Robust consensus in social networks and coalitional games
Robust consensus in social networks and coalitional games
We study an n-player averaging process with dynamics subject to controls and adversarial disturbances. The model arises in two distinct application domains: i) coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU) and ii) opinion propagation. We study conditions under which the average allocations achieve robust consensus to some predefined target set.
Game theory, networks, allocations, robust receding horizon control
1537-1542
Bauso, Dario
7c533143-ebe7-41d5-8fe7-1d1977c4e4d5
Cannon, Mark
d2a52d25-9100-4a93-9bc7-8d10f4f3fa17
Fleming, James
b59cb762-da45-43b1-b930-13dd9f26e148
Bauso, Dario
7c533143-ebe7-41d5-8fe7-1d1977c4e4d5
Cannon, Mark
d2a52d25-9100-4a93-9bc7-8d10f4f3fa17
Fleming, James
b59cb762-da45-43b1-b930-13dd9f26e148
Bauso, Dario, Cannon, Mark and Fleming, James
(2016)
Robust consensus in social networks and coalitional games.
In IFAC Proceedings Volumes.
vol. 47,
Elsevier.
.
(doi:10.3182/20140824-6-ZA-1003.02020).
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Conference or Workshop Item
(Paper)
Abstract
We study an n-player averaging process with dynamics subject to controls and adversarial disturbances. The model arises in two distinct application domains: i) coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU) and ii) opinion propagation. We study conditions under which the average allocations achieve robust consensus to some predefined target set.
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e-pub ahead of print date: 25 April 2016
Keywords:
Game theory, networks, allocations, robust receding horizon control
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Local EPrints ID: 422576
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/422576
PURE UUID: f8eceb47-3522-4409-9033-399b82a2de98
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Date deposited: 25 Jul 2018 16:30
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 21:27
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Author:
Dario Bauso
Author:
Mark Cannon
Author:
James Fleming
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