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Contractivity and invariance in games with vector payoffs

Contractivity and invariance in games with vector payoffs
Contractivity and invariance in games with vector payoffs
We study a distributed allocation process where, repeatedly in time, every player renegotiates past allocations with neighbors and allocates new revenues. The average allocations evolve according to a doubly (over time and space) averaging algorithm. We study conditions under which the average allocations reach consensus to any point within a predefined target set even in the presence of adversarial disturbances. Motivations arise in the context of coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU) where the target set is any set of allocations that make the grand coalitions stable.
Bauso, Dario
7c533143-ebe7-41d5-8fe7-1d1977c4e4d5
Cannon, Mark
d2a52d25-9100-4a93-9bc7-8d10f4f3fa17
Fleming, James
b59cb762-da45-43b1-b930-13dd9f26e148
Bauso, Dario
7c533143-ebe7-41d5-8fe7-1d1977c4e4d5
Cannon, Mark
d2a52d25-9100-4a93-9bc7-8d10f4f3fa17
Fleming, James
b59cb762-da45-43b1-b930-13dd9f26e148

Bauso, Dario, Cannon, Mark and Fleming, James (2014) Contractivity and invariance in games with vector payoffs. 4 pp .

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)

Abstract

We study a distributed allocation process where, repeatedly in time, every player renegotiates past allocations with neighbors and allocates new revenues. The average allocations evolve according to a doubly (over time and space) averaging algorithm. We study conditions under which the average allocations reach consensus to any point within a predefined target set even in the presence of adversarial disturbances. Motivations arise in the context of coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU) where the target set is any set of allocations that make the grand coalitions stable.

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Published date: 2014
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Local EPrints ID: 422575
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/422575
PURE UUID: e4ea88da-192c-45d9-b134-0674c0e9eea7
ORCID for James Fleming: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0003-2936-4644

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Date deposited: 25 Jul 2018 16:30
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 20:14

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Contributors

Author: Dario Bauso
Author: Mark Cannon
Author: James Fleming ORCID iD

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