent high fertility has been attributed to shifts in settlement patterns and agricultural practices that favoured larger families and earlier marriage and the colonial order throughout the region which hindered industrialization, urbanization and education, all of which had contributed to fertility decline in Europe (Hirschman and Bonaparte 2012). After World War II, mortality improved drastically with the introduction of antibiotics and implementation of public health programs, leading to rapid population growth. Population in the region tripled from 176 million in 1950 to 590 million in 2010 (Hirschman and Bonaparte 2012).

The fertility decline in Southeast Asia from high fertility to replacement level fertility started in the mid-20th century and has been well underway for several decades (Hirschman and Guest 1990; Jones 1990; Hirschman and Young 2000). Analyses of Southeast Asian fertility transition have explored the socioeconomic mechanisms of fertility decline, including the changing demand for children, the impact of development, and the role of family planning (Knodel et al. 1984; Hirschman and Young 2000; Hukin 2014). Development in particular is posited to be an important key to fertility decline, working through both social and economic mechanisms to change underlying fertility strategies and incentives for childbearing (Bryant 2007).

Like many regional analyses of fertility transition, the Southeast Asian fertility transition is often framed from the perspective of either changes in marriage or changes in marital fertility. Earlier work on fertility transition in Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines) in the 1960s and 1970s decomposed fertility decline into what was attributable to postponement of marriage versus attributable to changes in marital fertility (Hirschman and Guest 1990), finding

more evidence of decreased marital fertility among both younger and older women, a pattern which has also persisted in more contemporary contexts (Knodel et al. 1984; Hukin 2014). Although becoming important in a later stage of fertility decline (Jones 2007), marital postponement played a more minor role in kick-starting fertility decline in Southeast Asia, where the age of marriage has traditionally been later, relative to East Asia and South Asia. However, another major shift in marriage that occurred during this time period was the weakening of the arranged marriage system as ages at marriage began to rise and women spent more time in school and the formal workforce, exposing them to a wider range of potential partners and increased autonomy (Jones et al. 2011). More recently, the combined postponement of marriage, increase in non-marriage, and lack of nonmarital childbearing have been considerable factors in the continued and rapid fertility decline in most of Southeast Asia, in some cases to below replacement levels (Jones 2007; Hull 2012).

Furthermore, compared to the more rigid patrilineal and patriarchal family systems in East Asia and South Asia, the status of women in Southeast Asia has historically been higher, with bilateral kinship systems, little differences in parents' sex preference for children, and educational and occupational opportunities widely accessible to women even after marriage (Hirschman and Guest 1990). In practice, even in theoretically patriarchal Muslim communities, spousal relations were relatively egalitarian (Jones et al. 2011). As such, the relationship between female education and fertility in Southeast Asia has varied depending on the stage of fertility transition, with fertility declines among the highly educated at the onset of fertility transition and among the less educated as the transition progressed (Hirschman and Guest 1990). Finally, the geographic pattern of fertility decline in Southeast Asia in the 1960-70s provides some support for theories of diffusion, with fertility decline first spreading in a manner more related to common cultural and historical patterns versus development and modernization (Hirschman and Guest 1990; Jones 1990).

In the later part of fertility transition between the 1980s and 1990s, the local socioeconomic context— such as measures of marital postponement, the economic role of children, infant mortality, and women's status — was found to link more closely with fertility than individual level traits, suggesting stronger support for changing normative context and social structures, over individual based microeconomic and ideational theories (Hirschman and Young 2000). Earlier work in Thailand and more recent work in Cambodia demonstrate further support for social and economic changes that have shifted norms and preferences about family size, thereby decreasing marital fertility (Knodel et al. 1984; Hukin 2014). Lastly, the implementation of strong, centralized

government sponsored family planning programs in the 1970s around the same time that fertility began to decline may have also played a role in fertility decline in Southeast Asia by promoting an anti-natalist agenda, helping to change social norms, and providing accessible means to achieve desired fertility regulation, particularly in Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Thailand (Jones 1990; Hirschman 2001; Hull 2012).

3.3 Second Demographic Transition in Western Contexts

Change in fertility during the FDT is associated with decline from high fertility to replacement level fertility, by way of lower marital fertility or later marriage, and often in contexts where material concerns such as income, employment, housing, health, and education, are of primary importance, as in developing countries. However, further fertility decline and family change — such as below replacement fertility, further postponement of marriage, and childbearing outside of marriage — is often explained as the SDT and occurs in more developed contexts. In such contexts, when material needs are met, existential and expressive needs related to self-actualization and individual autonomy become central (Maslow 1943; Lesthaeghe 2011). Therefore, the SDT is an ideational and cultural theory of fertility and family transition, wherein the post-materialist higher order needs of the individual take precedence over traditionally prescribed family behaviours (Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa 1986; Lesthaeghe 2010). Although the SDT emphasizes ideational and cultural shifts, it does not discount the influence of structural changes and microeconomic considerations in family change, arguing instead that culture and ideas work in tandem with economic arguments to explain fertility and family change (Lesthaeghe 2014).

At its outset, the SDT described fertility decline to below replacement levels facilitated by contraception as its main feature (Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa 1986; Sobotka 2008). Later, the SDT theory was expanded to describe a systematic shift in family behaviours — including divorce, cohabitation, postponement of marriage, decreased fertility, and increased nonmarital fertility. The SDT explains this package of changes in family behaviour by arguing that instead of following traditionally prescribed social norms about childbearing and sex, individuals form relationships and have children in a manner that best serves their own self-actualization and individual autonomy. The expectations and authority of the family, state, and church are rejected in favour of personal expressions and preferences, leading to postponed fertility and marriage, lowered overall levels of fertility, and the delinking of marriage and childbearing. Individualist orientations are favoured over collectivist, and in some cases, as in Nordic countries, a welfare state replaces

family as a social security institution. The emphasis on individualization and self-fulfilment is facilitated by the sexual freedom associated with modern contraceptive use, improved gender equity, and secularization (Lesthaeghe 2011). Because elite individuals are in the best position to address post-materialist needs and also participate in prolonged or higher education through which idea change is said to diffuse, the ideational change associated with the SDT purportedly originates among higher status individuals before spreading to other social strata.

The first indication of the SDT occurred in the 1950s with the rising divorce rate in the United States and Scandinavia, followed by fertility decline from the height of the baby boom (Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa 1986; Lesthaeghe 2011). And while the average age at marriage had declined during the baby boom, the 1960s saw a reversal of this trend as well as increases in the proportions single and nonmarital cohabitation, including both premarital cohabitation and postmarital cohabitation after divorce or widowhood. Eventually, childbearing outside of marriage also spread from Scandinavia to other parts of Western Europe and the United States. For example, in 1960, 6 percent of all births occurred outside of marriage in the United Kingdom and France, compared to 40 percent in 2010 (Lesthaeghe 2011). In the United States, the proportion of births to unmarried women increased from 11 percent in 1970 to 40 percent in 2010 (Curtin et al. 2014).

Critics of the SDT question whether the family behaviours associated with the SDT are truly original and whether the SDT is a linear, irreversible development (Coleman 2004; Perelli-Harris and Sanchez-Gassen 2012). For example, if the economic security provided by a welfare state were to disappear, would family-centric institutions then re-emerge and individualism recede? It has also been argued that there is no clear discontinuity between the FDT and the SDT, meaning that the second transition is simply an extension of the effects of modernization that led to the first transition (Cliquet 1991). The counter argument to this critique is that although the SDT may have depended on similar cultural, economic, and social shifts that also shaped the FDT, viewing the first and second transitions together would blur major social and demographic differences (Lesthaeghe 2011). For one, the FDT is anchored in a context where basic material needs are still of prime importance, compared to the SDT which is a specific expression of higher order needs. The nuptiality and fertility regimes are also directly reverse, with the FDT characterized by universal marriage, low divorce, and high remarriage after divorce whereas for the SDT, marriage is delayed or forgone in favour of cohabitation, divorce rates are high and cohabitation after divorce is preferred over remarriage (Lesthaeghe 2011). Moreover, the FDT features increased investment in children and lowered fertility through declines in higher order childbearing,

whereas childbearing in the SDT is a motivated by adult fulfilment in the lifestyle of a parent and lowered fertility occurs via postponement (Lesthaeghe 2011).

Another criticism of the SDT is that new family behaviours may not actually reflect post-material individualism. For example, the rise of divorce and re-partnering may not necessarily be a new behaviour stemming from individualism but may be a response to longer life expectancy from the FDT, which functionally elongates the duration of marital relationships and exposure to risk of marital dissolution (Coleman 2004). There are also populations which exhibit behaviours associated with the SDT and yet remain traditional in cultural and family values or have not achieved economic prosperity that one would associated with post-materialism, such as East Asia and some Eastern European countries, respectively (Coleman 2004; Sobotka 2008; Raymo et al. 2015). As in East Asia, below replacement fertility may not be an individualistic family behaviour but instead attributed to a combination of the rapid shift to gender equity in educational and occupational institutions and the persistently low gender equity in family arrangements and expectations (McDonald 2000).

A counter argument to these SDT critiques is that countries progress through the SDT in different ways and at different rates, with national context constraining or guiding development, leading to the creation of SDT sub narratives (Sobotka 2008; Lesthaeghe 2010; Lesthaeghe 2014). Changes in family behaviour occur differently because they are driven by changing value orientations that are context specific (Perelli-Harris and Bernardi 2015). Moreover, ideational change may manifest differently depending on the context, and the same SDT features may not necessarily apply across different contexts. Specifically, history, context specific institutions, and interactions between ideational and behavioural changes may all shape the direction of SDT development (Sobotka 2008). For example, the stricter gender norms, weak state, and strong family ties in Southern European countries have led to slower variant of the SDT where marital postponement is prevalent, while cohabitation and nonmarital fertility have been slower to emerge, but have indeed emerged. Lesthaeghe (2010) also argues that it is not enough for SDT behaviours to materialize but that they must materialize in a certain manner (i.e. below replacement fertility must be via postponement, age at marriage should represent free partner choice and women's autonomy) in order to be representative of ideational change. Subsequently, below replacement fertility alone cannot necessarily be evidence of the SDT, nor should above replacement fertility rule out the possibility of the SDT.

Additionally, the SDT is often discussed at a national level, with countries categorized as either SDT countries or non SDT countries. However the link between values — religiosity, social

cohesion, gender role orientations, tolerance toward minorities etc. — and family behaviour has also been observed at the individual level across countries at different points in the SDT (Surkyn and Lesthaeghe 2004). For example, in both SDT and SDT precursor regions which vary by date of SDT onset, speed of transition, culture, and history, childless cohabitants consistently have the most non-conformist values while marriage or parenthood are associated with more traditional values, supporting the connection between ideational effects and the SDT (Surkyn and Lesthaeghe 2004). This means there may be elements of the SDT in subpopulations before a whole country exemplifies these trends and that countries may not be strictly SDT or non SDT.

Although the SDT may not be a uniform, irreversible transition with a clear linear pathway, it is nonetheless a useful theory for understanding the general direction and pattern of interrelated changes in fertility and partnership (Sobotka 2008). Importantly, the SDT illuminates the role of cultural change and social norms in explaining demographic behaviour, as well as the linkages between changing values and attitudes, and changing family behaviours (Sobotka 2008).

3.4 The Second Demographic Transition in Non-Western Contexts

3.4.1 East and Southeast Asia and the Second Demographic Transition

While several East and Southeast Asian countries exhibit features associated with the SDT, there is disagreement over whether these features represent individualism (Atoh et al. 2004; Lesthaeghe 2010; Lesthaeghe 2011; Chen and Li 2014; Raymo et al. 2015). Consistent with the SDT, the TFR is below replacement in several countries due to postponement of marriage and childbearing (Jones 2007; Frejka et al. 2010). However, nonmarital fertility remains rare and levels of divorce, although rising, remain generally low. Moreover, nonmarriage and childlessness are more likely to be involuntary, compared to Western countries (Jones 2007).

Some researchers argue that the SDT features observed in East Asia – late marriage, low fertility – do not represent individualism but are instead attributable to rigid gender norms, the persistence of Confucian ideals, and the prominent role of family as an institution (Atoh et al. 2004; Chen and Li 2014; Raymo et al. 2015). Gender roles in East Asian countries tend to be relatively rigid, which educational expansion and women's force participation have not changed. Instead, the high levels of female education and labour force participation in East Asia are due to government policies (i.e. Communism in China, industrial development in South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan) and not to the gradual overturning of traditional gender roles (Chen and Li 2014). Subsequently, gender roles in the domestic sphere remain relatively rigid as well, with a much higher burden of

housework and childcare falling on women (Kan and Hertog 2017). Additionally, child-centric attitudes mean intensive investment in children is the norm, which along with weak parental policies and weak laws preventing workplace discrimination, and the heavy burden of a "second shift" for women, leads to postponement of marriage and a preference for smaller families (Lesthaeghe 2010; Chen and Li 2014; Raymo et al. 2015). Family is also central as an institution. For one, the family plays a key religious role because ancestral worship and therefore, emphasis on family lineage are pervasive (Atoh et al. 2004; Chen and Li 2014). Confucian ideals emphasize filial piety, and because parents theoretically rely on their children for old age care, the welfare state remains underdeveloped and family is the main social security institution (Atoh et al. 2004; Chen and Li 2014).

However, other researchers have argued that although gender norms and traditional family values are persistent across East Asia, they are nonetheless weakening, suggesting ideational change toward more individualistic orientations (Lesthaeghe 2010; Chen and Li 2014). For example, marriage is reportedly valued and expectations within marriage remain traditional but increasingly, well-educated young people view marriage as an unattractive set of roles and expectations, and non-marriage has increased (Bumpass et al. 2009). Because the meaning of marriage and its strict roles for women have not changed, young women are eschewing marriage as an inherently sexist institution (Chen and Li 2014). Individual level analyses of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan also suggest that people who postpone marriage and childbearing tend to be more liberally oriented (Lesthaeghe 2010). Moreover, the notion that married people must have children has also weakened somewhat (Raymo et al. 2015), suggesting increased tolerance of a wider array of family trajectories. Researchers have also compared East Asian countries to Southern European countries, which have seen slower growth in SDT behaviours compared to Nordic, Western, and Northern European countries, but have nonetheless gradually come to exhibit the features of an SDT (Lesthaeghe 2010; Lesthaeghe 2011; Anderson and Kohler 2013). Both regions have followed late marriage and low fertility patterns, likely attributable to the highly gendered division of domestic labour and incompatibility between occupational and family obligations for women, and are more broadly considered to have stronger family ties and rigidly held traditional values (Lesthaeghe 2010; Chen and Li 2014).

Some scholars predict that divorce, cohabitation, nonmarital fertility, and gender egalitarian nuclear families will eventually be more common in East Asia because these arrangements are more functional in modern, industrial societies (Chen and Li 2014). To date, these behaviours are not prevalent, especially compared with Western countries, but research suggests that they may

be on the rise (Lesthaeghe 2010). The following three sub-sections summarize SDT features in East and Southeast Asian countries, focusing on cohabitation, divorce, and premarital conceptions. Because nonmarital fertility is still rare in this region, I discuss premarital conception instead to gain insight into premarital sex.

3.4.1.1 **Cohabitation in Asia**

Compared to Western contexts, cohabitation in Asia is relatively uncommon. However, recent years have seen a marked increase in cohabitation in some Asian countries (Raymo et al. 2009; Jampaklay and Lucktong 2015; Raymo et al. 2015; Yu and Xie 2015). For example, a quarter of women aged 25-29 have cohabited in Taiwan (Lesthaeghe 2010) and 40 percent of the 2010-2012 marriage cohort in China reported cohabiting prior to marriage (Yu and Xie 2015). In Thailand, although premarital sex is purportedly against dominant cultural values, 10.2 percent of adults aged 18-59 have cohabited (Bumrungpak and Kamsamrong 2013). Data sources on cohabitation in Asian countries also tend to be more limited, which has prevented their inclusion in most cross national comparisons of cohabitation.

It is typically posited that cohabitation in Asia is always a prelude to or step toward the more desirable state of marriage, rather than a viable alternative to marriage, especially because childbearing remains highly valued and nonmarital fertility very taboo (Jones and Gubhaju 2009; Lesthaeghe 2010; Jampaklay and Lucktong 2015; Kobayashi and Kampen 2015). This is a key difference between cohabitation in Asia versus other Western countries and Latin America where cohabitation and nonmarital fertility — specifically childbearing in cohabitation — have both increased. Cohabitation also tends to be shorter in duration and likely to either dissolve or quickly transition to marriage in Asia; consequently, the proportion of people cohabiting at one point in time is relatively low, compared to those who have ever cohabited (Raymo et al. 2015). Finally, in many Western contexts, increases in cohabitation have offset postponed or forgone marriage, leading to little change in union formation overall. However in Asian contexts, such as Japan, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea, it is less clear whether delayed marriage has been similarly offset by increases in cohabitation — mostly due to limited data on the prevalence of cohabitation (Jones 2007).

Lack of legal recognition is one of the challenges to cohabiters in Asia (Murray and Kimura 2003). In China, cohabitation was previously illegal and was only decriminalized in 2001. Alternately, cohabiters may prefer not to legalize their relationships in order to escape legal scrutiny, such as paying the higher taxation rate required of married couples in Thailand (Jampaklay and Haseen

2011). Finally, it is also important to note that researchers often distinguish between cohabitation and traditional (i.e. unregistered) marriage, even though neither are legal marriage. For example, in rural parts of China, couples married in traditional ceremonies are not legally married but would still be recognized as married by their communities (Wang 2007). In Thailand, marriages may be celebrated and formally recognized among friends and relatives without being legally registered. In the 1990s, approximately half of marriages in Thailand were unregistered and in national surveys, people in unregistered marriages self- reported as being married, not cohabiting (Chayovan 1989; Jampaklay and Haseen 2011).

The growth of cohabitation Asian countries has been described as an urban trend, linked to rapid economic change, greater exposure to Western values, and rise in the status of women (Kobayashi and Kampen 2015). As in Western countries, the correlates of cohabitation vary between Asian countries and can provide insight on the meaning of cohabitation and its role as a family form. Cohabitation is sometimes a preference among more affluent, educated individuals exposed to Western culture. Alternatively, cohabitation may also be the resort of less advantaged populations who lack the resources or economic stability to marry (Raymo et al. 2009). In China, cohabitation is more likely to occur among affluent, educated individuals exposed to Western culture (Yu and Xie 2015) and in Thailand, cohabitation is more common among the urban university student population as well as those with more liberal attitudes towards sex (Jampaklay and Haseen 2011). At the same time however, Chinese rural-urban migrants who are typically less privileged than the native urban population are also more likely to cohabit, raising the possibility that distance from more conservative centres of social control (i.e. rural communities) may also play a role (Yu and Xie 2015). In Thailand, cohabitation has also been observed among slum-dwelling migrants in Bangkok, who may opt to cohabit due to a lack of appropriate documentation or lack of awareness of the legal benefits of registering their relationships (Esara 2012). Moreover, neither occupation nor education consistently predict cohabitation in Thailand, so whether university students cohabit due to exposure to liberal attitudes and distance from parental control, or for economic reasons (i.e. sharing housing expenses) is not clear (Jampaklay and Haseen 2011).

Finally, as popular discourse promotes the idea that marriage entails an elaborate wedding celebration and the purchase of costly material items (such as a house, furniture and appliances, and a car), marriage has become a contemporary symbol for consumerism, Western modernity, and affluence — a state to which some populations cannot realistically aspire (Esara 2012). In these cases, Esara refers to cohabitation as a “forced deviation from the ideal marital pattern”

due to lack of money (2012). This ends up amplifying existing social inequalities and leads to marriage becoming a symbol of modernity and consumerism (Jampaklay and Haseen 2011).

3.4.1.2 **Divorce in Asia**

Divorce is another behaviour associated with the SDT. This is because as higher order needs, such as self-actualization and emotional fulfilment, are emphasized in a post-materialist context, dissolving a marriage is preferable to remaining in one that does not meet a certain level of emotional standards — "a good divorce is better than a bad marriage" (Lesthaeghe 2011). From this perspective, the main function of marriage is not to form an economic unit in which to raise a family but instead to provide love and personal fulfilment. Similar to the SDT, Goode (1993) proposed that the initial onset of divorce would yield a positive socioeconomic gradient, as only the elite could afford the high economic and social burdens associated with dissolving a marriage. As divorce becomes more culturally entrenched, the cost of divorce would decline and the socioeconomic gradient would reverse, with divorce more likely to occur among the disadvantaged.

In Asia, divorce trends have followed several different trajectories, materializing into broad regional patterns. In East Asia, where levels of divorce were historically very low and divorce was both very taboo and difficult for women to obtain, the crude divorce rate has steadily risen over the twentieth century and only recently stabilized in some countries (Dommaraju and Jones 2011; Hull 2011; Chen and Li 2014). Interestingly, while the crossover from positive to negative socioeconomic gradient of divorce has been observed in Taiwan, the socioeconomic gradient of divorce is negative in most East Asian contexts, contrary to both the SDT and Goode's prediction (Chen and Li 2014). Purported reasons for the rise of divorce, such as the growing economic independence of women, the stressors associated with urbanization and urban living, and increased individualism over traditional Confucianism (Dommaraju and Jones 2011) do not address why divorce among the privileged has remained rare.

Southeast Asia has a larger array of divorce trends, with important differentials by culture, ethnicity, and religion. Unlike East Asia, the Islamic populations of Southeast Asia historically had high levels of divorce and have recently experienced declining divorce rates (Dommaraju and Jones 2011; Hull 2011). The Buddhist population of Southeast Asia exhibits moderate divorce rates, and both Chinese Malay and Chinese Thai populations exhibit very low divorce rates similar to the traditional patterns in East Asia (Hirschman and Teerawichitchainan 2003). Compared to East Asia, divorce in Southeast Asia was relatively common and not stigmatized — for example, in Indonesia a quarter of all marriages entered into in the 1940s and 1950s ended in divorce within

five years — often because marriage agreements were arranged for very young couples and led to dissolution before co-residence or consummation, especially among poorer and less educated people (Hirschman and Teerawichitchainan 2003; Dommaraju and Jones 2011). Because marriage was seen as the union of two family lineages and not simply the union of a couple, an unconsummated marriage alliance still fulfilled important social and economic purposes and there was often a delay of several years between the making of a marriage alliance and the consummation of the union (Hull 2011). In some cases, if an arranged marriage was strongly objected to by the girl, the parents may have allowed their daughter to continue living at home, leading eventually to divorce without consummation. Hirschman and Teerawichitchainan (2003) describe this apparent contradiction between the tradition of arranged marriage and respect for personal preference as a remarkable "feature of Southeast Asian culture than allows for considerable individual autonomy within the context of tradition."

Premarital pregnancy was very stigmatized so early marriage may have been important as a means to avoid any possibility of this happening and subsequently, divorce was the corresponding "safety valve" for early marriage (Hirschman and Teerawichitchainan 2003). Additionally, unlike the patrilocal and patrilineal societies of East Asia, Southeast Asian bilateral family ties meant women had the option of returning to their natal homes in the event of marital dissolution. Among the Malay and Islamic populations of Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Southern Thailand and Southern Philippines) the weakening of early arranged marriages, increased partner choice, delay in marriage, and stricter divorce laws have led to lower contemporary divorce rates. Currently, divorce is likely to follow a negative educational gradient as in many Western countries, with higher education predictive of greater marital stability (Dommaraju and Jones 2011).

Divorce patterns vary across Asia, with modernization leading to a rise in divorce in some countries and a decline in divorce in others, challenging the notion that the trend in divorce rates is invariably from low to high (Hirschman and Teerawichitchainan 2003). Similarly, the high divorce rates traditional in some Asian countries challenge the association between traditional, family-centric cultural values, and low divorce rates. Notions of what family behaviours are modern, individualistic, and Western and what family behaviours are traditional, family-centric, and Eastern may not always be clear and may also shift over time.

3.4.1.3 Premarital conception in Asia

Nonmarital fertility is another hallmark of the SDT, due to the convergence of marriage and cohabitation as family forms, and parenthood in cohabitation. Globally, Asia has the lowest rates of nonmarital childbearing with the percentage of children born to unmarried parents at 5 percent or lower (Scott et al. 2015). Despite the rise of both divorce and cohabitation, to date nonmarital fertility is still very stigmatized and uncommon in most of Asia, leading to a dearth of studies. However, the lack of nonmarital fertility does not mean that premarital sex does not occur (Choe et al. 2001; Hull 2012). Rindfuss and Morgan (1983) argue that a silent sexual revolution has occurred in Asia, leading to increased coital frequency because companionate, love marriages have replaced parental arranged marriages, yielding premarital and early marital conceptions. The declining interval between marriage and first birth has also been, among other factors, attributed to premarital conception (Feng and Quanhe 1996). Interestingly, even where nonmarital childbearing is very taboo, premarital conception is not similarly stigmatized and has even recently increased with the relaxation of sexual mores, decline of arranged marriage, and rise of companionate marriage (Rindfuss and Morgan 1983; Walther 2006).

However, because nonmarital births are taboo, when nonmarital conceptions do occur, they may be legitimated with marriage prior to birth (Raymo and Iwasawa 2008) or else followed by abortion (Raymo et al. 2015). For example, in Japan, 2 percent of all births were attributable to unmarried women (Raymo and Iwasawa 2008) but nearly a third of first births resulted from premarital conception (Raymo and Iwasawa 2008). In Taiwan, 76 percent of women reported having had premarital sex (Lee 1988) and 32 percent of currently married Taiwanese women reported being pregnant before marriage (Cernada et al. 1986). Conversely, only 4 percent of births are attributable to unmarried women in Taiwan (Raymo et al. 2015).

3.4.2 Latin America and the Second Demographic Transition

Many countries in Latin America have experienced a marked rise in cohabitation and childbearing in cohabitation, leading scholars to explore the possibility of an SDT occurring in this region (Esteve et al. 2012; Esteve et al. 2012; Laplante et al. 2015). Among in union women of reproductive age in Peru, Colombia, Uruguay, Honduras, Panama, and the Dominican Republic, the proportion of women in cohabitation exceeds the proportion married (Laplante 2015). Like the Philippines, many countries in Latin America have a Spanish colonial legacy as well as historical, indigenous marriage systems distinct from European marriage and unconfined by Catholic sexual mores, yielding a dual nuptiality regime (Castro-Martin 2002). In addition, during

the colonial era the slave population in Latin America would also have informal partnership systems that differed from the European model, referred to as "visiting unions." Within the context of several different marriage systems, the European model of marriage eventually became a mark of prestige and conversely, cohabitation a marker of disadvantage or a "poor person marriage," contrary to the SDT (Esteve et al. 2012; Laplante et al. 2015).

However, with the "cohabitation boom" of the past few decades, scholars of Latin America have distinguished between different modern versus traditional typologies of cohabitation in order to disentangle what may be attributed to modernization related to the SDT and what is an outgrowth of vestiges from the past (Esteve et al. 2012; Esteve et al. 2012; Covre-Sussai et al. 2015). Traditional cohabitation is not only more likely to occur among less advantaged populations, but may also be more closely linked to early union formation, early childbearing, and co-residence with kin (Covre-Sussai et al. 2015). Conversely, Esteve argues that a rise in cohabitation in liberalizing counties without an established history of traditional cohabitation (such as Brazil, Argentina, Chile) indicates the emergence of modern cohabitation, which is adopted by more privileged populations who form unions and begin childbearing later (Esteve et al. 2012). In some countries, such as Brazil and Argentina, cohabiting couples tend to live in nuclear households, resembling a more modern typology of cohabitation, in contrast to Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, and Venezuela where cohabiters' co-residence with kin is more likely (Esteve et al. 2012). This suggests the co-existence of both traditional and SDT related cohabitation in Latin America, which may differ by country.

Another argument in favour of the SDT versus disadvantage as an explanation for the cohabitation boom is the inconsistent relationship between development and cohabitation (Esteve et al. 2012). If cohabitation were truly fixed as a marker of disadvantage, development and modern era educational improvements across Latin America should have caused cohabitation to decline and marriage to increase, which has not been the case. In fact, increases in cohabitation in some country contexts are stronger among better educated groups and not closely predicted by national economic fluctuations, supporting the notion of a Latin American SDT over cohabitation as continued marker of disadvantage (Esteve et al. 2012). Additionally, tolerance of behaviours such as divorce and same sex relationships have also been observed at the national level across Latin American countries, suggesting ideational change and secularization (Esteve et al. 2012).

Childbearing outside of marriage, particularly within cohabitation, has also dramatically increased in countries across Latin America, from 17 to 29 percent of all births between 1970 and 2000

(Castro Martin 2011). In 2010 and 2011, more births occurred to unmarried women than to married women in Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Mexico, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic and Venezuela, with as many as 80 percent of all births attributable to unmarried women in some countries (Laplante et al. 2015; Laplante et al. 2016). Like cohabitation, nonmarital fertility has also followed different typologies across Latin America but has increasingly become more common among highly educated women, consistent with the SDT (Laplante 2015). While childbearing in cohabitation was uncommon for highly educated women in the 1980s, current fertility levels within cohabitation and marriage are very similar for the highly educated, demonstrating a flattening educational gradient of childbearing in cohabitation. The spread of childbearing in cohabitation among the highly educated could have been propelled by the increased labour force participation of women and legal protections extended to children in the event of union dissolution implemented in most Latin American countries, pointing to societal changes which facilitate women's independence from marriage as path to economic security (Laplante 2015). The age patterns of reproductive behaviours in marriage and cohabitation have also become more similar, including among privileged subgroups, as predicted by the SDT (Laplante 2015). Moreover, household structures of married and cohabiting families have become indistinguishable across Latin America, with both types of families more likely to be in nuclear households, suggesting growing similarity between married families and cohabiting families, consistent with the SDT (Esteve et al. 2012).

In addition to the cohabitation boom and rise in nonmarital childbearing across social strata, a growing number of Latin American countries are at or below replacement level fertility (Cavenaghi and Alves 2009) and there is evidence of postponement of childbearing for highly educated women (Rosero-Bixby et al. 2009), which also point to evidence of an SDT. However, critics of the SDT in Latin America argue that with educational expansion over the past few decades, tertiary education may not indicate the level of privilege that it used to and that moreover, at the individual level, highly educated women may not have more liberal views than their less educated counterparts (Covre-Sussai 2013, LaPlante 2015). Therefore, the rise of cohabitation and nonmarital fertility among the highly educated may be linked to economic uncertainty among both the lower and middle class.

With the rise of cohabitation across the region and among all social strata, it is likely that cohabitation, as well as marriage, has a diversity of perceived meanings and purposes that vary by country and socioeconomic subgroup (Covre-Sussai et al. 2014). For some subgroups, cohabitation may be the legacy of a historical practice, or a response to unplanned pregnancy or

economic uncertainty, while for others, cohabitation may be preferred over marriage. Exploring the concepts and meanings of cohabitation, as well as the perceived advantages or disadvantages of cohabitation compared to marriage provides important insight into how cohabitation and marriage fit into existing family systems, as well as how their roles may be shifting. To this end, the following and final section of this chapter discusses the different meanings and concepts of cohabitation.

3.5 Concepts and Meanings of Cohabitation

The rapid growth of cohabitation worldwide raises the question of what cohabitation means as a family form. The SDT posits that as the transition unfolds, cohabitation progresses through stages and gradually evolves from marginal, to accepted, to indistinguishable from marriage (van de Kaa 2001; Lesthaeghe 2010). However, the SDT does not explain in depth the shades of detail in this evolution process, specifically with regard to the diverse meanings of cohabitation in each stage and how they compare with marriage. To this end, this section provides a background of research exploring the different concepts and meanings of cohabitation and why people enter into such arrangements without marrying, as well as how cohabitation is viewed compared with marriage.

When cohabitation was a marginal practice, earlier studies framed it as a prelude or alternative to marriage. But as cohabitation became more prevalent and people started having children in cohabitation, these typologies were no longer appropriate to fully describe the breadth of cohabitation. Moreover, the rise in cohabitation differed by region and country, suggesting cross-national variation in the meanings of cohabitation, dependent on historical, political, economic, and cultural contexts (Perelli-Harris et al. 2014). Since then, a larger range of typologies emerged, based on the prevalence and duration of different cohabiting relationships in different contexts, and how accepted they are for childbearing. Heuveline and Timberlake (2004) suggest six typologies of cohabitation, which include cohabitation as a marginal practice, a prelude to marriage, a stage in the marriage process, an alternative to being single, an alternative to marriage, and indistinguishable from marriage, reflecting that not all cohabiting unions are entered with marriage as an aim or end result, nor are they all reproductive phases (Heuveline and Timberlake 2004). More recently Hiekel and Castro-Martin (2014) expand on this and propose additional meanings of cohabitation: conformists who believe marriage is an outdated institution but who nonetheless intend to marry due to social norms; cohabiters who value marriage and plan to marry but cannot due to economic reasons; cohabiters who actively reject

marriage as an institution and do not plan to marry; and cohabiters who feel neutral about marriage but do not plan to marry out of personal preference.

The meanings of cohabitation differ cross nationally and by population subgroup, and have been widely explored in the Western context (Hiekel and Castro-Martin 2014; Hiekel et al. 2014; Perelli-Harris et al. 2014; Perelli-Harris and Bernardi 2015). Cohabiters who view marriage as irrelevant and cohabit as an alternative to marriage are more common in Western and Northern Europe where the rate of cohabitation is high (Hiekel et al. 2014). In contrast, come cohabiters view their relationships as a prelude to marriage and have firm plans to marry (Hiekel and Castro-Martin 2014; Hiekel et al. 2014). Similarly, cohabitation could also simply be a waiting period after engagement or synonymous with engagement. Where cohabitation is a prelude to or stage in the marriage process, it may be of short duration but more likely to transition quickly to marriage (Heuveline and Timberlake 2004). Alternately, in the United States, cohabitation is often an alternative to dating, especially among lower income populations in economically unstable circumstances (Sassler 2004; Manning and Smock 2005) and most cohabiting relationships are short in duration (half of which last less than one year) and more likely to end in separation than marriage (Heuveline and Timberlake 2004; Lichter et al. 2006). Instability in cohabiting unions is particularly related to long term cohabiters with unrealized marriage expectations (Brown 2003). In some cases, people may "slide" into cohabitation without being motivated by larger or longer term objectives of marriage and childbearing (Manning and Smock 2005; Carmichael and Whittaker 2007; Sawhill 2014). Instead, couples may choose to cohabit to save money on domestic expenses and housing, or to spend time together more conveniently (Sassler 2004; Manning and Smock 2005; Carmichael and Whittaker 2007; Huang et al. 2011; Sassler and Miller 2011).

There may also be class variation in the process of entry into cohabitation as well as how cohabitation progresses a relationship, with middle class couples slower to enter cohabitation and more likely to transition from cohabitation to marriage than working class couples, suggesting economic barriers to marriage (Sasser and Miller 2011). In countries across Europe, cohabitation may be a strategy to cope with the economic uncertainty of unemployment and precarious work because cohabitation is viewed as more reversible and temporary than marriage and thus more suitable for an uncertain life (Perelli-Harris et al. 2010). In the American context, cohabiters may wish to marry but feel they need to reach a certain economic standard (i.e. saving money for a wedding, buying a house, becoming more financially secure) before marrying (Sassler 2004; Gibson-Davis et al. 2005; Smock et al. 2005). Conversely, cohabiters who view themselves as

"too poor to marry" are relatively scarce across Eastern and Western Europe (Hiekel and Castro-Martin 2014) and perceived financial barriers to marriage are less common (Perelli-Harris et al. 2014).

In addition to economic reasons, people may cohabit for relationship related reasons. Some couples may prefer a relationship with less "ideological baggage" than marriage and view cohabitation as having fewer scripted roles (Kiernan 2004). Instead, cohabitation can symbolize more independence, especially for women, for whom the avoidance of traditional expectations and dependency in marriage may be particularly relevant (Kiernan 2004). The view of these roles in marriage and cohabitation may also differ by gender. In the United States, men may view marriage as requiring higher standards of sexual fidelity and prefer the lower romantic behavioural standards of cohabitation and women may view marriage as requiring a stricter adherence to gendered division of domestic labour and prefer cohabitation as a more modern, gender equitable arrangement (Reed 2006). And while both marriage and cohabitation can represent a transition of identity from individual-based to couple-based, marriage in particular may be linked with concerns about losing individuality and independence (Soulsby and Bennett 2017). Similarly, cohabitation across Europe is also viewed as a relationship type with a higher level of freedom and autonomy and a lower level of commitment than marriage (Perelli-Harris et al. 2014). In Poland and Russia for example, cohabitation was viewed to entail a higher degree of sexual freedom, especially for men (Mynarska et al. 2014; Isupova 2015). A higher level of freedom may be viewed as particularly appealing or suitable for young people who are still focused on individualised needs (Berghammer et al. 2014). The level of commitment in cohabitation can also vary based on the intention to marry. Even in countries such as Sweden and Norway where cohabitation is prevalent, cohabiters report being less serious in their relationships compared with married people, but cohabiters who plan to marry are more similar to married people (Wiik et al. 2009). In the United States, cohabitation may also be viewed as a step forward in relationship commitment, even if marriage is not necessarily an immediate goal (Sassler and Miller 2011).

People may also cohabit due to a fear of or previous experience with divorce, because the cost of dissolving a cohabiting relationship is perceived to be lower than the cost of dissolving a marriage (Kiernan 2004; Hiekel and Keizer 2015; Perelli-Harris et al. 2017). As the rise and de-stigmatization of divorce has shifted the perception of marriage as a lifelong commitment, it may have also facilitated the emergence of cohabitation as an alternative relationship type. In the high divorce context of the Netherlands, cohabitation is viewed as a strategy to avoid divorce either by

avoiding marriage altogether or testing the relationship before marriage to decrease the chance of divorce (Hiekel and Keizer 2015). Cohabitation may also be the preferred method of re-partnering for people who have personally experienced the legal, financial and logistical burdens of divorce and do not wish to re-marry, due to a low opinion of marriage as an institution (Perelli-Harris et al. 2017). Experiencing parental divorce has also been linked to scepticism toward marriage and preference for cohabitation, either as a test relationship before marriage or as an alternative to marriage (Perelli-Harris et al. 2017).

Fertility behaviour and intentions are another way to conceptualize the meaning of cohabitation. Although cohabitation may be entered into without a view to long term commitment and without discussion of marriage or childbearing (Sassler and Cunningham 2008), it has nonetheless become a common childbearing family form in the United States and across Europe (Seltzer 2000; Perelli-Harris et al. 2010). Indeed, in some countries, cohabitation is the expected way of starting a family (Perelli-Harris et al. 2012), even if marriage occurs later, and nonmarital pregnancy may be more likely to result in cohabitation than marriage (Lichter et al. 2014). The meaning of cohabitation may also vary according to fertility intentions. For instance, although childbearing often occurs in cohabitation, cohabiters who view their relationships as having long term potential and who plan to marry in the near future are also more likely to plan to have children, indicating that marriage and fertility are still linked (Hiekel and Castro-Martin 2014).

However, not all childbearing in cohabitation is intended (Musick 2002; Sassler et al. 2008) and less advantaged couples especially may enter cohabitation as a direct response to an unintended pregnancy (Raley 2001). Such couples may choose to cohabit in order to more easily co-parent and share expenses (Reed 2006) and view cohabitation as preferable to either single parenting or marrying prematurely (Smart and Stevens 2000; Edin and Kefalas 2005). Specifically, single parenting places a disproportionate burden on one parent compared with cohabitation, which allows parenting duties and expenses to be divided while avoiding the commitment and expectations associated with marriage (Reed 2006). However, even with the decoupling of marriage and childbearing, having children may nonetheless be viewed as a strong reason to transition from cohabitation to marriage, even if other factors such as economic and relationship stability are more pressing determinants (Sassler and Cunningham 2008; Berghammer et al. 2014).

In many countries, cohabitation has also become the most common form of first partnership, with most people experiencing cohabitation before marriage (Heuveline and Timberlake 2004).

Subsequently, the rise of cohabitation has challenged the role of marriage and raised questions about the meaning of marriage (Cherlin 2004). As cohabiters come to share more similarities with married couples — such as splitting household expenses and domestic duties, benefiting from companionship, sharing sexual intimacy, having and raising children together — the practical functions and benefits of marriage have weakened, effectively deinstitutionalizing marriage (Cherlin 2004). One stark example of the deinstitutionalization of marriage is in Germany, where the fall of the pro-marriage socialist state effectively de-incentivized marriage in the post socialist order, creating a space for cohabitation to emerge and marriage to recede in importance (Klarner 2015). With the deinstitutionalization of marriage, researchers have argued that marriage has shifted to now become more symbolic in importance, representing a status symbol or marker of achievement (Cherlin 2004). Marriage may also be more ideologically loaded and perceived to entail higher levels of moral or structural commitment (Perelli-Harris et al. 2014) which can then motivate a deeper sense of trust and investment in a relationship, referred to as "enforceable trust" (Cherlin 2004).

With both marriage and cohabitation changing in function and meaning, institutions can also respond to these changes and to either shift or affirm their meanings. One way to delineate the meaning of cohabitation, especially compared with marriage, is through policies and laws, since both may influence institutions (Perelli-Harris and Sanchez-Gassen 2012). Legal recognition may make a family behaviour such as cohabitation or childbearing within cohabitation seem more credible and legitimate, and either directly or inadvertently support different types of family forms. Different policy approaches to cohabitation can also betray different cultural attitudes. For example, in the US where religiosity is a strong influence on the debate, policies in response to the growth of cohabitation have tended to encourage marriage while in more secular European contexts, policies are more likely to prioritize supporting cohabiting families in a manner similar to married families lies (Kiernan 2004). To date, cohabitation differs widely across countries in how it is regulated, and for the most part remains distinct from marriage as a legal institution (Perelli-Harris and Sanchez-Gassen 2012).

This section summarizes the research describing concepts and meanings of cohabitation. There is a diversity of meanings of cohabitation and reasons for entry into cohabitation, which vary by economic circumstances, cultural norms, and reproductive behaviours. There are also few simple policy responses to cohabitation, and few straightforward explanations for its increase. Cohabitation has multiple meanings which differ by context, which requires qualitative study to examine.

3.6 Individualism and Collectivism

In this final section, I introduce debates regarding individualism and collectivism/familism, which are approaches that have been used to conceptualise family and family relationships. These theories are then discussed in further detail in the theoretical framework of Chapter 7.

Individualism is linked to the breakdown of social restrictions and structures — such as class, gender roles, and family — and the emphasis of individual desires over social expectations and commitments. Focusing on love and marriage in the Western world, sociologists Beck and Beck-Gernsheim argue that individualism has changed family relationships through the collapse of prescribed family biographies and the emergence of a wide range of accepted family modalities (1995; 2001). For example, historically, marriage and childbearing (in succession) were key elements of the social order, a mode of living and working that was prescribed and could not be altered by individuals without stigmatization. Marriage was both essential and immovable because joint family work was the only accepted pathway to economic and material solvency. With the modern age and industrialization, the concept of the family as an economic unit weakened as people gained the option to work as individuals. Marriage shifted into a moral and legal institution which continued to function as a benefit of society and not for personal freedom, preference, or fulfilment. However, starting from the era of social changes wrought by the 1970s — such as increased sexual freedom, gender equality, and secularization — marriage has again shifted to become an individualized programme that people may enter and remain in or leave based on personal preference. While previously, marriage was a rigid institution that existed outside of an individual's control, modern marriage is something an individual creates themselves, leading to a more democratic array of biographies (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2001).

Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (1995) posit that because individualization changed contemporary marriage into a personal choice, the common interest of modern married partners is romantic love and emotional fulfilment, instead of economic necessity, or moral, legal, and religious obligation. Consequently, marital bonds are more fragile because they rest on a largely emotional foundation. Similarly, individualization can change kinship ties from permanent fixtures into relationships of choice which need to be reaffirmed regularly. As a result, kinship ties may also be fragile and tenuous, given the difficulty of their constant maintenance (Bauman 2003).

Beck and Beck-Gernsheim further emphasize that although the rise of individualism allows a wider range of accepted life choices, increased personal choice also means more risk, more personal responsibility, and a higher likelihood of conflicting views between family and partners,

which lead to love becoming both "chaotic" and elusive (1995). And although religion and tradition may not constrain family decisions to the extent that they used to, choices must still be made within the context of job markets, education systems, and economic and political contexts. For example, the globalization of labour markets and rise of contract work and precarity may influence individuals' decisions to cohabit or marry. In this way, marriage is an "individual situation dependent on institutions" (Beck 1992).

Giddens (1992) also relates individualism to changes in marriage by examining how romantic love and companionate marriage have been succeeded by confluent love and individualistic marriage or pure relationships. Romantic love and companionate marriage involve complementary gender roles, fulfilment from childbearing and child raising, and are expected to be permanent. In contrast, pure relationships exist solely for the sake of the relationship and last only as long as both people are romantically fulfilled, since personal fulfilment is the main purpose of a pure relationship. Pure relationships are not held together by tradition, obligation or a sense of long term commitment. In order to maintain pure relationships, couples may prefer cohabitation or serial monogamy to marriage, especially in contexts of uncertainty, change, or instability.

In contrast to individualism, collectivism and familism are more often features of non-Western family systems or ethnic minority groups in Western contexts (Tamis-LeMonda et al. 2008). Collectivism emphasizes family ties and collective needs over the individual and individuals are often perceived relationally with the greater group or family as referent (Kagitcibasi 1997). Because individuals are perceived as a part of a greater group (i.e family), individual actions have the power to either elevate or diminish a family (Kagitcibasi 1997; Tamis-LeMonda et al. 2008). Family is also viewed as an extension of the self; loyalty, reciprocity, respect for elders, and family solidarity are highly valued (Triandis 1995). Respect and obedience are high priorities in collectivistic communities because a strong hierarchy delineates clear authority and boundaries, preventing group conflict (Tamis-LeMonda et al. 2008).

With respect to family and relationships, collectivism and familism can influence partner selection, romantic passion and commitment, and dating norms. For example, people from collectivistic groups may have greater acceptance of parental influence over partner selection out of a sense of responsibility and connection to the family (Bejanyan et al. 2015). Moreover, in providing input on partner selection to their children, parents are more likely to emphasize qualities such as economic success and social status in order to elevate the family group (Bejanyan et al. 2015). People may also hesitate to commit to a relationship if they believe their families would not approve of it (Macdonald et al. 2012). Additionally, passionate relationships

may also be viewed as a potential threat or distraction to familial obligation, authority, or closeness (Bejanyan et al. 2015).

In some collectivist groups, dating and sex before marriage are considered inappropriate and unnecessary, because romantic feelings are expected to develop only after marriage (Bejanyan et al. 2015). This is in direct contrast to the pure relationships described by Giddens (1995), which depend on romantic and passionate love to come into existence. Restrictive norms regarding dating and sex may also persist among collective groups as a means of preventing embarrassment or shame to the larger family group. In one study of the Philippine diaspora in the United States, strict parental control over children's dating practices was viewed as a way to assert moral superiority and stronger family values compared with the dominant society (Espiritu 2001). By holding young women to strict dating guidelines, Filipino-American families protected their ethnic group's reputation for having both a strong sense of morality and strong family integrity.

While some societies may be broadly characterized as individualistic or collectivistic, all societies encounter tensions between the two orientations, especially in a modern world of globalization and cultural exchange (Kagitcibasi 1997). Triandis (1995) describes value systems as "probabilistic rather than deterministic" and suggests that values are guided by central tendencies instead of fixed pathways. To this end, views of individualism versus collectivism should take into account the variation that occurs within cultures and individuals and the potential for "dynamic coexistence" of the two orientations (Tamis-LeMonda et al. 2008).

Individualism and collectivism may coexist in different ways. For instance, individuals in transnational communities, such as ethnic minorities in Western countries, may attempt to balance individualism with tradition, religion, and family expectations when selecting a marriage partner (Smart and Shipman 2004). People who have experienced the "chaos" of modern love associated with individualism, such as divorce and remarriage, may continue to value commitment and view family ties as binding and permanent (Ribbens McCarthy et al. 2003). In the United States for example, a high valuation of pure relationships and the view that love has the power to surmount any obstacles draw from two seemingly contrasting views of intimacy. Moreover, even in highly liberal and individualistic Western contexts, the notion of marriage as a pure relationship without any economic underpinnings conflicts with the fact that women are more likely than men to earn lower wages, work part time, and engage in unpaid domestic and care work (Lewis 2001). Subsequently, even in a dual earner household, marital partners may continue to fulfil complementary gender roles in order to fully function as a work unit.

Additionally, in traditionally collectivist and family oriented contexts such as China, rising individualism may nonetheless manifest in a uniquely family-centric way. For example, the decline of filial piety and obedience to parents has been suggested to increase intergenerational closeness between parents and adult children (Yan 2016). Instead of obedience to parents as the hallmark of parent/child relationships, the focus has shifted to parents devoting themselves to the personal happiness of their children, which reshapes but maintains the close bond between parent and child. In this way, the "meaning of one's life is still deeply embedded in the web of interpersonal relations" (Yan 2016).

3.7 Summary

This chapter provided an overview of the relevant theory and empirical background for this thesis. I first discussed fertility decline, summarizing concepts of tempo and quantum fertility change and drivers of fertility decline related to the FDT, followed by a brief overview of demographic transition and fertility decline in Southeast Asia for regional context.

I then introduce the SDT theory and explore possible manifestations of the SDT in Asian and Latin American countries, two regional contexts which have cultural relevance to the Philippines, in order to underscore the importance of context in understanding the different meanings of the same family behaviours in different countries.

Given the cross-national variation in how the uptake of cohabitation unfolds, I conclude the chapter by explaining existing theories of the different meanings and concepts of cohabitation in various contexts and how approaches to family differ from individualistic and collectivistic perspectives.

Chapter 4 Data

This PhD research uses two sources of data — the Philippines' National Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) from 1993 to 2013 and qualitative data I collected through focus groups in the Philippines in 2016.

The first mixed methods paper employs secondary data analysis using five rounds of DHS data collected regularly from 1993-2013 in 5 year intervals for its exploration of historical fertility trends and the age patterns of fertility by union type. This paper also uses qualitative focus group data to gain insight into how norms, values and attitudes relate to the age patterns of fertility and growth of nonmarital fertility.

The second paper uses only 2013 DHS data to evaluate the socioeconomic correlates of cohabitation.

The final paper is qualitative and focuses on the primary data collected in focus group discussions to investigate views of cohabitation compared with marriage.

4.1 National Demographic and Health Surveys

The DHS is collected by the Philippines Statistics Authority (formerly the National Statistics Office), with support from the United States Agency for International Development through ICF International (formerly Macro International). It is designed to provide indicators on fertility, family planning, maternal and child health, and gender based violence. The DHS has been collected in some form every five years since 1968 and currently relies on three main modules- a household questionnaire, an individual questionnaire, and a women's safety questionnaire focused on domestic violence. Earlier rounds of the DHS also included a health module and did not collect a domestic violence module. Men are also interviewed in some rounds of the DHS but men's questionnaires are not investigated in this PhD research. I requested permission to access the Philippines DHS data from ICF which consisted of filling out an online form describing the intended use of the data. This PhD research utilizes data from the individual questionnaire which is implemented among all eligible women age 15-49 in the surveyed households. The household and individual women response rates are both exceptionally high, ranging from 97 to 99 percent, with little difference between urban and rural response rates and no systematic differences in response rates by age group. Details regarding each survey may be found in Table 4.

Chapter 4

The most recent DHS (2013) uses the 2010 Census of Population and Housing for its sampling frame. A two stage stratified sample design is used with systematically selected urban and rural census enumeration areas (EA) as the primary sampling unit. EAs are based either on a barangay or part of a barangay in the case of geographically larger or more populous barangays. Each EA has 350-500 households. A census database was then used to select a sample of 20 households from each EA for the second stage. In past rounds, the sampling has been done in a similar fashion, using a recent national census for its sampling frame and from which to select EAs. For example, the 1993 cycle used barangays and households in the two stage sample design and the primary sampling units were systematically selected based on the 1990 Population Census data. In 2008, a three stage stratified sample was used based on contiguous barangays, geographically defined sub areas in the barangay, and household.

Table 4 - DHS sample sizes 1993-2013

	1993	**1998**	**2003**	**2008**	**2013**
Regions included	14	16	16	17	17
Households selected	13,728	13,708	13,914	13,764	16,732
Households occupied	13,102	12,567	12,694	12,555	14,893
Household sample size	12,995	12,407	12,586	12,469	14,804
Household response rate (%)	99.2	98.7	99.1	99.3	99.4
Eligible pool of 15-49 year old women	15,332	14,390	13,945	13,833	16,437
Women sample size	15,029	13,983	13,633	13,594	16,155
Women's response rate (%)	98.0	97.2	97.8	98.3	98.3

Although all sub-national regions were sampled in most survey rounds, the total number of national regions has increased over time as new regions have been incorporated. In 1993, there were only 15 regions in the Philippines and the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) had only recently been formed and thus only 14 regions were included in sampling. In 1998 and 2003, 16 regions were sampled. Details regarding which sub-national regions were surveyed in each survey year are provided in Table 5.

Table 5 - Sub-national regions surveyed in DHS 1993-2013

Regions	1993	1998	2003	2008	2013
National Capital Region	X	X	X	X	X
Cordillera Admin Region	X	X	X	X	X
Region I- Ilocos	X	X	X	X	X
Region II- Cagayan Valley	X	X	X	X	X
Region III - Central Luzon	X	X	X	X	X
Region IVA- CALABARZON	N/A	N/A	X	X	X
Region IVB- MIMAROPA	N/A	N/A	X	X	X
Region V- Bicol	X	N/A	X	X	X
Region VI-Western Visayas	X	X	X	X	X
Region VII-Central Visayas	X	X	X	X	X
Region VIII -Eastern Visayas	X	X	X	X	X
Region IX- Zamboanga Peninsula	N/A	N/A	X	X	X
Region X - Northern Mindanao	N/A	N/A	X	X	X
Region XI –Davao	N/A	N/A	X	X	X
Region XII – SOCCSKSARGEN	N/A	N/A	X	X	X
Region XIII- Caraga	N/A	X	X	X	X
ARMM	N/A	X	X	X	X

Note: x means data are available for this region in this survey round

4.2 Demographic and Health Surveys Data on Fertility and Unions

The DHS have several strengths, such as their large sample sizes, ease of comparability between survey rounds, representativeness at the national level, and their very high response rates. However, as with any survey, there are some data that have limitations and possible quality issues relevant to the research questions of this thesis. The DHS questions most relevant to this PhD research are the birth history and union status questions. In this chapter, I give an overview of how the DHS collects fertility and partnership data, and discuss data issues general to the DHS and specific to the broad aims of the thesis. The data limitations specific to the research questions of

Chapter 4

Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, which utilize the DHS in quantitative analyses, are described more fully in the data and methods sections of each paper (Sections 5.4 and 6.4).

4.2.1 Birth history data

Because one of the main objectives of the DHS is to measure fertility and the sociodemographic correlates of childbearing, the data on birth history are particularly detailed, which is a major strength of the DHS. Birth histories in the DHS ask women about all the pregnancies they have experienced, including current pregnancies and pregnancies that resulted in stillbirth. For live births, both the year and month of the live birth and the birth order of the child are recorded. Because both the date of birth of each woman and the date of birth of each child a woman has are collected, it is also possible to impute how old a woman was for each of her births. Moreover, births that occurred within one to five years of the date of interview are flagged by the DHS to allow for the calculation of period total fertility rates. In the 2013 survey, of all reported live births, over 99.9 percent had complete data for both month and year of birth; missing data were limited to the month of birth only. Older surveys had similar levels of completeness for birth data. For the 1993 survey, 98.9 percent of live births had complete birth dates, 99.4 percent in 1998, 99.6 percent in 2003 survey, and 99.8 percent in 2008.

Heaping may also occur in self-reported birth date data. Heaping refers to the coarsening of self-reported data that occurs when respondents round the value of a variable (such as year of birth or age) to the nearest 5 or 10. To assess the degree of heaping, the calendar ratio can be calculated for each year. This is done by multiplying the number of births in year x, or B_x, by 2 and then dividing that by the sum of reported births in the previous year (B_{x-1}) and the following year (B_{x+1}), and then multiplying by 100.

$$Calendar\ Ratio = [2B_x(B_{x+1} + B_{x-1})] * 100$$

A calendar ratio above 100 indicates over reporting of births in a year (heaping), while a calendar ratio less than 100 indicates under reporting of births in a year that is attributable to over reporting of births in an adjacent year. Across surveys, a small degree of transference of births is evident particularly in years that are a multiple of 5 (such as 2010, 2005, 2000). For example, there was transference of births from 2009 to 2010 and from 2011 to 2010, such that the calendar ratio of births was 104 in 2010, 94.9 in 2009, and 94.8 in 2011. However, compared to DHS data in other countries, this level of transference is relatively minor and does not pose analytical problems.

Other potential issues regarding reported birth data is social desirability bias where respondents may be embarrassed to report having given birth at a young age and either misreport their own age or date of birth or their child or children's ages or dates of birth. However, this potential bias would most likely lead to an underestimate of fertility at younger ages, not an overestimate. Because evaluating the extent of childbearing among teenagers and young adults is one of the objectives of Chapter 5, this possible bias would suggest that actual fertility among teenagers and young adults may in fact be even higher than calculated in Chapter 5.

4.2.2 Union history data

In contrast to birth history data, union history data is much less detailed because the objective of the DHS in assessing partnership status is to use it as a proxy for sexual debut and recent sexual activity, since they are risk factors for pregnancy and STI transmission. To this end, the questions regarding marriage and partnership are grouped with the questions regarding sexual activity and differences between marriage and cohabitation are not emphasized. Union related questions are largely consistent across survey rounds from 1993 to 2013 (Table 6).

Table 6 - DHS union history questions, 1993-2013

	1993	**1998**	**2003**	**2008**	**2013**
Current union status (at time of interview) ***Never in union*** ***Married*** ***Living together*** ***Widowed*** ***Divorced*** ***No longer living together***	X	X	X	X	X
Married to/lived with a man once or more than once? ***Once*** ***More than once***	X	X	X	X	X
Husband/partner living with you? ***Living with you*** ***Living elsewhere***	X	X	X	X	X
Month and year of entry into first union	X	X	X	X	X
Age at entry into first union	X	X	X	X	X

	1993	1998	2003	2008	2013
If more than one union					
Month and year of entry into current/last union	X	X	N/A	N/A	N/A
Age at entry into current/last union	X	X	N/A	N/A	N/A

Note: x means data are available for this question in this survey round

Details regarding higher order unions and the occurrence and timing of any union transitions are not known. Examples of survey questionnaire excerpts pertaining to marriage and partnership may be found in Appendix A. Across survey years, most respondents have complete data for their age and date of entry into first union, with 99.99 percent of respondents having complete information in 2013, compared with 99.9 in 1993, 99.8 in 1998, 99.97 in 2003, and 99.95 in 2008.

As a check, I evaluated the extent to which cohabiting women actually lived with their partners, based on their responses to the question "Is your husband/partner living with you now or staying elsewhere?" I did the same for married women. For all surveys between 1993 and 2013, between 89 and 92 percent of cohabiting women reported that their husbands and were living with them. Similarly, between 90 and 94 percent of married women reported that their husbands were living with them. This shows that regardless of union type, the vast majority of partnered women lived with their husbands/partners. Although the reasons for husband/partner absence are not explored by the survey, it is possible that some couples may be separated due to the high level of both internal and international labour migration of both men and women in the Philippines.

I then further checked women's self-report of whether their husbands/partners lived with them against the household roster to evaluate to what extent women's reports agreed with the household grid used by the DHS to record all usual members of the household and people staying there. Only the 2003, 2008 and 2013 surveys link women's responses with their husband's line number on the household grid so only these surveys were checked. I found that for married women, there was 99 percent agreement for all three surveys. Similarly, for the cohabiting women, there was between 98 and 99 percent agreement, indicating a high level of agreement for both cohabiting and married women.

There may also be bias in reporting of the date of birth of a child or the date of entry into union if the respondent is hesitant to report that a birth or conception took place outside of marriage or outside of a relationship. Specifically, biased reporting could occur with an over reporting of births 9-10 months after entry into union in order to avoid reporting a conception that occurred

either outside of marriage or a relationship. To check this, I looked at ever partnered women who have ever given birth in the 2013 survey. An examination of the interval in months between these women's first union and first birth indicates a peak in reported intervals at 9 months and 10 months. For example, 8 percent of women reported an interval of 9 months and 7.2 percent of women reported an interval of 10 months, compared to 4.7 and 5.5 percent who reported 8 and 11 month intervals respectively. This suggests possible social desirability bias in reporting of either the date of first birth or the date of first union. Nevertheless, 31 percent of these ever partnered women who had ever given birth reported conceiving their first child outside of marriage or cohabitation, indicating that even with possible social desirability bias, a large minority of women are still willing to report conceiving outside of marriage or cohabitation. Checks performed with the older surveys yielded very similar results with a peak in reported intervals of 9 and 10 months, and between 23.8 and 30 percent of women reporting a premarital or pre-union conception. In addition to the possibility of biased reporting, the peak of births in the 9-10 month category could also be because couples form unions in response to pregnancy, to ensure that the subsequent birth occurs within a partnership. Moreover, such bias would lead to nonmarital fertility being underestimated.

Additionally, some respondents may report being married when they are not legally married either because they perceive themselves as part of a lifelong commitment, or because they have had a traditional wedding ceremony but not a legally registered one. Respondents may also identify themselves as being married when they are not if they are sexually active, living with a man, pregnant, or have children, due to social desirability bias. However, as with biased reporting of the dates of birth or dates of entry into union, over reporting of being legally married, would again cause calculations of nonmarital fertility to be underestimated.

Further explanations of data limitations specific to the research questions and analyses of Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 are discussed in greater detail in 5.4 and 6.4.

4.3 Focus Group Data

Qualitative data is important to this study because it allows for the discovery of potential new meanings and variables, particularly useful for examining the emergence of new social phenomena (Corbin and Strauss 2008). This section provides a brief discussion of the preparation process for collecting the qualitative focus group data, and the background information of the study sites and the focus group respondents. Further details on the benefit of focus groups as a method and justification for their use in examining norms and views of cohabitation and marriage

may be found in the data and methods section of Chapter 7 in section 7.6. Information regarding the recruitment process for participants, the implementation of the focus group discussions, and method limitations may also be found in the data and methods section of Chapter 7 in section 7.6.

4.3.1 Focus group discussion preparation

In February 2016, I travelled to the Philippines to conduct the qualitative data collection. Prior to travel, I designed a focus group discussion guide and study materials, including a consent form, participant information sheet, and participant intake questionnaire, which I submitted for ethics review with the University of Southampton institutional review board. Ethical approval was obtained and a copy of the ethics application may be found in Appendix O, in section O.1. Ethical approval was also discussed with my in-country contacts and there was no formal process to undertake for local ethical approval. After arrival in the Philippines, with analytical and logistical support from the University of the Philippines Population Institute (UPPI), I further refined the focus group discussion guide and study materials in two stages.

In the first stage, I met with the director of UPPI and one of the selected focus group moderators, both of whom had conducted focus groups in the past on cohabitation and other demographic topics, to discuss the comprehensiveness, clarity, and validity of the questions, the process of informed consent, and the study forms. After integrating the comments and revisions, all study materials were translated into Filipino by the same focus group moderator. I then refined the materials in the second stage by pilot testing all materials with the specific aim of ensuring all questions were clear and comprehensive. Two separate mock focus groups were held with volunteer sociology undergraduate students at UPPI as participants and materials were adjusted accordingly based on the comments from pilot test participants. The full focus group discussion guide is enclosed in Appendix O, in section O.2.

Together with a research team composed of UPPI staff, faculty, and graduate students, I held eight focus group discussions in 2016 among men and women in Quezon City, National Capital Region and in Hermosa in the Bataan Province in Region III-Central Luzon, assessing both cohabiting and married men and women's values, perceptions, and attitudes toward marriage, cohabitation, and childbearing. Both study sites were selected based on the existing informant networks with UPPI and for convenience of location.

4.3.2 Study site and participant background information

The two study sites were in Quezon City and Hermosa. Quezon City has a population of nearly three million people, with over 34,000 people in the barangay Pansol where the focus groups were held (2015). Employment in Quezon City is dominated by the service and sales sectors, clerical work, and "elementary occupations," which the census loosely defines as rote, unskilled work, including manual labour. Hermosa has a population of nearly 66,000, with 2,828 people in the barangay Bacong where the focus groups took place (2015). The most common occupations in Hermosa are plant and machine operator and assembler jobs, services and sales work, and elementary occupations. Although the national level of education in the Philippines is relatively high, both populations in Hermosa and Quezon City are on average more highly educated than the national average (based on the educational attainment of the over 25 year old population), with the vast majority having high school education or higher (2015). The residents in both cities are also majority Catholic, with over 80 percent reporting Roman Catholicism as their religion, which is also similar to the national average. Non Catholics belong to a variety of Christian sects, such as Iglesia ni Cristo (2015).

Based on the recommendation of UPPI faculty experienced with conducting focus groups, most discussions had 6-8 participants, for a total of 54 respondents, 26 women and 28 men (Table 7). One discussion had 9 participants and another discussion had 5 participants due to no-show of one scheduled participant. Only women and men above 18 years of age were recruited. In total, eight focus group discussions were conducted with cohabiting and married women and men who were aged 22-62 years from one urban barangay (Pansol, Quezon City, National Capital Region) and one rural barangay (Bacong, Hermosa, Bataan province). Focus groups were disaggregated by gender, residence, and union status. In addition to signing a consent form acknowledging their understanding of the study, the potential risks, and the voluntary nature of participation, participants also filled out a short form providing details about basic demographic information and union history. Participants were reminded that they did not have to provide any information they did not want to or feel comfortable sharing.

Most participants had a medium level of education, which I defined as having high school education, although about a fifth of respondents had university education. The focus groups with cohabiters tended to have younger participants than the focus groups with legally married participants and the urban focus groups tended to have participants with higher education, consistent with the broad national patterns. One female respondent and one male respondent did not report their ages and one male respondent did not report his level of education. The vast

majority of respondents, 78 percent, reported that they had never been in a previous union (i.e. that the union they were currently in was their first union). Those who did report being in a previous union were all cohabiters, four of whom reported that their previous union was a legal marriage.

Table 7 - Background characteristics of focus group respondents in each focus group

		Focus Group 1	Focus Group 2	Focus Group 3	Focus Group 4	Focus Group 5	Focus Group 6	Focus Group 7	Focus Group 8
Sex	**Male**	9	8	6	5				
	Female					6	8	6	6
Residence	**Urban**	9	8			6	8		
	Rural			6	5			6	6
Union Status	**Cohabiting**	9		6		6		6	
	Married		8		5		8		6
Education	**Low**	1		2	1		1	1	2
	Medium	4	6	4	2	5	3	5	4
	High	3	2		2	1	4		
	Missing	1							
Age	**20-29**	6		1		2	1	2	
	30-39	2	3	2	2	1	1	1	3
	40-49		2	2	2	1	5	3	3
	50-59		2	1	1				
	60+		1			1	1		
	Missing	1				1			
Total Respondents		9	8	6	5	6	8	6	6

Chapter 5 How Have Pro-Natalist Values and Rising Nonmarital Fertility Shaped Fertility Trends? A Mixed Methods Exploration

5.1 Abstract

The Philippines' fertility transition has been slow compared to other Southeast Asian countries. Paradoxically, although fertility has declined, teenage pregnancy has increased, and childbearing remains persistently young. Nonmarital childbearing has grown dramatically —unexpected in a high fertility Asian country. Using Demographic and Health Surveys (1993-2013), I investigate age patterns of marital and nonmarital fertility to explore association between young childbearing and nonmarital fertility. I find little change in the average age of first birth and a substantial shift toward nonmarital childbearing, particularly among young women. Further investigation based on focus group data show that childbearing remains highly valued, while attitudes toward nonmarital childbearing have liberalized, due to relaxed social norms and family policies, and fear of relationship instability, since divorce is illegal. Young women may postpone the responsibility and commitment of marriage without having to also postpone sex, partnership, or childbearing, balancing conservative pro-natalist family values with individual emotional needs.

Keywords: nonmarital fertility, Philippines, Demographic and Health Surveys, mixed methods, pro-natalist

5.2 Introduction

Many East and Southeast Asian countries have seen rapid, substantial declines in fertility and postponement of both marriage and childbearing among young women, with little recuperation at older ages. Due to a strong regional stigma against nonmarital childbearing, delayed marriage in East and Southeast Asia has directly led to delayed childbearing and in some cases, involuntary non-marriage and childlessness, all of which contribute to the region's low fertility (Jones 2007; Frejka et al. 2010; Hull 2012; Raymo et al. 2015). Fertility in most of East Asia is below replacement level and several Southeast Asian countries have reached replacement or close to replacement level fertility.

The Philippines, however, has deviated notably from the regional pattern of low fertility and postponement of childbearing (Hull 2012). While the TFR in the Philippines declined with the onset of Southeast Asia's fertility transition, decreasing steadily from 6.0 in 1973 to 3.0 in 2013 (Hirschman and Guest 1990; ICF 2014), its current TFR is well above replacement level, higher than the regional average in Southeast Asia of 2.2 (UN 2015), and also higher than the TFR of countries where consistent fertility decline began after the Philippines started to experience a decline, such as Cambodia, Indonesia, Vietnam and Myanmar (Figure 4). Demand for large families is widespread in the Philippines and the reported mean ideal number of children among Filipino women is 2.8 (ICF 2014), with more than a third preferring four or more children (Pedroso 2008).

Figure 4 - Total period fertility rates, Southeast Asian countries, 1950-2015



Source: UN WPP 2015

Additionally, unlike the postponement of childbearing observed in other parts of Asia, the Philippines' median age at first birth has not changed substantially, even among urban and highly educated women (DHS 1993-2013). Instead, the age pattern of childbearing has shifted to younger ages and teenage childbearing has increased in recent years (ICF 2014; YAFS 2014). While other Southeast Asian countries have generally experienced marked decreases in teenage childbearing, the Philippines' pattern has been much flatter overall, and has even increased in the past two decades (Figure 5).

Figure 5 - Births per 1,000 15-19 year olds, Southeast Asian Countries, 1950-2015



Source: UN WPP 2015

Although initiation of childbearing in the Philippines remains young, the average age of marriage has increased in the past decades (Jones and Gubhaju 2009) and the number of registered legal marriages has declined continuously since 2005 (PSA 2017). However, partnership in general has not been postponed in the Philippines and the prevalence of both cohabitating unions and nonmarital fertility has dramatically increased, with most nonmarital births occurring to cohabiting women (Casterline and Kabamalan 2010; Ogena 2015). In other Asian countries, women's average age at first marriage has increased to nearly 30, leading to a prolonged period of singlehood in the 20s without the offsetting effect of cohabitation (Jones 2007; Frejka et al. 2010; Raymo et al. 2015). In contrast, Filipino women's average age at first partnership — including both cohabitation and marriage—has remained in the early 20s for decades (DHS 1993-

2013). The rapid rise of both cohabitation and nonmarital fertility in the Philippines is exceptional in an Asian country with conservative family policies and a predominantly Roman Catholic population, and subsequently, it may explain why fertility has remained high compared to other Asian countries where marriage and partnership have been postponed, virtually all childbearing occurs within marriage, and nonmarital fertility is extremely taboo (Jones 2007).

The case of the Philippines is also puzzling because teenage pregnancy, early initiation of childbearing, and early union formation are typically associated with pre- or early transition high fertility regimes, while cohabitation and nonmarital childbearing are more often linked with post transition fertility regimes, and sometimes characterized as features of an SDT. According to the SDT theory, individualism and self-fulfilment gain precedence over family-centric values and traditional sexual mores, and more educated individuals are the forerunners of value change who adopt liberalized attitudes toward new family behaviours (Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa 1986; Sobotka 2008; Lesthaeghe 2010).

The SDT posits that social norms and values regarding new family behaviours first change among the elite before becoming widespread. Over time however, continued uptake of cohabitation may reflect the values, norms, or constraints of various social strata and for some subgroups, cohabitation could be a strategy to cope with socioeconomic disadvantage and instability (McLanahan 2004; Perelli-Harris et al. 2010). Additionally, the very increase in prevalence of cohabitation, nonmarital fertility and teenage childbearing may render these behaviours less stigmatized and more socially acceptable. In the Philippines, cohabitation has grown rapidly with a consistent negative educational gradient, challenging the notion that new family behaviours are pioneered by the elite before being gradually adopted by the less privileged (Chapter 6) and suggesting rapid de-stigmatization of cohabitation alongside behavioural change. Although previous studies have framed cohabitation in the Philippines and other Asian countries as a short term prelude to marriage (Williams et al. 2007; Kabamalan and Ogena 2013), most first order cohabiting unions in the Philippines are over five years in duration (ICF 2014) which, together with the rise of childbearing in cohabitation, indicates cohabitation may also be an accepted longer term family arrangement as posited by the SDT.

The growth of both cohabitation and nonmarital fertility in a context where partnership formation and the initiation of childbearing remain young and teenage childbearing is high suggests a paradoxical combination of liberal and conservative, modern and traditional attitudes toward partnership and childbearing. While the emergent issues of cohabitation, teenage childbearing, and nonmarital fertility have been examined separately (Casterline and Kabamalan 2010; Hussain

and Finer 2013; Natividad 2013; Gipson and Hicks 2016), broader analyses of their interdependencies and how they converge to influence the Philippines' fertility transition have not been undertaken. And although the slow fertility transition in the Philippines has been noted (Freedman 1995; Hirschman and Young 2000; Costello and Casterline 2002; Bryant 2007; Hull 2012), the role of cohabitation in shaping the fertility transition has not received the same level of attention. This paper uses a mixed methods approach to investigate the connections between young childbearing, cohabitation, and nonmarital fertility and proposes an explanation for both their concurrence and their relationship to the fertility transition.

I look separately at different components of fertility change from both a quantitative and a qualitative angle. First, I examine time trends in the age pattern of fertility in the Philippines over approximately the last two decades (1993-2013) using DHS data to show the persistently early and nearly universal childbearing patterns, and increase in teenage fertility. Second, given the dramatic shifts in union formation, I then demonstrate the sharp growth of nonmarital fertility and proportion of first births that are nonmarital, and show the young pattern of nonmarital fertility. Third, I examine the sequencing of first births and first unions to evaluate the extent to which single women partner, either by cohabiting or marrying, in response to becoming pregnant or giving birth, and how this has changed over time. If more single women cohabit in response to pregnancy versus marrying and more cohabiting women choose to remain in cohabitation after becoming pregnant or giving birth, this could indicate that cohabitation is becoming more similar to marriage with respect to reproductive behaviour (Raley 2001).

Alongside the quantitative analyses, I present analyses of focus group data regarding attitudes, norms, and values toward cohabitation, nonmarital fertility, and childbearing. Although focus group data cannot be interpreted as nationally representative data, focus group research can nonetheless shed insight into explanations for social phenomena. My mixed methods approach proposes substantive explanations for why the age pattern of first births has remained persistently young while partnership patterns have changed substantially, which survey data alone cannot provide.

This research provides a better understanding of the linkages between fertility and partnership change in an underexplored Asian country, contributing to both fertility transition research in a non-Western context and the evidence base for family policies and programs in the Philippines. By exploring behaviours conventionally associated with liberal Western culture in a high fertility Asian country with conservative social policies, I also question the framing of any family behaviour as inherently liberal or conservative, Western or Eastern. Finally, this study also has significant

development implications as the Philippines is among the most populous and fastest growing Southeast Asian countries with over 100 million residents, where relatively high levels of female education and labour force participation have had little effect on delaying fertility. National concern about high fertility, maternal mortality, unintended pregnancy, and teenage pregnancy also point to the importance of better understanding childbearing and partnership trends, how they are interrelated, and how they have developed over time.

5.3 The Philippines' Context

The Philippines' slower pace of fertility decline has been linked to the country's unusual characteristics (Hirschman and Young 2000; Choe 2002; Herrin 2002; O'Sullivan 2013). First, the Philippines is the only Christian country in Southeast Asia besides Timor-Leste, with the vast majority of Filipinos identifying as Roman Catholic (PSA 2015). Prior to colonization by the Spanish in the 16th century, the Philippines was a loose collection of tribal villages and Islamic city states. Following colonization, governance and leadership emerged as a decentralized system of village level Catholic bishops and bilateral kinship ties. Today, the Philippines is still characterized by a strong Catholic Church presence, weak central government, and strong family ties. A few elite families dominate government and industry, and socio-economic inequality is rated among the highest in the region (Zhuang et al. 2014).

Despite not being an official state religion, the Catholic Church in the Philippines has played an important role in governance by facilitating political regime changes and influencing government policy, either directly through statements of support or censure, or indirectly through national and local level politicians, and religion is often used by government agencies to justify policy positions (Herrin 2007). Importantly, the Philippines is the only country in the world where divorce is illegal for most of the population and the only recourse to marital dissolution is either legal separation (without the possibility of re-marriage in the future) or a costly and complicated annulment procedure inaccessible to most. This contrasts markedly from divorce policy in other Southeast Asian countries where divorce is not only legal, but traditionally common among Muslim populations in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand (Hirschman and Teerawichitchainan 2003).

In addition to prohibiting legal divorce, the Catholic Church in the Philippines also intensely opposes modern family planning, promoting pro-natalist values which are then echoed by national and local level leaders and reflected at all levels of policy (Freedman 1995; Bryant 2007). In direct contrast, governments in several Asian countries — Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea,

Singapore, Indonesia — have historically led strong, centralized family planning programs with the specific aim of decreasing fertility (Hull 2012). Unsurprisingly, contraceptive use in the Philippines lags behind other Asian countries (Hull 2012) at around fifty percent of all married and cohabiting women, nearly a third of whom rely on less effective traditional methods, such as withdrawal and rhythm methods (ICF 2014). The highly controversial Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 calling for universal access to family planning services, referred to as the Reproductive Health Bill, took over a decade to pass due to vocal opposition from the Catholic bishops. Moreover, the Reproductive Health Bill relies on LGUs for implementation and while some local level leaders are supportive of family planning, other areas face substantial obstacles to implementation, making the quality and accessibility of family planning supplies and services highly variable throughout the country. More recently, public family planning services have struggled to secure the appropriate national funding and commodities approval, causing additional obstacles to implementation.

Improvement in women's status — particularly female education — concomitant with modernization has also been linked to fertility decline (Jejeebhoy, 1995). Compared to the rigid patrilineal and patriarchal family systems in East Asia and South Asia, women in the Philippines have traditionally had a higher status, due to Southeast Asian bilateral kinship systems — and subsequently, weak son preference — relatively later marriage practices, and educational and occupational opportunities accessible to women even after marriage (Hirschman and Guest, 1990, Choe, 2002). Due to colonial policies and American occupation in the early 20th century, free mass primary education was implemented relatively early (Francia, 2010) and female education has historically been high in the Philippines, even when compared to the relatively gender equitable Southeast Asian context. Subsequently, contemporary improvements in female education may have had less of an impact on fertility, relative to other countries (Hirschman and Young, 2000, O'Sullivan, 2013).

The Philippine religious, legal, political, and socioeconomic factors are important to consider in the examination of family change, especially given their potential to directly influence or constrain fertility and partnership trends. This paper aims to explore the interlinkages between childbearing and partnership patterns to better understand their interdependent development in a country with a particular set of legal constraints and an unusual policy climate.

5.4 Data and Methods

5.4.1 **Quantitative**

5.4.1.1 **Data**

I use Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) data conducted in 1993 to 2013 for all quantitative analyses. The DHS is collected by the Philippines Statistics Authority (formerly the National Statistics Office), with support from the United States Agency for International Development through ICF International (formerly Macro International). The objective of the DHS is to provide nationally representative indicators on fertility, family planning, and maternal and child health. Each survey sample from 1993 to 2013 has between 13,000- 16,000 women of reproductive age. Additional details about the DHS sampling frame and collection process may be found in Chapter 4 in section 4.1. Using the DHS, I calculate age trends in fertility and fertility patterns by union status. The mean age at first birth is also calculated by union type.

The DHS collected birth histories for all women who have ever given birth. Women were asked the birth order and date of birth for all births in the five years preceding the survey, as well the number of children ever born to them. The full birth history for the five years preceding the survey allows for the calculation of age specific fertility rates and first order age specific fertility for each survey year. However, because the DHS only asks about union status at the time of interview and does not specifically ask women what their union status was at the time of either their first birth or any subsequent births, I focus only on births in the year preceding the survey to minimize the likelihood of respondents' union status changing between time of birth and time of interview. For example, a woman who is married at the time of interview and gave birth three months prior to the interview would be recorded as having had a marital birth, although she may have been single or cohabiting at the time of birth. While it is possible women may experience union status transitions between the time of birth and the time of interview — single women may enter cohabitation or marriage and cohabiting women may marry — it is most likely that this data limitation would lead to underestimation of nonmarital fertility, not overestimation. This is because union transitions in the opposite directions — i.e. marriage to cohabitation — are much less likely within a short time frame.

Because reproductive events such as pregnancy and birth may influence union formation decisions, I also investigate the sequence of pregnancy, first birth, and union formation based on

respondents' reported date of first union and date of first birth in order to identify the extent to which pregnancies and births occur before entry into union.

The DHS does not ask about relationships that are neither cohabitation nor marriage but because it aims to capture exposure to the risk of pregnancy, it does ask a range of questions on sexual activity, which may proxy for relationship status. Although it is possible that there is a continuum of relationship types that fall outside of cohabitation and legal marriage, the vast majority of women who fall outside these two categories have never been or are not currently sexually active. Women who have never been in union (35 percent of the overall sample population) have never married or cohabited and 86 percent of them also report never having had sex. Moreover, women who have previously been partnered but are not currently married or cohabiting — including widowed, divorced, separated but formerly married, separated but formerly cohabiting women — comprise only 5 percent of the sample and more than 77 percent of them report that they have not been sexually active in the past 4 weeks for reasons other than post-partum recovery. Therefore, my focus on married and cohabiting women capture the vast majority of relationships.

5.4.1.2 **Method**

Period age specific fertility rate describes the number of births per 1,000 women of a certain age group that occur over a time period. Typically, age specific fertility is described per five year age group. Fertility rates do not describe an instantaneous point in time but instead describe the births that occur over some period of time; for the DHS, this is typically between one to five years prior to the survey. Over such a time period, women's ages change and a woman who is a certain age at the beginning of a time period will be older at the end of the time period, which could affect the amount of person time she contributes to a five year age bucket. In order to account for this, the total amount of exposure time in each age group needs to be considered by counting events (births) and measuring exposure in age groups for the relevant time period. To do this with the DHS requires the dates of birth of children born in the time period of interest, the dates of birth of all women, regardless of whether they had a birth or not, and the dates of the survey (assuming the fertility rates will be reported in reference to the survey). The date of the survey for each woman is important because administration of the survey occurs over several months, over which a woman's age in years may change.

The DHS data I used was individual level data. Each row contains all the values of the variables for one individual woman, including her date of birth, the date of the survey, and the dates of birth

for all her children. To calculate the number of births and exposure time requires the transformation of individual level data into a person-period data file — in other words, transforming data from wide format to long format — and collating data into a table of births and exposure for each age group. In the person-period data file, each observation (woman) in the original data file is split into one or several lines which correspond to the period during which her five year age group membership is constant.

An example is illustrated in Table 8, with each woman represented by a unique case id. The time period in question is the year preceding the survey. The first two rows represent the first woman (case id number 1) who is 20-24 years old for 9 months of the year preceding the survey, and 25-29 years old for the three remaining months of the year preceding the survey, contributing 0.75 years of person time to the 20-24 year age group and 0.25 years of person time to the 25-29 year old age group. The first line represents the period during which she is 20-24 years old and the second line represents the period during which she is 25-29 years old. She has one birth when she is between 25-29 years of age, captured in the second line, which is factored into the age specific fertility rate of 25-29 year olds. The second woman (case id 2) is in the third line, and spends all 12 months in the 30-34 year old age group during which she also has one birth, contributing both one year of person time and one event to the 30-34 year old age group. The third woman is 15-19 years old for only six months of the year preceding survey which means she must have turned 15, thereby becoming eligible for the survey, partway through the time period in question. She contributes only six months of exposure time to the 15-19 year old age group. The fourth woman is 40-44 for 8 months of the year preceding survey and 45-50 for the remaining 4 months of the year preceding survey. Finally, the fifth woman is 15-19 for the entire period in question.

Table 8 - Illustration of person period data file (births and exposure in five year age groups for year preceding survey)

Case id	Age group	Births	Exposure in months	Exposure in years
1	20-24	0	9	0.75
1	25-29	1	3	0.25
2	30-34	1	12	1
3	15-19	0	6	0.50
4	40-44	0	8	0.67
4	45-50	0	4	0.33
5	15-19	0	12	1

These person period data are then aggregated across all women into a table of total exposure time and total births, by age group, with weights applied to account for sample design. Weights

are normalized so they add up to the sample size of women and are used to calculate weighted sums of births and exposure time. Because weights are applied, the number of births is not always a whole number. Examples of the weighted tables of events and exposure may be found in Appendix B and Appendix D.

The transformation of birth history into person period data and tables of exposure for the calculation of age specific fertility rates was done using the STATA package tfr2 (Schoumaker 2013), a program designed specifically for use with DHS data that transforms birth histories into weighted tables of age specific births and the person-time at risk of women in different age groups. This allows for the computation of age specific fertility rates and mean ages at first birth by union status. The tfr2 module was used for its flexibility to compute age specific fertility rates for different timespans preceding the survey, for first order births only, and for women of different background characteristics, such as union status.

5.4.2 **Qualitative**

With a research team, I collected the qualitative data through focus group discussions conducted in 2016 among men and women in Quezon City, National Capital Region and in Bataan Province in Region III-Central Luzon. Focus group discussions assessed both cohabiting and married women's values, perceptions, and attitudes toward marriage, cohabitation, and childbearing. With input from UPPI, I designed the focus group discussion guide and study materials, which were pilot tested for clarity and validity and adjusted accordingly. All study materials were translated into Filipino. Male and female moderators and note-takers were selected from the UPPI faculty based on previous experience conducting focus groups. Participants were recruited by UPPI staff and the barangay chairperson through convenience and key informant sampling. All discussions had 6-9 participants except for one group which had 5 participants. There were a total of 54 respondents, including 26 women and 28 men. Only women and men above 18 years of age were recruited. In total, eight focus group discussions were conducted with cohabiting and married women and men aged 22-62 years from one urban barangay (Pansol, National Capital Region) and one rural barangay (Bacong in Hermosa, Bataan province). All focus groups were audio recorded and transcripts translated into English for analysis with NVivo software. I first reviewed transcripts for major themes using a deductive approach and then reviewed transcripts with a focus on themes that respondents raised. Additional details on the focus group methodology can be found in Chapter 4, in section 4.3 and in Chapter 7 in section 7.6.

5.5 Results

5.5.1 Lack of postponement, low childlessness, and high demand for children

In this section, I provide evidence from both national level survey data and qualitative focus group data to demonstrate the high demand for children, the high value placed on childbearing, and the consistently young age pattern of fertility. I argue that fertility in the Philippines has stayed relatively high with a young age pattern because childbearing is both highly valued and viewed as inevitable, and therefore there has not been a strong desire to delay entry into parenthood.

5.5.1.1 Quantitative evidence

The decline in TFR over the past few decades may reflect either tempo or quantum shifts. Figure 6 shows the age specific fertility rate for all births in the three years preceding survey, which is the timespan the DHS typically uses to calculate fertility rates, in order to capture a larger number of births. The corresponding table of events and exposure time used to calculate the age specific fertility rates is displayed in Appendix B.

Figure 6 demonstrates a gradual downward quantum shift in fertility for all age groups, except 15-19 year olds. It also shows an overall tempo shift toward younger ages. Although the TFR decreased from 4.1 to 3.0, and fertility declined for nearly all age groups, the peak of childbearing shifted gradually to younger ages, from 25-29 year olds to 20-24 year olds. Furthermore, in the past two decades, the teenage fertility rate increased from 50 to 57 per 1,000, which has also been noted in studies of teenage fertility (YAFS 2014; Gipson and Hicks 2016)

Figure 6 - Age specific fertility rate, all births three years preceding survey



Figure 7- Age specific fertility rate, first births only (first births in year preceding survey)Figure 6, however, does not account for compositional changes by birth order. As overall fertility declines, first births to younger women become a larger proportion of all births. Without attention to birth order, compositional changes in birth order may be mistaken for changes in the age distribution of childbearing. To account for compositional change in birth order, Figure 7 shows the age pattern of first births only, for births in the year preceding survey.[3] In order to highlight the change over time in fertility by each age group, the x and y axis of Figure 7 are reverse from those of Figure 6.

Figure 7 shows that the age pattern of first births has also remained both persistently young and highest among 20-24 year olds. The corresponding table of events and exposure time used to calculate the age specific fertility rates is displayed in Appendix D. Strikingly, the rate of first births among teenagers has increased steadily since 1993 and is at a 20 year high at nearly 50 per 1,000 women, unexpected given the context of overall fertility decline. In fact, in 2008 and 2013, first order fertility was higher among teenagers than among 25-29 year olds. Equally surprisingly,

[3] In this instance, first order age specific fertility is calculated based on births in the year preceding survey to be consistent with further analyses of first order fertility in following sections, which are also based on births in the year preceding survey. The reason for focusing on births in the year preceding survey is to minimize the time for union transitions between time of survey and time of birth. The age specific fertility curve of first order births for births three years preceding survey as well as the table of events and exposure time may be found in Appendix C.

the rate of first births to 25-29 year olds was lower in 2013 than it was in 1998, and there has been little consistent change in the first order fertility rate of women over 30, signifying a lack of postponement.

Figure 7- Age specific fertility rate, first births only (first births in year preceding survey)



Although first order fertility remains highest among 20-24 year olds, between 2008 and 2013 a marked decrease occurs from 80.7 per 1,000 to 68.4 per 1,000, equivalent to a 15 percent decline. This may be attributable to both the 9 percent rise in first order teenage fertility during the previous survey interval (2003-2008) and possible future increase in first births to older age groups in the years following 2013. From 2008 to 2013, first order fertility increased slightly in the 25-39 year old age groups, which may be evidence of the start of a trend toward postponement.

Not only has the first order fertility rate of younger women increased, but the share of all first births attributable to young women has also increased. Figure 8 illustrates the increased proportion of all first births attributable to women 15-19, from 24 percent in 1993 to 33 percent in 2013. Importantly, the rise in teenage childbearing has actually led to a decline in overall mean age at first birth from 23.8 to 22.8 over the same time period (Figure 8, horizontal axis). This trend towards younger first births may be due to earlier sexual initiation among youth (Natividad 2013; Gipson and Hicks 2016). Overall, in contrast to the pattern of postponement and low fertility in other Asian countries, first order fertility trends in the Philippines show little evidence of postponement and instead depict an increasingly young age pattern of first birth, despite overall fertility decline.

Figure 8- Proportion of first births in year preceding survey attributable to each age group, over time; and declining mean age at first birth (horizontal axis)



Finally, Figure 9 shows both lack of postponement and low childlessness from a cohort perspective, illustrating the cumulative percentage of women who have begun childbearing by age group, for birth cohorts ranging from 1959 to 1998. Although the full range of cohort data are not captured due to truncation, the available data demonstrate the persistently young pattern of first time childbearing and low levels of childlessness. The patterns of transition into motherhood over the life course are remarkably consistent across birth cohorts, showing little variation. In addition to young entry into motherhood, childlessness is also uncommon in the Philippines and has not increased over the past two decades, demonstrating the consistent and high priority placed on childbearing. The vast majority of women eventually have children and less than ten percent of women are childless by age 45-49. Moreover, most women —approximately 70 percent — have begun childbearing by 25-29.

Figure 9 - Cumulative percentage of women who have begun childbearing by age group, across birth cohorts



5.5.1.2 **Qualitative evidence**

The focus groups shed insight into the high demand for children, lack of postponement, and low childlessness in the Philippines. All respondents indicated that children are highly valued, largely for emotional reasons, and also for care in old age. Moreover, respondents generally preferred larger families, acknowledging that raising more children would be more resource intensive but reasoning that "if you have a lot, then you will be able to survive it" and that "God will not give [children] to you if you can't handle it." Respondents from all focus groups repeatedly described children as "blessings" and said that their children invigorated their lives and provided them motivation to work. Although respondents acknowledged the hard work of raising children, they also emphasized that the work provided meaning to their lives.

Respondent: "*It feels good to have a child, first of all because he's your inspiration in life, right? So that you would have more gusto to work, you have something to give him when you come home.*"
-married male, age 39, college educated

Our findings also suggested that the young age pattern of childbearing may not be due to a specific preference for early childbearing but may instead be related to ambivalence and lack of family planning. Most acknowledged that it was ideal to delay childbearing in order to complete one's education and obtain financial stability but still indicated that childbearing in reality often

happened before these parameters were fulfilled, reflecting on their own experiences and those of their adult children.

Respondent: *At first, I was planning to get married [but] what I wanted was, before I had a child, before I got someone pregnant, I [wanted to have] money saved. But it happened that [my partner] got pregnant. Maybe God already gave that so that my life can be renewed and I can think to myself that I won't be a bachelor for life."*
- cohabiting male, age 23, college educated

Furthermore, female respondents framed pregnancy as inevitable once in a sexual relationship and described "having a boyfriend" as synonymous with becoming pregnant, indicating that both events "just happen." The fatalistic attitude that being in a relationship inevitably leads to pregnancy, along with the high value of children, led to respondents expressing very weak preferences regarding when to begin childbearing, since delaying childbearing would also indirectly entail delaying sexual relationships. In other Asian countries where marriage is expected to be quickly followed by childbearing, people postpone marriage in order to also effectively postpone the responsibility of childbearing and are willing to remain single until they are ready for parenthood (Jones 2007). In the Philippines however, there has not been a similar postponement of union formation, perhaps because people do not feel strongly enough about postponing childbearing to also postpone sex and relationships.

Ambivalence toward when to begin childbearing was also paralleled in respondents' overwhelmingly fatalistic approach toward regulating or planning fertility. Although respondents were aware of modern contraceptive methods, such as condoms and female sterilization, they lacked accurate or comprehensive knowledge of the full range of methods and many reported a lack of interest in using family planning or scepticism toward the safety of certain contraceptive methods. Respondents indicated "these things [having children] are not planned…it just suddenly happens," "[children] just come," and "some do plan...[but] we don't know how to plan." Relative ambivalence toward family planning could be related to limited access to contraception for unmarried women and the lack of legal abortion. In this sense, the age at which one becomes pregnant may also be when one must become ready to parent simply because there are limited options for unmarried, sexually active women to prevent pregnancy and following this, no legal options to terminate pregnancy.

5.5.2 **Young age patterns of nonmarital fertility**

To further understand early childbearing in the Philippines, I analyze age specific fertility by union type to investigate possible connections between young childbearing and nonmarital fertility. I

argue that the acceptance and growth of nonmarital fertility has paved the way for young women to enter sexual relationships and parenthood while effectively postponing the commitment, expense, and legal implications of marriage. In western countries, increasing nonmarital fertility has been due to births to cohabiting couples (Kennedy and Bumpass 2008; Perelli-Harris et al. 2010), while the growth of nonmarital fertility in the Philippines is due to increases in births to both single women and cohabiters (Figure 6). However, my analysis focuses on births to cohabiters, since they represent the large majority of nonmarital births.

5.5.2.1 Quantitative evidence

Nonmarital births have increased dramatically and now represent the majority of first births. Figure 10 shows that between 1993 and 2013, the proportion of all births attributable to unmarried women — including cohabiting women, separated women and women who have never been in union— nearly quadrupled from approximately 10 percent to 40 percent, with the majority of the increase among cohabiting women (DHS 1993-2013). At the same time, the proportion of all births attributable to married women fell from nearly 90 percent to 60 percent.

Figure 10 - Proportions of all births in year preceding survey by union status, over time



Note: Not standardized by age structure

This shift toward nonmarital fertility is even more dramatic among first births (Figure 11). In 1993, about 20 percent of all first births were to unmarried women and by 2013, this proportion had tripled to nearly 60 percent, demonstrating an enormous and rapid shift within two decades from essentially all births occurring within marriage (Figure 10) to the majority of first births occurring outside of marriage (Figure 11). The rapid growth of nonmarital fertility in the

Philippines is in direct contrast to both the strong and pervasive stigma against nonmarital fertility in other Asian countries and the more gradual growth of nonmarital fertility — usually first preceded by cohabitation and low fertility — experienced by other high nonmarital fertility regions (Jones 2007; Lesthaeghe 2010).

Figure 11- Proportions of first births in year preceding survey by union status, over time



Although nonmarital fertility is attributed to women with a range of different relationship statuses, I focus on women who have first births in cohabitation because they are by far the largest group and comparable in number to married first time mothers. Table 9 demonstrates the age differences between married and cohabiting first time mothers, indicating a connection between the increase in births to cohabiting women and the young overall age pattern of first births demonstrated in the previous section. Because union status data is only collected at the time of survey, Table 9 describes the average age at first birth for women whose first birth occurred in the year preceding the survey, based on their union status at the time of survey. On average, first time mothers who were cohabiting at the time of survey gave birth at a younger age than first time mothers who were married. Additionally, both married and cohabiting first time mothers have seen very little change in their respective mean ages at first birth, meaning the overall decline in mean age at first birth (see Figure 8, horizontal axis) and the overall persistence of early childbearing could be due to compositional increase of cohabiting first time mothers.

Married first time mothers are older than cohabiting first time mothers, but it is important that the average age of first birth has been largely stable between subgroups, meaning the behaviour of married and cohabiting first time mothers has not shifted, even if first births in cohabitation are now more common. This is unlike the bimodal patterns of other countries, such as the United

States and parts of Latin America where fertility patterns have not only diverged between subgroups, but behaviour within subgroups has continued to change. In such cases, women from lower social strata have continued to have early first births while women of higher social strata have shifted toward having births later and later, suggesting differential uptake of postponement behaviour across subgroups of women (Sullivan 2005; Rendall et al. 2009; Nathan et al. 2016). The Philippines' example shows compositional shifts but to date no postponement within subgroups, indicating nonmarital fertility, not postponement, is the unevenly adopted new behaviour.

Table 9 – Mean age at first birth by union type (first births in year preceding survey)

DHS year	Married	Number of first births to married women	Cohabiting	Number of first births to cohabiting women
1993	24.2	329	21.5	67
1998	24.3	314	22.0	61
2003	24.7	282	21.3	118
2008	24.2	186	21.7	172
2013	24.8	213	21.3	196

To further examine the relationship between young childbearing and nonmarital fertility, Figure 12 depicts first births to married women and cohabiting women separately, per 1,000 women (regardless of union status) from ages 15-34.[4] I do not include first order age specific fertility rates for women 35 and older because they are very low and make the figure more difficult to read. Figure 12 again demonstrates the sharp increase in nonmarital first order fertility and corresponding decline in marital first order fertility. While first order births to married women (solid lines) have decreased at all age groups, first order births to cohabiting women (dotted lines) have increased in nearly all age groups. Not only does this show the phenomenal rise of nonmarital fertility, it also indicates the decline in marital first births among young women is offset by increases in first births to young cohabiters — especially teenagers — which maintains an overall pattern of young childbearing. Additionally, first births to women over 30 have not increased consistently among either married or cohabiting women, which further emphasizes the lack of postponement of childbearing. The diverging fertility patterns between married and cohabiting women and the compositional change of first time mothers (Figure 11) demonstrate

[4] For an age specific fertility graph of first births that includes births to never in union women, see Appendix E

that the mean age of first births among married women has trended older because young first time mothers are now more likely to be cohabiting women rather than married women, not because married women have opted to postpone.

Figure 12- First order births to married women per 1,000 women (solid lines) and first order births to cohabiting women per 1,000 women (dashed lines) from 1993-2013



5.5.2.2 Qualitative evidence

The growth of nonmarital fertility is likely associated with the increased acceptance of cohabitation as both a testing ground for relationships and a longer term family arrangement suitable for having children. Focus group respondents consistently reported that previous stigma associated with nonmarital fertility had declined considerably and referred to cohabitation and nonmarital fertility as normal in their communities. The main reasons respondents gave for this shift were their communities being "liberated," "modern," and "open-minded," and specific policy changes extending the rights of children born to unmarried parents.

Respondent: "*Even if you're not married, you can have a child. Others, they are married but they can't have a child. When you live in, you bear a child. It's the same thing.*"
- cohabiting male, age 32, high school educated

In particular, respondents referred to recent changes in the Family Code which now allow children born out of wedlock to carry their father's last name and register at school with a birth certificate instead of their parents' marriage license, effectively decreasing the stigma of having unwed

parents. Both male and female respondents consistently reported that it was very important for children to have their father's last name because it represented paternal acknowledgement, acceptance, and familial love. Respondents also reported that the change in Family Code now ties child support and inheritance to biological parentage, regardless of the marital status of the children's parents, which also makes cohabitation more appealing and marriage less necessary for securing children's futures.

Respondent: *"Because there is a law that enables [children] to use the last name of the man. Children aren't teased at school anymore because they can use their father's last name and register with a birth certificate. "*
- married female, age 44, high school educated

In addition to more liberal social norms and family policies, respondents reported fear of relationship instability as a reason to cohabit instead of marry, in order to test the strength of the relationship without the legal implications and commitment of marriage, since legal divorce is not available. Cohabitation was also framed as an acceptable longer term family form, especially since respondents felt that marriage did not guarantee a stable relationship, despite the high barriers to legal marital dissolution.

Respondent: "*I'm serious with my live-in partner even if we're not yet married. I tell my partner, there are so many couples who tie the knot, but eventually get separated. Compared to us, we're 15 years and our relationship gets stronger. But we're going to get married. I promised her that we'll get married."*
- cohabiting male, age 41, high school educated

5.5.3 Increasing cohabitation in response to pregnancy

In this section, I investigate the sequencing of first births and first unions to evaluate the extent to which single women move in with their partner in response to becoming pregnant or giving birth, and how this has changed over time and by union type. I look separately at the sequence of events for married and cohabiting women who became first time mothers in the year preceding the survey to demonstrate the growing role of cohabitation as a family form. I propose that because more single women cohabit versus marry in response to pregnancy, and more cohabiting women choose to remain in cohabitation after becoming pregnant or giving birth, this could indicate a convergence of marriage and cohabitation with respect to reproductive behaviour and the acceptance of cohabitation as a family form.

5.5.3.1 **Quantitative evidence**

The rise of nonmarital fertility and births within cohabitation may partly be attributed to cohabitation as an increasingly acceptable response to unplanned pregnancy since unions are often formed in response to pregnancy. At the time of the 2013 interview, the vast majority of partnered Filipina women —96 percent of married women and 90 percent of cohabiters — were either pregnant or had at least one child. Approximately a third of these women had their first birth either before or within seven months of forming their first union, meaning they may have moved in with their partners in response to the pregnancy or birth (DHS 2013).

Earlier, Figure 11 demonstrated the decline of first births to currently married women and the corresponding rise of first births to currently cohabiting women. The following section delves further into these first births with Table 10 and Table 11 examining first time mothers by their union status. Table 10 shows the different pathways to first birth and first union among currently married women who gave birth in the last year. Table 11 shows the same for currently cohabiting women. Below Table 10 and Table 11 respectively are Figure 13 and

Figure 14, which illustrate the three sequences described in the tables. Each sequence type is numbered in both the table and its corresponding figure.

Among the currently married women who had a first birth in the last year, approximately one fifth became pregnant before marriage, a fairly consistent proportion over time Table 10. This shows that although married first time mothers have decreased as a proportion of all first time mothers, these women still tend to follow a consistent marriage and childbearing trajectory, with most waiting until marriage to conceive (3) and a fifth legitimating a nonmarital pregnancy with marriage (1).

In contrast, the proportion of first time cohabiting mothers who entered cohabitation only after becoming pregnant (1) has generally increased from 16 percent in 1993 to 28 percent in 2013 (Table 11). Along with Figure 11, Table 11 suggests that cohabitation is not only becoming a more common context for first births but also an increasingly acceptable response to nonmarital conception, likely serving some of the same functions as marriage in legitimating a nonmarital birth. This may reflect the shifting role of cohabitation as a family form appropriate for childbearing and rearing with some of the same cultural, social, and economic benefits as marriage. Whereas previously, cohabiting couples conceived and had their first birth after moving in together, now a higher proportion of couples conceive before living together and cohabit in response to the pregnancy.

Lastly, due to lack of data on first union type, it is possible that some currently married women first cohabited with their partners before later transitioning to marriage, which would lead to an underestimation of women who cohabit in response to pregnancy or birth. In summary, the increase of both single women who cohabited in response to pregnancy, and the high prevalence of cohabiting women who did not marry in response to pregnancy but remained in cohabitation suggests the emergence of cohabitation as a family form and a similarity between marriage and cohabitation with respect to reproductive behaviour.

Table 10- Sequence of first pregnancy and first partnership, among married women who had a first birth in the year preceding survey

	% became pregnant while single		% became pregnant after marriage (3)	Total	Number of first births in year preceding survey
	Married after becoming pregnant (1)	Married after giving birth (2)			
1993	19.99	0.66	79.34	100	329
1998	20.86	0.77	78.37	100	314
2003	27.95	1.81	70.25	100	282
2008	22.98	1.7	75.32	100	186
2013	21.25	0.5	78.25	100	213

Figure 13 - Stylized multistate model of sequence of first pregnancy and first partnership, among married women who had a first birth in the year preceding survey



Table 11- Sequence of first pregnancy and first partnership, among cohabiting women who had a first birth in the year preceding survey

	% became pregnant while single		% became pregnant after entry into cohabitation (3)	Total	Number of first births in year preceding survey
	Entered cohabitation after becoming pregnant (1)	Entered cohabitation after giving birth (2)			
1993	16.14	1.37	82.48	100	67
1998	10.79	4.46	84.75	100	61
2003	15.17	1.36	83.46	100	118
2008	32.9	3.17	63.93	100	172
2013	28.18	3.38	68.45	100	196

Figure 14 – Stylized multistate model of sequence of first pregnancy and first partnership, among cohabiting women who had a first birth in the year preceding survey



5.5.3.2 **Qualitative evidence**

Respondents reasoned that cohabitation and nonmarital births were more common not only because of policy changes and social acceptance, but also because marriage is no longer compulsory when an unmarried woman becomes pregnant. The acceptance of nonmarital fertility is likely linked to the lack of legal abortion options, which contrasts sharply with other Asian countries where abortion is widely available and nonmarital births are stigmatized. Without legal abortion options, a nonmarital pregnancy is much more likely to lead to a nonmarital birth, and the growing prevalence of nonmarital births may further normalize a wider range of partnership contexts deemed acceptable for childbearing. In fact, respondents emphasized that becoming pregnant alone was not a good reason to get married and that impulsively entering into marriage could become extremely problematic, due to the risk of relationship instability and the

unavailability of legal divorce. Although being married was not a prerequisite for having children, love and relationship stability were deemed essential to marriage.

Respondent: *"Right now, we are in a modern generation already. If you get pregnant and you want to get married and you both love each other, so be it. But if you don't love each other and you only did it [sex] out of impulsiveness—It's okay if you don't marry."*
- married female, age 40, high school educated

Respondent: *"But (if) it's my daughter, I will ask her if she gets pregnant. If she loves the boy, she should marry the boy. But if she does not, I won't let her marry the boy even if she is pregnant. I will raise and take care of my grandchild."*
- married male, age 37, college educated

In contrast to marriage, cohabitation presents an alternative partnership option that creates a similar familial context for childbearing and rearing while still allowing for more relationship flexibility. One female respondent explained the disadvantage of marrying in response to pregnancy because "when getting married, at times it is sudden… and there are situations which require you to do it [pregnancy] but then you do not know one another" and after giving birth, might regret getting married. Female respondents in particular felt that an unexpected pregnancy sometimes forced two people into a relationship who were "not meant to be," in which case the flexibility to easily exit the relationship was extremely important. Because pregnancy is often unplanned, cohabitation is sometimes a more logical response than marriage, since it often requires less planning, deliberation, and resources than entry into marriage.

Nonetheless, although respondents described both births in cohabitation and cohabiting in response to pregnancy as socially acceptable, sexual activity and childbearing among single women was not as consistently accepted. Although nearly 12 percent of first births in 2013 occurred to single, never partnered women (Figure 11), my focus group findings suggest that single mothers may still face stigma that cohabiting mothers increasingly do not. One cohabiting female respondent replied that "in the case of the woman… it is humiliating to be pregnant and not be in a relationship. They'll say, 'What's that? It just formed?' " This response suggests that sexual activity should still occur within a relationship, if not necessarily marriage.

5.6 Discussion and Conclusion

Between 1993 and 2013, the age profile of fertility in the Philippines experienced a shift toward younger ages, defying worldwide trends of fertility postponement. The increased relative importance of younger childbearing was partly due to a compositional shift in birth order — a proportional increase in first births due to decreasing higher order births from overall fertility

decline. Nonetheless, first order fertility also remained young, and the teenage first order fertility rate consistently increased, surpassing that of 25-29 year olds. Meanwhile, there was no clear pattern of increased fertility for women above 30, and the overall mean age at first birth decreased by a year over the past twenty years, suggesting little evidence of postponement, indeed a trend in the opposite direction of much of the rest of the region and world.

During the same time period, nonmarital births — including births among both cohabiters and single women — sharply rose to nearly 40 percent of all childbearing. In 2013, the majority of all first births occurred outside of marriage, rather than within marriage. My study found a younger age pattern of first births among cohabiters compared to married women. Decreases in marital births at ages 15-29 were offset by increases in births to cohabiters in the same age groups; and again, there was little discernible change in first order fertility among women over 30 for both groups. This means marital first births have adopted an older age pattern over time likely because of compositional changes in the union status of first time mothers, and not because of postponement among married women. Specifically, women who give birth at younger ages are increasingly more likely to be cohabiting than married, compared to previous years when young mothers were more likely to be married. These findings suggest an important connection between the persistence of young childbearing and the rise of nonmarital fertility.

Findings from the focus groups also indicate that the slow fertility decline and persistence of a young age pattern of fertility in the Philippines may be related to the emergence of cohabitation, childbearing in cohabitation, and cohabitation in response to pregnancy as socially acceptable options. Respondents reported that such practices were both more common and less stigmatized in their communities than they had been in the recent past, raising the possibility that changes in behaviour and social norms may have mutually reinforced each other. Moreover, respondents also cited changes in family policy as reasons for the increased prevalence and decreased stigma of nonmarital cohabitation and childbearing, implicating policy change as either a determinant of or response to behavioural change.

Given the social and structural changes that facilitate more flexibility toward relationships and the context of childbearing, nonmarital pregnancies and births no longer incur as high a social or economic penalty, reducing the incentive to postpone sex. While in the past, women have either been married or required to marry upon entry into parenthood, the current shift of childbearing from marriage to cohabitation has paved the way for young women to enter parenthood even if they are not ready for marriage. Thus, the growing acceptance of cohabitation may present a more palatable partnership option than marriage, allowing young women to simultaneously meet

traditional preferences for childbearing and childrearing within a two parent household, while still maintaining the flexibility to exit the union if higher order emotional needs are not met and the relationship proves unsatisfactory.

The Philippine patterns discussed in this paper differ from the predominant pattern of fertility and family change in East and Southeast Asia, where marriage and childbearing have been postponed, and nonmarital fertility is largely unacceptable, all of which have kept fertility levels low (Jones 2007; Raymo et al. 2015). The Philippines and other Asian countries also diverge with respect to access to contraception and the option of legal abortion and divorce. In other Asian countries, nonmarital pregnancies may be legitimated with marriage or terminated through abortion, which may contribute to maintaining the stigma around nonmarital childbearing. In the Philippines, however, without access to legal abortion and limited options for legally dissolving an unsatisfactory marriage, cohabitation is the more appealing and practical recourse to a nonmarital pregnancy and childbearing and childrearing in cohabitation have become more acceptable. The preference for cohabitation has been further reinforced by family policies, such as the Family Code, which have evolved and liberalized to include cohabiting families, unlike the conservative policies surrounding divorce and abortion. In this way, the paradoxically liberal and conservative national context supports the unusually rapid delinking of marriage and childbearing, concurrent with the acceptance of cohabitation, preventing the type of fertility decline experienced by the rest of the region.

Although distinct in the Asian region, the Philippines shares demographic similarities with Latin America. Like the Philippines, similar changes in family structure have occurred in Latin America in the last few decades — a dramatic rise in cohabitation, and nonmarital fertility which currently surpasses marital fertility in some countries (Esteve et al. 2012; Laplante et al. 2015; Laplante et al. 2016). Most of Latin America also has a Catholic Spanish colonial legacy like the Philippines, and despite overall fertility decline, a young pattern of both childbearing and union formation (Esteve et al. 2013). The Latin American story seems to be similar to that of the Philippines — marriage and childbearing have been delinked, attributable mostly to large increases in childbearing in cohabitation, although out of union births have also increased (Grace and Sweeney 2014; Laplante et al. 2015). At the same time, sex and pregnancy remain strong drivers of union formation, indicating that childbearing and partnership are still closely coupled, regardless of the legal status of the partnership (Grace and Sweeney 2014; Laplante et al. 2015). The gradual substitution of marriage by cohabitation is postulated to be related to the downward trend in women's age at union formation, as the growing acceptance of premarital sex and

cohabitation paves the way for early unions, and thus early childbearing, echoing my findings (Esteve et al. 2013). Nevertheless, important contrasts exist between the Philippines and the patterns in Latin America. While the Philippines has a negative educational gradient of cohabitation (Chapter 6) and different age patterns of fertility between married and cohabiting women, several countries in Latin America have trended toward a flatter educational pattern, with both cohabitation and childbearing within cohabitation increasingly common among the more educated, and similarities in age pattern between marital and nonmarital fertility (Esteve et al. 2012; Laplante et al. 2015). Furthermore, fertility in the Philippines remains well above replacement level with no evidence of postponement, while below replacement fertility has occurred in several Latin American countries.

There are also similarities in the shifting social roles of marriage, cohabitation, and childbearing between the Philippines and disadvantaged communities in the United States, a country that occupied the Philippines for decades, leaving lasting influences. For example, the legal and educational systems in the Philippines are based on the American systems, English is an official language in addition to Filipino, important migratory channels have existed between the Philippines and the United States for decades, and American culture and media are widely consumed. Edin and Kefalas (2005) argue that nonmarital childbearing in the United States largely occurs among disadvantaged communities where childbearing is valued over marriage as a meaning making activity, representing self-actualization and transition to adulthood. Because a relationship is perceived to require a certain standard of economic and emotional stability before it can be converted to marriage, marriage requires "years of careful planning and preparation," and in contrast, childbearing is a universally accessible necessity that "happens along the way" (Edin and Kefalas 2005). Thus, a premature and impulsive marriage in response to a nonmarital pregnancy is considered imprudent in these communities, but early childbearing is not. In this perspective, marriage, while still significant, is no longer about childbearing but about personal fulfilment.

Parallels between the Philippines and both the United States and Latin America echo an oft touted saying regarding the Philippines' colonial history — "300 years in the convent and 50 years in Hollywood" (Karnow 1989). Although this pithy saying is admittedly reductionist, it does speak to the paradoxical complexities at play in the Philippines. The restrictive political and legal climate, a vestige of the Catholic Spanish occupation, is exemplified by the draconian divorce policy, poor family planning access and no legal options for abortion, and seems directly at odds with the increased legal and social acceptance of cohabitation and nonmarital fertility, which

perhaps echo the more recent, liberal American influence. While the acceptance of cohabitation and cohabiting families reported by qualitative findings does indicate some level of liberalization and ideational change in the Philippines, it appears that childbearing is still key to self-actualization and larger families are still preferred. Furthermore, the conservative policy climate may inadvertently act as both an impetus for behavioural change regarding cohabitation and an obstacle to ideational change regarding the value of childbearing. The growing acceptance of cohabitation and nonmarital fertility may not be a rejection of Church, establishment, and patriarchy but instead represent practical family strategies that create a familial context for childbearing and childrearing similar to marriage, while still allowing for relationship flexibility.

In the past, researchers hypothesized a convergence of family systems around the world, first predicting the dominance of the modern two child nuclear family (Goode 1963) and then the post-modern delinking of marriage and childbearing, rise of cohabitation, and below replacement fertility as posited by the SDT (Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa 1986). Family behaviours and some attitudes have indeed changed in the Philippines toward a post-modern pattern, but not entirely in the way or for the reasons predicted by the SDT (Lesthaeghe 2010). For example, the SDT posits that sexual liberation and the contraceptive revolution led to the rejection of the notion that sex must be confined to marriage and for procreation only and subsequently, fertility would decline to below replacement level as individual needs took precedence over family-centric values. However, in the Philippines, contraception is not widely accessible, sex is still supposed to occur within serious relationships, childbearing is intrinsically linked to self-actualization, and sex and childbearing remain strongly associated. Fertility also remains relatively high. Nonetheless, sex and childbearing have become uncoupled from legal marriage.

Thus, the Philippine case provides further evidence that the evolution of family systems does not follow a universal, linear pathway with one end point, and new family behaviours do not always emerge in the same chronological order or for the same reasons. The causes of family change and the mechanisms through which such changes occur vary worldwide, reflecting the contextual mix of religion, norms, political climate, and economic development (Cherlin 2012). Although Lesthaeghe (2010) acknowledges the existence of SDT sub narratives based on national context, he maintains that liberalization and individualization are at the root of post-modern family change. The case of the Philippines, however, demonstrates that while on the surface, family systems may indeed evolve over time in tandem with global trends, country and context specific interdependencies are important to consider. The emergence of new family behaviours and

attitudes in the Philippines are not solely products of modernization or liberalization but instead represent the competing and interrelated influences of religion, policy, social, and cultural norms.

Chapter 6 The Unexpected Rise of Cohabitation: Evidence of Socioeconomic Disadvantage?

6.1 Abstract

Cohabitation has increased rapidly in the Philippines, with the prevalence among young adult women quadrupling from 6% in 1993 to 24% in 2013. This increase is dramatic and exceptional given the slow change in other family behaviours — such as low divorce rates, continued high fertility, and the persistent influence of the Catholic Church. While cohabitation is often framed as evidence of ideational change and liberalization, its continued uptake over time may relate to socioeconomic constraint. Using the 2013 National Demographic and Health Surveys, I apply a discrete-time competing risks model to examine the relationship between socioeconomic status and cohabitation, using education as a proxy for resources and opportunities available to women. My findings demonstrate that lower levels of education are significantly associated with a higher risk of cohabitation, suggesting that the rising cohabitation in the Philippines is more linked to socioeconomic disadvantage than the devaluing of marriage among educated elites.

Keywords: cohabitation, education, Second Demographic Transition, Philippines, Demographic and Health Surveys

6.2 Introduction

Although cohabitation has been increasing in countries around the world, its meaning and role in family formation vary cross-nationally and by population subgroups (Raymo et al. 2009; Perelli-Harris et al. 2010; Jampaklay and Haseen 2011; Esteve et al. 2012; Perelli-Harris et al. 2014; Yu and Xie 2015). Some scholars frame the emergence of cohabitation and other family behaviours – such as postponement of marriage and childbearing, nonmarital fertility, and divorce— as evidence of ideational change and liberalization, referring to this systematic shift as a "Second Demographic Transition" (SDT) (Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa 1986; Sobotka 2008; Lesthaeghe 2010). From this perspective, ideational change diffuses through higher or prolonged education among elite subgroups, and more educated individuals are considered the forerunners of value change who adopt new family behaviours.

Alternatively, understanding changing family behaviours also depends on the local and historical context (Heuveline and Timberlake 2004; Perelli-Harris et al. 2014). As cohabitation becomes more accepted, its continued uptake over time may relate to socioeconomic circumstances. Individuals of different socioeconomic backgrounds may have reasons for choosing cohabitation which reflect the values, norms, or constraints of their social strata. Depending on the population subgroup, cohabitation could represent individuals' increasingly liberal values or could be coping strategies related to socioeconomic disadvantage and instability (McLanahan 2004; Perelli-Harris et al. 2010).

While cohabitation is mainstream in many countries of Europe and the Americas, in Asia cohabitation is a comparatively marginal, albeit growing practice. At the same time, other family behaviours related to the SDT— low fertility and postponement of marriage and childbearing— have been observed increasingly in Asia, leading scholars to explore the possibility of the SDT spreading to Asia (Atoh et al. 2004; Lesthaeghe 2010; Yu and Xie 2015; Ghosh 2016). This research examines the exceptional case of the Philippines —an Asian country exhibiting rapid uptake of cohabitation but little evidence of the types of family change experienced by other Asian countries— and whether cohabitation is evidence of SDT related liberalization or socioeconomic disadvantage.

Unlike neighbouring Asian countries and the Western settings, the Philippines has not experienced other family behaviours typically pertinent to the SDT, such as below replacement fertility or large scale postponement of marriage and childbearing. While divorce is on the rise in some neighbouring Asian countries, the Philippines is the only country in the world where divorce

is illegal (1987; Laranas 2016). Moreover, although the SDT links the rise of modern contraception with the relaxation of sexual mores and acceptance of new family behaviours, modern contraceptive use in the Philippines remains relatively low, family planning services are inaccessible for young unmarried women, and abortion is illegal. Widespread international and internal migration has also led to the emergence of transnational families and mobile populations, introducing another layer of complexity. Furthermore, the Philippines, as the only Roman Catholic country in Southeast Asia besides Timor-Leste, has a strong colonial legacy, as well as complex and cultural, political, and economic contexts. As a diverse and densely populated nation of over 100 million, the family demography of the Philippines deserves attention as it may have substantial impact on the future global landscape.

To my knowledge, there is no systematic exploration of the large-scale shift towards cohabitation in the Philippines. Existing studies of union formation in the Philippines do not distinguish cohabiters from married people, or else focus solely on youth and mainly use descriptive methods (Kabamalan 2004; Williams et al. 2007; Abalos 2014). However, cohabitation has grown rapidly and markedly beyond a teenage phenomenon, calling for a broader exploration of those who marry and those who cohabit without marrying, across all age groups. Using the recent Philippines Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) data, I investigate union formation at the national level to identify correlates of cohabitation. I investigate whether women who cohabit differ systematically from women who marry, particularly by socioeconomic status, with education and childbearing behaviour as proxies. Although education is an imperfect proxy, it represents the expectations and opportunities of different social strata in the Philippines and is closely linked to likelihood of poverty (PSA 2015). This study provides insight into why and among whom cohabitation has increased in a unique and underexplored country, generating new evidence of cohabitation trends in a non-Western context and expanding the evidence base for family policies and programs in the Philippines.

6.3 Background

6.3.1 Cohabitation and socioeconomic status

The SDT addresses the increasing importance of post-materialist "higher order needs," individualism, secularization, and gender equity, positing that new family behaviours such as cohabitation feature among populations that embody these characteristics (Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa 1986). SDT behaviours are first adopted by elite, highly educated subgroups better

positioned to negotiate higher order needs and challenge existing norms. In Asian countries, highly educated women have tended to postpone marriage and childbearing rather than adopt cohabitation, due to the persistence of traditional family values, and rigid gender roles within relationships and families (Chen and Li 2014; Raymo et al. 2015). Nonetheless, there is also evidence of correlation between liberal, individualist attitudes and postponement of parenthood in Asian countries, for example Japan, South Korea, and Singapore (Lesthaeghe 2010).

The empirical relationship between socioeconomic advantage, as measured by indicators such as educational attainment, income, employment, economic potential, and social class, and cohabitation is varied and context specific. While in some contemporary societies, socioeconomic advantage is positively related to cohabitation or union formation in general, in other contexts there is a negative or insignificant relationship. In China, cohabitation is more likely to occur among affluent, educated individuals exposed to Western culture (Yu and Xie 2015) and in Thailand, cohabitation is more common among urban university students as well as those with more liberal attitudes towards sex (Jampaklay and Haseen 2011). Alternatively, cohabitation may also be the resort of less advantaged populations who lack resources or economic stability to form marital unions (McLanahan 2004; Raymo et al. 2009; Perelli-Harris et al. 2010; Jampaklay and Haseen 2011). Young people are also more likely to cohabit, but whether that is due to more liberal attitudes, economic instability, or relationship instability is not always clear (Jampaklay and Haseen 2011).

The empirical relationship between socioeconomic advantage and cohabitation may also depend on how cohabitation compares with marriage. Where cohabitation is more mainstream and plays a similar role in family formation as marriage, socioeconomic conditions may have a similar relationship with both types of union formation (Thornton et al. 2007; Jalovaara 2012). Finally, as marriage is associated with an elaborate wedding celebration, homeownership, and the purchase of costly household items, being ready for marriage is often synonymous with achieving a level of affluence unattainable to disadvantaged populations, or at least unattainable at the time of union formation (Edin and Kefalas 2005; Williams et al. 2007; Esara 2012). In this case, socioeconomic conditions could link more strongly with marriage than cohabitation, due to higher socioeconomic requirements associated with entry into marriage (Xie et al. 2003; Jalovaara 2012).

Pregnancy and childbearing are also important correlates of union formation that intersect closely with socioeconomic advantage (Berrington and Diamond 2000; Raley 2001; Edin and Kefalas 2005; Raymo et al. 2009; Perelli-Harris and Gerber 2011). Single women may either cohabit or marry in response to pregnancy, depending on socioeconomic class and the acceptability of births

outside marriage. An increase in single women cohabiting in response to pregnancy instead of marrying may indicate liberalization and the convergence of cohabitation and marriage as family forms (Raley 2001). Alternatively, pregnancy and births in cohabitation may be more common among less advantaged women who lack the resources and stability perceived as necessary to marry in response to pregnancy (Edin and Kefalas 2005; Perelli-Harris and Gerber 2011). Moreover, where nonmarital fertility is more common among the less advantaged, the polarization of family formation patterns across socioeconomic status could further exacerbate inequality (McLanahan 2004). Socioeconomic differences in family formation are therefore important to examine given the interconnections between childbearing, union formation, and advantage, and the potential different family formation trajectories may have in amplifying socioeconomic disparities.

6.3.2 Cohabitation and the Philippine context

Cohabitation has been historically documented in the Philippines, particularly among lower income people to avoid the legal fees and celebration costs of marriage (Kabamalan 2004). Although cohabitation has been associated with socioeconomic instability (Kabamalan 2004; Williams et al. 2007; Xenos and Kabamalan 2007), existing studies have examined cohabitation with the view that it is solely a temporary arrangement for young people, focusing only on a very narrow age group using descriptive methods or cross-sectional methods which do not account for the rate or timing of union formation or circumstances at the time of entry into union. Moreover, the percentage of women currently cohabiting has rapidly increased across all age groups (Figure 15), highlighting the importance of considering cohabiters of all ages and also suggesting that either incidence or duration — or both— of cohabitation have also increased, which may also suggest the evolution of cohabitation as a longer term family arrangement. In particular, the prevalence of cohabitation at the time of interview has quadrupled among 20-29 year old women, from around 6 percent in 1993 to 24 percent in 2013 (ICF 2014).

Among youth and young adults, cohabitation is associated with disadvantage and socioeconomic instability, such lack of paid employment and low education (Kabamalan 2004; Williams et al. 2007). Both education and economic resources are useful proxies for socioeconomic status as they represent the expectations and constraints of different social strata, which may then influence union formation decisions. For example, although marriage has reportedly been considered ideal in the Philippines, young cohabiters cite the expense of a wedding celebration and the cost of filing the appropriate paperwork as obstacles to marriage, highlighting the role of

economic considerations in union formation (Xenos and Kabamalan 2007). Differences in sexual mores between classes also suggest that cohabitation may be more socially acceptable among lower income classes (Xenos and Kabamalan 2007; Kabamalan and Ogena 2013). Based on the youth studies of cohabitation in the Philippines, I expect that a negative relationship between cohabitation and socioeconomic status, as measured by education and wealth, may persist for the general population.

Figure 15- Proportion of women cohabiting at time of interview in each age group, 1993-2013



The growth of cohabitation in the Philippines may also relate to the increase in nonmarital pregnancy, due to a combination of increased premarital sex and low family planning use (Natividad 2013; DHS 2014; YAFS 2014). Despite reported stigma against premarital sex, young adults commonly report pregnancy as a motivation for cohabiting (Williams et al. 2007; Xenos and Kabamalan 2007; Natividad 2013). Although marriage may be the preferred context for childbearing, an unplanned pregnancy among couples may hasten entry into cohabitation instead of marriage, due to the higher commitment and economic expectations associated with marriage (Kabamalan and Ogena 2013). Stigma against single parenting is strong, even though approximately 13 percent of first time mothers in the Philippines are single, which has more than quadrupled since 1993 (PSA and ICF 2014). Furthermore, 32 percent of ever-partnered mothers were pregnant before they entered their first partnerships and 7 percent had already given birth, suggesting that pregnancy or birth may influence the decision to enter a partnership (DHS 2014).

Given the interconnection between childbearing, socioeconomic status, and union formation, the growth of premarital sex and the prevalence of pre union pregnancy call for closer examination of pregnancy and childbearing as risk factors for union formation, and whether they are more likely to lead to cohabitation or marriage.

6.4 Data and Methods

6.4.1 Data and outcome variable

The 2013 DHS is a nationally representative sample of 16,155 women aged 15-49, interviewed from a pool of 16,437 eligible women. The DHS mainly collects data on fertility and family planning, including data on the timing of first union and current union status. However, it does not collect detailed union histories, such as higher order unions or timing of union transitions or dissolutions. All interviewed women have current union status data and most women (95 percent) who have ever been in union reported the month and year they entered their first union. For the remaining 5 percent of women ever in union, the DHS imputed values to adjust for the month and year of their first union. Of 10,643 women who had ever been in union, 921 women reported having had more than one union — less than 9 percent. For these women, I made educated assumptions regarding the type of first union (for details, see Appendix F). For example, currently married women who reported multiple unions are likely to have cohabited for their first union, since divorce is illegal. For 90 women (82 currently married and 8 current cohabiting) there was no information on higher order unions, and I assumed they had only one union.

Currently, the legal age at marriage is 18 for the general population and 16 for the Muslim population. Previously, the legal age at marriage was either “by puberty” or age 15 (at the latest) for the Muslim population. Only two women reported being legally married despite being Catholic and under age 18 at the time of interview and they were therefore re-categorized as cohabiters.

The possibility of recall or social desirability biases cannot be ruled out in the study context. For example, women with children may hesitate to report not being in a union, and married women may recall the start date of their unions more accurately than their cohabiting counterparts because marriage is often celebrated with a wedding.

6.4.2 Analytic strategy

My primary interest in this study was to investigate union formation at the national level to identify correlates of entry into cohabitation. I also explore whether women who cohabit differ systematically from women who marry, across age groups and particularly by socioeconomic status.

However, the analysis was not straightforward. Because the wording in the DHS questionnaire did not directly ask the type of first union, the type of first union can only be implied based on current union status. As stated earlier, this requires making educated assumptions about women who have had multiple unions, which are outlined in Appendix F. Additionally, this creates a problem for distinguishing between direct marriage and a marriage preceded by premarital cohabitation, raising potential right and left censoring issues. Therefore, I used two different strategies to investigate cohabitation, each addressing the limitations of the other. First, I focused on entry into first order unions and applied survival analysis and competing risks hazard models. This approach required me to compare first cohabiting unions that had not transitioned into marriage by the time of interview, and first unions that directly or eventually transitioned into marriage. The benefit of this approach is that it produces risks of entrance into partnership and addresses the issue of right censoring, which is problematic when younger adults have not had time to enter into a partnership, enabling us to better understand new behaviours which are rapidly emerging among young adults. In addition, the discrete-time method allows for key variables such as education, age, and calendar time to vary over the observation period.

In order to provide basic descriptive risks of union formation, for example the age profile of entrance into different types of unions, I first conducted survival analysis using Stata v 13.0 (StataCorp 2013) and STCOMPET (Coviello and Boggess 2004). Kaplan-Meier survival curves using STCOMPET (Coviello and Boggess 2004) (1-KM) were fitted to estimate the cumulative incidences of unions that were still cohabiting at interview and unions that transitioned to marriage before interview. Unions that transitioned to marriage before interview were the main event. The competing event of interest was cohabitation. Those who did not enter either a marriage or cohabitation by the time of survey were censored.

I then used a discrete-time competing risks hazard model to examine the educational gradient associated with entry into union. The outcome variable had three categories: 1) women who entered *cohabitation* and did not marry by the time of interview (which I will refer to as "cohabitation"; 2) women who entered a union that either directly or subsequently transitioned

to *marriage* by the time of interview (which I will refer to as "marriage"); and 3) women who had *never been in union* by the time of interview (which I will refer to as "single"). The unit of analysis over the observation period was person-months. Respondents entered the risk set at the month of their 14th birthday and exited upon entry into first union. Women who never entered any union by time of interview were censored. 173 subjects who reported entering a union *before* the month of their 14th birthday were assumed to have failed in the month after they turned 14, at exact age 14 years and 1 month, thereby contributing one month of survival.

I estimate the hazard of union formation in each person month using the following model:

$$h_{it}(m) = \frac{exp\left(\sum_j x_{ijt}\,\beta_{jm}\right)}{\sum_{k=1}^{M} exp\left(\sum_j x_{ijt}\,\beta_{jk}\right)}$$

with $h_{it}(m)$ representing the hazard of respondent i experiencing an event m in month t, and j representing the value of respondent i's covariate at time t. This is equivalent to the number of unions of type m formed in month t, divided by the number of never in union women at risk in the beginning of month t. In each person-month, there are three possible outcomes (M=3): single, marriage, or cohabitation. For each outcome type m, there is a separate coefficient β_{jm} estimated for the j different covariates. The value of β_{jm} is pegged to 0 for the reference category of "single," meaning the hazard is pegged to 1 (exp(0)). The exponentiated β_{jm} coefficient approximates the change in relative risk of entering a union related to one unit increase or category change in the value of covariate *j.* For example, the exponentiated coefficient for the low education category is the change in the risk of entering a union between low educated and medium educated women (the reference category for the education variable), while controlling for other variables.

My second approach was to apply a multinomial logistic model based on cross-sectional current partnership status data, which does not account for right censoring. However, unlike the previous analysis, it does not require assumptions to be made about unions that transitioned from cohabitation to marriage and I incorporate additional variables that are measured only at the time of interview. I modelled age groups separately and present results for each age group to account for differences across the life course.

6.4.3 Independent variables

6.4.3.1 Education

My main independent variable of interest was education, considered a proxy for socioeconomic status. The large majority (95%) of both men and women in the Philippines have had some formal education, and generally, women have completed more schooling than men (PSA and ICF 2014). Although primary school is compulsory and high school education a basic human right according to the national constitution, net enrolment is far below universal and the completion rate for both primary school and high school is less than 75% (Department of Education 2010).

In the competing risks model, I used a time varying categorical variable to describe the level of education achieved by the respondent in each person month. The time varying education variable was based on respondents' reported total years of education with the assumption that all respondents were continuously enrolled and began schooling at age 6, when primary school in the Philippines typically begins. Respondents transitioned from low education (6 years or fewer), to medium education (7-10 years), to high education (over 10 years), depending on their completed years of education each person month. In addition to the level of educational attainment, school enrolment may also be related to union formation, as student status may be perceived as incompatible with partnership (Thornton et al. 2007). Being enrolled in school may also delay marriage, because marriage is typically associated with more preparation and a larger outlay of time and resources compared to cohabitation (Thornton et al. 2007). To explore this, I also included school enrolment as a binary time varying explanatory variable in the competing risks model.

For the cross-sectional multinomial logistic model, the education variable was fixed and based on the highest level of education attended by the respondent at the time of interview.

6.4.3.2 Pregnancy and parenthood status

I included pregnancy and parenthood status in the competing risks model because reproductive behaviour, union formation, and disadvantage are often interrelated and early union formation may be related to disadvantage through early childbearing (Raley 2001; Hoem and Kostova 2008; Raymo et al. 2009; Perelli-Harris and Gerber 2011; Jalovaara 2012). Depending on social norms, premarital pregnancy may lead to marriage or cohabitation (Raley 2001; Raymo et al. 2009) and women who enter into a union soon after giving birth are likely to be partnering with the father of their child in response to the birth. Based on these considerations and the high prevalence of pre-

union pregnancies and births in the Philippines, I constructed the pregnancy/parenthood predictor as a time varying categorical variable with five possible values — nulliparous, pregnant, parent of a ≤1 year old, parent of a 2-3 year old, and parent of a 4 year old or older. I set pregnancy to begin 7 months before a woman's first live birth because women may not be aware of their pregnancies any earlier and thus, unlikely to base union formation decisions on pregnancy any earlier. I did not account for pregnancies that ended in miscarriage or abortion due to lack of data. Both pregnancy and parent status were included as separate possible values to examine the different implications pregnancy and giving birth may have for the risk of union formation and whether the patterns differ for marriage compared to cohabitation. Parent status was disaggregated according to the age of the first child to investigate how the risk of union formation after birth changes over time, with the assumption that mothers who partner sooner after birth are more likely to be partnering with their child's father than mothers who partner later. Because pregnancy may have a large effect size on union formation, I also ran the competing risks model without the pregnancy/parenthood variable for a sensitivity analysis and found there was no change to the main educational patterns. The results of this test may be found in Appendix G.

I did not include pregnancy and parenthood status as predictors in the cross sectional models because the vast majority of partnered women (93%) have already had a child at the time of interview.

6.4.3.3 **Period**

I included a variable for historical period in the competing risks model to reflect the rapid increase in cohabitation over the past several decades. The categorical period dummy consisted of three separate decades spanning 1978-2007, and one final category consisting of 2008-2013, with the earliest decade as the reference category. Birth cohort was also tested to examine changing behaviours across cohorts and yielded similar results. I also tested an interaction term between education and period to explore whether the relationship between socioeconomic status and union formation has changed over time but did not ultimately include it in the model due to lack of significant effect. The results of this test may be found in Appendix HAppendix A.

Because the cross-sectional models focus solely on the time of interview, I did not include period in these models because it does not change.

6.4.3.4 **Age**

The respondent's current age was included in the competing risks model as a time varying control. Both age and age squared were included in the competing risks model to account for non-linear relationships between age and union formation.

Age was not included as a variable in the cross-sectional analysis because I fit separate models for 18-19 year olds and each subsequent 10 year age group for women 20-49, so age did not need to be controlled for. I selected 18-19 as the youngest age group of interest because women under 18 at the time of interview cannot be legally married. I also tried fitting the models by five year age groups for women 20-49 and found that the main patterns were consistent. The results of these models may be found in Appendix I.

6.4.3.5 **Wealth**

Another proxy of socioeconomic status is household wealth. The DHS does not collect individual or household income data due to the challenges of ensuring comparability over time and accounting for non-monetary wealth in developing countries. Instead, the DHS uses principle components analysis to calculate an index which places households on a continuous scale of wealth, based on basic measures such as dwelling characteristics (i.e. plumbing quality, roof material) and household assets (i.e. ownership of radio, television, car). This scale is then calibrated into wealth quintiles. Although an imperfect measure of individual socioeconomic status, the DHS household wealth index is a validated proxy used by researchers to estimate wealth effects in developing countries (Filmer and Pritchett 2001). While quintiles mask economic inequalities at the national level, the distribution of women across wealth quintiles may differ by union type if certain types of union are more related to socioeconomic advantage or disadvantage. Due to lack of data on household wealth history, I examined household wealth in the cross-sectional models only.

In some contexts, there may be collinearity between wealth and education. To address this, I checked for collinearity between wealth and education and found no evidence, based on both visual inspection and collinearity diagnostics, such as the variance inflation factor and condition index. The results of these tests may be found in Appendix J.

6.4.3.6 **Household structure**

I also examined the relationship between household structure and union status in the cross-sectional model, specifically whether women live with either their parents or grandparents at the time of interview. In the Philippines, young couples traditionally establish their own households (Choe 2002). Women who are married or cohabiting but still living with their parents or grandparents at the time of interview may differ from those who have formed their own households in either economic or emotional independence. Living in the parental home may also indicate a temporary or interim arrangement, and could imply either parental approval or control of a woman's relationship. Furthermore, because wealth is measured at the household level, controlling for household structure is important since women who still live with their parents and grandparents may tend to be from wealthier households than women who have moved out on their own.

6.4.3.7 **Place of Residence**

Because the DHS does not collect residential history data, I used a fixed residence variable measured at the time of interview in the cross-sectional model only to control for differences between rural and urban residents. While on average, rural residents may be more likely to form unions than urban residents, urban residence may represent exposure to more liberal attitudes and Western culture.

6.4.4 **Model checking**

Multinomial logistic models require that the assumption of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) is met. The IIA assumption indicates that the addition or removal of alternative outcome categories will not influence the odds for the remaining outcomes. To test this, I first fit the full multinomial logistic model with all three outcome categories, followed by two restricted models with one outcome excluded. Visual comparison of coefficients between models did not suggest substantial differences. However, I then conducted a test of seemingly unrelated estimation to see whether the IIA assumption could be rejected and based on the results, the assumption was rejected. The results of the tests may be found in Appendix K.

6.5 Results

I first present descriptive statistics of current cohabiters, currently married women, and never in union women at time of interview. I then present results from both analytic approaches, the competing risks model followed by the cross-sectional model. The competing events in the first analytic approach are entry into a cohabiting union that did not transition to marriage by time of interview ("cohabitation") and entry in a union which started with direct marriage or married by the time of interview ("marriage"). The second analytic approach presents results from a cross-sectional model, modelling the likelihood of outcomes "currently cohabiting," "currently married," and "never in union." For this cross-sectional model, "currently married" is the reference category.

6.5.1 **Descriptive analysis**

Table 12 presents the socioeconomic characteristics of women by their current relationship status. A smaller proportion of currently cohabiting women were highly educated or in the highest wealth quintiles, compared with both currently married women and never in union women. At the time of survey, currently cohabiting women's mean age was 29, younger than currently married women, who were on average 36 years old, but older than never in union women who were on average 22 years old. Table 12 also displays the age profile of currently cohabiting women, currently married women and never in union women, with column percentages adding up to 100 percent. For example, 11 percent of current cohabiters are 35-39 years old in contrast to Figure 15 which shows that 13 percent of 35-39 year olds are currently cohabiting.

Nearly a third of currently cohabiting women lived with their parents or grandparents at the time of interview, compared with 15 percent of currently married women and 76 percent of never in union women, which may indicate that cohabiters were less financially or emotionally independent than married women. And while most currently married women lived in rural areas, the majority of both currently cohabiting and never in union women lived in urban areas. Finally, the percentage of current cohabiters who reported being Catholic was nearly 10 points higher than the percentage Catholic among currently married women.

Table 12- Sociodemographic profile of respondents, by union status at time of interview

	Currently married	**Currently cohabiting**	**Never in union**
Variables	48.2%	15.2%	36.6%
Age (at time of interview)			
15-19	0.9	10.5	51.6
20-24	7.5	27.5	26.8
25-29	13.1	21.9	10.0
30-34	20.5	14.7	4.7
35-39	20.0	10.6	2.4
40-44	19.7	7.9	2.4
45-49	18.3	6.9	2.1
Education- highest attended			
Low	22.7	20.9	8.1
Medium	44.8	56.9	51.5
High	32.5	22.3	40.4
Co-residence with parents/ grandparents	15.4	34.9	76.0
Yes	84.6	65.1	24.0
No			
Household wealth			
Poorest	20.3	19.0	10.6
Poorer	18.7	23.0	14.9
Middle	19.1	25.0	18.5
Richer	20.5	21.1	24.4
Richest	21.4	11.9	31.6
Ethnicity			
Tagalog	29.5	37.6	41.0
Cebuano	19.7	21.0	17.4
Ilocano	9.2	6.6	6.6
Ilonggo	9.5	7.3	8.0
Bicolano	5.6	7.2	4.8
Other	26.5	20.3	22.2
Religion			
Catholic	75.7	86.5	78.6
Islam	7.0	0.3	5.7
Protestant	5.4	4.2	5.0
Other	11.9	9.0	10.7
Residence			
Urban	45.8	57.6	59.0
Rural	54.2	42.4	41.0
n = 16,155			

Note: The column percentages add to 100. Separated/divorced and widowed women are excluded (n=777)

6.5.2 Approach 1. Competing risks model- time to first union

Figure 16 illustrates the young age profile of union formation in the Philippines, displaying the cumulative proportions of those entering different types of unions from age 14 to 49. The estimates show that by approximately age 24, half of all women had entered their first union and by age 50, approximately 90 percent of respondents had entered into a union.

Figure 16- Cumulative probability of entry into first order cohabiting union, first order union with direct/eventual entry to marriage, or either type of union, by age



Women had a higher risk of entering unions which started with direct marriage or married by the time of interview (henceforth "marriage") than by entering into a cohabiting union that did not transition to marriage by time of interview (henceforth "cohabitation"). Half of all first marriages in the risk set occurred by about age 22, indicating swift uptake of marriage between ages 14-22, followed by more gradual growth subsequently. The cumulative incidence of cohabitation also rapidly increased from age 14-21, followed by more gradual growth, suggesting that not only teenagers and young women enter cohabitation. Union duration analysis (Table 13) reveals that more than half of first order cohabiting unions were over five years in duration, which is contrary to previous research suggesting that cohabitation is typically a shorter term prelude to marriage for young people (Williams et al. 2007; Kabamalan and Ogena 2013) and also contrasts with cohabiting relationships in many Western contexts, which are typically shorter in duration and break up within 2 years (Heuveline and Timberlake 2004).

Table 13- Percent of first order unions in each 5 year duration increment, by union type

First Order Union Type	0-4 years	5-9 years	10-14 years	15-19 years	20-24 years	25-29 years	30+ years	TOTAL
Direct/Eventual Marriage	11.7	19.9	21.3	17.9	15.6	11.0	2.6	100
Cohabiting	43.3	25.4	11.8	7.7	6.3	4.2	1.4	100

6.5.2.1 **Competing risks model - Multinomial logistic regression**

I now present the results from the competing risks model (Table 14). Because first unions in the Philippines are generally formed early in the life course and the competing risks model depicts speed of entry into first union, patterns of cohabitation and marriage may reflect the correlates of early union formation in general, instead of cohabitation or marriage specifically. To address this, the extreme right column shows the risk terms for entry into cohabitation relative to marriage, in order to directly compare the two different union types. All relative risk coefficients displayed in Table 14 represent the ratio between two relative risk terms each associated with a unit or category change in the associated parameter. For example, the risk terms in the extreme left column of Table 14 reflect a comparison of slope of the educational gradient for cohabitation relative to the slope of the educational gradient for remaining single.

Chapter 6

Table 14- Results from competing risks model showing relative risk ratios (RRR) for entry into cohabitation versus single, marriage versus single, and cohabitation versus marriage, by background characteristics

	Cohabitation versus Single		Marriage versus Single		Cohabitation versus Marriage	
Variables	RRR	(95% CI)	RRR	(95% CI)	RRR	(95% CI)
Education level						
Medium (reference)	1.00		1.00		1.00	
Low	1.36	(1.20-1.54)***	1.34	(1.25-1.44)***	1.01	(0.89-1.15)
High	0.56	(0.50-0.63)***	0.90	(0.85-0.95)***	0.63	(0.55-0.71)***
Pregnancy and parental status						
Nulliparous (reference)	1.00		1.00		1.00	
Pregnant	17.48	(15.41-19.82)***	20.46	(19.04-21.98)***	0.85	(0.75-0.98)*
Parent of 0-1 year old	4.98	(4.15-5.98)***	3.66	(3.24-4.14)***	1.36	(1.10-1.69)**
Parent of 2-3 year old	2.70	(1.97-3.70)***	1.37	(1.10-1.72)**	1.97	(1.34-2.90)***
Parent of 4+ year old	2.48	(1.86-3.31)***	0.92	(0.73-1.15)	2.70	(1.87-3.91)***
Current age	1.33	(1.23-1.44)***	1.57	(1.50-1.64)***	0.85	(0.78-0.92)***
Current age squared	0.99	(0.99-1.00)***	0.99	(0.99-0.99)***	1.00	(1.00-1.00)*
School enrolment						
No (reference)	1.00		1.00		1.00	
Yes	0.22	(0.18-0.26)***	0.23	(0.21-0.26)***	0.92	(0.75-1.14)
Period						
1978-1987 (reference)	1.00		1.00		1.00	
1988-1997	1.08	(0.87-1.34)	0.89	(0.82-0.96)**	1.21	(0.96-1.53)
1998-2007	2.47	(2.00-3.04)***	0.88	(0.80-0.95)**	2.81	(2.25-3.52)***
2008-2013	4.85	(3.96-5.95)***	0.44	(0.40-0.48)***	11.09	(8.85-13.90)***
Total number of person-months = 1,462,759						

Note: RRR: Relative Risk Ratios; ***Significant at the 0.001 level; ** significant at the 0.01 level; *significant at the 0.05 level

The coefficients demonstrate a significant, strong negative educational gradient of cohabitation. Low educated women had a 36 percent increased risk of cohabitation, compared to medium educated women, while highly educated women had a 44 percent decreased risk of cohabitation compared to medium educated women. For women who married, the middle column of Table 14 indicates a flatter educational pattern, with low educated women at a 34 percent higher risk of marriage compared to medium educated women, and highly educated women at a 10 percent lower risk of marriage compared to medium educated women. The rightmost column of Table 14 shows that the risk of cohabitation relative to marriage is 37 percent lower for highly educated women, compared to medium educated women while low educated women and medium educated women are at a similar risk of cohabitation relative to marriage. Although there is a negative educational gradient of entry into both cohabitation and marriage, the direct comparison of the two gradients in the rightmost column shows that the slope of the educational gradient of cohabitation is significantly more negative than that of marriage, when comparing highly educated women with medium educated women. These results shows that lower educated women are more likely to enter a union earlier, and lower educated women are also more likely to cohabit than marry.

Pregnancy and parenthood status were both strongly related to the relative risk of entry into cohabitation and entry into marriage. Pregnant women had approximately 18 times higher a risk of cohabitation and 20 times higher a risk of marriage than nulliparous women. Parenthood also increased the risk of both cohabitation and marriage, when compared with nulliparous women, although this risk was negatively associated with the age of the first child. For example, the leftmost column of Table 14 indicates that parents of a child 0-1 years of age had 5 times higher a risk of cohabitation than nulliparous women, while parents of a 4+ year old had 2.5 times higher a risk of cohabitation than nulliparous women. The middle column shows that parents of 0-1 year olds had 3.7 times higher a risk of marriage than nulliparous women while parents of children 4 years old or older had a similar risk of marriage as nulliparous women. The decreased relative risk of union formation for women with older children may be because women are less likely to partner several years after the birth. In contrast, pregnant women and women with younger children may be more likely to partner with the father of their child.

Although pregnancy and childbearing may prompt both types of union, comparing cohabitation relative to marriage shows that pregnancy is more strongly linked to marriage and having a child is more strongly linked to cohabitation. The extreme right column of Table 14 shows that compared to nulliparous women, pregnant women had a 15 percent lower risk of cohabitation,

relative to marriage. However, women who had already given birth consistently had a higher risk of cohabitation relative to marriage.

I found a positive relationship between age and entry into both types of union. For each year increase in age, women had an approximately 33 percent increased risk of entry into cohabitation and a 57 percent increase in the risk of entry into marriage. Comparison of cohabitation relative to marriage showed that each year increase in age was associated with a 15 percent decrease in the risk of cohabitation relative to marriage, meaning older women were at a higher risk of union formation in general, but younger women had a higher risk of cohabitation relative to marriage. The significant quadratic age term for both types of union also indicates the non-linear age pattern of union formation, with lower risks at both the youngest and oldest age groups. Decade was also significantly associated with cohabitation with women at a higher risk of cohabitation in nearly each successive decade. In contrast, the risk of entry into marriage has generally decreased over time.

6.5.3 Approach 2. Cross-sectional model with current union status

The competing risks model showed a negative socioeconomic gradient of cohabitation, but it could be critiqued as anticipatory analysis. Because the data does not indicate the type of union that was formed when the couple moved in together, I cannot take into account transitions from cohabitation to marriage. This may result in bias if those who cohabited before marriage were more educated than cohabiters who did not marry by interview. For example, highly educated women may start their relationships with cohabitation, but if they are more likely to transition into marriage than their less educated cohabiting counterparts, the socioeconomic gradient of cohabitation would be negatively biased. Therefore, to examine the socioeconomic pattern of cohabitation from another angle that is not subject to this bias, I analyse the socioeconomic correlates of women “currently cohabiting” at time of interview from a cross -sectional perspective across age groups, compared to the baseline group of women “currently married.” If cohabiters who have not transitioned to marriage later in the life course are less educated and less wealthy than women who marry, this further supports the claim that cohabitation is associated with disadvantage.

6.5.3.1 Cross-sectional multinomial logistic model of socioeconomic status and risk of current cohabitation

In the following section, I show only the risk of cohabitation relative to marriage and do not display results for the risk of "never in union" relative to marriage, although single women were included in the model. The results of the risk of being "never in union" relative to marriage may be found in Appendix L.

Table 15 illustrates a relationship between socioeconomic status and risk of cohabitation relative to marriage that appears to change over the life course. Among 18-19 year old women, there were no significant socioeconomic patterns of being in cohabitation versus marriage at the time of interview, while for older age groups (aged 20 to 49), a negative socioeconomic gradient emerged and was generally steepest at the oldest age groups. Older, highly educated women had between 35 and 43 percent lower risk of being in cohabitation versus marriage when compared to their medium educated counterparts, whereas low and medium educated women had similar risks of being in cohabitation relative to marriage. There was a similar age pattern between household wealth and the risk of cohabitation relative to marriage. Among the 20-29, 30-39 and 40-49 year old age groups, the wealthiest women had respectively 28, 55 and 65 percent lower risk of cohabitation relative to marriage, when compared with middle income women. For women 30-39 and 40-49, those in the second wealthiest quintile were at a respectively 33 and 39 percent lower risk of cohabitation versus marriage than middle-income women.

As mentioned earlier, these models were also run by five year age group for the women aged 20-49, resulting in the same main patterns which may be found in Appendix I.

Chapter 6

Table 15- Results from cross-sectional multinomial logistic regression model showing relative risk ratios (RRR) of cohabitation at time of interview versus marriage at time of interview

	Currently cohabiting (baseline currently married)							
	18-19		20-29		30-39		40-49	
Variables	RRR	(95% CI)	RRR	(95% CI)	RRR	(95% CI)	RRR	(95% CI)
Education level								
Medium (reference)	1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00	
Low	0.61	(0.30-1.23)	0.98	(0.77-1.25)	1.22	(0.93-1.59)	0.89	(0.66-1.19)
High	1.45	(0.5-4.21)	0.63	(0.51-0.77)***	0.65	(0.50-0.85)**	0.57	(0.38-0.86)**
Wealth quintile								
Middle (reference)	1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00	
Poorest	0.78	(0.30-2.00)	0.72	(0.54-0.97)*	0.75	(0.54-1.03)	1.37	(0.93-2.02)
Poorer	0.88	(0.35-2.26)	1.10	(0.86-1.41)	0.95	(0.71-1.27)	0.84	(0.58-1.23)
Richer	1.18	(0.31-4.50)	1.04	(0.80-1.35)	0.67	(0.51-0.89)**	0.61	(0.41-0.91)*
Richest	0.41	(0.11-1.64)	0.71	(0.52-0.97)*	0.45	(0.32-0.62)***	0.35	(0.22-0.56)***
Co-residence with parents or grandparents								
No (reference)	1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00	
Yes	1.49	(0.70-3.16)	1.62	(1.36-1.93)***	1.64	(1.27-2.14)***	1.70	(1.03-2.80)*
Residence								
Rural (reference)	1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00	
Urban	1.34	(0.62-2.87)	2.28	(1.86-2.80)***	1.95	(1.56-2.43)***	2.54	(1.90-3.38)***
Constant	2.34	(0.85-6.45)	0.52	(0.40-0.67)***	0.19	(0.14-0.24)***	0.11	(0.08-0.15)***
Total Observations	1,144		4,790		3,951		3,398	

Note: RRR: Relative Risk Ratios; ***Significant at the 0.001 level; ** significant at the 0.01 level; *significant at the 0.05 level

To highlight the educational differences between cohabiters and married women across the life course, Figure 17 and Figure 18 display the predicted probabilities of current cohabitation and current marriage by education and age group. At the youngest age groups (18-19 and 20-29), there was a negative educational gradient for both cohabitation and marriage, suggesting that being in any type of union early in the life course may be related to disadvantage. However, at older age groups, the educational gradient of marriage reversed direction and became flatter or positive, while the educational gradient of cohabitation remained persistently negative. While some young cohabiters may go on to marry, my results demonstrate that women who cohabit at older ages were less privileged compared to similarly aged married women.

Figure 17- Predicted probability of cohabitation from cross-sectional multinomial logistic regression model, by education level and age group



Figure 18- Predicted probability of marriage from cross-sectional multinomial logistic regression model, by education level and age group



As a final check, I compared the socioeconomic characteristics of 'currently cohabiting' and 'currently married' women who entered their relationships within 3 months or less of the interview. This was done with the assumption that "currently married women" who formed a relationship only three months ago were likely to have directly married, given the short interval of time at risk for a union transition. The results of this are displayed in Table 16 and demonstrate a similar socioeconomic pattern as that of the main cross-sectional multinomial logistic model. The majority of women who partnered recently were cohabiters, 74 percent, compared to 25 percent married women. The cohabiters were also younger, less educated, from lower wealth quintiles than the married women. These patterns parallel the patterns of cohabitation demonstrated in the cross-sectional and competing risks models. I ran a similar check looking at women who partnered within 6 months of the interview. The results of this are similar to Table 16 and may be found in Appendix M.

Table 16 - Socioeconomic characteristics of currently married and currently cohabiting women who partnered in the last three months

	Currently Married	**Currently Cohabiting**
Variables	24.86%	74.32%
Age (at time of interview)		
15-19	15.64	40.62
20-24	51.21	48.28
25-29	27.39	5.69
30-34	0.00	1.83
35-39	5.76	0.00
40-44	0.00	1.52
45-49	0.00	2.07
Education- highest attended		
Low	2.76	16.21
Medium	33.81	57.72
High	63.43	26.07
Household wealth		
Poorest	15.24	22.46
Poorer	20.19	31.60
Middle	9.31	21.14
Richer	21.54	15.56
Richest	33.73	9.23
Residence		
Urban	48.80	42.44
Rural	51.20	57.56
n = 102		

Note: The column percentages add to 100

6.6 Discussion

The Philippines is undergoing an unusual transition where cohabitation is increasingly practiced while other family behaviours and values remain relatively conservative. Although past research suggests cohabitation is a short prelude to marriage (Williams et al. 2007; Kabamalan and Ogena 2013), my results show that most first cohabiting unions were over five years in duration, indicating that cohabitation is more often a longer term arrangement. While some shorter term cohabitations may convert to marriage, it is important that there are women who do cohabit for the long term. Moreover, cohabitation is practiced across the life-course, with 10-15 percent of women in their 30s and 40s still cohabiting at the time of interview. Contrary to previous literature, both the duration and age profile of cohabitation suggests that cohabitation may be an

entrenched and persistent living arrangement more similar to marriage, as the SDT posits. Alternatively, while other studies argue that cohabitation has led to a "late marriage pattern" in the Philippines (Xenos and Kabamalan 2007), two things are important to note. One is that the bulk of first unions still happen at an early age, regardless of union type, and another is that childbearing occurs in both union types, meaning later marriage does not necessarily entail delayed childbearing as in the SDT pattern.

Our competing risks model shows that both entry into cohabitation and entry into unions that were direct marriage or marriage by the time of interview were associated with a negative educational gradient. While both types of union had a negative educational gradient, the significantly steeper educational gradient of cohabitation suggests that cohabitation and marriage are distinct family forms and cohabitation is more strongly selective of the less educated than marriage. The cross-sectional approach confirms the findings from the competing risks model. Education and wealth were both negatively associated with the risk of cohabitation relative to marriage across most of the life course. Among all women except teenagers, cohabiters were more disadvantaged than similarly aged women who had married.

In the competing risks model, becoming pregnant or having a child were very strong predictors of union formation for both cohabiting and married women, although pregnancy had a stronger link to marriage, while being a parent was more linked to cohabitation. This may mean that the incentive to marry is strong when a woman becomes pregnant — perhaps to legitimate the birth— but if she chooses to have a nonmarital birth, the incentive or social pressure to marry may weaken and cohabitation may be preferred or more acceptable. Parents of younger children appeared to have a higher risk of union formation than those with older children, possibly because women were more likely to partner with the father of their child soon after the birth. Furthermore, parents had a higher risk of cohabitation versus marriage which appeared to further increase with the age of the child, perhaps because as more time elapsed between birth and subsequent union formation, the likelihood of cohabiting with a new partner increased, while the likelihood of marrying the child's father decreased.

The negative socioeconomic gradient of cohabitation and young age at union formation in the Philippines are not consistent with the SDT, which posits that cohabitation increases due to liberalized attitudes and the rejection of marriage among the educated elite. Instead, the Philippines' pattern is more reminiscent of "diverging destinies" or the "pattern of disadvantage" noted in the United States and across Europe (McLanahan 2004; Perelli-Harris et al. 2010). The "pattern of disadvantage" describes the negative socioeconomic gradient of childbearing within cohabiting unions and posits that while women of all socioeconomic backgrounds may cohabit,

less privileged women are the most likely to have a birth within cohabitation. In such a context, continued uptake of cohabitation and nonmarital fertility among the less privileged reproduces and exacerbates patterns of socioeconomic inequalities. My findings suggest a similar pattern in the Philippines, where cohabitation is related to disadvantage and those who have nonmarital births are more likely to cohabit than marry, which could further polarize class patterns of partnership and family formation. While there are cross-national parallels between the Philippines and other countries, it is important to note the different implications of disadvantage in developing and developed countries. For example, a fifth of Filipinos live below the poverty line of approximately $1.20 US per day and (PSA 2015), which puts into perspective the practical realities of disadvantage for millions of Filipinos.

In addition to the socioeconomic patterns, my findings also demonstrate a rapid overall rise in cohabitation, as well as a recent decline in marital unions. The significant uptake of cohabitation in the Philippines among less advantaged women challenges the notion that new family behaviours are pioneered by the elite before being adopted en masse by the less privileged. From the perspective of both the "pattern of disadvantage" and "diverging destinies," less traditional family behaviours were first adopted and normalized by liberal, privileged communities before the class gradients reversed; the liberalization of attitudes then created space for people of all backgrounds to make a wider range of partnership decisions based on their own circumstances (McLanahan 2004; Perelli-Harris et al. 2010). The development of cohabitation in the Philippines does not provide clear evidence of such an evolution and instead indicates an unusually rapid pattern of changes with a consistent socioeconomic pattern over time, which suggests that cohabitation has been a marker of disadvantage from its onset, and that its growth may represent a combination of both liberalized attitudes and resource constraint among this group.

In fact, the current patterns of union formation in the Philippines proves to be distinct in a number of ways — distinct from existing patterns in Western, Asian, and Latin American regions. First, cohabitation has gained prevalence despite the fact that postponement of nuptiality and fertility has been weak at best and overall fertility remains high. Typically, cohabitation and parenthood in cohabitation are lagging features of the SDT because they conspicuously challenge religious and sexual norms and gain prevalence only after the development of delayed marriage, delayed childbearing, or substantial fertility decline, as in Southern Europe and East Asia (Lesthaeghe 2010). The "cohabitation boom" in Latin America has some parallels to the Filipino pattern, in that it has occurred within the context of persistently early union formation and childbearing. However, cohabitation in Latin America has followed a more polarized path over time, with the emergence of different typologies of cohabitation representing both disadvantage and modernization and within a lower fertility context (Esteve et al. 2012; Covre-Sussai et al.

2015). In contrast, the socioeconomic pattern of cohabitation does not appear to have changed over time in the Philippines, although it may change in the future if the growth of cohabitation among lower socioeconomic strata normalizes cohabitation politically and socially, paving the way for the elite to adopt cohabitation as a more accepted living arrangement.

Second, the policy climate in the Philippines, particularly the illegality of divorce and abortion, the limited availability of family planning, and the emphasis on co-residential nuclear families, is particularly conservative and may act simultaneously as both an impetus for cohabitation and also an obstacle to widespread ideational change in other family domains, preventing full convergence to SDT related values. Without access to legal divorce, cohabitation may be appealing to those who fear relationship instability, especially lower income populations who also cannot realistically access the resources required for an annulment (Xenos and Kabamalan 2007). Cohabitation, on the other hand, allows flexibility and freedom to enter and change partnerships without the same legal implications and is an option for separated people who are unable to re-marry.

More recently, changes to family policy have extended the rights of children born to unwed parents (Republic Acts 9255 and 9858), which may also have helped to normalize nonmarital cohabitation. Cohabitation may therefore also represent a reactionary measure to both restrictive and liberal family policies. Finally, the large scale international migration of working age men and women undoubtedly has an impact on familial cohesiveness and perhaps also on attitudes toward partnership. Without many accessible avenues for dissolving marital unions, international labour migration among married Filipinos has sometimes been referred to as "Filipino divorce" (Bennhold 2011), although further research is required to better explore the relationship between migration and partnership.

The lack of full union history data is a limitation of the present analysis and it is not possible to rule out recall or social desirability bias in self-reported partnership data. Further analysis of union formation dynamics and its correlates will require nationally representative data with in-depth partnership histories, which to date, are not collected in the Philippines. Nonetheless, this research is a novel analysis of a large national level dataset in a highly populated but understudied country, providing key insight into the unexpected growth of cohabitation in the Philippines within the larger context of family formation patterns worldwide. Future research should investigate men and women's attitudes, ideals, and beliefs toward cohabitation and marriage, as well as the role of cohabitation in family formation, and how partnership decisions are related to childbearing behaviour. This would allow for a more comprehensive understanding of the meaning of cohabitation in the Philippines and its growing importance as a family form.

Chapter 7 Is Marriage 'Just a Paper'? : Focus Group Perceptions of Cohabitation and Marriage

7.1 Abstract

Cohabitation in Asian countries is often framed as a temporary prelude to marriage, due to the cultural inclination toward familism. However, the growing prevalence of cohabitation and childbearing in cohabitation in the Philippines suggests that social norms and views of cohabitation may be evolving, which to date have not been explored. To address this, I use focus groups to examine perceptions of how cohabitation compares to marriage and reasons to cohabit or marry. Respondents perceived that cohabitation was similar to marriage in terms of practical and emotional benefits and sometimes a more pragmatic option. While marriage may provide a relationship with a sense of permanence, respondents believed cohabitation could also have high levels of love and commitment. Respondents also viewed cohabitation as a preferable response to nonmarital pregnancy over marriage, enabling co-parenting without the commitment to an untested relationship. Moreover, respondents often evaluated cohabitation and marriage based on how either would affect their children. The emphasis on relationship quality and the tolerance of a variety of family forms imply individualistic views, yet the child-centric nature of relationship decisions also suggest persistence of familism, indicating the complex nature of these family changes.

Keywords: cohabitation, marriage, focus groups, qualitative, individualism, Philippines

7.2 Introduction

Cohabitation and childbearing within cohabitation have increased rapidly in the Philippines, with more than half of first births now occurring outside of marriage, mostly to cohabiting women (Chapter 6; Chapter 5). Cohabitating families are often associated with individualistic cultures and family systems, in contrast to family-centric cultures which are characterized by pro-marriage, pro-natalist norms, and strong adherence to family expectations, tradition, and religious and sexual mores (Lesthaeghe 2010). The Philippines has both a strong family-centric culture and conservative, pro-natalist family policies – divorce and abortion are illegal and family planning access is limited — and the majority of the population identifies as Roman Catholic. Therefore, the rise of cohabitating families in the Philippines is particularly surprising given its family-centric culture and socio-political context (Miralao 1997; Alesina and Giuliano 2013; Morillo et al. 2013; Medina 2015).

Earlier Philippine studies have framed cohabitation as a marginal, temporary prelude to marriage for young people who prefer to marry and believe it will improve their lives and relationships, but lack the means and stability to do so (Kabamalan 2004; Williams et al. 2007; Xenos and Kabamalan 2007; Kabamalan 2011). The family-centric nature of Philippine culture has also reinforced notions of cohabitation as a prelude to marriage, as in other Asian countries (Raymo et al. 2015). Furthermore, nonmarital sex and nonmarital childbearing tend to be viewed narrowly as problematic behaviours because they are often studied as youth issues (Gipson et al. 2012; Gipson and Hicks 2016). Yet, the rise in childbearing within cohabitation, the relatively long duration of most cohabiting unions, and the increased incidence and prevalence of cohabitation across all age groups (Chapter 6) suggest the meaning of cohabitation may have shifted to encompass a more entrenched, long term, marriage-like family form. The rapid rise of childbearing in cohabitation in particular challenges previous notions of cohabitation as a prelude to marriage, calling for more in-depth exploration (Heuveline and Timberlake 2004).

To date, little is known about how these new behaviours relate to new norms of cohabitation and marriage in the Philippines, especially with respect to childbearing. Although quantitative analysis demonstrates the national level increases in cohabitation and childbearing within cohabitation, qualitative analysis is essential to gain insight into the meaning of these practices, to more fully describe these social phenomena. Qualitative data is also useful for its ability to examine how changes in family behaviour may relate to shifts in social norms and expectations and furthermore, is not constrained by predetermined categories, questions, and responses as survey data are (Perelli-Harris and Bernardi 2015). In addition, previous studies of survey data in the Philippine context suggest disapproval of cohabitation, including among subgroups most likely to

cohabit (Kabamalan 2004; Williams et al. 2007; Xenos and Kabamalan 2007), revealing a gap between reported attitudes and actual behaviours, which qualitative data may help to elucidate.

This paper addresses this knowledge gap by qualitatively exploring how people view norms regarding cohabitation and marriage, and specifically the advantages and disadvantages of cohabitation compared with marriage. My analysis is based on a series of eight qualitative focus group discussions with a total of 54 participants conducted in 2016 in Quezon City in Metro Manila of the National Capital Region and in Hermosa, Bataan Province. Additionally, this paper also discusses whether views of cohabitation and marriage may be more individualistic or family-centric to gain insight into the rise of cohabitation and cohabiting families in an otherwise family-centric culture.

The paper begins with the motivation for studying cohabitation compared with marriage in the Philippine context, followed by a theoretical overview of relationships in individualistic and family-centric contexts, and the relevant empirical context of familism and cohabitation in the Philippines. I then describe the data collection process and method of data analysis and provide the analysis results, focusing on the advantages and disadvantages of cohabitation, from practical, emotional, and social perspectives. Finally, in the discussion, I briefly summarize the substantive findings of this study, and discuss how the results reflect themes of individualism and familism, the limitations of generalizability, and the broader study implications.

7.2.1.1 **The relevance of cohabitation in family demography**

Cohabitation is a growing social phenomenon, evolving and heterogeneous in its forms worldwide. Studying the meaning of cohabitation and understanding its heterogeneity is important in order to situate cohabitation within the family demography of a country (Seltzer 2004; Hiekel and Castro-Martin 2014; Perelli-Harris et al. 2014). For example, the legal approach to cohabitation varies greatly by national context, reflecting the cross-national heterogeneity of cohabitation in national family systems (Kiernan 2004; Perelli-Harris and Sanchez-Gassen 2012). Family laws may treat cohabiters and married people similarly if cohabiting and married couples are perceived to need the same types of family support and recognition. Alternatively, cohabiting and married people may be treated differently to acknowledge that couples may cohabit specifically to avoid the legal framework of marriage. Family laws and benefits may also exclude cohabiting couples and families in an effort preserve the importance of marriage. Understanding the context specific meaning and purpose of cohabitation is therefore necessary to inform policies such that they accurately reflect contemporary family behaviours, protect weaker and more vulnerable family members, and avoid discrimination based on legal status (Kiernan 2004; Perelli-Harris and Sanchez-Gassen 2012). In the Philippines, where there are limited policies in support

of cohabiting families and cohabitation is linked to disadvantage (Chapter 6), gaining insight into how people feel about cohabitation and marriage in a policy context may reveal how appropriate existing policies are for protecting the vulnerable.

7.2.1.2 Why compare cohabitation and marriage?

It is also important to understand how people perceive cohabitation compared with marriage in a broader social and political context. Typologies of cohabitation are often stylized in reference to marriage (Heuveline and Timberlake 2004; Hiekel and Castro-Martin 2014), so understanding qualitatively how cohabitation and marriage compare to each other could help to more precisely articulate the typology of cohabitation. Moreover, because marriage is the dominant cultural framework for family relationships, participants of qualitative cohabitation research often discuss and view cohabitation in reference to marriage (Reed 2006). Additionally, cohabitation and marriage may both be changing as institutions, indicating the need to examine both union types without assuming that either is fixed (Smock 2000). The meanings of cohabitation and marriage may also vary over the life course (Berghammer et al. 2014) or change with the changing sequence of life events (Berrington et al. 2015). This indicates a need to qualitatively examine both union types together to gain a more nuanced understanding of their differences, similarities, and potential fluidity or overlap.

At the same time, it is important not to limit the conceptualization of cohabitation solely in reference to marriage because marriage may not be the clear goal of all cohabiters and therefore an irrelevant reference point for some (Sassler 2004; Manning and Smock 2005). People may cohabit in order to save money by sharing expenses, to spend time together in a more convenient way, to advance commitment in a relationship, or due to housing issues (Sassler 2004; Huang et al. 2011; Sassler and Miller 2011). Unmarried parents may cohabit to more easily co-parent (Reed 2006). In a context where the cost of divorce is high, couples may cohabit as a risk reduction strategy either by avoiding marriage altogether or by testing the relationship prior to marriage to decrease the odds of dissolution (Williams and Guest 2005; Hiekel and Keizer 2015). Indeed, there are many reasons people cohabit that may be unrelated to marriage and understanding these reasons can help to more fully understand the meaning of cohabitation.

7.2.1.3 Rising popularity of cohabitation in the Philippines

Examining views of cohabitation and marriage may also illuminate the role of individualistic or family-centric cultural tendencies in different family forms. Cohabitation and marriage have often been compared in individualized societies to understand the reasons people choose cohabitation or marriage and to what extent their relationship or family functions are similar (Kiernan 2001;

Hiekel and Keizer 2015). In contrast, in the Philippines where individualistic tendencies may feature less prominently, incorporating an additional family-centric perspective when comparing cohabitation and marriage may help provide further insight into why cohabitation has become an increasingly popular family form.

Despite the rise in cohabiting families, the long duration of cohabiting relationships, and the subsequent retreat from marriage in the Philippines, less is known about perceived norms around the advantages and disadvantages of cohabitation and marriage, including with respect to having children. This paper investigates how people view norms regarding cohabitation and marriage, and asks what are the advantages and disadvantages of cohabitation compared with marriage? I also explore whether views of cohabitation and marriage may be more individualistic or family-centric, which is of particular theoretical interest because the Philippines is generally viewed as a family-centric society. Existing qualitative studies of cohabitation tend to focus on Western contexts, to the exclusion of family-centric Asian countries. In this way, this paper also importantly contributes a new cultural perspective, widening the range of the Western dominated debate on cohabitation.

7.3 Theoretical Background

7.3.1 Individualism and relationships

In an individualistic culture, people are not beholden to class, gender, religious or family expectations, but focus instead on personal needs and developments. In the context of relationships, the individual need for romantic love, emotional satisfaction, and self-fulfilment may take precedence over long term commitment or feelings of obligation toward a relationship (Giddens 1992; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1995). As familial and societal influences weaken, relationship decisions become the choice of the individual or couple (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1995) and the life course de-standardizes into “biographies of individual choice” (Beck 1992). Individual decisions about relationships may however be influenced by institutional constraints such as labour market conditions, education systems, and social policies (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2012). And although there are more opportunities to live according to personal preference, family related failures also become more of a personal responsibility, engendering fear of relationship instability or failures (Giddens 1994; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1995; Bulcroft et al. 2000). Additionally, because of the emphasis on emotional fulfilment and the ensuing high expectations, relationships are more likely to disappoint and thus more likely to dissolve in individualized societies (Beck 1992).

Increased cohabitation and the legal recognition of cohabiting families are commonly noted as evidence of individualization (Lesthaeghe 2010) and cohabitation is often discussed from the individualism perspective (Berghammer et al. 2014; Hiekel and Keizer 2015). In individualized cultures where cohabiting families are accepted, cohabitation and marriage may have similar functions as relationships and family forms (Kiernan 2001) and in some cases, cohabiting couples may be viewed as committed to each other as a married couple (Berrington et al. 2015). This then raises the question of how the two relationships are different or similar in other ways, and why people choose one arrangement over the other. Cohabitation may have the advantage of being less fraught with gendered and social expectations compared with marriage, which may appeal to some couples, particularly women (Edin and Kefalas 2005; Reed 2006). In an individualised context, marriage could be a personal risk reduction strategy in case of union dissolution, providing economic or legal protection, alimony or child support, and ensuring property rights (Hiekel and Keizer 2015; Perelli-Harris et al. 2017). And although cohabiting relationships may have the potential to be as serious as marriage, cohabitation could also generally allow more freedom (Berghammer et al. 2014) and require less personal commitment, expressed as romantic love (Johnson 1991; Lewis 2001; Duncan et al. 2005; Berrington et al. 2015), which may appeal to some. On the other hand, where cohabitation is an alternative to dating, some may even view moving in together as a sacrifice of freedom, particularly men (Huang et al. 2011).

Changing union and family formation behaviours may also indicate changing meanings and norms. In particular, with the growth of cohabitation, the meaning of marriage has arguably shifted away from its institutional origins toward a more emotional, symbolic significance (Cherlin 2004; Kiernan 2004). As unions more often begin with cohabitation, marriage may not mark the beginning of a relationship but may instead be a public confirmation of one (Kiernan 2004). For example, if a couple is already cohabiting and have children together, getting married may not change their day to day lives but may instead change the broader societal perception of the couple, the couple's perceptions of themselves, the couple's own standards of behaviour, love, and commitment (Reed 2006). Additionally, if marriage has shifted away from its traditional social functions and gendered expectations, people may also choose to marry or cohabit simply as personal preferences and not as ideological statements.

7.3.2 **Familism and relationships**

Familism refers to the notion that the needs of the family are a higher priority than the needs of individuals, valuing collectivist versus individual orientations (Cauce and Domenech-Rodriguez

2002; Cardoso and Thompson 2010). Key components of familism have been summarized as perceived support and emotional closeness, family obligation, and family as referent (Sabogal et al. 1987). Perceived support and emotional closeness mean family members can be depended on, and should have close relationships and united interests. Family obligations require family members to provide economic and emotional support to each other, while family as referent requires adherence to family expectations. In family-centric cultures, the family unit is cohesive and interdependent, (Cardoso and Thompson 2010) and adherence to tradition, religious mores, and family expectations is strong (Lesthaeghe 2010).

Prioritization of familial harmony and family expectations is in direct contrast to individualism, and cohabiting families are not commonly associated with family-centric cultures. Instead, cohabitation and childbearing within cohabitation usually represent deviation from traditional values and are typically against religious mores. Indeed, even in cultures where cohabiting families are not stigmatized, cohabitation may still have disadvantages compared to marriage. Compared to marriage, cohabitation may be perceived as a more autonomous and less committed arrangement, while marriage on the other hand is a more solid commitment and a more enduring and fulfilling romantic relationship, recognized by society and the law (Reed 2006; Perelli-Harris et al 2014). Marriage may be perceived to entail higher levels of moral obligation between partners to stay in the relationship, referred to as moral commitment, and marriage may also benefit from greater structural commitment, such as social and financial ties that bind a married couple together, the legal and financial obstacles of ending a marriage, and the stigma of divorce (Berrington et al. 2015). Overall, marriage is more consistent with the standard biography and traditional values of family-centric cultures.

Nonetheless, people may still choose to cohabit or have children in cohabitation for reasons that are family oriented, and specifically child-centric. This is particularly evident in populations where childbearing in cohabitation is common while marriage and children remain valued, such as among disadvantaged sub groups in the United States (Edin and Kefalas 2005). It is also noteworthy that childbearing in cohabitation is increasingly common across socioeconomic groups in many Latin American countries (Laplante 2015) despite the family-centric nature of Hispanic cultures (Sabogal 1987). For instance, cohabitation may be a response to an unanticipated birth and not a deliberate relationship decision in rejection of marriage, allowing a couple to have children together and co-parent without prematurely committing to an untested or sub-standard relationship (Reed 2006; Edin and Kefalas 2005; Chapter 5). In such cases, the normative role of parenthood is strong enough to bring a couple together to cohabit, but not to marry if the relationship is not of high enough quality (Reed 2006; Chapter 5). In this way, providing children a two parent family context for childrearing and ensuring relationship quality

before marriage both acknowledge and preserve the importance of family and the value of marriage. Moreover, for cohabiting couples, having a child together could be viewed as a strong reason to transition from cohabitation to marriage, even if adherence to this preference is varied (Sassler and Cunningham 2008). Cohabitation decisions may also be child-centric when made by single parents who are considering introducing a stepparent figure into their children's lives (Reid and Golub 2015). And in family-centric cultures such as Japan, China, and Thailand, where cohabitation has become more common, cohabitation is typically a precursor to marriage or stage in the marriage process, and marriage remains the clear goal (Lesthaeghe 2010; Raymo et al. 2015).

7.4 Familism in the Philippines

A key component of Philippine culture is its emphasis on family, especially familial closeness and family obligation. Historically, a family clan worked and lived together on a contiguous area of land, relying heavily on kin networks for social, legal, political, and economic structures. To this day, there is a strong reliance on family ties and distrust of government and public institutions (Francia 2010), including a preference for welfare systems based on the family rather than the market or government (Alesina and Giuliano 2013). Reciprocity is extremely important to reaffirm kinship ties, and providing support to relatives expected (Miralao 1997; Morillo et al. 2013). Even with modernization and the rise of international and internal labour migration, the expectation of assisting kin remains strong, and the family still functions as an extended network, regardless of geographic separation (Go 1993). Not only is familism strongly associated with Asian cultures goal (Raymo et al. 2015), it is also a core characteristic of Hispanic culture (Sabogal 1987), both of which have cultural relevance in the Philippines as an Asian country and former Spanish colony.

Marital relationships were also meant to serve family-centric purposes. Marriage in the Philippines traditionally functioned as an alliance between family clans, and it was important for a male suitor to gain the approval of the entire family. In order to gain approval, a male suitor needed to demonstrate devotion and worthiness not only to his intended but also to her family by doing chores for them, such as fetching water and chopping firewood. Courtship and marriage alliances were also traditionally managed by parents and other kin, with parents exercising a large degree of control over their children's relationship decisions and over the courtship process in general (Medina 2015). Today, there is less emphasis on marriage as a duty to one's parents and clan in the contemporary Philippines (Williams and Guest 2005). Traditional, formal courtship with its emphasis on parental approval has given way to more modern forms of dating that are less supervised and family-centric. Instead, people are more likely to exercise personal choice in

mate selection and see marriage as important for practical and personal reasons, such as for company, to have children for old age support, and to provide structure and discipline to one's life (Williams and Guest 2005).

Because of the need to rely on reciprocity within a clan, Philippine family values have also historically been linked to a preference for large families and relatedly, a child-centric culture (Miralao 1997; Morillo et al. 2013; Medina 2015). Children are expected to provide help to their parents — such as with housework, caring for other siblings, and financial contributions when they start working — and to also care for their parents in old age (Medina 2015). Additionally, children also play an important role in the family by linking the maternal and paternal kin groups to form the bilaterally extended family, effectively expanding the clan group from which resources and support may be expected (Medina 2015). Finally, children are also perceived to provide important emotional benefits such as companionship, love, happiness, a sense of purpose and fulfilment, and an incentive to work hard and lead a moral life (Bulatao 1978). Although family behaviours and structures have shifted to incorporate less traditional modalities, (Medina 2015), children remain highly valued and two parent households are still viewed as normative and essential for child well-being (Morillo et al. 2013). Furthermore, the family is still perceived to be defined by emotional closeness, support, and warmth (Tarroja 2010), highlighting the persistently important role of family in Philippine culture.

7.5 Cohabitation Context in the Philippines

Approximately 15 percent of reproductive aged women in the Philippines are currently cohabiting, with up to a quarter of 20-29 year olds currently cohabiting (ICF 2014). Older studies argued that although cohabitation was becoming more prevalent among young people, cohabitation was still not an accepted or widespread substitute for marriage (Kabamalan 2004; Williams et al. 2007; Medina 2015). In particular, previous studies of attitudinal survey data found that cohabitation was widely disapproved of, even among younger people who were most the likely to cohabit (Kabamalan 2004; Williams et al. 2007). Despite increasingly engaging in cohabitation and premarital sex, most Filipino youth were not in favour of these practices for either men or women. For example, approximately two thirds of 20-24 year old youth disapproved of both cohabiting without plans to marry and of nonmarital pregnancy (Kabamalan 2004; Williams et al. 2007). Attitudes regarding how women should behave compared to men were even more conservative. For example, both men and women were more likely to disapprove of women having premarital sex than to disapprove of men having premarital sex (Ventura and Cabigon 2004). Relatedly, young men were also more likely to engage in premarital sex than young women, underscoring gendered norms for sexual behaviours (Gipson et al. 2012).

Additionally, the Philippines is the only country in the world where divorce is illegal and the only recourse to marital dissolution is either legal separation (without the possibility of re-marriage in the future) or a costly and complicated annulment procedure that is inaccessible to most. Cohabitation may therefore be useful for those concerned about testing a relationship before marriage (Williams and Guest 2005) or it may be a strategy to avoid marriage and thus the risk of divorce altogether. Furthermore, cohabitation is also the only arrangement available to married people who are estranged from their spouses and wish to re-partner but cannot legally remarry. The prevalence of divorce and legal separation is very low in the Philippines, mostly attributable to the high cost of the procedure but also possibly due to strong kinship linkages, social stigma, and the prevailing child-centeredness of the Filipino culture wherein two parent households are preferred for childrearing (Abalos 2017; Chant 1997; Morillo et al. 2013). Nonetheless, petitions for marital annulment have more than doubled between 2000 and 2014 (Abalos 2017), alongside a decline in the number of registered marriages (PSA 2014). Several attempts to pass a divorce law and increasing public support for legalizing divorce suggest that social norms and perceptions of family unions and dissolutions may be liberalizing (Miller 2008; Laranas 2016) although support is still nowhere near universal (Abalos 2017).

7.6 Data and Methods

7.6.1 Motivation for using focus groups

Focus groups discussions are typically held among groups of six to ten people, with the aim of discussing a specific topic in order to examine how attitudes, social norms, preferences, and values emerge in a group conversation (Flick 2009; Klarner 2015). The interactive group discussion technique is particularly useful for exploring the norms and values that govern behaviours because values and norms are not fixed traits that occur in isolation from a social context but are instead replicated, produced, or adjusted through social interactions (Bloor et al. 2001; Stewart et al. 2007; Liamputtong 2011 ; Klarner and Knabe 2017). In social interactions, people experience the acceptance or rejection of a given behaviour, which further transmits and reinforces shared beliefs and attitudes; social interactions are shaped by compliance with norms and in turn, norms are reaffirmed by social interactions (Perelli-Harris and Bernardi 2015). Therefore, because norms and values are generated through social interaction, it is effective to study norms and values in the context of a group discussion that mimics everyday interactions, as in focus groups (Barbour 2007). Lastly, the use of focus groups to examine social norms is particularly useful for explaining family change because ideational change theories highlight the

importance of normative context in shaping the development of new behaviours (Thornton 2001; van de Kaa 2001; Lesthaeghe 2010).

In terms of studying views and norms of cohabitation and marriage, focus groups can be more effective than in-depth interviews because they allow exploration of shared understanding, conceptualizations, and contradictions, instead of focusing on individual people's experiences. In contrast to in-depth interviews, focus groups can create a situation where people can discuss between each other, question norms, challenge, and criticize each other (Wilkinson 2003; Barbour 2007). Such norms may relate to the proscription or prescription of certain behaviours and the discourse provided by focus groups documents the arguments for and against various behaviours. Respondents may consistently share some views and disagree on others and both their responses and interactions can be analysed to gain insight into what is entrenched and what is more controversial, what is stable and what is evolving, and how these norms influence perceptions and behaviours (Stewart et al. 2007; Perelli-Harris and Bernardi 2015). Focus groups can also help to show how ambiguous norms can be and how ambivalent people can be when interpreting meanings (Bloor et al. 2001). Moreover, the purpose of the focus group is not to make generalizations about the whole population but to gain insight into the range of how people perceive situations (Krueger and Casey 2014).

7.6.2 **Focus group discussions**

Together with a research team from UPPI, I held eight focus group discussions in 2016 among men and women in Quezon City, National Capital Region and in Hermosa in the Bataan Province in Region III-Central Luzon, assessing how cohabiting and married men and women viewed cohabitation and marriage. Details on the preparation of study materials, and background information on study sites and the discussion participants can be found in Chapter 4, specifically in sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2.

The focus group discussion guide consisted of open ended questions (see Appendix O for the full discussion guide). For example, the moderators asked respondents their opinions on why some people cohabit and why some people marry, why they thought cohabitation was becoming more popular, and whether they thought cohabitation was now accepted by society. The moderators also asked whether expecting or having a child was a good reason for a couple to marry or if there was a certain time limit of cohabitation after which a cohabiting couple should eventually marry. The discussion guide provided probes for each question in case they were needed to stimulate conversation. An example of a question and its relevant probe is provided below:

> "Sometimes unmarried couples live together for years, buy a house together, or have a baby together and still do not get married. Do you think this is accepted and common in the Philippines?
> Probes: Do you know of anyone like this? If so, do you think there is stigma against them?"

> Although the discussion guide was used by the moderators to lead the conversation, the moderators were not compelled to go through every single question if they felt that the issues had already been discussed and were given the authority exercise their own judgement. Male and female moderators and note-takers were selected from the UPPI faculty based on previous experience conducting focus groups in sociology and demography among similar populations. Each focus group had one moderator and one note-taker who were both the same gender as the participants of the focus groups in order to help participants feel more comfortable expressing their candid opinions. I used the same moderators and note-takers for all of the urban focus groups and another set of moderators and note-takers for all of the rural focus groups. All moderators and note-takers were native Filipino speakers and most of them were approximately of similar age to the younger respondents (i.e. in their early to mid-twenties), with one moderator in her thirties.

The research team first sent letters to the barangay chairpersons to ask for assistance with conducting the study in the community. After making contact, participants were recruited by the research team and the barangay chairperson through convenience and key informant sampling. Participants were asked whether they would be interested in participating in a one to one and a half hour discussion for married and cohabiting men and women regarding their views on marriage, cohabitation, and childbearing. Participants were also given an information sheet describing the study and with contact information for study personnel, which is attached in Appendix N. Recruitment staff explained the study objectives and protocol, and arranged with interested parties for a time and place to meet for the discussions at a later date. On the day of the focus groups, the moderator went over the study objectives and protocol again with all participants and obtained informed consent. The moderator informed all participants that participation was completely voluntary and that they could leave at any time during the conversation if they wished. As a thank you for their time, participants were given refreshments and a monetary remuneration approximately equivalent to the price of a cup of coffee.

Because the recruitment process was not random, there are limitations to the generalizability of the focus group data. For example, key informants may be more likely to refer friends or

acquaintances to participate in the discussions, and friend groups are more likely to have similar viewpoints. Furthermore, people who hold more extreme or unpopular views, or who have had unusual family experiences may be hesitant to volunteer to participate in a group discussion even though moderators did not ask directly about individual experiences. Finally, because the research team recruited within the relatively small community of the barangay, some participants may have been acquainted with each other. These recruitment limitations could bias the data to be of a more limited or homogenous range of viewpoints. It is also a limitation that the focus groups all took place on the most populated of the three main island groups in the Philippines (Luzon) and none in a Muslim majority locale. However, because my main aim was to assess the social norms and values of the broader community, and not necessarily to assess personal experiences or sub group differences, the focus group methods remain effective in achieving this goal.

Based on the recommendation of UPPI faculty experienced with conducting focus groups, most discussions had 6-8 participants, for a total of 54 respondents, 26 women and 28 men. One discussion had 9 people and another had 5 people due to no-show of one recruited participant. Only women and men above 18 years of age were recruited. In total, eight focus group discussions were conducted with cohabiting and married women and men who were aged 22-62 years from one urban barangay (Pansol, Quezon City, National Capital Region) and one rural barangay (Bacong, Hermosa, Bataan province). Focus groups were divided by gender, residence, and union status. In particular, I ran separate discussion groups for married and cohabiting people so people could openly express opinions on potentially sensitive subjects such as premarital sex, nonmarital childbearing, cohabitation, and divorce (without fear of insulting a fellow discussant), encouraging examination of the underlying values that shape their beliefs, preferences, and practices. Additionally, by stratifying people based on similar background, discussions were among people who were more likely to be similar and have similar views (Barbour 2010), coalescing around a more homogenous set of norms and themes. Although prior research suggests cohabitation is associated with education, I did not stratify the discussions by education level due to complexity of recruitment. Based on the experience of UPPI faculty, highly educated people tend to be difficult to recruit for focus group participation because the opportunity cost of an hour long conversation may be higher. This may bias my results if those more willing to participate are also more likely to be less educated.

Because respondents were all over 18 and represented a wide range of ages, viewpoints did not particularly favour any particular stage in the life course, and excluded teenage perspectives. With the wide range of respondent ages, moderators made a deliberate effort to encourage everyone to participate in the discourse, in case either the oldest or youngest participants felt

hesitant to share views different from the majority. In cases where respondents were asked about issues pertaining to a stage in the life course they were no longer in or had not yet reached, (i.e. how to advise adult children on relationships) the moderator nonetheless encouraged respondents to reflect hypothetically on the question and share their views. Additionally, respondents all came from the same small community and most had a high school education, which limited the range of represented socioeconomic statuses to the exclusion of very poor or very affluent people, as well as both the very low and very highly educated. And although I held discussions among both urban and rural residents, the rural residents lived only a few hours' drive from the National Capital Region, and were not by any means the most isolated rural dwellers in the Philippines. The vast majority of respondents were parents and due to the recruitment method, everyone reported being in either a legal marriage or cohabiting relationship, which may also be reflected in people's views of childbearing and partnership. Finally, in group discussions, sometimes the most outspoken people are the most likely to share their opinions and have them dominate the conversation. The moderators counterbalanced this potential drawback by directly inviting less vocal people to share their views on the subject at hand.

7.6.3 **Data analysis**

All discussions were audio recorded and lasted between 60 to 90 minutes in duration. The note-takers made notes for the entire duration of each discussion. After each focus group, the research team debriefed and summarised the major findings of the discussion. All focus groups' audio recordings were transcribed verbatim into Filipino and translated into English by members of the research team. All translation was conducted by two members of the research team to ensure as much consistency as possible. One audio recording was cut off toward the end of the discussion, so I relied on the discussion notes for analysis of that portion of the focus group. The focus group discussion notes were taken in English so did not require translation.

I coded transcripts using the qualitative data analysis software NVivo 13 with a thematic coding process. I reviewed the data for major themes using a top down, deductive approach, using theoretical explanations to guide the identification of themes pertaining to the practical, emotional, and social benefits and drawbacks of cohabitation, as well as those of marriage.

In order to not be limited by existing theories and explanations, I also allowed for new perspectives to organically arise in a more bottom up, inductive approach, allowing the data to speak for itself. This involved identifying themes raised by respondents outside of the range of expected theoretical explanations – for example, the role of surnames and lineage (see section 7.7.1). Finally, I noted recurring themes, categorizing them as themes of individualization and/or

familism. Thematic codes were used to identify and retrieve quotations to elucidate major findings that emerged in the focus group context.

7.7 Results

7.7.1 Child-centric views of relationships

The objective of the focus group discussions was largely to explore cohabitation and marriage. However, respondents independently raised the issues of children and family when asked about their views on relationships. Although not the main goal of the focus group discussions, the consistent reference to children and family was a revealing component of the data, speaking to the family-centric and child-centric nature of Philippine culture. Because I wanted to let the focus group data speak for themselves, this section presents select findings that demonstrate how respondents consistently viewed cohabitation and marriage from a child and family-centric perspective. Results in subsequent sections are also presented without disentangling mention of children and family.

Respondents often shared their views on the benefits and disadvantages of cohabitation and marriage by describing how either relationship type would affect their families and children. This is different from qualitative studies of cohabitation and marriage in Western contexts where participants focus more on what cohabitation or marriage mean for their intimate relationships, and not for the family as a whole, indicating a more individualistic approach to marriage and cohabitation (Perelli-Harris et al. 2014). Moreover, other qualitative studies in Western countries can also more easily discuss separately cohabitation as a relationship and cohabitation as a context for childbearing because not all cohabiting couples have or plan to have children together (Hiekel and Castro-Martin 2014). This was not the case for this study, where nearly all cohabiting focus group participants had children with their partners.

Some respondents also directly associated partnering, whether cohabitation or marriage, with having children. For example, respondents were asked whether a person needed to be married in order to feel complete, in order to explore how people viewed marriage as a path to self-fulfilment. Male respondents reported that marriage and subsequent transition to family life motivated them to change their destructive or immoral behaviours, making their lives more purposeful, stable, and wholesome. Notably, because marriage implicitly also meant having children to men, they reported the same benefits for both.

Respondent: *"Before, I don't [didn't] really want to get married. I don't [didn't] want to marry because I think [thought] that a life of a young man is convenient and comfortable. You won't*

have any problems; your salary will be fully yours. But it seems my intuition tells me I lack[ed] something. I was fed up of my life as a young man. Because modesty aside, when I was a young man, I had a lot of women around me… And then, I will see a family walking in the streets… They are complete and happy. But me? I am walking alone… [Now] I have four children. I am already complete. Maybe stress would not disappear permanently in life. You are always worrying but it is very fulfilling."

-rural married male, age 54, college educated

Women also spoke of partnering as synonymous with having children, for example, by explaining that they did not want their daughters to have a boyfriend until the daughter was also ready to have children. However, in contrast to men, women were more likely to evaluate the gratification of marriage and childbearing separately. For female respondents, having children was reportedly a universal and non-negotiable requirement for happiness. However, many women did not view having a husband or indeed even a partner as a guarantee of happiness, reasoning that some husbands drink too much alcohol or are abusive and some reflected on the significant hardships faced in their own relationships. Due to these potential relationship issues, female respondents reported that the necessity of marriage or a partnership depended on the individual, indicating less alignment with traditional values and more emphasis on individual partnership preferences, despite their child-centric values.

Moderator: *"But who do you think are happier, those who have spouses or those who have none?"*

Respondent 1: "*It depends on the situation eh."*

Respondent 2: *"It depends on the person. On where she'll find happiness. On where she'll find joy."*

Respondent 3*: "Eh if you have a husband, but then you're always fighting—"*

-rural married females, ages 30-40, high school educated

Respondent*: "It would depend entirely on the individual... because sometimes, people would wonder if it is really necessary to have a lover. But once the children come, happiness comes with the children."*

-rural cohabiting female, age 22, high school educated

Respondent: *"Your world revolves around your children- maybe a husband is secondary. As long as you have a child, life is complete"*

-urban cohabiting female, age 30, high school educated

7.7.2 Views of cohabitation and marriage

In contrast to the disapproval of cohabitation and preference for marriage asserted by other Philippine studies conducted in the past (Kabamalan 2004; Xenos and Kabamalan 2007), both male and female, and both married and cohabiting respondents in these focus groups reported that cohabitation had become largely acceptable, both as a prelude to marriage and even as a longer term arrangement appropriate for childbearing and childrearing. The focus group respondents in this study acknowledged that marriage was important and had some benefits that cohabitation lacked, but also generally expressed a common thread of ambivalence throughout most of the discussions. In general, respondents were neither opposed in principle to the institution of marriage nor did they believe it was essential for everyone to marry. Unlike previous studies in the Philippines identifying more conservative attitudes among women (Ventura and Cabigon 2004; Gipson et al. 2012), female respondents in particular noted that norms around cohabitation had changed, sexual mores were more relaxed and forgiving, and that people accepted cohabitation because they were "liberated," "modern," and "practical." Respondents said it was previously highly stigmatized to live with someone without being married, but agreed that it was now very common in their communities and many had friends and neighbours who were in cohabiting relationships, although there was disagreement on whether this was a positive development.

When asked why so many people now cohabit instead of marrying, respondents gave a wide range of reasons to cohabit, reflecting practical adaptations to circumstances, emotional reasons, and changing social expectations. In the next sections, I present respondents' views on why people cohabit and what the practical, emotional, social benefits are, as well in which ways cohabitation differs or falls short of marriage.

7.7.2.1 Practical considerations

7.7.2.1.1 Economic concerns

Financial concerns were one of the most consistently mentioned reasons to cohabit instead of marry. Specifically, respondents said cohabiting was a more practical financial option than marrying and having to host the expected wedding celebration. By cohabiting, respondents reasoned, couples could either buy themselves time to save money for a wedding, avoid the expense of a wedding altogether, or allocate their resources toward their children instead.

Although respondents emphasized the financial obstacles to marriage, they also generally did not perceive marriage as a high or urgent priority for everyone. For example, respondents were well aware of more affordable options to marry, such as marrying at city hall or participating in a mass

wedding, suggesting that financial insufficiency alone may not be the reason for cohabitation. Instead, a lack of urgency or priority to marry may also be at play. Indeed, several cohabiting subjects who expressed both a desire and plan to marry also admitted that allocating the resources toward a wedding was simply not a high priority, especially given the competing needs of their children. A rural cohabiting female respondent reasoned, "For the expenses, they should prioritize the education of their children rather than the wedding." In this way, cohabitation was viewed as a strategy to save resources for your children, compared with the discretionary expense of a wedding.

Moderator: *"For example right now, I will give each of you five thousand [pesos]. In your opinion, will you get married?"*
Respondent 1: *"Ay, not anymore, Ma'am. I will give it to my children..."*
Respondent 2: *"And also, I would also invest for my kids."*
-rural cohabiting females, age 40-44, high school educated

Another rural cohabiting male respondent replied that he had not married his partner because they were "always busy," again highlighting the lack of urgency or priority of marriage. Relatedly, some respondents explained that unmarried couples with children were simply not "excited" to marry, and were "comfortable" after many years of being together and raising children together, again emphasizing the lack of pressure or hurry to marry, even after having children together.

Past Philippine studies have also identified economic reasons as obstacles to marriage (Williams et al. 2007; Xenos and Kabamalan 2007), and specifically, the cost of the wedding reception, but not general issues of overall financial stability or the resources necessary for raising a family (Kabamalan 2004). However, the attitude that marriage is not a priority and that it is more responsible to allocate discretionary funds towards your children than towards a wedding adds a new angle. This angle considers cohabitation from the perspective of parents and demonstrates that the priority of marriage declines when there are children to consider. Moreover, considering cohabitation from the lens of parenthood may have become more relevant because children in the Philippines are increasingly born in cohabitation and the vast majority of cohabiters have children (Chapter 5). The view that a wedding is a lower priority than child-related expenses, especially for lower income people, has been in observed in other qualitative studies of cohabitation in Western contexts (Berrington et al. 2015). Once pregnant, a wedding is no longer a priority expense and marriage may be postponed until eventually, the motivation and enthusiasm toward marrying declines. This is precisely opposite to the notion common to family-centric Asian cultures that stipulates marriage when the woman becomes pregnant (Raymo et al. 2015).

7.7.2.1.2 Policy changes

Another reason respondents gave for cohabitation was the recent change in family law — specifically, the Family Code — extending rights to cohabiting families. Respondents said that because children could claim benefits as their father's dependents, such as health insurance and inheritance, regardless of whether their parents were married, cohabitation was now more appealing and marriage less necessary. Additionally, respondents also said that school registration for children previously required the parents' marriage license but could now be completed with the child's birth certificate, which also made marriage less crucial. In addition to incentivizing cohabitation and dis-incentivizing marriage, these policy changes were also viewed to have improved the social acceptance of cohabitation.

Respondent: *"It [cohabitation] is generally accepted. Because, ma'am, there is now a Family Code.*
-rural cohabiting female, age 44, high school educated

The most frequently mentioned policy change in support of cohabitation was related to children's surnames. A child having his or her father's surname is extremely important because it indicates family membership and paternal recognition. Moreover, the maternal surname is often used as a middle name for children and so the inclusion of the paternal surname is particularly germane because of the Philippine bilateral kinship systems which equally value both maternal and paternal lineage. Before it was amended, the Family Code (1987) had required children born outside of marriage to use their mother's surname. Consequently, the ability of a child to use his or her father's surname was viewed as an important purpose of marriage in the Philippines (Williams and Guest 2005). However, since the Family Code was amended to allow children of unmarried parents to use their father's surname, respondents reported that cohabitation was now much more appealing and acceptable because a child could use the father's surname regardless of his or her parents' marital status.

Respondent: *"Because right now, a child not carrying his/her father's last name is no longer a problem. It's not a problem anymore, you don't [have] to get married. But now there's a law… that even if you are not married, the child can already use the man's last name."*
-urban married male, age 45, high school educated

In the UK context, sharing a surname may change the social identity of a couple, reinforcing their bond as a couple and acting as a public statement of commitment (Berrington et al. 2015). In the case of these focus groups, it is interesting that the shared surname most strongly emphasized by both male and female respondents was between father and the child, and not between couples.

A shared surname between parent and child was viewed to demonstrate personal, moral, and structural commitment to a child. Respondents reported that the paternal surname represents acknowledgement of paternity and paternal love, an obligation to provide support, and a legal link between father and child, again reflecting the child-centric nature of respondents' views.

Most discussion of policy changes and legal benefits was focused on how they impacted children, underscoring the child-centric nature of the discussions. Interestingly, respondents did not mention that the Family Code also gives cohabiting couples property rights similar to married couples and that wages and salaries of cohabiting couples are also seen as communal property (Family Code, Article 147). Filing taxes separately was also not mentioned as either a benefit or disadvantage, possibly because both married people and cohabiters are allowed to file taxes separately and still get the same exemptions for their children.

However, respondents did report that compared to cohabitation, marriage still provided more comprehensive legal support for both partners and children. Specifically, respondents said marriage allows access to spousal benefits, such as health care and social security, and entitlement to spousal pensions. And although respondents believed that children of cohabiters could avail of several key benefits, they still believed having a legally documented marriage would make administrative tasks less complicated for their children, such as school registration, employment applications, or securing permission to travel abroad.

Respondent*: But if I am not married, I cannot use the Phil Health [health insurance] of my husband since it is not allowed by law. However, my children may be able to use the Phil health benefits since they have the same surname. Only I wouldn't be able to use it. Because we have the law, even if we are not married my children will get the benefits"*
-rural cohabiting female, age 22, high school educated

7.7.2.1.3 Cohabitation as a testing ground

Respondents also explained that cohabitation was useful for partners to get to know each other and to "check" the relationship. Female respondents in particular advised that it was not wise to rush into marriage and that a couple should take as much time as they needed to get to know each other in cohabitation. Even a couple with multiple children together could "still be in the process of getting to know each other."

When prompted to consider how long a cohabiting couple could live together before they should get married, answers varied. Some respondents suggested one to five years while others said there was no set time frame. Those who said there was no time frame also said it depended on however long it took for a couple to test the relationship and truly get to know each other. While

some cohabiters reported a desire to marry their partners, others said that they were cohabiting because they wanted to be together but were still unsure whether their partner was the right person for them, and thus did not have a clear aim to marry. This indicates that cohabitation is not always viewed as a precursor to marriage as previous Philippine studies have asserted but may also be a "test relationship" or "testing ground," or indeed even an alternative to dating (Perelli-Harris et al. 2014).

Respondent 1: *"It's not yet right for me"*
Moderator: "*When is the right time [to marry] for you? What are the signs that it's already the right time?"*
Respondent 2: *"For me, when the time comes that I want to be tied to another person already, but for now, not yet".*
-rural cohabiting males, ages 38-41, high school educated

7.7.2.1.4 Fear of marital instability

In addition to cohabitation as a useful way to test a relationship, respondents also viewed cohabitation as a way to avoid the possibility of being trapped in an unhappy marriage, which is especially germane given the lack of access to legally dissolving a marriage. Cohabitation as a testing period may help lower the chance of divorce in the future or may be a strategy for avoiding marriage altogether. This has parallels with individualistic cultures across Europe where, although divorce is legal and less stigmatized, cohabitation is also a risk reduction strategy borne out of fear of dissolving a marriage because of the high perceived emotional, social, and legal consequences of divorce (Hiekel and Keizer 2015; Perelli-Harris et al. 2017).

Some focus group respondents also viewed cohabitation as the only feasible pathway to future re-partnering for people in unhappy marriages. Indeed, the spectre of unhappy marriages was prevalent among respondents, leading discussants from one focus group to suggest that if divorce were legal and free of cost in the Philippines, "100 percent" of marriages would end. This deep and consistent fear of relationship instability may also be related to individualistic relationship attitudes. Specifically, an individualistic approach to relationships allows for more opportunities to live according to personal preferences, but at the same time, promotes the view that family related failures are personal failures, leading to high anxiety toward relationship instability or failures (Giddens 1994; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1995; Bulcroft et al. 2000). And similar to previous studies of cohabitation and marriage across Europe, some respondents' views on the longevity and happiness of marriage were influenced by witnessing their parent's experiences with marital instability (Berghammer et al. 2014; Perelli-Harris et al. 2017).

On respondent summed up many of these themes when discussing his own experiences. Notably, this respondent uses the term "wife" even though he is not legally married to his partner. Throughout the focus groups, cohabiters often referred to their partners as their spouses, even though they were not legally married. Both married and cohabiting respondents also use the English term "live in," which is a commonly used colloquialism for cohabitation. This is not unusual because the Filipino language incorporates many Spanish and English terms.

Respondent: *"For us, (we) live in first, because my wife is thinking about what happened to her mother and father who got married then got separated. So that became her thing, her fear. So we talked about living in first. Because in terms of financial problem, to get married, because there are mass weddings anyway, which are free. It's only nowadays that people make a problem about weddings because they make it grand. Getting married does not have to be grand. It just needs to be in the eyes of God, even if it's free that's okay... judge or mass wedding, that's okay. For us, we lived in first because she fears getting married then getting separated. And we're also strengthening our relationship in that we're challenging this live in status first before we get married."*

-urban cohabiting male, age 21, college educated

Previous qualitative work on attitudes toward marriage in the Philippines had also identified a fear of marital instability and a view toward cohabitation as a strategy to test a relationship and lower the chance of marital instability (Williams and Guest 2005). However, the findings of this qualitative study suggested that long term cohabitation was also viewed as a way to avoid marriage altogether. While intended to strengthen the institution of marriage, the divorce laws appear to have had the inadvertent side effect of also discouraging entry into marriage in the first place and incentivizing cohabitation as a testing ground or substitute for marriage, due to fear of marital instability. Furthermore, the extension of rights to the biological children of unmarried couples discussed in the previous section also appears to dis-incentivize marriage by weakening one of its key benefits. Given the strict divorce policy, the legal recognition of cohabiting families is somewhat unexpected but also a logical development in a context where people avoid marriage due to the extremely high cost of marital dissolution. The divorce policy and the policies recognizing unmarried families may have had different intentions but in effect, they have both made marriage less appealing and influenced people's behaviours in the same way.

7.7.2.2 **Emotional considerations**

7.7.2.2.1 Love and personal commitment in cohabitation

Respondents believed that people married for love and to secure their relationship and their children's future, but also believed that cohabitation could have love, and some degree of security. Some cohabiting respondents also said that they personally cohabited out of love and so they could be with their partners. Additionally, several respondents said cohabiting relationships could be just as personally committed and stable as marriage, depending on the couple. Respondents reasoned that to some, being married was "just a paper" and a good relationship "does not depend on marriage" but on the couple themselves and their specific relationship and circumstances. Nonetheless, respondents admitted that they may prefer for their children to legally marry, though in reality, many of their adult children were not married, suggesting that although there is tolerance of different pathways, some may still be more preferable than others.

Moderator: *"In your opinion, can two people be committed to each other even if they are not yet married?"*

Respondent 1: *"Yes."*

Moderator: *"It is possible?"*

Respondent 2*: "Possible."*

Moderator: *"How- how can that happen, that they become committed even without marriage?"*

Respondent 2*: "Others will say that it's just a 'paper.'"*

Moderator: *"Just a paper?"*

Respondent 3*: "It is between-, it is between the two persons. It depends on their agreement—"*

Moderator: *"Not on marriage?"*

Respondent 2*: "Not on marriage."*

Respondent 3*: "It does not depend on marriage. It depends on the two parties. If a man and a woman understand each other, and they really love each other, then that's it."*

Respondent 2*: "Even if they are not married."*

Moderator*: "Even if they are just living-in?"*

Respondent 3*: "Yes."*

-rural married females, ages 30-40, high school educated

Moderator: "*Could it be possible that two lovers can be serious, honest and committed to each other even if they aren't married yet? Is that even possible?"*

Respondent: "*Yes sir. That's love and that's why there is a serious relationship. But if you don't love the person why would you take the relationship seriously? You might court someone else or pick someone else to court you."*

Moderator: *"Even though they aren't married? If they really love each other?"*

Respondent: "*If it's love, sir and they are serious about loving each other."*

-rural married, age 33, high school educated

Respondents also consistently reported that a legal marriage did not necessarily ensure the happiness or success of a relationship. Across focus groups, respondents independently raised the point that not all marriages were happy or long lasting, while some long term cohabiting relationships were both happy and long lasting. Several respondents gave examples of people they knew who were in long term cohabiting partnerships that broke up soon after transitioning to marriage, suggesting that there is nothing about marriage that necessarily makes a relationship better, happier, or more personally committed. One rural female cohabiter reported that her parents married after 43 years of cohabitation and separated shortly thereafter. She said "it is horrible if people enter into unions and get married, but they would only break up in the end. They have been together for so long and yet did not marry. However, when they were finally married, they ended up separating."

7.7.2.2.2 Moral commitment

Although respondents said a cohabiting relationship could be as stable, loving, and personally committed as a marriage, some respondents, especially male respondents, also believed that marriage usually had higher levels of expected moral commitment, although adherence to this expected commitment varied. Furthermore, as in qualitative studies in the U.S, male respondents reported that marriage generally entailed an expectation of higher behavioural standards, such as fidelity and increased romantic attention to one's spouse, compared to cohabitation (Edin and Kefalas 2005; Reed 2006).

However, both male and female respondents frequently and independently raised issues of infidelity and instability in marriage. Interestingly, while both men and women felt that marriage could keep a relationship together through infidelity, women saw this as self-protection if their husband cheated, whereas men saw this as self-protection if they cheated. Men said that being married meant their partners would be more obligated to them and less able to leave them, compared to a non-legal union, with one respondent saying marriage meant you could "snatch her back." Women expressed that being legally married provided a sense of legitimacy and a claim in the relationship as the "original" wife in case of infidelity or a similar threat to the relationship. One female respondent specifically stated that marriage was a "strong defence

against the other woman," with which several other respondents agreed, speaking again to a fear of relationship instability as an important consideration for relationship decisions and norms, as in older studies of the Philippines (Williams and Guest 2005). Additionally, several cohabiting men suggested that marriage could be an important legal link to your children, and in case of conflict with the mother, they would not be denied access to seeing their children. These findings parallel the findings of focus groups conducted across Europe where cohabitation was accepted but marriage was viewed to generally have a stronger sense of moral and structural commitment (Perelli-Harris et al 2014).

7.7.2.3 **Social expectations and tradition**

7.7.2.3.1 Cohabitation and childbearing

Another main reason to cohabit was pregnancy. Specifically, respondents said cohabitation was a common response to nonmarital pregnancy or birth. While marriage used to be the required response to a nonmarital pregnancy (i.e. all respondents in one focus group of married women reported being pregnant when they married), most men and women believed that cohabitation was now also an acceptable and usually preferable option. Respondents reasoned that cohabitation could allow a couple to co-parent for the benefit of the child, without prematurely committing either person to an untested or potentially unstable marriage.

Respondent: *"Before, we were not living in. When she got pregnant, that's when we lived in. Because I said, if I will leave you here and I will go home, who will take care of you? Who will you send on an errand if you wake up in the middle of the night? Who will accompany you going to the clinic? Who will assist you, what if you slip?...We will get married, but the right time is not here yet. "*

-urban cohabiting male, age 23, college educated

When asked whether an unmarried couple should marry if the woman becomes pregnant, one female respondent said:

Respondent: *"An attitude like that is old-fashioned. [For example,] when you get pregnant, you have to get married whether you like it or not… This practice is very archaic. Right now, we are in a modern generation already. If you get pregnant and you want to get married and you both love each other, so be it. But if you don't love each other and you only did it [sex] out of impulsiveness—It's okay if you don't marry."*

-urban married female, age 40, high school educated

Some respondents also said that having several children still did not necessitate marriage.

Moderator*: "If the girl gets pregnant, should they marry?"*

Respondent: *"No, not really. I have five children with my live in partner… Up to this date our relationship gets stronger."*

-rural cohabiting male, age 41, high school educated

Some respondents reflected on their personal experiences with cohabitation and childbearing, while other people discussed the experiences of their adult children. While respondents said they would prefer for their children to marry and have children within marriage, they did not want this at the expense of relationship or partner quality. This is similar to other studies of cohabitation in individualised Western contexts where the arrival of a child, and legal and financial advantages might have a role in the immediate decision to marry, but are not valid reasons alone; instead, the quality of the relationship is the highest priority (Berghammer et al. 2014). Men in particular said they would prefer to protect their daughters from a bad relationship and care for their grandchildren, instead of encouraging them to marry an unsuitable man.

Respondent: *"But [if] it's my daughter. I will ask her if she gets pregnant. If he loves the boy, she should marry the boy. But if she does not, I won't let her marry the boy even if she is pregnant. I will raise and take care of my grandchild."*

-rural married male, age 37, college educated

Quantitative analysis in the Philippines also suggests that increasingly, cohabitation instead of marriage is a response to nonmarital pregnancy (Chapter 5), supporting respondents' views on this changing norm. The norm of cohabitation as an acceptable response to nonmarital pregnancy has also been found in other qualitative studies of Western countries such as the U.S, the UK, and Austria (Berghammer et al. 2014; Reed 2006; Berrington et al. 2015). These studies have similarly identified the perception of cohabitation as a beneficial arrangement for unmarried parents, allowing them to co-parent and still retain both a greater level of autonomy and the freedom to exit the relationship if necessary, emphasizing the continued valuation of a two parent household, despite decoupling of marriage and parenthood (Reed 2006).

While respondents all acknowledged that childbearing in cohabitation is a common occurrence and increasingly acceptable, there was some disagreement, mostly among men, on whether this was a positive development. Nonetheless, although some participants expressed preferences for how their own children should behave, they were generally hesitant to criticise other people's family decisions, hinting at an ambiguity of social norms and tolerance of a wider range of lifestyles and family forms, as in other Western contexts (Hiekel and Keizer 2015; Berrington et al. 2015).

7.7.2.3.2 Family and social expectations

Although respondents gave a variety of reasons why people cohabit, how it compares to marriage and what the benefits of cohabitation are, they also simply reasoned that people cohabited because it was now an acceptable option. Basically, several respondents expressed that cohabitation was more common now simply because it was now allowed. This suggests that cohabitation may have always been a logical, practical, and beneficial arrangement that was only historically marginal because of social norms and stigma. One respondent spoke candidly about how societal expectations and norms regarding sexual behaviour has loosened up markedly:

Moderator: *But they [cohabiters] aren't judged anymore or anything of the sort? Like what you were saying earlier [about] morals?*

Respondent: *"Come on, [before], if you were seen walking off the street with someone after dark, people would have said that something 'happened' to you already. Nowadays, you see couples making out in public, no one cares. It's different now compared to before."*
-urban married female, age 45, college educated

Regarding marriage and social norms and expectations, respondents' views were varied. Some cohabiting respondents, particularly men, reported being questioned about why they had not married, and some older married women respondents reported being forced or pressured into marriage by their parents because their parents believed that premarital sex had taken place. However, in neither case was family pressure viewed positively or as a good reason to marry. In contrast, respondents' perspectives as parents themselves were generally more liberal. Respondents in particular said that nowadays, "parents' mentalities aren't the same" as they were before. One urban married woman pointed out that pressuring a pregnant daughter to marry a "nobody," such as an irresponsible or abusive man, would "just be a pity." Another woman specifically said she did not want her daughter to marry when she became pregnant because the man in question did not have a job.

Respondent: "*If it were up to me, it's okay that she gets pregnant [and doesn't marry] because, the guy does not have a job. My daughter just loves him. But, I tell my child, it's not me who has to deal with your husband… You make the decision. But as a parent, I didn't want her to get married in that kind of situation, a man doesn't have a job. Right, it's like [she's] at a disadvantage?"*
-urban married female, age 44, high school educated

Another social expectation regarding marriage that respondents raised was the social norm of a large wedding celebration. Respondents said that if someone in their community married in a church wedding, everyone in the community would expect to be invited. In Western contexts, such as the U.K, a wedding may be viewed as a couple's public expression of commitment to each other, made in the presence of family, friends and society (Berrington et al. 2015). However, the respondents in my focus groups expressed that inviting everyone to a wedding was socially expected and necessary, but did not mention public demonstration of love, commitment, and family cohesiveness as the purpose of a big wedding. Instead, respondents emphasized God's blessing as the main purpose of a church wedding, which is further explained in the next section.

7.7.2.3.3 Religious values

Religious prohibitions against nonmarital sex and nonmarital childbearing were not independently mentioned by respondents as reasons to marry instead of cohabit. When prompted to discuss how religion intersected with the decision to cohabit or marry, respondents said that religion could actually be an obstacle to marriage, such as prohibition of intermarriage across religions. More importantly, respondents also did not connect the decision to cohabit or marry as a religiously motivated decision, and when prompted, noted that it was better to be practical than to fastidiously follow religious rules of technicality. For example, many women said that the truly moral and selfless thing to do with extra resources would be to allocate it towards your children's education, not towards a wedding celebration. And on a pragmatic level, respondents reported that it did not make sense to marry someone if you did not know them well and were unsure of the relationship, regardless of circumstances or whether it was technically against religious rules.

However, respondents did explain that a church wedding was different than either a civil wedding or long term cohabitation because it provided the union a blessing from God. For example, several times, both married and cohabiting respondents reported that a civil ceremony meant you were married in the eyes of the law but a church ceremony meant you were married in the eyes of God.

Respondent: *"Like, the one in court… that is still in the eyes of the people because an attorney is the one who [marries you]… right? In church, it's like God is your witness. That's the main thing of you getting married."*
- urban cohabiting male, age 20, education level unreported

For this reason, many respondents said a church wedding was superior to a civil wedding and cohabitation because it meant the relationships was approved of by God. One respondent said:

Respondent: *"Ahh, for us, ah, it is important that there is a blessing from the church. One, for our beliefs, most of us here are Catholics eh. They say that when you have the blessing from church, grace and blessings will easily come to you."*
-rural married woman, age 40, high school educated

Nonetheless, the same respondent also maintained that the spiritual benefits of marriage did not always outweigh the practical considerations. Specifically, a blessing from God was still reportedly not worth entering into an impulsive marriage.

The valuation of a blessing from God is a distinctly spiritual, religious value which differs from, for example, the Italian context where the Catholic religion influences marriage decisions through adherence to cultural and family traditions and expectations, instead of spiritual beliefs (Vignoli and Salvini 2014). Respondents' religious valuation of God's blessing is also an interesting juxtaposition against respondents' pragmatic disregard of other religious dogma, such as the prohibition against premarital sex.

7.8 Discussion

Because cohabitation is often perceived to serve more individualistic relationship needs, it is typically examined from an individualistic perspective. Subsequently, an individualistic perspective is also applied when exploring how people view cohabitation in relation to marriage, and why and when people choose one arrangement over the other. In the Philippines, the rise of cohabitation has been unexpected because family-centric values feature prominently in the culture. With this in mind, my study considers both individualistic and family-centric lenses when examining views of cohabitation and marriage in the Philippines in order to understand why cohabitation has become an increasingly popular family form.

My key finding is that overall, value systems regarding marriage have indeed changed dramatically and quickly toward an individualistic bent, but the value of children is persistent and in this way, select family-centric values appear quite intact. Family and social expectations regarding marriage have weakened, with personal choice and fulfilment becoming more prominent factors in relationship decisions, consistent with individualistic tendencies and the deinstitutionalization of marriage (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1995, Cherlin 2004). With the shift toward individual preferences, the pathway to family formation has diverged into nonstandard biographies and there is increasing tolerance of different family forms, even if some forms may be preferable to others. However, relationships, regardless of their legal status, remain inextricably intertwined with having children and in this way, views and norms remain family and child-centric. Having children, parenting in a two parent household, and ensuring children are strongly

connected to both maternal and paternal kin groups remain fundamental priorities. Additionally, having children is not only crucial to achieving full personhood but also a key purpose of relationships. In this next section, I summarize the main findings and discuss how they relate to individualism and familism, as well as how tolerance of a variety of biographies has engendered attitudes of ambivalence.

7.8.1 **Individualism, familism, and ambivalence**

The focus group respondents expressed liberalized attitudes of cohabitation and marriage often associated with individualism (Beck and Beck Gernsheim 1995) — such as acceptance of cohabiting families, the belief that cohabitation can be as committed as marriage, and a tolerance of non-standard biographies. While marriage may have some benefits, respondents viewed cohabitation as having the potential to be of similar relationship quality to marriage, depending on the individuals or couple. Although participants named several practical, emotional, and religious benefits of marriage, they also expressed a sense of ambivalence and a belief that the decision to enter into marriage depends on personal preferences and circumstances and should not be rushed, even in the context of nonmarital pregnancy. On the whole, the focus group discussions generally indicated that marriage was neither ideologically rejected nor did most people view it as essential. Respondents also strongly emphasized the importance of love and finding the right partner, expressing a high valuation of relationship quality and romantic fulfilment, which also suggests an individualistic approach to relationships.

Nonetheless, several family-centric values persist, including the high value of children, the power of parenthood, and the importance of family, as well as a considerable degree of religiosity. Many of the benefits of cohabitation were viewed from a family and child-centric perspective. Respondents' lack of mentioning some of the major legal benefits extended to cohabiting couples regarding communal property and assets indicates either that they are unaware of such legal provisions or that such provisions are irrelevant or unimportant to them, compared to policies regarding children's surnames which were repeatedly mentioned. Moreover, men tended to express more conservative preferences such as preferring marriage over cohabitation for having children. Still, respondents' high valuation of children and family did not conflict with the view that marriage and cohabitation decisions should be based on what was best for the couple, instead of following a normative family formation pathway. In order to meet expectations about both childbearing and partnerships, a more liberal attitude toward the chronology of childbearing and union formation is necessary, yielding a wider range of acceptable life trajectories.

The combination of child-centric values and acceptance of cohabitation and cohabiting families has some similarity with other Asian countries where liberal attitudes toward premarital sex and new family behaviours have not encroached on the fundamental importance of marriage and children. In other Asian countries, this "individualization without individualism" (Kyung-Sup and Min-Young 2010) has led to late marriage and low fertility as intentional risk-averse strategies to control the effective scope and duration of family life. The Philippines differs in its implementation of "individualization without individualism" because value systems regarding marriage have indeed changed but the value of children has not. However, just as postponement and smaller family size may be strategies to marry and have children in a more manageable manner, childbearing within cohabitation could also be a risk-averse strategy. Specifically, the rapid emergence of cohabitation and childbearing within cohabitation — often framed as evidence of deinstitutionalization of the family — may be strategies to achieve both traditional family preferences (i.e. having children and raising them in a two parent household) and a self-fulfilling relationship. Because family life remains so important, reshaping a manageable trajectory is necessary in order to cling to it, instead of abandoning it, given competing external influences (Kyung-Sup 2010). Similarly, because respondents repeatedly emphasized the impact of family policy change and divorce laws, another relevant perspective on cohabitation and childbearing within cohabitation may be "institutionalized individualization," in which social structures, services, and policies prompt individuals to follow individualized living arrangements and lifestyles (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2010).

7.8.2 Shifting costs and benefits of cohabitation and marriage

In addition to preferences and attitudes regarding the importance of family, partnership, and childbearing, respondents also discussed how economic considerations influence family decisions. Cohabitation in the Philippines follows a negative educational gradient (Chapter 6). Similarly, the focus group respondents cited the high cost of marrying as a benefit of cohabitation, which suggests less privileged couples cohabit out of resource constraint and not necessarily a preference for cohabitation over marriage, as in the U.S and across Europe (McLanahan 2004; Edin and Kefalas 2005; Perelli-Harris et al. 2010). However, the perceived high cost of marriage must be considered within the context of changing norms, values and policies which have also shifted the cost/benefit ratios of both marriage and cohabitation.

First, the main financial obstacle to marriage overwhelmingly raised by respondents was the cost of paying for a wedding reception, with very little discussion otherwise of overall financial stability, which is similar to findings from other focus group studies across Europe and Australia (Perelli-Harris et al. 2014). This differs from studies in the U.S and Thailand where the perceived

economic obstacles to marriage are not limited to the cost of the wedding but also include a level of economic affluence that should be achieved prior to marriage (Edin and Kefalas 2005; Esara 2012). In such instances where there is a perceived marriage bar, readiness for married life is perceived to require a range of material and economic trappings — for instance, a car, a house, a steady job — beyond simply paying for a wedding reception and people express a broader concern of overall economic uncertainty. General economic concerns were discussed by respondents, but only in reference to how money problems could cause relationship stress. And in contrast to other studies of cohabitation in the U.S (Reed 2006), no one in the focus groups mentioned sharing expenses, convenience or housing issues as pragmatic or economic reasons to cohabit. Instead, among the respondents of these focus groups, concern about paying for a wedding to the exclusion of other financial interests of worries raises additional questions. For example, to what degree is "saving for a wedding" latent for either disinterest or unwillingness to marry and a more palatable way to express such feelings without inviting further questions? As respondents noted, choosing not to marry could be due to financial concerns, or to uncertainty about the relationship or to the perception that cohabitation may be just as loving and committed as a marriage.

Second, marriage may be perceived as too costly because it is now more optional, given the availability and acceptability of cohabitation. Respondents named the difficulty of paying for a wedding reception as an explanation for the recent rise in cohabitation but wedding celebrations have always required some outlay of resources and people are widely aware of more affordable options to legally marry. Perhaps, now that marriage is viewed as more optional, the decision to spend money on a wedding celebration seems more discretionary and like a luxury purchase. Moreover, with the extension of rights to cohabiting families and the social acceptance of cohabiting families, marriage may no longer be worth the expense if one can avail of its benefits through cohabitation, which is less financially costly.

Third, the decision to enter marriage or cohabitation now often occurs in the context of pregnancy or a recent birth, during which there are many competing demands on attention and resources. Previously, most first births occurred after marriage (Chapter 5) and it was not necessary to choose between allocating resources to a wedding celebration or to one's children, since the wedding occurred before children were born. With the increase in premarital sex in a context of low family planning use, many people now make union formation decisions after there is a pregnancy or child to consider. Therefore, it is reasonable that people may prefer to allocate resources to their children versus to a wedding celebration. Indeed, in lieu of a wedding, childbearing in cohabitation may be evolving to become a similar public declaration of commitment (Berrington et al. 2015). This approach is in direct contrast to other Asian contexts

where premarital conception or nonmarital birth would likely expedite marriage, not provide a cause to postpone it. Additionally, the lack of legal access to abortion and limited access to family planning for unmarried women in the Philippines contrast with both the high abortion rates and wide family planning access in other Asian countries, which are likely related to the different approaches to nonmarital conceptions. Specifically, in the Philippines, unintended nonmarital pregnancy may be more likely to occur given the limited access to family planning, and also much more likely to be carried to term, given the lack legal access to abortion. In the Philippines, the weakening social pressure to legitimise a nonmarital birth and the extension of rights to cohabiting families, has shifted the balance between the benefits and the significant legal, financial, and emotional liabilities of marriage, making raising a family in cohabitation more appealing. In summary, my findings demonstrate that the perceived costs and benefits of marriage and cohabitation shift within the context of changing norms, values and policies.

7.8.3 Limitations of generalizability and future research

In contrast to most previous qualitative Philippine studies addressing partnered and unpartnered young people, this study included respondents from a range of ages and focused specifically on legally married and cohabiting people to allow for closer examination of the differences between these two family forms from a larger range of perspectives. The cohabiters in the focus groups were also a heterogeneous group, some of whom had recently partnered and others who had cohabited for over ten years with several children, suggesting that cohabitation does not have a single meaning, as reflected in the range of responses given by participants. While my results reflect the range of attitudes among people of different ages but from a similar level of education, future qualitative research could examine attitudes by different age groups and education levels to facilitate group discussion among people of similar demographic characteristics. Lastly, because the focus groups were only conducted in two locations in the Philippines, both in Luzon, future qualitative work could also explore a wider range of locations, including Muslim majority regions.

7.8.4 Key contributions of this study

The results of this study show new perspectives on cohabitation and marriage in the Philippines emerging alongside rapid behaviour change. Respondents' perception of cohabitation as a common and acceptable arrangement for having and raising children contrasts strikingly with Philippine studies conducted a decade ago when cohabitation was perceived disapprovingly, and solely as a prelude to marriage for young people unable to immediately marry. This hints at rapid change in society regarding views of cohabitation and by extension, the role and importance of

marriage. Additionally, this finding is a key study contribution because it suggests the meaning of cohabitation may have rapidly shifted to become more like marriage, which to date, has not been the case in other Asian contexts where cohabitation is practiced or in earlier Philippine studies. Most strikingly, it is unexpected that cohabitation is not only prevalent in a family-centric culture such as the Philippines but is in part motivated precisely by family and child-centric values. Although norms and behaviours regarding cohabitation and marriage have changed profoundly, the focus on and high valuation of family in the Philippines have remained consistent.

Previous Philippine literature has also argued that women are more disapproving toward cohabitation and more motivated to marry (Williams and Guest 2005). However, women in this study expressed more liberal attitudes toward cohabitation and nonmarital fertility than the male respondents, a few of whom viewed divorce, nonmarital childbearing and voluntary non-marriage negatively. It is possible women have less conservative attitudes because they bear a larger burden under restrictive divorce laws, rigid sexual mores, or continued stigma against nonmarital childbearing and thus they may be more willing to reject such conservative views. Earlier studies also mostly assessed younger women, who may have felt social pressure to speak more reservedly about issues like premarital sex. In contrast, these focus groups encompassed a range of ages, including older women with children who may have felt less guarded about expressing their candid opinions.

Also notable is that value change and innovation in family behaviour appear to be prevalent among the non-elite. Focus group respondents primarily represented medium levels of education, and are not the highly educated forerunners of social change referred to by SDT theory. From the SDT perspective, new family behaviours are pioneered by the elite at the forefront of value change before gradually trickling down to other classes and becoming widespread. However, in the Philippines, value change and widespread behaviour change appear to be happening rapidly and simultaneously, without a changing socioeconomic gradient (Chapter 6). Although cross sectional qualitative data are insufficient for identifying value change, it is noteworthy that respondents overwhelmingly reported that social norms had changed recently, with many citing new family policies and modern, liberalized attitudes as relevant drivers.

This study offers a new perspective that rethinks family behaviours as strictly individualistic, liberal, and Western or family-centric, conservative, and Eastern, by exploring the extent to which the same behaviours can be innovatively re-claimed to address both individual needs and family values. In doing so, this paper challenges the notion that family norms and behaviours must either serve individual fulfilment or traditional, family-centric values. Contrary to the notion that only individualized societies prioritize higher order needs over prescribed family behaviours, the

Philippine case demonstrates that societies with strong family ties can also highly value personal emotional fulfilment, adapt behaviours accordingly, and evolve to accept a wide range of family formation trajectories.

Chapter 8 Conclusion

8.1 Introduction

This thesis uses a mixed methods approach to understand the growth of cohabitation and nonmarital fertility — specifically childbearing within cohabitation — in the Philippines, and positions the Philippines within the context of global family change. In doing so, this work both builds on and challenges the extant literature regarding cohabitation and nonmarital fertility in the Philippines and more broadly, in Asia. It also contributes to the body of knowledge regarding family systems around the world.

In this chapter, I summarize the main findings of each of the three papers, how each paper addressed an existing knowledge gap, and what the original contribution to knowledge each paper makes. Following this, I reflect on the extent to which the Philippines is experiencing an SDT, specifically summarizing how it compares with patterns in Asia and Latin America, and what we can learn from the similarities and differences. I then discuss briefly the general limitations of the thesis and potential avenues for future research. I conclude with broad policy and development implications and a discussion of the significance of this thesis to the academic canon.

8.2 Summary of Findings

Chapter 5 used mixed methods to examine how nonmarital fertility and pro-natalist values can explain why fertility in the Philippines has been slow to decline. The quantitative analysis found a persistently young age pattern of childbearing, and increased childbearing in cohabitation, especially among young people. Moreover, a substantial proportion of births occurred in cohabitation because women entered cohabitation after becoming pregnant. Together with the qualitative analysis, my findings suggested fertility has been slow to decline because cohabitation provides young people an easier, soft transition to parenthood and family life, compared to marriage, lessening the incentive to postpone childbearing or union formation. With cohabitation and nonmarital fertility becoming more accepted, fertility in the Philippines is unlikely to decline precipitously as it has in other Asian countries. This analysis contributes a novel perspective on the role of cohabitation in shaping both the high fertility trend and the persistently young age pattern of first childbearing, which to date has not been considered or researched. Although high fertility, cohabitation, nonmarital fertility, and teenage fertility have been examined separately in the Philippines, this paper was the first of its kind of synthesize these

interdependent threads and articulate the interrelationship between them and their implications for the future of family systems in the Philippines.

We learned from the Chapter 5 that childbearing in cohabitation has become widespread, surpassing marital childbearing, which demonstrates that cohabitation is an important social phenomenon in the Philippines and perhaps becoming a fundamental part of the Philippine family system. This then raised the question of who cohabits and whether those who cohabit without marrying differ systematically from those who marry? Chapter 6 addressed these questions by analysing the relationship between socioeconomic status and cohabitation with a novel approach. Specifically, the analysis applied a survival analysis method — which to date has not been used in studies of cohabitation in the Philippines — to a dataset that has also not been used before to examine cohabitation. Together, the method and data enabled the study of the correlates of cohabitation among a nationally representative sample of women of reproductive age, which to date has not been undertaken. Results demonstrated that women with lower socioeconomic status were more likely to cohabit without marrying. The link between disadvantage and cohabitation indicates that cohabitation may not be something people prefer to do because they reject marriage. Instead, cohabitation may be a union type people resort to because they lack the resources and stability to marry.

The fifth and sixth chapters presented a picture of the close linkages between cohabitation, young age at childbearing, and disadvantage. We learned from Chapter 5 and 6 that more women are cohabiting and having children in cohabitation at relatively young ages and moreover, that cohabitation is correlated with socioeconomic disadvantage. However, this does not reveal how people view cohabitation compared with marriage, and what they think the benefits or drawbacks of either partnership or family type is. Exploration of the meanings of cohabitation and marriage as family forms requires qualitative study. To date, studies of cohabitation in Asian countries have been mainly quantitative. A few qualitative studies of cohabitation in the Philippines focus solely on teenagers and young adults and do not specifically examine the meaning of cohabitation and how it compares with marriage, nor do they consider cohabitation from the perspective of parents. The existing Philippine studies were also conducted over ten years ago when cohabitation was more marginal and nonmarital fertility much less common, and the views and perceptions towards nonmarital unions and reproductive behaviours may have also changed in the interim. Moreover, the qualitative literature on the meanings and concepts of cohabitation focus mainly on Western countries, to the exclusion of Asian countries.

Chapter 7 applied qualitative methods to examine the perceived advantages and disadvantages of cohabitation and marriage, and whether relationship norms are more individualistic or family-

centric. Results indicated that the necessity of marriage has declined due to the acceptance of cohabitation and a greater tolerance for personal preferences in making relationship decisions and non-standard biographies. Nonetheless, the importance of children and the support and presence of two parents for childrearing remains strong, suggesting the persistence of family-centric orientations, even if creating a family may now be done through the less traditional path of cohabitation, which has similar perceived benefits and fewer perceived liabilities than marriage. Additionally, respondents reported that while marriage usually implies a higher level of moral and structural commitment, cohabitation can also potentially be a loving and committed relationship comparable to marriage and appropriate for raising children. This suggests cohabitation may be potentially evolving as a family form, which is in direct contrast to previous studies of cohabitation in both Asia and the Philippines.

8.3 Is There a Second Demographic Transition in the Philippines?

There are several features of an SDT in the Philippines, and yet also several attributes more reminiscent of a country still undergoing its FDT. A comparison of the characteristics of both the First and Second Demographic Transitions in the Philippines is recapped in (Table 17), showing that there are clearly elements of both which are relevant.

In several important ways, both demographically and in the societal context, the Philippines is still in its FDT. The total fertility rate is still well above replacement level. Although fertility is steadily declining and will likely eventually reach replacement level, it may not be through the pathway of postponement of first births, as the archetype of the SDT posits (Lesthaeghe 2010). Childlessness in the Philippines is also low and has not shown any evidence of changing in the past two decades. The authority and influence of the Church is very strong, and religiosity at an individual level is high, even if people are not dogmatic about the behavioural guidelines laid out by the Catholic religion. Family planning access continues to be poor and both divorce and abortion are very unlikely to be legalized in the near future. Family is also still a fundamental institution in the Philippines, acting as a source of economic, social, and emotional resources for many. Most importantly, as a developing country, the societal context of the Philippines is not post-material for a large part of the population. Although there is a deeply entrenched elite class who reaffirm their privilege through family connections, as well as a middle class buoyed by migrant labour remittances, a significant share of the population live in extreme poverty. For many, everyday material needs are indeed highly relevant.

Table 17 - Placing the Philippines within the First and Second Demographic Transitions

First Demographic Transition (FDT)	Second Demographic Transition (SDT)	More relevant in the Philippines?
Marriage		
Rise in proportions marrying, Declining age at first marriage	Fall in proportions married, Rise in age at first marriage	SDT
Low cohabitation	Rise in cohabitation (pre and post marital)	SDT
Low divorce	Rise in divorce, earlier divorce	FDT Due to illegality of divorce
High remarriage	Decline in remarriage following divorce and widowhood	SDT Low likelihood of remarriage due to difficulty of legally dissolving a marriage
Fertility		
Decline in marital fertility due to reduced fertility among older women, effectively lowering mean age at childbearing	Decline in fertility through postponement, Increasing mean age at first parenthood, Structural sub-replacement fertility	FDT
Poor contraception	Effective contraception	FDT
Declining illegitimate fertility	Rising nonmarital fertility due to parenthood within cohabitation	SDT
Low definitive childlessness among married couples	Rising definitive childlessness in unions	FDT
Societal Context		
Preoccupations with basic material need. Solidarity prime value	Rise of “higher order” needs. Tolerance prime value	SDT
Rising memberships of political, civic and community oriented networks. Strengthening of social cohesion	Disengagement from civic and community oriented networks. Weakening of social cohesion	FDT
Strong normative regulation by State and Churches. Initial secularization waves, political and social pillarization	Retreat of the State, postwar secularization waves, sexual revolution, refusal of authority, political “depillarization”	FDT
Segregated gender roles, familistic policies, promotion of breadwinner family model	Rising symmetry in gender roles, female economic autonomy	FDT and SDT
Ordered life course transitions, prudent marriage and dominance of one single family model	Flexible life course organization, multiple lifestyles, open future	SDT

Source: Lesthaeghe (2010); Lesthaeghe (2011)

Another important difference between the SDT archetype and the Philippines is that the SDT predicts that the highly educated are typically the forerunners of innovative family behaviours. Adoption en masse of new behaviours emerges after the elite have rendered it acceptable. In contrast, in the Philippines, the less advantaged subgroups are currently more likely to cohabit, which has not changed over time. Previous work on the SDT does not specifically consider the non-European, post-colonial case of when the groundwork for an innovative family behaviour may have been laid by traditional practices that predate colonization and colonial Christian European marital systems. For example, in Latin America, it has been argued that the uptake of cohabitation among the highly educated may have been facilitated by the widespread traditional acceptance of cohabitation and nonmarital fertility among the lower classes, which was never against moral codes or sexual mores (Laplante et al. 2015; Laplante et al. 2016). The elite may be in a better position to innovate in most contexts, but the exceptional context of the Philippines, where divorce is illegal and there is an indigenous history of cohabitation, may perhaps be the right combination of factors to prompt lower and middle class people to innovate and pioneer social change, with traditional practices as a blueprint.

And while it is possible that privileged Filipinos may not accept cohabitation or nonmarital fertility because of stricter sexual mores and higher valuation of marriage, it is also possible that the appeal of cohabitation is simply less relevant for privileged people. More privileged people may be less likely to have unintended pregnancies which require making a decision between marriage or cohabitation. More privileged people may also be less concerned about marital instability because annulment could be more accessible to them. And while cohabitation is appealing because it ensures the support of both parents, this may be less crucial to people of more means.

Nevertheless, there are also many characteristics of the SDT in the Philippines, in terms of the fertility and nuptiality practices as well as the societal context. With cohabitation and nonmarital fertility featured in the media and practiced among high profile personalities — such as celebrities and politicians, including the current president — and how-to articles about cohabitation in popular magazines (i.e. Cosmopolitan, Esquire), these family behaviour trends seem unlikely to recede any time soon. In addition to the dramatic growth of cohabitation and nonmarital fertility, there is an emerging tolerance, if not necessarily approval, of a range of family arrangements, and a flexible approach to life course organization. With so much cultural focus placed on family and close knit familial ties, people are also hesitant to judge what people outside of their immediate circles do, suggesting lose social cohesion at a higher level. The Philippines is still far from having experienced a sexual revolution, but sex and marriage have delinked for many young people, even if this has not been openly accepted by broader society. With respect to female economic autonomy, both female education and female labour force participation are relatively high. The

gender gap in educational attainment between men and women has closed and labour force participation of women is comparable to the OECD country average and enhanced by female emigrant workers, who just outnumber male migrant workers (Battistella and Asis 2013; Mercer-Blackman and Tanaka 2015). In 2010, the combined number of female government officials, corporate executives, managers, and supervisors surpassed the number of males (PSA 2014) and the country has the highest percentage of firms with female ownership in the Asia Pacific region (Mercer-Blackman and Tanaka 2015).

However, while there are elements of the SDT in the Philippines, in terms of family behaviours, norms and attitudes, and societal context, the growth of these behaviours may not all be directly motivated by individualism. Instead, the SDT related behaviours are likely the result of a complex, web of interdependent factors, motivated by stable family-centric values in an environment of liberalizing priorities and social norms. For example, the value of children and family remains consistent but could conflict with the prioritization of a satisfactory intimate relationship, leading to innovative family behaviours like cohabitation as a counterbalance between these competing needs. One need does not have to completely recede in order for another need to gain importance or be valid. Individuals in a family oriented culture may approach their relationships in an individualistic manner, while retaining or behaving according to some traditional, family-centric attitudes. And paradoxically, certain priorities, such as love and emotional fulfilment, may be reinforced by both individualistic and family-centric values. For example, the individualistic emphasis on emotional quality in intimate relationships may be reaffirmed by the longstanding cultural prioritization of close emotional ties within a family, and by the increasing importance of maintaining high quality emotional ties in a context where families are often separated by geography via labour migration. So although family has been preserved as a fundamental institution in the Philippines, its modalities are changing, as are the strategies for achieving a family in a context of new priorities and norms.

As in East Asia, where the occurrence of an SDT is often debated, the rigidity of gender norms and family values leads some to argue that SDT related ideational change is absent (Atoh et al. 2004; Chen and Li 2014; Raymo et al. 2015). However, the SDT may simply progress differently in different contexts. For example, in East Asia, although the cultural expectations implicit in marriage and childbearing have remained somewhat traditional, there are people who postpone or entirely opt out of this prescribed package of expectations, which is indeed an expression of a self-interested preference. Kyung-Sup and Min-Young (2010) argue that postponement and small family size represent the crafting of a manageable family strategy precisely because people continue to value marriage and family and do not want to miss out on it. However, I would extend this argument to add that it also means people are trying to make personal self-fulfilment and

well-being a priority as well, by extending the lifespan of their independence and finding a compromise between competing needs. People may not want to miss out on family life but they are not willing to completely self-sacrifice in its service either. Some also argue that postponement and opting out in East Asia are involuntary (Frejka et al. 2010); nonetheless, these behaviours still reflect choices that represent trade-off and a balance between ideals and the competing constraints of reality. East Asia and the Philippines show us that there are shades of nuance between rejecting an institution entirely and accepting everything unquestioningly. In between, there can be adaptive strategies to make life easier and adapt to new modern norms and practices, without entirely rejecting tradition and culture.

The Philippines also has many similarities to the patterns in Latin America, where scholars are also debating the relevance of a Second Demographic Transition (Esteve et al. 2012; Covre-Sussai et al. 2015; Laplante et al. 2015). Like the Philippines, Latin America's fertility transition was known for its unusual pattern of continued fertility decline without concomitant changes in the age patterns of union formation or childbearing; early and nearly universal childbearing persisted, despite significant developmental changes such as educational expansion. Countries across Latin America have varying levels of cohabitation, but in many countries, cohabitation exceeds marriage as a share of partnerships and fertility in cohabitation is higher than fertility in marriage (Laplante et al. 2015). And as mentioned earlier, both the Philippines and several countries in Latin America have some historical tradition of cohabitation or consensual union that was disapproved of by the church. In Latin America, this laid the foundation for a dual nuptiality regime where consensual union and childbearing in cohabitation was never stigmatized or considered immoral for a significant segment of the population (Laplante et al. 2016). And while there is currently evidence of increased postponement of childbearing (Rosero-Bixby et al. 2009), this emerged after cohabitation became widespread, unlike the European SDT where postponement preceded cohabitation (Esteve et al. 2012). Likewise, the Philippines has also experienced the widespread uptake of cohabitation prior to postponement of childbearing, which parallels the patterns in Latin America.

Despite the similarities, there are distinct and important differences in the demographic characteristics of the fertility transitions of Latin America and the Philippines. Specifically, Latin American countries have other features of the SDT that the Philippines does not. For example, the regional level of fertility in Latin America and the Caribbean is approximately replacement level at 2.14, and the vast majority of countries in the region have lower fertility than the Philippines (UN 2015). Postponement has also been documented, especially among the highly educated, with an increasing proportion of women in their twenties and early thirties who have not transitioned to motherhood (Rosero-Bixby et al. 2009). And while cohabitation and

nonmarital fertility had a negative socioeconomic pattern across Latin American countries, more recently the socioeconomic patterns have been flattening, as people across classes are starting to behave more similarly with respect to cohabiting and having children in cohabitation (Laplante et al. 2015; Laplante et al. 2016). Lastly, the age patterns of marital and nonmarital fertility are very similar in many Latin American countries (Laplante et al. 2015; Laplante et al. 2016), unlike in the Philippines, where the age patterns are very different between union types.

A detailed investigation of the reasons for the similarities between the demographic transitions of the Philippines and Latin America is beyond the scope of this project. However, some clear parallels emerge upon examination. The most obvious commonality between the Philippines and Latin America is their colonial legacy, specifically one culturally centred around Catholicism. Indeed, the spectre of Catholicism looms largely in the culture of the Philippines and in countries across Latin America and may in part explain the strong influence of pro-natalism and familism. The association between the colonial history and the evolution of a dual nuptiality system that laid the groundwork for the modern cohabitation boom may also be germane, and would require further investigation in the Philippines.

The SDT describes the direction of family change that much of the world is headed in, while still acknowledging the diversity in which changes develop. For this reason, the SDT is relevant for understanding the case of the Philippines. However, the SDT cannot and does not claim to predict exactly how each sub narrative will unfold because that is dependent on understanding the different context of different populations. This PhD research describes one particular sub narrative of the SDT, considering the specific implications of an Asian country with a Catholic colonial legacy, further underscoring the importance of context in appreciating and describing the global diversity of family change.

8.4 Limitations and Future Work

The limitations of each of the three papers are discussed in greater detail in their respective chapters. Here, I summarize broadly the general limitations of the thesis and suggestions for future work.

The main limitation of this thesis is the lack of complete data on union histories which did not allow for the identification of union transitions. Moreover, lack of data on the union status of women at the time of their first birth also required the assumption to be made that women's union status did not change between the time of survey and the time of birth. This may have been an issue because pregnancy and birth are often associated with union transitions within a relationship, particularly the transition from cohabitation to marriage. A pregnancy or birth may

precipitate a union or anticipation of entry into a union may lead to the decision to become pregnant or have a baby. However, it is reasonable to assume that the magnitude of nonmarital fertility is underestimated, due to the direction in which union status transitions within a relationship are most likely to progress, from cohabitation to marriage, instead of marriage to cohabitation. Future work would benefit from data that reports union histories in greater detail, which to date are not collected in either national or sub-national surveys. In particular, the examination of the sequences of events such as union formation, union transitions, and childbearing would be useful to understand in greater detail how different union types might be associated with different pathways of family formation, and how this differs by subgroup.

With regards to qualitative data, I was limited by time and resources from collecting data in a wider range of geographic areas, including a non-Catholic majority area, such as the Muslim majority areas in Mindanao in the southern part of the Philippines. Language barriers also meant that I had to work from translated transcripts instead of directly with original transcripts. The similarities between Latin America and the Philippines raise questions about how the role of Catholicism relates to the evolution of family systems. It would be useful in the future to examine views of family in a Muslim majority area, where presumably, the influence of Catholicism is weaker, and where more liberal divorce policies exist. This would allow for the disentangling of some of the influences of religion versus culture.

Lastly, the demographic parallels between the Philippines and Latin America may be a promising avenue for further in-depth exploration. A particular dive into pre-colonial marriage and childbearing practices of the Philippines and a comparison of the colonial pasts of both areas may illuminate some of the commonalities and differences.

8.5 Policy and Development Implications

Cohabiting families are a growing reality, which is a pattern that seems unlikely to reverse anytime soon in either the Philippines or worldwide. In the Philippines, cohabitation and nonmarital fertility are not solely problematic behaviours that will decrease with the right policy intervention. To this end, the right policies for cohabiting families need to be in place and existing policies for cohabiting families should be made more well-known so cohabiters may avail of them. For example, cohabiting partners are not considered the closest kin when medical decisions need to be made on behalf of an incapacitated person and a cohabiting partner is not the de facto heir in the case of the other partner's death (de Vera and Enano 2017) . Cohabiters who are still legally married to a previous partner, as many are, do not benefit from the same rights as cohabiters who are free to marry each other. Determining the most appropriate policy approach toward

legislating cohabitation is complex, as evidenced by the diversity of legal approaches across countries (Kiernan 2004; Perelli-Harris and Sanchez-Gassen 2012) , and will require further study, which future research may undertake.

Avenues for legally dissolving a marriage should also be made much more accessible to people of all backgrounds. Although it is unlikely that divorce will be made legal in the near future, the prohibitively high cost of annulment means that in practical terms, only the very wealthy have a chance to legally dissolve their marriages. Popular discourse seems to frame marriage as a luxury item because of the high cost of the wedding. However, in reality, the high cost of the exit clause is also keeping less affluent people out of the institution of marriage. To address this, the legal process of annulment should be simplified and the requirements made less stringent.

The growing number of unions that are formed in response to unplanned pregnancies also underscores the need for family planning to be much more widely available and accessible to unmarried people. Although the desire to postpone childbearing may be relatively weak in the Philippines, there is nonetheless a high prevalence of unintended pregnancy (ICF 2014). Not only is family planning access a basic human right, but lack of access to family planning may be detrimental to the health of women and families and also hinder micro and macro level economic progress. The content of marriage family planning counselling should also be made available to cohabiters so they may also benefit from the information as their married counterparts do.

8.6 Thesis Contributions

In May 2017, the Commission on Appointments met to confirm the appointment of the Social Welfare Secretary Judy Taguiwalo. During this confirmation, the Senate Majority Leader Vicente Sotto III — also a celebrity television host and the grandson and grandnephew of former senators —remarked on Taguiwalo's status as a single mother, despite his full support of her appointment. Taguiwalo responded that she was indeed a single mother who had had an unconventional life path, citing her time underground and in prison as a political activist during the years of the Ferdinand Marcos dictatorship. Sotto then said, "In the street language, when you have children and you are single, ang tawag do'n ay na-ano lang (we call that 'you just got knocked up')," to the laughter of the audience in the hearing, then adding "Thank you. You have 100% my support." Taguiwalo responded "Senator Sotto, I teach women's studies. We respect all kinds of families and that includes solo parents. Thank you." Sotto later responded to wide criticism of his remarks by saying that his comment was meant as a joke and that he obviously held no prejudice against single mothers since both of his daughters were also single parents, one separated and one unmarried. This anecdote captures perfectly the complexity of nonmarital fertility in the

Philippines as a social phenomenon that occurs widely and is tolerated, and yet is still not overtly approved of or viewed as favourably as marital fertility. It also depicts the paradoxical gap between contemporary behaviours and traditional values. Indeed, the Philippines is a country on an interesting frontier, where behaviours and ideas are both changing, but perhaps not at the exact same rate, where a male politician can mock his female colleague for behaviours his own family members also engage in, and where this joke lands, but is also criticized.

This thesis explores the complexities of family and fertility in the Philippines. In doing so, this work contributes several new findings to the literature on cohabitation and nonmarital fertility. First, it presents a case of largescale nonmarital fertility occurring in an Asian country, which to date has not been documented in the international literature or observed in another country in the region. And unlike other studies of nonmarital fertility in the Philippines which focus on youth and the issue of teenage pregnancy as a social problem, this study reframes nonmarital fertility to specifically consider childbearing in cohabitation and its relevance as a family behaviour among older age groups, in addition to teenagers.

Second, this thesis presents the current picture of national level cohabitation patterns in the Philippines, which has also not been done before. Although young, lower educated people are the most likely to cohabit, people do cohabit at all ages and most cohabiting relationships last several years, implying that cohabitation may be a more stable family form than previously indicated and certainly more stable in comparison to other contexts where cohabitation lasts for much shorter durations, especially among the less educated (Heuveline and Timberlake 2004; Musick and Michelmore 2015). The emergence of cohabitation as a tolerated family form was further revealed with the qualitative component of this thesis.

Third, this thesis contributes to the qualitative literature on the meanings and concepts of cohabitation, a literature which is currently dominated by Western experiences, even as cohabitation has increased across the world. Strikingly, it is unexpected that cohabitation is not only prevalent in a family-centric culture such as the Philippines but is in part motivated precisely by family and child-centric values. In the midst of rapid behaviour change, some family values may have persisted, even as other norms have evolved. In other words, views and social norms may have reshaped not to accommodate an entirely new set of values, but to preserve the same values while adapting to new policy circumstances, relationship standards, and other realities.

Most importantly, this thesis draws connections between the various threads of fertility and family change in the Philippines to demonstrate the interrelationships and interdependencies, which to date has also not been undertaken before.

Chapter 8

This thesis is a lesson illustrating the world wide diversity of family systems, despite superficial similarities. The same behaviours do not always have the same causes or interdependencies and are instead highly context specific. This research presents an important perspective on both the diversity and universality of family change patterns by showcasing the different mechanisms and interdependencies behind global change in family behaviours, contributing another potential sub narrative of how SDT related family behaviours can unfold.

Appendix A DHS Questionnaire - Marriage and Partnership Excerpts, 1993 & 2013 Surveys

1993 Survey



SECTION 5. NUPTIALITY

NO.	QUESTIONS AND FILTERS	CODING CATEGORIES	SKIP TO
501	Have you ever been married or lived with a man?	YES.....1 NO.....2	→504
502	ENTER "0" IN COLUMN 6 OF CALENDAR IN MONTH OF INTERVIEW, AND IN EACH MONTH BACK TO JANUARY 1988.		
503	IF NEVER BEEN MARRIED OR LIVED WITH A MAN: Have you ever had sexual intercourse?	YES.....1 NO.....2	→518 →523
504	Are you now married or living with a man, or are you now widowed, divorced, or no longer living together?	MARRIED.....1 LIVING TOGETHER.....2 WIDOWED.....3 DIVORCED.....4 NO LONGER LIVING TOGETHER.....5	→507
505	Is your husband/partner living with you now or is he staying elsewhere?	LIVING WITH HER.....1 STAYING ELSEWHERE.....2	→507
506	Where does your husband live?	IN COUNTRY.....1 OVERSEAS.....2	
507	Have you been married or lived with a man only once, or more than once?	ONCE.....1 MORE THAN ONCE.....2	
508	In what month and year did you start living with your (first) husband/partner?	MONTH..... DK MONTH.....98 YEAR..... DK YEAR.....98	
509	How old were you when you started living with him?	AGE..... DK AGE.....98	
510	CHECK 507: MARRIED OR LIVED WITH A MAN ONLY ONCE → SKIP TO 513 MARRIED OR LIVED WITH A MAN MORE THAN ONCE ↓		
511	In what month and year did you start living with your current/last husband/partner?	MONTH..... DK MONTH.....98 YEAR..... DK YEAR.....98	
512	How old were you when you started living with him?	AGE..... DK AGE.....98	
513	How old was your current/last husband/partner when you started living with him?	AGE..... DK AGE.....98	

Source: DHS Report 1993, page 211

Appendix A

2013 Survev

SECTION 6. MARRIAGE AND SEXUAL ACTIVITY

NO.	QUESTIONS AND FILTERS	CODING CATEGORIES	SKIP
601	Are you currently married or living together with a man as if married?	YES, CURRENTLY MARRIED ..... 1 YES, CURRENTLY LIVING WITH A MAN ..... 2 NO, NOT IN UNION 3	→ 604
602	Have you ever been married or lived together with a man as if married?	YES, FORMERLY MARRIED ..... 1 YES, FORMERLY LIVED WITH A MAN ..... 2 NO 3	→ 609
603	What is your marital status now: are you widowed, divorced, or separated?	WIDOWED ..... 1 DIVORCED/ANNULLED ..... 2 SEPARATED 3	→ 606
604	Is your husband/partner living with you now or is he staying elsewhere?	LIVING WITH HER ..... 1 STAYING ELSEWHERE 2	
605	RECORD THE HUSBAND'S/PARTNER'S NAME AND LINE NUMBER FROM THE HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE. IF HE IS NOT LISTED IN THE HOUSEHOLD, RECORD '00'.	NAME_____ LINE NO.	
606	Have you been married or lived with a man only once or more than once?	ONLY ONCE ..... 1 MORE THAN ONCE 2	
607	CHECK **606**: MARRIED/ LIVED WITH A MAN ONLY ONCE → In what month and year did you start living with your husband/partner? MARRIED/ LIVED WITH A MAN MORE THAN ONCE → Now I would like to ask about when you started living with your first husband/partner. In what month and year was that?	MONTH ..... DON'T KNOW MONTH ..... 98 YEAR ..... DON'T KNOW YEAR 9998	→ 609
608	How old were you when you first started living with him?	AGE	

Source: DHS Report, 2013 page 315

Appendix B Weighted table of births and exposure time for calculation of age specific fertility rate, 1993-2013, all births in three years preceding survey

Age Group	Weighted Births	Total Exposure Time in Years	Central Date
1993			
15-19	446.13	8855.53	1991.84
20-24	1473.05	7734.11	1991.84
25-29	1547.23	7124.93	1991.84
30-34	1137.34	6285.02	1991.84
35-39	649.91	5434.33	1991.84
40-44	222.00	4354.77	1991.84
45-49	17.96	2200.79	1991.84
1998			
15-19	373.08	8171.49	1996.71
20-24	1192.61	6741.39	1996.71
25-29	1357.88	6459.56	1996.71
30-34	940.76	6050.39	1996.71
35-39	570.79	5150.14	1996.71
40-44	166.07	4119.77	1996.71
45-49	15.69	2412.61	1996.71
2003			
15-19	382.91	7289.38	2002.00
20-24	1164.88	6530.85	2002.00
25-29	1147.01	6016.58	2002.00
30-34	819.97	5793.62	2002.00
35-39	506.63	5326.63	2002.00
40-44	198.83	4570.93	2002.00
45-49	13.96	2677.27	2002.00
2003			
15-19	411.64	7586.35	2007.11
20-24	1024.99	6300.30	2007.11
25-29	1086.50	6301.93	2007.11
30-34	725.18	5327.10	2007.11
35-39	430.43	5143.98	2007.11
40-44	171.64	4544.76	2007.11
45-49	15.83	2856.31	2007.11
2013			
15-19	518.29	9074.01	2012.12
20-24	1157.14	7804.07	2012.12
25-29	939.04	6375.43	2012.12
30-34	829.99	6558.05	2012.12
35-39	498.24	5907.50	2012.12
40-44	217.97	5818.96	2012.12
45-49	25.30	3612.58	2012.12

Appendix C Age specific fertility rate, first births only in three years preceding survey, 1993-2013 and corresponding weighted table of births and exposure time



Age Group	Weighted First Births	Total Exposure Time in Years	Central Date
1993			
15-19	319.77	8855.53	1991.84
20-24	540.38	7734.11	1991.84
25-29	248.08	7124.93	1991.84
30-34	92.23	6285.02	1991.84
35-39	28.34	5434.33	1991.84
40-44	6.09	4354.77	1991.84
45-49	0.00	2200.79	1991.84
1998			
15-19	255.79	8171.49	1996.71
20-24	492.76	6741.39	1996.71
25-29	282.31	6459.56	1996.71
30-34	83.13	6050.39	1996.71
35-39	33.47	5150.14	1996.71
40-44	2.16	4119.77	1996.71
45-49	0.00	2412.61	1996.71
2003			
15-19	288.15	7289.38	2002.00
20-24	499.38	6530.85	2002.00
25-29	236.79	6016.58	2002.00
30-34	73.60	5793.62	2002.00
35-39	28.04	5326.63	2002.00
40-44	5.33	4570.93	2002.00
45-49	0.00	2677.27	2002.00
2008			
15-19	330.61	7586.35	2007.11
20-24	485.01	6300.30	2007.11
25-29	247.25	6301.93	2007.11
30-34	66.83	5327.10	2007.11
35-39	23.62	5143.98	2007.11
40-44	4.10	4544.76	2007.11
45-49	2.23	2856.31	2007.11
2013			
15-19	401.66	9074.01	2012.12
20-24	498.75	7804.07	2012.12
25-29	191.94	6375.43	2012.12
30-34	93.30	6558.05	2012.12
35-39	22.59	5907.50	2012.12
40-44	8.07	5818.96	2012.12
45-49	0.00	3612.58	2012.12

Appendix D Weighted table of births and exposure time for calculation of age specific fertility rate, 1993-2013, first births in year preceding survey

Age Group	Weighted First Births	Total Exposure Time in Years	Central Date
1993			
15-19	99.36	3100.64	1992.84
20-24	177.13	2627.23	1992.84
25-29	83.46	2402.45	1992.84
30-34	40.93	2159.91	1992.84
35-39	14.03	1874.70	1992.84
40-44	0.75	1537.03	1992.84
45-49	0.00	969.47	1992.84
1998			
15-19	90.47	2871.81	1997.71
20-24	172.16	2279.54	1997.71
25-29	100.57	2199.68	1997.71
30-34	28.10	2032.09	1997.71
35-39	17.17	1795.59	1997.71
40-44	0.00	1439.81	1997.71
45-49	0.00	1038.61	1997.71
2003			
15-19	104.48	2598.41	2003.00
20-24	173.31	2210.86	2003.00
25-29	91.08	2014.50	2003.00
30-34	33.93	1936.45	2003.00
35-39	10.70	1846.35	2003.00
40-44	0.85	1555.77	2003.00
45-49	0.00	1176.45	2003.00
2008			
15-19	116.77	2652.47	2008.11
20-24	171.49	2124.69	2008.11
25-29	75.36	2135.55	2008.11
30-34	25.49	1803.19	2008.11
35-39	4.43	1780.69	2008.11
40-44	0.00	1506.03	2008.11
45-49	0.94	1256.96	2008.11
2013			
15-19	155.63	3156.73	2013.12
20-24	185.98	2717.99	2013.12
25-29	80.66	2138.95	2013.12
30-34	38.01	2218.42	2013.12
35-39	9.61	1978.46	2013.12
40-44	0.78	1956.08	2013.12
45-49	0.00	1583.68	2013.12

Appendix E First order births to married women (solid lines), cohabiting women (dashed lines), and never in union women (dotted lines) per 1,000 women, from 1993-2013



Appendix F Construction of the outcome variable (married, cohabiter, never in union) for the competing risks model, by current union status and union history

Current Union Status	Union History		
	1 union only (n=9,632)	**More than 1 union (n=921)**	**Missing union history data (n=90)**
Ever in union			
Married	Married (n=7,260)	Cohabiter (n=301)	Married (n=82)
Cohabiting	Cohabiter (n=1,699)	Married (n=516)	Cohabiter (n=8)
Widowed - formerly married	Married (n=184)	Cohabiter (n=11)	-
Widowed - formerly cohabiting	Cohabiter (n=29)	Married (n=6)	-
Divorced - formerly married	Married (n=2)	Cohabiter (n=1)	-
Divorced - formerly cohabiting	Cohabiter (n=1)	-	-
Separated - formerly married	Married (n=180)	Cohabiter (n=27)	-
Separated - formerly cohabiting	Cohabiter (n=277)	Married (n=59)	-
Never in Union	Never in union (n=5,512)		

For women who have only been in one union, I assign their first union category to match their current union status. The vast majority of women — more than 90 percent — have only been in one union. Less than one percent of women have missing data regarding how many unions they have been in and I assume that they, like the majority of the population, have only been in one union and use the same protocol to assign their first union type as women who reported one union only.

Among women who have ever been in union, 8.65 percent have been in more than one union. For women who have been in more than one union, I make a series of educated assumptions about their type of first union. Because it is very unlikely for a respondent to experience multiple marriages, I assumed that currently married women who reported being in more than one union

cohabited for their first union. I also assume current cohabiters with more than one union were married for their first union because more women do marry.

Finally, I assume that those who have had multiple unions but are not in union at the time of interview, refer to their more recent union when describing whether they are formerly married or formerly cohabiting. Formerly married women were then assumed to cohabit for their first union, again because multiple marriages are very unlikely. Former cohabiters were assumed to have married for their first union like the majority of women.

Furthermore, although I made assumptions about all re-partnered women, re-partnering is more common among older women and cohabiting women so any limitations related to these assumptions may affect these groups more.

I also tested the robustness of the main findings by running the competing risks model with outcome variables based on a variety of different assumptions regarding first union type for women who reported higher order unions. Overall, cumulative incidences and median ages at entry into union did not vary noticeably. More importantly, the educational pattern was consistent. Other control variables' coefficients differed somewhat, depending on assumptions, but did not affect the main educational pattern findings.

Appendix G Sensitivity analysis: Removing pregnancy/parenthood predictor variable

Results from competing risks model showing relative risk ratios (RRR) for entry into cohabitation versus single, marriage versus single, and cohabitation versus marriage, by background characteristics

	Cohabitation versus Single		Marriage versus Single		Cohabitation versus Marriage	
Variables	RRR	(95% CI)	RRR	(95% CI)	RRR	(95% CI)
Education level						
Medium (reference)	1.00		1.00		1.00	
Low	1.39	(1.23-1.56)***	1.35	(1.26-1.45)***	1.02	(0.90-1.17)
High	0.53	(0.47-0.60)***	0.88	(0.83-0.93)***	0.61	(0.53-0.69)***
Current age	1.52	(1.40-1.65)***	1.75	(1.67-1.83)***	0.87	(0.79-0.95)**
Current age squared	0.99	(0.99-0.99)***	0.99	(0.99-0.99)***	1	(1.00-1.00)*
School enrolment						
No (reference)	1		1		1	
Yes	0.19	(0.16-0.23)***	0.21	(0.19-0.23)***	0.94	(0.76-1.16)
Period						
1978-1987 (reference)	1.00		1		1.00	
1988-1997	1.1	(0.88-1.37)	0.92	(0.86-1.00)*	1.19	(0.94-1.51)
1998-2007	2.64	(2.14-3.25)***	0.96	(0.88-1.04)	2.76	(2.21-3.45)***
2008-2013	5.56	(4.53-6.82)***	0.51	(0.46-0.56)***	10.92	(8.73-13.67)***
Total number of person-months= 1,462,759						

Note: RRR: Relative Risk Ratios; ***Significant at the 0.001 level; ** significant at the 0.01 level; *significant at the 0.05 level

Appendix H Test for interaction between education and period

Results from competing risks model showing relative risk ratios (RRR) for entry into cohabitation versus marriage, by background characteristics

	Cohabitation versus Marriage	
Variables	RRR	(95% CI)
Education level		
Medium (reference)	1.00	
Low	1.45	(0.96-2.19)
High	1.61	(0.87-2.98)
Period		
1978-1987 (reference)	1.00	
1988-1997	1.49	(1.03-2.15)*
1998-2007	3.79	(2.68-5.38)***
2008-2013	15.4	(10.87-21.84)***
Education * Period Interaction		
Low Education * (1988-1997)	0.82	(0.51-1.32)
Low Education * (1998-2007)	0.74	(0.46-1.17)
Low Education * (2008-2013)	0.6	(0.36-0.99)*
High Education * (1988-1997)	0.43	(0.2-0.89)*
High Education * (1998-2007)	0.34	(0.18-0.64)***
High Education * (2008-2013)	0.37	(0.19-0.69)***
Current age	0.84	(0.77-0.92)***
Current age squared	1	(1.00-1.00)**
School enrolment		
No (reference)	1	
Yes	0.92	(0.74-1.14)
Pregnancy and parental status		
Nulliparous (reference)	1	
Pregnant	0.85	(0.75-0.98)*
Parent of 0-1 year old	1.36	(1.09-1.68)**
Parent of 2-3 year old	1.96	(1.33-2.89)***
Parent of 4+ year old	2.67	(1.85-3.86)***
Total number of person-months = 1,462,759		

Note: RRR: Relative Risk Ratios; ***Significant at the 0.001 level; ** significant at the 0.01 level; *significant at the 0.05 level

Appendix I Cohabitation cross-sectional models, by five year age groups

Results from cross-sectional multinomial logistic regression model showing relative risk ratios (RRR) of cohabitation at time of interview versus marriage at time of interview

	Currently cohabiting (baseline currently married)											
	20-24		25-29		30-34		35-39		40-44		45-49	
Variables	RRR	(95% CI)	RRR	(95% CI)	RRR	(95% CI)	RRR	(95% CI)	RRR	(95% CI)	RRR	(95% CI)
Education level												
Medium (reference)	1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00	
Low	1.15	(0.83-1.59)	0.91	(0.65-1.27)	0.97	(0.67-1.40)	1.67	(1.15-2.44)**	1.08	(0.72-1.64)	0.72	(0.47-1.12)
High	0.99	(0.75-1.30)	0.45	(0.33-0.62)***	0.58	(0.42-0.80)***	0.78	(0.51-1.20)	0.53	(0.30-0.93)*	0.62	(0.36-1.07)
Wealth quintile												
Middle (reference)	1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00	
Poorest	0.59	(0.39-0.89)**	0.85	(0.58-1.26)	0.75	(0.48-1.17)	0.72	(0.45-1.15)	1.32	(0.78-2.22)	1.42	(0.85-2.36)
Poorer	0.96	(0.67-1.37)	1.22	(0.85-1.76)	1.01	(0.69-1.49)	0.82	(0.51-1.30)	0.87	(0.53-1.45)	0.8	(0.48-1.33)
Richer	0.84	(0.57-1.22)	1.31	(0.9-1.91)	0.57	(0.39-0.85)**	0.82	(0.54-1.26)	0.84	(0.49-1.43)	0.42	(0.24-0.74)***
Richest	0.76	(0.47-1.24)	0.9	(0.59-1.37)	0.56	(0.37-0.85)**	0.34	(0.19-0.62)***	0.52	(0.29-0.94)*	0.21	(0.10-0.44)***
Co-residence with parents or grandparents												
No (reference)	1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00	
Yes	1.46	(1.14-1.87)***	1.41	(1.09-1.81)**	1.46	(1.05-2.03)*	1.82	(1.18-2.79)**	1.67	(0.86-3.22)	1.65	(0.74-3.67)
Residence												
Rural (reference)	1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00	
Urban	2.66	(1.98-3.58)***	1.98	(1.53-2.56)***	1.89	(1.42-2.51)***	1.97	(1.41-2.75)*	2.35	(1.65-3.35)***	2.82	(1.81-4.40)***
Constant	0.72	(0.50-1.03)	0.41	(0.30-0.57)***	0.23	(0.17-0.32)***	0.14	(0.10-0.21)***	0.1	(0.07-0.15)***	0.13	(0.08-0.20)***
Total Observations		2,721		2,069		2,091		1,860		1,775		1,623

Appendix J Test for collinearity between education and wealth

The bivariate correlation between education and wealth was examined with education and wealth as continuous variables. The correlation coefficient was 0.54, which is below the recommended threshold of 0.80 from UNC. A further test was done using the STATA command *coldiag* which produces a variance inflation factor, tolerance, eigenvalues and condition number. The regression tested the outcome variable of time to first union against the continuous predictor variables of wealth score and years of education. The results of the test are shown below.

Variable	Variance Inflation Factor	SQRT Variance Inflation Factor	Tolerance	R-squared
Wealth	1.36	1.16	0.74	0.26
Education	1.36	1.16	0.74	0.26
Condition Number	7.15			

When there is no collinearity at all, eigenvalues and the condition number are equal to one. With the presence of collinearity, eigenvalues and the condition number may be greater or less than one. A variance inflation factor greater than 10 and a condition number greater than 15 may indicate major issues with multicollinearity. In this case, the variance inflation factor was only 1.36 and the condition number 7.15, neither of which are near the threshold.

This test was also run against the multinomial logistic regression modelling likelihood of entering a type of first union against the categorical predictor variables of wealth and education with similar results. The variance inflation factor was 1.36 and the condition number was 7.15, neither of which are near the thresholds of 10 and 15 respectively, to be of major concern.

Appendix K Test of independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption

Variable	Full Model - Model 1		Marriage Only - Model 2		Cohabitation Only- Model 3	
Cohabitation						
Education level						
Medium (reference)						
Low	0.31	***			0.30	***
High	-0.57	***			-0.57	***
Pregnancy and parental status						
Nulliparous (reference)						
Pregnant	2.86	***			2.85	***
Parent of 0-1 year old	1.61	***			1.60	***
Parent of 2-3 year old	0.99	***			0.99	***
Parent of 4+ year old	0.91	***			0.91	***
Current age	0.29	***			0.28	***
Current age squared	-0.01	***			-0.01	***
School enrolment						
No (reference)						
Yes	-1.54	***			-1.53	***
Period						
1978-1987 (reference)						
1988-1997	0.07				0.08	
1998-2007	0.90	***			0.90	***
2008-2013	1.58	***			1.58	***
Constant	-10.22	***			-10.10	***
Marriage						
Education level						
Medium (reference)						
Low	0.30	***	0.29	***		
High	-0.10	***	-0.10	***		
Pregnancy and parental status						
Nulliparous (reference)						
Pregnant	3.02	***	3.01	***		
Parent of 0-1 year old	1.30	***	1.30	***		
Parent of 2-3 year old	0.32	**	0.32	***		
Parent of 4+ year old	-0.08		-0.08			
Current age	0.45	***	0.45	***		
Current age squared	-0.01	***	-0.01	***		
School Enrolment						

Variable	Full Model - Model 1	Marriage Only - Model 2	Cohabitation Only- Model 3
No (reference)			
Yes	-1.46 ***	-1.46 ***	
Period			
1978-1987 (reference)			
1988-1997	-0.12 **	-0.12 **	
1998-2007	-0.13 **	-0.13 **	
2008-2013	-0.83 ***	-0.83 ***	
Constant	-10.49 ***	-10.47 ***	
Statistics			
N	1462759	1460405	1454470

Note: ***Significant at the 0.001 level; ** significant at the 0.01 level; *significant at the 0.05 level

Appendix L Cohabitation cross-sectional models

Results from cross-sectional multinomial logistic regression model showing relative risk ratios (RRR) of being "never in union" at time of interview versus marriage at time of interview. Note this is the same model as Table 15, only it shows the results for the "never in union" women in the model

	Currently never in union (baseline currently married)							
	18-19		20-29		30-39		40-49	
Variables	RRR	(95% CI)	RRR	(95% CI)	RRR	(95% CI)	RRR	(95% CI)
Education level								
Medium (reference)	1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00	
Low	0.30	(0.16-0.57)***	1.04	(0.81-1.34)	1.80	(1.13-2.85)**	0.87	(0.58-1.29)
High	5.34	(2.04-13.96)***	1.77	(1.47-2.14)***	1.36	(1.00-1.87)*	0.79	(0.53-1.17)
Wealth quintile								
Middle (reference)	1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00	
Poorest	0.73	(0.33-1.65)	0.46	(0.35-0.61)***	0.34	(0.18-0.62)***	1.12	(0.60-2.07)
Poorer	0.71	(0.31-1.66)	0.63	(0.48-0.81)***	0.52	(0.30-0.93)*	1.07	(0.59-1.91)
Richer	1.79	(0.52-6.19)	1.37	(1.07-1.77)**	1.17	(0.81-1.69)	1.50	(0.90-2.51)
Richest	1.79	(0.54-5.92)	2.13	(1.61-2.81)***	1.51	(1.00-2.29)*	2.12	(1.23-3.65)*
Co-residence with parents or grandparents								
No (reference)	1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00	
Yes	2.73	(1.36-5.49)**	4.62	(3.88-5.51)***	7.39	(5.35-10.21)***	18.57	(12.75-27.05)***

	Currently never in union (baseline currently married)							
	18-19		20-29		30-39		40-49	
Variables	RRR	(95% CI)	RRR	(95% CI)	RRR	(95% CI)	RRR	(95% CI)
Residence								
Rural (reference)	1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00	
Urban	1.67	(0.84-3.30)	1.94	(1.61-2.32)***	1.84	(1.40-2.42)***	1.80	(1.25-2.60)***
Constant	4.61	(1.79-11.88)***	0.29	(0.23-0.37)***	0.04	(0.02-0.05)***	0.03	(0.02-0.05)***
Total Observations	1,144		4,790		3,951		3,398	

Note: RRR: Relative Risk Ratios; ***Significant at the 0.001 level; ** significant at the 0.01 level; *significant at the 0.05 level

Appendix M Socioeconomic characteristics of currently married and currently cohabiting women who partnered in the last six months

Variables	Currently Married	Currently Cohabiting
	27.22%	71.59%
Age (at time of interview)		
15-19	14.62	45.60
20-24	50.61	40.48
25-29	25.83	8.13
30-34	4.92	3.75
35-39	4.02	0.00
40-44	0.00	0.86
45-49	0.00	1.18
Education- highest attended		
Low	7.11	12.26
Medium	32.99	58.17
High	59.90	29.58
Household wealth		
Poorest	15.61	17.03
Poorer	19.10	28.48
Middle	14.64	26.00
Richer	17.18	18.98
Richest	33.48	9.52
Residence		
Urban	49.69	46.86
Rural	50.31	53.14
n = 188		

Note: The column percentages add to 100

Appendix N Participant Information Sheet

Study Title: Partnership and Fertility in the Philippines

Please read this information carefully before deciding to take part in this research. If you are happy to participate you will be asked to sign a consent form when you attend the focus group discussion.

What is the research about?

The purpose of this project is to learn about people's values, attitudes, and preferences toward marriage, cohabitation, and childbearing. We would like to understand how people in the Philippines feel about these family issues and how they come to make decisions about entering into relationships and having children.

We are a research team based in the University of the Philippines Population Institute and the University of Southampton in the UK. This project forms part of my training which will lead to a PhD in demography.

Why have I been chosen?

The participants in this project are all adults over the age of 18 who live in Metro Manila or the surrounding areas. We are looking for people of different backgrounds to take part in group discussions about marriage, cohabitation, and childbearing.

What will happen to me if I take part?

If you agree to take part, we will arrange to meet at a time and venue nearby. It will not cost you anything to take part. Once you have given your consent to take part, we will have a group conversation with 5-7 other people of similar backgrounds who have also agreed to participate in the study. The group conversation will take between one to two hours and will focus on your opinions and beliefs about marriage, relationships, and having children. The conversation will be audio recorded.

Are there any benefits in my taking part?

I hope that you will find taking part an interesting experience. The results of this research may be useful to policy makers and programs targeted toward supporting families and children. We will also provide a small bother fee of 200 PHP to compensate you for travel costs and provide snacks and drinks at the end of the discussion.

Appendix N

Are there any risks involved?

There are no real risks to being involved and you are not obliged to talk about any experiences you feel uncomfortable discussing or find distressing. You may also leave the conversation at any time you wish if you do not want to continue for any reason.

Will my participation be confidential?

Confidentiality is very important in this project. The recording and any documents will be stored on a computer and they will be password protected so that they cannot be accessed by anyone outside of the research team. In any written documents your name and any identifying information will not be used. Information will be kept safe in line with UK laws (the Data Protection Act) and University of Southampton policy.

What happens if I change my mind?

You have the right to withdraw from the focus group at any time and this will not incur any penalty.

What happens if something goes wrong?

If you have any concerns or complaints about how this research is conducted, you may contact:

Research Governance Manager

University of Southampton, UK

+44 2380 595058

rgoinfo@soton.ac.uk

If you would prefer to speak with someone directly in the Philippines in order to raise your concerns you can contact:

Dr. Maria Midea Kabamalan

University of the Philippines Population Institute

Palma Hall Diliman Campus

[PHONE NUMBER]

mmkabamalan@up.edu.ph

Where can I get more information?

If you have any further questions once you have read this information sheet, please get in touch with me using the following details:

Bernice Kuang

University of Southampton, United Kingdom

Mobile: 0995 327 9059 (Philippines)

Mobile +44 7477 168428 (United Kingdom)

Bk2g14@soton.ac.uk

Appendix O Ethics Application Form and Focus Group Discussion Guide

O.1 Ethics Application Form

SSEGM ETHICS SUB-COMMITTEE APPLICATION FORM

Please note:

- ***<u>You must not begin data collection for your study until ethical approval has been obtained</u>.***
- ***It is your responsibility to follow the University of Southampton's Ethics Policy and any relevant academic or professional guidelines in the conduct of your study. This includes providing appropriate information sheets and consent forms, and ensuring confidentiality in the storage and use of data.***
- ***It is also your responsibility to provide <u>full and accurate information</u> in completing this form.***

1. Name(s): Bernice Kuang

2. Current Position: PhD Student, Demography & Social Statistics

3. Contact Details:

Division/School: Social Sciences

Email: bk2g14@soton.ac.uk

Phone: 07477168428

4. Is your study being conducted as part of an education qualification?

Yes

5. If Yes, please give the name of your supervisor

Sabu Padmadas and Brienna Perelli-Harris

6. Title of your project:

Partnership and Fertility in the Philippines

7. Briefly describe the rationale, study aims and the relevant research questions of your study

Fertility has declined in recent decades in the Philippines but remains relatively high, given the country's progress in development indicators and the fertility levels of neighbouring countries. Moreover, age at first union and age at first birth have also been relatively stable over the last few decades. At the same time, other components of family demography have shifted substantially, such as increases in teenage pregnancy, shifts in the age specific fertility patterns, increased non-marital cohabitation, and increased non-marital fertility. To this end, I aim to research attitudes and values toward partnership and fertility in the Philippines to see how changing sexual mores, social norms, and practices may relate to both the elements of change and stability. Specifically, I would like to triangulate my quantitative findings on marriage, cohabitation and fertility with qualitative research examining women's motivations and preferences behind their partnership and childbearing decisions. Using focus groups stratified by sex, residence, and education, I plan to conduct focus groups to assess people's motivations behind and attitudes toward marriage, cohabitation, and childbearing and to see if there are systematic differences between social groups.

8. Describe the design of your study

My study is a mixed methods study which will be conducted in two parts. In the first part, I will conduct quantitative analysis of Demographic and Health Surveys Data to examine correlates of fertility change, the socio-economic predictors of cohabitation versus marriage, and the intentionality of marital and non-marital births. In the second part, I will conduct focus group discussions to round out my quantitative findings and assess women's attitudes toward partnership and childbearing. Focus groups will be stratified by residence (urban residents vs rural residents), gender (men vs. women) and education levels (non-higher education vs. higher education) yielding 8 discussions in total. Each will have 6-8 participants, last approximately 1.5-2 hours in duration, and be moderated in Filipino by a researcher from the University of the Philippines. We will offer a small financial compensation called a bother fee to subjects at 200 PHP for rural residents and 400 PHP for urban residents. This is mainly used as compensation for travel expenses. We will also serve snacks or lunch depending on the time of day for the focus group discussion.

9. Who are the research participants?

Focus group participants will be randomly selected adult residents of Metro Manila and the surrounding rural areas. The sample will be recruited from villages or workplaces

10. If you are going to analyse secondary data, from where are you obtaining it?

Appendix O

Secondary data analysis will be conducted using the Demographic and Health Surveys collected by Macro International. The data is publicly available for download from the Macro International website, after user registration.

11. If you are collecting primary data, how will you identify and approach the participants to recruit them to your study?

Please upload a copy of the information sheet if you are using one – or if you are not using one please explain why.

The data collection team will first prepare letters for the Mayor and Barangay (Village) Captains and bring them during courtesy calls to the local chief executives to explain the study objectives and request permission to recruit participants for the focus group discussion. We will also contact local agencies who may be able to assist with recruitment and identifying study participants. Typically, the chief executives refer the data collection team to Barangay Health Workers (BHWs) for recruitment support because the BHWs are in direct and regular contact with the people in the villages/communities. The collection team then approaches households to recruit participants. The data collection leader explains the objectives of the FGD, what it means for them to participate and answers any queries the prospective participants may have. They will also provide an information sheet reiterating study information translated into Filipino for the prospective participant to review.

Once the prospective participant agrees to join the FGD, he/she is informed of the venue and time of the FGD. The same procedures are used in both urban and rural areas.

12. Will participants be taking part in your study without their knowledge and consent at the time (e.g. covert observation of people)? If yes, please explain why this is necessary.

No

13. If you answered 'no' to question 13, how will you obtain the consent of participants?

Please upload a copy of the consent form if you are using one – or if you are not using one please explain why.

Participants will be briefed verbally regarding the nature of the study and what the focus group discussion will involve when they are recruited, and this will be reiterated more fully at the start

of the focus group discussion. At the discussion, the moderator will again go over the study objectives and how the focus group discussion will proceed, using the script as a guide. The moderator will distribute a short consent form translated into Filipino and explain the contents and give subjects an opportunity to voice any queries or concerns. Following this, the moderator will ask participants who would still like to proceed to sign the consent form.

14. Is there any reason to believe participants may not be able to give full informed consent? If yes, what steps do you propose to take to safeguard their interests?

No- we plan to only speak with people over 18 years of age in the local language.

15. If participants are under the responsibility or care of others (such as parents/carers, teachers or medical staff) what plans do you have to obtain permission to approach the participants to take part in the study?

N/A

16. Describe what participation in your study will involve for study participants. Please attach copies of any questionnaires and/or interview schedules and/or observation topic list to be used

In order to participate, potential subjects must be counselled on how the study will proceed, what will be expected from participants, and the risks involved. After this, participants who are interested will have the opportunity to ask questions and make a decision about whether they would like to participate. Finally, participants will return to a pre-determined place and time for a 1-2 hour group discussion. Participants will again be counselled on study objectives and the risks involved and then be asked to sign a consent form if they are happy to continue. Following this, participants will engage in a 1-2 hour group discussion moderated by a trained researcher.

17. How will you make it clear to participants that they may withdraw consent to participate at any point during the research without penalty?

The recruiting research assistant will inform participants verbally that they may withdraw from the focus group at any time if they feel uncomfortable with the conversation or do not wish to continue for any reason. The focus group discussion moderator will also reiterate this before the

discussion begins so participants know that they may leave at any time for any reason, even after the discussion has begun.

18. Detail any possible distress, discomfort, inconvenience or other adverse effects the participants may experience, including after the study, and you will deal with this.

Discussion topics will include issues such as premarital sex, non-marital pregnancy or births, and non-marital cohabitation. While the discussion will not focus on anyone's personal experiences, some people may find these topics sensitive in nature and feel embarrassment at discussing them. To address this, we will remind participants that they do not need to disclose any information they are uncomfortable discussing, that they may leave the conversation at any time without incurring a penalty, that analysis of all data will not include identifying information, and that all audio recordings of the discussion will be stored in a secure place accessible only to the research team. Finally, we will also remind participants not to share details of the discussion with people outside of the focus group in order to respect the privacy of their fellow study participants.

19. How will you maintain participant anonymity and confidentiality in collecting, analysing and writing up your data?

Analysis will not include any identifying information beyond the variables on which the focus groups are stratified (gender, residence and education).

20. How will you store your data securely during and after the study?

Discussion audio recordings will be stored electronically on a password protected laptop and backed up on a secure online location indefinitely. The password will only be known to the researcher. The laptop will be either in the direct supervision of the researcher or in a locked office at all times during the study.

Paper records will be kept to a minimum during the study, and will be kept in a locked location when not in use or while being transported. Personal information will only be included on printed information where it is essential (e.g. consent forms or interview schedules) and this will be either scanned for secure electronic storage and destroyed, or placed in locked storage, immediately after use. After the study only electronic records of personal data will be retained and stored securely as above.

21. Describe any plans you have for feeding back the findings of the study to participants.

We will not feedback findings to the study participants.

22. What are the main ethical issues raised by your research and how do you intend to manage these?

Because we are collecting data among people from a variety of backgrounds, it is important to ensure that the magnitude of any financial remuneration is not coercive. To this end, we are limiting remuneration to a small sum equivalent to the cost of transportation to attend the focus group discussion. We are also tailoring the remuneration to match the different living costs in rural versus urban areas.

23. Please outline any other information you feel may be relevant to this submission.

O.2 Focus Group Discussion Guide

The focus group will be semi structured in nature and will be guided by a trained moderator. The moderator will ensure that participants stay on topic but will encourage participants to have a dialogue with each other, guided by the following questions and probes, instead of enforcing a strict "Q&A" style where each participant takes turns answering each question. This discussion guide consists of a set of prompts to engage the participants in the discussion.

Icebreakers: Moderator will begin the focus group discussion with informal icebreaker questions to put respondents at ease with each other and comfortable speaking.

Part 1 – Marriage

Notes for moderator: The purpose of this section is to ask people about whether they value marriage as an institution and whether they feel it is necessary as a framework for life or relationships.

1) What do you think are reasons for getting married?

Probes: For financial support? For love & to have a stimulating relationship? In order to have children? Because you or your partner are pregnant? In order to make your parents happy? In order to fit into society? Do you think all these things are important?

2) Do you think everyone needs a spouse in order to be happy and fulfilled? Does it matter if you are married to the spouse or not?

Probe: Can you have a happy or meaningful life without having a spouse? Do you think people in relationships are happier than single people? What about married people and people who live together?

Appendix O

3) Do you think a couple can be serious and committed to each other even if they are not married?

Probe: For example, can a couple be serious and committed to each other if they are living in together and not married

4) Do you think marriage protects people from unfortunate circumstances? What rights do you think you have when you get married that unmarried live in couples wouldn't have?

Probe: For example, if a couple is married and the man dies or leaves the family, do you think being married will protect the woman by guaranteeing her inheritance of his property and assets, or by requiring the man to pay spousal/child support?

5) Is there an age by which one should be married or does it depend more on your life circumstances- i.e. on your job or your house or your education plans?

Probe: How would you advise your children on if and when they should get married?

6) Divorce is currently not legal in the Philippines. A married couple can get legally separated in the Philippines and live separately but that means that they can't marry other people in the future. What do you think of this law? Do you think divorce should be legal? Do you think it makes people scared to get married or does it make marriages stronger? How do you think this policy has affected families or couples?

FOR COHABITERS: If divorce were legal, would that change your mind about getting married?

Probes: Do you know of anyone who has been hurt or helped by the divorce law? Are people less willing to get married? Does it make marriage stronger? Do you think it hurts or helps people?

Part 2- Cohabitation & Nonmarital Fertility

Notes for moderator: The purpose of this section is to assess people's values and beliefs regarding non-traditional family forms.

7) Some couples live together without getting married. Why do you think some people decide to live together without being married?

Probe: Do you think couples live together as a "trial marriage" or because they got pregnant but aren't ready for marriage ye t? Is it because they can't afford to get married? Is it because their partner may be married to someone else and unable to end the marriage? Or is it because they don't think marriage is important?

8) If people do live together just as a trial marriage, how long should they live together before they eventually marry? Or does it not matter?

9) Sometimes unmarried couples live together for years, buy a house together, or have a baby together and still do not get married. Do you think this is accepted and common in the Philippines?

Probes: Do you know of anyone like this? If so, do you think there is stigma against them?

10) If an unmarried couple gets pregnant, what should they do?

Probe: Should they get married? Is it okay if they just live together? Is it okay for the couple to live apart and raise the child separately from two different households?

11) There are a lot of Catholic people in the Philippines and yet at the same time the number of people living together and having children without being married is rising. Since this is, in some ways, contrary to Catholic teaching, do you think you can be a good Catholic and still engage in these practices? Do you know anyone who is Catholic but who might be living with a partner or have a child without being married? / How do you think one's religion can affect his/her decision on marriage?

Part 3

A. Cohabiters Only

12) Why are you in a live in relationship?

Probes: Do you feel like the relationship is not ready for marriage? Do you feel like you cannot afford to get married? Do you feel like getting married is unimportant? If you decided to live together because you or your spouse became pregnant, do you think you would have made the same decision if you hadn't gotten pregnant?

13) Do you plan to marry sometime in the future?

14) Have you ever been married before?

B. Married Only

15) Have you ever lived with a partner?

16) Did you live with your husband/wife before you got married? If yes, do you think it made your marriage stronger?

Appendix O

17) Why did you eventually get married?

Part 4- Childbearing

Notes for moderator: The purpose of this section is to assess people's values and beliefs regarding childbearing.

18) What about having children? Do you think it is important in life to have children? Can you have a meaningful life without children?

Probes: Do you think children are important to have someone to care for you in old age? Do you think raising children can be too expensive or too much work? What advantages or disadvantages do you think children bring to your life?

19) When is the best time for couples to have children? Does it depend on whether they are married or not?

Probes: Should it be right after they get married or is it best to wait a few years? Can it be anytime, as long as they *eventually* get married? Can it be anytime, as long as they *eventually* live together?

20) Sometimes, children are born to parents who are not married. Do you think there is still stigma against unmarried parents or their children? Do you think this is a problem in the Philippines?

Probes: Do you think the children would get made fun of at school? Do you think the parents would be embarrassed? Do you think both the mother and the father would be embarrassed?

Part 4 – Gender

21) Sometimes a couple live together and share household chores (cooking, cleaning, laundry). What do you think the best way to divide up these chores is?

Probes: How do you and your partner divide up these chores?

22) What do you think are priorities in your life (such as work, family, finding time to take care of yourself and do things you enjoy?) Do you think these priorities change once you get a partner or have children? Do you think men and women have different priorities? Taking care of yourself, your family and your work are the three most important things in life and at any one time, you can only take care of two of them- the other one must suffer.

Probes: Do you agree? If you do, which two would you select? Do you think men and women would select different ones?

Thank you all so much for being a part of the discussion today. It was wonderful to hear your thoughts on these important issues. If you have any questions later, please feel free to contact anyone on the research team. As a thank you for your time, we have some light refreshments that we invite you to enjoy.

Thesis Bibliography

(1987). The Family Code of the Philippines. G. o. t. Philippines. **Executive Number 209**.

2011. *2011 Family Health Survey* Philippines:

Abada, Teresa and Eric Y. Tenkorang. 2012. Women's autonomy and unintended pregnancies in the Philippines, *Journal of Biosocial Science* **44**(6): 703-718.

Abalos, J. B. 2017. Divorce and separation in the Philippines: Trends and correlates, *Demographic Research* **36**(50): 1515-1548.

Abalos, Jeofrey. B. 2014. Trends and Determinants of Age at Union of Men and Women in the Philippines, *Journal of Family Issues* **35**(12): 1624-1641.

Alesina, Alberto and Paola Giuliano (2013). Family Ties Working Paper 18966. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series

Anderson, T. and H. P. Kohler. 2013. Education Fever and the East Asian Fertility Puzzle: A case study of low fertility in South Korea, *Asian Popul Stud* **9**(2): 196-215.

Arguillas, Joy and Lindy Williams. 2012. Correlates of non-marriage in the Philippines, *Philippine Population Review* **2**(1).

Asis, Maruja. 1994. Family Ties in a World Without Borders, *Philippine Sociological Review* **42**(1/4): 16-26.

Atoh, Makoto, Vasantha Kandiah, and Serguey Ivanov. 2004. The Second Demographic Transition in Asia? Comparative Analysis of the Low Fertility Situation in East and South-East Asian Countries, *The Japanese Journal of Population* **12**(1): 42-75.

Barbour, R. 2007. *Doing Focus Groups* Los Angeles SAGE Publications Ltd.

Battistella, Graziano and Maruja Asis. 2013. *Country Migration Report*. Makati City, Philippines:

Thesis Bibliography

Bauman, Z. 2003. *Liquid Love: On The Frailty of Human Bonds*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Beck, Ulrich. 1992. *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity* Sage

Beck, Ulrich and Beck-Gernsheim. 1995. *The Normal Chaos of Love*. Cambridge: Polity Press

Beck, Ulrich and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim. 2001. *Individualization: Institutionalized Individualism and its Social and Political Consequences* London: SAGE.

Beck, Ulrich and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim (2012) Families. The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Globalization

Becker, Gary S. 1960. An Economic Analysis of Fertility, in (eds), *Demographic and Economic Change in Developed Countries* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Becker, Gary S. 1991. *A Treatise on the family*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

Bejanyan, K., T. Marshall, and N. Ferenczi. 2015. Associations of Collectivism with Relationship Commitment, Passion, and Mate Preferences: Opposing Roles of Parental Influence and Family Allocentrism, *PLOS One* **10**(2).

Bennhold, Katrin (2011). From afar, moneymaker and mother. The New York Times. New York.

Berghammer, C., K. Fliegenschnee, and E. Schmidt. 2014. Cohabitation and Marriage in Austria: Assessing the Individualization Thesis Across the Life Course, *Demographic Research* **31**(37): 1137-1166.

Berrington, A. and Ian Diamond. 2000. Marriage or Cohabitation: A Competing Risks Analysis of First-Partnership Formation Among the 1958 British Birth Cohort, *Royal Statistical Society* **163**(2): 127-151.

Berrington, A., B. Perelli-Harris, and Paulina Trevena. 2015. Commitment and the changing sequence of cohabitation, childbearing, and marriage: Insights from qualitative research in the UK, *Demographic Research* **33**(12): 327-362.

Bloor, Michael, Jane Frankland, Michelle Thomas, and Kate Robson. 2001. *Introducing Qualitative Methods: Focus Groups in Social Research*. London: SAGE Publications Ltd.

Bongaarts, John and John B. Casterline. 2013. Fertility Transition: Is sub-Saharan Africa Different?, *Population and Development Review* **38**(1): 153-168.

Brown, Susan. 2003. Relationship Quality Dynamics of Cohabiting Unions, *Journal of Family Issues* **24**(5).

Bryant, John. 1998. Communism, Poverty and Demographic Change in North Vietnam, *Population and Development Review* **24**(2): 235-269.

Bryant, John. 2007. Theories of fertility decline and the evidence from development indicators, *Population and Development Review* **33**(1): 101-127.

Bulatao, Rodolfo. 1975. *The Value of Children: A Cross-National Study*. Honolulu, Hawaii: U. P. o. Hawaii.

Bulatao, Rodolfo. 1978. *The value of a Filipino child: Pleasure and profit against cost and concerns*. Population of the Philippines ESCAP Country Monograph 5.Bangkok:

Bulcroft, Richard, Kris Bulcroft, and Karen Bradley. 2000. The Management and Production of Risk in Romantic Relationships: A Postmodern Paradox, *Journal of Family History*.

Bumpass, Larry, Ronald Rindfuss, M. K. Choe, and Noriko Tsuya. 2009. The Institutional Context of Low Fertility *Asian Population Studies* **5**(3).

Cabato, Regine (2017). This Might be your Last Year to Access Birth Control CNN Philippines. Manila.

Caldwell, John C. 1980. Mass education as a determinant of the timing of fertility decline, *Population and Development Review* **6**(2): 225-255.

Cardoso, J. and S. Thompson. 2010. Common Themes of Resilience Among Latino Immigrant Families: A Systematic Review of the Literature, *The Journal of Contemporary Social Services* **91**(3): 257-265.

Carmichael, Gordon and Andrea Whittaker. 2007. Living Together in Australia: Qualitative Insights into a Complex Phenomenon, *Journal of Family Issues* **13**(2): 202-223.

Casterline, John B. 2001. Diffusion processes and fertility transition, in J. B. Casterline (eds), *Diffusion processes and fertility transition*. Washington DC: National Academies Press.

Casterline, John B. and M. Midea M. Kabamalan (2010). The Growing Significance of Nonmarital Fertility in the Philippines. 11th National Convention on Statistics.

Castro-Martin, Teresa. 2002. Consensual Unions in Latin America: Persistence of a Dual Nuptiality System, *Journal of Comparative Family Studies* **33**(1): 35-55.

Cauce, A. and M. Domenech-Rodriguez. 2002. Latino Families: Myths and Realities, in (eds), *Latino Children and Families in the United States: Current Research and Future Directions* **pp.**3-25

Chayovan, N. 1989. *Marriage registration among Thai women*. Demographic and Health Surveys Further Analysis Series. 1.Bangkok, Thailand:

Chen, Yen-Chun Cheryl and Jui-Chung Allen Li. 2014. Family Change in East Asia in J. Treas, J. Scott and M. Richards (eds), *The Wiley Blackwell Companion to the Sociology of Families*. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. **1**, **pp.**61-82.

Cherlin, Andrew. 2012. Goode's World Revolution and Family Patterns: A reconsideration at fifty years *Population and Development Review* **38**(4): 577-607.

Cherlin, Andrew J. 2004. The Deinstitutionalization of American Marriage, *Journal of Marriage and Family* **66**(4): 848-861.

Choe, M. K. 2002. *Tradition and Change in Marriage and Family Life*. The Future of Population in Asia E. W. Center.

Choe, M. K., Hui-Sheng Lin, Chai Podhisita, and Corazon Raymundo. 2001. *Sex and Marriage: How Closely are They Related in the Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand*. East West Working Papers

Choe, Minja Kim, Hui-Sheng Lin, Chai Podhisita, and Corazon Raymundo. 2001. Sex and marriage: How closely are they related in the Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand, *East-West Center* **108-14**.

Cleland, John. 2002. Education and future fertility trends, with special reference to mid-transitional countries, in (eds), *Completing the fertility transition*. United Nations **48/49**, **pp.**187-202.

Coale, Ainsley J. 1973. The Demographic Transition Reconsidered *IUSSP International Population Conference, Liege, Belgium 1973.*

Coleman, David. 2004. Why we don't have to believe without doubting in the "Second Demographic Transition" - some agnostic comments, *Vienna Yearbook of Population Research* **2**: 11-24.

Coleman, Jasmine (2011). World's 'seven billionth baby' is born. The Guardian.

Corbin, Juliet and Anselm Strauss. 2008. *Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory*. Thousand Oaks, California:

Costello, Marilou P. and John B. Casterline. 2002. Fertility decline in the Philippines: Current status, future prospects, in (eds), *Completing the fertility transition*. United Nations. **48/49**, **pp.**479-486.

Coviello, Vincenzo and May Boggess. 2004. Cumulative incidence estimation in the presence of competing risks, *The Stata Journal* **4**(2): 103-112.

Covre-Sussai, Maira, Bart Meuleman, Sarah Botterman, and Koen Matthijs. 2015. Traditional and Modern Cohabitation in Latin America: A Comparative Typology, *Demographic Research* **32**(32): 873-914

Curtin, S.C., S.J. Ventura, and G.M. Martinez. 2014. Recent Declines in Nonmarital Childbearing in the United States *NCHS Data Brief* **162**: 1-8.

Darroch, Jacqueline E., Susheela Singh, Haley Ball, and Josefina Cabigon. 2009. *Meeting women's contraceptive needs in the Philippines*. In Brief. New York:

de Vera, Ben O. and Jhesset O. Enano (2017). Attitudes toward marriage changing. Inquirer.

Diaz, Ramona (2017). Birth Place. New York Times.

Dommaraju, Premchand and Gavin W. Jones. 2011. Divorce Trends in Asia, *Asian Journal of Social Science* **39**(6): 725-750.

Duncan, S., A. Barlow, and G. James. 2005. Why Don't They Marry- Cohabitation, Commitment and DIY Marriage, *Child and Family Law Quarterly* **17**: 383-398.

Edin, Kathryn and Maria Kefalas. 2005. *Promises I can keep: Why poor women put motherhood before marriage* University of California Press

Esara, Pilapa. 2012. Moral Scrutiny, Marriage Inequality: Cohabitation in Bangkok, Thailand, *The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology* **13**(3): 211-227.

Espiritu, Y.L. 2001. "We Don't Sleep Around Like White Girls Do:" Family, Culture and Gender in Filipina American Lives, *Signs* **26**(2): 415-440.

Esteve, Albert, Joan Garcia-Roman, and Ron Lesthaeghe. 2012. The Family Context of Cohabitation and Single Motherhood in Latin America, *Population and Development Review*

38(4): 707-727.

Esteve, Albert, Ron Lesthaeghe, and Antonio Lopez-Gay. 2012. The Latin American Cohabitation Boom, 1970-2007, *Population and Development Review* **38**(1): 55-81.

Esteve, Albert, Luis Angel Lopez-Ruiz, and Jeroen Spijker. 2013. Disentangling how educational expansion did not increase women's age at union formation in Latin America from 1970-2000, *Demographic Research* **28**(3): 63-76.

Feng, Wang and Yang Quanhe. 1996. Age at Marriage and the First Birth Interval: The Emerging Change in Sexual Behavior Among Young Couples in China, *Population and Development Review* **22**(2): 299-320.

Filmer, Deon and Lant H. Pritchett. 2001. Estimating wealth effects without expenditure data- or tears: An application to educational enrollments in states of India, *Demography* **38**(1): 115-132.

Flick, U. 2009. *An Introduction to Qualitative Research 4th Edition*. Los Angeles: Sage

Francia, Luis H. 2010. *A History of the Philippines: From Indios Bravos to Filipinos* The Overlook Press

Freedman, Ronald (1995). Asia's recent fertility decline and prospects for future demographic change. Honolulu, East-West Center **1**.

Frejka, Tomas, Gavin W. Jones, and Jean-Paul Sardon. 2010. East Asian Childbearing Patterns and Policy Developments, *Population and Development Review* **36**(3): 579-606.

Frejka, Tomas and Tomáš Sobotka. 2008. Fertility in Europe: Diverse, delayed, and below replacement, *Demographic Research* **19**(3): 15-46.

Ghosh, Saswata. 2016. Second Demographic Transition or Aspirations in Transition: An Exploratory Analysis of Lowest Low Fertility in Kolkata, India, *Asian Population Studies*.

Gibson-Davis, Christina, Kathryn Edin, and Sara McLanahan. 2005. High Hopes But Even Higher Expectations: The Retreat From Marriage Among Low-Income Couples, *Journal of Marriage and Family* **67**(1301-1312).

Giddens, Anthony. 1992. *The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love and Intimacy in Modern Societies*. Cambridge: Polity

Giddens, Anthony. 1994. Risk, Trust, Reflexivity, in (eds), *Reflexive Modernization*. **pp.**184-197.

Gipson, J. D., S. A. Gultiano, J. L. Avila, and M. J. Hindin. 2012. Old ideals and new realities: the changing context of young people's partnerships in Cebu, Philippines, *Cult Health Sex* **14**(6): 613-627.

Gipson, Jessica D. and Andrew L. Hicks. 2016. The delinking of sex and marriage: Pathways to fertility among young Filipino women, *Journal of Biosocial Science* **26**: 1-14.

Gipson, Jessica D., Alanna E. Hirz, and Josephine L. Avila. 2011. Perceptions and practices of illegal abortion among urban young adults in the Philippines: A qualitative study *Studies in Family Planning* **42**(4): 261-272.

Gloria, Charmian K. 2007. Who needs divorce in the Philippines?, *Mindanao Law Journal* **1**: 18-28.

Go, Stella. 1993. *The Filipino Family in the Eighties*. Manila: De La Salle University

Goldscheider, Frances, Eva Bernhardt, and Trude Lappegard. 2015. The Gender Revolution: A Framework for Understanding Changing Family and Demographic Behavior, *Population and Development Review* **41**(2): 207-239.

Goode, William J. 1963. *World revolution and family patterns* New York: The Free Press

Goode, William J. 1993. *World Change in Divorce Patterns*. New Haven: Yale University Press

Grace, Kathryn and Stuart Sweeney. 2014. Pathways to marriage and cohabitation in Central America *Demographic Research* **30**(6): 187-226.

Graham, Elspeth and Lucy P. Jordan. 2011. Migrant Parents and the Psychological Well-Being of Left Behind Children in Southeast Asia, *Journal of Marriage and Family* **73**: 763-787.

Herrin, Alejandro N. 2002. Fertility change and economic growth: East Asia and the Philippines, *Philippine Population Review* **1**(1).

Herrin, Alejandro N. 2007. Development of the Philippines' Family Planning Program: The Early Years 1967-1980, in J. Ross and W. Robinson (eds), *The Global Family Planning Revolution*. Washington D.C: World Bank.

Heuveline, P. and J. M. Timberlake. 2004. The Role of Cohabitation in Family Formation: The United States in Comparative Perspective *Journal of Marriage and Family* **66**: 1214-1230.

Hiekel, N. and R. Keizer. 2015. Risk Avoidance or Utmost Commitment? Dutch Focus Group Research on Cohabitation and Marriage, *Demographic Research* **32**(10): 311-340.

Hiekel, N., Aart C. Liefbroer, and Anne-Rigt Poortman. 2014. Understanding Diversity in the Meaning of Cohabitation Across Europe, *European Journal of Population* **30**(4): 391-410.

Hiekel, Nicole and Teresa Castro-Martin. 2014. Grasping the Diversity of Cohabitation: Fertility Intentions Among Cohabiters Across Europe, *The Journal of Marriage and Family* **76**(3): 489-505.

Hirschman, Charles (2001). Fertility transition in Southeast Asia. International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences. N. J. Smelser and P. B. Baltes. Oxford, Elsevier. **8:** 5597-5602.

Hirschman, Charles and Sabrina Bonaparte. 2012. Population and Society in Southeast Asia: A Historical Perspective in L. Williams and P. Guest (eds), *Demographic Change in Southeast Asia*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University

Hirschman, Charles and Philip Guest. 1990. The emerging demographic transitions of Southeast Asia, *Population and Development Review* **16**(1): 121-152.

Hirschman, Charles and B Teerawichitchainan. 2003. Cultural and socioeconomic influences on divorce during modernization: Southeast Asia, 1940s to 1960s, *Population and Development Review* **29**(2): 215-254.

Hirschman, Charles and Yih-Jin Young. 2000. Social Context and Fertility Decline in Southeast Asia: 1968-70 to 1988-90, *Population and Development Review* **26**: 11-39.

Hoem, Jan M. and Dora Kostova. 2008. Early traces of the Second Demographic Transition in Bulgaria: A joint analysis of marital and non-marital union formation, 1960-2004, *Popul Stud (Camb)* **62**(3): 259-271.

Huang, Penelope, Pamela J. Smock, W.D Manning, and C. A. Bergstrom-Lynch. 2011. He Says: She Says: Gender and Cohabitation, *Journal of Family Issues* **32**(7).

Hukin, Eleanor. 2014. Cambodia's fertility transition: The dynamics of contemporary childbearing, *Population and Development Review* **40**(4): 605-628.

Hull, Terence H. 2011. Statistical Indices of Marriage Patterns in Insular Southeast Asia, in G. W. Jones, T. H. Hull and M. Mohamad (eds), *Changing Marriage Patterns in Southeast Asia*. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.

Hull, Terence H. 2012. Fertility in Southeast Asia in L. Williams and P. Guest (eds), *Demographic Change in Southeast Asia*. Ithaca: Cornell University

Hussain, Rubina and Lawrence B. Finer. 2013. *Unintended pregnancy and abortion in the Philippines*. In Brief. 3.New York G. Institute.

ICF. 2014. *Philippines National Demographic and Health Survey 2013*. Manila, Philippines and Rockville, Maryland: I. International and P. S. Authority.

Isupova, O. 2015. Trust, Responsibility, and Freedom: Focus-group Research on Contemporary Patterns of Union Formation in Russia, *Demographic Research* **32**(11): 341-368.

Jalovaara, Marika. 2012. Socio-economic resources and first-union formation in Finland, cohorts born 1969–81, *Popul Stud (Camb)* **66**(1): 69-85.

Jampaklay, Aree and Fariha Haseen. 2011. Marital Unions and Unmarried Cohabitation in Bangkok, Thailand, *Asian Population Studies* **7**(2): 137-156.

Jampaklay, Aree and Aksarapak Lucktong. 2015. Cohabitation: the case of Thailand, in S. Quah (eds), *Routledge Handbook of Families in Asia*.

Jejeebhoy, Shireen J. 1995. *Women's education, autonomy and reproductive behaviour: Experiences from developing countries*. Oxford, United Kingdom: Clardendon Press

Jensen, E. R. and D. A. Ahlburg. 2004. Why Does Migration Decrease Fertility? Evidence from the Philippines, *Popul Stud (Camb)* **58**(2): 219-231.

Johnson, M. 1991. Commitment to personal relationships, in W. Jones and D. Periman (eds), *Advances in Personal Relationships* London: Jessica Kingsley **3**, **pp.**117-143.

Jones, Gavin W. 1990. Fertility transitions among Malay populations of Southeast Asia: puzzles of interpretation, *Population and Development Review* **16**(3): 507-537.

Jones, Gavin W. 2005. The "Flight from Marriage" in South-East and East Asia *Journal of Comparative Family Studies* **36**(1): 93-119.

Jones, Gavin W. 2007. Delayed Marriage and Very Low Fertility in Pacific Asia *Population and Development Review* **33**(3): 453-478.

Jones, Gavin W. 2010. *Changing Patterns of Marriage in Asia*. ARI Working Paper Series 131. N. U. o. Singapore.

Jones, Gavin W. and Bina Gubhaju. 2009. Factors Influencing Changes in Mean Age at First Marriage and Proportions Never Marrying in the Low-Fertility Countries of East and Southeast Asia, *Asian Population Studies* **5**(3): 237-265.

Jones, Gavin W., Terence H. Hull, and Maznah Mohamad. 2011. Marriage Trends in Insular Southeast Asia: Their Economic and Socio-Cultural Dimension, in G. W. Jones, T. H. Hull and M. Mohamad (eds), *Changing Marriage Patterns in Southeast Asia*. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.

Juarez, Fatima, Josefina Cabigon, Susheela Singh, and Rubina Hussain. 2005. The incidence of induced abortion in the Philippines: Current level and recent trends, *International Family Planning Perspectives* **31**(2): 140-149.

Kabamalan, M. Midea M. 2011. Cohabitation and Poverty in the Philippines, in G. W. Jones, T. H. Hull and M. Mohamad (eds), *Changing Marriage Patterns in Southeast Asia*. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.

Kabamalan, Maria Midea. 2004. New Path to Marriage The Significance of Increasing Cohabitation in the Philippines, *Philippines Population Review* **3**(1): 112-129.

Kabamalan, Maria Midea and Nimfa B. Ogena. 2013. Marriage as ideal cohabitation as practical: Revisiting meanings of marriage in the Philippines *IUSSP XXVII International Population Conference, Busan, Korea 2013.*

Kagitcibasi, C. 1997. Individualism and Collectivism, in J. Berry, M. Segall and C. Kagitcibasi (eds), *Handbook of Cross-Cultural Psychology*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. **3**, **pp.**1-49.

Kan, Man-Yee and Ekaterina Hertog. 2017. Domestic division of labour and fertility preference in China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, *Demographic Research* **36**(18): 557-588.

Karnow, Stanley. 1989. *In our image : America's empire in the Philippines*. New York: Random House.

Kennedy, Sheela and Larry Bumpass. 2008. Cohabitation and children's living arrangements: New estimates from the United States, *Demographic Research* **19**(47): 1663-1692.

Kiernan, Kathleen. 2001. The Rise of Cohabitation and Childbearing Outside Marriage in Western Europe, *International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family* **15**: 1-21.

Kiernan, Kathleen. 2004. Redrawing the Boundaries of Marriage, *Journal of Marriage and Family* **66**: 980-987.

Kiernan, Kathleen. 2004. Unmarried Cohabitation and Parenthood in Britain and Europe, *Law & Policy* **26**(1): 33-55.

Klarner, A. 2015. The Low Importance of Marriage in Eastern Germany- Social Norms and the Role of People's Perceptions of the Past, *Demographic Research* **33**(9): 239-272.

Klarner, A. and A. Knabe. 2017. On the Normative Foundations of Marriage and Cohabitation: Results from Groups Discussions in Eastern and Western Germany, *Demographic Research* **36**(53): 1637-1666.

Knodel, John E., Napaporn Havanon, and Anthony Pramualratana. 1984. Fertility transition in Thailand: A qualitative analysis, *Population and Development Review* **10**(2): 297-328.

Knodel, John E. and M Wongsith. 1991. Family Size and Children's Education in Thailand: Evidence from a National Sample, *Demography* **28**(1): 119-131.

Kobayashi, Karen and Ruth Kampen. 2015. Cohabitation in Asia, in S. Quah (eds), *Routledge Handbook of Families in Asia*.

Krueger, Richard and Mary Anne Casey. 2014. *Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied Research* Sage

Kuang, Bernice, B. Perelli-Harris, and Sabu Padmadas (2016). The Unexpected Rise of Cohabitation in the Philippines: Evidence for a Negative Educational Gradient. Population Association of America. Washington D.C.

Kuang, Bernice and Brienna Perelli-Harris (2017). How have pro-natalist values and rising nonmarital fertilty shaped fertility trends in the Philippines? A mixed methods exploration. Population Association of America Annual Meeting. Chicago

Kyung-Sup, Chang and Song Min-Young. 2010. The stranded individualizer under compressed modernity: South Korean women in individualization without individualism, *The British Journal of Sociology* **61**(3).

Lai, Siow-Li and Nai-Peng Tey. 2014. Socio-economic and proximate determinants of fertility in the Philippines, *2014* **31**(10): 1828-1836.

Laplante, Benoit, Teresa Castro-Martin, Clara Cortina, and Ana Laura Fostik. 2016. The contributions of childbearing within marriage and within consensual union to fertility in Latin America, 1980-2010, *Demographic Research* **34**(29): 827-844.

Laplante, Benoit, Teresa Castro Martin, and Clara Cortina. 2015. Childbearing within marriage and consensual union in Latin America, 1980-2010, *Population and Development Review* **41**(1): 85-108.

Laranas, Gin de Mesa (2016). Will the Philippines finally legalize divorce? New York Times. New York.

Lesthaeghe, R. 2010. The Unfolding Story of Second Demographic Transition *Population and Development Review* **36**(2): 211-251.

Lesthaeghe, R. 2011. The "Second Demographic Transition": A Conceptual Map for the Understanding of Late Modern Demographic Developments in Fertility and Family Formation, *Historical Social Research* **36**(136): 179-218.

Lesthaeghe, R. 2014. The Second Demographic Transition: A Concise Overview of its Development, *Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A* **111**(51): 18112-18115.

Lesthaeghe, R. and D.J. van de Kaa. 1986. Twee demografische transities ?, in R. Lesthaeghe and D. J. van de Kaa (eds), *Bevolking: Groei en Krimp*. Deventer: Van Loghum Slaterus, **pp.**9-24.

Lewis, J. 2001. *The End of Marriage? Individualism and Intimate Relations*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Liamputtong, P. 2011 *Focus Group Methodology: Principles and Practice*. London: Sage

Lichter, Daniel, Zhenchao Qian, and Leanna Mellott. 2006. Marriage or Dissolution? Union Transitions Among Poor Cohabiting Women, *Demography* **43**(2): 223-240.

Lichter, Daniel, Sharon Sassler, and Richard Turner. 2014. Cohabitation, Post-Conception Unions, and the Rise in Nonmarital Fertility, *Social Science Research* **47**: 134-147.

Macdonald, G., T. Marshall, J. Gere, A. Shimotomai, and J. Lies. 2012. Valuing Romantic Relationships: The Roles of Family Approval Across Cultures, *Cross-Cultural Research* **46**: 366-393.

Manning, W.D and Pamela J. Smock. 2005. Measuring and modeling cohabitation: New perspectives from qualitative data, *Journal of Marriage and Family* **67**(4): 989.

Martin, Teresa Castro. 1995. Women's education and fertility: Results from 26 Demographic and Health Surveys *Studies in Family Planning* **26**(4): 187-202.

Maslow, A.H. 1943. A Theory of Human Motivation, *Psychological Review* **50**(4): 370-396.

Mason, Karen Oppenheim. 1987. The impact of women's social position on fertility in developing countries, *Sociological Forum* **2**(4): 718-745.

McDonald, Peter. 2000. Gender Equity in Theories of Fertilty Transition, *Population and Development Review* **26**(3): 427-439.

McKinley, William (1903). Interview with President William McKinley. J. Rusling. The Christian Advocate.

McLanahan, Sara. 2004. Diverging Destinies: How Children Are Faring Under the Second Demographic Transition, *Demography* **41**(4): 607-627.

Medina, Belen T. 2015. *The Filipino Family 3rd Edition*. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press

Medina, Belen T. and Ellseo A. de Guzman. 1994. Filipino Families and Households in Three Selected Philippine Areas, *Philippine Sociological Review* **42**.

Mercer-Blackman, Valerie and Sakiko Tanaka. 2015. *Women in the Workforce : An Unmet Potential in Asia and the Pacific*. Mandaluyong City, Philippines:

Miller, Aurelia. 2008. A Proposal for the Philippines to Legalize Divorce, *Connecticut Journal of International Law* **181**.

Miralao, Virginia A. 1997. The Family, Traditional Values and the Sociocultural Transformation of Philippines Society, *Philippines Sociological Review* **45**(1/4): 189-215.

Morillo, Hannah M., Joseph J. Capuno, and Amado M. Mendoza. 2013. Views and values on family among Filipinos: An empirical exploration, *Asian Journal of Social Science* **41**: 5-28.

Musick, Kelly. 2002. Planned and Unplanned Childbearing Among Unmarried Women, *Journal of Marriage and Family* **64**(4): 915-929.

Musick, Kelly and K Michelmore. 2015. Change in the Stability of Marital and Cohabiting Unions Following the Birth of a Child, *Demography* **52**(5): 1463-1485.

Mynarska, M., A. Baranowska-Rataj, and A. Matysiak. 2014. Free to Stay, Free to Leave: Insights from Poland into the Meaning of Cohabitation, *Demographic Research* **31**(36): 1107-1136.

Nathan, Mathias, Ignacio Pardo, and Wanda Cabella. 2016. Diverging patterns of fertility decline in Uruguay, *Demographic Research* **34**(20): 563-586.

Natividad, Josefina. 2013. Teenage pregnancy in the Philippines: Trends, correlates and data sources, *Journal of the ASEAN Federation of Endocrine Societies* **28**(1): 30-37.

Natividad, Josefina and Maria Paz N. Marquez. 2004. Sexual Risk Behaviours, in C. Raymundo and G. T. Cruz (eds), *Youth Sex and Risk Behaviours in the Philippines*. Quezon City, Philippines: University of the Philippines Population Institute

Notestein, Frank W. 1953. Economic problems of population change, in (eds), *Proceedings of the International Conference of Agricultural Economists*. London: Oxford University Press, **pp.**13-31.

O'Sullivan, Jane N. (2013). Revisiting demographic transition: correlation and causation in the rate of development and fertility decline. IUSSP International Population Conference. Busan, Korea.

Ogena, Angelique Florendo (2015). The role of Filipino women's context of first birth on their fertility and socioeconomic situation. College of Social Sciences and Philosophy Quezon City, University of the Philippines. **Masters of Arts in Demography**.

Orbeta, Aniceto C. 2006. Poverty, fertility preferences, and family planning practices in the Philippines, *Philippines Journal of Development* **33**(1): 129-160.

Padilla, Lysander. 1994. Mobility, Family Formation, and Fertility in a Transitional Society: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis, *Philippine Sociological Review* **42**(1/4): 142-158.

Parrenas, Rhacel Salazar. 2010. Transnational Mothering A Source of Gender Conflicts in the Family *North Carolina Law Review* **88**: 1826-1856.

Pedroso, Luis M. 2008. Respondents' characteristics and fertility preference: the case of Filipino husbands and wives, *Philippine Population Review* **7**(1): 61-73.

Perelli-Harris, B. and Laura Bernardi. 2015. Exploring social norms around cohabitation: The life course, individualization, and culture, *Demographic Research* **33**(25): 701-732.

Perelli-Harris, B., A. Berrington, Nora Sanchez Gassen, Paulina Galezewska, and Jennifer Holland. 2017. The Rise in Divorce and Cohabitation: Is There a Link?, *Population and Development Review* **43**(2): 303-329.

Perelli-Harris, B., Michaela Kreyenfeld, Wendy Sigle-Rushton, R. Keizer, T. Lappegard, Aiva Jasilioniene, C. Berghammer, and P. Di Giulio. 2012. Changes in Union Status During the Transition to Parenthood in Eleven European Countries, 1970s to Early 2000s, *Popul Stud (Camb)* **66**(2).

Perelli-Harris, Brienna and Theodore Gerber. 2011. Nonmarital childbearing in Russia: Second Demographic Transition or Pattern of Disadvantage?, *Demography* **48**: 317-342.

Perelli-Harris, Brienna, Monika Mynarska, Ann Berrington, Caroline Berghammer, Ann Evans, Olga Isupova, Renske Keizer, Andreas Klarner, Trupe Lappegard, and Daniele Vignoli. 2014. Towards a new understanding of cohabitation: Insights from focus group research across Europe and Australia, *Demographic Research* **31**(34): 1043-1078.

Perelli-Harris, Brienna and Nora Sanchez-Gassen. 2012. How Similar Are Cohabitation and Marriage? Legal Approaches to Cohabitation Across Western Europe *Population and Development Review* **38**(3): 435-467.

Perelli-Harris, Brienna, Wendy Sigle-Rushton, Michaela Kreyenfeld, Trude Lappegard, Renske Keizer, and Caroline Berghammer. 2010. The Educational Gradient of Childbearing Within Cohabitation in Europe, *Population and Development Review* **36**(4): 775-801.

PhilCensus (2015). "Highlights of the Philippine Population 2015 Census of Population ". from https://psa.gov.ph/content/highlights-philippine-population-2015-census-population.

PSA (2014). "Statistics on Filipino Women and Men's Labor and Employment." Retrieved December 2017, from http://pcw.gov.ph/statistics/201405/statistics-filipino-women-and-mens-labor-and-employment.

PSA (2015). Philippines in Figures P. S. Authority. Quezon City, Databank and Information Services Division.

PSA (2015). "Poverty in the Philippines." 2016, from https://psa.gov.ph.

PSA (2017). "Philippine Marriages: 2015." Retrieved July 2017, from https://psa.gov.ph/content/philippine-marriages-2015.

Raley, R. Kelly. 2001. Increasing fertility in cohabiting unions: Evidence for the Second Demographic Transition in the United States? , *Demography*

38(1): 59-66.

Raymo, James M. and Miho Iwasawa. 2008. Bridal Pregnancy and Spouse Pairing Patterns in Japan, *Journal of Marriage and Family* **70**: 847-860.

Raymo, James M., Miho Iwasawa, and Larry Bumpass. 2009. Cohabitation and Family Formation in Japan, *Demography* **46**(4): 785-803.

Raymo, James M., Hyunjoon Park, Yu Xie, and Wei-jun Jean Yeung. 2015. Marriage and Family in East Asia: Continuity and Change, *Annual Review of Sociology* **41**(1): 471-492.

Reed, Joanna M. 2006. Not crossing the "extra line": How cohabitors with children view their unions *Journal of Marriage and Family* **68**: 1117-1131.

Reid, Megan and Andrew Golub. 2015. Vetting and Letting : Cohabiting Stepfamily Formation Processes in Low Income Black Families, *Journal of Marriage and Family* **77**: 1234-1249.

Rendall, Michael S., Olivia Ekert-Jaffe, Heather Joshi, Kevin Lynch, and Remi Mougin. 2009. Universal versus economically polarized change in age at first birth: A French British comparison, *Population and Development Review* **35**(1): 89-115.

Ribbens McCarthy, J., R. Edwards, and V. Gillies. 2003. *Making Families: Moral Tales of Parenting and Step-Parenting*. York: Sociology Press

Rindfuss, Ronald and S. Philip Morgan. 1983. Marriage, Sex, and the First Birth Interval: The Quiet Revolution in Asia *Population and Development Review* **9**(2): 259-278.

Rosero-Bixby, Luis, Teresa Castro-Martin, and Teresa Martin-Garcia. 2009. Is Latin America Starting to Retreat from Early and Universal Childbearing?, *Demographic Research* **20**(9): 169-194.

Sabogal, F., G. Marin, R. Otero-Sabogal, B. Marin, and E.J. Perez-Stable. 1987. Hispanic Familism and Acculturation: What Changes and What Doesn't, *Hispanic Journal of Behavioural Sciences* **9**(4).

Sassler, Sharon. 2004. The Process of Entering Into Cohabiting Unions, *The Journal of Marriage and Family* **66**(2): 491-505.

Sassler, Sharon and Anna Cunningham. 2008. How Cohabitors View Childbearing, *Sociological Perspectives* **51**(1).

Sassler, Sharon and Amanda J. Miller. 2011. Class Differences in Cohabitation Processes, *Family Relations* **60**: 163-177.

Sassler, Sharon, Amanda J. Miller, and Sarah Favinger. 2008. Planned Parenthood? Fertility Intentions and Experiences Among Cohabiting Couples, *Journal of Family Issues* **30**(2).

Sawhill, Isabel. 2014. *Drifting into Sex and Parenthood without Marriage* Brookings Institution Press.

Schoumaker, Bruno. 2013. A Stata module for computing fertility rates and TFRs from birth histories: tfr2, *Demographic Research* **28**(38): 1093-1144.

Scott, Mindy, Bradford Wilcox, Renee Ryberg, and Laurie Derose. 2015. *Mapping Family Change and Child Well-Being Outcomes*. Washington D.C:

Seltzer, Judith. 2000. Families Formed Outside of Marriage *Journal of Marriage and Family* **62**: 1247-1268.

Seltzer, Judith. 2004. Cohabitation in the United States and Britain: Demography, Kinship, and the Future, *Journal of Marriage and Family* **66**: 921-928.

Smart, C. and Shipman. 2004. Visions in Monochrome: Families, Marriage and the Individualization Thesis, *The British Journal of Sociology* **55**(4): 491-509.

Smart, C. and P. Stevens. 2000. *Cohabitation Breakdown*. London: Family Policy Studies Centre

Smock, Pamela J. 2000. Cohabitation in the United States: An Appraisal of Research Themes, Findings, and Implications, *Annual Review of Sociology* **26**: 1-20.

Smock, Pamela J., W.D Manning, and Meredith Porter. 2005. "Everything's There Except Money": How Money Shapes Decisions to Marry Among Cohabitors, *Journal of Marriage and Family* **67**(3): 680-696.

Sobotka, Tomáš. 2008. Overview Chapter 6: The diverse faces of the Second Demographic Transition in Europe, *Demographic Research* **19**: 171-224.

Soulsby, Laura and Kate Bennett. 2017. When Two Become One: Exploring Identity in Marriage and Cohabitation, *Journal of Family Issues* **38**(3): 358-380.

Stewart, D.W., P.N. Shamdasani, and D.W. Rook. 2007. *Focus Groups: Theory and Practice*. Thousand Oaks: Sage

Sullivan, Rachel. 2005. Age Pattern of First Birth Rates Among US Women *Demography* **42**(2): 259-273.

Surkyn, Johan and Ron Lesthaeghe. 2004. Value Orientations and the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) in Northern, Western and Southern Europe: An Update, *Demographic Research* **Special Collection 3**: 45-86.

SWS (2015). Social Weather Stations. S. W. Surveys. Quezon City, Philippines

Tamis-LeMonda, C., N. Way, D. Hughes, H. Yoshikawa, R. Kalman, and E. Niwa. 2008. Parents' Goals for Children: The Dynamic Coexistence of Individualism and Collectivism in Cultures and Individuals, *Social Development* **17**(1).

Tarroja, Maria 2010. Revisiting the Definition and Concept of Filipino Family: A Psychological Perspective, *Philippines Journal of Psychology* **43**(2): 17-193.

Thornton, Arland. 2001. The Developmental Paradigm, Reading History Sideways, and Family Change, *Demography* **38**(4): 449-465.

Thornton, Arland, William G. Axinn, and Yu Xie. 2007. *Marriage and Cohabitation*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press

Triandis, H.C. 1995. *New Directions in Social Psychology: Individualism and Collectivism*. Boulder: Westview Press.

UN. 2015. *World Population Prospects*. New York U. Nations.

Upadhyay, Ushma and M. J. Hindin. 2007. The Influence of Parents' Marital Relationship and Women's Status on Children's Age at First Sex in Cebu, *Studies in Family Planning* **38**(3): 173-186.

van de Kaa, D.J. 2001. Postmodern Fertility Preferences: From Changing Value Orientation to New Behaviour, *Population and Development Review* **27**: 290-331.

Ventura, E. R and Josefina Cabigon. 2004. Sex-related views, in C. Raymundo and G. T. Cruz (eds), *Youth Sex and Risk Behaviours in the Philippines* Diliman, Quezon City: Demographic Research and Development Foundation and University of the Philippines Population Institute **pp.**121-132.

Vignoli, D. and S. Salvini. 2014. Religion and union formation in Italy: Catholic precepts, social pressure, and tradition, *Demographic Research* **31**(35): 1079-1106.

Walther, Carol S. 2006. Emerging patterns of premarital conception in D. L. Poston, C.-F. Lee, C.-F. Chang, S. L. McKibben and C. S. Walther (eds), *Fertility, family planning and population policy in China*. London: Routledge, **pp.**75-86.

WHO. 2014. *Trends in Maternal Mortality : 1990 to 2013* U. WHO, UNICEF, the World Bank and the United Nations Population Division.

Wiik, K. A., Eva Bernhardt, and Turid Noack. 2009. A Study of Commitment and Relationship Quality in Sweden and Norway *Journal of Marriage and Family* **71**(3): 465-477.

Williams, Lindy and Philip Guest. 2005. Attitudes toward marriage among urban middle-class in Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines, *Journal of Comparative Family Studies* **36**(2): 163-186.

Williams, Lindy, Nimfa Ogena, and Midea Kabamalan. 2007. Cohabitation in the Philippines: Attitudes and Behaviors among Young Women and Men, *Journal of Marriage and Family* **69**(5): 1244-1256.

WVS (2012). World Values Survey Wave 6 2010-2014 W. V. S. Association. Madrid, Spain

Xenos, Peter and M. Midea M. Kabamalan. 2007. Emerging Forms of Union Formation in the Philippines, *Asian Population Studies* **3**(3): 263-286.

YAFS. 2014. *2013 Young adult fertility and sexuality 4 key findings* Quezon City: D. R. a. D. F. a. t. U. o. t. P. P. Institute.

Yan, Yunxiang. 2016. Intergenerational Intimacy and Descending Familism in Rural North China, *American Anthropologist* **118**(2): 244-257.

Yu, Jia and Yu Xie. 2015. Cohabitation in China: trends and determinants, *Population and Development Review* **41**(4): 607-628.

Zhuang, Juzhong, Ravi Kanbur, and Dalisay Maligalig. 2014. Asia's Income Inequalities, in R. Kanbur, C. Rhee and J. Zhuang (eds), *Inequality in Asia and the Pacific* New York: Routledge/Asian Development Bank, **pp.**21-36.

Zosa, Victorina and Aniceto C. Orbeta. 2009. *The Social and Economic Impact of Philippine International Labout Migration and Remittances*. Discussion Paper Series No. 2009-32. Makati City, Philippines: