The University of Southampton
University of Southampton Institutional Repository

Institutional impact on the expropriation of private benefits of control in North Africa

Institutional impact on the expropriation of private benefits of control in North Africa
Institutional impact on the expropriation of private benefits of control in North Africa

This paper examines the effectiveness of six institutional quality measures, namely corruption control, effective government, political stability, regulatory quality, rule of law and voice and accountability, in inhibiting self-rewarding behaviour of boards in terms of their compensation as well as in influencing the likelihood of disclosure of individual executive salaries in IPO listings prospectuses. Using a unique and comprehensive dataset of 78 hand-collected IPO firms from across North Africa from 2000 to 2012 I find substantial evidence that government effectiveness and corruption control are important in inhibiting director self-reward and expropriation while political stability is more associated with increased likelihood of transparency in reporting of salaries. In addition firms from poor informational environments are more likely to initiate enhanced self-governance and transparency so as to overcome institutional deficiencies.

Board of directors, Institutional theory, IPO
0275-5319
1-23
Hearn, Bruce
45dccea3-9631-4e5e-914c-385896674dc2
Hearn, Bruce
45dccea3-9631-4e5e-914c-385896674dc2

Hearn, Bruce (2014) Institutional impact on the expropriation of private benefits of control in North Africa. Research in International Business and Finance, 30 (1), 1-23. (doi:10.1016/j.ribaf.2013.04.002).

Record type: Article

Abstract

This paper examines the effectiveness of six institutional quality measures, namely corruption control, effective government, political stability, regulatory quality, rule of law and voice and accountability, in inhibiting self-rewarding behaviour of boards in terms of their compensation as well as in influencing the likelihood of disclosure of individual executive salaries in IPO listings prospectuses. Using a unique and comprehensive dataset of 78 hand-collected IPO firms from across North Africa from 2000 to 2012 I find substantial evidence that government effectiveness and corruption control are important in inhibiting director self-reward and expropriation while political stability is more associated with increased likelihood of transparency in reporting of salaries. In addition firms from poor informational environments are more likely to initiate enhanced self-governance and transparency so as to overcome institutional deficiencies.

Full text not available from this repository.

More information

Accepted/In Press date: 22 April 2013
e-pub ahead of print date: 10 May 2013
Published date: January 2014
Keywords: Board of directors, Institutional theory, IPO

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 423338
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/423338
ISSN: 0275-5319
PURE UUID: 3b1a4156-34f1-4ed5-84b6-d2d664899c33
ORCID for Bruce Hearn: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0001-9767-0198

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 20 Sep 2018 16:30
Last modified: 10 Dec 2019 01:23

Export record

Altmetrics

Download statistics

Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.

View more statistics

Atom RSS 1.0 RSS 2.0

Contact ePrints Soton: eprints@soton.ac.uk

ePrints Soton supports OAI 2.0 with a base URL of http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/cgi/oai2

This repository has been built using EPrints software, developed at the University of Southampton, but available to everyone to use.

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue without changing your settings, we will assume that you are happy to receive cookies on the University of Southampton website.

×