UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON

FACULTY OF SOCIAL, HUMAN AND MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES

Department of Politics and International Relations

The Bureaucratic Policy Capacity of the Turkish Ministry of the Interior (2002-2016)

By

Mehmet Akcay

Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

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This research project assesses the bureaucratic policy capacity of the Turkish Ministry of the Interior (MoI) to understand and describe the complex capacity of the one of the most important public Turkish departments. It explores the coherence, interrelationships and integration of the three competences (i.e. the analytical, administrative, and political) in terms of three resource levels of capacity (i.e. individual, organisational and systemic).

After two decades of implementing the New Public Management (NPM) model, perceptions of the government's ability to develop, implement, and evaluate policies are critical. The country's policy capacity is limited because of the general incapacity of the Turkish public sector. These criticisms have triggered persistent reforms by the country's Justice and Development Party's government since it came into power in 2002.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that previous assessments of bureaucratic capacity remain vague, biased, and not based on empirical research, especially fieldwork. The existing Turkish literature suggested some of the elements of policy capacity; the need was identified, however, for a more in-depth, holistic research focusing more on (bureaucratic) policy capacity of one Turkish public department in particular.

For this purpose, after conducting this literature review, I have determined two main research questions:

    1. Does bureaucracy give the minister the advice needed to reach a decision?

    2. How has the bureaucratic policy capacity of the Turkish Ministry of the Interior changed during the reform years, 2002 – 2016?

In order to answer these research questions, I chose the ethnographic qualitative, single case study, research design because such a research describes the political-administrator elites' world from their own standpoints. Ethnographic fieldwork also enabled me to use my insider role and to see everyday life of the political administrators. Thus, I can better understand bureaucratic policy capacity of the MoI. Such a vast understanding would not have been possible without the use of an ethnographic qualitative research design.

The research adopts data triangulation – the use of diverse data sources, including pattern of practice, talk, and considered writings. The accounts of senior politicians and prefects of the MoI are the most important data used in my research.

The key findings of this thesis could be listed under five interactive and interdependent main themes for observing the dynamic, interactive, interdependent and often overlapping facets of all sub-policy capacities of the MoI. To respond all research questions, the Turkish bureaucratic (administrative) tradition forms the mainstay of the themes due to its dominant role and interaction with the different elements of policy capacity. Therefore, in the denoting the themes, this tradition was placed in the central position.

- Dominance of Turkish administrative tradition

- Dominance of ministers' political and administrative leadership roles over policy capacity of MoI

- Triumph of the Turkish administrative tradition over reform pressure

- The impacts of the dynamic external political environment

- Specific limits to policy capacity

The importance and contributions of this thesis are:

- Understanding and describing MoI's policy capacity provides valuable information on its political administrators and external actors.

- This research redesigns the existing models of policy capacity and provides a framework for analysing bureaucratic policy capacity of less developed countries.

- It pioneers ethnographic research methods for assessing the policy capacities of other Turkish ministries.

- This research studied impact of ministerial role on the policy capacity of MoI. These issues have been understudied in the literature.

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DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP

I, Mehmet Akcay

declare that this thesis and the work presented in it are my own and has been generated by me as the result of my own original research.

The Bureaucratic Policy Capacity of the Turkish Ministry of the Interior (2002-2016)

I confirm that:

This work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research degree at this University;

Where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or any other qualification at this University or any other institution, this has been clearly stated;

Where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly attributed;

Where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given. With the exception of such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work;

I have acknowledged all main sources of help;

Where the thesis is based on work done by myself jointly with others, I have made clear exactly what was done by others and what I have contributed myself;

None of this work has been published before submission.

Signed:

Date:

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Abbreviations

BIMER: Basbakanlik Iletisim Merkezi (Communication Centre of the Prime Ministry)

EU: European Union

GD: General Director/Directorate

ICT: Information and Communications Technology

IT: Department of Information Technology

IM: Institutional Memory

KOY-DES: Koy Altyapisini Destekleme (Project for Supporting Village Infrastructure)

MOBESE: Mobile Electronic System Integration

MoI: Turkish Ministry of the Interior

NPM: New Public Management

NPG: New Political Governance

TODAIE: Türkiye Ortadoğu Amme İdaresi Enstitüsü (Turkey and Middle East Public Administration Institute)

Chapter 1:   INTRODUCTION

The purpose of Chapter 1 is to introduce this research project, which seeks to understand and describe the bureaucratic policy capacity of the Turkish Ministry of the Interior (MoI) to assess the complex capacity of the one of the most important public Turkish departments. It explores the coherence, interrelationships and integration of the three competences (i.e. the analytical, administrative, and political) in terms of three resource levels of capacity (i.e. individual, organisational and systemic).

MoI is, outside the Prime Ministry, the most senior, highest status public department in the Turkish government. It handles the most delicate areas of the country's policy-making, including national internal security, law enforcement, national border protection, the administration of migration policy, the administration of provinces and local administrations, and the coordination of all public servants via the country's system of territorial administration. Therefore, the capacity of the Ministry to respond to present-day problems is a crucial issue for the Turkish government. As my original contribution, this research is directly interested in how the MoI safeguards their security priority tasks in a dynamic, dangerous environment despite their having significant deficiencies in policy capacity.

Secondly, this project directly addresses the effect of current public administration reforms regarding bureaucratic policy capacity. Furthermore, this research provides robust reasons for how the tradition of the MoI has persisted in spite of these reforms. This research also provides important contributions regarding how the external environment has affected the MoI.

Moreover, my research addresses limits to policy capacity regarding organisational structure, processes and tradition, individual competences, systemic barriers, especially impact of reform pressure, and impacts of external political environment, dominance role of the minister, demand and supply side of bureaucratic advice, unintended consequences of administrative tradition, which have been main arguments in the literature.

I have determined two main research questions:

   1. Does bureaucracy give the minister the advice needed to reach a decision?

   2. How has the bureaucratic policy capacity of the Turkish Ministry of the Interior changed during the reform years, 2002 – 2016?

To answer these questions, I employ the qualitative ethnographic single case method in order to facilitate the triangulation of the data sources, including conversations, observations, and written

documents. To directly obtain the views of political-administrators[1] is at the heart of this thesis. I was able to interview fifty one elite political-administrators, including top politicians and top-ranking civil servants (prefects) of the MoI. Furthermore, my insider role provides a unique position from which to interpret these findings.

Chapter 1 is organised into nine sections. These explain what I did (questions), why what I did matters (significance), and how I did it (theory and methods). Also included are this thesis's key findings and summaries of each of this thesis's chapters.

Research Aims and Questions

After two decades of implementing the New Public Management (NPM) model, perceptions of the government's ability to develop, implement, and evaluate policies have are critical. [2] The country's policy capacity is limited because of the general incapability of the Turkish public sector. These criticisms have triggered persistent reforms by the country's Justice and Development Party's government since it came into power in 2002.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that previous assessing of bureaucratic capacity remain vague, biased, and not based on empirical research, especially fieldwork. As an exception, one grey report (MoI, 2008), which shared a similar aim with this research, revealed similar issues in the international literature (for more, see the literature review in Chapter 2).

The scarcity of empirical research on policy capacity in the Turkish public sector raises the need for an ethnographic, single case study because such a research would be able to describe the political-administrator elites' world from their own standpoints for the purpose of assessing the policy capacity of the MoI. Furthermore, this innovative method lends itself to thematic analysis. Thus, I discuss this thesis's findings in line with its research questions by applying a theoretical framework in order to identify the tradition of the MoI with overarching themes and sub-themes, thereby revealing the opinions of the interviewees. Besides the benefits of conducting a research utilising the qualitative ethnographic method, there are a few challenges and limitations to such an approach (these will be discussed at length in the Conclusion). Nevertheless, considering these

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[1] "Political-administrator" term includes ministers, deputy ministers and prefects. "Prefect" term (called "mülki idare amiri" in the Turkish administrative tradition) refers to member of the elite Turkish bureaucratic class ("prefectoral class") which only includes governors, deputy governors, and district governors and MoI's administrators who gain this statue before being appointed into MoI's central organisation cadres (State Personnel Law 657, act 36). In this research, I will use "prefect" term for undersecretary, deputy undersecretary, general directors, and their deputies, chief inspectors, legal advisors, head of division, director of branch, inner circle of minister (general secretaries, personal private secretaries, and advisors) who have prefects background. Currently there are 296 prefects working for MoI central department.

[2] See: Painter and Pierre, 2005; Parsons, 2004; Peters, 1996; Savoie, 2003; Tiernan, 2010, 2011a; Edwards, 2009.

benefits, as well as the unique context of the MoI, these challenges and limitations may be easily ignored because they were not able to prevent achieving my main research aims; namely, to:

- assess the policy capacity of one of the most important ministries of Turkey;

- understand the effects of both the public management reforms and the external environment on the bureaucratic policy capacity of the MoI since 2002;

- understand the relationship between minister and prefects from their own standpoints;

- understand how prefects perceive the ministry's policy capacity and their advisory roles;

- argue in favour of the usefulness of the amended theoretical framework applied by this research based on its findings.

The Significance of the Study and its Contribution to the Field

In line with my aims, the importance of this study can be summarised as follows:

- Assessing this department's policy capacity in an academic way could provide valuable information for its practitioners – both politicians and prefects –and external actors.

- Assessing the MoI's policy capacity to serve the ministers in their several roles;

- Assessing the usefulness of the adapted theoretical frameworks of this thesis (see pp. 45-46 below) and the qualitative ethnographic method for exploring the policy capacity of one of the public departments of a developing country which does not operate based on the Westminster system.

- The capacity of the Ministry to respond to present-day problems is a crucial issue for the Turkish government;

- This project directly addresses the question of whether current reforms are efficient or not.

Literature and Definitions of Policy Capacity

In Chapter 2, I surveyed what is already known about policy capacity. I examine the following topics and themes: firstly, I particularly focus on the definition of policy capacity with regards to the aims of the research. Although there is no doubt that having a robust policy capacity is necessary for policy success, there are considerable disagreements amongst scholars regarding

the conceptual definition of policy capacity. Secondly, I examine main arguments, especially, the theme of the limits to bureaucratic policy capacity. This has emerged as a major concern for governments in many countries in recent years and is often seen as a result of the NPM movement and associated changes to the public service and public sector environments.[3]

Due to the developing socioeconomic status and ever changing internal and external political environment of Turkey, one would expect to find more complicated and diverse findings in Turkey than in developed nations. Nevertheless, whilst conducting international literature, I realised that there have been similarities with Turkish case despite the differences with Westminster country. I highlighted some of them in the emprics chapters, including the impacts of external political environment, issues related to coordination and collaboration, some concerns regarding the administrative and political system policy capacities and deficiencies of individual capacity across all competences. For instances, regarding to limits to policy capacity; a lack of enough demand for bureaucratic advice, lack of proper analytical knowledge and skills and being reactive to political demand and no strategic thinking. Therefore, policy capacity literature was relevant to Turkish case.

Thirdly, and more importantly, I search through both the international and national literatures to find out how to assess the policy capacity of governmental departments in terms of their interactions, common points, weaknesses and strengths.

Finally, as a conclusion, two things were more important regarding policy capacity: policy advisory capacity and impacts of public administration reforms –NPM- and external political environment over policy capacity. After calling attention to the gaps in the literature, the research questions of this thesis are presented.

Overall Theoretical Perspective

In this research, I preferred to use the comprehensive definition of policy capacity, which uses it as an umbrella term consisting of three competences – analytical, administrative and political – at three resource levels – individual, organisational and systemic, inspiring from previous literature (see p. 14 of this thesis).

Furthermore, I adhere to the theoretical framework which was originally developed by Wu et al. (2015) (see pp.42-43 of this thesis). It consists of nine sub-policy capacities, including elements,

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[3] Internationally, there has been a concern that governments have been losing their policy capacity for 20 years, more or less (see, for example, Painter and Pierre, 2005; Parsons, 2004; Peters, 1996; Savoie, 2003; Tiernan, 2010 and 2011a; Edwards, 2009; Dincer and Yılmaz, 2003; and Eryilmaz, 2013).

instances, tasks and dimensions. The logic of their matrix is simple but important. They stress that these skills and competences could be mobilised given the availability of adequate resources. These, they state, must exist at the individual, organizational and system levels. For instance, even though an organisation may have skilful staff, they might not be able to succeed unless the department has the capability to store, collect and disseminate data all the way up to the systemic level in order to support the department, especially when dealing with recent events. In addition, making policy and improving new ideas requires the support of both a minister and a set of rules. This comprehensive and interactive framework not only provides structure for the empirical chapters but also provides elements and dimensions for responding the research questions of the thesis.

On the other hand, because of the dominancy of managerial terms, as well as a lack of empirical background for the purpose of using the ethnographic qualitative method, I modified the theoretical frameworks of Wu et al. (ibid) with the literature written on qualitative research on public departments[4], which stresses the importance of oral tradition and the external environment.

Yet, this modified framework was developed to assess the policy capacities of developed countries rather than that of developing countries. Despite the interactive and dynamic features of this framework, it is not sufficient for explaining bureaucratic policy capacity in terms of a unique political and administrative context and tradition, not to mention the language used by MoI's ministers and prefects. Therefore, I redesigned this modified theoretical framework in order to comply with the context of the MoI and Turkish administrative tradition which I had already known about due to my role as an insider. This is the reason why I give more value to robust tradition, informal training, diplomacy, the role of ministers, and informal institutional memory (IM) rather than what is dictated in the original model.

Another advantage of this research design was that it enabled me to incorporate my professional insider role (prefectoral identity) that provided me some advantages during the fieldwork.

- Enabled me to incorporate explicitly my own assumptions, previous experience and my knowledge of Turkish public administration and its tradition into the research findings. Further, my Turkish heritage helped me to further understand their everyday life and the nuances of their speech.

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[4] I.e Tiernan's (2011, 2015) dimensions; Gleeson's (2009) domains (tasks); and Hughes's (2014) systemic approach.

- Provided me with trust and credibility, viz. better access to and acceptance by political administrators. Therefore, participants tended to be more open with me than they would be with outsiders.

- Provided me a greater awareness of key informants and official reports,

- My insider role also informed the interview structure: I already knew the red lines which should not be crossed, (e.g. arguing explicitly about current ministerial role, style, and discretion)

However, my insider role made this research different from that conducted by an 'outsider', and may have raised questions about objectivity. Yet, Adler and Adler stated (I agree with them) that:

> Fieldwork is a subjectivist methodology. It employs subjective means to study subjective phenomenon. If we want to get the closest to understanding the human actor in the human world (Adler and Adler, 1987, p.85).

This final framework (see pp.45-46 of this thesis), in turn, enables me to assess the policy capacity of the MoI. (See Chapter 3) I will broadly assess the utility of using this framework for my research in this thesis's Conclusion (chapter 8).

Scope of the Research

The scope of this study is limited to the bureaucratic policy capacity of the MoI between 2002 and 2016. Since I wished to assess one public department's capacity in Turkey, I chose the MoI, being a strong ministry with a long-standing tradition, for the following reasons.

First of all, besides its unique tasks, the Ministry constitutes a potential typical case in terms of its organisation and administration among twenty-one ministries, which are structurally and functionally organised uniformly under the provisions of a powerful constitution-like act[5] throughout the Turkish central government.

Secondly, the MoI is a good example for understanding the effects of the public administration reforms on bureaucratic policy capacity since it plays a central role in administering public reforms and integrating the EU's standards throughout the country.

Thirdly, assessing the usefulness of the theoretical framework mentioned above and applying it to developing countries which do not have a Westminster system. Thus, I seek to demonstrate similarities and differencies between Westminster system and Turkish administration system

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[5] The Act on the Establishment and Duty Principles of Ministries, which came into force in 1984.

whenever needed. This comparison shows that main arguments related to policy capacity, which mostly cover the limits policy capacity, are relevant to the Turkish case.

On the other hand, the dominance of Turkish administrative tradition and its triumps over public administration reforms - theMoI's administrative tradition is dominated by the brotherhood of prefects - could provide answers to the question "What can the rest of the world learn from the case of Turkey?"

Lastly, due to my being a member of the prefectoral class and due to my working for this ministry for over 18 years, I can use my insider role and previous experience and knowledge about the MoI and the Turkish public administration system to draw a colourful portrait of the policy capacity of MoI rather than other public departments which are unfamiliar to me. Furthermore, conducting a comprehensive research project on another department, obtaining background knowledge about those departments, and accessing key political-administrators working in those departments would most likely be more difficult for the researcher, not to mentions time consuming.

Nevertheless, given the wide scope and complexity of this research topic, I determined the scope of this study carefully. I classified the MoI's central department in the following way: its central or line (operational) sections; its coordinating sections; its external affairs sections; its advisory, research and audit sections; and its support section. Instead of conducting interviews with participants randomly, I chose them deliberately according to my classification of the MoI's departments in order to better answer this thesis's research questions and so as to meet its research aims. For instance, the members of the inner circle, the participants from advisory departments, and the heads of departments were all questioned with regards to their advisory capacities; whereas deputy undersecretaries and participants from coordinator departments were questioned regarding their administrative (coordination) capacity (see Chapter 3 and Appendix B and C).

Overview of the Research Design

In order to answer these research questions, I chose the ethnographic qualitative (single case study) research design. The research adopts data triangulation – the use of diverse data sources, including pattern of practice, talk, and considered writings for the purpose of creating more knowledge production (Denzin, 1989, pp. 237-241). The accounts of political administrators – senior politicians and prefects– of the MoI are the most important data used in my research. However, documentary sources are also widely used to explore the contextual features of Turkey. They contribute to the understanding of this thesis's background knowledge, and to help evaluate the findings of the interviews which are to be conducted. Moreover, in order to fill in some

information gaps with regards to the views of stakeholders, I benefitted from recent Internal reports.

I used the qualitative thematic analysis for analysing my findings. I observed that the ethnographic qualitative research design fitted well with thematic analysis (see Chapter 3 – I will broadly assess the utility of the ethnographic qualitative (single case study) method and thematic analysis for my research in Chapter 8).

Main Findings

To respond to my research questions, the Turkish administrative tradition forms the mainstay of my account. It plays a dominant role, interacting with the different elements of policy capacity. Therefore, in the denoting the themes, this tradition was placed in the central position. Seeing as the MoI has had to survive in a dynamic environment with many persistent, crucial issues, such as Kurdish terror attacks, ISIS, the Syrian Refuge crises, etc., the MoI could keep going on successfully due to its having a large storage of past experiences coupled with an adamantine-like tradition.

The findings indicated that the triumpts of Turkish tradition over reform pressure deserved further attention. I found that persistent top-down public administration reforms has mostly had a negligible impact on the practice and tasks of MoI. Despite several official papers and rhetoric used by political actors; prefects as well as some ministers rejected this pressure either explicitly or implicitly relying on the leverage from the strong MoI tradition. "Things happens as usual." In detail, this theme aims to make outsiders aware of the importance of the oral administrative tradition determined by unique (brotherhood) tradition of prefects within the MoI as well as MoI's unique tasks within the Turkish public administration, a finding which is important for addressing the second research question.

There are the impacts of a dynamic external political environment over all themes including the administrative tradition, a finding which is important for addressing the second research question. I found that the external political environment has an undoubtable effect on the MoI's policy capacity. On the one hand, the EU integration process, migration and border administration, and media pressure, have pushed the MoI's capacity to improve; on the other hand, centralisation, an increase in political power against bureaucracy has weakened policy capacity while also increasing stress levels within the ministry. Furthermore, establishing a new unit in the reform era was acceptable since this unit aimed to support MoI's tradition. Namely, some new departments including the department of the EU, IT, Migration, and Association strengthen policy capacity whereas the RC, Strategy Department and especially the Internal Audit Department did not make

significant contributions to policy capacity because of clashing with administrative tradition of MoI.

As a few pioneer academics pointed out, that ministers' influence need to be considered when assessing policy capacity, which is important for addressing the first research question. The findings of this research highlighted that the political and administrative role of the ministers and their effect on daily administration, policy making, coordination, and diplomacy, viz. policy capacity, must be considered when describing and assessing the bureaucratic policy capacity of MoI. Their relationship with prefects which is based on mutual trust and support is also vital regarding policy capacity. I found that responsiveness—willingness to support the minister and his position—and getting political support have been a primary value for prefects. Moreover, good relations between ministers and prefects that are characterised by mutual trust strengthens policy capacity, however, micro administration of ministers, an excess of responsiveness and strict following of the opinions and orders given by the ministers, are likely to limit prefects' initiative and willingness to speak the truth to the seniors, in addition to acting as a barrier for developing individual and organisational analytical and administrative capacity.

Consideration of the limits to policy capacity provides a platform to assess all nine sub-policy capacities and address the research questions of the thesis. The limits to policy capacity was attributed to some characteristic of the administrative tradition, including strict hierarchy, political control, risk awareness etc., domination of ministers' political and administration role, and impact of the external political environment, deficiency of individual, organisational, systemic level competences. Indeed, the thesis findings confirmed that for instance, focussing only on individual analytical skills and ignoring system and organisational analytical capacity as well as overall Turkish tradition could lead one to arrive at incorrect conclusions.

These main findings draw upon a robust ministry which is dominated by the Turkish administrative tradition and MoI's security, and law enforcement based tasks. Detailed explanations regarding these findings will be provided in empirical Chapters 4, 5, 6, 7, and in this thesis's conclusion chapter 8.

Thesis Outline

This study comprises eight chapters. An overview of the remaining seven chapters is provided as follows:

Chapter 2 examines the literature in order to gain a broad understanding of the term "policy capacity," as well as to determine how previous literatures have assessed the policy capacity of

public organisations. This chapter also notes the limitations and gaps to be found in the international and national (Turkish) literature with regards to policy capacity.

Chapter 3 details the methodological and theoretical approaches adopted by this research. The first section of this chapter describes the qualitative ethnographic single case study research design used by this research for the purpose of addressing this research's aims and research questions. It, thus, examines the methods used for selecting case, collecting the data; the data coding and analysis which was employed for the thematic analysis; and the research design's limitations, as well as its ethical considerations.

The second section of Chapter 3 describes the nature of the policy capacity studies conducted in the MoI and introduces the framework which is used for the analysis of the data from the interviews, as well as how the official reports, observation notes, and literatures examined comply with the research's aims and questions.

Chapter 4 presents the findings of the study about to the Turkish administrative tradition and administrative tradition of MoI, which are at the heart of this thesis since the tradition has been significant factor across all of the policy capacities (administrative, analytical, and political) and resources (individual, organisational, and system) of the MoI.

Chapter 5 presents an analysis of the administrative policy capacity of the MoI consists of three sections according to the three levels of administrative policy capacity; viz., organisational, individual and system.

Chapter 6 examines the analytical policy capacity of the MoI again applying the conceptual framework mentioned above. This is done by dividing the chapter into three sections, the first section examines the important individual analysis skills utilised in the MoI's policy practice. These are grouped into two sets of competencies: knowledge sets and skill sets. The second section examines the organisational analytical capacity of the MoI. The last section examines the MoI's analytical policy capacity at the systemic level, focusing on its relationship to its knowledge institutions.

Chapter 7 examines the political policy capacity of the MoI by employing the conceptual framework. Firstly, individual political policy capacity is examined in two sections regarding, firstly, the political leadership of ministers and, secondly, the political acumen capacity of prefects. The second section, which regards organisational capacity, consists of three sub-topics: viz., responsiveness, political support, and public legitimacy and trust. The third section deals with political system policy capacity (the external political environment), a capacity which could have the potential to affect all of the other capacities of the MoI. This section is divided into three parts

including globalisation, centralisation, and media pressure so as to better answer the second research question.

Chapter 8 discusses the findings of the analysis conducted upon the research data presented in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 in the context of the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 and in accordance with the research design, aims, and theoretical framework model presented in Chapter 3. Furthermore, it will underline the research's challenges and limitations and provide some recommendations for future researches.

Research "Cut-Off" Date

In preparing this thesis, a research "cut-off date" was determined for April, 2017 that was end of my second round fieldwork trip. No further reference materials regarding "organisational structures and regulations" were searched for or utilised after this cut-off date.

Chapter 2:   A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE REGARDING THE BUREAUCRATIC POLICY CAPACITY OF THE TURKISH MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR

Introduction

In this chapter, I conduct a review of the literature which is in order to identify the most commonly referenced factors relevant to my research. First, "policy capacity" is defined briefly (see Chapter 3 for a broader definition and conceptualisation of this multi-dimensional phenomenon). Secondly, I present what the literature reports about the limits to policy capacity of the (Turkish) public departments, as well as the results of that limits. Thirdly, I detail what both the international and national bodies of literature have said about how one may effectively assess the policy capacity of governmental departments. The literature are presented and discussed in relation to their common points, weaknesses and strengths. Finally, after calling attention to the gaps in the literature, preliminary research questions are then suggested.

2.1   What Is Policy Capacity?

Previous attempts define policy capacity have focused on a number of different dimensions. For instances, Painter and Pierre (2005, p. 2) provide a well-known definition of policy capacity in the literature; viz., 'the ability to marshal the necessary resources to make intelligent collective choices about and set strategic directions for the allocation of scarce resources to public ends.' Aucoin and Bakvis (2005, p. 190) place a similar emphasis on 'intelligent choice,' whereas Peters (1996, p. 13) underlines 'the ability to make decisions.'

On the other hand, Wu et al. (2015a) criticise the existing definitions of policy capacity because they highlight different dimensions which do not relate to the subject and which simply focus on their ability to formulate and make policy choices while also ignoring their ability to perform tasks and functions in other stages of the policy process. Besides their quantitative-based researches, other recent qualitative researches systematically attempt to develop a working definition of policy capacity which encompass the ability: to make intelligent, collective decisions; to mobilise resources to support policy making; to implement policy; and to coordinate policy making across an entire government. Namely, they defined it as mostly being associated with the resources (high quality information, analyses and advice) which are available to governments for the purpose of making decisions. They also interpreted policy capacity as being a multi-dimensional

phenomenon consisting of both organisational and individual dimensions.[6] Gleeson et al. (2011, pp. 240-242) summarised the main elements of organisational capacity saying that they are 'the organizational structure, processes and culture that support effective policy development and implementation.' Furthermore, Hughes defines "policy capacity" as an umbrella term while also proposing that another level -the systematic level- was also needed (Hughes, 2014, p. 53). Considering previous literature, this complex term can be defined as:

> Bureaucratic policy capacity is a multi-dimensional term, which refers to combine of the analytical-knowledge and skill sets-, administrative and political competences of bureaucracy regarding at individual , organisational –structure, process, tradition- and systemic resource that provide vital ability for making intelligent choice and policy decision, mobilising resources (high quality information, IM, analyses and advice, staff and funds) to make and support these decisions, implementing, monitoring and evaluating these decisions and policies in order to fulfil the public tasks (paraphrased from Hughes, 2014, p. 53.)

With the theoretical framework, this comprehensive definition provides useful domains within all organisational, individual, and systemic levels that plays a critical role in collecting and analysing data, as well as conceptualising part of this research (see Chapter 3).

Issues regarding the limits to policy capacity trigger these kinds of academic study and governmental report which focus especially on bureaucratic capacity, its definition, and assessing, as well as strengthening and rebuilding strategy.

2.2   The Limits to Policy Capacity

For 20 years now, there has been a concern that governments have been losing policy capacity.[7] This is often seen as a result of the NPM, as well as other changes related to the public service and public sector environments. Basic issues which limit to policy capacity could be listed as follows:

- Policy advice is too often reactive and narrow;

- There are too little genuinely strategic policy capabilities;

- Policy advice is not sufficiently connected to implementation;

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[6] See Gleeson, 2009; Gleeson et al., 2011, p. 240; Tiernan, 2010, p. 113; and Hughes, 2014.
[7] See, for example, Painter and Pierre, 2005; Parsons, 2004; Peters, 1996; Savoie, 2003; Tiernan, 2010 and 2011a; Edwards, 2009; Dincer and Yılmaz, 2003; and Eryilmaz, 2013.

- There is an insufficient amount of feedback and learning regarding the quality of policy and advice;

- There is an insufficient amount of engagement with stakeholders and citizens;

- There is a lack of common [public administration] identity to build experiences and cross-boundary thinking;

- There is an insufficient amount of investment in learning and development;

- There has been a loss in IM;

- There is an insufficient amount of creativity and innovation; and

- There is an insufficient number of management skills (Lindquist, 2010, p. 117).

The findings of another comprehensive research[8] were similar to the list given above, adding the following two limits:

- There is an insufficient "stewardship" – not just managerial – role of departmental secretaries; and

- There is a lack of demand for public advice (this being both a signpost and a result) (Tiernan, 2015, pp. 55-56).

In the Turkish case, perceptions regarding the Turkish government's capability to develop, implement, and evaluate policies have not been as expected. Therefore, inefficiency, ineffectiveness, unresponsiveness, increasing levels of corruption, and the incapability of the public sector have all been notes as issues affecting the Turkish case.[9] In their guiding study, Dincer and Yilmaz (2003) assert that there exist four critical gaps –for MoI, strategic and performance gap- in the Turkish public administrative system which could be highlighted as policy capacity issues:

- The Strategic Gap: there being no strategic approach, only a short amount of time for thinking, as well as being reactive and narrow;

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[8] This research was a Special Issue of the Australian Journal of Public Administration (2011, 70 (4)) which examined the policy advisory capacity of the APS across key policy sectors, including economic policy, defence, central coordination, housing policy, intergovernmental relations, and the government's capacity to deliver.
[9] This could be seen as dominancy of managerial terms in Turkish literature. (Dincer and Yılmaz, 2003, pp. 58-59; Government Programmes 2002 and 2007; Eryilmaz, 2013, pp. 256-263)

- The Performance Gap: the public administration's failure to satisfy citizen expectations and policy aims due to the inadequacy of administrative philosophy, structure, and public auditing structures (Dincer and Yilmaz, 2003, pp. 65 – 74).

The perception of there being limits to policy capacity triggered persistent reforms in Turkey in lieu of actually assessing the government's policy capacity. In reality, the question "how and to what extent have these policies affected the ministry's bureaucratic policy capacity?" has remained unanswered. Assessing regarding bureaucratic capacity mostly were ambiguous and biased and were not based on any fieldwork. [10] Instead, the perception of there being limits to the Turkish public administration's policy capacity should have triggered debates regarding why there has been a limit in the first place. These reasons will be examined in greater detail in the following sub-section.

Reasons for the limits to Policy Capacity in the Turkish Bureaucratic System

It is commonly reasoned for the limits to policy capacity are in the external environment (e.g. changes in the state-society interface), in the public sector's organisations (i.e. public management reforms and public sector down-sizing), or in the analytic capacity of the policy workforce overall (Gleeson, 2009, p. 61). Namely, the proposed causes the limits to the Turkish bureaucratic system's –regarding MoI- policy capacity could be listed as follows:

- Public Reform Syndromes: NPM;

- The increased importance and role of the PM's Office and the trend towards politicisation;

- The changing relations between politicians and bureaucrats and the advent of a third element (for MoI case, PM advisors rather than its own advisors);

- The unwillingness of politicians to listen to the public's advice and their underrating the craft skills of public administration;

- Changes made to the policy making environment (i.e. changes caused by the media, globalisation, and citizen expectation);

- The fact that capacity has fluctuated according to the interests and needs of ministers and the government as a whole.

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[10] See Dincer and Yılmaz, 2003, pp. 66-74; Eryilmaz, 2013; Government programmes, 2011.

Even though there are several reasons for the limits to policy capacity in the Turkish bureaucracy, undoubtedly the most important reason for the limits may be attributed to the recent public reforms — especially the NPM reforms.

Public Administration Reform Syndromes: NPM

Few if any governments are willing to confess that their public service reforms have been in the wrong direction, even if they have introduced measures to counter the unintended consequences (Aucoin and Bakvis, 2005, p. 200).

The international literature mostly agrees that the public management reforms which were implemented during the 1980s in Western democracies have, in turn, diminished those states' policy capacities.[11]

Savoie (2003, p. 5) summarised the main reasons for this as follows:

The civil service has become too powerful in setting government policy, and government officials are poor managers. The goal was clear: reduce the influence of permanent officials on policy and the policy process, and strengthen the capacity of government officials to manage.

Eryilmaz (2013**,** p**.** 248) likewise distinguishes three stages of the post-1980 reform process in Turkey:

- Legal-structural liberalisation in the public sector;

- The privatization of state-owned enterprises;

- Citizen-centred public services, the accountability of the public sector, good governance, decentralisation, transparency in administration, and performance management (post-2002).

Because of the MoI's unique situation of being dominated by security-based vital tasks, this traditional ministry was not affected by the first two stages mentioned above; the third stage, on the other hand, pushed the MoI to change its mentality unlike any of its foreign counterparts.[12] The main aim of the Turkish public administration reforms was to change, not only 'the structure of the public administration,' but also 'the transition from the traditional state-centric understanding to the citizen-centric understanding of the public administration' (Balci, 2015, p. 3).

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[11] i.e. Bakvis, 2000, p. 71; Aucoin and Bakvis, 2005, p. 185; Painter and Pierre, 2005, p. 24.
[12] 'Privatisation, down-sizing, and contracting out were among the management reforms that were salient in terms of diminishing policy capacity within government bureaucracies' (Gleeson, 2011, p. 239).

For the MoI, following Eryilmaz's third stage, the themes of openness, transparency, accountability, efficiency, and participation could be considered as being more important to building a citizenship-based administration. I argue that some managerial tools, such as strategic management, performance management, and assessing have 'weakened the dominance and/or power-resources of bureaucracy against politics,' contrary to the prevailing opinion touted in the Turkish literature.[13]

The Unintended Consequences of the NPM regarding Policy Capacity

After two decades working under the NPM model, critics, as well as supporters, of the reforms — especially the NPM reforms — have acknowledged that continuous, inconsistent, and usually partial reform efforts, driven primarily in a top-down fashion, have had unintended consequences on the bureaucratic policy capacity. Tiernan listed the most important unintended consequences of those reforms as follows:

- A "hollowing out," or "thinning," of state capacity and institutions;

- Changes that have tilted the balance between ministers and public servants decisively in favour of elected officials, to the detriment of "frank and fearless" advice;

- The erosion of policy capacity;

- The fragmentation and the creating of intense challenges for central coordination and control despite efforts to reinforce the centre;

- The loss of an IM;

- A loss of accountability;

- The decline of administrative processes and record keeping;

- The loss of capacity for long-term thinking (Tiernan, 2015, p. 57).

In addition, Aucoin and Bakvis (2005, p. 185) mention another unintended consequence; viz., the difficulty of recruiting and retaining 'the best and the brightest.'

If we evaluate the aforementioned list, the loss of IM, as well as the limit of administrative processes and record keeping could be considered in terms of the MoI's limit to policy capacity.

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[13] i.e. Lamba, 2014: 40.

Rhodes also stressed that there is incoherence between managerial tools with the traditional political system (reality) and the public administration.

It is because such private sector management techniques do not fit the political context and can be neutered by both bureaucratic and party political games. Such games are compounded by the demands of political accountability and the media spotlight, which pick up relatively trivial problems of implementation and threaten the minister's career. (Rhodes, 2016, p. 641)

In the Turkish literature, there have not been any sufficient studies investigating whether or not the NPM policies have affected the policy capacity of the MoI.[14] Furthermore, Turkish literature which does indirectly introduce the topic, are not based on any fieldwork (e.g., surveys or interviews). Even though most of the researchers and official reports interpreted the implementation of the NPM system as not only being one of the contributing reasons behind the erosion of the traditional understanding and structure of the public administrative system, but also as a possible solution for achieving better strategic governance (i.e. rebuilding the government's policy capacity).[15] Therefore, I analyse the NPM's effect on the bureaucratic policy capacity of the Ministry in an academic manner using first-hand information derived especially from this research's interview findings. Since it would be unfair to simply blame the NPM reforms for the limit to policy capacity, I agree with Balci (2015, p. 25) that:

In order to fully comprehend whether or not the NPM policies have affected the traditional understanding of public administration, understanding the structure of that system and the roles played by its agents would be beneficial. Moreover, an in-depth analysis of this issue—as was the case with the other studies—is missing.

Moreover, whether the process of politicisation and the role of the PM's Office had any effects on MoI's policy capacity or not should also be discussed. That is what shall be examined in the next sub-section.

The Increasing Role of the Prime Minister's Office and the trend towards Politicisation

One of the important finding of the Special issue (70/4) was underlined by Lindquist and Tiernan (2011, p. 444) as follows:

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[14] As indirect exceptions, Balci (2015) conducted a research on the effects of the NPM on prefectoral class powers and roles; Varol (2015) researched the reasons behind and the results of the public administration reforms on the overall Turkish public administration system.
[15] See Dincer and Yilmaz, 2003; Eryilmaz, 2011; Mol, 2011a; 2015a; Mol, 2011-2016c.

PMs articulate the government's agenda, indicate their personal interest in particular policy areas, and set the tone of relationships with the public service. This can affect the trajectory of [the] policy advisory capacity in [other] departments and agencies.

Just like Turkey's internationally counterparts, after 2002, the PM's Office became much more important than before in terms of the Turkish political and administrative system.

> The PM was able to take control of the cabinet due, not only to his constitutional authority and related legislative powers, but also due to the country's having a leader-oriented political and administrative culture, …[not to mention] his victory at the elections… In particular, the will of the PM and his Undersecretary to change the administrative structure and culture have been important factors affecting the country's public policy capacity… This centralisation and top-down policy approach prevents ministries to generate [their own] ideas [or make their] own decision[s]; therefore unused policy capacity could be lost (Varol, 2015, p. 130).

For instance, regarding this research's primary topic, some interior committee members have claimed that the Prime Ministry has played a dominant role even whilst drafting the Ministry's own vital regulations. The following quote is a good example of this opinion:

I do not believe that this parliamentary bill [metropolitan municipality] was drafted by the MoI. It is so obvious that it has been drafted by the PM's Office (Turkoglu, MP, Minutes from the Interior Committee of Parliament, 12/10/2012, p. 77).

Aucoin (2012, p. 178) describes these developments, which include the concentration of policy and decision-making at the centre of the government and the political executive exerting greater control over public services, as the 'new public governance' (NPG), whose main aim could be to 'control their public service bureaucracies and not be undermined or obstructed by them as in the "Yes, Minister" script.' He characterised the NPG by describing it utilising the following four main features:

- the integration of executive governance and…continuous campaign[ing],

- [the use of] partisan-political staff as a third force in governance and public administration,

- a personal politicization of appointments to the senior public service,

- [and] an assumption that public service loyalty to, and support for, the government means being promiscuously partisan for the government of the day (ibid., pp. 178-179).

Distrusting the public service and attempting to use it for partisan advantage is the most important factor contributing to the limit of policy capacity. The OECD (2011) acknowledges that Turkey has a high turnover rate of appointments to senior positions after elections, even when the same government is elected. In terms of centralisation, increasing political appointments to senior public position forces the public service to pay more attention to politics. Furthermore, a policy which had special advisers interfering more and more into the state's policy would be questioned and there would be indictments that the Turkish government is heading towards a "NPG." Eryilmaz (2013, p. 171) raises concerns regarding the perceptions of "decent" bureaucrats being, not only loyal to the government, but partisan as well. Moreover, how prefects of the MoI understand the meaning of politicisation (see Tiernan and Weller, 2010, p. 127) should be investigated further.

These debates provide more focus on the relationship between politicians and prefects, especially in terms of the advent of political advisers. These two topics shall be examined in more detail in the following two sub-sections.

The Changing Relations between Politicians and Bureaucrats

If minister wants to do something stupid, "[t]o object once is obligatory, twice is desirable and three times is suicidal" (Tiernan and Weller 2010, p. 159).

The relationship between politicians and bureaucrats has been the subject of scholarly focus and debate.[16] Dichotomous and complementary approaches have dominated this debate. One academic approach - similar to Weberian tradition - saw roles as being separate; thus, the relationship between politicians and public servants was extremely direct and functional, where the politicians made the decisions and the public servants implemented them with non-partisan policy advice. The other academic approach, on the other hand, saw their relationship as being

[c]haracterized by interdependency, extensive interaction, distinct but overlapping roles, and political supremacy and administrative subordination coexisting with reciprocity of influence in both policy making and administration. Complementarity means that politics and administration come together to form a whole in democratic governance' (Craft, 2012, p. 7; from Svara, 1999, p. 678).

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[16] See Eryilmaz, 2012; Demir and Nyhan, 2008; Eichbaum and Shaw 2006, 2007a; and OECD, 2011.

Administrative tradition, the expectations of political actors, the everyday political reality, and daily pressures are very important to determining roles, responsibilities, as well as all phases of policy work. As Hamburger and Weller (2012, pp. 365-366) explain:

> First, the public servant's involvement in policy work will depend on where the line is drawn between the roles of minister and public servant in their particular jurisdiction at the time. Second, within the jurisdiction-wide expectations or culture of minister–public servant relations, the public servant's role will be contingent on the working preferences of each minister ... Third, the way that public servants interact with policy may depend for each policy issue on how the issue has arisen.

Rhodes (2015, p. 22) stresses the need for complementarity if both politicians and civil servants wish to cope and survive together. Smith (1999, p. 107) states that ministers could not make decisions without the support of administrators. Furthermore, Tiernan and Weller (2010, pp. 13, 15, 117, 136, and 150) see healthy relations as '[lying] at the heart of a government.'

In the case of Turkey, the former PM— and current President — of the Turkish Republic, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, used to complain about the bureaucratic oligarchy which existed in the country during the early years of his being the PM:

> We have to demolish bureaucratic oligarchy, who have been resisting innovation, reform and development due to their narrow horizon (PM, 09/06/2003).[17]

These accusations are more than the discourse of the limits to policy capacity. The former PM's Undersecretary, who was the top senior servant between the years 2003 and 2007 in the Turkish Public Administration System, also characterised the amount of bureaucracy that existed in the system as being an obstacle to reforms. As he states,

> [t]hey told me to stop. Who [was] I and what was I doing while they had 150 years of experience and knowledge. If you [want to] make change, in my opinion, [the] major obstacle is their 150 years of experience (interview with Dincer, 2013; quoted from Varol, 2015).

It seems that there has been a permanent conflict between bureaucratic and political cadres. On the one hand, the bureaucracy was dominated by a single party, even though its political authority consented to remain in the background. Turkish studies conducted in the past have mostly focused on the relationship between elite actors, such as politicians and bureaucrats.

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[17] See http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2003/06/11/p03.html (retrieved 21/08/2015).

Interestingly, though, recent academic studies have tended to been partial towards political authorities. Important contributions to these early debates were made by advocates who saw the ministerial staffing system as a means of enhancing ministerial control over policy and overcoming the bureaucracy's resistance to implementing the government's agenda.[18] They were not interested on this relationship's effect on policy capacity, nor did they conduct any fieldwork. Rather, they instead used secondary data.

Internationally, this bilateral relationship has changed due to the advent of a third element. This has been due to there being a change in the policy-making environment for the better exercise of political leadership.[19] In terms of the Turkish case, Ozden (1997, p. 88) underlines that fear that the political executives' 'manipulation of their decisions and bureaucrats' controlling the agenda were the most eminent precautions for appointing special advisers.' This is the reason why Connaughton (2015, p. 44) has described them as being a "third element" in the relationship between ministers and civil servants.

The Advent of a Third Element: Political Advisers

Today's information and communication technologies have not only increased the sources of information and created new communities but have, at the same time, also raised public expectations regarding government response times. Meanwhile, partisan advisors are important subjects of study due to the privileged position of ministers, as well as because of the bridging and buffering role which they play between politicians and others; therefore, most national and international studies have focused their attentions on the roles of special advisers.[20] I have derived a list of roles played by partisan advisers based on the international literature:

- Supporting ministers to perform their job: being their "eyes and ears," emotional and intellectual support; decreasing public service monopolies; protecting ministers from "untrusted departments";

- Steer policy: "bridging" and "shaping" the policy-making process;

- Political support: controlling departments in line with government priorities; assisting the minister in parliament; working with the party;

- Coordinating the ministry, both within and with outside;

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[18] See: Durgun, 2002; Demir, 2011; Dogan, 2013; and Lamba, 2014.
[19] See: Tiernan, 2004, p. 9; Tiernan and Weller, 2010, p. 221; and Eryilmaz, 2013, pp. 145-162.
[20] See Tiernan, 2007; Zussman, 2009; Eichbaum and Shaw, 2010; OECD, 2011; and Craft, 2012.

- Assisting the minister: dealing with 24–hour media; speech writing; mediating the minister's relations with key players; holding an arbitral role between other ministries, especially with the PM's Office;

- Representing them in meetings and discussions.[21]

In the Turkish literature, there are two diaries and one academic article that were written about political and bureaucratic advisers and their roles. While one is an article, (which is not directly related, but just focuses on the role of the political adviser and does not mention public servants) entitled "Advisers to Ministers in Turkish Public Administration" (Akin, 1997), the others are diary entries entitled "Ben Müsteşarken [When I was an Undersecretary]," (Kongar, 1996) and "Bakan Danışmanın Not Defteri [Diary of a Minister's Adviser]" (Abakay, 2008), respectively. Akin (1997, pp. 87-90) classified advisers' contributions to the government as providing the four following roles:

- The Informative Role: they provide information to ministers about technical affairs related to their function;

- The Evaluative Role: they evaluate technical information in terms of political aspects and priorities;

- The Monitoring Role: they monitor policy implementation for the purpose of ensure that the aimed-for political priorities are achieved;

- The Participative Role: as experts, they are directly involved in activities.

If I add more functions to my field work, his classification might be useful to my research (i.e. a policy-making/shaping activity). Kongar (1996) narrated his memoirs with regards to the bureaucracy and its relationship to culture and art, while Abakay (2008) narrated his appointment to being one of the minister's advisers and the roles that that position entailed, albeit using an ironic tone. This latter writer claimed that the selection of advisers was based on nepotism and political favouritism. He sharply humiliated their role as personal secretaries. Instead of being a political adviser, even they had to deal with the will of the people who had voted for the minister (i.e. buying flight tickets, attending funerals, booking places at hospitals) (ibid., pp. 15-26). Nonetheless, this diary exaggerated the status of the political advisor due to its lacking an objective framework. My research, on the other hand, is examined in an academic way.

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[21] See Maley, 2010, pp. 100-105; Eichbaum and Shaw, 2007c, p. 111, and 2014, p. 611; Tiernan, 2004, 2007, p. 23; Tiernan and Weller, 2010, pp. 221, 255-256; OECD, 2011; Craft, 2012; Connaughton, 2010, p. 164; and Fawcett and Gay, 2010, p. 198.

With regard to the MoI, there are ten cadres of advisers—half of them for prefects and the other half for external advisers. During this period, ministers preferred to use one to two advisers from each sides. Supporting ministers to perform their job, dealing with 24-hour media, coordinating special issues and mostly personal support could be considered as their main roles. It should be underlined that the MoI's political advisors do not have a special legal framework and a code of conduct. Instead, main Law 657 applies regarding their discipline and roles. I investigate the role of the adviser and evaluate whether the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats affected policy capacity or not.

On the other hand, the PM's special advisers, who have a close relationship with the PM, have become important figures in both the political and governmental life of Turkey, not to mention the fact that they have a position which enables them to monitor political-administrative relations. If we are to consider political actors, we should examine the PM's Office and its political advisers for the purpose of assessing the bureaucratic policy capacity of the MoI since the PM's Office has played a dominant role in the public administration system. If we use Zussman's (2009) model, while the informative role, the monitoring role, and the role of providing personal support could accurately characterise a ministry adviser; the gatekeeper's role (the political adviser plays a dominant role and has a privileged position), controlling departmental policy, engaging in policy-making, and steering the policy-making role might be considered as the primary roles of the PM's advisers. Namely, this study only focuses on their roles and how they affect the MoI's policy capacity.

Furthermore, since the roles and powers of the MoI's political advisors has been weaker than that of the PM's and their counterparts, issues regarding political advisers in the literature, such as their accountability, their cost, and their numbers; the lack of a framework regarding their role, influence/performance, and conduct; their quality and experience; their partisan activity with public money; their behaving like ministers; their manipulating the media; their aggressive/spoiled attitudes; and their being spin doctors against oppositions (Tiernan 2007, p. 226; and see also Blick, 2004) is not likely to be observed.

Recently, the roles of ministers have become important aspects of those relations. Arklay et al. (2011) also commented that 'ministers should be encouraged to reduce their need to know everything' (ibid., p. 373). Furthermore, Tiernan (2007, p. 241) has asserted that 'the growing and unchecked power of ministers is the elephant in the room of ministerial staffing arrangements.' Moreover, the power to control the appointment of their advisers (both public and political ones) could increase the strength of ministers' influence over policy-making (Peters et al., 2000, p. 268).

Nevertheless, one should ask whether ministers have become less dependent on public advice the more they gain power.

The Political Unwillingness to Listen to Bureaucratic Advice

> A few minister[s] wish to hear different aspect[s] of [the] issues/topics. (Yong and Hazell 2014, p. 102)

Although it is encouraged by some regulations, the ignorant public view — which used to be associated with "free, frank, comprehensive and fearless advice" — has become an issue.

Nevertheless, as Hamburger and Weller (2012, p. 363) note, 'the involvement of public servants in policy work in any system of government is contingent on political circumstances and the political culture of the time, as well as on the trajectory of institutional history'; the public's side still, undoubtedly, has been considered as an important actor. Some of the literature supports this statement. Savoie (2003, p. 4), for instance, has asserted that governments do not do anything without the public service being involved. Public servants not only 'deliver government programs and services but they are also involved in advising on policy and in some instances making policy on their own' (Wanna, 2011, p. 348). Furthermore, in still some other cases, they might strive to provide advice which may not be wished to be heard by the minister but, nevertheless, ought to be heard (ibid).

Contrary to this view, Varol (2015, pp. 186, 153) has claimed that the PM (or ministers) have always been dominant in the decision-making process in Turkey due to their having a political and administrative tradition; thus, they do not need anyone else's advice. On the other hand, he mentioned the reluctance of senior civil servants to make risks, describing the strategies of senior civil servants as that of avoiding risks in order to secure jobs and obtain promotions. Even though this idea has been shared by Turkish academics,[22] the opinions of bureaucrats should still also be voiced.

Tiernan (2015, pp. 55-56) focused on the demand-side factors of this topic. She considered leaders' styles — e.g. policy driver, partisan, warrior, energetic, and maintenance —, the level of centralisation, relationships, governmental priorities, decision-making styles, and how competitive the advisory system is and how that affects the demand for public-side advice. Indeed, Tiernan and Weller (2010, p. 311) have claimed that 'a failure to respond to demand for advice from an incoming government can undermine confidence in the ability and willingness of the public service to serve a new administration.'

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[22] See Dogan, 2013, and Lamba, 2014.

In addition, another factor which undermines the confidence of the public's side is that of the changing policy-making environment. This shall be examined further in the following sub-section.

The Changing Policy-Making Environment

There is a consensus that policy-making has been becoming increasingly difficult due to:

> Globalisation (international political and economic forces have been playing a more important role in shaping national policy), the increasing use of technology [especially in social media], [an over-]reliance on market mechanism[s], and increasing citizen and stakeholder expectations (Gleeson et al., 2009, p. 2).

Therefore, it would be difficult to predict or control the impact of policy changes in the long-run. Peters (2005, p. 74), for instance, perceived that changes made to the socioeconomic and political environment are important factors which change the policy capacity of governments. Former departmental secretary Podger listed his view as a senior public servant as follows:

- the 24/7 focus on politics and the increased capacity required by ministers to respond and manage the immediate demands of the media [in the view of many public servants, ministers and their political advisers are driven by the media — see also Tiernan and Weller, 2010, p. 230];

- the increased expectation on government by the public, including immediacy of action, the linking of all program activities and the almost limitless reach of government;

- the response by governments of greater central control and control of communications [and] in particular the increased role of ministerial staff [i.e. the pluralisation of advice];

- the increased involvement in policy and administration by non-governmental organisations and individuals;

- the increased power and pressure of globalization [on] the top of regulation and [and the] increased…need for intergovernmental and inter sectoral coordination in policy making [in my case, the EU] (Podger, 2009, p. 27).

The MoI saw similar changes with their counterparts. In official reports, globalisation (the pressure made by the EU), centralisation, the 24/7 pressure of the regular and social medias, the

need to respond to citizens' expectations, and the information age all affected the administrative tradition and structure of the MoI.[23]

 Gleeson et al. addressed briefly the consequences of these changes on policy making and policy implementation:

> These changes in the policy environment have resulted in greater uncertainty and complexity in policy-making. With increasing scale and complexity, balancing the rational/technical and the political aspects of policy development appears increasingly difficult. Policy-makers increasingly need skills in coordinated and cooperative policy work, networking, and negotiating, collaborating, and flexible policy implementation (Gleeson et al., 2009, p. 2).

Tiernan and Weller (2010, pp. 15, 210-211, 257-259) also agreed with them, saying that the '[p]arliament, multimedia and the community are the platforms where Minister[s] are assessed unpredictably and [in an] uncontrolled [fashion]**.'** This means that working inside the Minister's Office is stressful, dynamic and exhausting. Overall, Tiernan considers that:

> The public service evolved from being focused mainly on skills and capacities to being now increasingly concerned about the operating environment for career officials, their ability to fulfil their stewardship obligations, and to practice their craft (Tiernan, (2015, p. 53).

Therefore, the limit of policy capacity inevitably has detrimental effects, especially on IM. This will be examined in the following section.

The Results of a Limit to Policy Capacity: Losing IM

> The old craft skills of traditional public administration remain of paramount importance (Rhodes, 2016, p. 638).

Rhodes and Tiernan (2014b, p. 149) defined IM as '... [referring] to the organised, selective retelling of the past to make sense of the present. [This is done when] [s]enior public servants explain past practice and events to justify recommendations for the future.' Pollitt conceptualised organisational memories as:

- The experience and knowledge of the existing staff: what is in their heads?

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[23] See MoI, 2011a; 2015a; 2011b-2016b; 2011c-2016c.

- The technical systems, including electronic databases and various kinds of paper records;

- The management system (organizational routines and standard operating procedures commonly build in knowledge acquired from previous operating experiences);

- The norms and values of the organizational culture. These can function as a sort of memory – certainly as an element of continuity: 'this is the way we do things around here' (Pollitt 2009, pp. 201-202).

Thus, any change in one or more of these facets could pose a threat to memory loss. Losing IM impedes the creation of stories which provide knowledge and skills in order for others to learn from past experiences. An eroding IM could be considered as one of the main reasons for limiting policy capacity (Rhodes and Tiernan, 2014b, pp. 153-156).

One of the MoI's internal performance reports (MoI, 2008, pp. 73, 75, 523) underlined the importance of IM. Nevertheless, it is not a widely acceptable idea in the Turkish case. As mentioned before, a leading actor, who had experience in both the civil service and politics, saw IM as a major obstacle to changing public administration procedures (see p. 25 of this thesis). Contrary, I agree with Rhodes and Tiernan (2014a, pp. 176-186) that valuable lessons could be distilled from IM in order to better assess policy capacity, especially individual (i.e. analytical, operational and political) policy capacity.

2.3   Assessing Policy Capacity

The perception of the limit to policy skills of public service employees prompted some official reports to be prepared, as well as some academic researches to be conducted, in order to assess bureaucratic policy capacity.

There are international official reports which have been written which pertain to this research's topic in particular. As Gleeson et al. (2009, p. 14) have highlighted, most of these official reports attempt to measure policy capacity according to "objective" measures of policy outcomes, or according to explicit evaluative criteria, instead of using a range of qualitative methods which employ the judgement of policy practitioners themselves in evaluating policy capacity. For instance, the "Capability Review of [the] Department of the PM and Cabinet and [the] Department of Immigration and Citizenship" (APSC, 2012) focuses on the leadership, strategy, and delivery capabilities of the Department of the PM to highlight the department's internal management strengths and weaknesses using 39 questions according to 10 elements. On the

other hand, benchmarking official reports, such as the KPGM (2009) and "Ahead of Game: the Blueprint for the reform of Australian Government administration" (aka the well-known "Moran Report"), prefer contributions from several participants, including Commonwealth public servants and the wider public, as well as a senior Australian public services reference group. Its main aim is to:

> [S]trengthen the APS to meet the tests of a new century and stay ahead of the game...to provide outcomes of the highest quality for the Australian public, through integrated citizen-centred services, effective regulatory frameworks, and high quality, forward looking advice to government (KPGM, 2009).

Lindquist (2010, p. 142) criticised this report in the following way:

> [N]o workforce data was provided on the size of the policy functional community, where the greatest gaps were across the APS, and whether universities and other institutions were generating the kind of expertise to deal with emerging and future challenges.

Another important critique of the report regarded its ignoring ministers' roles. More importantly, the report did not mention the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats (Mulgan, 2010, p. 289).

In the case of this research, there are official reports which were published and which comply with government programmes, such as strategic plans and periodicals, the annual reports of the Ministry. These reports might offer good sources of information for this study in order to cross-check them for extra interview data derived from their case studies. The most important report for this thesis is an internal performance analysis of the central departments of the MoI published in June 2008 (MoI, 2008). Its main aim, after assessing the bureaucratic capacity of the Ministry, was that of developing suggestions and precautions for strengthening its capacity to achieve better governance. The report was prepared in an academic manner; therefore, they used primary and secondary sources by means of conducting interviews and questionnaires, as well as reviewing the literature. This supplementary research targeted 23 central departments of the Ministry. They searched and assessed the department's capacity in order to: fulfil the responsibilities which are required of them by regulation; coordinate with other departments; and improve their human and physical capacities. The main findings which relate to my topic in particular are listed as follows:

- That its organisational structure does not exactly "fit" with its missions because of the changing policy-making environment, as well as the rebuilding strategy implemented for the public administration;

- Failure of implementation;

- Failure to develop policy;

- Reluctance in giving mandates to a junior official;

- Top senior servants avoid taking initiative;

- A lack of well-educated expert staff;

- A lack of IM due to high personnel turnover;

- And a lack of coordination (MoI, 2008, pp. 517-523).

Post-2000, in trying to implement the NPM and to achieve good, strategic governance, the Ministry has conducted many such reports; with a few exception[24], however, most official reports have similar informants and information [all of which have a 'show me' attitude (Lindquist 2010, p. 144)]. Some of the reports' main points did not change, even though they were written in different years.[25] Nevertheless, I could derive information from them in order to assess policy capacity and to triangulate my interview findings by utilising both the statistical data that they had obtained regarding their personnel and the SWOT analyses that they had conducted (N.B. all of the reports provided the same analysis, with the weak and threatening points coinciding with their internal-performance report findings). Unlike the internal performance reports, the SWOT analyses drew attention to the need for a suitable education programme for personnel so that they might better adapt to new environments, as well as better implement strategic governance/good governance tools.

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[24] **1. MoI 2010-2014 Strategic Plan**. This plan involved internal and external stakeholder situation analysis reports. The internal situation analysis was conducted on MoI's central department staff including the prefectoral class (%17) and public administration staff (%83) via electronic official network. (There is no information about the number of participants.) For the external situation analysis, the questionnaires were sent to 5 groups of stakeholders (total 370 institutions) including several public institutions (n: 38)–President and the PM office, the parliament and other ministries and central public bodies—relevant NGOs (n: 80); provincial organisations (n: 120)—governors, district governor offices, special provincial directories of administration, local administration offices (n: 89), and others (n: 40) including media, unions, political parties, and development agencies. 204 of the 370 (%55) institutions responded to questionnaires giving a total of 1151 participants (MoI, 2009a).
2. MoI external stakeholder situation analysis report in 2013. This report was prepared during the strategic plan preparation phase. 12,632 questionnaires were conducted with participants from local administrations (%74); public bodies including PM office, the Turkish parliament, other ministries, and other public institutions(%20), and also several society groups including NGOs, political parties, media, universities, unions and development agencies (%6) (MoI, 2013d).
3. MoI internal stakeholder situation analysis report in 2013. 12,857 members of the MoI including prefectoral class (%5.44), administration staff (%62.37) and police and gendarme force (%23.98) responded the questionnaires via the official network (MoI, 2013e).
[25] See MoI, 2011b-2017b; 2011c-2017c.

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More importantly, since the image management of the Ministry had been identified as being one of its weaknesses, a comprehensive fieldwork was conducted by a group of academics in collaboration with the Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs from 2013 to 2014 with its main aim being that of learning what the citizens thought about the Ministry. In the TIAV (2013; 2014a; 2014b and 2014c), the project was named "The Perception of the MoI and the Prefectural Class in the Society." Four reports were published with regards to these perceptions. The first report focused on the perceptions of citizens; the second, unsurprisingly, targeted the media's perceptions; the third aimed to obtain the prefects' perceptions; and the last, similarly to the first, related to the perception of different actors in society. In my thesis, I focus on all of the perceptions regarding the Ministry's bureaucratic capacity.[26]

The first research utilised a face-to-face questionnaire method and aimed to have 3050 people over the age of 18 as participants. They were successful in achieving 96% of that target. The first report revealed how citizens viewed the Ministry as nothing more than the governors, district governors, and police vis-à-vis the ministry itself (TIAV, 2013).

The second report's main aim was that of investigating how different segments of society perceived the ministry and its prefects. In order to achieve that aim, the survey was conducted with 3050 citizens, 362 village headmen, 330 lawyers, 261 representatives of non-governmental organisations, 83 retired mayors, and 56 retired parliamentarians. Most of them, except the lawyers, underlined the paternal role of the Ministry. The village headmen and retired mayors thought that the Ministry had been providing more efficient and quality services than ever before. Nevertheless, while half of them appreciated the level of coordination achieved by the Ministry, the other half did not. The representatives of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and retired parliamentarians, on the other hand, mostly complained about the lack of coordination between themselves and the Ministry. These latter groups criticised the Ministry for being politicised, as well as their lacking good government approach (TIAV, 2014a).

The third report focused on how the media and the news perceived the Ministry. They did this in an academic way by using a discourse analysis on twenty-four TV and newspapers, either broadcasted or published, between 01/01/2013 and 10/05/2013. This report revealed a similar result to the one aforementioned: viz., while the ministers and public security forces were the most newsworthy, the institutional perception of the MoI was ignored (TIAV, 2014b).

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[26] Also, all reports are used according to the appropriate chapter in order to triangulate their fieldwork findings, as well as to fill in data gaps effectively.

The last questionnaire was conducted with 848 prefects (governors, deputy governors, and district governors) between 20/02/2014 and 20/03/2014 in Turkey. The response rate achieved was around 60% (496/848). The findings of the survey which related to this thesis revealed that the prefects were seen as well-educated and reflected that they were perceived as playing a positive paternal role. Furthermore, their bureaucratic capacity [N.B. not their policy advisory capacity] was criticised for being red taped, centralised, politicised, nepotistic, and not very innovative. Paradoxically, they proffered an optimistic view about the Ministry's strategic planning, its training of prefects, and its ability to conduct good governance via the Ministry (TIAV, 2014c)

The second group of literatures was conducted by academics. International research — based on fieldwork — in this area is limited, as well. I have identified only three published study. First one, Tiernan and colleagues[27] focussed on the policy advisory capacity of several ministries in Australia. Second one, Craft, Howlett and their colleagues[28] assessed 'governmental capacity to meet significant policy challenges, in this case those related to climate change adaptation including detailed examination of five policy sectors—finance, infrastructure, energy, forestry, and transportation—in two countries, Canada and the United States' (Craft and Howlett, 2013, p. 1). Third one, Howlett and his colleagues assessed all nine policy capacities of several countries.[29] I benefitted all of them although my study is different from them because I covered all nine policy capacities of one specific case.

Due to the similarities, I focussed seminal study of Tiernan and her collegues, which was conceived in Australia. "A Special Issue of Australian Public Administration" (Journal of Australian Public Administration, 2011, 70(4)) examined the policy advisory capacity of the Australian Public Service (APS) across key policy sectors, introducing six case studies based on the Commonwealth government's responsibilities.[30] The Special Issue concludes with an article by Lindquist and Tiernan which assesses the ability of the APS to support decision-making using its policy advisory functions and its preparedness to meet the challenges of 21st century governance. They utilised four criteria for their case selection process. These were: activity (central or line agencies); function (coordinating, economic, social welfare); reformist (either embraced or resisted change over the period under study); and research focus (the research's being active/non-active). With

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[27] Australian Journal of Public Administration, 70 (4), 2011.
[28] Review of Policy Research, 30 (1), 2013.
[29] Policy Science, special issue, 34 (3), 2015.
[30] These include: the Treasury (Wanna, 2011); Defence (Arklay, Tiernan, and White, 2011); the Department of the PM and the Cabinet (PM&C) (i.e. central coordination) (Hamburger, Weller, and Stevens, 2011); Housing Policy (Milligan and Tiernan, 2011); implementation and delivery (Building the Education Revolution (BER) programme) (Althaus, 2011); and intergovernmental relations (Menzies, 2011).

regards to this thesis, these criteria could also be adopted for the purpose of choosing cases (see chapter 3).

Tiernan comprehensively summarised the main tasks of researchers, adding that, due to the multi-faceted nature of policy capacity, they also paid attention to its individual, organisational, and network dimensions. She highlighted that her study's main focuses would be on:

> … the education and professional backgrounds [skills and knowledge] of the individuals involved in policy advising, …examine institutional and organisational factors: information sharing, knowledge management and [IM]; leadership and human capital processes and strategies; organisational processes and routines for policy coordination,…consider[ing] [their] organisational culture: organisational identity, the presence (or not) of a learning culture and, finally, to consider the networks and relationships in which policy advisory activities occur… [in stressing the importance of the changing the policy-making environment.] …the authorising environment for their work, [centralisation] and other pressures as well as [the] specific events or challenges that they have confronted. [And] whether and how this conforms to the expectations of political leaders and the complexities of the issues on which they need advice from the public service (Tiernan, 2011a, pp. 341, 344-345).

Moreover, Linquist and Tiernan highlighted these case studies' main perspectives and issues as follows:

- Performance of a diversified policy advising system is a vantage point;

- PMs play a critical role in the quality of policies which guide governments;

- Taking advantage of a broader system of distributed analytic capacities is important to the improvement or decline of policy capacity;

- Public services should highlight their departments' issues in order to gain the trust and confidence of governments;

- For the sake of evaluating and renewing public service competence, realising the 'inevitably of gaps in advising in certain policy domains is another crucial issue.'

- 'It is worth considering broader environmental trends and the extent to which they reflect a predictable and unique Australian experience' (Linquist and Tiernan, 2011, pp. 442-443).

Tiernan also derived four dimensions of concern regarding the advisory capacity of the public service from her previous studies and after reading the practitioner/scholarly literature, including the recent reviews and reports which were noted earlier. It will be valuable to quote at length the descriptions that she provides for these four dimensions below since most of them will be the basis of my fieldwork.

Analysis and advice:

• Subject matter knowledge and expertise;

• The ability to generate or source policy ideas and to critically assess them;

• The availability and reliability of information and intelligence on current and emerging issues, including, where necessary, counselling caution or devil's advocacy;

• The rigour and sophistication underpinning policy advice.

Coordination and Collaboration:

• The ability to mobilise and coordinate around whole-of-government issues;

• To address cross-cutting problems and issues;

Responsiveness and Policy Coherence:

• Timeliness and accuracy of information provided to ministers;

• The "fit" with style and governmental preferences;

• To produce logical and consistent policies (by anticipating unintended consequences);

• The pattern of demand for advice and analysis;

 • The nature of relationships between agencies and ministers' offices;

• The strategies used by agencies to convey advice they feel might be "unwelcome" or "unwanted."

Delivery and Implementation:

• The link between policy advice and implementation – the extent to which policy and program design is informed by operational realities and the experience of the "front line";

- the ability and willingness of the public service to promptly deliver government commitments and priorities;

 - To provide seamless service to clients.

- the potential for policy intent to become distorted or diffused during implementation (Tiernan 2011a, pp. 341-342).

As Weller (1998, p. 579) stresses, policy advice is still 'a crucial determinant in public sector activity.' Edwards examined the implications of these developments against these four criteria for quality policy advice. These implications, which are used to assess advisory capacity in this research, are listed by her as follows:

- strategic and long term;

- informed by practicalities of implementation;

- coherent and with a whole-of-government visage; and

- responsive to the elected government's agenda (Edwards, 2009, p. 292).

On the other hand, a search into the Turkish literature for the queries "policy capacity of governmental departments" and the "bureaucratic policy capacity of Ministry of the Interior " yielded that there do exist a few literatures related to my research topic. Most of them, however, are not related directly, with their main theme being bureaucratic reform. The Turkish version of the "Moran Report" was written by Dincer and Yilmaz (2003) for the purpose of reorganising the public administration.[31] In their guided study, they firstly examined the administrative reform experiences of nine developed countries. They did this for the purpose of trying to elaborate upon the conditions and needs of Turkey (ibid., pp. 20-65). In the second part, their main focus was that of the reform process. They identified several factors which affect the reform process. The primary problem areas identified by them include the political and administrative tradition, structural problems, the inefficiency of the public administration, and the EU accession processes being undergone in Turkey. Even though they were not able to defend this by means of any fieldwork findings, they perceived bureaucracy as being ineffective and not based on strategic or citizenship-related considerations (ibid., pp. 65–113). Finally, in the last part of their paper, which concludes the analysis, they offered suggestions for rebuilding the public administration system

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[31] Dincer was the designer and leader of the reform programme as a bureaucrat and was the implementer and supervisor as a Minister; then, he later became the Education Minister; also, the other writer, Cevdet Yilmaz, became the Development Minister in 2011.

by providing a map for regulating it better. Their solutions are more efficiency, more participation, citizens' satisfaction, performance-based work, effective auditing procedures, and strategic governance (ibid., pp. 113-163). Like most of the other Turkish literatures, their study ignored the voices of practitioners (even the ministers).

On the other hand, Varol's (2015) study is based on fieldwork, thereby enabling one to gain a deeper understanding of the reform experience in Turkey, as well as the factors which affected its reform process during the period between 1980 and 2010. This study shows that a declining bureaucratic policy capacity is both a reason for, and a result of the reforms. Furthermore, it is shown that politicisation and centralisation are the key factors which are primarily responsible for this.

2.4   Conclusion of the Chapter

In this chapter, I surveyed what was already known about policy capacity, the assessment of policy capacity, and other research and literature relating to policy capacity under the following topics and themes regarding the aims of this research:

- the definition of policy capacity;

- the theme of the limits to policy capacity; and

- how to assess the policy capacity of governmental departments.

Focusing more on qualitative researches regarding policy capacity in the international literature provided me with valuable definitions, dimensions, frameworks, and approaches for assessing governmental departments. Nevertheless, these researches had gaps. Some other researches tried to fill these gaps. For example, whereas some researches focused on one dimension of policy capacity -mostly advisory capacity-, others adopted all three competences, as well as three levels of resource.

Yet, the literature, which belong to other countries' own structures and traditions, could not be utilised without amendment. Therefore, in this chapter, I also focused on the Turkish literature – specifically, academic studies and official reports. The limits to bureaucratic policy capacity and the issues of red tape and bureaucratic oligarchy are popular topics for politicians, academicians, and even citizens in Turkey; nevertheless, there was not enough research in the Turkish literature regarding my topic. Moreover, none of them achieved a holistic view. The aforementioned Turkish academic studies mostly just focused on the relationships between elite actors and the fact that bureaucracy played a barrier role against reforms and better management. Although a

few official reports were published, most of them had similar formats and information. Moreover, the main points which were identified did not change between years. They revealed the following issues: there being a lack of IM, education strategy, expert personnel, and coordination; there being a high mobility of key personnel; and the politicisation of the administrative system.

With regards to the methodological standpoints of these studies, it is fair to say that there were few field studies in the reviewed literature which involved interviews with administrative elites. Most of these studies used secondary documentary data coupled with their own analyses.

In sum, the existing Turkish literature suggested some of the elements of policy capacity; the need was identified, however, for a more in-depth, holistic research focusing more on (bureaucratic) policy capacity of one Turkish public department in particular. Therefore, describing and assessing this department's policy capacity in an academic way, empirical fashion, could provide valuable information, both to political administrators of MoI and externals.

For this purpose, after conducting this literature review, I have determined two main research questions:

1. Does bureaucracy give the minister the advice needed to reach a decision?

2. How has the bureaucratic policy capacity of The Turkish Ministry of the Interior changed during the reform years, 2002 – 2016?

In order to respond to these questions, I chose an ethnographic qualitative (case study-based) research design. Moreover, I preferred to use the qualitative thematic analysis method in order to get inside and better analyse this study's findings by employing the adapted framework (see pp. 45-46 of this thesis).

In the next chapter, I will detail these frameworks and methods in much more detail.

Chapter 3:   THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODS

3.1   A Framework for Analysing Policy Capacity

Policy capacity has emerged as a major concern for governments in many countries in recent years due to the recurrent failures of there being satisfactory outcomes from policy actions. Although there is no doubt regarding the necessity of policy capacity for policy success, there are considerable disagreements about the conceptual definitions of policy capacity among scholars.

Policy Capacity: A Multi-Dimensional Phenomenon

As mentioned in the literature review chapter, there is a large number of different definitions of policy capacity that highlight the different dimensions of the subject. This thesis considers policy capacity term as a multi dimensional phenomenon that not only focuses on bureaucrats' ability to formulate and make policy choices, but also because it considers their ability to perform tasks and functions at the other stages of the policy process, stressing the importance of the external political environment and internal administrative tradition within three interactive/ interdependent resource levels. Thus, policy capacity includes:

> the individual competencies of policy workers (knowledge, skills and personal attributes) organisational (structures, processes and [tradition]) and, systemic capabilities (political and public administration systems), [the] external environment (political parties, electoral cycles, community expectations, stakeholder interests and media) that support and promote 'good' policy making (Hughes et al., 2015, pp. 232-233).

In the same vein, Wu et al. (2015a, p. 4) defines policy capacity 'as a set of skills, competences, resources, and institutional arrangements and capabilities with which key tasks and functions in [the] policy process are structured, staffed and supported.'

Dimensions and levels of policy capacity

Wu et al. (2015a) developed a theoretical framework which consists of three skills or competences at three dimensions: the analytical, operational, and political. As they say:

> Analytical competences allow policy alternatives to be effectively generated and investigated; operational capacities allow state resources to be effectively brought to bear on policy issues; and political capacities allow policy-makers and managers the support required to develop and implement their ideas, programs and plans (ibid., p. 5).

They state that these dimensions allow one to understand the cases of the limits to policy capacity while having a high level of analytical competence since policy successes demand competence and skills along all three dimensions. Moreover, they stressed that these skills and competences could be mobilised based on the availability of adequate resources, which 'must exist at the individual, organizational and system-levels in order to allow individual policy workers [to] participate in and contribute to designing, deploying, and evaluating policies' (Wu et al., 2015a, p. 5).

Firstly, policy abilities should be measured at the individual level. The skills and competences of key political-administrators who play a critical role in the shaping and development of duties and functions in the policy process but which require various kinds of resources which exist at multiple levels – from the organisational level to the level of political, economic and social systems. While organisational features overly circumscribe individual decision capabilities, system-level capabilities excessively surround both the individual and organisational levels.

> Conditions at the individual level most relevant are knowledge about policy processes, competence in policy analysis and evaluation, and [operational] expertise… The organizational conditions most relevant to policy capacity include those related to information, management, and political support… Finally, system level capabilities include the level of support and trust a public agency enjoys from its political masters and from the society at large (Blind, 2006) as well as the nature of the economic and security systems within which policy-makers operate (Ibid., pp. 6-7).

Since the interaction and interdependence of these factors complicate the policy making process and environment, policy capacity should be considered broadly (ibid, pp. 8-15). As shown below in Table 1, each of these three competences involve resources or capabilities at the three different levels, thereby generating nine basic types of policy-relevant capacity (ibid., p. 2). The logic of this matrix is simple, but vital. It stressed that skills and competences could be mobilised where adequate resources, which 'must exist at the individual, organizational and system-levels' are available. In other words, it is possible to have a limit to policy capacity despite having a high level analytical competence in situations where other competencies and resources cannot support analytical policy capacity. For instance, even though an organisation might have a skilful staff, they might not succeed unless the department has the capability to store, collect and disseminate data at the systemic level and has support from both minister and rules. In doing so, I have agreed with Ramesh et al. (2016, p. 17) who says that this general framework of policy capacity recognises 'the nested nature of policy capacity – not only do[es] policy capacity [exist] at

different levels but these levels interact with each other.' Thereby, in the beginning of this study, I followed this theoretical framework.

Table 1. The Theoretical Framework (original) of policy capacity, with illustrative examples, domains and dimensions			
Resource Level Skill Dimension	**Individual Capabilities**	**Organisational Capabilities**	**System Capabilities**
Analytical **Competences**	**1. Individual Policy Analytical Capacity** Knowledge of policy substance, analytical techniques, and communication skills	*2.* **Organisational Analytical Capacities** Capability in data collection, storing and disseminating information regarding citizen need; service utilisation, e-services architecture; budgeting and human resource management systems	**3. Knowledge System Capacity** Institutions and opportunities for knowledge generation, mobilisation, and use
Managerial **Competences**	**4. Individual Managerial Capacity** Visionary leadership; strategic and operational management skills; negotiation and conflict resolution skills; financial management and budgeting skills	*5.* **Organisational Managerial Capacity** Funding; staffing; levels of intra-agency and inter-agency communication; consultation, coordination; system for monitoring agency performance	**6. Accountability and Responsibility System Capacity** Presence of rule of law; accountability, transparent adjudicative and career systems; coherence of relevant societal groups
Political **Competences**	**7. Political Acumen Capacity**	*8.* **Organisational Political Capacity**	**9. Political-Economic System Capacity**

	Understanding of the needs and positions of different stakeholders; judgment of political feasibility; networking and communication skills	Access to key policy makers; politicians' support for the agency, programmes and projects; levels of inter-organizational trust and communication; process for public engagement	Presence of public legitimacy and trust; political accountability for policies; an adequate fiscal system to fund programs and projects; participation of civil society in the policy process

Source: Wu et al., 2015a; 2015b; Howlett, 2015; and Ramesh et al., 2016a.

Further, after conducting literature review and using my previous experience working for the MoI, I came to realise that the original model was not appropriate for this research through these below reasons:

- The original model did not place a high value on informal elements such as the administrative tradition of the organisation and its interest in forming the policy capacity.
- The original model did not adequately involve the impact of external political environment on policy capacity.
- The impact of political leadership on policy capacity was not incorporated into the framework.
- There being a domain of managerial terms within the model.
- The original model is a lack of adequate empirical background.

Hence, I decided to conduct previous empirical based qualitative researches on public departments' policy capacity[32], which could provide me with a wide vision through the use of ethnographic qualitative methods. After conducting related literature, I modified the original framework through adding:

- Administrative leadership into individual administrative policy capacity
- Gleeson's domains (tasks) and Tiernan's dimension of policy capacity into organisational administrative policy capacity,
- External political environment in political policy capacity,

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[32] Gleeson, 2009; Hughes, 2014; Rhodes, 2011; 2016; Tiernan et al., 2011 and Rhodes and Tiernan, 2014.

That provided me with an appropriate conceptual framework to assess the policy capacity of the MoI.

On the other hand, as I was familiar with Turkish public administration system and the MoI tradition due to my insider role in the MoI, as a third step, I redesigned this modified theoretical framework to make sure it was in line with the context of Turkey, which is a developing country without a Westminster system.

I resigned modified framework which went through several modifications, including removals and additions, to ensure that the framework was applicable to the tradition, structure, and the processes of the MoI as well as the surrounding external political factors.

Firstly, the impact of external political environment on policy capacity was adequately incorporated into the framework. Because, the thesis findings indicated that changes to the external political environment impact on policy capacity. For instance, besides detrimental effect of centralisation on policy advisory and policy making capacity of the MoI; EU integration process has pushed the MoI to establish new units such as EU, IT, and Internal Audit Unit, Strategy department to adopt NPM approach against Turkish administrative tradition.

Secondly, the impact of political leadership on policy capacity was incorporated into the framework. This was necessary for the context of Turkey as the minister plays a central role within the MoI in supporting the policy.

Lastly, the impact of managerial terms (including customer-based terms) on policy capacity was negligible in the context of MoI administration. Therefore, the framework was amended to replace managerial terms with administration terms. For instance, the MoI administration was not concerned about financial issues due to existing governmental support and traditional tasks. Therefore, terms of budgeting, funding, bargaining, etc. were removed.

In sum, I give more value to robust tradition and informal training and diplomacy, the role of ministers, and informal IM vis-à-vis the original model. This (final) framework was employed in this thesis to understand and describe policy capacity of the MoI. (I will assess the utility of this framework for my research in Chapter 8).

Table2. The Framework (final) of Policy Capacity of the MoI with elements, domains and dimensions

Resource Level Skill Dimension	Individual Capabilities	Organisational Capabilities	System Capabilities
Analytical **Competences**	**1. Individual Analytical Policy Capacity** a. Knowledge sets including knowledge of context, policy processes, overall administration systems, their dynamics and environments; priorities of government and ministers; comparative historical and expert knowledge. b. Skill sets consisting of **c**onceptual and data analytical skills; having strategic, political and intuition skills; policy-making skills; counselling, and communication skill (advise); other skills: writing, foreign language, and project administration skills.	**2. Organisational Analytical Policy Capacity** a. Availability and reliability of information; b. Access and use of information; c. Research and evidential knowledge production; d**.** Evaluate reality and the priority of ministers' governmental policies.	**3. Knowledge System Policy Capacity** a. Institutions and opportunities for knowledge generation, mobilisation, and use; b. The MoI Centre of Research.

Administrative Competences	4. Individual Administrative Policy Capacity	5. Organisational Administrative Policy Capacity	6. Administrative System Policy Capacity
	Administrative leadership and administrative skills of prefects	a. Administering policy processes; b. Analysis and advice; c. Coordination and collaboration; d. Links between policy development and implementation; e. Monitoring, evaluation and review; f. Personnel administration; g. Personnel training.	a. presence of the rule of law; b. accountability and responsibility.
Political Competences	7. Individual Political Policy Capacity a. Political leadership, including roles, accountability and responsibilities, style, judgment of political feasibility, and relationship with bureaucracy; b. Bureaucratic political policy capacity	8. Organisational Political Policy Capacity a. Responsiveness and policy coherence; b. political support; c. Public legitimacy and trust;	9. Political System Policy Capacity (External Political Environment) a. Globalisation: the EU integration process; b. Centralisation: Top- down policy; c. media pressure.

Source: Redesigned by author (Inspired from the models developed by Wu et al. 2015a and 2015b; Howlet, 2015; Ramesh et al., 2016a; Gleeson, 2009; Gleeson et al., 2009 and 2011; Tiernan, 2011; Hughes, 2014; and Rhodes and Tiernan, 2014.

The nine types of policy capacity which are detailed in Table 2 will be examined in much more detail in the following section.

Nine Types of Policy Capacity

This section shall dissect the nine types of political capacity which were derived from the redesigned framework (see Table 2) that will be utilised in this thesis. I shall first detail the analytical competences of this framework.

1. **Individual Analytical Policy Capacity:**

The MoI must employ individuals with the ability to acquire and use both internal and external knowledge. The "individual policy—analytical capacity" could be defined as 'the ability to access and apply technical and scientific knowledge and analytical techniques to cope with problems and developing appropriate strategies' (Howlett, 2015, p. 2). Individual analysis skills have been grouped into two sets of competencies: knowledge sets and skill sets.

Knowledge sets:

- Knowledge of the public administration system and its dynamics;

- Comparative and historical knowledge;

- Knowledge of the departmental and public sector environment;

- Knowledge of the policy process;

Skill sets

- Conceptual and analytic skills;

- Strategic and political skills;

- Intuitive judgement, communication, and interpersonal skills;

- Skills in accessing, appraising and filtering information;

- Evaluation skills;

- Data analysis, and research skills;

- Project management skills;

- Other skills.[33]

Individuals need to be supported by adequate organisation with an enabling context in order to improve their skills and knowledge (Angels, 2015, p. 199).

2. **Organisational Analytical Policy Capacity**

This provides 'structure for collecting and disseminating information within and across public sector agencies. In order to find, store and share information more quickly and provide for re-use of existing information without duplication of efforts' (Wu et al., 2015a: 11). IM is especially vital for making policy and better implementation. Following Gleeson, the organisational analytical capacity of the MoI consists of the following four dimensions:

- Availability and reliability of information;

- Access to, and use of, information;

- Conducting research in order to produce evidential knowledge;

- Evaluating reality in terms of ministerial government policy (Gleeson, 2009, p. 203).

Nevertheless, this capacity plays a critical role in the effective formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of public policies. Thus, both the individual and organisational analytical capacities need to be supported by knowledge systems in society.

3. **Knowledge System Policy Capacity**

This larger level capacity could be simply defined as the overall state of educational and scientific facilities in a society. That kind of 'data and evidence facility[ates] [the] transparency and credibility needed for nation-states to cooperate on issues requiring global coordination' (Angel, 2015, p. 197).

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[33] Wu et al., 2015a; Gleeson, 2009; Tiernan, 2011; and Hughes, 2014.

It is important to point out, though, that the 'availability of good quality information, willingness, speed and ease of access generally to high quality information determine their beneficences' (ibid). Otherwise, the lack of speed and of quality information will not be able to provide proper resources from which to draw when new issues start to arise. In the Turkish context especially, 'many aspects of this type of capacity may be difficult to change or beyond the scope of individual government organizations and individual actors' (Wu et al., 2015a, p. 12). On the other hand, organisational structure and tradition should tend to demand systematic knowledge. Political support, in turn, is another factor which affects this capacity.

4. Individual Administrative Policy Capacity

It could be defined as 'the ability to build [and implement] policy through local-level judgment, mentorship, initiative and responsibility and through mobilizing organizational resources' (Gleeson, 2009, p. 367). For this research, seeing as 'the characteristics and behaviours of middle and senior level bureaucrats contribute to improvements in policy capacity' (Tiernan, 2015b, p. 211), I assess the individual administrative capacity of the prefects. Gleeson (2009, pp. 347-348) considers these tasks in terms of the bureaucratic leadership role, saying that they would enable:

> …more intelligent use of information in policy making; better people management; stronger stakeholder relationships; more effective collaboration across program, departmental and jurisdictional boundaries; better relationships between policy development and program management; better policy management; and improved policy evaluation and monitoring.

I deliberately removed the managerial points that are mentioned. For, even though managerial skills have come to the forefront during the NPM era, thereby requiring entrepreneurial leadership from bureaucrats, there was a lack of evidence from my fieldwork to mention these skills in terms of the MoI's practices. I agree with Rhodes that 'if leadership is everything, maybe it is nothing'; rather 'administrative leadership is about the constitutional and political role of public administration in the polity; it is not about better management' (Rhodes, 2014c, p. 112). Rhodes also criticised this conceptualisation of public leadership, underlining that the characteristics of administrative leadership should be based on the hierarchical authority of the state. Hughes (2014, p. 204) has similarly commented that:

> Leadership is interpreted as senior executive … positions, with prescribed authority through their defined roles and responsibilities for providing high level, specialist [and general] advice, [administrating] and directing staff, and controlling resources.

Therefore, in the [MoI administration, administrative] leaders are empowered by their position.

My research findings — which are demonstrated in the emprical chapters of this thesis — supported the fact that defining the characteristics of administrative leadership.

As Ramesh et al. (2016a, p. 14) opines, these attributes provide 'not only [individual operational skills] but also political legitimacy and trust in the government.'

It should be underlined that these skills depend on the administrative capacity of the institution and the effective partnership between ministers and senior officials (Tiernan, 2015b, p. 215). In addition, 'the occurrence of policy change is contingent upon the dynamic interaction of policy actors, organizations and institutions' (Ramesh et al., 2016a, p. 2 — see Chapter 7).

Organisational administrative capacity could be labelled as being the hearth of the policy capacity since all level individual capacities are affected by this more.

5. Organisational Administrative Policy Capacity

This is a well-known aspect of capacity that administrators work and makes organisations function more effectively.

Following Gleeson's (2009) framework, this capacity is structured around six domains,[34] or tasks, of administrative policy capacity, in which organisational structure, processes and tradition contribute to the quality of policy practice with "enablers" and "barriers'' (borrowed from Painter and Pierre, 2005). In order to remove the managerial terms which do not comply with the MoI's tradition from this framework, this study blends Gleeson's organisational "policy capacity framework" with Tiernan's (2011) four dimensions — which, themselves, focus more on the advisory capacity of public service and which is benefits from the use of public administration terms. Thus, the tasks used in this thesis are: administrating the process; analysis and advice; coordination and collaboration; linking policy development and implementation; monitoring, evaluation and review; personnel administration; and personnel training.

How well political administrators administer these tasks also depends on the accountability and responsibility evidenced at the system capacity level. This capacity shall be examined in the following section.

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[34] I remove leadership from organisational administrative policy capacity to individual administrative capacity (administrative) and political policy capacity (political) just as Hughes (2014) does.

6. Administrative System Policy Capacity

This sub-capacity consists of the presence of rule of law and the accountability and responsibility of public departments:

> …an existing legal-administrative system that allows public agencies the discretion to carry out their functions but also the checks on discretion, presence of laws and regulations governing administrative systems, and systems for holding government accountable for its actions (Hughes et al., 2015, p. 230).

The presence of the rule of law is defined by the Turkish Constitution as follows:

> The Turkish State has the principle of rule of law which means all state activities are subject to legal accountability and all individual rights are under legal protection whether against the state or against other individuals. (Constitutional Article 2)

This definition could be interpreted with accountability as 'the existing rules of law and engagement [which] provide adequate checks and balances to allow public agencies the discretion to carry out their functions, and systems that hold governments and organisations accountable for their actions' (Wu et al., 2015a, p. 14).

Rhodes stressed that public servants value both tradition and the presence of rule of law and their practical benefit.

> The civil service respects tradition and codifies much of it in rules and procedures. They refer to it as the departmental philosophy. It is less logical but wiser and more comprehensive and consequences lucidly and to tender sound advice in precise and clear paper. (Rhodes, 2011, pp. 59-60)

Similar to Rhodes's implications, legality is the foremost value for the MoI which requires a legal provision or framework to cover every action of a public servant. Namely, a working, rule-based manner must frame all of their public tasks.

7. Individual Political Policy Capacity

It is essential for policy actors to have 'a keen nose, not only for understanding politics, but also for reading the broader environment in order to play an effective role in the policy-making process' (Pal and Clark, 2015). Simply, it could be named "political knowledge", it consists of the following skills for political administrators:

   a. Diplomacy: focus on spanning boundaries and facilitating interactions;

b. Political nous: ability to have "a wide view of politics." (Rhodes, 2016, pp. 641-644)

The political acumen capacity is applicable to both politicians and bureaucrats whereas political leadership role solely belongs to ministers. Yet, there has also been debate on the role of ministers and their accountability amongst academicians[35] (see Chapter 7); namely, their leadership role, which involves accountability, has been missing and even taboo.[36]

At the organisational level, these attributes both ease and strengthen the relationship that political- administrators have with one another.

8. Organisational Political Policy Capacity

Organisational political capacity includes responsiveness, political support, and public trust. First element of this capacity is responsiveness to political priority and concern that 'enhances awareness, understanding, and support for government policies' (Wu et al., 2015a, p. 15). Thus, bureaucracy should carry out their minister's priorities and decisions neutrally and professionally.

The second element of this capacity is political support and trust. Bureaucracy needs political support to fulfil its tasks. This element 'involves the policy [actors'] ability to take the political aspects of policy tasks into consideration and to enhance political support for the tasks they perform' (Ramesh et al., 2016, p.15).

The third element of this capacity is public trust that is at the heart of this capacity:

> Trust ensures that state actions and institutions are perceived as legitimate and receive public support, which in turn allows political skills to be exercised, preventing political or institutional decay and policy ineffectiveness. (Wu et al., 2015b, p. 271)

Furthermore, this organisational capacity should be supported by larger, system-level capabilities.

9. Political System Policy Capacity

This is the most wide-ranging policy capacity since it has the potential to shape all of the other capacities. This includes external political environment including:

- The increased power and pressure of globalisation [on] the top-down features of regulation;

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[35] Mulgan, 2009; Tiernan, 2015; Rhodes, 2011 and 2014.
[36] See the literature review and the MoI's Strategy (2009; 2014) and Performance (2010-2016) Reports.

- Centralization and top-down policy making: the increasing need for reactiveness for political demand;

- The 24/7 nature of both the regular and social media pressure.

In sum, as shown above, there being distinctive elements of all nine policy capacities, which more or less interact each other's.

Summary of the Section

As mentioned in Chapters 1 and 2, whereas most of the previous literature focuses on a number of different dimensions in order to define "policy capacity," I prefer to use the "policy capacity" as an umbrella term that consists of three competences — analytical, administrative, and political skills — at three resource levels — the individual, organisational and systemic.

In the beginning of this study, I followed the matrix model (pp. 42-43 of this thesis) developed by Wu et al (2015a, 2015b). It consists of nine sub-policy capacities, with elements, instances, tasks and dimensions. The logic behind this matrix is simple but vital. They stressed that these skills and competences could be mobilised in case of the availability of adequate resources, which must exist at the individual, organisational and systemic levels.

On the other hand, the framework not only consists of domains with managerial terms, but also lacks the empirical background to use the ethnographic qualitative method.

Further, after conducting literature review and using my previous experience working for the MoI, I came to realise that the original model was not appropriate for this research. Therefore, I modified the theoretical frameworks of Wu et al. (2015) with the literature on qualitative research on public departments. Despite the interactive and dynamic features of modified framework, according to the evidence obtained by this research, it is unlikely to assess a developing country's policy capacity without its own unique political and administrative context and its administrative traditions, as well as its semantic standpoint. Therefore, I resigned modified framework which went through several modifications, including removals and additions, to ensure that the framework was applicable to the tradition, structure, and the processes of the MoI as well as the surrounding external political factors. This (final) framework was employed in this thesis to understand and assess policy capacity of the MoI.

3.2 Methodological Dimensions of the Research

Introduction

This chapter describes the formulation of a research design that 'determines how the evidence is generated and analysed' (Burnham et al., 2008, p. 68) in order to achieve the main goal of the study. As Bryman (2008, p. 31) notes, 'A research design provides a framework for the collection and analysis of data.' Furthermore, it has a 'dramatic influence on the procedure' as well as on 'the role of researcher, steps in data collection and analysis, strategies for validity, accuracy of findings, and narrative structure' (Creswell, 2012, p. 179).

In order to explain the methodological approaches, design and procedures of the study, this chapter is structured under five major themes. Firstly, the choice of the "qualitative ethnographic single case study" design is explained and justified — along with some triangulation by adding some significant references from the related literature. Then, data sources and data collection activities are described, with the use of semi-structured elite interviews, observations, and documentary sources being justified. In the following section, the analysis of the data is explained with reference to the applied framework (see pp. 45-46 of this thesis). Answers to the quality and reliability concerns of the research are presented in a separate section. The last section refers to ethical issues and the researcher's insider role. The researcher's reflections are also summarised in that section.

As noted before, the following sub-section will explain the qualitative ethnographic single case research design and will provide justifications for why it was applied to this research.

3.2.1 Qualitative Ethnographic Single Case Research Design

This research employs the "qualitative ethnographic single case study" design. This combination shall first be explained before addressing its pros and cons. Before that is done, though, it will be useful to emphasise the general benefit of adopting the qualitative research design.

Qualitative Research Design

As Bryman (2008, p. 366) explains, the qualitative research design 'usually emphasises words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data.' This method offers:

- Researchers the ability to see through the eyes of research participants.

- A great deal of descriptive detail when reporting the fruit of their research.

- Emphasis on processes that provide opportunities to use different approaches to collect data (i.e. ethnography, semi-structured interview).

- Data which is interpreted in regards to the particulars of a case rather than generalisations.

- The opportunity for meanings and interpretations to be negotiated with human sources.

- Flexibility and a limited structure. (ibid., pp. 366, 384-389; Creswell, 2012, pp. 198-199).

Internationally, researches on public policy capacity has been conducted using a qualitative design.[37] Yet, I cannot provide any examples of qualitative methods having been used successfully in the Turkish context as there have been only a few researches like that done in Turkey.[38]

Gleeson et al. (2009, p. 12) recommends researchers to employ qualitative methods using political-administrators' judgements because they, as actors, are 'motivated by concerns about their ability to marshal and tap into expertise, anticipate and respond to issues, and identify new and robust ways to design and deliver policy for governments.'[39] Thus, considering above advantages, I felt that such a methodology was appropriate for best capturing and understanding the topic and views of the elites regarding public policy capacity.

Ethnographic Fieldwork

The ethnographic fieldwork is a relatively new method in the political sciences. Indeed, Rhodes (2015b, p. 171) acknowledges that 'there are no schools of thought about the theory or methods of political ethnography.' A well-known definition of ethnography is provided by Hammersley and Atkinson (2007, pp. 2-3) as follows:

> [It] usually involves the researcher participating, overtly or covertly, in people's daily
> lives for an extended period of time, watching what happens, listening to what is said,
> and/or asking questions through informal and formal interviews, collecting documents
> and artefacts – in fact, gathering whatever data are available to throw light on the issues
> that are the emerging focus of inquiry.

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[37] Examples include: a special issue of Journal of Australian Public Administration (70(4)) which examined the policy advisory capacity of the Australian Public Service across key policy sectors (Tiernan et al., 2011); see also Gleeson et al., 2009, 2011; Edwards, 2009; Tiernan and Weller, 2010, Rhodes, 2011; and Hughes, 2014.
[38] This includes Mol, 2008; Crawley and Kutlu, 2009; Sen, 2015; Varol, 2015; Balci, 2015; and Feslihan, 2016.
[39] Linquist & Tiernan, 2011; Tiernan, 2011; Gleeson, 2009; and Hughes, 2014 are all good examples of researchers who employed this methodology.

Considering the fact that its main techniques are that of observation and ethnographic interviews, I agree with Bryman, who suggests that

> [these methods enable the] ethnographer to understand [the] meaning of actions and practices in the field, making a series of friendly conversations with the actors – [which] involves intensive repeat interviews and [which] is a stronger practice than [the] elite interview (Bryman, 2008, p. 402).

I were not able to conduct ethnographic interview rather conducted elite interview around semi-structured questionnaires due to the time restriction, however, I were able to fill this gap with observation. In other words, interviews are cross-checked with the other observations which were made and vice versa as Rhodes stated:

> The observations cover everyday activities, conversations, pen portraits of individuals, new ideas about the research, and the personal impressions and feelings of the ethnographer (Rhodes 2015b, p. 173).

I cannot understand the policy involvement of prefects, their context, and their circumstances without participants' words [deriving from their words and official documents, as well as diaries and speeches, minutes, and histories].

In sum, the ethnographic method provides several advantages. These are itemised by Boll and Rhodes as follows:

- Ethnography enables gathering of data not accessible with other methods: to hear and to see what goes on every day in public offices.

- Ethnography disaggregates organisations and helps us to see inside "the black box" and understand the internal processes of groups and organisations providing inside knowledge, texture and nuances, as well as richness and depth.

- Ethnography recovers beliefs and practices of actors and may result in moments of epiphany providing an authenticity that can only come from the main characters involved in the work.

- Ethnography gives voice to groups all too often ignored or [which are] secret... [For instance, in this research, the voice of the political-administrators of the MoI is heard for the first time] (Boll and Rhodes, 2015).

Thus, focussing on the everyday lives of the political administrators will make it easier for the researcher to understand the MoI's case better, as well as enable him to respond to the research questions with much more profundity.

The Unit of Analysis: The Turkish Ministry of the Interior

MoI is, outside the Prime Ministry, the most senior, highest status, public department with a long-standing tradition in the Turkish government. It handles the most delicate duties. The Ministry is a useful, single "holistic" case for understanding the complexities of the Turkish public administrative system through examining nine sub policy capacities. Moreover, as mentioned before, the MoI is a potential typical case in terms of its organisation and administration among twenty-one ministries and a good example for understanding the effects of the public administration reforms on bureaucratic policy capacity. (See also The Unit of Analysis: The Turkish Ministry of the Interior in Appendix B)

My main aim is to examine administrative, analytical and political policy capacities in order to answer my research questions (Bryman, 2008, p. 375). Therefore, the framework underpins my selection of sub-cases.

For the first question, "Does the bureaucracy give the minister the advice needed to reach a decision?", I examined administrative and analytical policy capacities and preferred to conduct research on departments which belong directly, and work closely to, ministers, including the undersecretary and his deputies, the general secretary of the MoI and the Private Office; and the Special Adviser, Press and Public Relations Unit [I named these as the "inner circle"]. [40] I have added some key departments that belong directly to the Minister as main advisory and audit units, the Department of Civil Inspection Board, the Department of Legal Consultancy. (The Department of Internal Audit belongs directly to the Undersecretary). Furthermore, I consider the Department of Personnel Administration and Training as a supportive department because of

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[40] The "court" term was defined as 'the prime minister and a small group of carefully selected courtiers.' It also covers the 'shift from formal decision-making processes in cabinet…to informal processes involving only a handful of actors' [quoted from Savoie, 2008, pp. 16–17). Furthermore, it was defined … 'as a broader definition that distinguishes between an inner and an outer court; between circles of influence spanning the intersecting and overlapping domains of politics, policy and administration' (Rhodes and Tiernan, 2016, pp. 339-340, 351).
Once we regard the role of deputy minister, undersecretary, and the inner circle, including advisors, the GS and the PPS, the findings do not reveal a significant contribution to making policies and decision; rather than the personal, supportive role of the inner circle and the coordination and monitoring role of the deputy undersecretaries. Besides that, there is a lack of "the greater numbers of partisan staff" and "policy" units supporting ministers and there are neither ministerial nor undersecretarial courts in the MoI. Instead, the GDs supported the minister or undersecretary, with regards to policy advisory tasks, monitors and evaluates issues/policies (see advisory departments). Therefore, I will use "inner circle" for the minister and "office" for the undersecretary rather than using the more generic term of "court."

their critical role in individual and organisational policy capacity, as well as their close relationship with ministers and the undersecretary.

For the second question, "How has the bureaucratic policy capacity of the Turkish Ministry of the Interior changed during the reform years, 2002 - 2016?", I examined political policy capacity and chose a relatively new department and unit in terms of its date of establishment: viz., the Department for EU Affairs and Foreign Relations, the Centre for Research and Studies, the Department for Information Technologies, and the Department for Strategy Development. Department of local administration was chosen in order to observe effects of local public administration reforms (its process) on policy capacity of MoI.

It is worth noting that, while some may be investigated in detail, others may be examined in order to check or generalise previous literature's findings (Gomm et al., 2000, p. 107). Admittedly, it is difficult to assess the bureaucratic policy capacity as a whole, even though the cases are chosen deliberately. Conducting interviews with former ministers mitigated this concern. Yet, it might be a generalisation problem, but qualitative research requires thick descriptions rather than statistical generations (Rhodes, 2015) (see pp. 67-68 of this thesis).

In order to achieve this research's aims, the collection of data for this case study was an important phase of this case study

3.2.2 Data Collection Methods

According to Bryman (2008, p. 31), '[a] research method is simply a technique for collecting data.' In this study, both the design of this research and the framework which is deployed provide the criteria for collecting data and interpreting the empirical evidence that was obtained from the MoI. The research has three data sources, including talking, observation, and written documents.

Semi-Structured Elite Interviews

This research employs semi-structured elite interviews as the main method for collecting data seeing as it has been presented as the main source of data collection for case studies by several authors.[41] Yin proposes the interview as one of the most important sources of evidence in case studies, underlining the main strengths and weaknesses of this technique. The strengths are:

- targeted: focuses directly on case study topics;

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[41] Burnham et al., 2008, p.231; Yin, 2014, p. 102.

- Insightful: provides explanations as well as personal views (e.g. perceptions, attitudes, and meanings).

He considers bias and reflectivity as the main weaknesses:

- Bias: due to poorly articulated questions;

- Response bias: indirect information filtered through the views of participants;

- Inaccuracies: due to poor recall;

- Reflectivity: interviewee provides what the interviewer wants to hear. (Yin, 2014, p. 106)

Creswell (2012, p. 186) listed the different levels of participant articulation and perception as weaknesses for interviews as well. Despite all of these assertions, I do not agree with them. Considering the benefit of ethnographic fieldwork design, the semi-structured interview is the most important method for allowing participants to use their words and experiences in order to stand out and also 'enables new ideas and interpretations' (Burnham et al., 2008, p. 247). By obtaining data from different participants with different experiences, information bias could be prevented, thereby increasing the credibility of the information. The goal of using interviews is to attempt to provide a more fruitful picture of how participants view policy capacity. In other words, '[a]t the heart of interviewing research is an interest in other individuals' stories because they are of worth' (Seidman, 2006, p. 3) Moreover, '[a] more collaborative approach to interviewing elites may provide a positive way through the difficulties of subjective methodology' (Morris, 2009, p. 215).

For this research, I conducted semi-structured interviews with 51 participants. I can label my participants as being "elite" in accordance with Brinkmann and Kvale's (2015, p. 171) definition, which states that "elite" refers to 'persons who are leaders or experts in a community, usually in powerful positions.'

Selection of Participants

With regards to my ethnographic study-up fieldwork, because my research is based on elite interviews, I mainly conducted semi-structured elite interviews with political-administrators, including the former ministers, deputy undersecretaries, current and former general directors

(GD),[42] deputy general directors, general secretaries (GS) of the Ministry, public/political advisors, and personal private secretaries (PPS)— all of whom complied with my selected departments (see pp. 57-58 of this thesis). Using the snowball technique, I had a chance to conduct interviews with chief civil [ministry] inspectors and legal counsellors, who provided invaluable information about the Ministry's context and who had, themselves, contributed to some researches and investigations regarding the Ministry's bureaucratic capacity.

Before conducting the fieldwork, I had reminded myself of this invaluable simple advice: 'the maxim for the best way to design and conduct a study is "purpose, purpose, purpose." It's elementary that the primary question one must ask before designing a study is, "What do I want to learn?"' (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002, p. 673). Regarding the choice of the sample group, the major factor was their close involvement in the decision-making process and implementation phases of the Ministry's inner workings. I selected interviewees on the basis of their position in the departments and their being stakeholders. In doing so, I agreed with the idea that:

> …the quality of policy advice and analysis from across the department and agencies comprising a public service, usually channelled through top officials to ministers.
> (Linquist and Tienan, 2011, p. 444)

I tried to ensure that all the dimensions of policy capacity are assessed in the study. Therefore, participants — except for the ministers, deputy ministers, and undersecretaries — have been selected among other high-level executives of the selected departments, as well as some key stakeholders (members of parliament (MP) who had duties in the interior committee and the GS of the Municipality Union). In sum, all of the interviewees were either political administrators or key people concerning my research. This is because I needed interviewees who could 'explain the meaning of their actions, providing an authenticity that can only come from the main characters involved in the story' (Rhodes, 2015, p. 174).

Since there is career system and a high personnel turnover for prefects and even ministers, my participants were likely to have different positions and experiences. Traditionally and legally, all of them [except for the head of the Department of Internal Audit] came from districts as prefects (either as a governor, district governor, or deputy governor) and who are, therefore, experienced in implementing policy. Normally, they were appointed to the MoI's central cadres as section directors or heads of division, and then were afterwards promoted to senior levels or secondment positions, especially with regards to inner circle responsibilities. Therefore, my participants were

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[42] I considered some heads of department as GDs since their departments are directly under the control of the undersecretary, not to mention the fact that they will likely turn into GDs in the near future.

well-informed, not only about their current position, but also about their lower position. For instance, one of my participants had been appointed from the province to the head of the local administration unit and, after five years, was promoted to the position of deputy of the GD of the same department, not to mention his being seconded as the PPS of the undersecretary. After changing to the role of undersecretary, he was assigned as a legal advisor. (LA) Furthermore, I had the chance to compare other public departments (in the overall Turkish bureaucratic context) since ten of them had worked outside the MoI as secondments and were willing to share their experiences.

Similar to LAs and chief inspectors, (CI) during my interview period, I asked my colleagues to refer me to people who could contribute to my study. After receiving broader advice, important contributions were made by the Council of State's Chief Prosecutor and members who had taken key roles at the MoI before being promoted to this supreme, consultative, and appellative court.

Moreover, I conducted interviews with two MPs -former head of the Personnel Administration Department and deputy Governor- who played/ is playing a role in the Interior Committee of the Turkish Grand Assembly. Another one of my participants was the general secretary of the Municipalities Union (GS of the Union) who was a key stakeholder in the Ministry, especially during the period in which the local administration reforms were being implemented.

Having examined how the participants were selected, the next section shall discuss how the interviews were conducted.

Conducting the Interview

I visited Turkey for the purpose of conducting my fieldwork between 20 March and 16 April, 2016 (first round) and between 7 April and 23 April, 2017 (second round). I had already chosen my most participants, who were supposed to provide me with information regarding my research questions and in accordance to my conceptual framework, before I travelled to Turkey. Totally, I conducted 51 semi-structured elite interviews. These interviews took between 31 minutes and 2.01 hours. I recorded 53 hours of interviews with t 47 out of 51 participants. The remaining 4 interviews lasted approximately 3 hours and I took fifteen page interview notes (see the list of participants in Appendix B). I The interviews were in Turkish. I transcribed and translated them all. Regarding the number of interviewees, the literature on semi-structured elite interviews states similar views, which is that "it depends" on the purpose of the study.[43] Burnham et al. (2008, p. 233) emphasise that there is no single certain answer for such a question and that it should be

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[43] Edwards, 2012, p. 42; Brinkmann and Kvale, 2015, p. 140.

determined by the "objectives and purposes" of the studies to provide saturation, explained as 'each additional interview yield[ing] diminishing returns … [with] relatively little [addition] to the stock of information or understanding' (ibid., p. 234). I felt confident about the number of my interviewees after analysing my fieldwork findings. Considering it had been a relatively short time since I had been an "insider," I could access most of the key people whom I wished to target. However, I were not able to conduct interviews with any undersecretary, I filled this gap by the contribution of well-informed deputy undersecretaries and members of inner circle of ministers and undersecretaries.

There are, however, a number of strengths associated with the semi-structured elite — whose judgements, by the way, have a high degree of normative validity — interviews for this study, although limiting the sample to senior political-administrators and the exclusion of a broad range of administrative staff and low level bureaucrats might restrict the study's interaction between policy development and implementation. If I considered low-level bureaucrats, my numbers could increase, but according to my preliminary findings, their participations would not provide significant contributions to my research due to their lack of responsibilities regarding the setting of agendas, analysing, policy making, advising, and even monitoring and evaluating tasks rather than dealing with routine technical duties.

On the other hand, using the case study method and focusing on the central organisation of the MoI (and its key policy practitioners) enabled the researcher to examine the organisational context of policy capacity (Gleeson et al., 2009, p. 245).

As recommended by the theories of research methods regarding the interview process, a semi-structured interview guide [44] was designed by the researcher based upon a comprehensive review of the literature, including previous guides and questionnaires which had been employed in the field.[45] Several guides were prepared in English and, later, a Turkish copy was produced. Most of the participants asked to be provided with the interview guide in advance because of their being cautious and their wishing to be familiar with the questions before going into the interviews. Even though this could be a barrier to conducting semi-structured interviews in an interactive manner, this made them feel relaxed and gave them a chance to formulate their own opinions about the guide. In this way, I was able to revise, add and delete some questions. Furthermore, during the last week of the interview period, I concentrated on what I found to be missing in my research.

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[44] i.e. Bryman, 2008; Seidman, 2006; Silverman, 2010.
[45] See Rhodes, 2011; Rhodes and Tiernan, 2014; Tiernan et al., 2011; Gleeson et al., 2009 and 2011; Edwards, 2009; Tiernan and Weller, 2010; and Wu et al., 2015.

My fieldwork experience showed me that one cannot plan everything before starting a qualitative research fieldwork.

Besides this source of data, however, my second source of information was "direct observations."

Observation

Generally, 'observation, is an everyday skill, which is methodologically systematised and applied in qualitative research. Practically all senses—seeing, hearing, feeling, and smelling— are integrated into observations' (Flick, 2014, p. 308) Therefore, 'observation is a broad category, covering everyday activities, conversations, pen portraits of individuals, new ideas about how to do the research, the diary of the ethnographer recording personal impressions and feelings' (Rhodes, 2015, p. 10). In this study, I benefitted from every opportunity, including observations of the daily life of the MoI, top meetings, and political-administrators' style, attitude, and inner circle activities, *inter alia*.

> Concerning political-administrator elites, there are some obvious difficulties in 'being there.' As 'the research participants are more powerful than the researchers (Shore and Nugent 2002: 11); they control [the] access and exit [routes] (Rhodes, 2015, p. 11).

Although participant observation refers to when 'researchers go into the field and try to become part of the field and an active member of it,' 'it is the best-known method of research in the social science[s]' (Flick, 2014, p. 296; Bryman, 2008, p. 257), I aimed to adopt a non-participant (direct) observation method (i.e., Ministry executive meetings chaired by undersecretary) due to there being a time lag and difficulties in obtaining official permissions. Non-participant (direct) observations are based on a simple logic as Adler and Adler (1994, p. 378) explain, 'observers follow the flow of events. Behaviour and interaction continue as they would without the presence of a researcher, uninterrupted by intrusion.'

My colleagues let me join the two top meetings that were chaired by the deputy Minister and undersecretary. They totally lasted 3 hours. Their participants were from other ministries and the topics which were covered were related to current issues. Observing these meeting was important for the purpose of evaluating MoI's coordination capacity and prefects' dealing with current, emergent issues, not to mention observing protocols.

Observing the Ministry in action is important for my research project. Although secrecy is a pervasive character of the MoI, as an insider, I could observe their daily lives while waiting to interview them or while visiting them in their offices. Waiting time took approximately 5 hours.

After that, I wrote my observation notes. (FWNB) Thus, I could identify the main issues of their departments in order to determine their perspectives regarding bureaucratic policy capacity.

The third source utilised for writing this thesis is written documents. These are beneficial for comparing the written word with that of the practices and opinions of the participants.

Written Documents

In this study, primary documentary data sources are used in this research. They are obtained from the Ministry and/or its websites, which consist of textual data in the form of the strategy plans, strategy performance reports, activity reports, and minutes of the Turkish Parliament and its Interior Committee; as well as organisational records which show budget or personal records etc. Since all of them were written in Turkish, related part was translated from Turkish into English by the author.

As secondary audits, I benefit from the data derived from internal performance reports, as well as several research reports prepared by the MoI's departments. Related books (including those published by stakeholders), academic articles, published diaries and memoirs were obtained from the internet and libraries. Their related part were also translated from Turkish into English.

Quality has been an important issue for documents. Regarding the judgement of the quality of documentary sources, Burnham et al. (2008, pp. 208-212) recommended four control criteria: 1. Authenticity; 2. Credibility; 3. Representativeness; and 4. Meaning. Amongst them, controlling meaning (i.e. webs of interpretation which are accurate, comprehensive, and consistent (Rhodes, 2015, p. 17) is the most vital aspect of utilising such written documents.

I agree with Flick (2014, p. 372) that I need to triangulate data sources in order to strengthen this thesis's reliability.

Triangulation

Triangulation is defined as 'the mixing of data or methods so that diverse viewpoints or standpoints cast light upon a topic' (Olsen, 2004, p. 103). Rothbauer (2008, p. 892) stresses the usage of triangulation as a multi-method approach in both data collection and data analysis. The concept of triangulation is required for a 'variety or a combination of data sources and research methods since that avoiding of suffer from limitations related with that methods and data' and also avoiding misinterpretation' (Bryman, 2003, p. 1142). In addition, the triangulation approach provides 'a useful tool to cope with this diverse data from numerous data sources to validate each other' (Burnham et al., 2008, p. 212). Triangulation can contribute both to the reliability and validity of this case study. It shall be used to support and validate the evidence provided by

interview transcriptions. The role of documentary sources, on the other hand, are mostly kept in the background, thereby helping one to better understand the context of this research and facilitating the analysis of the interview results. Thus, I combine three sources of information with their corresponding methods (e.g. the semi-structured interview, observation, and written documentation) for the purpose of extending the possibilities of producing more knowledge. (Denzin, 1989, pp. 237-241).

Firstly, I have read a range of reports written about this department, have conducted internet searches on official websites and, most importantly, have perused the minutes of meetings and important papers. These latter show, for instance, the processes of local administration reforms, as well as the routine archival reports associated with the everyday life of the Ministry. Analysing these reports and international/national literatures then became the basis of further observations, interview questions and themes.

Secondly, as mentioned above, after developing a systematic interview and observation strategy, I conducted interviews and did observations.

Finally, I continued to recollect relevant data from within the organisation, especially considering the fact that documentary and archival sources offer 'great opportunities for [me] to develop novel accounts and interpretations of [findings]' (Burnham et al., 2008, p. 208).

Of course, there were conflicts between the several sources of data. Where possible, I checked with the interviewees. Otherwise, I made a judgement about the reliability of my souces. There were not many such conflicts. I had a rich data set to analyse.

3.2.3   Data Analysis: Thematic Analysis

As Braun and Clarke (2006, p. 79) explain, thematic analysis is a method for 'identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data. It minimally organizes and describes your data set in (rich) detail.' I utilise a thematic analysis in order to 'read "between the lines" of what is said [or]...not said' (Flick, 2014, p. 370). My main goal was that of 'exploring and explaining what is "underlying"' or to "distil" [the] essence, meaning, norms, patterns, rules, structures et cetera [as well as the level of concepts and themes]' (Rapley, 2011, p. 276).

Actually, this method's main aim is to find repeated patterns [themes] that '[capture] something important about the data in relation to the research question, and [represent] some level of patterned response or meaning within the data set' (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p. 82).

Braun and Clarke developed six phases of thematic analysis:

✓ Familiarising yourself with your data: Transcribing data (if necessary), reading and re-reading the data, noting down initial ideas.

✓ Generating initial codes: Coding interesting features of the data in a systematic fashion across the entire data set, collating data relevant to each code.

✓ Searching for themes: Collating codes into potential themes, gathering all data relevant to each potential theme.

✓ Reviewing themes: Checking if the themes work in relation to the coded extracts (Level 1) and the entire data set (Level 2), generating a thematic 'map' of the analysis.

✓ Defining and naming themes: On-going analysis to refine the specifics of each theme, and the overall story the analysis tells, generating clear definitions and names for each theme.

✓ Producing the report: The final opportunity for analysis. Selection of vivid, compelling extract examples, final analysis of selected extracts, relating back the analysis to the research question and literature, producing a scholarly report of the analysis. (ibid., p. 87)

I trace Braun and Clarke's (2006, p. 87) phases. Firstly, interviewee responses were transcribed. I re-read the interview transcripts a few times in order to be familiarised with the data, and then I attempted to identify the key issues and relations between them.

Both the interview and documentary data were coded and analysed through Nvivo 10 qualitative data analysis software to enhance the reliability of the coding, thereby providing a better quality analysis. Of course, as Patton underlines, 'computers and software are tools that assist analysis. Software doesn't really analyse qualitative data' (2002, p. 442).

Eventually, by understanding the respondent's views on these issues and the relationships between them, triangulating different resources provided an opportunity to recognise clear patterns and emergent findings in the fieldwork.

Namely, I use a selective coding method which helps to make connections between the categories for the purpose of making sense of what is happening in the field. This is also an element of analytical induction since I have been researching different contexts with regards the current international literature. Observed patterns in the data set were coded under relevant themes derived directly from the data (inductive codes), as well as more theoretical codes derived from

the literature review and theoretical framework; nevertheless, data coding continued until the data set was organised in the order of themes, codes, and sub-codes.

Finally, I created a themes map which enabled both the researcher and the readers to check the logical coherence and meaningfulness of the account in order to cover all of the topics and themes identified from the interviews and literature (see p. 324 of this thesis). Thus, the findings from the qualitative thematic analysis provided me with a 'greater comprehensiveness and richness of knowledge; to enhance the quality of data gathered and of data analysis and to compare empirically obtained data' (Bryman, 2008).

Quality of the Qualitative Ethnographic Single Case Study Research: Issues of Generalisability and Validity

I follow Rhodes (2015, pp. 177-180), who identifies five problems: representation, generalisation, objectivity, explanation, and reflexivity related to ethnographic fieldworks.

The most relevant critique related to the qualitative ethnographic research design is that seeing through the eyes of research participants might make the research findings too subjective. I accept that telling the story from the prefects' eyes, even if triangulated by other sources, reveals only a partial truth (ibid., p. 177). My insider role also could provoke objectivity concerns.

Yet, I deliberately chose central departments and my 51 participants, in order to assess the policy capacity of the MoI and derived a significant amount of data from the fieldwork. It should be stressed that although almost all the study participants were prefects or having prefectoral background (two ministers and two MPs), findings showed a diversity of opinions, for several reasons.

The first reason is closely associated with the participants' positions. Most of those who current held senior positions tended to be cautious during the interview phase, and their responses were mostly optimistic about the policy capacity of MoI. On the other hand, participants who held relatively passive or former positions tended to be more critical with policy capacity.

Yet, there were exceptions to these instances. For instance, there were significant differences between the opinions of two current deputies of undersecretaries. Further, there were instances where the same participant expressed differing, and sometimes opposing, ideas on the same or relevant topics. For instance, although one participant advocated good governance tools, for similar questions, he tended supporting secrecy and central state notion.

Moreover, the second round of fieldwork, in which I focussed on politicians' views, provided me with colourful stories and opinions to check prefects' opinions. Therefore, it could be argued that my fieldwork revealed diverse and sometimes clashing opinions rather than monolithic views.

Further, documents, including legislations, official documents, reports and statistical datasets, and related recent Turkish literature, were widely used to explore the context of MoI and Turkey. These diverse documents provided the necessary background information for understanding and presenting the interview findings. To further understand the views of the stakeholders, I benefitted from the recent perception researches and grey reports which addressed information gaps. Thus, I could effectively demonstrate the bureaucratic policy capacity of the MoI.

In brief, considering objectivity, the availability of a relatively high number of participants who are likely to be the most informative and key (elite) policy/decision makers, with more than 1200 pages of transcriptions, observation notes, significant broad-based official reports, perceptive researches, and a few old papers from the Turkish literature — either directly or indirectly conducted by the MoI or its prefects for the purpose of critically triangulating data sources — strengthens the objectivity of this study.

A similar issue is generalisation. But my aim was not to deduce laws and predict outcomes from fieldwork, rather I struggle to get best explanation for my case. Namely, I was able to make general statements from my case.

Furthermore, receiving thick descriptions and overall themes through prefects' stories strengthen this thesis's findings' quality. As mentioned before, triangulation also diminishes concerns regarding reliability.
My thematic analysis of the data meets such conventional academic criteria as accuracy, precision, rigorous argument, and I strove for clarity in presentation. My arguments are backed up with much evidence.

In sum, ethnographic fieldwork method helped me describe and understand the policy capacity of the MoI in depth.

3.2.4 Ethical Issues

I have been carrying out the research in line with the Ethics Policy of the University of Southampton. As this chapter shows, I designed, reviewed and undertook the research in a way that ensures its integrity and quality. I began my fieldwork only after the University's ethics committee approved my proposal as being ethical.

Before conducting the semi-structured elite interviews, the participants read the participant information sheet and consent form. I gave all respondents an information sheet that provided them with the aim, purpose and intended use of the data. After signing the consent form, the semi-structured elite interviews were implemented with the participants. The interviews were audio-recorded upon receiving their permission to do so.

All the interview questions that had been prepared for the participants were translated from English into Turkish. These forms were equivalent in meaning to the forms which had been approved.

At first, all of the respondents were guaranteed anonymity if they preferred. I understand 'anonymity' as meaning 'for citation but not for attribution without agreement' just as Rhodes (2011a, p. 302) does. This was confirmed by an information sheet which was given to the participants. Their right to anonymity was explained by the researcher at the beginning of the interviews, both verbally and in written form on the participants' information sheet.

Since only just twelve of the fifty-one participants consented to revealing their names for this research, I will protect the thirty-nine participants' who wished to remain unknown's anonymity. Instead of using these participants' names, I instead utilised abbreviations to refer to their job titles. For instance, (DU) refers to deputy undersecretary. I also add numbers (e.g. DU1 and DU2) in order to differentiate between two different undersecretaries (see Appendix C).

All participation in the study was voluntary. At the beginning of each interview, all participants were reminded that they can withdraw at any time. They freely gave their consent, with a consent form being signed for each and every one of them. I stored all of those forms in an evidentiary database. The recordings and transcriptions are referred to as quotations.

I conducted the research in a way that minimises any harm or risk to the respondents. I also ensured that the participants were not able to gain anything personal in nature from participating in this study while also guaranteeing that the main aim of the researcher was that of understanding the policy capacity of the Ministry.

The data which was provided from the semi-structured elite interviews, as well as the other results obtained from this research, were evaluated utilising scientific methods. In this way, role-conflict did not occur. I am confident that the privacy of the participants was not violated. Certain personal questions, such as their political opinions (for senior servants) were not asked. The data obtained from the semi-structured elite interviews were analysed objectively. Individual answers was, and will not be, shared with anyone. All the data which was obtained from the semi-structured elite interview is stored electronically in a secure and password-protected laptop, with

the written data being kept in a locked and secure place both during and after the fieldwork. Only the researcher has access to the semi-structured elite interviews by means of a password.

3.2.5   The Researcher's Role and Reflections

As a member of the prefectoral class, I had a professional insider role during the fieldwork having worked as a district and deputy governor throughout the country for sixteen years and having extensive knowledge and experience of Turkish public administration.

Therefore, even though I have been conducting this research as a researcher, I am not a "value free researcher." My experiences in public administration and working for this ministry as a district governor have created, of course, some preconceptions and attitudes which have shaped the research and methods chosen. Yet, there were no conflicts of interest or partiality in the study. As Creswell (2012, p. 196) asserts: 'one cannot escape the personal interpretation brought to qualitative data analyses as well as filtering the data.' Adler and Adler (1987, p. 85) also argue that the distinction between researcher and participant has 'traditionally existed more strongly in theory than in practice' and that 'objectification of the self has occurred in the analysis rather than the fieldwork.'

Besides this problematic side of being an insider, it allowed me to gain more rapid and more complete acceptance by the participants, being more open with me as an insider than outsiders. As Norell (2007, p. 104) stressed, if I were an outsider or an academician, I would be unlikely to access — not to mention have difficulty choosing — cases. Having experience and broader knowledge about the MoI (its structure, tradition, and processes) and political administrators in general provided me with a better understanding about their world since I, myself, come from the same roots and tradition. Furthermore, I felt that, during the interview period, all of the participants acknowledged that I was one of them rather than merely a researcher. Thereby, they tended to share some information with me, which they would not let outsiders to see.

They sometimes expected me to understand their fragile positions and anticipate the reasons for some vague responses. They could, nevertheless, explain their opinions, roles, difficulties, tradition, processes, and past and current issues easily. Furthermore, they sometimes avoided giving me technical/legislative information since they assumed that I should know to what they were referring.

Finally, having an insider role also influence how I developed my interview schedules seeing as I know their "red lines." If I had prepared them solely in an academic manner, some of my

questions would not have received a response. Thus, my fieldwork could have faced difficulties — and even cancellation — if I had not have been sensitive to the sensibilities.

Summary of the Section

Nevertheless, different methods and designs have their own pros and cons, and the importance of having clear research aims and questions for the purpose of determining the methods which were to be used is beyond argument.

Considering this thesis's research questions and aims, its research strategy needed to support the exploration and explanation of complicated policy capacity of MoI. Examining this comprehensive topic in depth required a sufficient data repository in order to address the needs of the research, not to mention an appropriate methodological approach for handling its questions and aims. Given this situation, the best methodological approach to employ for the research was to utilise the ethnographic fieldwork method for compiling a case study on the MoI — which is a central (traditional) governmental department "in action." This research design enabled me:

> to hear and to see what goes on every day in public offices [as well as] … to see inside "the black box" and understand the internal processes of [the MoI,] providing inside knowledge, texture and nuances, as well as richness and depth. (Boll and Rhodes, 2015)

I have tringulated three sources of information with their corresponding methods. I conducted 51 semi-structured elite interviews with top political administrators, observed the MoI in action for around total 8 hours, and benefitted from significant numbers of official reports and related literature. In sum, 'there is no substitute for being there.' (ibid)

In this section, I also described how I coped with the issue of the quality of "qualitative ethnographic (single case study) research."

I used thematic analysis in order to "read between the lines" in order to explore and explain the tradition of the MoI through their own "eyes" in order to understand and describe the policy capacity of the MoI.

My insider role provided me with better access to, and a chance to understand and describe the MoI's policy capacity since I, myself, am part of the world that I am trying to interpret. The Turkish (MoI's) administrative tradition, which is at the heart of this thesis, also shaped my thinking, concerns, and altruism. It is this tradition which shall be examined in the next chapter of this thesis.

Chapter 4:   TURKISH ADMINISTRATIVE TRADITION

Introduction

This chapter presents the findings of this study about the Turkish administrative tradition and the administrative tradition of the MoI in particular, which is at the heart of this thesis since it determined bureaucratic policy capacity of the MoI.

Administrative traditions were seen as composed of both ideas and structures (Painter and Peters, 2010, p. 6) First, administrative tradition is "a set of inherited beliefs and practices about the institutions and history of governments' (Rhodes, 2011a, p. 2)

Second, administrative tradition has a structural dimension 'contained within established and taken-for-granted institutions, organizations, formal rules and procedures … that have come into being in the past and that still are present' (Yesilkagit, 2010 p.148).

This study adopts above conceptualization of administrative tradition because both organisational structure and ideas have been significant regarding bureaucratic policy capacity. Feature of prefectoral strand of Turkish administrative tradition could be considered as embodied by ideas whereas feature of Weberian strand of Turkish administrative tradition could be considered as embodied by structures.

Following section, I will elucidate characteristics of the Turkish administrative tradition in two strands: characteristic of Prefectoral strand and characteristic of Weberian strand.

4.1   Characteristics of the Turkish Administrative Tradition

The Turkish public administrative system has adopted the Napoleonic tradition since the early years of the Turkish Republic in emulation of the French administrative system. Having prefects and territorial (field) administration were distinctive feature of this tradition. Territorial administration are governed by the prefects who are the representative of the state, a separate representative of each minister and the administrative and political executive of both at the provincial level (Law No. 5442/9). Thus, the prefects and their unique administrative tradition became the most important factors in Turkish public administration and in MoI administration since appointments to senior positions in the ministry have to be filled amongst prefects.

This research will argue prefectoral strand of Turkish administrative tradition rather than French version of Napoleonic tradition, which is not sufficient for Turkish administrative tradition given the fact that Turkey have unique political and administrative contexts, administrative tradition,

and semantics. For instance, the Napoleonic tradition tends to have fewer barriers between the political and the administrative than most other traditions. 'Indeed many politicians begin their careers as civil servants trained by the state and then move into political careers' (Peters, 2008, p. 123). Nevertheless, characteristic of formalistic and hierarchical bureaucratic (career) system and relation between politicians and bureaucrats tended to be more Weberian characteristic.

Thus, looking at the characteristics of Prefectoral and Weberian strand of Turkish administrative tradition could provide one with a better understanding about the administrative tradition of the MoI in particular. Table 3 demonstrates main characteristics of Turkish administrative tradition as:

Table 3: Dominant Characteristics of the Turkish Administrative Tradition

Feature of Prefectoral strand of Turkish Administrative Tradition	Feature of Weberian strand of Turkish Administrative Tradition
The State: State sovereignty, protection of the State authority and public order; interventionist, a political philosophy of the State which sees the State as being above society; highly centralised and formal relations within society; **A unitary structure:** Uniformity; **Field (territorial) administration** (governors): prefectoral class speaks for the state to citizens and for citizens to the state	**Formalistic and hierarchical bureaucratic (career) system** **Political control:** Ministerial Discretion (sharp distance between politicians and bureaucrats) **Legalistic administration** (Rule of Law) **Legalistic Accountability** (ex-ante control by administrative jurisdiction);

Source: Author (inspired from Rhodes, 1999; Peters, 2008; Painter and Peters, 2010; Varol, 2015; Feslihan, 2016.)

Following section, these characteristics will be discussed in detail.

4.1.1 Prefectoral Strands of the Turkish Administrative (MoI) Tradition

These characteristics will be demonstrated through following dimensions: the state, uniformity, and field (territorial) administration (governors).

The State

The strong and unquestioned State tradition is roots in the Rechtsstaat model, which developed historically from the Ottoman to Turkish polity, and has always been a fundamental characteristic of the Turkish prefectoral system.

> The cultural norms of Turkish administration and politics create a State notion independent from society. Since the Ottoman Empire era, there has always been a particular elite group, who acted on behalf of the State [and] independent from society and politics. All public institutions and the cultural aspect of the politics and administration have a certain administrative and political philosophy, in concepts such as; spirit of the constitution, public interest, common good, perpetuity of the state and etc (Heper and Keyman, 1998: 259 cited in Varol, 2015, p. 58).

The State, under this philosophy, has "high interests" which are regarded more important than the interests of individuals or the community. Similarly, the MoI and its prefectoral class are assumed to be the representatives of the state.

> We consider ourselves as representatives of the state. We act on behalf of the state rather than on behalf of the nation. So, you should not expect our class to welcome changes that disturb our traditional role (DU2, TI).

This participant's opinion complies with Law 5442, as well as a recent perception research whose findings revealed that citizens identified the MoI and its prefectoral class with the State's identity itself (TIAV, 2013, pp. 31 and 67).

There is also another important aspect of this relationship which is more directly relevant to the day-to-day operations of both the government and the public administration. As Peters (2008, p. 127) notes, 'the relationship between the state and citizens is similar to a father and sons stressing public services [who benefit] automatically [from] public life including protection and care in return for obedience'. The Turkish State tradition that values the maxim, "Let man flourish so that the State can flourish." All of the participants supported this maxim.

Yet, the sharing of the responsibilities of state authority has not been included in Turkish administrative tradition. Instead, there is a tradition in which mechanisms work in a top-down fashion and authority is concentrated in one dominant leader to ensure uniformity.

Uniformity

Uniformity has been a top-down strategy of state-building. It assumes that 'reducing differences [is] the best way to generate commitment to the state [and that] … [c]itizens should be treated fairly and equally according to their needs and their eligibility for services' (Peters, 2008, p. 125).

Complying with uniformity, centralisation, and its top-down policy approach is the main determining factor for the MoI. Ensuring coherence with governmental discretion and regulation is foremost value for Turkish administrative tradition. Thus, development plans, government programs, and strategic plans must be taken into consideration (GD6, TI)..

Furthermore, having territorial administration, which is 'the governance of the territories of a country on its own lands in accordance with the central administration principles' (Ciner, 2014, p.445) and prefectoral class — is generalist-elite and represents the State and central government as protectors of the status-quo; state authority and public order— ensures uniformity.

> First, historically, the prefecture was passed down from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey… and was considered an instrument of centralization of the Empire. Second, the prefectoral system was used to provide a social ground with territorial administration (mülki idare) following the centralization, in order to create a subsequent nationalization and found a new regime to develop the country (Ciner, 2014, p.445).

Thus, having prefects and territorial administration became distinctive features of prefectoral strand of the Turkish administrative tradition.

Territorial administration

> The prefectoral system has traditionally been steeped in bureaucratic practices and ascribes a distinctive place to MoI bureaucracy within the structure of the state (Sen, 2015, p. 84).

Territoral administration and prefectoral class are still among the most important actors in Turkish public administration and MoI central administration. This prefectoral class speaks for the state to citizens and for citizens to the state. It means that (central) prefects know what happens in the field. This experience underpins their claim to be the premier department (see Apendix B)

Prefects' 'upbringing style, education, and professional training process make them identify themselves with the state' (Ciner, 2014, p. 446). Thereby, prefects, which have a unique philosophy and vocational virtue, were seen as being natural leaders with more than 180 years of

tradition and experience.[46] All of the participants, including those from ministers[47] and representative of the stakeholders, shared this opinion.[48] Moreover, according to recent perception researches' findings, several vocational groups, heads of village, mayors, lawyers and politicians approved this situation.[49]

In sum, considering these features (the state notion, uniformity, and field administration), the findings confirm that the prefectoral strand of Turkish administrative tradition which creates an atmosphere which is quite conservative and resistant to change. Furthermore, Weberian strand of Turkish administrative tradition strengthens this atmosphere.

4.1.2 Weberian Strands of the Turkish Administrative (MoI) Tradition

These characteristics will be demonstrated through following dimensions:

- The legality of the administration (rule of law);
- Formalistic and hierarchical bureaucratic (career) system;
- Political control: Ministerial Discretion (sharp distance between politicians and bureaucrats); and
- Legalistic Accountability (ex-ante control by administrative jurisdiction).

The Legality of the Administration (Rule of Law)

Of course, there must be regulations in order to abolish a lack of order (DGD2, TI).

In Turkish administrative tradition, legality is also the foremost value and the beginning point — rather than the ending point. As Peters (2008, p. 122) notes, 'the constitution, laws and regulations became the main source of administrative action and administration was based on the supremacy of law.' This could be interpreted as the necessity for a legal provision or framework with which to cover every action of a public servant, including the performing of tasks, making decisions and policies, implementing them, etc. Participants mostly support this legality criterion.

> You have to look from the perspective of legality when you consider things in front of you. You must fulfil your duty within the lines of the framework of the legislation (Gunduzoz_GD8, TI).

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[46] DU2, Ceber_CI5, GD2, TI.
[47] Former Minister 1 and Minister 2_Atalay and Minister 3_Gonul, TI.
[48] HIA, DGD7 and Gungor_GS of Union, TI.
[49] TIAV, 2014a, pp. 14, 62, 104 and 140.

This is stressed strongly by almost every MoI grey report which has been published. For instance, as one grey report (MoI, 2009a, p. 53) states, 'legality guides strategy development in the MoI.' Participants' accounts mostly support this pillar.

As a result, there is a system in which everyone has to comply with these laws and regulations, including both prefects and ministers. Namely, they are able to use their own initiative in line with these regulations (DGD2, TI).

One participant (former GD and Governor, member of Council of State) stressed the distinct role of the MoI comparing other ministry in line with legalisation.

All public services surely must be conducted within the framework of the law in a constitutional state since the MoI deals with delicate activities. For instance, security and law enforcement lead to effective results regarding personal freedom. So, searching for the compliance with the legislation in such a case should be the first priority (Atbas_FGD2, TI).

In such a system, if a problem triggers a process, then a certain rule is activated to respond with appropriate solutions.

> The solutions are also pre-determined and formulated within the rule-base that operates in connection with the organisational memory, which is defined as "the stored information from an organisation['s] history that can be brought to bear on present decisions" (Sen, 2015, p, 123).

One participant shared this statement:

> Finally, the state is defined as a structure which is formed by an accumulation of certain rules which highlight how to do things, as well as who will do them. (FGS3, TI)

The findings have revealed that risk awareness supports this statement

> If you strictly obey the regulations, you are unlikely to get into any trouble. Quite on the contrary, you will struggle to improve alternative ways of tackling issues since you are likely to face difficulties. (Atbas_FGD2, TI)

Prefects did not point out any significant evidence which might demonstrate that there are any deficiencies or problems in legislation. The vast majority were satisfied with the laws and the other regulations which highlight their ways and daily practices. These basic laws and other regulations are very detailed and mostly well codified [50]

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[50] See in detail: http://www.mia.gov.tr/ministry-legislation last retrieved 21/11/2016.

On the other hand, there were some critics regarding the availability of proper legislations – i.e. regarding either their absence or their overlapping or contradicting one another (MoI, 2008, p. 520

Moreover, formalistic administration was seen as the main reason for the limits to policy capacity by a few prefects who stressed that regulations should be dynamic in character for the purpose of responding to citizen necessities. This aim creates difficulties in dealing with some practical issues.

> Sometimes, you should do things fast. If you wish to comply with the legislation, you cannot step forward. Rather, we solve problems comply with the tradition regardless of what the law says. Only after the emergency is resolved, will we create legal procedures. You do not have any chance to tell the citizens 'you should wait until we make a tender to provide you this service.' (DGD2, TI)

Lastly, it should be underlined that regulations which overlook or stand in conflict with the government's choices cannot be implemented

Formalistic and hierarchical bureaucratic (career) system

In the Turkish public administrative system, Law 657 regulates civil servants' status, payment, and other rights, as well as the fundamental principles of the civil service system, such as career, equality, merit, classification and impartiality,[51] all of which are in line with the Weberian rational bureaucratic model. [52]

> Legally and traditionally, public servants have been at the core of the civil service.[53] Almost all senior civil service positions are occupied by public servants. Their status is constitutionally assured and can only be regulated by law… Public servants are appointed for life on the basis of competitive examinations and are removed only in exceptional cases… They must remain loyal to the constitution and cannot join political parties (Varol, 2015, pp. 221-223).

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[51] i.e. if one public servant wishes to be a candidate for a political position, he/she must resign from his/her public servant position.

[52] Recently, however, political executives have been exerting greater control over the public services. In addition, due to the last coup attempt on 15 July, 2016, the government can now easily dismiss significant numbers of senior public servants. 'After the coup attempt of 15 July [2016],… as of the end of October [2016], 139000 public employees have either been suspended (76000) or dismissed (63000), including those from the education sector and academia' (EU, 2016).

[53] According to Article 4 of Law 657, there are four types of personnel who carry out public services; Public Servants, Contracted Personnel, Temporary Personnel and Workers.

Nevertheless, this model did not create an overall operative Turkish civil service system due to the favouritism and nepotism, inefficiency, the lack of clear and exact definitions of the function, capacity, authority, and responsibilities of personnel, wage inequalities etc (see concerns in detail in personnel administration section in Chapter 5).

Yet, there is an established and strong administrative tradition dominated by the practice of a strict hierarchy and state protocol (LA2, TI) (see in detail in the administration tradition of MoI.) With exceptions,[54] ministers mostly tend to keep power to themselves due to their willing to know and control everything about the MoI's daily activities in order to ensure political control, which are all rooted in Turkish administrative tradition.

Political control: **Ministerial Discretion**

> Politicians should govern [command] and make decisions and the bureaucracy [should]
> implements them. If the bureaucracy substituted willpower, it would cause issues.
> (Efkan Ala -former [prefectoral] minister of MoI) [55]

The roles which divide ministers and bureaucrats is so clear that it reflects a typical Weberian-based bureaucracy. The minister represents the political side that simply is responsible for the ministry's policies and, in turn, represents the ministry in politics and the public arena, whereas their prefects who fulfil their commands are the bureaucratic side of the relationship. All matters concerning the Ministry — its policies, strategies and priorities — are stated by the minister (see impacts of ministerial role over policy capacity in Chapter 7). Issues or topics which are on the Ministers' agendas, therefore, are more important than everything else.

Most of the prefects whom I interviewed believe that a leader-based command tradition is pervasive within the Turkish administration, within the MoI in particular. After 2002, with one political party's power dominating the public arena. Thus, the minister's priority has become the bureaucrat's as well. Indeed, Karaca has claimed that ministerial will has increased dramatically:

> Until 2002, bureaucrats in the MoI used to administer the MoI; now, politicians govern
> the MoI…. In the past, there were state policies [referring to prefectoral strand of the
> tradition] which did not change regardless of who the ministers were. With their vast
> experience, bureaucrats had offered classical solutions since they had been educated

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[54] Research findings confirmed that Minister Atalay gave a mandate to Undersecretary Gunes regarding the external relations of the MoI with parliamentary and key stakeholders. He applauded his political acumen skills and statesmanlike character. (Former Minister 3_Besir Atalay, TI)
[55] He was former prefect and undersecretary of PM. http://www.memurlar.net/haber/607265/retrieved on 24/08/2016)

and learned either from their masters or from their experience. The democratisation process, however, has forced the ministry to change on behalf of the politicians who officially represent the citizens and who are expected to know, decide, and control everything. (Karaca_LA4, TI)

This power should not be debateable by bureaucracy as if it was holy writ. (FGS3, TI) Criticism is sometimes perceived as being against the current government's programmes.

When you criticise policies even in an academic way, someone may label you as an enemy of the government. In other words, you might be ostracised for offering different opinions. (Avsarbey_CI3, TI)

Therefore, senior bureaucrats try to learn or anticipate these actors' opinions. That is to say, intuition is their most desirable skill.

The government prefers to work with bureaucrats who sign pro-government songs. (MP 1, TI)

Ministerial discretion is not always clear and makes the bureaucrats struggle in order to learn or predict their opinions — something which is rather challenging to do on time.

Recently, bureaucracy has been required to read the minister's body language and mind. They should think and do just like the ministers — not much more or much less! (Karaca_LA4, TI)

In sum, political control is the main characteristic of the Turkish administrative tradition.

Legalistic form of Accountability

In the Turkish administrative tradition, accountability is formal and legalistic similar to foreign instances.

While certainly there are political elements and a role for parliament and even the public; the principal elements for control are through legal instrumentalities such as the council of state. Further, many of the controls are exercised ex ante, so that administrators often must gain approval prior to making decisions, rather than acting decisively and then be held accountable later. This pattern may ensure the strict legalism of actions, but also makes effective administration more difficult (Peters, 2008, p. 129).

Therefore, external monitoring and inspection by the Council of State and the Court of Accounts, traditionally, has been the most important institution in Turkish Administration with regards to auditing accounts rather than parliamentary and public scrutiny (for more on this issue, refer to Chapter 5). Moreover, the administrative tradition has a secretive nature that obstructs the transparency and accountability of the government.

Besides administrative tradition of Turkey, administrative tradition of the MoI in particular should be examined to understand and describe bureaucratic policy capacity of the MoI due to the distinct feature of the MoI's tasks, everyday challenges and actors.

4.1.3 Characteristics of the Administrative Tradition of MoI

Characteristics of MoI's administrative tradition shall be examined in detail in the following sub-sections:

- Value of tradition;

- Value of loyalty to minister;

- Having a strict hierarchy and state protocol;

- Having field based solution practice;

- A dynamic, reflexive, and firefighting practices;

- A busy everyday life: the stressful work atmosphere;

- Risk awareness (zero-mistake pressure) and secrecy;

- Pragmatic for knowledge: value of experience, not evidence based policy;

- Prefectoral/field administration tradition

- Incremental error correction for surprises, not systematic evaluation;

- Ministry of prefects: A brotherhood tradition rooted in shared field experience.

Value of tradition

The MoI, which is a guardian of the established order [state], has traditionally been the heart of the Turkish public administrative system. (Former Minister 2_ Gonul, TI)

The MoI has existed for over 180 years, having first been established under Ottoman rule. The MoI is one of three ministries that have been able to preserve their identity in the Turkish Administration History.

> You can observe this kind of tradition inside the MoI, [the Ministry of] Foreign Affairs, and [the Ministry of] Finance since the Ottoman era. I could also add the State Planning Organisation considering my 8 years' of experience there. (Former Minister 3_Besir Atalay, TI)

All my participants agreed that the MoI has been the most deep-rooted mechanism in the state's administrative arsenal. Furthermore, the majority of prefects perceive the MoI as being identical with state bureaucracy. A minister who had an academic background confirmed that statement.

> Once I took over the ministerial position in the MoI, I found a well-established ministry. Even though there were exceptions, the MoI fulfilled its tasks successfully because of its strong tradition and well educated prefectoral class. In addition, I could not observe any significant institutional deficiency while I was running the MoI. (Former Minister 3_Besir Atalay, TI)

That tradition makes its members proud. Some prefects reminded me not to underestimate the tradition of the MoI.

> Both the Turkish public administration and the MoI have tradition. Sometimes, the tradition of the Ministry and go before the law. Even though laws may change, the MoI's tradition nevertheless endures. There is some tradition that have existed since the Ottoman era, and even before the Ottoman period. (DGD2, TI)

Tradition is associated with IM which stores useful experiences for the purpose of dealing with daily life's problems. As Rhodes (2011a) stresses, past experiences highlight current, — even unexpected — new and future issues with pre-tested and reliable methods. The risk awareness tradition tacitly feeds this idea. The following comment was made by an administrator:

> Since it was like this before, we do it in the same way. (FGS3, TI)

The MoI's wide-range of vital tasks (see Appendix B) force the MoI to keep its tradition.

> Traditionalism is a requirement and thoughtful choice due to the service characteristics of the MoI, referring mostly to the core functions and mandates such as law enforcement and security that have highly public characteristics. Therefore, [political administrators] should ensure the continuity of the existing system (Sen, 2015, p. 183).

My participants supported such conservative position as well:

> I do not think from the perspective of the services we provide that it would be beneficial
> to consider very different alternatives. I would rather consider more significant the
> efforts for continuous adjustment. You should not play with them so much. (DU2, TI)

Sometimes, however, even though being traditional is associated with a status quo bias and a lack
of elasticity, most prefects are happy with this feature. Some also supported their opinions with
instances of foreign successes:

> I do not think that tradition is a bad thing. Look at the British system. It seems like the
> best system in the world. They preserve their tradition. (CI4, TI)

Naturally, accounts show that the MoI will not change in a short amount of time.

> The ministry is not going to change from today to tomorrow. This Ministry has been
> deeply loyal to its tradition. (DGD3, TI)

One former minister confirmed that:

> I worked very comfortably within the MoI's bureaucracy, but I should confess that it was
> not easy to change anything inside the MoI. That was because the MoI has a robust
> tradition supported by a well-educated prefects who considers themselves as knowing
> everything and that they are always right. You could face some resistance (Former
> Minister 3_Besir Atalay, TI).

Similarly, prefects tend to object to the reactiveness[56] since it conflicts with the administrative
tradition of the MoI and its members. They complain about the recent public administration
reforms and regulations which have inclined to ignore IM, choosing instead to solve problems
with new regulations from foreign countries' best experience instead of their own (Varol, 2015, p.
168). Similarly, my participants shared the anxiety that these top-down reforms should not be
transferred directly without modification to the unique system of the country. A few, however,
did not object to these given that they provide better solutions to dealing with public problems,
with most of them asserting that they have not solved problems but, rather, that they have been
growing them.

Another shared concern was hurriedness. One legal advisor pointed out that hurriedness prevents
debates being had about recent regulations. Since they had to regulate them in a short amount of

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[56] Reactiveness can be defined as 'opposite of incrementalism which refer[s] to change should [occur at a] slow pace
instead of [in a] radical way to abolish past experience immediately' (Sen, 2015, p.29).

time, the prefects did not have enough preparation in order to support the legitimation process (LA1, TI). Furthermore, these reforms were seen as top-down policies supported by the government or the minister. Therefore, they were not able to internalise these changes due primarily to the administrative tradition of the Ministry itself.

On the other hand, a number of participants have claimed that a powerful conservatism and strong traditionalism have also had various negative consequences on the MoI. For example, as mentioned before, the MIAPER (Performance Appraisal) could not be implemented even if it had been adopted in the strategic plan and supported by top political-administrators (CI6, TI).

Nevertheless, post-2002, the MoI's prefects could not resist rather adopting two things. First, one was the government's priorities and reform agenda. Since the MoI has a tradition of responsiveness and a lack of power to resist the government, they had to make some regulations even if they might damage the power of prefectoral class. Secondly, prefects have voluntarily adopted technological developments, even going so far as to play the pioneer role in Turkey's public life.

Value of loyalty to minister

> I like the MoI's bureaucracy. They accept their ministers, regardless of political identity and personal background. I did not experience any resistance. They even sometimes exaggerated protocols for the sake of keeping my position high. (Former Minister 3_Besir Atalay, TI)

Turkey's overall administrative tradition is based on loyalty. It is widely believed that 'cheating ministers is a big sin' (Rhodes, 2011, p. 129). One of the quote represents this common opinion.

> Regardless of their political identity, no prefects deliberately prepare wrong documents [against legality and political priorities etc.] and presents it to the minister to sign. (GD6, TI)

The findings show that the prefects will to support the minister to be a strong position and care more about their minister than his government, political party, or even the PM himself.

> I am one hundred percent sure about this intention. I've spent 12-13 years of my life in the Ministry's Central Department. I saw that this bureaucracy has fulfilled their duties regarding the government's policies in a heartfelt way in order to strengthen their minister's position inside the government. (DU2, TI)

> While working on a topic, we found that its results might damage our Minister's
> position. So we stopped working on it. (GD6, TI)

Willing to support the Minister to have a strong position is so closely related with responsiveness that one needs to know the minister's style, ideas, priorities, anxieties, etc. Namely, as the findings confirm, prefects are supposed/expected to know the minister very well.

> I know Efkan Ala, Besir Atalay, or the other ministers' thoughts. Even newly appointed
> district governors working outside the ministry know their thoughts. (CI1, TI)

The government and its party programmes, priorities, and commitments affected the bureaucracy of the MoI with regards to strengthening its minister's position.

Having a strict hierarchy and state protocol

> Everyone knows his place in the hierarchy of the MoI. (CI2, TI)

All of the participants agreed that the MoI is undoubtedly a hierarchical public department. Some of them understood that hierarchy positively, whereas some preferred to stress its harsh and detrimental characteristics, including its having barriers to speaking to the truth, improving innovative opinions and analytical skills, and strengthening command and control and the status quo.[57] The most striking comment made by one former minister who had had an academic background and who had been an important actor for preparing and administering the public administration reforms on behalf of the Justice and Development Party said that:

> During my era in the MoI, I observed that hierarchy was such a vital element for the
> public department that you could not govern that department using the logic of a
> private company. The MoI was one of the best ministries, having a strong hierarchy and
> a robust discipline. I do not consider hierarchy as a barrier; instead, given that everyone
> knows their own places, you can govern there more successfully. Furthermore, I do not
> believe that hierarchy and discipline prevent one from improving different ideas.
> Moreover, the MoI's bureaucracy did not wish for someone to break with this tradition.
> I worked very well with them. You cannot observe this discipline within most ministries.
> (Former minister 2_Besir Atalay, TI)

Hierarchy could be observed in the everyday life of the MoI through its policy making process, as well as its intra- and inter-departmental relationships.

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[57] i.e. DU2, Yildiz_FPPS3, Karaca_LA4, TI.

The inner circle knows this basic protocol and arranges the ministers' and undersecretaries' diaries in line with that state tradition. It is mostly impossible for junior-level prefects to have a place of their own in this narrow theatre.

> Even though some lower level prefects have innovative thoughts, they should not be allowed to present his or her files directly to the political administrators. (DGD2, TI)

Brotherhood of prefects inside the MoI does not break this strict rule. This strict hierarchy, however, sometimes is camouflaged as respect which, in turn, often prevents them from telling the truth; rather, they have to allude to their opinions whenever a superior-subordinate relationship exists.

> Command and control is a reality inside the Turkish administrative system rooted in our patriarchal Asiatic culture…. Everything is decided by top [political administrators]. Objection to their ideas does not even exit. (GD1, TI)

Similarly, the findings have revealed that the organisational setting of the MoI does not allow for the cultivation of a pluralist culture which builds upon diversity and the conflict of ideas.

> At the moment, any topic which does not have any government leverage cannot be put on the agenda. If you suggest some proposals, like "Let's establish civil inspections on the police and gendarme," your ideas would be rejected and, even worse, you might even be warned. (Avsarbey_CI3, TI)

Even if such open debates are allowed, seniors' discretion are prioritised. Thus, as one participant noticed,

> If a senior tells us "OK, we already knew about this information, so my order still goes," the debate is over. We have this kind of infrastructure. (Avsarbey_CI3, TI)

On the other hand, command and control does not just consist of cons. Since the minister and undersecretary's leverage role has been so important for almost every issue, command and control could: (i) make things work faster; (ii) make things work in a more collaborative way; and (iii) break the resistance to some new duties which have not been internalised by the departments yet.

> The Honourable Undersecretary values internal audits. We informed him and told him the importance of our jobs. He was convinced and replied 'very well.' He gathered together a number of senior-level bureaucrats. We briefed them as well. He wrote

regulations and made orders for all of the other departments. With his support, we

progressed relatively well. (HIA, TI)

Since command and control is so pervasive in the MoI, the prefects' accounts reveal that its
decision-making system's flexibility is contingent on the top politico-administrators' personal will
to share power with other actors. This phenomenon will be further examined in the next sub-
section.

Unwillingness to Share Power

Seniors tend to behave timidly with regards to sharing power with us. We do not also

share responsibilities with our subordinates. Thus, we become tired because of the

things that we have to do on a daily basis. (CI2, TI)

This is not a new issue. Evidence shows that nothing has changed. One of the grey reports
underlines this fact:

…most of the authority is still centralised. Thus, only the top senior level has most of the

responsibilities. [Thus,] [t]he senior level, including ministers, have to tackle an overload

of signatures (The MoI, 2008, p. 508).

One of the most important barriers was the current regulations, which gave the sole mandate to
the minister. (Former minister 1, TI) This corresponds to one of the recent research findings.

Particularly the legalistic philosophy of the state requires almost all changes to be

carried out by new legislation and complicates the situation by adding further

obstructing factors to the process (Varol, 2015, p. 162).

Secondly, risk awareness and the wish to make zero mistakes could trigger this anxiety. They
believe that more documents mean more awareness. Participants who had been working in the
inner circle as GDs and PPSs acknowledge that:

It took more than 2 hours a day to sign documents by the ministers. It was really time

consuming. Mostly, because he was so busy, lots of important documents had to wait

for his approval, even though we divided them and placed them into several different

trays related to their urgency. I suggested that he should issue an order in order to

decrease the number of documents that he had to sign seeing as most of them were

routine paperwork which need not all be signed by the ministers. He was convinced. I

wrote up a regulation to delegate mostly routine task. I presented it to him. He told me,

however, to 'hang on a second! Unless these documents come to me, how can I know

what is happening at the MoI. Leave it now. I'll consider it later.' I got the message, and I never asked him about it again. (FGS1, TI)

All of the participants complained about the fact that superiors were always wary of delegating powers to their subordinates.

We do not prefer to share our authority due to the fact that we are used to steering the services with power and in an authoritarian manner. (Atbas_FGD, TI)

The general unwillingness of superiors to give over their authority to their juniors relates to the capacities of the juniors as well. An important point which I observed the First Legal Advisor's and the Deputy Head of the Chief Inspectors and which found voice during the interview phase was that:

Not only important tasks but also some routine basic tasks had to be drafted by senior level prefects due to the lower level prefects and administrative staffs lacking enough analysis and writing skills amongst themselves as they complained. (FWNB)

Last, but more importantly, with exceptions,[58] ministers mostly tend to keep power to themselves due to their being involved in daily political life and, more importantly, their willing to know and control everything about the MoI's daily activities in order to ensure political control, which are all rooted in Turkish administrative tradition.

In sum, the Ministry is an example of a classical Weberian bureaucratic organisation which strongly emphasises hierarchical position as the basis of status (rather than expertise) and which has a "command and control" tradition dominated by ministerial discretion and career practices. All of the participants acknowledged this idea, with some even claiming that its hierarchical structure and relationship style is more dominant than that of the military.

Field based solution practice

Most of the accounts revealed that prefects' district experiences were based on solving daily issues conveyed by the central departments. Thus, the district governor's experiences shape their actions, policies and decisions. Most of the participants tended to use stories when they practiced as district governors in order to explain their behaviours, policy preferences and learning processes. For instance, the ministers who were governors more than 30 years ago, provided examples from their prefects' past experiences in order to explain their style and relationship with

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[58] Research findings confirmed that Minister Atalay gave a mandate to Undersecretary Gunes regarding the external relations of the MoI with parliamentary and key stakeholders. He applauded his political acumen skills and statesmanlike character. (Former Minister 3_Besir Atalay, TI)

the prefects (Former minister 1 and former minister 2_Vecdi Gonul, TI). I felt that they do not wish to lose their roots.

Since they knew the field and citizen life very well, the prefects were considered as field based problem-solver. (Yildiz_FPPS3, TI).

> The prefectoral class is not problem-based but, rather, solution-based. They do not think about what problems would occur if they did something wrong; instead, they consider which solutions they could implement in order to tackle those issues. Other ministries are rule-based and evaluate solutions in line with laws. We ignored whether the solutions that we brainstormed were legal or not. You know our practice; we preferred to make our decisions legal later. We felt that we were responsible for relieving the citizens' problems in advance. (Karaca_LA4, TI)

The management paradigm[59] was also rejected by all of the participants seeing as they do not see citizens as consumers. Rather, they all favoured a more human-oriented administration [not management] of service delivery.

> The citizen as a customer! No! The citizen is not a customer for us. The citizen is the owner of the business! (DU1)

The MoI's Reflexive, Firefighting (i.e. Crisis Management) Practices

Most of the accounts acquired from the participants acknowledged that the MoI's reflective skills have improved in line with the government's priorities, new emergency situations, and daily political developments.

> I hold the MoI in very high regard considering its ability to cope with unexpected issues. The majority of them could read the external environment and its crises. I benefitted from their skill at giving early warnings, which was rooted in their previous daily life experiences in the districts. Furthermore, they struggled as much as I did with ameliorating crises in an idealist manner. Therefore, I respected and valued their altruistic practicality. (Former Minister3_Besir Atalay, TI)

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[59] That was asserted in the Turkish literature of Dincer (who was the former PM Undersecretary and Education Minister] and Yilmaz (who was the Minister of Development). The customer-oriented management aspect has once more gained salience as a valued principle in recent decade. (Dincer and Yilmaz, 2003)

For hot issues, normal mechanisms work faster than during normal, casual times. The minister and undersecretary's attention and support accelerated this phase (see chapter 5). Recently, the Syrian refugee crisis has been monitored by them very closely (LA3, TI). The Ministry established a new mechanism in order to tackle this issue. The territorial administration, administered by prefects, under the minister's authority also strengthened the implementation process (DU2, TI).

Since that crisis, sudden developments have become usual for the MoI to deal with. I observed that:

> The prefects always monitor recent developments despite their busy daily lives. TVs
> were always on and the participant watched the news, especially the speeches made by
> the PM and the Minister. (FWNB)

Since the ministry's responsibilities are so great, they have to anticipate developments which might pertain to their responsibilities.

> The news mentioned that one committee of the EU will come to Turkey next week. We
> should anticipate that they will likely visit our Ministry. Thereby, we prepared the proper
> documents. (GD5, TI)

Even though this early warning system can find solutions for unpredictable and complicated events, such as the "Gezi Olaylari" [the Gezi Park Demonstration]. The MoI reacted quickly and developed contra policies for the purpose of providing some order to the chaos. According to their eyes, before this event, even though social media and public relations had been seen as the weakest sides of the MoI, political-administrators were able to use social media to prevent the public from being misled against the government.

> A contrary responses phase began immediately. We appointed an expert on social
> media to the media unit. Social media accounts were opened on behalf of both the
> minister and the MoI. Our aim was to inform the public correctly, and we did it properly.
> You know that most of them [i.e. the people who made propaganda and demonstrated
> against the government] gave up [in light of our corrective measures]. (FGS3, TI)

The MoI not only appointed people in case of new, emergent issues but also changed its structure as such. During the post-2002 period, the MoI established new departments and units (e.g. Centre of Research, Department of Strategy, and the EU Department) in line with its meeting the essential step of adapting to the new reform era. Likewise, unexpected and new issues have made the MoI reflective and has led to its introducing new units. For example, in the past, immigration was not a big issue for the MoI until the Syrian Refugee crisis; nevertheless, in just three years'

time, the Immigration Bureau has turned into an enormous department of its own right. Furthermore, technological developments, and especially cyberterrorism, have triggered the establishment of a Department of IT with a huge budget.

It should be noted that the reflective skill has been associated with the MoI's firefighting competence. Firefighting refers to the ability to administrate (domesticate) crises.

> Firstly, we should accept the reality that the best definition for the MoI is a ministry which manages crises. You cannot say that we simply sit around making lengthy strategic plans like the Agricultural or Cultural Ministries do. You do not have a comfortable seat [at the MoI]. A bomb explodes in one place; at another, you face natural disasters and an influx of refugees. At the same time, you have to respond to all of those problems and deal with them. Namely, you are in a place in which crisis management permanently occurs. (FPPS1, TI)

The crisis administration process does not start unless the issues become blind. Namely, if an issue needs intervention, the MoI interferes with it. Participants did not blame top political-administrators since they are always busy with other blind issues. As one representative notes:

> I explained it to the Undersecretary; thanks to him, he listened to me. I wished to make him aware about our responsibilities with regards European funds. I stressed the fact that the deadline was approaching and warned him that, unless we fulfilled our duties, the ministry would face some inevitable problems. Nevertheless, I knew that it would be impossible to take his attention while he was dealing with the terror attacks that has recently occurred in Ankara. (GD5, TI)

As always, the motto of coping and surviving determines the level of intervention given to any situation. As one participant noted:

> Of course, intervention is just to ward off those things instead of solving the problem fundamentally. (Avsarbey_CI3, TI)

For both the Ministry and its actors, the current events and emerging issues which require firefighting determine everyday life at the Ministry. This is rooted in the prefects' district field experiences. The prefects, who constitutes the majority of the MoI's administrators, incline to focus on day-to-day administrative issues due to their experience as provincial administrators, where both crisis management and problem solving held priority. There, urgent issues always had priority over important, bureaucratic issues.

The Minister, his top senior team, and his inner circle have to deal with daily issues. Recently, terror, migration and the EU Visa Agreement were the main issues that the Ministry attended to. Therefore, the MoI requires a flexible, rather than a long-term and plan-based, administration. The opinion that "there is no tomorrow" was expressed by most of the participants.

> You cannot plan for something for ten years in Turkey. Everything could change in three months. You have to accept the fact that we have no chance to manage the agenda in Turkey due to the stemming geography and rapid changes which occur. Therefore, we have to take reactionary steps. (CI4, TI)

Therefore, their routines and programs (meetings, visits, preparation of regulations, evaluations, etc.) are arranged according to these priorities. These findings show similar concerns with their international counterparts.

> The APS [Australian Public Sector] may have become too reactive, too focused on the short-term and the delivery of tasks, and unable to generate the range of new ideas that it might have liked (Tiernan, 2015, p. 215).

Prefects feel this pressure immensely. While most of them internalised this situation, they complained about the last-minute atmosphere which exists. They wished to administer the agenda casually. For instance, the Head of the Strategy Department stressed that they could not implement some strategic plans because unexpected events oftentimes forced the ministry to take actions exactly contrariwise to their strategic aims.

> Recent experiences in Turkey have shown that we sometimes cannot support the policies which we had made into our strategic plan. The MoI must deal with responsibilities in a dynamic environment. So, you are not allowed to maintain daily administrative operations consistent with the strategic plan. (GD1, TI)

This daily struggle not only damages the strategic aspect of the MoI, but also plays a role in triggering stress and tensions. The next section will examine this side of working at the MoI.

A Busy Everyday Life: The Stressful Work Atmosphere

> There is no such thing as a typical day. All days come with surprise, with stress with last minutes changes (Rhodes, 2011a, p. 75).

The MoI has had wide range duties and coordinator role in the Turkish public administration, especially crisis management due to the governing territorial administration (see in detailed in Appendix B). Thereby, the MoI and its top political-administrators should work almost 24/7 since

their agendas are always busy. Recently, the increasing amount of terror, migration issues, and the EU integration process have overburdened the MoI's roles.

> In my 13 years' experience [at Central], the ministry has always been busy. The development of intense security issues have enhanced this. Anyway, look at our other duties! Yet, the MoI is also busy. (DGD3, TI)

Ministers feel this overburden more than others because of their having "several hats" (see the "political leadership" section in Chapter 7). If ministers work, prefects should work as well. Undersecretaries, GDs, and the minister's inner circle especially must always be ready to respond to his demands and fulfil his orders regardless of time restrictions.

For the most part, their work time is not standard. They can work for long hours until midnight, even during the weekends. Anyways, their moods become increasingly exhausted because of their workloads. These senior and key supporting personnel are traditionally not allowed to go home until they deal with any particular problem. Tomorrow, maybe a new issue might arise and continue their being restless for longer.[60] I observed that:

> After the normal working time, senior prefects were waiting in their PPS's office or their own offices for the purpose of either responding to or giving an explanation or taking orders from their superiors until their Minister and Undersecretary left the Ministry. (FWNB)

While it seems time consuming, it has been beneficial for strengthening intra-departmental coordination and avoiding failures and entertaining any contradictory views regarding the Minister's aims. (FWNB)

A busy daily life forces them to work after normal working times. Even at weekends, they preferred to come and complete their job or, at best, read reports and prepare special documents without the interference of visitors or phone calls which they usually experience throughout the official work week. They mostly confirmed that this is the best time for thinking and analysing.[61]

Uncertainty and sudden developments prevent one from planning and allocating time for one's family. This issue was revealed, not only by the bureaucrats, but also by the minister himself.

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[60] GD1, GD2, Gunduzoz_GD8, GD3, Yildiz_FPPS3, FPPS2FGS2, TI.
[61] DGD2, CI2, GD5, TI.

I could only see my children after they had already fallen asleep. One day, my daughter wrote me a letter. She wrote, 'Can you give us an appointment to see you?' (Minister1, TI)

These gut-wrenching experiences notwithstanding, holidays are also practically meaningless for top political-administrators.

Neither we nor our ministers know about holidays. Even sparing time for other activities and hobbies are enough to blame us of stealing time from our public duties.
(Yildiz_FPPS3, TI)

Nevertheless, the administrative practices of the Ministry was internalised by its members, with them feeling extremely stressed.

The Ministry has been engaging with a more political, consistently hot, very busy agenda. We have been working under constant stress, thereby causing within us intense panic. (GD1, TI)

Speed is required, but speed reduces the quality of their work. Moreover, some papers — even those vital for the department — could be ignored by the top because of their busy firefighting daily agenda. Thus, the stress is constant for those who work at the Ministry. The long quotation below is important for demonstrating their interaction with daily routine.

If you want information, they must bring it as soon as possible. GDs thought 'The Undersecretary is waiting for me. I need to go to him in the shortest possible time.' Otherwise, as PPS, I have to push him to be in a hurry; he pushes his juniors as well. Everyone joins the stressful game. Anyway, they prepare something in order to get rid of stress regardless of quality and further consideration. They know that the person who fulfils orders in the shortest amount of time will be considered the "best man."'
(Yildiz_FPPS3, TI)

Ministerial discretion and a lack of devolution with juniors are other issues that cause stress. The heads of department need to receive top political-administrators' approval. It means waiting a long time to meet with them and explain their aims and priorities. The stress which is caused during this waiting, or uncertain, phase made some more tired than when they were faced with their heavy daily tasks.

No, routine does not tire us. Waiting and indecision do. We are used to working. If you work, you never tire. But if our senior is indecisive, it makes us tired. (DGD3, TI)

Nevertheless, most of them claimed that their field experience and daily life practices enable them to handle the stress. Besides their adaptation skills, they believed that dealing with different tasks in their daily life helped to keep them alive and ensure their concentration (FGS3, TI).

Gaining the support of the minister is another main aim that they have which helps them to endure all of the stress.

Risk Awareness (Zero Mistake Pressure)

All participants stress that the fact that they do not have a chance to make mistakes. This forces them to be aware at all times, especially with regards to unforeseeable issues. They have to be ready to respond, especially to the minister and undersecretaries' preferences and demands.

Although some asserted opposite views, [62] some participants similarly pointed out that prefects avoid speaking the truth to power; instead, they tell them whatever the minister wishes to hear.

> Ideas that the minister would not wish to hear or which are seen to be against the government's programmes and priorities would be unwelcomed. This discourages prefects from speaking from their hearts. (Avsarbey_CI3, TI)

This is because, if they wish to keep their position, or even be promoted to a better position, they are required to be cautious and harmonise with the current situation (GD6, TI). A lack of correlation between promotion and performance measurement, rather than political patronage relations, supports this opinion (CI6, TI).

Risk awareness feeds the necessity for caution, intuition, secrecy and a lack of trust with anybody for your personal record.

> Successors observe and draw lessons from this experience that make them more cautious. (Atbas_FGD2, TI)

The findings, coupled with my observations during the fieldwork, confirmed this concern for the MoI's practice. Moreover, this concern for secrecy spans from secret information to technical, detailed information. In addition, recent dramatic developments – i.e. the coup attempt in July 2016 – have made the MoI be more cautious. Further distrust of outsiders was common which rendered joint discussions of draft policies, especially those regarding security-based tasks' challenging.

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[62] Former Minister 1 and Former Minister, Besir Atalay, told me that they enjoyed listening to different views without any hindrance.

Since our duties involve secrecy, we wish others do not interfere with our state issues. We think that this possible interaction and information-sharing could have a detrimental effect on state security. (Atbas_FGD2, TI)

In line with both the International literature (see Tiernan, 2015 and Mulgan, 2009), the Turkish literature, and some accounts of my participants underlined that ministerial style is also not very willing to take risks. Ministers are inclined to save their chair just like prefects, especially given the effects of the external political environment, such as the rising dominance of the PM, the unpredictability of Turkish political and daily life, the pressure of the media, endless reform sinfonias etc (see the "political leadership" section in Chapter 7).

Speak the Truth to Power

Speaking the truth to power is an important indicator of risk awareness in everyday practices. Nevertheless, even though Law 657 prescribes that public servants must speak the truth for the public's benefit, most participants, however, related the opinion that prefects have not been able to express its views freely because of the ministry's strictly hierarchal control, anxiety regarding the loss of their positions, etc.

In addition, however, even though the tradition of the brotherhood of the prefects provides better coordination, better informal training, and better solidarity, this fraternal tradition makes the MoI less internally argumentative and decreases the likelihood of having debates about issues since, as some participants have asserted, differing opinions could be perceived as being disrespectful behaviour by seniors.

They [the prefects] are generally respectful of seniors in this context and do not project any such negative behaviours, such as disrespectful acts, and will not posit many objections! (Atbas_FGD2, TI)

The findings corroborate this. The following comments highlight this dimension and place more stress on hierarchy:

Our council meeting[63] is headed by the undersecretary. Since hierarchy exists, bargaining does not take place at those meetings. (DU2, TI)

This experience transfers to other generations to such an extent that one deputy undersecretary labelled this phenomenon as a kind of "learned helplessness" (DU2, TI). The administrative

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[63] Since this board is chaired by the Undersecretary and since the Head of Department participates on the board, this is the most important decision and advisory board of the MoI.

tradition feeds political leadership. Most of the participants confirmed this. In other words, prefects, who lead their districts using command and control, also dislike objections. This feeds a lack of toleration for, and protection of, people who think differently from the majority.[64]

It is not easy to control people who think differently or in an opposite way than you do. This is true even of me. On the one hand, everybody tells you, 'You can fly! You are so smart!' You like them. On the other hand, these *sui generis* people assert that 'You can neither fly nor succeed. You cannot even walk properly!' That attitude humiliates you and breaks your pride. You hate them. (FGD1)

During the interview period, I commented that

> [t]he question of "Does the MoI's bureaucracy tell the truth even if they know that the minister wishes not to hear opposing views and even if he would likely react terribly?" irritated my participants. (FWBN)

The minister's style is important. If the minister tends to listen, that encourages the prefects to speak up. If not, though, they prefer to remain silent:

> If our political master behaves as if he knows everything, we do not talk. How can you explain something to someone who believes that he knows everything better than everyone else? (GD6, TI)

A member of the inner circle observed that, if they are given the chance to speak, the bureaucracy becomes more relieved. They underlined that some ministers' (e.g. Aksu, Atalay and Sahin) ministerial rooms or meeting hall were places full of useful talks and debates on hot topics.[65] Ministers confirmed that:

I preferred to argue topics with my friends [prefects]. I liked these debates. I encouraged them to share their opinions freely. Honestly, we benefited much from these. (Former Minister 1, TI)

> Every morning, the first thing that I did was to meet with the senior bureaucrats, especially the undersecretary. We talked about current issues and regulations. I found these debates useful and vital. If it had not have been for these consultations, I would not have been able to see my way as Interior Minister. (Former Minister 3_Besir Atalay, TI)

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[64] Avsarbey_CI3, FGD1, GD6, GD5, TI.
[65] I.e. FPPS1 and Yildiz_FPPS3, TI.

Most times, prefects expect their seniors or ministers to encourage them. One participant shared the following story:

> The meeting was chaired by the undersecretary. He knew the MoI. The members of the meeting began to talk respectively. While a group of GDs were talking, the undersecretary interfered and invited them to explain their "real opinion freely." It was at that moment that the meeting's atmosphere, with the members presenting relatively radical ideas. Even someone who had talked before wished to talk again and amend their views. (GD6, TI)

Furthermore, the prefects have a political nous. They know that, if the government has a set of priorities or if recent events are pressuring the ministry, they should not work against the minister's top-down policies (Karaca_LA4, TI). Protecting the minister and the MoI are still the foremost values for all prefects. For example, one former minister confirmed that:

> The prefects know what the minister can and cannot do. They did not do anything that would have disturbed my position. During this period, I felt this protective manner that they had for me. (Former Minister 3_Atalay, TI)

Yet, in sum, of course, their idealism and amateur spirit has been revealed in the findings; nonetheless, they mostly have not had enough chances or courage to speak the truth to power and demonstrate their capacity. The MoI's administrative tradition is dominated by other characteristics of Turkish administrative tradition (strict hierarchy, political control), which is a vital barrier to their improvement and ability to show their competency.

Pragmatism for knowledge and academic studies: value for experience, not evidence based policy

Value for knowledge and academic studies are closely related to analytical policy capacity, especially the organisational and system analysis capacities. As observed in detailed chapter 6, a pragmatic approach is adopted with regards to the value for knowledge and academic studies vis-à-vis an evidence-based policy and decision-making manner. Nevertheless, these findings have revealed that the MoI's pragmatism could not be understood as being Machiavellian in manner. Instead, its main aims are to provide solutions and make the life of the public easier (see chapter 6 for detail).

Incremental error correction for surprises, not systematic evaluation

The MoI does not have an administrative practice of systematically analysing the results of any policy that they have implemented (see the "monitoring and evaluation task" section in chapter

5). Instead, the MoI inclined to evaluate and amend solutions during their implementations. Gaining feedback about the problems that occurred from those solutions has been a priority mechanism rather than monitoring and evaluating them in a structural manner. Thus, acting upon complaints is perceived to be an important characteristic of the MoI (and Turkish) bureaucracy. The majority asserted that this is not such a bad method. They mentioned examples from foreign experiences, referring to the UK's public administration reforms and the changes that it has undergone. They claimed that everything could not be planned during the policy-making phase and asked 'how could you know or predict outcomes without implementation?' (GD5, TI). Their opinions were that:

It could be more didactic and improve our practical wisdom. (DGD2)

Complaints were made via petitions, feedback from prefects who worked at the frontlines at the territorial administration, the politicians — acting as mediators between the citizens and the MoI —, the media, and the internet.[66] Similarly, most of them pointed out that ministerial interest is vital in highlighting those issues. Sometimes, their individual observations triggered their solving the issues at hand (FPPS2, TI).

The Ministry of the Prefectural Class: A brotherhood tradition rooted in shared field experience

Prefects, which have a unique philosophy and vocational virtue, were seen as being natural (administrative) leaders in Turkish public administration and MoI administration. Findings confirmed that the prefectoral class also determines the bureaucratic policy capacity of the ministry. Solidarity — aka the "brotherhood of prefects" — has consistently been its foremost value (see section of coordination and collaboration inside MoI).

> You know that there has been some competition amongst the prefects and their departments. Imagine that one department [also its head] had a rough time and that the others did not attempt to benefit from their weakness and that they, rather, tried to support them like a family member in order to recover their position. Once one of them "gets into the soup," their solidarity will be revealed. (DU2, TI)

Furthermore, the findings derived from the interviews, documents and observations from the Ministry seem to acknowledge that neither street level bureaucrats[67] nor administrative staffs hold the key role regarding the MoI's administration. Instead, the administrative staff role was

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[66] The complaints mechanism has progressively become systematised and simplified through e-government applications. For example, the PM established a direct line called the Prime Ministry Communication Centre (BİMER) to receive citizens' complaints about public services in person, by phone, via the internet, or through letters.
[67] See Page and Jenkins, 2005.

framed as doing ordinary bureaucratic things, supporting technical issues and fulfilling administrators' orders by the majority of the prefects. A few expressed their opinion in an ironic fashion, stressing that analysis and thinking were to be considered as solely prefects' job.

> The administrative staff are responsible for serving the prefects and understanding their orders correctly; in other words, their "just doing them." Their duty is not to think but just do. (FGS2, TI)

According to the administrative staff's perspective, however, they respect and mostly internalise the leadership role of the prefects, they feel like stepchildren. (Gungor_GS of the Union, TI) They stressed that the lack of opportunity to promote themselves to upper levels and receiving awards diminished their motivation and organisational policy capacity.

The former prefect and current MP asserts that the strict division of roles created peace in the working environment.

> Having seniors from the prefectoral class provides confidence to the administrative staff. More importantly, however, this protects them from relentless competition to being promoted to upper levels. (MP 1, TI)

In sum, it seems that it was a rational choice to prefer to conduct elite interviews instead of interviews with street level bureaucrats or administrative staff.

4.2   Summary of the Chapter

The main findings of this chapter are that, the Turkish administrative tradition shows significant characteristics, including:

- A unitary and centralised structure and the legalistic philosophy of the State;

- Highly centralised and formal relations within society: a political philosophy of the State which sees the State as being above society; a lack of participation from the public it also construes the existence of the State elite, viz. prefects, as protectors of the status-quo;

- Its being formalistic, greatly hierarchical career-based bureaucracy;

- Legalistic administration (rule of law);

- Legalistic accountability;

- Political control: loyalty to a powerful political leader and a philosophical orientation towards having a powerful leadership and strong patronage relations.

- Having field administration and field based solution practice: Because of their territorial administration experiences, prefectoral class know what happens in the field. This experience underpins their claim to be the premier department.

Considering these features, the findings confirm that Turkish administrative tradition creates an atmosphere which is quite conservative and resistant to change.

With regards to the MoI's administrative tradition:

- Prefects value the tradition

- Its being formalistic, greatly hierarchical career-based bureaucracy could cause a limit to policy capacity despite of providing some advantages.

- Having secrecy concern and being risk awareness could cause a limit to policy capacity.

- Its having a reactive, altruistic, and field-based solution practice have all been pushing factors for improving its policy capacity.

- Error correction for surprises, not systematic evaluation and having a pragmatism for knowledge and academic studies, rather than its having an evidence-based policy or decision-making manner has both pros and cons.

- Loyalty and a willingness to support the minister to have a strong position and are the foremost values which could strengthen trust between the ministers and prefects whereas their too responsiveness to political demand rather than (sometimes) avoid speaking the truth to minister could be interpreted as a limit to policy capacity. This is still a great issue for the MoI.

- The MoI has a very busy everyday life and a stressful work atmosphere because its having a wide range duties, as well as a strong coordinative and pioneering role within the Turkish public administration system. That could limit to advisory policy capacity, analytical policy capacity as well (see chapter 6).

- Their main aim is that of coping and surviving in a dynamic and unpredictable internal and external environment. Prefects are mostly considered as successful with how they are able to tackle that challenge.

- Prefectural class and its brotherhood tradition rooted in shared field experience still hold a monopolistic administrative role inside the MoI.

In sum, robust administrative tradition has both pros and cons regarding bureaucratic policy capacity that will be described in detailed in empirical and conclusion chapters. Therefore, the following sections of the thesis will inevitably stress this administrative tradition.

Chapter 5: ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY CAPACITY

Introduction

In this chapter, I present an analysis of the administrative policy capacity of the MoI by applying the conceptual framework mentioned earlier in Chapter 3. Thus, this chapter consists of three section according to the three levels of administrative policy capacity; viz., organisational, individual and systemic. I prefer to begin organisational administrative capacity since this capacity has determined individual administrative capacity.

5.1 Organisational Administrative Policy Capacity

In this section, I aim to understand and describe the MoI's organisational administrative policy capacity. Following Gleeson's (2009) framework, this chapter is structured around seven domains[68] – tasks- of administrative policy capacity, in which organisational structure (see Appendix B), process and tradition contributes to the quality of policy practice with 'enablers' and 'barriers,'' something which is borrowed from Painter and Pierre (2005). Seven main task topics are:

- administering the process;

- analysis and advice;

- coordination and collaboration;

- links between policy development and implementation;

- monitoring, evaluation and review;

- personnel administration;

- personnel training (Gleeson, 2009, pp. 203-253; Tiernan, 2011, 341-342).

5.1.1 Administering Policy Processes

This part is related to demonstrating the administering policy processes (see table 2, 5a) in terms of the distinctive features of the MoI's responsibilities (see appendix B).

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[68] She considered leadership as eighth domain. But, I prefer to describe leadership as administrative leadership and political leadership. Former one will be described section 5.2.1., individual administrative policy capacity while later one will demonstrated in individual political policy capacity in Chapter 7 in line with table 2.

The MoI is a traditional ministry, so there are regulations as to how policies should be processed, even though this was criticised by one of the grey report for lacking norms and protocols for policy development.

> Some of the tasks regulated in the laws were not reflected in the ministry's operating instructions.
>
> There was a lack of some work regulations regarding job descriptions. In addition, the guidelines defining policy making processes have become outdated.
>
> This report underlines that, in this model of vertical organisation, the routine policy/decision making process requires a nine-step, down-to-up signature process (MoI 2008, p. 520).[69]

Most of the participants drew attention to the fact that it has been too difficult to trace this path since the MoI works in an extremely dynamic, external political environment. Therefore, administering the policy process is highly contingent; 'contingent on time, the issue (i.e. controversial or routine), personalities [ministers and undersecretaries], and bureaucratic level (from unit to division to department to whole-of-government)' (Gleeson, 2009, p. 333).

Although the formal decision route was designed with the intention of promoting participative decision-making, the pressure to make decisions and develop policies for the purpose of solving problems quickly has often forced them to skip some formal steps. For example, hurriedness mostly prevents prefects from adequately attending to defining the problem because it was not considered as a priority in the era of coping and surviving.[70]

Besides hierarchical decision-making, the informal policy process provides alternative routes for speeding up the policy- and decision-making process. In addition to the formal framework of decision-making, there was a form of internal diplomacy that expected the existence and exploitation of strong personal links and effective communication skills.[71] For instance, decisions are mostly made through informal decision-making channels by top administrators. Formal signature routes, on the other hand, are traced in exactly the opposite way. Nevertheless, this reverse top-down process has not faced any resistance due to the command and control, leadership- and loyalty-based Turkish administrative tradition.

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[69] 1. Data prepare and control operator; 2. Chief of administrative staff; 3. Branch head; 4. Head of division; 5. Deputy General Director; 6. The General Director; 7. The Deputy Undersecretary; 8. The Undersecretary; 9. The Minister (Ibid: 521).
[70] Yildiz_FPPS3 and CI6, TI.
[71] CI4 and, Gunduzoz_GD8, TI.

> Our staff, including our colleagues, did not hesitate to initial documents which were
> approved or signed by either the minister or the undersecretary. (DU1, TI)

The informal route provides the MoI with a way of solving issues faster, but this process is seen as being a barrier to analysing and evaluating policies in advance. Mostly, issues regarding definitions, agenda setting, debating, and the elaboration of decisions and policies are likely to miss and ignore parts at lower levels. The practices of the MoI demonstrate that trial and error would not be the worst method and may even be the best way of evaluating some policies' results (GD5, TI). In this way, a policy or decision might later be amended according to the feedback received regarding the problem in line with administrative tradition.

If regulations go further outside the MoI (i.e. to the Prime Ministry or to the parliament), this is taken more seriously. These policies or decisions mostly belong to the government's agenda as a whole and are, ergo, more than solely related to topics which only affect the MoI itself. During the reform era since 2002, even the ministers' roles have become too narrow to take the initiative in such a dynamic policy environment (see the "external environment" section in Chapter 7).

There have been intensive agendas determined by the PM, President, and the Turkish parliament which should, in turn, be traced by the ministers. Meanwhile, the minister had been watching for an opportunity to put forward or remove certain issues related to the ministry. It was very difficult to control the agenda. (FPPS1, TI)

Namely, for the MoI, two topics were important: that current, unexpected issues and regulations correspond to the government programmes and priorities that could dominate the minister's priorities. That means that some parts of the policy making/decision making process could be dismissed; for instance, agenda setting, since issues and even possible solutions could be provided as top-down policies. Mostly;

> [the] process begins with the minister or undersecretary's command; after that, the
> department takes part. The senior prefects have to collect data, analyse them, and
> prepare a draft policy proposal to present to the undersecretary and, after approval, to
> the minister. (Gunduzoz_GD8, TI)

This is acknowledged by all of the participants who responded to this question and complied with my observations.

> Their preparations show similar features. They call their juniors, meet with them, share
> their expectations, draw the lines, and command them. The juniors do vice versa. For
> the most part, the head of the branch prepares a draft paper and presents it to his

immediate senior. This draft paper is sometimes argued about by both the seniors and the juniors together. If the GDs are convinced, they will share the department's paper with the deputy undersecretary or present it to the undersecretary and, rarely, directly to the minister. (FWNB)

Whether it is presented to the minister directly or not is directly related to the paper's topic and emergency level. As I have explained earlier, speed is of the utmost importance. At every stage, the prefects check and balance the process. Risk awareness is vital importance.

> No one wishes to disagree with recent trends and the ministerial will and make mistakes in the regulation draft paper which will finally find its way to the minister's table. (Yildiz_FPPS3, TI)

Avoiding the MoI's hierarchical structure can actually cause mistakes. As my observation regarding the process of making such a regulation attests:

> A junior usually presents or shares his view with his seniors. More experienced seniors, who already mostly knew (i.e. are already informed about) or intuited top political administrators' expectations, recommended/ordered how to prepare this regulation, or mostly amended it corresponding to their own expectations. (FWNB)

This happens spontaneously in an informal way. During this phase, they could tolerate juniors seeing as they, themselves, have experienced similar things before. The tradition of the brotherhood of prefects and that of the master-apprentice supports this type of learning by doing and is named "informal training" (DU1, TI).

After the regulation process inside the department, the GDs solely present it to the undersecretary or, very rarely, even directly to the minister. This is due to the ministry's strict hierarchical tradition (FGS2, TI).

> Hiearchy could not be ignored. Ministers do not ask juniors to present the final versions of regulations; they ask the undersecretary to present it. They talked to the undersecretary and, sometimes, to the GDs regarding current issues. Even if he asked about something from his advisor regarding important issues or regulations, his advisor would probably simply say 'we had better consult our undersecretary.' The MoI's bureaucracy is based on hierarchy and values that tradition. (Former minister 2_Vecdi Gonul, TI)

Juniors do not have the chance to join and observe them. Therefore, they learn from the political administrators' opinions and reflect upon their seniors' feedback.

> Though they are confident in us, they share information with us as we need to know
>
> [this is known as the secrecy and need-to- know principle]. (DGD3, TI)

An exception occurs in the case of a ministerial direct command regarding a specific issue. Mostly chief inspectors or legal advisors who had been experts or conducted relevant issues or regulations accompany the GD or undersecretary. It is here that they have the chance to present their reports or opinions with supporting documents.[72]

The style of the political-administrators affect the speed and content of the policy creation process.

> If a minister or undersecretary works rigorously…our GDs tend to make detailed and
> inclusive preparations on time. (FGS1, TI)

The style of presenting policies to the minister could change according to the minister's preference or preferred topics. There are broad participant meetings regarding local administration reforms (DGD2, TI), whereas more security-related topics are conducted in secret with only a handful of participants.

> I witnessed the beginning of the "resolution process" of abolishing terror. They worked
> on establishing an "Under-Secretariat of Public Order and Security." Seeing as the
> process of its establishment was extremely delicate, just the honourable minister,
> undersecretary, and chief of police came together in order to work upon it until
> midnight or even 02.00 a.m. (Yildiz_FPPS3, TI)

With regard to the policy-making process, the ministers mostly took key prefects' advice. The ministers' public and political advisors were unlikely to join game. (Their main duty has been for personal support than advising with regards to policy-making.) Namely, the MoI is known as working on a "close-circuit." An exception appeared during the policymaking regarding local reforms when the municipalities unions and mayors were included in the process as well.[73] Furthermore, with the exception of Minister Atalay's era, the MoI's political-administrators did not wish to collaborate with outside knowledge institutions (see Chapter 6).

Participants stated that they used all of their communication tools, like emails, phone calls, official writings, and informal/formal chats. While official writing used to be the bureaucratic language, face-to-face communications have come to the forefront. The majority of participants confirmed that, in case of important policymaking processes, the minister and undersecretary prefer to use

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[72] CI2 and CI4, TI.
[73] GD2, GS of Union and Bilmez_DGD1, TI.

formal or informal debates in meetings with very few participants. This style turns into informal chats inside the department's own processes. If they need to argue, they could meet anytime, mostly in a senior's room (some departments, though, have their own meeting room). If the regulation in question was a priority for the top, this process would be greatly accelerated.

Inside the department, communication during the preparation or development of ideas, policies, or decision-making strategies are debated upon seeing as it is relatively unlikely for any problems to occur due to the strict hierarchy with which the ministry is ordered, revealing respect to seniors and mitigated even further by the fraternal tradition mentioned in the previous section. The prevailing thought is that of the dominant position of the GDs inside the department. They were expected to know the MoI's minister and undersecretary's priorities and the external environment in order to not only improve ideas, but also avoid making mistakes (GD2, TI). My observations during the interview period, especially with the first legal advisor and the GDs, confirmed that, especially, with regards to important regulations:

> They joined even the preparation phase actively, and also every stage was accompanied with them either writing comments on pieces of paper or calling their juniors in order to explain what was missing or what needed further consideration. There were a significant number of books on their table or behind their desk. (FWBN)

Another issue which they were concerned about and which was revealed amongst the findings was uncertainty and their having a top-busy agenda (their waiting for a long time to meet in order to present their opinions or draft resolutions for the approval of either the undersecretary or the minister) has been a serious and time-consuming barrier to their being able to make decisions and policies correctly and saving time for their juniors.[74] On the other hand, coordinating and especially collaborating intra-ministry was seen as being a bit problematic despite the tradition of the brotherhood of prefects. They asserted several reasons (see in detail "collaboration task" in the following section). Sometimes, a lack of proper coordination and collaboration caused conflicts. This is not a new issue. In internal reports, some of these issues were also revealed.

> We observed that several departments worked on the same regulation at the same time without being aware of others' work, even fully drafting those regulations and turning them into ministerial orders. (MoI, 2008, p. 512).

Recently, in an attempt to avoid this kind of overlap, the undersecretary's office— consisting of four undersecretaries and a small public servant team whose duty is that of mostly checking

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[74] I.e. GD5, GD2 and GD1, TI.

whether draft regulations are in line with already existing legislations — has become the primary coordinator.[75] Yet, the undersecretary and his office role is not simply restricted to coordinating or gatekeeping. Undersecretaries can actively participate in the policymaking process, even during its early phase.

For the supporting undersecretary, the minister's inner circle (the general secretary and his deputy, and, albeit rarely, the PPS and some other advisors) also sometimes joins the temporary teams at the minister's discretion. This is due to the fact that the majority of them were chief inspectors in the past. Actually, they used to be gatekeepers who checked whether regulations were in line with legislations, government programmes, and minister priorities— even spelling rules. Ministers value their roles. For instance, when a few regulations were presented by others, most ministers preferred to send them to their general secretaries in order to check.[76]

If the making of a policy receives attention by the Prime Ministry or the Turkish parliament, though, the minister's participation becomes more vital. The minister administers this process mostly directly, but they sometimes use their undersecretary as well. This translates into long meetings and lengthy debates. A few participants considered this meeting useless because of the ministry's strict hierarchy and command and control administrative tradition[77], whereas others (mostly those who had actually had to participate in such processes) rejected strict ministerial and undersecretarial discretion in virtue of the technical features of the legislative process. According to one representative's account:

> There have been serious debates on new laws which lasted for hours — even days.
> Often the ministers and undersecretary would chair these debates up until midnight.
> Being a minister should not mean that they should know about everything. (CI4, TI)

Another important point is the regulation feature. If it comes from the top, the ministry administers its infrastructure with more coordination from the PM Office.

If they have to take into consideration the parliament's point-of-view, the process of policymaking becomes much more stressful. This is because the MoI must present its regulations, persuade political actors, respond to politicians' questions, and work and collaborate with several stakeholders in the public arena. Yet, this pressure has been diminished ever since the one-

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[75] During my second round of fieldwork, I met a junior district governor who had been appointed as a (secondary) advisor to the undersecretary. He had been responsible for supporting the undersecretary in order to diminish his overburden. He told me that the undersecretary gave him some topics or tasks to monitor. He regularly checks papers before their being signed by the undersecretary, just like a GS of the minister, and prepares annotations (just like a policy briefing). If this system is elaborated and becomes permanent, we can argue for the existence of a court. (FWNB)
[76] FGS2, FGS3, FDGS, GS and DGS, TI.
[77] Yildiz_FPPS3, Avsarbey_CI3 and DU2, TI.

government party era. Mostly, seeing as top-down policy manners have dominated public life, regulations have been prepared and coordinated by the Prime Ministry and amended in an interactive way, with opposite parties' political actors and stakeholders being mostly ignored (see Chapter 7).

The MoI used to employ contact persons under the general secretary inside the Parliament who acted as the MoI's eyes and ears. Recently, the current minister has established a bureau and has appointed one of his advisors (a chief inspector) with administrative staff inside the parliament. This advisor is responsible for supporting the minister, informing him about everything related to the MoI, and ensuring coordination between the Ministry and the Parliament.

> I monitor everything related to the MoI. Our minister works as if he was a bureaucrat. Therefore, we work rigorously. I prepare briefing notes, policy reports, etc., and send them to him via email every day. I also act as a coordinator between our ministry and Parliament. (A2, TI)

The general secretary's role of governing parliamentary relations, especially that with regards the regulation process, has passed to this bureau. He showed me some files that involve reports, parliamentary bulletins, briefing notes, etc. Despite its being a new bureau, my first impression during the interview and chatting with them was that their capacity is developing in light of the minister's support and a chief inspector's administration. (FWNB, TI)

The findings revealed that the MoI's members were satisfied with undertaking the policy creation process in the Parliament.[78] Everyone shared the view that the prefects work hard in order to keep their minister at a superior position in all parliamentary debates. The current advisor stated that a good perception of the prefects enables and facilitates their role (A2, TI).

5.1.2 Analysis and Advice

Analysis and advice policy capacity (see table 2, 5b) have been seen as important tasks which determine the entire public policymaking stage.

As was mentioned in the administrative tradition in Chapter 4, prefects have a monopolistic role inside the ministry. The undersecretary, and, recently, the deputy minister (his role is still vague), deputy undersecretaries, GDs (including the head of the Inspectors Board and the first legal advisors, who are mostly members of the Ministry Council), and, to a certain extent, advisors, the

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[78] I.e. GD1, DU1, FPPS1.

inner circle, and, very rarely, the central Governors, could be considered as being part of the "advisors" team.

The head of the team is, undoubtedly, the undersecretary. The MoI's protocols, rituals, and regulations support his administrative leadership. Therefore, the main unit which advises and reports to the Minister has been the undersecretary's office. His four deputy undersecretaries, who each oversee various functions of the Ministry, and the GDs support the undersecretary's advisory role. Most of the time, advice is conveyed through the undersecretary's stewardship. In spite of there being a hierarchical inner circle and an inspection board which are both directly responsible to the Minister, they cannot ignore anything that he says due to his high standing (Former Minister 2_Vecdi Gonul, TI).

The minister's style is also important. If the minister is open to listening to new opinions and debates, the bureaucracy could feed him better ideas. In addition, the minister's playing his role has contingencies and barriers, such as government programmes, party issues, and the expectations of stakeholders etc.

> Minister Sahin [prefectoral minister] enjoyed hearing different ideas, whereas Minister Guler [prefectoral minister] did not let the bureaucracy talk and elaborate upon specific issues which were already restricted or established by political concerns. Thus, whereas the bureaucracy at least attempted to present different aspects on issues during the Sahin era, they preferred to be silent during the Guler era. (FPPS2, TI)

Yildiz pointed out the reasons behind this silence:

> They saw that the MoI did not implement anything against the government's priorities and programmes because resistance would be risky, not only for the ministry but also for individual careers. (Yildiz_FPPS3, TI)

Yet, the findings show that most participants have optimistic views. The bureaucracy can give the Minister and the Undersecretary the advice needed to reach a decision or to respond to unexpected, emergent, or controversial issues rather than 'strategic and long term' ones.[79] In addition, all of the former ministers found prefects to be successful with regards to their being 'informed by practicalities,' 'responsive [to] the elected government,' and having a 'coherent government visage.'[80] Namely, the findings could be interpreted as saying that the prefects are good at giving advice which corresponds to both the government and minister's expectations:

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[79] FPPS1, CI3, GD, LA1, DU1, TI.
[80] Former minister 1, Former minister 2_Vecdi Gonul and Former minister 3_Besir Atalay, TI.

They have been skilful in intuiting their political boss's opinions in advance. (Karaca_LA4, TI)

> I found the MoI as being an established ministry whose bureaucracy had high
> responsiveness skills. Furthermore, I valued consulting them and sharing my
> expectations with them. Thereby, they mostly met my expectations. (Former minister
> 3_Besir Atalay, TI)

As mentioned before, when the supportive advisory role came to the fore, both participants from
the inner circle and others confirmed that the MoI does everything to keep the Minister strong
both inside and outside the ministry.[81] My participants shared experiences of wishing to decrease
the Minister's burdens and supporting him in several different ways. Their advisory role could be
seen as firefighting in the scope of many broad activities.

The top political style of the political-administrators is as important as the quality of advice.
Namely, it might either aid or impede according to ministerial discretion. They asserted that the
minister's support triggers the awakening of the supply-side's implicit competence. Some
prefects, however, had more pessimistic opinions than their former ministers.

> It is in honour of ministerial discretion. Imagine that they were able to develop
> proposals and give him advice on the ministry's duties. The ministry might be able to
> improve the advice capacity to support his minister. Nevertheless, I have not observed
> this kind of attempt so far. I feel that they do not have the discretion for this and also
> that no one felt them to be necessary. (CI6, TI)

Similarly, it has been mentioned that the lack of a proper demand prevented prefects from
contributing to the policymaking process.

> Of course, it depends on demand. Imagine that the MoI had an analysis capacity. How
> would you present it without further request? (CI1, TI)

Karaca claimed that, in the past, prefects had more initiative than it now does.

> In the past, if inspectors identified an issue, they could investigate it closely and present
> their opinion to the minister via official reports or without official papers. Moreover, the
> minister would listen to, think about, and make decisions regarding issues rooted in
> governmental reforms. Nowadays, however, this tradition has been abolished.
> (Karaca_LA4, TI)

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[81] I.e. DU2, FPPS1, FGS3, TI.

One of the current chief inspectors rejected this opinion, seeing as legislations regarding check-based inspections have changed during the past three years. He stated:

> The former one was also mostly useless. We could investigate specific issues related to governmental policies in great detail. We presented our reports and gave advice to the minister via our head or undersecretary. I believe that our minister valued our reports and shared them in his cabinet meetings for, as I observed, they began implementing changes in the field. (CI4, TI)

On the other hand, however, a majority of the participants believed that the prefects have been attributed because of their experiences with the problem feedback mechanism in the districts. In their busy everyday lives, however, the implementation and evaluation phases were ignored by the participants. Changes were only implemented when problems were revealed (for further concerns, see link between policy development and implementation).

All participants agreed that long-term strategic advice has been all but impossible to prepare and make in this dynamic, external environment and cope and survive era. Therefore, advice should aim to abolish the crisis and blow out the fire. Due to the discretion and political accountability of the ministers, the prefects did not need to feel anxiety about being too reactive and having insufficient strategic policy capability. Findings confirmed that they could meet expectations. Thus, despite of quality concerns, this could not be seen as a limit to policy capacity.

I received a few responses regarding the question of what gaps in the advisory capacity need to be filled both inside and outside the Ministry in order to better anticipate and achieve the MoI's desired policy goals. Yet, the research pointed out a few deficiencies regarding agenda setting, implementation and evaluation, and analysis of policies.

Their bureaucratic role was less visible in the agenda setting because of the dominant leadership character of the Minister. After taking command, they were capable in the 'policy formulation' and 'decision making' phases (Yildiz_FPPS3, FGD1, TI). Moreover, further consideration should be given to their advisory role regarding implementing and evaluating their policymaking needs. The findings do not tend to indicate that prefects have all of the advisory skills which they need and are all supported by analytical approaches.

> If there is an issue regarding the Parliament, or through the media news, we often struggle to predict how it affects our ministry or minister rather than analysing it with simply "professional" eyes. This professional advisory capacity does not exist in the MoI's bureaucratic practice. (DU2, TI)

Even though the former chief inspectors[82] supported this critique, they placed more emphasis on IM, which is also storage of past advice experiences. The former Head of the Inspector Board, Yilmaz, argued that their duty was that of turning data into systematic information for the purpose of providing advice to the minister. Instead, recently, the Board has inclined to prepare reports in line with legal inspections whose aim was that of checking their *de facto* implementation and compliance with laws.

> Even though advising the minister is one of our duties, we never aimed to highlight the real necessities or deficiencies in the public administration. Our duty was restricted by the working definition of the regulations and controlling for their overall legality. (Yilmaz_FGD3, TI)

One former GS stated that standard and well-prepared (i.e. quality) advice was not prepared by all of the MoI's departments. Indeed, he even went so far as to claim that some departments did not know how to give advice.

> It changes from department to department. A few of them brought such quality information that we could immediately present them to the minister without any corrections, while the others prepared reports with too many details and too little analysis. (FGS1, TI)

Unlike their foreign counterpart, ministers' advisors do not have any links with the SpAds at the PM's Office. Therefore, they were not able to affect departmental policies. Furthermore, there is no separate policy unit[83] in the MoI (vis-à-vis Number 10). Instead, Post-2002, five departments were established in order to improve the MoI's advisory capacities: viz., Department of the EU and External Relation, Department of Information technology (IT), Department of Immigration, the Research and Studies Centre and the Department of Strategy Development.

The establishment of the Department of the EU and External Relation, Department of IT, and Department of Migration Administration were essential steps in responding to the EU integration process, new technological developments and threats, and immigration waves and border control. The study findings acknowledged that these departments not only improved the MoI policy advisory capacity, but also revived their confidence. [84]

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[82] CI1 and Yilmaz_FGD3, TI.

[83] One report confirms this gap. 'The Ministry currently lacks a sufficiently high powered central corporate policy unit, responsible for development of major policy options, reviewing and assessing the implementation of agreed major strategies and commissioning or undertaking research to underpin policy recommendations and to monitor and assess the impact of agreed policies' (Crawley and Kutlu, 2009, pp. 17-18).

[84] (FGD1, LA4, and GD4, TI)

On the other hand, I found that the Strategy Department and Research and Studies Centre have made fewer contributions to advisory policy capacity.[85] Further, the internal audit unit could not benefit the policy advisory capacity as it conflicted with the MoI's administrative tradition that rejects measurement and risk assessment grounded in the NPM (see section 5.2.6).

Coordination and collaboration can be evaluated more robustly than advisory skills because of the brotherhood tradition which exists inside the MoI.

5.1.3 Coordination and Collaboration

In this section, coordination and collaboration task (see table2, 5c) will be considered under two main headings:

- coordination and collaboration inside the ministry and

- Coordination and Collaboration with those outside of the Ministry

Inside the Ministry "Brotherhood Tradition of Prefects"

> An advantage of being prefects is so important that, once one launches a sentence with the word "agabey"[86] the hierarchy of the bureaucracy diminishes at least seventy percent. (Avsarbey_Cl3, TI)

By no means has the Weberian hierarchical structure dissolved, but an informal relationship rooted in the administrative tradition of the MoI still plays an important role in the MoI's everyday practices and rituals. The participants mostly agree that the Ministry has a strict hierarchy and that the minister and the top seniors speak the last word and that everyone obeys it. On the other hand, the prefectoral ministers are especially trusted in the prefects since they are their colleagues. The minister, who is not from prefectoral roots, also confirms the existence of this form of trust (Atalay_Former minister 3, TI). For the prefects, the minister is perceived as being the father of the Ministry rather than as a political boss. Namely, the relations amongst both the senior and low levels prefects are determined by a special tradition of brotherhood.

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[85] GD1, DGD1 and LA3, TI.

[86] Calling seniors "agabey," or elderly brother, instead of "sir" has been a ritual of the prefectoral class. The exception is when addressing either the minister or the undersecretary, whom the prefects call "my honourable minister/ undersecretary."

We have "brotherhood relations" unlike what the other ministers have. Actually, a prefect is a prefect. We do not always care about seniority for the sake of brotherhood. Juniors [from other departments] can visit us and share their opinions. We share our experiences with them and vice versa. (GD1, TI)

Most of the participants applauded having tradition of brotherhood. Considering its absence:

If the brotherhood tradition was abolished, this ministry would become paralysed and collapse. (Gunduzoz_GD8, TI)

Furthermore, betraying their class is a big sin. This tradition generates the respect of others in line with the MoI's protocols.

Communication is pretty easy and robust. Even, before sending official writings [to senior colleagues in other departments with either negative comments or requests], we inform them to avoid any touchiness. We value brotherhood tradition and its rituals. (Karaca_LA4, TI)

In sum, I found that coming from a prefectoral background provides the MoI's practices with better coordination.

Coordinators

Ministers, undersecretaries, and deputy undersecretaries play a key role in coordinating central departments. This is directly related to the hierarchical nature of the MoI's administrative tradition:

Of course, ministers provide coordination because they are at the top. Secondly, under his command, the undersecretary who administrates the MoI on his behalf coordinates his deputies and departments. Respectively, the deputy undersecretaries help him according to how their roles are divided. (DU1, TI)

Besides the office of the undersecretary, the inner circle of ministers sometimes facilitated coordination within the MoI. The GS and the PPS actively moderate all coordination proceedings. Departments have been delicate in fulfilling their duties in the coordination phase because of their awareness that the inner circle behaves on the behalf of the ministers.

Barrier and Enablers for coordination

The majority did not raise any problems amongst the departments due to the ministry's having a strict hierarchy, brotherhood tradition, not to mention the robust coordinator –enabler- role of the undersecretary. One sample account was:

> We have not had problems whilst coordinating due to the robust amount of communication which is supported by the tradition of brotherhood. We were able to communicate with our deputy minister and undersecretary and other GDs whenever we needed to as long as it was also suitable for them. We can use all modes of communication, but mostly phone calls and face-to-face meetings. Thanks to God, we have not experienced any obstacles so far. (GD1, TI)

Nonetheless, a few participants asserted that sometimes, several departments were likely to work on the same issues without being aware of others' work because of the MoI's having a fragmental IM (FGD1, TI). Another participant criticised the detrimental effect of strict hierarchy on coordination.

> Due to there being a strict hierarchy, prioritised risk awareness, and the fact that policy making decisions are placed in one man's discretion, the priorities of the upper echelons of the ministry always come to the fore, whereas the necessities of those at the lower levels are often ignored during the coordination phase. In other words, coordination's aim was always to strengthen the top's position rather than to solve issues. *(*Atbas_FGD2, TI)

While brotherhood tradition, meetings, the personal style with which most forms of communication are formulated, and the formal (writing, e-mail) and — more preferably — informal chats (visitations or telephone conversations) facilitate coordination; secrecy, busy working times, emergency issues, and competition may decrease the quality of coordination.

Speaking the truth to power has been a matter of coordination as well, with the heads of department sometimes tending to conceal their real opinions, as well as their departments' real situation, thereby causing detrimental effects on coordination.

> The meetings chaired by the minister and undersecretary with our head of department are places in which people are unwilling to speak the truth in case they may be perceived as being weak. How can we coordinate our departments without trustworthy information? (LA3, TI)

Better coordination means that one may better reflect and respond to daily developments. Quickness, however, is something which is extremely important for the MoI as well. Therefore, it has become inevitable to use technological communications -as enabler- in order to coordinate things.

> Recently, the need to be quick has pushed us to use more electronic communications. For instance, we trace action plans via email. Other departments send a report detailing their current situation to us by email so that we may check them and give feedback to them and vice versa. (GD1, TI)

Some newly created departments, like the IT, Strategy, EU, and External Affairs departments, utilise information technologies more than others to ensure better coordination (DGD5, TI). Nonetheless, elderly prefects use technology tools less than their younger colleagues.

> When I need to contact someone, I just call him, visit him, or invite him to my office. We chat whilst drinking tea or coffee and look each other in the eyes. In ten or fifteen minutes, [we] can solve and coordinate our issues. How could [we] do that with a computer? (CI2, TI)

Inside the departments

Besides intra-departmental coordination, inter-departmental coordination and collaboration has been better than the former. Inside the departments, informal tools have been used more than formal ways (i.e. when the MoI's protocol and hierarchy are always sought after). Face-to-face coordination comes to the fore. It is not only for the purpose of coordinating but also an opportunity for informal training for juniors. They could learn the views of top political-administrators, other departments' position, and the big picture from their seniors (see master-apprenticeship in the "training task" section).

In sum, the findings have revealed that departments are, on the whole, mostly satisfied with departmental coordination.

On the other hand, most of them criticised the collaboration capacity which exists amongst the MoI's departments. The majority of the participants see misleading others as an unforgivable sin, but the theme of collaboration needs to be examined more closely. This shall be done in the following section.

Collaboration: To Address Crosscutting Problems and Issues

Findings shows that collaboration has been problematics due to the some reasons. Firstly, as some of the participants mentioned that each department's wish not be interfered by others.[87] One sample account reads as follows:

> They do not wish others to interfere with their job, asking the question 'why do I have to share my job with others?' (DU2, TI)

I found that this opinion directly relates to achievement. Each department head wishes to demonstrate their abilities. If this work benefits their better position and success, they incline to administrate the work by themselves for the purpose of taking 'possession of their effort.' (FDGS, TI)

Secondly, individual career expectations, i.e. for a senior to become a Governor, causes them to be uncooperative. Being a leader in a district [i.e. a "lonely man"] and being trained as a bureaucratic leader are important barriers to those types of people working as a team. Amongst the findings, one interesting account shows a narcissistic manner:

In the public sector, the MoI included, everyone wants to be promote vertically. The tradition of jointly conducting a job does not exist. While three or five people come together to do something, most of them think, 'If I were not with you, you could not do anything!' (LA3, TI)

Thirdly, recently, having information has been associated with power with relation to serious responsibilities and risks.

> They wish to keep their information close to them in case of necessities. If they believe that the information might use it against their department or might bring them unexpected responsibilities, they are not likely to share that information with others. (LA2, TI)

As an exception, technological developments have pushed the various different departments of the MoI to collaborate with IT department, even though it is a relatively new one.

> We have been receiving new demands for technological support by the different departments to improve their service quality. They have been so ambitious and open to collaboration — even their seniors! (GD4, TI)

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[87] I.e. GD1 and CI4, TI.

Fourthly, besides their lacking a collaborative administrative tradition, the MoI's structure and system of processes seems to be an obstacle as well. Therefore, the main problems in these instances are there being a lack of proper information and past experiences (viz., a shared IM) (see Chapter 6) to deal with relatively new issues, compounded and accelerated by their having enormous responsibilities with time restrictions.

Nevertheless, they advocated that, in case of emergencies (i.e. solving issues and protecting the MoI's image), the MoI administration could collaborate for the purpose of combining their IMs.

On condition that the issues reveal and become necessary to resolve, the MoI needs to remember its hidden memories from its several departments. These might not only be issues regarding security or crises but also daily, routine issues as well. (GD5, TI)

In sum, collaboration inside the MoI is not as well as coordination due to the MoI's administrative tradition, structure and system of processes -busy daily life based on coping and surviving-, and dynamic and unpredictable external political environment of the MoI.

Coordination and Collaboration with those Outside of the Ministry

Findings pointed out differences regarding MoI's coordination and collaboration with those outside of the Ministry. On one hand, there being robust relation with senior public departments including President, PM office and other ministries, security forces and senior judicial authorities and parliamentary. On the other hand, MoI has some issue with collaborating with stakeholders.

Most of them are proud of how others outside perceive the Ministry. They claimed that the other ministries, even the Prime Ministry Office, have a high opinion of the Ministry; therefore, it enables them to coordinate and share the Ministry's views with them. A former minister confirms that perception:

> Before being appointed as a minister for the MoI, I had already known some prefects. While I was charged with preparing the public and local administration reforms and government action plans, we invited some of them to the PM's Office to work on them with us. We benefitted from their knowledge and experience. (Atalay_Former minister 3, TI)

Similarly, my participants who had represented the MoI in meetings with those from outside the ministry confirmed the respectful place the MoI has amongst the Turkish bureaucracy:

> The prefectoral class has a good reputation amongst the bureaucracy of Ankara
> [Turkey's capital city]. They value our opinions, even if most of us are younger than our

counterparts. We have been known as well-educated and well-experienced. Since we have learned the state's protocols during our experience as bureaucratic leaders in the districts, we are able to contact them without any problems. (Ceber_CI5, TI)

My observation notes confirmed that experience.

Two top meetings -headed by the Deputy Ministers of the MoI and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which was later headed by the undersecretary- were interactive and well prepared, with the undersecretary in particular encouraging debate. I did not observe any collaboration issues. (FWNB)

The existence of hot issues and the fact that they need to be quick in everything that they do pushes their need to coordinate and collaborate with others intensively. One former head of division for the Immigration Department shared his experience on the Syrian Refuge crisis:

The process of dealing with this Syrian refugee crisis was so dynamic that you could not hesitate for even one moment. For example, if there were visa issues, you would have to contact Ministry of External Affairs. The need to provide education to refugee children forced you to coordinate and collaborate with the Ministry of Education. We always kept in touch with our counterparts. (LA3, TI)

Similarly, the MoI's administrators develop their networks during the interdepartmental coordination phase. Some departments have come to the forefront with regards to using outside networks, such as the departments of Migration, Strategy, the Local Administration, EU, IT; the Legal Advisory Board, and the General Secretariat. For instance, a member of the Local Administration Department which collaborates, not only with the public administration side, but also with municipal unions, MPs and political parties, etc., due to their duties overlapping with political agendas (DGD2, TI).

As some prefects had duties in other public institutions, including the Prime Ministry and other key ministries, it strengthened the coordination between those other ministries and the MoI, not to mention the fact that it increased the network size that the MoI had. All prefects saw them as representative of the MoI, viz. member of prefectoral brotherhood. One sample answer was:

If you have a colleague in the Ministry of Education, you can coordinate with him and solve your issues faster than others. Nevertheless, you know that they have duties in their new positions, and their identity as a prefect always comes to the fore. They always do their best for the MoI. (Yilmaz_FGD3, TI)

Even when they returned to their nest, they were always able to keep alive their relations with external departments for the sake of better administrating the MoI. Moreover, as they know other public departments well, their experience provides the MoI with invaluable knowledge about external political environments and the working style of others. All of the participants who had these types of experience confirmed this.[88]

> It is so important to know the answers to the questions: "How does the Prime Ministry make policy and decisions? What is their aspect? Who are their key people? Who knows about such-and-such?" When you know what the natural checks and balances are, it might diminish the resistance you might face when proposing your own draft policy. (Avsarbey_CI3, TI)

Thus, they were able to use their contacts in the bureaucracy in order to establish relationships and retrieve needed information.

Yet, there are always problems which exist with coordination and collaboration regarding outside, with the main problem being that of institutional fanaticism. This was revealed in the finding that. Each ministry or other public institution wishes to control their arena and demonstrate their successes. In other words, a kind of hidden competition exists between them which, in turn, has probably caused them to waste public money.

For instance, one time in the past, we developed a smart electronic identity card. We shared this idea with the other ministries in a cabinet meeting chaired by the honourable PM, yet the Ministry of Social Security Affairs insisted on developing it in their way. We saw, however, that when they did eventually make their own card, it was exactly the same card that we had proffered at the meeting! (FGD1, TI)

In sum, the findings revealed that both intra- and inter-ministerial coordination with senior public departments was seen as being strong, whereas there were significant intra- and inter-ministerial collaborative deficiencies in terms of policy capacity.

On the other hand, the MoI has not been so successful at keeping healthy relations with stakeholders, rather mostly ignored by prefects.

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[88] I.e. DU1, Yilmaz_FGD3, LA2, LA1, Avsarbey_CI3 and Karaca_LA4, TI.

Relation with Stakeholders

Findings revealed that coordination and collaboration with outside stakeholders [89] had significant weaknesses regarding policy capacity. A few participants explicitly expressed this issue.

> The MoI took no notice of outsider opinions. (FPPS2, TI)

Some grey reports, such as external stakeholder analysis report and perception research reports revealed similar findings. An excerpt from the official report is below.

> Just 27% of participants selected that that there is clear and effective communication with stakeholder's of the MoI, and also same proportion of participants from the MoI gives importance to the satisfaction of stakeholders… [Furthermore] 29% of participants disagreed with the statement "MoI considers constructive criticism and suggestions from stakeholders"… 28% disagreed that MoI understands the needs of its stakeholders and tries to meet them. Majority selected "I have no idea" for this question' (TIAV, 2014a, pp. 66-72).

Furthermore, working with stakeholders has still been a minor part of policy work in comply with Turkish administrative tradition. Findings revealed rare instances in which better coordination and collaboration with stakeholders was aimed. Particularly, The Directorate-General for Local Administration has been in the political realm with the responsibility of regulating local authorities. The Department's relations with municipalities, who are its primary stakeholders, were extremely dynamic due to the intrinsic characteristics of the field. Participants' accounts showed that this department could not ignore the demands of the stakeholder. (Bilmez_DGD1, TI)

One key stakeholder's responses confirmed these accounts. GS of the Municipality Union narrated the following about this relation:

> Recently, in spite of past rival experiences, we have established good relations with the General Directorate [local administration]. (Gungor_GS of Union, TI)

Despite of recent positive effort, there remain barriers regarding relation between the MoI and its key stakeholders.

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[89] In this section, as stakeholders, I will focus relation between the MoI and Union of Municipalities, Union of Turkish Administrators, associations, other related NGOs, several society groups (ordinary citizens, mayors, headman of village, local and national political actors, and lawyers. In this section, I distracted relation with senior public institution and media (see chapter7).

Barriers to coordination and collaboration with stakeholders

Despite the shift of the tradition of the MoI towards one which puts more emphasis on the opinions of and relations with the stakeholders compared to the past, there being still barriers about sharing administrative powers with the stakeholders due to the secrecy concern and characteristic of the Turkish administrative tradition (see chapter 4).

The GS of the Municipalities Union [the most important stakeholder] shared his experience which demonstrated how difficult it was to break the resistance of the administrative tradition:

> We suffered…Sometimes they told us directly, sometimes we felt as if we stole their role… I remembered that one GD did not answer our phone calls. While I was presenting our views on the local administration reform in Cabinet room, even the minister was not happy with our contribution to and existence in that meeting. (Gungor_GS of Union, TI)

Leadership-based administrative tradition prevails over collaborating with others.

> When we were district governors, we used to be a leader. Therefore, we took decisions by ourselves without sharing our authority. We ignored stakeholder participation. After being appointed to central cadres, we wished to maintain this one-man game. But how could you maintain this in the wider web? We had difficulty in adapting to the wider environment. (LA2, TI)

However, listening to the views and assessments of stakeholders have been an increasing trend for the MoI,[90] knowledge about stakeholders could be a secondary issue in the MoI administration since their participation and consultation in matters were not seen to be essential, rather meeting legality obligation.

> When we ask the stakeholders about their opinions, our concern is just to meet an obligation. If we get enough responses on time, we just put them into files in order to prove participation. We do not read them properly. Mostly, we do not care about their views. (LA2, TI)

One participant talked about an important instance of maladministration of NGOs' and citizens' concerns and demands from the "Gezi demonstration". [91]

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[90] However, those research studies aimed to measure the perception of both the MoI and prefectoral class, particularly of the public and stakeholders. Responses about MoI were mostly vague and dominated by signposting question. The findings support that the MoI identify with its prefects and territorial administrations (TIAV, 2013; 2014a).

[91] 'A wave of demonstrations and civil unrest in Turkey began on 28 May, 2013, initially for the purpose of contesting the urban development plan for Istanbul's Taksim Gezi Park. The protests were sparked by outrage at the violent eviction of a sit-in at the park protesting the plan. Subsequently, supporting protests and strikes took place all across

We could not administrate the recent protest. If government and ministry could establish good rapport with the protests, and at least listen to their concerns, it would not have turned into a huge crisis. (CI1, TI)

Further, some pointed out that it is not faithful to blame the MoI solely for lack of proper collaborations with stakeholders. They mostly believed that stakeholders cannot easily contribute to their duties. The participants asserted that:

Most stakeholders, including municipalities, NGOs and over all citizen, do not have the capacity to make significant contributions. (CI6, TI)

Some participants asserted that the stakeholders' unwillingness should be considered as well.

There is no devotion and capacity with regard to participation. For God's sake, tell me, how many NGOs the MoI is in touch with visited our websites and read official reports! (CI6, TI)

A few mentioned that many stakeholders, including the Union of Municipalities have not needed to contact the prefects; some even ignore ministers. Instead, they strive to change policies in a top-down manner in the dominant PM era. (MP 1, TI)

The more our capacity increased, the more doors welcomed us [referring to the support of the PM and other ministers]. So, we did not depend solely on the MoI. (Gungor_GS of Union, TI)

In sum, despite of optimistic opinion of participants, stakeholders stated that there being issues on coordination and collaboration.

5.1.4 The Link between Policy Development and Implementation

"The caravan gets aligned on the way."

This Turkish maxim is 'directly opposite [to the] rational policy making process with regard to [the] link between policy development and implementation' (Sen, 2015, p. 196). The MoI has a wide range of duties which impels the MoI to make a wide range of decisions, develop policies, and give directions on how to implement them. In this part, instead of examining the process of administrating policy, I focus on my participants' opinions in order to reflect how political

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Turkey, protesting a wide range of concerns at the core of which were issues of freedom of the press, of expression, assembly, and the government's encroachment on Turkey's secularism' (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gezi_Park_protests. (Retrieved 18/10/2016).

administrators perceive the link between policy development and implementation (see table 2, 5d).

The findings reveal that the prefects have field experiences which strengthen their ability to implement policy. This is supported in the international literature as being an important enabler (Gleeson, 2009, p. 237).

> Our prefects came from districts where they administered the implementation of the MoI's policies. [They also implement other ministries' policies] It is impossible to believe that they were not aware of implementation. We always bear in mind what works or does not work in practice. (Gunduzoz_GD8, TI)

Similarly, during policy development, they benefit, not only from their field experience but also from their being in permanent contact with the prefects of territorial administration (the governors, the district governors) during the implementation phase.

> The law is soulless on paper. You can make public mandates and publish them. Who blows the spirit inside them? The governor, the district governors, and their staff. Therefore, we collaborate with them anytime we need to. (CI2, TI)

They valued the role of practitioners and empathised with them:

> When we develop policies, we should ensure that they be understood by practitioners. Therefore, they must be simple, clear, and comply with legislation. Namely, this policy should be developed considering practitioner's situations and concerns. As deputy general secretaries, our contribution was to ensure this coherence. (FDGS, TI)

On the other hand, some rejected this sensibility regarding MoI practice.

> To be honest, [showing a paper] if I were a district governor, I would not fulfil all of the duties commanded by this public mandate which I sent to district. It cannot be their deliberate choice. Because it cannot be implemented.[92] (GD5, TI)

Their ignoring the policy implementation of others corresponds to what Tiernan et al. (2011a) found in their research on Australian public departments. My findings also pointed out that, especially during the local reform period, the practitioners' views were ignored because of their political discretion to avoid political risk — something which complies with Gleeson's (2009, p. 236) implication.

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[92] I experienced this kind of hesitation. Sometimes, we staggered how they sent those public mandates, although they were supposed to know the topic/practice better than us because of their seniority/expertise.

Governors and district governors held some meetings, with their opinion being taken during the local reform period. What was changed? This participation was just to relieve them.[93] All of the regulations were made without our holding opposite views. No one took the risk to clash with the PM's agenda. (Karaca_LA4, TI)

That being said, hurriedness was seen as being an important barrier when considering implementation during the policy development phase. This hurriedness forces the MoI to make serial comprehensive public mandates that sometimes causes practitioners to be confused as to how to internalise and implement them. (LA3, TI).

This confusion could be a barrier to facilitating the implementation process. Moreover, they preferred to ask for further explanations in order to clarify the task, thereby overburdening the central department (Gunduzoz_GD8, TI).

Lack of proper training feeds a sickly implementation phase. Instead of there being a central training alternative, the departments incline to develop their own training programmes (DGD2, TI).

The participants mostly objected to top-down policy making strategies which abolish the policy development stage and which seek an implementation method based on a trial-by-error method. A few explicitly expressed their favourable opinion regarding this trial-and-error method:

The trial-and-error method still has been the best tool that the MoI has traditionally employed. (GD5, TI)

The MoI administration trace this path mostly 'when the expected results of a decision are relatively non-costly or tolerable and when decisions are easily reversible, even though it requires new legislation in Parliament' (Sen, 2015, p. 196). Government power has also encouraged trial-error. Namely, one-party government easily made new laws regulated and passed in the Turkish Parliament without proper preparation process.

On the other hand, when dealing with high budget projects, the majority explicitly supported that piloting is the best way to minimise risks of wasting public resources, not to mention other factors, such as social risks and their departments' losing their public reputation[94] The following comment from a prefect from the IT department stressed the relationship between the irreversibility of decisions and their high costs:

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[93] I felt similar concern while I was a district governor at that times. I believed that the government would change power in district in favour of local administration regardless of our objections.
[94] FGD1, GD4, DU1, and CI4, TI.

We have no choice regrading this subject. You are not able to make compensations after

spending a large amount of the public budget. (DGD4, TI)

Nonetheless, all of the participants agreed that it could not be easy to consider implementation issues in early stages because of the dynamic character of the external environment surrounding the MoI. Fluctuation in governmental priorities and policies, not to mention individual discretion, should be considered.

You cannot predict implementation in Turkey because everything can change in the span

of three months. By developing policy, we aimed to prevent or abolish the detrimental

effect of current issues. In other words, implementation issues were often our second

priority. (CI4, TI)

In line with link between policy development and implementation, high turnover is another important barrier (LA3, TI).

In sum, although the participants had practitioners' backgrounds, a strong link with the territoral administration, and tended to use the piloting method, trial-and-error was seen to be the prevailing method adopted by the MoI. Actually, whatever method the MoI's administration uses to link policy development and implementation, this tools determines their monitoring and evaluation. Namely, trial-and-error has been associated with error correction for surprises administrative practice, whereas piloting is said to be a more evidence-based, systematic monitoring and evaluation.

5.1.5 The Relationship between Monitoring and Evaluation

The relationship between monitoring and evaluation (see table 2, 5e) has been seen as being problematic in the international literature.[95]

It is better to consider the monitoring and evaluation capacity with respect to the aspects of policy capacity (structure, processes, and tradition) which facilitate or prevent the effective use of evaluation and monitoring in the process of making policies (Gleeson, 2009, p. 239).

Components of the monitoring mechanism could be listed as the internal control (i.e. a house evaluation skill, including reporting to the Strategy Department (SD), internal audit units (IAU), routine inspections, the hierarchical control of the Undersecretary, etc.) and the external audit conducted by the Court of Accounts. (CoA)

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[95] See Chapter 2, but especially: Tiernan and Linquist, 2011; Tiernan, 2015a; and Gleeson, 2009; 2011.

Internal Control of the MoI

Department of Strategy

The SD was designed to be a central, legally-binding, evaluative monitoring unit in line with the administrative area of the tasks:

- to improve performance and quality criteria and fulfil other duties assigned in this context;

- to collect data, analyse and interpret information regarding the development of services and the performance of the administrative management;

- to examine the external factors which affect service;

- to conduct research on in-house capacities;

- to analyse the effectiveness of service and satisfaction; and

- to conduct general research studies on the deficiencies of administrative jurisdictions (MoI, 2015b, p. 17).

The fulfilment of these duties by the SD has been a debated topic amongst the MoI's political administrators. Nevertheless, a few participants support the position that the publication of annual activity, performance reports[96] have had a positive effect on the implementation of plans.[97] The majority of the participants opined that this department has not been able to perform these duties properly in practice and, rather, that it has performed the function of accumulating the department's quarterly performance data and returning the data to the units as a single report for feedback purposes. Moreover, they found their analyses unsystematic, non-institutionalised, departmental and superficial. One of their views could reflect the majority of the participants' views.

> The SD, in my opinion, only conducts secretarial works. Namely, after gathering other departments' [performance] data on a regular and systematic way, they simply reiterate that data in another form. But I doubt whether these are actually evaluated or not. (CI1, TI)

Former minister agrees with that view:

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[96] They involve 'the achievement levels of performance targets that were due to be set beforehand in a performance programme, as well as spending figures' (Sen, 2015, p. 158).
[97] I.e. GD3, DGD4 and DGD7, TI.

Considering my 8 years of planning experience and my being ministers and deputy PMs, unfortunately, strategic planning could not be put into practice properly. We designed the SDs as think tanks and advisory units for the purpose of monitoring and coordinating with the whole of the ministry. In practice, however, they, including the MoI's SD, confined themselves to preparing budgets rather than formulating strategies. Unfortunately, I could not change that trend. (Atalay_Former minister 3, TI)

In contrast, participants from this department claimed that they regularly monitor implementation through performance reports and situation analyses (GD1, TI). One outsider expressed that the lack of evaluation and proper monitoring is not solely their responsibility but also other departments' as well.

The lack of a collaborative practice, the lack of quality data stemming from other departments, and the lack of an internalising strategic management with regards to all aspects has affected the quality of monitoring and evaluation. (DU1, TI)

Another issue related to the monitoring, and especially the evaluation, capacities of the SD is their lacking enough time to conduct their duties due to a complicated budget process and the complicated process of coordinating legislation and routines (HD1, TI).

In sum, SD cannot perform adequately its tasks with regards to monitoring and evaluation. But, paradoxically, if one interpreted the majority of responses, actually, their own departments, rather than the SD, deserved this comment since they derived these reports from their own data without making any additions to it.

There are two other control elements within the system in addition to the reporting mechanism: viz., routine biennial inspections and an internal auditing system. These shall be examined below respectively.

Routine Biennial Inspections

The routine biennial inspections are conducted by the MoI's Inspection Board to determine the achievement of the ministry's strategic goals, as well as many other subjects. This deeply rooted traditional board was seen by its members and others as the most important department for monitoring and evaluating the MoI's policy implementation. Some critics, however, noted that their inspections mostly focused on legality control, including standardised requirements and protocols rather than dealing and revealing real issues.

Ministerial approval, however, pushes them to solely inspect implementations regarding

their legality. Of course, they write their comments as problems with the

implementations. But who cares? (HD1, TI)

Actually, after this routine period, three or four chief inspectors are charged with reading all of

the reports and need to develop a proposal which is derived from those reports in order to better

improve the administration in the district and central units. A few participants have asserted that

these reports used to be presented to the minister. At that time, they likely affected the ministry's

policies more or less (CI2, TI). The majority, however, did not agree with this assertion. Their

answers are simple: "Who cares?"

As Yilmaz mentioned, ministerial discretion has been important with regards to monitoring and

evaluating policies. Recently, the MoI has been using the Inspector Board to monitor specific

government policies' implementation in the field. Contrary to the majority's views, a few

applauded the new trend due to its being more effective and based on evaluation rather than the

annual inspections which were abolished four years ago:

In the past, the Inspection Board used to focus on classic [legality check] duties; now,

their investigations and evaluations focus more on the government's policies in the field.

We have been searching how to extend healthy government policy implementation and

assessing and measuring public servants' performance with regards to what extent they

fulfil their duties. Namely, I suppose that our roles have evolved. (CI4, TI)

Besides, top political-administrators' expectations regarding inspections, especially with regards

to disturbing and irritating activities, make the Inspection Board's role more difficult.

One chief inspector (CI6, TI) pointed out the fact that departments wish to live in their comfort

zones without any interference. In addition, nevertheless, all of the participants applauded the

board members' skills and the fact that they have an excellent training system based on the

master-apprenticeship scheme and which includes field inspection experience, there being a lack

of collaboration and demand from other departments prevents them from assessing their policy

capacity systematically.

Now, I am of the opinion that there is a lack of collaboration in facilitating and

strengthening effective inspection by means of sharing ideas about what they expect

from the Inspection Board and telling whether they want feedback or not. (CI6, TI)

The second form of internal control is the Internal Auditing System which was introduced by the

Communique of the Public Sector Internal Audit Standards in 2003.

Internal Auditing System

As Sen (2015, p. 136) notes, the Internal Auditing System was designed to:

> [C]onduct an annual analysis of internal and external risks that might obstruct the achievement of strategic goals and targets and to recommend necessary actions to be taken by the organisation.

The Internal Auditing Unit (IAU) of the MoI was established in 2008 with ministerial approval and has performed its duties on behalf of the undersecretary's role of commanding and controlling the ministry (Head of IA, TI).

With only one exception,[98] I found that the IAU was seen as useless, ineffective, and time-consuming; that it was perceived as being an unneeded expenditure of red tape which had a personnel which lacked the qualifications and which demonstrated a clumsy attitude; that it has stolen the Inspector Board's role due to its being structured in an ill-advised way which lacked any role definitions; that it is based on a sickly form of managerialism; and that it is oriented by a top-down policy.[99] Therefore, this monotype IAU has faced resistance and a lack of support (Avsarbey_CI3, TI). One GD believes that their ineffectiveness is due to their lacking sanctioning powers:

> The auditor has no sanctioning power to disturb you. [Their reports are ineffective.] Whenever they say, 'There is a risk, be careful,' we do not care. I do not think we should. (GD5, TI)

Others also criticise their hierarchical position.

> They do not have a hierarchical position on our organisational chart in line with laws since their work is under the Undersecretary's control. How could they audit the Undersecretary's office and the main departments' performance and assess their risk without avoiding hierarchical concerns? (LA2, TI)

The majority of respondents suggested that IAU must be abolished, though the participants who worked for this unit suggested, rather, to better clarify their roles (their focusing more on advising and supporting departments) in order to avoid any overlap with the Inspection Board (Head of IAU, TI).

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[98] DGD3, TI.
[99] CI2, Gunduzoz_GD8, DGD3, DU2, Yilmaz_FGD3 and CI6, Atbas_FGD2, and Avsarbey_CI3, TI, respectively.

In sum, the findings revealed that this unit has been ineffective at monitoring and evaluating policy capacity. Nevertheless, the traditional control exerted by ministers (see in Chapter 4 and 7) and undersecretaries seems to be more powerful than any other.

The Hierarchical Control of the Undersecretary

The hierarchical control of the Undersecretary was perceived to be an influential and significant component of the monitoring mechanism by majority of prefects due to the dominant and coordinating role played by the Undersecretary (see about the administrative leadership role in following section 5.2.1).

As their hierarchical top traditional administrative position is supported by law, prefects are obliged to inform him about almost every important topic, with the aim of receiving his support as well. Moreover, being directly responsible to the ministers forces the undersecretaries to trace every policy making and administrative process. Therefore, not only the department, which is responsible for monitoring, but also the others struggle to inform him about almost anything and everything. The Undersecretary never complains about being bothered from various people — indeed, it even encourages so as to diminish the lack of coordination. Namely, it strengthens their checks and balances.[100]

Nevertheless, even though that form of checks and balances exists, the fragmented and unsystematic nature of evaluation and feedback has continued to exist. We could not consider it regardless of the MoI's administrative tradition, which has shaped its barriers and its enablers (both of which shall be examined below). Moreover, the MoI's analysis capacity is essential for evaluating the need of giving any further attention to the enablers and barriers to either individuals or organisations (see Chapter 6).

Besides internal controls, as of late, external controls have come to the fore in line with the recent public administration reforms.

External Control

The external control of organisational performance was ascribed to the Court of Accounts. (CoA) The CoA was to check performance audits and prepare performance reports in addition to its ongoing public spending reviews behalf of Turkish Grand National Assembly (Turkish parliament).

Compared with the IAU, it can be said without any hesitation that the CoA has traditionally been the foremost institution in the Turkish Administrative tradition regarding the auditing of accounts

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[100] FPPS1, FPPS2 and Yildiz_FPPS3, TI.

(see legalistic form of accountability in chapter 4). Nevertheless, even though its role in monitoring and evaluating the MoI has not been well framed, its reports have been perceived as being effective and of great value by political-administrators — i.e. at least not to be ignored.[101] My findings confirmed this, even though some did not even know the contents of the reports to which they were referring.[102]

The report written by the CoA was based on checking the reliability and applicability of the MoI's target and performance criteria which were revealed in several strategic plans, performance reports, annual administration reports, as well as their coherence with legislation.[103]

Similarly with the IAU, many critiques could be revealed for similar reasons, but the prefects were cautious about making any such comments regarding the CoA. Most of them pointed out that their duties must fulfil the CoA's comments, whether or not they agree or understand them.[104]

Barriers to Monitoring and Evaluation

That the top political-administrators' limited interest in performance figures and reports, their busy daily life, their lacking policy evaluation experts with the necessary skills, the endurance of complaint-based evaluations, and their having a feedback practice were all internal factors with detrimental impacts.

Limited Interest in Performance Figures and Reports

This might be considered with the value of knowledge. One of my aims was to learn to what extent the data — derived from daily practice, official statistics, monitoring, or inspection or audit reports — could be analysed or evaluated. The findings, however, did not reveal a significant amount of data. The majority of the respondents agreed that the MoI has no structure and tradition for evaluating data for the purpose of making better policies until they become essential

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[101] Additionally, I observed that:
There are reserved two rooms for the commissioner of audits in the main building while the IAU has suffered from insufficient places. (FWNB)
[102] I.e. GD2, DU2, TI.
[103] For instance: Regarding the MoI's Performance Program (MoI, 2015c):
    -It was published in accordance with the legal provisions,
    -Once examined, 6 goals and 77 performance indicators were determined in the program, with 75 of the indicators being related to the goals and objectives, with only 2 of the performance indicators not related to the target;
    -Measurable targets and indicators were found to be related with one another and were well defined.
  Regarding the Annual Report (MoI, 2015b):
    -Except for 5 indicators, most indicators were verified by the department annual reports;
    -The explanations for 23 of the remaining indicators being below the target has been found to be invalid and unconvincing. (CoA, 2016)
https://www.sayistay.gov.tr/tr/Upload/76662805/files/Stratejik%20Planlama/2015_Faaliyet_%20Raporu.pdf. Retrieved 20/01/2017.
[104] I.e DU1, GD3, TI.

to analysis in order to tackle current problems. For instance, there have been a considerable number of inspection reports which demonstrate the provincial situation, but this information was not always based on policy development for Provincial Administration Department.

> For the Turkish bureaucracy, we do not have any such administrative tradition. We do not amend our policies according to the results of implementation. No one even reads them! (Yildiz_FPPS3, TI)

Some supported his assertion that there is a lack of structure, institutional process, and time (LA2, TI). That "the public service automatically benefits the citizens" has still endured.[105]

Having an Inadequate Data System and Form of Management

This administrative tradition underlines input or the provision of service rather than outputs, outcomes, and their links to costs. For instance, mostly, the evaluation of ministerial grey reports were based on inputs (the realisation of an activity or project, personal numbers, qualifications, budgets, etc.) rather than outputs and outcomes.[106] If we consider Edward's (2009, pp. 291-292) opinion about the difficulty of assessing outputs and especially outcomes, it could be described as "do, wait and see policy" of the MoI.

As an exception, if we consider some more technical departments whose service field is quantifiable and who use an intensive ICT infrastructure, such as the departments of civil registration and IT, the findings revealed a more systematic evaluation and feedback of results. They have provided an ISO 9000 certificate (for measuring and ensuring quality) and have requested standardised requirements and protocols for policy evaluation. Their members expressed that, although there are sometimes adaptation problems due to their private sector logic, these certificates motivated them to maintain the quality of their services and pushed them to evaluate their capacity on a regular basis.[107]

Yet, generally, these managerial terms — such as input, output, etc. — has been unrequited for the MoI's administration. Rather, my findings confirmed that success was mostly assessed via the eyes of seniors (discretion) and that there existed no feedback regarding possible implementation problems.[108] Moreover, some of the participants (and I agree with their opinion) stressed that

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[105] DGD3 and DU1, TI.
[106] See the MoI's strategic plans, performance reports, annual reports, and situation analyses (MoI, 2009a; 2015a; 2010-2016b; 2010-2016c).
[107] FGD1, GD4, DGD4, TI.
[108] FGS1 and Yildiz_FPPS3, TI.

there is no magic key to evaluating everything because of their tasks feature security-based, invisible duties.

Incremental Error Correction to Surprises, not Systematic Evaluation

As mentioned before in administrative tradition section, the complaints of citizens are an important part of the existing feedback mechanism. 'Complaints direct the departments to see and eliminate the detrimental effects of public service and re-shape the service in order to avoid such mistake[s] in the future' (Sen, 2015, p. 148).

Pre-occupation with Evaluation as Accountability

That being said, even though accountability and transparency have come to the fore due to the introduction of top-down, good governance reforms, political-administrators can still interpret any type of monitoring or evaluation as an interrogation of their ability and competence rather than an assessment of their departments' capacities. Since there has been "risk awareness" practice from both the political and public sides, any critique could trigger their anxiety.[109]

As mentioned before, what monitoring and evaluation means to those being monitored or evaluated is of the utmost importance. The inspectors' and auditors' interrogative style feeds this threat perception in the participants. Most of them have asserted that they always cynically sought a gap rather than advisory support for their departments (i.e. FGD1, TI)

The perception of the evaluation reports being ineffective has been another issue. One sample quotation by a former GD is as follows:

> I do not think that the evaluation system produces grave consequences for our departments. (FGD1, TI)

To fair with them, one should ask and respond question "Do prefects have enough time and opportunity to utilise from these monitoring and evaluation these reports?"

Short-Time Horizons

As mentioned before, hurriedness is important barrier to reconsideration of policy/ decision making process, organisational deficiencies, practices etc. Furthermore, as an unexpected consequences of dynamic political environment with continuous public administration reforms, detailed evaluations have not always been available when needed.

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[109] Karaca_LA4 and Yildiz_LA3, TI.

We changed the Turkish Administrative System. While one reform was being implemented, regardless of its being evaluated or not, another one was made. For instance, even though we abolished the special territorial administration (headed by the Governor), we developed metropolitan municipalities instead without any preparation. Ok, it happened, at least get their consequences! Nothing happens. (Yildiz_FPPS3, TI)

Dealing with these deficiencies, the departments inclined to evaluate their house jobs by themselves rather than via central monitoring and evaluation departments or by means of annual meetings which were seen in a more beneficial way, especially by new departments like the EU, Strategy, ICT, etc.[110]

As a result, due to the absence of external and internal forces for effective evaluation and feedback, as well as there being a lack of institutional structure, previous experience, and experts with the necessary skills for effectively evaluating capacities; the traditional way of hierarchically monitoring and evaluating was supported by the administrative tradition of the MoI and has been sustained post-2002.

Following section, another task, personnel administration (see table 2, 5g) will be described.

5.1.6 Personnel Administration

In the MoI's case, as of February, 2017, the number of staff in its central departments is 2.440 and consists of prefects (296), administration staff, including experts and chief local administration controllers (1690); contracted personnel (42); and others (412) (MoI, 2017b).

Recruitment and Retention

In advance, we should take into consideration the fact that the Ministry's top administration has primarily consisted of prefects.

The MoI operates on a traditional "administrative" model, with most senior "specialist" supporting roles, such as Head of Personnel, Head of Training, and Head of Strategy, as well as the generic administrative and governance roles, are filled by [prefects], typically former-governors, not by specialists recruited for their expertise… [This describes] an inward looking and closed culture (Crawley and Kutlu, 2009, p. 10).

The participants were mostly happy with this situation, except for one former minister, even though he praised the prefects' competency throughout the interview.

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[110] GD1, GD5, DGD4 and DGD5, TI.

You know that the MoI's departments have being administered by the prefects, even of the IT department. Of course, there are some advantages. On the other hand, though, I believe that the technical department could be better headed by expert administrators. In practice, though, I would not be able to change it because of the resistance that I most probably would face.[111] (Atalay_Former Minister 3, TI)

Inside the MoI, there has been barrier for administrative staff to be appointed by upper-level administrators like outsider. Almost all of the participants supported the opinion that prefects have been recruited from "the best and the brightest" graduates after serial examinations and that they were trained very well. They pointed out the fact that prefects were directly appointed to leadership positions and that their several district leadership experiences make them better administrators than the administrative staff themselves.

I asked participants to share their opinions with regards to promotion of prefects to higher positions. The former GD of Personnel Department of the MoI tended to repeat the idea of creating an ideal system which would be congruent with the legislations. Simply,

> We appoint our personnel to new positions in line with regulations. (GD3, TI)

The perception of others differed from this ideal Weberian tradition. This opinion could be presented as having two sides. On the one side, the assertion that there has not been much issues regarding promotions to upper levels is greatly exaggerated. Firstly, the participants mentioned, in line to merit, there has not been any significant qualitative differences amongst the prefectoral class.

> Our friends have more or less equivalent skills and experiences. Thus, even though there are no problems in promoting one or the other, there might be hesitation in choosing the best amongst the brightest. (DU1, TI)

A Minister confirmed that:

> I never regretted appointing someone to my inner circle or a senior position. Anyways, prefects in the MoI's central cadre are always very well qualified. We worked congruously with these friends. (Former Minister 1, TI)

According to the findings, the minister and undersecretary's discretion are vital for getting promoted to upper levels and to the inner circle.

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[111] His persuasive style could explain this tolerance. Actually, he was known as having a strong position inside the cabinet and as a person who had close relations with the PM. Furthermore, the PM –current President- called him "my hodja," or "my teacher," which, in Turkish tradition, is considered a great sign of respect.

This has mostly been internalised by prefects. In addition, most participants asserted that this discretion could not prevent a meritocratic system from being formed. One representative, for instance, stated that:

> Of course, a government [i.e. the minister] selects senior people who are close to their own understanding. It is extremely natural for ministers to have political choices. So, we should respect his preference. They [the ministers] have to deal with local authorities, deal with politicians. Who supports them? (CI2, TI)

On the other hand, there has been some concerns regarding personnel administration.[112] Firstly, favouritism and nepotism are still concerns. A few of them — who mostly held passive positions in the MoI — expressed the thought that the personnel retention and promotion system reflected an overall sickliness in the Turkish Administrative System, including favouritism and nepotism.

> We cannot consider our ministry as being separate from the Turkish bureaucratic administrative system. Namely, favouritism and nepotism exist inside the MoI even though this ministry should have played a pioneering role because of their having a well-educated and well-trained prefects. Instead, the seniors mostly do not evaluate their competence or skills. (Yildiz_FPPS3, TI)

One agreed with this thought by criticising his own appointment:

> I put a big question mark over the merit system part, including me! In my case, I was once appointed as an inspector, even though my friends, who were better qualified than me, were not able to enter the Inspection Board. (Avsarbey_CI3, TI)

Furthermore, loyalty is something which is required. Some stressed that prefects who do not cause any problems (i.e. not too many to be considered "critical") and obey their seniors' commands and who are comfortable with the government's policies are those who are preferably chosen. Namely,

> There has been a "come if you fulfil the duty just as I wish it to be fulfilled" attitude. (DU2, TI)

Exceptions would usually only be considered during crisis times. Yildiz, for instance, claimed that:

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[112] Throughout this research, the prefects avoided criticising the MoI's administration directly. Instead, they preferred to refer to the Turkish Administrative System in general (FWNB).

The MoI knows who is best fit to deal with these urgent issues. Only in cases where a "firefighter" is being sought can merit be taken into consideration. (Yildiz_FPPS, TI)

In sum, despite some of its advantages, employment and promotions based on favouritism are likely to destroy the ideal Weberian bureaucratic personnel system, however, prefects mostly reject this concern.

On the other hand, considering public administrative staff and experts, their recruitment and promotion inside the MoI's bureaucracy has been a secondary concern amongst political-administrators because of their having a relatively weak role in policymaking and decision making inside the MoI. Their administrators could be promoted as branch managers and heads of division. Even in the same hierarchical position, they have to serve under prefects. The upper cadre traditionally is used to be close to them. This was seen as being one of the most important detriments to the motivation of the administrative staff in the participants' eyes.[113] Some prefects also shared their concern by stressing this lack of motivation.

These guys are young. After two years of being deputy experts, they are appointed as experts. Later, there will be no career step for them. In other words, their career has already finished. How could you motivate and encourage them or threaten them to do better work? (GD5, TI)

As mentioned before, even though their roles are restricted to routines, recently, the fact that newcomers such as MoI experts, ICT, EU experts who graduated from popular universities has been welcomed by prefects.[114] For instance, the head of the IT department and his deputy applauded their contributions to enormous budget projects.[115] As an exception to the MoI's practice, the members of the IT department have asserted that they could recruit their contracted ICT experts objectively and relatively regardless of any top-down involvement.

They pointed out that their recruitment, supported by good training, might strengthen the IM and organisational analysis capacity of the ministry, which are considered the most notable deficiencies of the administrative staff[116], and mitigate detrimental effect of personnel high turnover on policy capacity if this policy will be supported by better salary and career.

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[113] Gungor_GS of Union and DGD7, TI.
[114] I.e. GD3, GD5, GD1 and HD2, TI.
[115] GD4 and DGD4, TI.
[116] GD6, DU2, TI.

High Turnover

High turnover was recognised by most of both internal and external stakeholders as a weakness and threat to the future of the MoI. It has not been new issue for MoI.[117] This issue was repeated in last perception report.[118] Wage inequalities inside and outside the MoI exacerbates this trend.

The high turnover rate with regards to prefects was interpreted in different ways. Some found it to be too normal a part of the career cycle to exaggerate. Their views comply with the GD of department of personnel administration's explanation, which were in line with the regulations:

> Actually, there is not a sufficient amount of circulation in the central department as is supposed to be. These promotions or appointments were done in line with the "appointment and displacement code" with regards to seniority. (DU1, TI)

On the other hands, people with the opposite view gave concrete instances. For example, the former Head of the Strategy Department [who now is the current Governor of a province] derived from his own experience the following statement:

> We are mobilized. I came here three years ago. My four or five deputies have been replaced in such a short time. Look! I cannot even remember their names, or even their numbers. (GD1, TI)

Furthermore, my fieldwork experience provides reliable evidence regarding the high turnover of prefects.

> When I checked my interview list, 28 in out of the 51 participants has have had held the same position up to writing up session. Others has have left with for several different reasons. As promoting, 9 of them were promoted to became Governor, 4 of them were appointed in to more prestige prestigious departments, such as the GD and deputy undersecretary, whereas 10 were dismissed from their public duties for being accused to of supporting last the failure failed coup attempt of 15 July, 2016. (FWNB)

As mentioned before, the majority accepted that there has been detrimental effects on both IM and individual training. A few, however, have claimed that this high turnover is an important part of prefects' training for administrative leadership:

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[117] According to the data obtained from the Ministry between the years 2002-2006, 840 MoI employees, including the central and provincial departments, left in order to join other institutions; 128 public servants resigned; and 50 of the ministry's employees have been temporarily assigned to external departments. 88% of the staff criticised personnel's rights as being insufficient. If the staff had the opportunity, 82% of them would wish to work in other public bodies in order to receive more personal rights. (MoI, 2008, p. 528)

[118] I.e. from the Personnel Administration Department's appreciation questionnaire of 2016.

They are able to recognise the MoI totally by means of this displacement the more the department elaborates your knowledge and opens your vision. Once your memory enlarges, so does the MoI's. (DGD3, TI)

In sum, despite of some advantage, high turnover is still issue for MoI's individual and organisational policy capacities. Current personnel administration and staff appraisal system inside the MoI that do not show Weberian character rather solely depend on subjective factors is also detrimental effect on high turnover that cause a limit to policy capacity.

As aforementioned, the MoI has been an operational ministry; therefore, their workforce training focuses on developing operational skills rather than improving analysis skills or making policies.

5.1.7 Personnel Training

Personnel training (see table 2, 5h) inside the MoI could be classified as formal or informal personnel training in line with the MoI's practice.

Formal Personnel Training

The research shows that, except for a small number participants,[119] they did not have much information about the central cadres' training activities. Once one does a short search regarding the Department of Education's activity, training programs mostly target the improvement of generic skills instead of positions and responsibilities while keeping people with the relevant knowledge, skills and experience (MoI, 2016d). This could be interpreted as a limit to policy capacity regarding policy making and advisory capacity of the MoI.

The Department of Training has been responsible for all formal personnel trainings except for the subsidiaries (i.e. the gendarme, police and coast guard) of the MoI. On the other hand, the relatively new departments[120] have elaborated their training sources and have collaborated with one another. [121] This was seen as enabler to strengthen policy capacity of the MoI. The

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[119] GD7, GD6 and DGD1, TI.

[120] Like the IT, the European Union and External Relations, and the Strategy and Research Department.

[121] For example in 2016, 50 in-service trainings will be steered by this central unit, whereas 34 personnel training activities will be provided by several other departments (ibid). The Department of EU and the External Relation value for project-based training and collaboration have increased with the establishment of the EU's Turkey Delegation, the EU Central Finance and Contracts Unit, and Ankara University's EU Institute (DGD6, TI). Furthermore, the strategy department has been receiving the support of the Ministry of Finance, which has been playing a pioneering role with regards the budget process, and by the Ministry of Development, which has regulated the process of making strategic plans (HD2, TI). All of the participants from these departments confirmed that this department did not have any difficulties, like a lack of budget or a lack of collaboration to train their staff.

Department of IT, for example, has come to the fore with 7 training programmes due to the innovative and technological features of their job.

> We [the IT] have been collaborating with international technology companies like Microsoft and Oracle to train our contracted staff towards achieving success on enormous budget projects. (GD4, TI)

Furthermore, experience abroad has been seen one of the greatest strengths of the current training system by political administrators.

Abroad Experience

Prefects have been learning different foreign systems and different approaches as a core part of their training and development. The training includes a requirement to study overseas administrative systems and the acquisition of foreign language skills involving oversees placements, visits and occupational courses. Overall, for prefects, these experiences ensure that their institutional tradition remains more open to change than might be supposed.

> …[During] the post-1980 period, systematically sending prefects abroad has been one of the biggest gains for the MoI— living in a foreign culture, recognising foreign administrative systems, the idea of working with them, introducing something new like NPM...the list goes on. Thus, this process could be understood as a form of cultural transmission. (GD6, TI)

The majority of respondents who had experience abroad during their working lives, not to mention all former ministers, favoured the idea of the ministry's having such a programme. For example:

> This not only improved our individual capacity but also enriched the MoI's policy capacity by allowing us to compare their institutional structure and experiences with our own and observe their process. (DGD3, TI)

All of the ministers supported their opinions. During the interview period, they gave instances of its benefits, including administering the reform process, introducing and implementing new, huge projects, improving external relations, enriching their views, accelerating the EU integration process, etc.[122]

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[122] Former minister 1, Atalay_Former minister 3, and Gonul_Former minister 2, TI.

On the other hand, although they did not object to training abroad, a few asserted that this expensive training did not result in full benefits because "not to move outside their current comfort zones" is still such a very strong inclination that it actually prevents what might have been gained by experiencing foreign systems of administration is lost and cannot be put into practice.

> Of course, it benefits individual training, but for the MoI, no! You know that our friends, who had done their PhDs in foreign countries, were appointed to the districts instead of to the central cadres. We both waste our public money and our friends' efforts. If you did not benefit from them, why do you send them to do their masters or PhD? (Yildiz_FPPS3, TI)

Similar to this concern, there are significant barriers for formal training, including pragmatism for knowledge and academic studies: value for experience, not evidence based policy (see section 5.1.1. and Chapter 6), wide-range duties and a great number of staff, performance and training correlation, and informal training as a barrier to formal training.

Wide-Range Duties and a Great Number of Staff

In practice, some considered that, since the Ministry's responsibilities are so different and numerable, it is not possible to train personnel with regard to every aspect. It seems too difficult to train over 24.000 staff members.

> We concerned about time and having an adequate budget. This forces us to plan training programmes based on huge groups consisting of 100 participants in restricted areas like meeting halls instead of seminar rooms or workshops. (GD7, TI)

Emergency issues, daily firefighting, and the lack of value given to training worsens this situation. Therefore, the heads of department sometimes did not wish to let key personnel join one-week training activities. On the other hand, with governmental priorities and ministerial discretion, this resistance easily turned into collaboration.

Being aware of training necessities was of vital importance. Subsequently, even though the Department of Education strove to revive it, paradoxically:

> The Department of Education has not arranged any in-service training for its staff since its re-establishment [in 1983] (MoI, 2008, p. 362).

The head of the Department of Education confessed that nothing has changed since that. He added that their staff joined training programmes as moderators or took part in simply organising those events (GD7, TI).

Performance and Training Correlation

Recently, the most important aim for the MoI is that of "enhancing the performance and motivation of employees" (MoI, 2016d) Nevertheless, the perception of training as a holiday trip somewhat like awards was criticised by some of the prefects.[123]

The link between training and expected outcomes does not seem to be strong.

> You know that we [the Department of Education] used to give certificates at the end of our courses. It provided extra points concerning promotion exams. That was one of the reasons why our staff wished to join those courses. Recently, however, that benefit was abolished.[124] Now, how can you motivate your staff to participate a course in Ankara? (GD7, TI)

Current personnel administration and salary policies have been seen as barrier for better training and policy capacity. One sharp account was:

> If your staff thinks that 'I am doing the same job, I am getting the same salary,' they will easily ignore the imperative to educate themselves. (CI6, TI)

Daily practice due to the ministry's pressuring them to cope and survive and lack of strategic aspect regarding personnel training also prevents MoI staff to improve their individual competences.

Informal Training as a Barrier to Formal Training

According to the findings, with exception two reports of training necessities (2009d, and, recently, 2016d) the MoI's administration shows a relative low interest in evaluating the training of personnel, with them mostly administering the training process in the traditional way without further attention or adherence to the scientific method.

The findings revealed answers as to why the MoI administration could not understand the deficiencies of formal training; viz., that informal training has mitigated that gap. Thus, this

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[123] I.e. Yildiz_FPPS3, CI6, GD7, TI.
[124] Except for those civil administrators who wish to be appointed to the "Airport or Border civilian authority."

traditional way of learning undeliberately discouraged the development and implementation of a rational training policy.

Informal Training as a Primary Method

The findings show that, for the MoI's central cadres, informal training has been seen as the best and inescapable method for training political administrators.

> I sometimes met with my predecessors. We chatted on some issues with them. They wished to share their opinions with me. I benefitted from their experiences [stories] and opinions. If my successors wished something similar from me, I could certainly try. (Former Minister 1, TI)

> I had known minister Aksu since I was a student at Mulkiye [the Faculty of Political Sciences]. I called him "agabey" [elderly brother]. Normally, he never interferes with his successors' business. Nevertheless, when I was appointed as the minister of the MoI, I asked him, 'agabey, please guide my way.' He, in turn, advised me in a respectful manner. (Atalay_Former minister 3, TI)

This trend shows a similar experience with other foreign counterparts who learned their trade mostly by word-of-mouth instead of by reading political biographies, of which few exist in Turkish political life (Rhodes and Tiernan, 2014).

The Master-Apprentice System: Informal Mentoring

> In the master-apprentice relationship, you learn concerns, motives, manners, rituals. (DGD2, TI)

The findings show that the master-apprentice system has been a very important part of the MoI's administrative (brotherhood) tradition. Newcomers/apprentices have to ask their senior colleagues and respect their experiences and stories and learn as much as they can from them as quickly as possible. The willingness to learn and be aware of this is seen as being an important step:

> If someone really wishes to gain experience, you should share your experiences. Otherwise, you cannot do it. They should observe, struggle to learn, and look for any opportunity to ask questions of their master. (GD2, TI)

The masters are expected to teach routines and protocols and transfer their work and life experiences to their apprentices as is customary due to the tradition of brotherhood which exists in the MoI.

Despite implicit competition, there exists a kind of solidarity in the prefectoral class.
They believed that, if your junior is successful, so are they. (Karaca_LA4, TI)

Indeed, they are willing to train them:

No doubt we share our experiences; they will learn and become better qualified. (DU1,
TI)

The master not only introduces his apprentice to his own personal stories, but to institutional stories.

Our ministry has had a unique tradition which must be transferred from one to the
other. In this way, this tradition could live forever. (DU1, TI)

During everyday life, the apprentice can come to their master's office and have a chat and take his orders. This allows him to understand indirectly the top administration's priorities, daily politics, governmental programmes, etc. Most of the participants acknowledged and claimed that it is the best way to learn and that it cannot be learned from books or academic studies. For instance, one of the former GSs had a chance to work together and observe his senior for 6 months which, in turn, contributed to the eventual attainment of his skills (FGS1, TI).

Another informal training occurred through departmental meetings. There has been a consensus amongst my participants that these meetings provided them with the opportunity to share information, departmental stories, and inform juniors about their current situations, priorities, external environment, and the expectations that other departments had of them. (Gunduzoz_GD8, TI).

More importantly, sometimes apprentices may accompany their master during important meetings, giving presentations to ministers, etc. Therefore, he can obtain invaluable lessons from such encounters by learning about the minister's views and political preferences, etc.

Nevertheless, even though the master-apprentice system provides invaluable benefits for learning and adapting to one's job, prefects should still learn by their selves. Namely, in such a dynamic ministry, with the ever-present pressure of coping and surviving, one should learn by doing while also avoiding making mistakes (DU2, TI).

Learning by Doing

There is no school for prefects who have been appointed to a position in the central department from the district. It must be underlined that prefects have already had at least 11 years of district

leadership experience before being promoted into the central cadres. Nevertheless, their expert knowledge and analysis skills were considered as insufficiencies:

> If we consider leadership skills, yes, our friend was trained as well as if he had graduated from Enderun.[125] This vocation provide us with many skills, but that does not mean we are experts, no! I could not say that! (GD1, TI)

It is usual for newcomers to be unfamiliar with their new position, especially ministers' inner circle position. One of the GDs shared the following memory:

> Ilhami agabey [126] told me that: 'who took this training amongst us? None of us! I am [performing like a] PPS; did I train as a PPS or take protocol lessons? We have been learning by doing. That is the amateur way, as is the case in other ministries' (GD5, TI).

Prefects' first aim is to recognise the MoI, their department, and, more importantly, they need to focus on their task. Once they sit in their chair, their responsibilities begin because the MoI has already been in action. They should accomplish their task in a dynamic atmosphere in the shortest amount of time. Their skills, knowledge, and experience should be developed through learning by doing. Actually, the MoI's administrative tradition — i.e. its daily practices, rituals and protocols — provides them with a map:

> If you are appointed here as a branch manager, then you are obliged to perform the duties of the unit. Therefore, you are already working in consultation with the relevant department heads or deputy GDs, or sometimes, the GD himself. For instance, you have to deal with an official opinion. Besides taking their opinions and discussing them with the upper or lower levels, you should open files and search about judicial decisions and legislation. You need to struggle to find the best way to make a proper, official opinion. This circle lasts until your senior confirmation. In other words, you are permanently resigned to reading and talking with the upper and lower level of the ministry. (GD2, TI)

Especially in relatively new departments, not having enough experience forces prefects to struggle much more to learn and fulfil their duties:

> To be honest, when I was appointed to the "Internal Audit Unit [in the Strategy Department], I did not know anything, even the meaning of "internal audit terms." There were, however, experts on strategy who are still learning about these new concepts. I can say that we learned together. I read the related legislation, joined the

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[125] A special school for raising the political administrators' class in the Ottoman palace.
[126] The former PPS of the minister; in June 2016, he was appointed to a Governorship.

Ministry of Finance's meetings, and benefitted from them. They actually shared key documents with me. Namely, we learned firstly, and then after strived towards introducing them to other departments. It is an ongoing process. (HD2, TI)

Prefects in the IT Department also often have to struggle to learn more technical skills in order to administer large technological projects. Individual effort is also paramount.

I did not have much knowledge about ICT before being appointing here. Practically, in 6 months, I was able to gain an idea about ICT and, at the end of the first year, I felt that I was able to administer ICT projects. However, expectations from us were not to be experts at ICT as our contracted [technical] staff was but, in my opinion as an administrator, we should at least be given the knowledge to control and steer these projects. (DGD4, TI)

Prefects were mostly found to be successful at even unfamiliar tasks for them through learning by doing by engaging their adaptation skills. One instance represents others' opinions as well:

Our friends have been fulfilling their responsibilities even better than what was expected of them. For instance, even some specific topics like ICT or the national identity card project. You know that we are unfamiliar with these technologically-based duties in the district because we were not trained to steer those types of project. With their individual efforts, though, they were able to succeed. Indeed, their department was awarded last year for accomplishing such a pioneering project. Their success and passion made us be confident and ignited within us new efforts. (HD1, TI)

Similarly, as mentioned before, although the high turnover for prefects is a barrier for IM, secondments and permanent recruitments are seen to be better tools for improving their generic bureaucratic leadership skills and for learning the practices of the MoI in a better way (DGD3, TI).

This process of learning by doing without any orientation training has not been without any stress. One participant shared his nervousness regarding working at the MoI without any orientation activities:

If you are asking how to deal with it…you have to stay awake without any sleep for several days, read, investigate, and get stomach pains. (FGD1, TI)

A few criticised the methods of learning by doing, although they saw it as being inevitable in the MoI's practice. For example, they pointed out that it is probably one of the most expensive methods:

…because it essentially means that you have to learn by trial-and-error. Thus, it is likely

that they will make serious mistakes and waste the public's time and resources. (CI1, TI)

Yildiz supports this participant's ideas, saying:

We load a job on them [low level prefects] which they have never done before and wait

for them to learn in, at maximum, five or six months. Afterwards, we hope that they will

administer their branch or division by means of their own competence. How can they do

that? How can they be unit leaders? Be faithful. Our expectations of them should

essentially be "just save the day." (Yildiz_FPPS3, TI)

Nevertheless, participants' accounts, my observation, and my personal experience show that the brotherhood tradition, informal training, ministry's strict hierarchical structure, in which decisions must, at last, be made by the top, provides checks and balances for avoiding lower level mistakes before the implementation process. Furthermore, successful prefects' stories even whilst working outside the MoI acknowledge that prefectoral class has adoptive skills.

In the following part, I will examine the individual administrative capacity of the MoI for the purpose of highlighting whether prefects could demonstrate enough administrative skills within the MoI or not.

5.2 Individual Administrative Policy Capacity of Prefects

This section introduces the prefects of the MoI and describes their administrative leadership.

Actors

In this section, I will briefly introduce the actors and describe their administrative leadership role with barriers via the participants' eyes.

There are two levels of prefects inside the MoI. The first level is senior prefects, 'referring to the top echelons of the public service with [the] responsibility [of administrating] a large sphere of human and financial resources' (Hughes, 2014, p. 204). Undersecretaries, deputy undersecretaries, and general directors (GDs) could be classified as senior prefects. The findings revealed that the undersecretary undoubtedly has an "administrative leadership role" because of his having the highest bureaucratic hierarchical position amongst all of the prefects in line with legislation. This prevailing role also involves his being effective on the Inspector's Board and in the minister's inner circle because of his traditionally respectful position. Secondly, GDs were seen to act as leaders more than their deputy undersecretaries (DU) since they have departments – both

their staff and their budget – to administer, whereas the latter ones do not. Therefore, their role is seen as being more influential than that of DUs.

The second level is middle and low level prefects – deputy general directors (DGD), heads of branch (HB), and directors of division (DD) –who support the senior administration and who supervise and support subordinate staffs. In addition to supervising staff, middle, and especially low level prefects are still engaged to some extent 'shaping and crafting policy work, and ensuring delivery of branch and or unit objectives' (ibid, p. 238).

Rhodes (2011, p. 60) also describes some generalist administrators' skills: 'the capacity to absorb detail at speed, analyse…unfamiliar problems [in a] short [amount of] time, clarify, summarise, and present option[s].' If we consider general administrators having these skills, prefects could more or less be labelled as 'classical generalist[s]; they can master any policy brief[ly] even [if] they did not know the policy issues deeply but they did know a lot about those sort[s] of subject' (ibid, p. 119). If we consider their role and duties in MoI, undersecretaries are typical example of general administrators besides their administrative leadership role.

Undersecretary

An undersecretary's appointment solely depends on ministerial discretion. Most of the time, the undersecretary is a close working friend of the minister. Because of the undersecretary's strong position, the department heads act upon their orders and directives.

> It is impossible to consider issues without the undersecretary's contribution. I always valued taking his view. I appreciated his opinions, even though they sometimes clashed with my own. I did not avoid giving mandates to him. I praise his loyalty, experience, skills and working style. We still have good contact with one another. (Atalay_Former minister 3, TI)

Rhodes (ibid., p. 56) divided their role into three main tasks: giving political advice to ministers, managing their department, and managing external relations. In the MoI's case, their personal styles affect these roles.

> They mostly preferred to work on more technical [bureaucratic] issues, even if two of them were appointed as seconded ministers or deputy ministers during the election period. (Yildiz_FPPS3, TI)

Most participants agreed that the undersecretary administered (stressing his stewardship role) the MoI under his minister's authority. Prefects found that the undersecretaries were able to play

their role of steward successfully.[127] Actually, they must do so in line with the expectations and Turkish (MoI) administrative tradition. One sample quote:

The undersecretary holds power inside the MoI. He administrates the MoI and makes important decisions. Everyone [at the upper level] needs to receive his approval before making and implementing policy. (DGD3, TI)

As mentioned before, a few asserted that recently, ministers hold so much power that their undersecretaries have become more like batman than bureaucratic leaders (FGS1, TI). Contrariwise, the majority of the participants asserted that (I agree with them), although ministerial discretion is still dominant, the undersecretary's role is still important, both for policymaking and for coordination.

Nevertheless, the findings seem to suggest that their administrative advisory role is more important than their political and policy making roles. The findings also supported his bridging and facilitating role between politicians and prefects. One sample account was:

Because of their prefects' identity, the prefects of the MoI expects the undersecretary to be a leader for them. Namely, he should be a motivator and a bridge through which the problems and requests of both the bureaucracy and the minister may be conveyed so as to better develop and implement policies. The MoI's bureaucracy needs his backing in order to develop policies and persuade the minister to implement them. In addition, the bureaucracy expects him to protect them against political pressure and support them in tackling their day-to-day crises. Put simply, the bureaucracy expects him to behave like an ''agabey'' of prefects. (Atbas_FGD2, TI)

The findings confirm that most undersecretaries were considered as being successful in performing their bridging role. This pattern is similar to their foreign counterparts' roles as a facilitator and coordinator (Rhodes, 2011, p. 57). One quotation refers to the daily practices of the MoI:

It was not always possible to make contact with the minister; our undersecretary conveys our opinions to the minister without any difficulties. Namely, our communication channels are always open [in virtue of his being there]. (GD1, TI)

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[127] It should be underlined that, as an insider, I already knew that, expressing criticism about a senior is unusual in the MoI's administrative tradition due to its feeding respect and its fear/risk awareness.

According to the findings, since each unit has a different mandate, the department heads mostly avoid intervening in other units' areas of interest. When any conflict emerges, his other role as a conflict resolver is revealed. Otherwise, it would be a challenge to 'impose some coherence on a complex organisation and its many policies' (ibid, p. 57). He can arrange ministerial committees to solve conflicts at any time. His role is considered to be the best way of avoiding any detrimental damages to the MoI's public service. Of course, the results and dominance of the undersecretary do not make everyone happy.

> How can you dispute anything? Whatever the undersecretary says sticks. (Atbas_FGD2, TI)

Of course, meetings are not always for resolving conflicts or making decisions. Instead, and more importantly,

> [t]hey are about refreshing the department's memory, updating everyone on where we are. Thinking time, writing time, and reading time are all at a premium (Ibid, p. 122).

Diplomacy with the outside has been another task that the undersecretary has been charged with. He must contact other central departments, local authorities, MPs, political parties, the media, and foreign counterparts (ibid, p. 58).

Being in a grey area, the undersecretary is expected to build good affiliations and abolish any ill relations on behalf of the ministers. Even after the MoI established the position of deputy minister in 2011 for the purpose of supporting the minister with relation to diplomatic issues, the undersecretary still has the duty of administrating relations with the outside. Furthermore, even though political relations with those from outside the ministry is still primarily performed by the ministers, the participants nonetheless applauded the diplomatic skills that the undersecretaries were able to demonstrate with relation to their other obligations. The former ministers' accounts, minutes of interior committees, and my observations all supported this perception (see the section 5.1.4).

The undersecretary of the MoI must originally come from the prefectoral class (i.e. he should have already been a governor) since he is also the chief of all of the other provincial governors in the country. His respectable position and previous work experience allows them to be better stewards comparing with other counterparts. For example, participants commented that:

> If someone is appointed as an undersecretary of the MoI, that means that he has had more than 20 years of field and professional experience as a district governor, governor, or prefect of the MoI central department. Look at other ministries, though! Sometimes,

someone can be appointed as an undersecretary who never even entered the ministry's gates. (Yildiz_FPPS3, TI)

I consider the MoI to have a robust tradition because it protects its seniors' positions against political pressures. Our undersecretary must be appointed from amongst the governors. We would not think of having an undersecretary from any other profession. (Gonul_Former minister 2, TI)

Besides the main central departments, the office of the undersecretary consists of four deputy undersecretaries, an advisor (added recently), a small team of public servants, and a PPS which supports his performing those roles.

With the exception of a few topics related solely to the minister's discretion, everything else is coordinated by the undersecretary's office. The policy and decision-making process also are administered and controlled by this office. They check that documents are in line with the legislation in every regard. After the undersecretary's signature (of approval), the documents come to our [General Secretary's] office. Similarly, except for parliamentary questions and daily political developments, the undersecretary's office provides coordination through meetings chaired by the undersecretary or deputy undersecretaries. Relatedly, our friends from the main department, the Chief Inspector's Board, and the Legal Advisory Board participated in these meetings. These types of work happen often in the MoI. (FGS3, TI)

Chairing ministerial committees[128] increases the undersecretary's power, thereby allowing him to say the last word in the bureaucracy. Yet, stressing its consultative character, Gonul underlined that the last word belongs to the political authority (political control) (Gonul_Former minister 2, TI).

Backing by the undersecretary has been of vital importance for all departments. If the departments receive the undersecretary's approval, the implementation of their policies may be accelerated. Namely, although its having strict hierarchy is mostly associated as being the main barrier with regards to policy capacity, in case of the undersecretary's support, this barrier could easily be turned into an enabler. His opinion and support was seen as the MoI's institutional opinion and support. Once GDs receive that message, their coordination and collaboration capacities are likely to increase significantly.

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[128] The council's members are under the leadership of the Undersecretary, the Police Chief, and the GDs of the ministry's main departments, the head of the inspector's board, the senior legal advisor and the GD of Personnel Administration (being the only one from a supportive unit). It shows that this department's role has been much more than simply supportive. This committee also has the authority to appoint prefects to senior positions, with the exception, however, of GD's.

> I consider it as being very positive. Once the undersecretary has commanded for us to do something, our task becomes easier to perform. Furthermore, progress is made faster since the GDs treat these tasks seriously. (HD2, TI)

The prefects wish to strengthen administrative leadership position of undersecretaries. Loyalty to the undersecretary has been seen as being as important as being loyal to the minister in line with the MoI's tradition of brotherhood. This solidarity strengthens trust inside the MoI — something which should not be underestimated with regards to (building) policy capacity.

Yet, the undersecretary's discretion should be in a restricted arena with several contingencies.

> Of course, they have several contingencies. For instance, there are ministers' opinions, their relations to other ministries, especially the PM's office, government programmes, unexpected external development, etc. It is similar all over the Turkish bureaucracy. The undersecretaries cannot behave independently. Therefore, they administrate the ministry and perform their tasks by seeking out those contingencies. (DGD6, TI)

As mentioned before, for the MoI's administration, an individual style should not be ignored with regards to relations. Some undersecretaries prefer to establish formal relations, whereas others inclined to perform their task in a more friendly way which placed value on the MoI's tradition of brotherhood.

Two undersecretaries preferred informal relations. In their era, many people came and chatted with them for long periods of time, whereas another undersecretary behaved more formally. Indeed, sometimes GDs had to express their demands or opinions without even sitting down. (Yildiz_FPPS3, TI)

On the other hand, deputy undersecretaries mitigate this concern due to bridge role between undersecretary and GDs whilst fulfilling their own responsibilities.

Deputy Undersecretaries

One deputy undersecretary (DU) simply described their roles in line with Law 3152 and with classic Weberian bureaucracy.

> DUs are deputies of the undersecretary. Namely, we support the undersecretary to perform his tasks. Mostly, we fulfil the duties that the undersecretary could not accomplish due to there being a lack of time. We behave according to the way in which our roles are distributed. We are not the chief of the GDs but we nevertheless

coordinate and collaborate departments' tasks on behalf of the undersecretary. (DU1, TI)

DUs work according to the commands of the undersecretary and their roles are divided to them based on the departments and committees which are normally chaired by the undersecretary. Even when the minister gives them a direct command, the MoI's protocol should not be ignored.

> Our honourable minister is likely to ask us to fulfil some tasks. Anyway, we inform our undersecretary about the minister's command. In addition, before presenting what we were tasked with doing to the minister, we discuss them with the undersecretary in order to take his comments and advice. In most cases, we present the work together with the undersecretary. Our tradition has taught us that, if the bureaucracy wishes to succeed, the undersecretary should be in a strong position; namely, it would be a big mistake to ignore him. (DU1, TI)

My findings and observation notes revealed that their coordinator role and their facilitating relationship amongst prefects has become more important. According to my accounts, they were seen as "agabey" (older brother) and bridge between the undersecretary and the bureaucracy. One sample account reads as follows:

> Before presenting our project, proposals, and issues to the undersecretary, we go to the related deputy undersecretary's room and talk and elaborate our ideas to them. Since they mostly know the top's view better than we do, we could benefit from their opinions. All DUs are older than we are, so their experience lights our way. Sometimes, we present our draft or proposal paper to the undersecretary with the deputy undersecretaries by our sides. (GD5, TI)

According to my observation notes:

> On the most part, GDs and junior prefects visited them, shared their ideas, and chatted about current issues. They can check their views before presenting them to the undersecretary or minister. Their room was sometimes like a therapy saloon. Relationship with them was more comfortable than relationship with the top level. (FWNB)

I found that meetings chaired by DUs were seen as chances to improve their policy advisory capacity since participants were able to share their ideas without many barriers. Nevertheless, the conclusions or recommendations made by these meetings need the approval of either the undersecretary or minister.

Presenting your work is easier in DU-chaired meeting. Nevertheless, DUs cannot determine the result unless the undersecretary also gives his approval. Therefore, the DU must always present the [important] decisions to the undersecretary in order to be confirmed by them. (DGD3, TI)

Since the DU have to deal with less tasks, they could be well informed about those task. My observation notes also acknowledge this.

The DU frequently spoke and contributed and even influenced the debate and its eventual decision. The Deputy Minister nodded at his contributions. In addition, from time to time, the Deputy Minister asked him to express his opinions. It was confirmed that he valued his knowledge. (FWNB)[129]

Yet, their role is not seen more important than GDs who must act administrative leader' role inside their department.

General Directors[130]

The findings have revealed that they administer their departments with regards to operational duties, but it was debateable whether they took the initiative, participated, or even dominated policymaking. There are two different opinions on their effectiveness. The first group asserted that the ministers and undersecretary work with the GD and valued their work and skills, being able to take the initiative in line with the top's discretion and current development and external environment. The following is a representative account of this view:

Besides the MoI administrative tradition [strict hierarchy, political control], the GD administers their department and can take the initiative if they have enough capacity and wish to perform their tasks. (Atbas_FGD2, TI)

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[129] This observation was made at the first meeting I had a chance to observe for European Union Visa Freedom meeting which was held on 28/03/2016 in the "Recep Yazicioglu Meeting Hall."

[130] The heads of department have several titles in the MoI's structure. In reality, being a GD or having another similar title does not matter according to the MoI's protocol. E.g., GD of the department, head of department, head of the inspector's board, and senior legal advisor of the MoI. For instance, amongst the main departments, the Local Administration Department was administered by GDs, whereas the European Union and External Relations Department was administered by a head of department. With the exception of the head of the Inspector's Board, all of them directly and hierarchically belonged to the undersecretary; therefore, I use "GD" to refer to all of them. There are, thus, a total number of 14 GDs in the central organisation (http://www.mia.gov.tr/organization-chart; retrieved 20/08/2016). Nevertheless, some have commented that they have had some difficulties coordinating and collaborating with departments outside of the MoI due to their title. (DGD6, TI)

The second view, on the other hand, claimed that, recently, just as with the Turkish bureaucracy as a whole, the MoI's bureaucracy has been wary of taking the initiative to administer their departments. Instead, they inclined to endure their traditional positions through command and control. They stressed, in this way, they have lost the role of being administrative leaders for their departments and underlined that the ministry's administrative tradition, as well as both the internal and external environments, have not been leverage for encouraging them.

> Could they make decisions by themselves? Could they start any projects without the
> top's approval? Even, to what extent do they administrate their own duties? If the
> answer is "yes," then we could say that there exists a bureaucratic leadership. On the
> other hand, if they feel obliged to ask everything from the undersecretary, even
> relatively routine tasks, they have to spare their working time to wait for approval from
> the top. How could we say that they are prevailing at their job? We cannot. (CI1, TI)

The findings mostly supported the latter view. This means that they have seen signs of limit of individual administrative policy capacity since there being a lack of initiative prevents them from improving their individual and departmental policy advisory capacities. Everyone more or less agreed that this has been a stressful position.

> Being a head of department is the most difficult position inside the MoI's
> administration. As a GD, you have to contact your top political-administrators. You are
> not expected to make mistakes. Therefore, being at headquarters and dealing with hot
> issues may be stressful. (GD1, TI)

As mentioned before, this position is perceived as a "waiting room" for being promoted as a governor. This expectation inclined them to be cautious rather than to improve their abilities and develop better policies. As expressed by prefects, that was one of the main barriers to strengthening individual capacities. Nevertheless, a former undersecretary and minister considered it as being an important motivational tool for keeping their energy high (Gonul_Former minister 2, TI).[131]

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[131] His opinion could be considered as the ministers' opinion overall because none of my ministerial participants complained about having stress and leading a busy life when they were ministers of the MoI — something which complies with Rhodes's implication. 'Stress can enhance performance. It can lead [the] minister to focus [on] it, [and can motivate] them. It goes with [an] adrenalin surge that many miss when leaving office' (Rhodes, 2011a, p. 267). Rather, even retired ministers were monitoring their political and administrative life closely and keeping them busy. For instance, it was not easy to schedule an appointment with them due to their having such a busy agenda. (FWNB)

Besides this caution, their individual and departmental performance could be contingent upon their personal attitudes as well. This refers to there being a lack of institutionalism which, in turn, triggers a limit of policy capacity:

> The GD's character determines the working performance of the department from the highest to the lowest levels. For instance, one GD could bring information which I had asked him to prepare in a short amount of time, while another one could do the same task after two or three times of me warning them until finally I have to threaten them properly using the minister's name and authority. (FGS1, TI)

Besides GDs' individual capacity and their domination on their departments, individual capacities of their juniors also important to fulfil departments' responsibilities, not mentioned their departments' organisational policy capacity.

Middle- and Low-Level prefects

The Deputy General Director (DGD), the Head of Division (HD) and the Director of Branch (DB)[132] were seen as operational powers inside the MoI. DGDs mostly supported GDs in fulfilling their tasks and coordinating them similarly to the DUs while HDs and DBs were perceived as "owners of the task" because of their active role in participating in making decisions and policies — the kitchen work of the MoI — and implementing and monitoring them on behalf of the GDs. One account stressed their role:

> In practice, the head of divisions [medium level prefects] administer the MoI. Most legislations and implementations could succeed only in light of their invaluable efforts. The upper echelons of the administration mostly debate and make policies and decision by means of their HDs' early preparation unless, of course, they are top-down policies, in which case the MoI in general only takes a small initiative to develop. (Karaca_LA4, TI)

Besides their exaggerated dominant role, the findings mostly confirmed that middle- and low-level prefects were found to be successful with regards to fulfilling their responsibilities in supporting the senior administration and supervising and supporting their administrative staff and, more importantly, conducting policy work, and ensuring the delivery of branch and/or unit objectives under the supervision of their senior colleagues.[133]

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[132] The DGD, DH, and BD cadres consist, respectively, as follows: 14; 33 (24 prefects, 9 administrative staff); and 105 (17 prefects, 88 administrative staff).
[133] I.e. the deputy undersecretaries and almost all GDs, even the minister.

On the other hand, according to some of the participants who served as HDs or DBs before being appointed to upper positions (17 participants), if the MoI valued their jobs more, the MoI's advisory capacity would be better than what it currently is and, even though they were likely to have less experience, they were more energetic and enthusiastic. They have to show their skills in order to be promoted to upper levels. Yet, risk awareness tradition may diminish their desire. Some shared how to adapt to such a cautious game. One representative account is as follows:

> When you came to the central cadre with the passion of a district governor, you often
> wish to change something wrong which you had observed in the field. Unfortunately,
> after 6 months working in that position, you understand that the central cadres have
> less power than the district governor. (LA3, TI)

Similarly, prefects agree that, in the districts, prefects have been acting as administrative leaders, whereas there is no consensus whether such leadership exists with regards to central cadres. Their comments pointed out some barriers.

Barriers for Administrative Leadership — Improving Administrative Policy Capacity

Majority agreed with Hughes et al. (2015, p. 242) statement that, 'such leadership is an individual attribute [but] it also depends on a broader culture which develops and recognises such leadership.' Besides characteristic of Turkish administrative tradition (see Chapter 4), some have proposed that administrative tradition, structure, process of the MoI, individual cultural roots of prefects are those things which prevent better leadership.

Key points are that obstruct being bureaucratic (administrative) leader: a practice averse to risk-taking and failure, a busy daily Life, personnel administration, lack of support to develop policy & improving one's leadership capacity.

I found that a practice averse to risk-taking and failure is the most important barrier to take initiative as observed in administrative tradition. Thus, the MoI's administrative tradition, itself, nurtures values which do not encourage true leadership skills in its prefects.

> Namely, risk awareness triggers cautiousness, such as "how can I rid myself of some of
> my responsibilities?" rather than "what can I do?" (CI6, TI)

Secondly, prefects working at the MoI have busy daily lives and inevitably perform their duties at a rushed pace. Dealing with routines and several issues at the same time causes prefects to lack the proper concentration on administrative role.

> In our case, policies and their implementation are determined by daily necessities. Therefore, we could not monitor and evaluate their process and results. Namely, the lower levels have not controlled everything about their tasks. How could they? They are pressured to do everything so quickly! (FDGS, TI)

Thirdly, this is so vital for keeping your position or promoting upper level due to the current personnel administration's policies. Nevertheless, the expectation of being promoted to a higher position, which made prefects be more cautious about affecting their individual administrative role. (Yildiz_FPPS3, TI).

Fourthly, gaining support from top political administrators also matters. Therefore, lack of support to improve administrative leadership capacity is another barrier.

> There is not much expectation from prefects to act in leadership roles inside the MoI. You do not need to have better administrative skills or intelligence. The best public servant obeys their political master's orders. Leadership was seen solely in the political arena. (GD5, TI)

Yet, a few asserted that the undersecretary and GDs could show the leadership taking the initiative in their restricted arenas:

> We witnessed that some could be dominant undersecretaries. Sometimes, a few GDs could do that as well. They could use their initiative for performing their routine operational duties. (Atbas_FGD2, TI)

Even though some could play the leadership role, the findings did not corroborate their encouraging their juniors to show or improve their bureaucratic leadership skills.

> You wish to feel your senior support when developing your job to get better public services. Sometimes you could get support, but not always. Especially when your department fails, you feel lonely. This discourages prefects from developing new projects and conducting research to better implement policies. Instead, you simply follow routines. (FDG1, TI)

One GD pointed out the term of "trust."

> If the top administration trusts you, they tend to accept your opinion and, more importantly, they let you administrate your department. (GD4, TI)

Finally, informal training and/or shadowing may improve bureaucratic leadership, nevertheless, in MoI practice, formal training for bureaucratic leadership has not been adequate similar to findings of one research:

> Leadership programmes have been generic [and have] not aim[ed] to improve policy leadership; rather, [they focus on daily operational routines and, ergo, are] ineffective. Therefore, policy leadership training programmes need to be grounded in real world contexts and [need to use] a problem-based approach. (ibid, p. 351)

In sum, considering these barriers, besides the administrative leadership of the undersecretary and a few GDs, the research could not observe bureaucratic leadership inside the MoI because of Turkish administrative tradition based on political control, strict hierarchy and administrative tradition of MoI—hurriedness, busy daily life, risk awareness, high turnover— and individual background of prefects. This can be interpreted as sign of limit to individual administrative policy capacity since these barriers also prevents improving administrative skills of prefects.

5.3 Administrative System Policy Capacity

This section focusses primarily on the participants' perceptions regarding the overall (systemic) legality and accountability of the Turkish public administrative system (see table 2, 6b), thereby determining the systemic administrative capacity of the MoI.

The Presence of the Rule of Law

Similar to Rhodes's implications (2011a, pp. 59-60), legality is the foremost value for the MoI, which is the necessity of a legal provision or framework to cover every action of a public servant. This is a consequence of the MoI's classic bureaucratic organisation, as well as that of the broader public administration, in which compliance with law, rules, and procedures are essential (to avoid repetition, see legalistic administration (rule of law) in Chapter 4).

In the following part, I will look for whether 'the existing rules of law and engagement provide adequate checks and balances to allow the [MoI] the discretion to carry out its functions, and systems that hold [ministers and bureaucrats] accountable for their actions' (Hughes et al., 2015, p. 241).

Accountability

There is characteristics of legalistic form of accountability in the Turkish administration tradition. In other words, accountability isformal and legalistic (see chapter 4).

The state administration is organised in a hierarchical and rational way. Ministries report to the Council of Ministers and constitutional bodies to the parliament. Public agencies have clearly established lines of accountability to [the] Court of Account and [f]iscal institutions. State institutions are required to submit annual accountability reports on the use of resources to achieve targets (EU, 2015, pp. 12-13).

Therefore, external monitoring and inspection by the Council of State and the Court of Accounts, traditionally, has been the most important institution in Turkish Administration with regards to auditing accounts rather than parliamentary and public scrutiny. Moreover, the administrative tradition has a secretive nature that obstructs the transparency and accountability of the government.

On the other hand, for the MoI, in grey reports, the MoI's political administrators seems to give value to the basic principles of good governance. For example:

This report was prepared with regard to transparency, accountability, and responsiveness in order to inform the public in a proper way. Preparing performance /activity reports — one of the key points of this system — is a process based on an understanding of providing accurate and reliable information to the public who gives the authority to obtain and use public resources in accordance with a strategic plan and performance programme (MoI, 2016c, p. 1).

Most of the participants expressed that the MoI's bureaucracy was aware of a new trend and that it was obligatory due to external pressures. Nevertheless, they confessed that there is no ideal system. Simply, they struggled to respond to this expectation, as well as to top-down policies.

So, the system has changed a lot. When we look at past experience, you could ignore accountability. But now, the MoI has published enormous reports [performance, activity reports, strategy reports, etc.], which increase our transparency and accountability. In addition, recent perception researches have also been conducted on accountability. Ten years ago, we could not imagine it. (Bilmez_DGD1, TI)

Yet, a report published in 2015 revealed that Turkey case does not reflect these statements.

Public scrutiny of government work is weak and parliamentary scrutiny suffers from the limited capacity of parliamentary committees. The oversight role has been weakened by the government's slow response to parliamentary questions… State institutions are required to submit annual accountability reports on the use of resources to achieve targets. These reports, however, are not specifically followed up by the Council of Ministers (EU, 2015, pp.12-13).

Findings also supported this statement for MoI. Being a former member of the MoI, however, he was well aware that the MoI values security and secrecy. One MP also complained about the MoI's practice of responding to parliamentary questions, stressing that the one-party government has tended to ignore opposing parties' opinions.

Recently, the MoI's bureaucracy has been less sensitive to our written questions. Look! When I was a member of the Interior Committee, my information requests were not responded to. How could you ignore parliamentary scrutiny? Our friends actually used to be sensitive before this government. Now, ministers have been controlling everything. You cannot receive any information unless the minister, himself, approves the response. (MP 1, TI)

Similar to this assertion and the abovementioned international report, the prefects value accountability to hierarchical seniors rather than to public or other institutions. In fact, informal accountability is much more vital than formal ones.

> For our bureaucracy, we feel anxious to respond to the expectations of our seniors or ministers. Of course, we should not ignore the parliament, citizens, or courts' concerns; but we know that only our inability to account to our seniors is likely to cause us to lose our position, not to others. (FPPS3, TI)

One participant stressed ministerial accountability, citing that lacking the will to take the initiative because they were wary of accounting for those tasks.

> Despite of using public authority; you leave the accounting to those who have political responsibilities. I put a question mark over public and parliamentary scrutiny of the government's works in our country. To be honest, in this situation [i.e. zero-mistake pressure], no one wishes to use their own initiative. (CI1, TI)

The lack of demand from others fed this statement, as is acknowledged by one recent research related to the MoI's strategic plan experiment.

> The lack of parliamentary engagement in holding public agencies accountable according to their performances, and the civil society's lack of demand for more accountable public services were other factors that led to weak implementation (Sen, 2015, p. 220).

As was mentioned in administrative tradition, the concern for secrecy for the sake of protecting state secrets and personal data, as well as risk awareness, restricts the right to access public information. Therefore, their ability to respond to citizens' demands inclined to retrogress.

Besides concerns for secrecy and their lacking the will to account for their responsibilities, the prefects still value administrative justice. Their authority and roles were internalised by all of the prefects, which comply with the present rule of law (DGD2, TI).

Yet, one international report confirmed this trend by stressing the difficulty of practical application.

> The right to administrative justice and fair treatment is regulated in the Code of Administrative Procedures… The efficiency of administrative courts is considered to be high. The Constitution ensures public liability and the right to seek compensation, but practical application is difficult to assess since no institution is responsible for collecting the relevant data. (EU, 2015, p.14)

In sum, the findings did not confirm MoI's robust systemic administrative capacity, even though MoI's career system and issues regarding accountability and legality were well regulated by law, as is required by the Turkish administrative tradition, as well as by the existence of goodwill in prefects.

5.4   Summary of the Chapter

The findings will be summarised in three parts: organisational, individual, and system administrative policy capacity.

The Findings regarding the Organisational Administrative Policy Capacity

With regard to the first question, "Does bureaucracy give the minister the advice needed to reach a decision?" I shall underline the key findings of the organisational administrative policy capacity.

Prefects can administer the policy processes to give the minister the advice needed to reach a decision (Table 2, 5a)

The findings did not uncover any instances of the prefects failing to administer policy processes in formal way.

When unexpected and emergency issues arise since they need to be tackled in the shortest amount of time. Simply, the formal policy process could not respond to this pressure. The MoI traditionally has had an alternative way. Besides the formal way (hierarchical decision-making), an informal policy process has provided an alternative route for speeding up the policy- and decision-making process. The participants saw the minister as being central to that process. Secondly, the undersecretary has played a coordinative role inside the MoI on behalf of the minister. Since the

deficiencies of the formal policy process were compensated by internal diplomacy, the findings did not point out a significant limit of policy capacity with regards to administering unexpected and emergency issues.

Prefects have been mostly good at giving the minister the advice needed to reach a decision. (Table 2, 5b)

Findings confirmed that both ministers, MPs and prefects asserted that MoI's bureaucracy could mostly meet this expectation successfully thanks to their district experience.

Secondly, I found that policy advice inside the MoI is too often reactive and narrow—there is too little genuinely strategic policy capability and evidence-based policy has been rare within the MoI practice. Nevertheless, mostly, accounts acknowledged that MoI has been dominated a by dynamic, reflexive and busy working daily life filled with 'firefighting' practices. Cope and survive has been the first priority within the MoI. Advice should aim to abolish the crisis and blow out the fire. Therefore, prefects' advice to the ministers should aim to resolve emerging issues as soon as possible rather than being strategic.

Thus, despite of quality concerns, this could not be seen as a limit to policy capacity since the feature of MoI's tasks pushed prefects to be reactive.

On the other hand, findings revealed that the inability to "speak the truth to power" was the most detrimental issue for the policy advisory capacity. Furthermore, the MoI was seen as a "closed circuit system". This system discouraged diverse opinions which could elaborate policy advisory capacity; a practice which is a sign of limit of policy advisory capacity.

The MoI has been good at coordination whereas had issues about collaboration (Table 2, 5c)

Participants mostly believed that, besides a few concerns, there have not been any significant issues with regards to coordination of administration of policy process, either inside the MoI and outside with other public institutions, because of the tradition of brotherhood and the prefects' (field) experiences. On the other hand, collaboration inside the MoI; coordination and collaboration with outside organisations, especially NGOs, seemed to be problematic, that could be considered as a limit to policy capacity.

Prefects have been successful practioners (Table 2, 5d)

Findings revealed that the prefects consider themselves to be successful practitioners like their political boss who came from the same background. Outsider minister also confirmed this. Prefects also depended on their experience and the trial-and-error methodology in amending

policies. Therefore, despite the lack of proper systematic monitoring and especially evaluation methods, the prefects could implement policy in a traditional way which mitigated potential mistakes. Thus, the prefects are able to provide advice on ministers' request.

Error correction for surprise not systematic evaluation (Table 2, 5e)

Similar to its implementation knowledge, the MoI tends to monitor and evaluate its implementation through feedback on problems rather than in a systematic way, although there have been traditional monitoring departments. Furthermore, with a few exceptions, these departments have had a little role in providing advice to ministers.

On the other hand, recently the Ministers have been inclined to order monitoring boards to monitor and (rarely) evaluate specific topics which mostly were determined by the agenda of the government or ministers as well as emerging urgent issues. Monitoring departments were seen to be successful for fulfilling these duties.

The prefects mostly anticipate and respond to their ministers' expectations (Table 2, 5f)

Findings showed that prefects wish to support their ministers. Loyalty has been the most important attribute. Therefore, they tend to follow their minister views. All study participants, including all ministers, pointed out that the prefects have known their ministers' policy, opinions, and anxieties. In practice, ministerial discretion dominates everything within the MoI administration. Prefects make every effort to work in line with the ministers. Because of their intuition skills, the prefects could predict the next step of the ministers, an ability which has been pivotal in gaining ministerial trust and protecting their position.

The study findings could not confirm the failure and inability of prefects in responding to the ministers' requests and taking the appropriate steps needed to adjust to new developments.

Prefects do not see personnel administration as problematic in line with advisory responsibilities (Table 2, 5g)

Although personnel administration was not seen as wholly based on a meritocratic system and speaking the truth to power has been rare inside the MoI that could cause a limit to policy capacity, the findings revealed that my participants mostly expressed that the appointment of prefects from amongst the "best and brightest" to positions of higher authority have not caused a limit to policy capacity due to their having similar qualifications and backgrounds. Thus, these elite public servants could support their minister with their advice.

The gap in formal training which exists is compensated forby informal training. (Table 2, 5h)

The majority of participants confirmed this statement. They were all aware of there being a lack of proper formal training for the MoI's central cadres, especially with regards to the orientation trainings supplied for newcomers that could cause a limit to policy capacity. In practice, "learning by doing," coupled with an apprenticeship practice, have been the main tools by which prefects have been trained to comply with the MoI's administrative tradition.

On the other hand, the participants applauded the MoI's reflective skills and adaptability with regards to new tasks. Thus, due to informal training and new goal-based training, the findings did not point out there being a significant gap stemming from a lack of proper, formal training.

Having shown how the findings of this chapter answer the first research question, the second research question of "How has the bureaucratic policy capacity of the Turkish Ministry of the Interior changed during the reform years, 2002 – 2016?" will now be analysed.

Public administration reforms stemming from the NPM has not changed the MoI's administration of policy processes. (Table 2, 5a)

In the administration process, these top-down reforms pushed the MoI's practices to change in line with the new reform era. The majority of the grey reports were prepared for the purpose of ensuring that the process correspond to the strategic plan's calendar.

Yet, strategic plan's calendar, however, clashed with cope and survive challenge against unexpected developments. Instead of strictly tracing the strategic plan's schedule, the MoI's administration tended to solve the urgent issues which arose instead. Therefore, the administration process was arranged and accelerated in order to tackle with current issues rather than the goals based on the administration's policies. Namely, within the MoI, 'things happens as usual'.

Performance management has not supplanted tradition (table 2, 5g)

My participants stressed that these reforms cannot create or internalise the managers' stories; rather, the performance of individuals and departments has not been measured by objective and pre-established measurements. In practice, the findings show that, despite a few failed attempts, the personnel administration system has maintained its traditional character. Viz., its appraisal of staff was mostly based on loyalty and the subjectivity of senior discretion and assessment.

The establishment of new departments to the MoI creates extra policy capacity for the MoI

I found that the establishment of the departments of IT, Migration Administration, and EU and External Relations during the reform process was seen as an essential step towards responding to new technological developments, threats, and the EU integration process. The findings confirm that these departments have not clashed with the prevalent MoI administrative tradition and have created an extra policy capacity for the MoI as well as reviving prefects' confidence.

On the other hand, the Strategy Department, the Internal Audit Unit, and the RC have made less contributions to policy capacity. Despite of revision of its structure and tasks, the Strategy Department was mostly seen as a coordinating department rather than as a strategic advisory department. Whereas the RC was sometimes applauded for their modest, well-intentioned efforts, it could not create extra analytical and advisory capacity skills and act as a bridge with other institutions of knowledge (see chapter 6). On the other hand, the majority of prefects undoubtedly believed that the Internal Audit Unit did not make any contributions to the policy capacity of the MoI. This unit also clashed with administrative tradition of the MoI.

In sum, these findings confirmed that the MoI prefers to add new units in order to increase policy capacity rather than reforming existing units.

Findings regarding the Individual Administrative Policy Capacity of the MoI

Prefects are generalist administrators, which make them be successful at administering their tasks while all of them are not administrative leaders (table 2, 4)

The findings did not reveal many deficiencies with regards to their individual administrative policy capacity — something which is confirmed by other participants, including ministers. Prefects were able to fulfil their responsibilities in a dynamic atmosphere. They have to cope and survive on the behalf of the MoI, their departments, divisions, and branches.

The findings supported that they were more or less capable of absorbing details at great speeds, analysing unfamiliar problems in a short amount of time, as well as clarifying and summarising ideas and positions, whereas presenting their (real) opinions to their seniors is more problematic due to the strict nature of Weberian characteristics of the tradition.

Regarding technical and new departments, the findings confirmed that, although some prefects did not have any technical [or managerial] skills when appointed as administrators for those unfamiliar departments, they were able to adapt by simply "learning by doing." They received some technical knowledge and adopted managerial skills in order to organise teams or well-educated ICT experts effectively. Furthermore, they were happy to combine the attributes of

prefects (i.e. vital generic skills which make them understood in both the internal and external environments) with managerial skills in order to successfully lead their technical departments.

Despite deficiencies at all levels of competence and sources, however, the prefects were found to be successful by participants, as well as by outsiders, in virtue of their prefectoral experiences.

Amongst them, the undersecretary has a strong position as an administrative leader with a special position which straddles the grey area of providing a means of communication between the prefects and the ministers, thereby enabling him to provide the most pertinent advice to the minister.

On the other hand, the research did not confirm that all of them were successful administrative leaders due to the Turkish administrative tradition, administrative tradition, structure, and processes of the MoI, thereby leading to a limit of administrative leadership in the MoI.

Findings regarding the Administrative System Policy Capacity of the MoI

Legality is the foremost value for the political-administrators of the MoI

The findings acknowledged that almost all of the participants agreed that there must be rules and regulations to guide their ways. The fact that they have to work in a highly dynamic environment that most issues need to be resolved in a short period of time. Therefore, the MoI's administrators seek to trace these rules since they provide them with a concrete guide with which to avoid making mistakes.

Accountability does matter

I found that the MoI's political administrators gave value to accountability, but there being only accountable to their hierarchical, political (i.e. the PM), and administrative seniors, the parliament's (i.e. the ruling party's) scrutiny, and administrative courts (specifically, the Court of Account) rather than to the public. In practice, there has been a concern regarding their accountability to public organisations — something which goes beyond the MoI's normal practices. The MoI has interpreted accountability narrowly due to the secrecy concerns mentioned in the administrative tradition.

The MoI's administration, including the minister, preferred to keep their secrecy in order to protect the MoI and the public good. In this regard, the administrative system policy capacity of the ministry may be said to have limited.

Chapter 6: ANALYTICAL POLICY CAPACITY

Introduction

Analytical policy capacity plays a significant role in the formation of the policy capacity, specifically with regards its role in informing executive governments about future projections and current developments (Lodge and Wegrich 2014, p. 14).

In line with this, this chapter aims to address the following research questions:

- To what extent and how are the MoI members equipped with relevant knowledge, analytical skills and experience?

- To what extent do the tradition, structure and processes of the MoI as well as daily routines and emergency issues allow the bureaucrats to think about and analyse issues?

- What is the overall knowledge policy capacity of other related Turkish and international institutions?[134]

I will evaluate the different aspects of analytical capacity of the MoI and discuss whether these comply with the framework and definitions found in literature. Specifically, I will focus on the following aspects:

- the intellectual dimensions of policy making;

- the importance of information, evidence, and other resources in choosing between different policy options;

- tradition of value for knowledge and academic studies;

- the availability of skilful people who have experience and good relations with knowledge institutions; and

- leverage of knowledge institution.

The first section of this chapter presents some analytical skills of individuals making up the MoI's policy capacity. Notably, most individuals accepted that knowledge, academic research and analytical skills were important, however, findings revealed a varying picture for both pessimistic and optimistic opinions. In the second section, findings on the organisational analytical capacity

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[134] I mean universities, public knowledge institutions such as TODAIE, TUIK, think tanks such as SETA, TESEV, TEPAV, and private (research) companies such as Technopolis, Orange etc. as knowledge institutions.

are evaluated through the perspective of the underlying cultural values towards knowledge and academic studies. Finally, the third section presents findings on the systemic analytical capacity of MoI by focusing on relation with related knowledge institutions through gaps, enablers and barriers.

6.1   Individual Analytical Policy Capacity

At the individual level, findings of this thesis showed different opinions. The majority of the participants had relatively optimistic views although a few asserted pessimistic ideas. Optimistic side pointed out advantage of being deep-rooted traditional ministry.

> Our administration has been central to the public administration machine of Turkey. The MoI has invaluable knowledge and experience thanks to the skilful prefects. In my opinion, we are the best. (DGD3, TI)

On the other hand, a few had pessimistic views on the overall individual analytical capacity and the overall public administration.

> I do not think that, except for a few instances, we have such kind of capacity in MoI or overall Turkish public institutions. Unfortunately, there does not exist professional analytical capacity inside the public administration to feed [support] politics in making better policy and widening their views. (DU2, TI)

Below, findings on the important individual analytical skills are presented in view of two sets of competencies: Knowledge sets and skill sets.

6.1.1   Knowledge Sets

In this section, I will describe these knowledge sets:

- Knowledge of context and policy process (knowledge of the public administration system and its dynamics);

- Knowledge of the departmental and public sector environment;

- knowledge of the priorities of government and minister;

- Comparative -awareness of national and international experience and historical knowledge of own organization;

- Expertise for one's own task (see table 2, 1a) (Gleeson, 2009)

Knowledge of Context and Policy Process

In the literature, it is argued that knowledge of bureaucratic norms and processes, knowledge of public sector and political environment—knowing 'your own limitations' and knowing 'what you can do' and 'what you cannot do in this circumstance'—are as vital as knowledge of departmental context in finding opportunities for making policies and decision in line with the daily realities and government priorities (Gleeson, 2009, p. 171).

For MoI case, in general, the prefects expressed that they could know MoI's context regarding its practice and wide range duties. In Turkish administrative tradition, the seniors were considered to have better knowledge about the context, policy process and tradition than juniors. In fact, no participant was expected to know every aspect of a huge organisation such as MoI. As discussed previously in Chapter 5, prefects learn context—tasks and policy process—by practice and following the master-apprenticeship tradition.

You should not expect from juniors to know MoI completely since they have little experience in a central position. They could know their tasks and environment. The more they fulfil their duties and tackle daily challenges, not mention to promoting to senior positions, the more they can possess context knowledge and have a chance to observe the big picture of the MoI. (FGS3, TI)

Furthermore, one participant pointed out a challenge particularly for people who came into the department with no previous experience of government departments:

> You know that the state has a specific culture and procedures. Especially, newcomers do not know much about the context and institutional tradition of MoI. (GD5, TI)

In summary, the majority of the participants thought that they possessed sufficient knowledge on the public administration system and its dynamics, and viewed knowledge of the MoI's administration context and processes to be vital.

Field and Implementation Knowledge

As discussed in implementation task section (Chapter 5), the findings showed that the majority of the participants believed that prefects in central cadres had considerable knowledge in implementation and field due to their shared district experience and through problem-feedback evaluations. Indeed, a participant highlighted this views as follows:

> I can proudly express that because of district experience, our friends know about implementation and the field better than other public servants who work for other

ministries even the PM office. We know policies/decisions and how they affect the field. (DGD3, TI)

This knowledge has been helpful in administrating large successful projects and avoiding producing "pure" policy that is too impractical to be implemented.

> While developing the e-head of village project, our staff was aware of their [villagers] ages, educational background and computer skills, and more importantly, how to convince them to use it. Therefore, we designed simple tools and uploaded only the related rules which provide the users with a simple guide to upload basic data. Up to now [one-year implementation], we received high level usage: 26,000-27,000 users. Recently, the president applauded our project. (GD4, TI)

On the other hand, a few disagreed with the majority opinion. A sharp view was expressed by a participant working for one of the key stakeholders:

> I do not believe that local administration staff know municipalities and their context, process and also concerns since that there are not local administrators who came from municipalities' background inside the GD of the local administration. (Gungor_GS of Union, TI)

Despite of his assertion, almost all participant including ministers and MPs agreed that prefects have adequate field and implementation knowledge. They also advocated their positive opinions regarding knowledge of the public sector environment.

Knowledge of the Public Sector Environment

Findings revealed that prefects have knowledge on the external political environment.

> Since we all have a district governor background, we immediately recognise our environments. In central cadres, we [seniors] always monitor the PM's and our minister's speeches, government programmes, and especially media to find out any changes on policies. When we present a report to undersecretary or minister, we review it in line with current political priorities, expectations of citizens, etc. We must know what is happening and why it is happening, and how we can carry out our tasks and policy processes. Therefore, with a few exceptions, most prefects know about the external environment. (Yilmaz_FGD3, TI)

MoI members' knowledge on previous external political environment enable them to predict possible crisis, which was deemed central for tackling emergency issues.

While I was working in General Directory of Migration Administration, Syrian civil war was about to outbreak. We monitored their situation closely regarding any migration towards our borders. We had already known that this kind of civil war like as so-called "Arab Spring Revolution" caused a refugee crisis for neighbouring countries. Besides humanitarian and national concerns, we derived lessons from previous instances: we knew that international pressure could force us to accept them [refugees]. (LA3, TI)

The study participants mentioned that they did not have the luxury to ignore the external political environment as a lack of awareness would pose challenges in responsiveness to emergencies. The participants had expressed that lack of knowledge was likely cause irreparable results. Therefore, they must monitor important events and issues.[135]

We must be aware of topics, which are relevant to our ministry. We monitor media, relevant international reports, and academic publications; keep in touch with our seniors and inner circles of the minister to find out his priorities or concerns. Mostly, we focus current events and issues which have been on the agenda for 15-20 days or will occur in a short time. (GD6, TI)

The participants expressed that they (even juniors) needed to be careful about any changes in the external environment and avoid misinforming the minister about the authorising environment since such mistakes could not be tolerated.

We presented hourly information to our minister during the Gezi Demonstration. The event happened at 09.00 a.m., and the media interviewed him at 10.00 a.m. We had to inform our minister before the media questioned him. So, we were supposed to gather information as soon as possible. We managed to do it on time. (FGS3, TI)

Recently, formal training policy targeted knowledge gaps in the internal and external environments.

We came to realise the knowledge gap in political realities, priorities and developments both within and outside our country after conducting the report on the training needs amongst our colleagues. Therefore, we invited our PM, ministers and key bureaucrats and academics. Despite their busy agenda, they, including our honourable PM, took the time to give speech to our friends. In these training activities, they shared their views and gave invaluable information on what is going on and the current political concerns

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[135] The role and the reports of Research Centre will be demonstrated in following part.

as well as their views on the current events and issues. Recently, terror and security concerns have been highlighted. (GD7, TI)

This account also show that knowledge of the priorities of the government and minister has been important for prefects.

Knowledge of the Priorities of the Government and Minister

Turkish administrative tradition strengthens the responsiveness and concurred with the programmes of the minister and the government.

> When we prepare official reports, such as strategic plans, and performance and annual reports; we review government programmes including party programmes, and speeches of our minister and the PM. This is because we must prepare a report that compares our policies or implementation with related government papers. (HD1, TI)

Supporting the minister's position is achieved through the knowledge of the style, ideas, priorities, and concerns of the minister. Mistakes and even faithful criticism was not tolerated in this regard. It was stated that the administration could respond to the ministers' demand and reflect the political reality of the day (see chapter 5 for further details).

Awareness of National and International Experience and Historical Knowledge of Own Organization

Prefects value knowledge on the history of the MoI—a finding which stressed MoI's administrative tradition. Historical knowledge could be associated with IM which includes information on pre-tested and reliable methods that can be used to deal with the daily problems as well as unexpected, new and future challenges. Namely, prefects must possess historical knowledge in order to ensure the continuity of the existing system. The following comment by an administrator supports this statement:

> It was like this before, so we do it in the same way. (FGS3, TI)

The MoI administration, especially that during the reform era, value knowledge on foreign countries as they think this helps them deal with similar issues. Therefore, the MoI sent prefects abroad to investigate the systems of foreign countries, and conduct academic research to allow relevant comparisons with Turkey.

In addition, the MoI administration officially prepared and published reports and books which aim to introduce the public administration system of foreign countries.[136] Their aim was simple and pragmatist: to adopt a better administration/management system, where possible. The majority of participants argued that knowledge of international context was common among their colleagues.

> Yes, there is a well-developed capacity inside the MoI. While regulating local reforms, we conducted research on foreign experience, regulations and structures. Thus, we adopted examples from different European countries. I can say that there have not been outstanding deficiencies regarding outside knowledge. (CI2, TI)

Knowledge of public administration of foreign countries was seen to be obligatory by prefects—a finding which stressed the pioneer role of the MoI amongst other ministries.

> I think we have been pioneer ministry, so we have no chance to ignore outside developments. In this highly dynamic and interactive world, lack of knowledge could cause detrimental consequences and that cannot be compensated. For instance unless we monitor outside, we could not understand that cyber security has been concerned. (DGD7, TI)

Some also had optimistic opinions on the value of comparative knowledge:

> It is my observation that while analysing problems, developing proposals and determining policies in the ministry, our friends' knowledge and experience from abroad are being used effectively. (LA1, TI)

Some stressed the importance of the support and encouragement from political-administrators for mentality changes.

> Our top-administration encourage us to compare our experience with that of the foreign countries while we were working on regulation in the internal security package. (GD1, TI)

Ministers who participated in the study confirmed these opinions:

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[136] For instance: "Administration in 21 st Century" was written by prefects in 2003. This book is examined broadly the governance structures of 25 countries in the world including: "Development of Management Structure in Historical Process, Factors Determining the Management System, Constitutional Structure, General Management Structure, Emergency State, Internal Security, Financial Management, Public and Semi Public Organizations, Citizen's Management, Current Developments and Problems in Public Administration."
Another recent instance, during 2015-2019 strategic plan preparation phase, according to official web site, related expert staff investigated strategic plans of several foreign countries [regardless having different public administration system] including USA, Germany, England [UK], New Zealand, Canada and Finland (MoI, 2015a)

> I encouraged my friends to go abroad and learn about recent public administration
> methods and tools. I was happy with their efforts. We were able to develop and
> implement successful projects using the knowledge and experience they gained abroad.
> (Former Minister 1, TI)

As discussed previously in the training section (Chapter 5), new departments were established in reform era with a view to train the members on their tasks and increase their individual knowledge by visits to other ministries and joint meeting and seminars. The participants stated that establishment of such departments was crucial in addressing gaps in their knowledge. (HD2, TI) A member from the training department supported this idea:

> We sent our training specialists to other ministries to allow them to examine external
> training programs. They examined and reported the training programs run by the
> Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Customs and Trade,
> and the State Personnel Department. We've been trying to take advantage of this
> knowledge now. (GD7, TI)

As discussed earlier, more than 130 prefects[137] were appointed to senior positions in several outside public departments temporarily, whereas a few of these appointments were permanent. Most of these administrators returned to the MoI. Most participants agreed that they increased their knowledge on public administration.

> I went to the PM Office. This experience not only increased my knowledge but also
> changed my opinions. You could see the big picture. In my opinion, for senior civil
> servants, serving different ministries should be compulsory like it is in Denmark.
> (Avsarbey_CI3, TI)

Despite the prevalent perception of success, the MoI has still suffered from expert knowledge on specific tasks.

Expertise Needed to Carry out Tasks

The majority of participants pointed out deficiencies in expert knowledge on specific tasks. One sample account was:

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[137] A few permanent posts include the Undersecretary of the PM (the highest-level bureaucratic position in the Turkish Public Administration), the General Director of TRT [national TV and radio]; the GD of Telecom; the Undersecretaries of several ministries; etc. They shared their colloquies' success outside the MoI. This seems to have recovered their confidence against the NPM's reform pressure.

To be honest, despite of having a few open-minded training experts, we could not say that we have enough expertise in developing policies, improving practices, and delivering training. You mostly have to work with the administration staff [rather than expert]. How could you plan and implement training programmes without expert knowledge on modern training techniques? (GD7, TI)

All participants welcomed the recently recruited expert personnel to MoI's several sections. Furthermore, they all agreed that this practice must be maintained if the MoI wishes to create shared IM and tackle complicated environments and issues, all of which require expert knowledge. Some department has come to fore regarding their personnel policy such as departments of IT, EU, Migration, and Strategy.

Study findings demonstrated that although the IT is a relatively new department which deals with cyber threats, it was seen to be successful in recruiting expert personnel's and appropriate benefit from their skills. Indeed, the knowledge of these newcomers, i.e. ICT specialists, was applauded by both prefects of IT and other prefects.

Because of our job, we need highly expert personnel. Therefore, we recruited ICT specialists. Their knowledge of the ICT system is very good. So far, we have successfully allocated a substantial budget to ICT projects. (GD4, TI)

Another department, which needed expert knowledge was the Strategy Department. Considering the difficulties in preparing strategic plans in the traditional ministry, these departments had to recruit and train expert personnel to meet expectations by pushing top-down public administration reforms dominated by NPM tools. The prefects from these departments applauded their expert personnel's individual capacity although some highlighted several gaps and concerns.

Our first strategic plan was mostly prepared by a private company staffed by academics whereby our staff adopted only a supportive role. On the other hand, I can proudly say that we prepared the second strategic plan with solely by the invaluable efforts of our personnel.[138] If you look both plans, you can see that the second one better complies with our ministry's tradition. (GD1, TI)

In terms of prefects' expert knowledge, the study findings revealed that despite some barriers such as high turnover, lack of background information, and training as generalist; the prefects applauded both their and their friend's adaptation skills gained through informal training, i.e.

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[138] Note that the situational analyses for second strategic plan were prepared by a private company (MoI, 2015a).

learning by doing and master-apprenticeship tradition. They were also aware of the obligation to develop the expert knowledge necessary to fulfil their duties, and even unfamiliar tasks such as ICT, budget process, training programmes, and EU relations.[139]

6.1.2   Skill Sets

In this section, I will describe skill sets (see table2, 1b) regarding below list respectively.

- conceptual and data analytical skills;

- Strategic-thinking, political and intuition skills;

- Policy making skills;

- Counselling, communication and interpersonal (advisory) skill;

- Other skills: Writing, foreign language, project administration skills (Gleeson, 2009).

Conceptual and Data Analytical Skills

As discussed in the framework section in Chapter 3, existing literature argues that the conceptual skills are critical for formulating policy, identifying problems, framing options, and understanding the consequences of different choices (i.e Gleeson, 2009 and Hughes, 2014). However, prefects stated very few opinions on conceptual skills. One pessimistic view highlighted the existing opinions.

> Honestly, I doubt methodology. You know that methodology in social science has been weak in Turkey. Similarly, we easily ignore it in our bureaucratic practice. Therefore, we are not good at setting the framework of issues, developing solutions and policies within this framework. Instead, we struggle to tackle issues gropingly as we do in districts. Of course, this also prevents us from creating long-term policies. Hopefully, the existing opportunities for monitoring media, going abroad, learning foreign languages and conducting academic research, which is supposed to improve our analytical and methodological skills, have changed the provincial mentality and daily base thinking a bit. (Atbas_FGD2, TI)

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[139] i.e. DGD 5, DGD6, DGD4, GD7 and HD2, TI.

In facts, it was unlikely to receive comments in the interviews on the perceived lack of conceptual skills since the participants were unfamiliar with this topic with a few exceptions, such as below:

> For instance, while I was doing a master's degree in the UK, I learned how to prepare proposals. We need to develop a proposal in a similar format before conducting any research and writing reports in the RC. I told my friends to follow the format I learned in my master's whenever you write proposals and reports for the RC. Actually, our friends could internalise this style, so that we can prepare successful reports relatively easier than the previously used fragmented format. (GD6, TI)

Similar to strategic skills, lack of conceptual skills was not identified as a significant issue by prefects as the prefects value the traditional way of understanding and addressing issues rather than valuing academic-based skills.

On the other hand, the ability to interpret research findings, and understanding the role of data and research in policy development were not completely ignored by the prefects. However, some of them asserted that individual data analysis and research skills were lacking within the MoI. One representative account was:

> I think that we have problems with data analysis and research before proposing policies. For instance, the Civil Registry Department has valuable data. We have difficulties in analysing such turning them into useful information that could inform policies and decisions. (GD6, TI)

Similarly, one recent situation analysis (MoI, 2015a) pointed out that the MoI need to increase individual and organisational analytical capacity needed to evaluate data and conduct research to make better policies. The main findings from the analysis of internal and external stakeholder opinions indicated that there is a need to improve and address the analytical gaps in the following services:

- analysis of crime and migration data/statistics,

- development and implementation of security and migration policies to ensure security and public order,

- gathering of information on general and provincial policies in order to develop appropriate policies,

- conducting research, producing statistical data on local administrations, and evaluating them for the development of local administrations,

- preparing population and life statistics of citizens, following population movements and collating reports to inform the improvement of civil registry policies (MoI, 2013d).

In sum, this report pointed out that more attention needs to be paid to the development and implementation of policies and practices based on information and databases, which in turn should improve the Ministry's level of success.

Prefects identified several barriers of data analysis, research and evaluation skills which hindered their individual analytical capacity. The first one was associated with the existence of "too much fragmented information", which made it challenging to easily unpick relevant information.

What statistical data will you access to analyse? Which statistical data will be correlated, and what results will you attain? These are all unclear. So, there is a problem in transforming data into systematic knowledge that could form the basis of policy proposals. For example, we have lots of inspection reports, but are we converting these reports into a systematic knowledge? I do not think so. (CI1, TI)

The second identified barrier was the shortage of expert personnel who could appropriately conduct research and analyse data. Indeed, although not all the participants implicitly expressed concerns around this issue, it was stated that the MoI did not have enough individuals with appropriate training in analytical skills.

We suffered from adequate staff who had analytical skills. This kind of task has been fulfilled by ordinary administration staff. How could they undertake such tasks without appropriate skills? (HD1, TI)

The third identified barrier was related to the prevalent organisational tradition, structure, and processes which prevented improvements in individual analytical capacity. Sample quotes pointed out the importance of top-down influence.

I could not say that the MoI does not have skilful staff; on the contrary we do. To be honest, we [administrative tradition] do not encourage individuals to improve their skills. (DU1, TI)

In my opinion, uncertainty has been a barrier for producing knowledge. We cannot properly use data [for knowledge development] without top's support in such kind of internal environment [referring to the command and control tradition]. (CI6, TI)

Busy daily life has been another important barrier in both coping with and surviving upcoming challenges.

Our Civil Registry department is responsible for identifying citizens. However, this department is not able to answer crucial questions. For instance, how do the characteristics and size of our population impact our economy, politics, and public services? More importantly, with regards to the increasing population settlements in specific areas, what will the repercussions of this kind of demographic shift be? We have neither been able to come forward with relevant foresight nor create policies based on these predictions. This is because we have not been competently assessing available data. Undoubtedly, the daily busy schedules of the senior administrators restrain their ability to undertake such projects with appropriate rigour. (Atbas_FGD2, TI)

In sum, considering these barriers, there being significant deficiencies of data analysis, research and evaluation skills of MoI's individuals. Similarly, having (or not) strategic thinking needs further attention.

Strategic-thinking, Political and Intuition Skills

Strategic-thinking and political skills are considered as important competencies for senior public servants in literature (Gleeson, 2009, p. 177). For MoI case, strategic skills were not identified as key skills in the interviews, whereas political astuteness and intuitive judgement were identified as a very important competencies for the prefects (see in political capacity chapter 7).

In these interviews, intuitive judgment referred to the intuition and knowledge of both ministerial will and political environment. Prefects considered themselves to know 'what will fly and what will not fly' due to their district experience and the MoI's problem-feedback evaluation practice.

Short-term foresight was also seen as an important element of judgement. This was defined as the 'ability to imagine short-term future scenarios and to predict which issues were likely to become political priorities in the near future' (ibid). Prefects believed they had a decent ability to fulfil their tasks with regard to short-term foresight.

Ilhami Agabey[140] asked me three days ago whether or not I saw the newspaper headlines on Tsipras's[141] Izmir visit. He advised me to prepare some briefing notes on the Syrian Refugee crises, since Tsipras is likely to meet with our PM. Therefore, the MoI and our minister will be required to prepare briefing material to guide conversations.

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[140] PPS of the Minister
[141] PM of Greece.

Today, our undersecretary called me and asked me to start preparations with Atilla
Agabey[142]. (GD5, TI)

Not all prefects agreed that they had the adequate skills for analysing, making, evaluating and
implementing policies to provide the minister appropriate guidance for developing better policies
or reaching appropriate decision. The findings also showed that the problem solving-based
practice forces the administrators to find ways around problems to overcome obstacles. Majority
believed that despite of altruistic effort, prefects need to improve their individual analytical
capacities.

Yes, we can do this. But to what extent? The professional and analytical capacity do not
exist within the MoI. In addition, our hierarchical structure does not encourage such
practices [analytically approaching these issues]. (DU2, TI)

Similarly, policy making skills are also determined by MoI's administrative tradition, structure, and
everyday life, not mention their practitioner background.

Policy Making Skills

As discussed earlier in Chapter 5, the study findings showed that the prefects were thought to be
successful in adopting appropriate policy development. It was highlighted that informal training
which involved master-apprenticeship practice and learning by doing was more helpful than
formal training in public policy and/or public administration for attaining a clear understanding of
the organisational and political environment for policy making. (FPPS1, TI). However, some
participants disagreed with this assertion.

Let us consider policy making skills. For God sake, would you be able to tell me how
many prefects have this skills? To be fair to them I cannot say they have no skills. They
do have some skills that allow them to conduct their routine tasks. However, these skills
are not comprehensive by any means. (GD5, TI)

Concerns about existing skills gap and barriers were predominantly related prevalent
administrative tradition within the MoI as well as the challenging external policy making
environment.[143] This has been supported by concerns regarding lack of initiative. Some believed
that leader-based Turkish administrative tradition had been intensive. The quote below
represents this view:

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[142] GD of the Migration Administration
[143] See in political capacity chapter 7.

Policy and decision making is always through a top-down process… Prefects cannot take such actions using their initiative. Such a thing would be unimaginable since their capacity and power to take initiative has been abolished. The seniors push prefects to respond to their wishes promptly… Who is the most skilful prefects? The answer is simple: the one who can obey orders in the shortest time. Analytical skills, contributing to and evaluating existing processes, and innovation and effectively executed projects are irrelevant. (Yildiz_FPPS3, TI)

Contrary to above opinion on policy making skills, prefects were perceived as skilful regarding counselling, communication and interpersonal competences.

Counselling, Communication and Interpersonal Skills (the ability to give, receive and follow advice)

As it was discussed in detail in Chapter 5 participants thought that prefects were successful in providing advice although they struggled when coming forward with speak the truth.

Prefects were applauded for their communication and interpersonal skills. These skills were found to be appropriate for coordinating and collaborating both within the MoI and with neighbouring ministries, the PM and the President office, the parliament, and high courts. In addition, it was believed that the prefects had a good reputation in Ankara. It was also noted that the prefects used to collaborate with public bodies more than collaborating with academia, media and citizen.[144]

Other skills: Writing, foreign language, project administration skills

Several other skills were briefly mentioned in the interviews. These are summarised below. Overall, there was negligible concern regarding the preparation of routine documents.

Our staff is good at writing. They can prepare brief documents that meet seniors' expectation. (DGD3, TI)

On the other hand, there were concerns in writing policy proposals, responding to queries and demands of individuals outside the MoI. Low level administration staff were not expected to undertake such tasks. This was confirmed by my observations. A considerable number of the senior participants were busy with editing documents during my interview visits (FWNB). They showed me papers and complained sarcastically. For example, one said:

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[144]See in depth in coordination and collaboration outside the MoI in task chapter 5.

Look at what I am doing now my dear brother! Believe me, this is better than most of the papers I see at this job. The MoI seniors have to deal with such papers. There being instances where they even rewrite the whole document. (Gunduzoz_GD8, TI)

The prefects were concerned about the proper writing skills, particularly those skills that could enable the staff to efficiently communicate issues, and support decision making by providing accurate comparisons of available policy options. One of the participants expressed this concern as follows:

> When I was the GS, some department staff were able prepare [write] clear, brief reports which hit the target. However, others wished to avoid this responsibility. When they prepared reports, they lacked a clear focus, and did not meet expectations. (FGS1, TI)

As observed previous account, prefects utilise abroad experience to improve writing skills of their staff. In the following section, I will argue other impact of foreign language skills on individual analytical capacity.

According to findings political administrators valued foreign languages skills the most. These skills were seen vital for improving the knowledge on the public administration experience of foreign countries, and conducting robust research on administration policies, and more importantly for maintaining external affairs, especially EU relations. The participants highlighted that the number of prefects who have foreign language skills has been increasing. The governmental grey reports support this statement.[145]

Foreign language skills were seen to be obligatory for some tasks of the MoI.

> Prefects should know not just one, but at least two languages. Our country has been internationally active. For instance, nowadays migration and border control have become enormous issues. How could you collaborate with our foreign partners without foreign language? You cannot solely depend on translators. The MoI has been administrating various international and EU funded projects in which prefects have been taking active roles. We had to take on projects in line with our national interest. In sum, foreign language skills have been central for fulfilling most of our tasks. (LA3, TI)

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[145] For instance, there were 224 people who worked for the Central cadres and were graded several levels—A, B, C and D- according to "foreign language proficiency examination for state employees" in 2010. This number increased to 262 in 2015. (2010 and 2015 MoI 2011c, 2016c). Placing this kind of information in most grey reports could be an indication of the importance of foreign language skills for the MoI administration.

Similar to this skill, project administration skills were highlighted by some participants as being essential skills for prefects and administration staff. The participants thought that prefects were successful in undertaking project administration.

> I believe that prefects have been good at producing and administering important projects. For instance, MERNIS (the Central Civil Registration System), E-Icisleri (the Electronic Data Processing System) and KOYDES (Supporting Rural Infrastructure) Projects were all developed and implemented successfully. During our service, our honourable minister encouraged us to develop these kinds of projects. He sent some friends abroad to conduct foreign projects. Our main tasks have already been so important, but these projects have strengthened our skills and confidence.' (FPPS1, TI)

Interview findings showed that, during the reform era, willingness to strengthen relations with the EU and obligatory integration processes prompt improvements in individual analysis capacity, especially that regarding administrative projects involving collaborations with international institutes, particularly with the EU.

> When I was in charge, there were two main EU projects. One was related to human rights and the other one was called "Civilian Oversight of the Internal Security Forces"[146]. These projects were carried out with Denmark and England [the UK], respectively. These detailed studies that lasted for over three years were carried out successfully by our friends. This period was so useful for improving our project management skills. Our foreign partners also applauded our efforts in several platforms. (Yilmaz_FGD3, TI)

Findings indicated that the MoI has increasingly adapted project-based work since 2002. This shift has improved the project administration capacity of both the MoI and prefects. It should be stressed that some departments, especially those newly established in the reform era, have developed better projects and more successfully implemented skills compared with others.[147] Findings confirmed that even unfamiliar tasks such as ICT projects were successfully undertaken due to administrators' efforts that involved learning by doing and altruism.[148] Following section, I will assess organisational analytical capacity, which directly affects individual analysis capacity.

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[146] Police and Gendarme

[147] i.e. Names of departments and their projects are: The Civil Registry (MERNIS), Local Administration (Local Administration Reform), Provincial Administration with Migration Administration (several huge budget border security projects), IT (Pioneer several huge budget ICT projects), EU Relation and External Affairs (administering EU based projects), Department of Associations (supporting association projects), and Research Centre (Several researches and publishing official books.)

[148] Former Minister1, Atalay_Former Minister 3, and DGD4, TI.

6.2   Organisational Analytical Policy Capacity

The organisational analytical capacity of the MoI is discussed in this section under the following subheadings:

- Availability of reliable information (IM)

- Access to, and use of, information

- Conducting research, evidence knowledge production

- Evaluate reality, priority of minister and government policy (Gleeson, 2009)

Availability of knowledge is primary necessity for proper analytical policy capacity.

6.2.1   Availability of Reliable Information (IM)

As discussed in the above chapters, all participants agreed that reliable information with detailed IM (see table 2, 2a) is a necessity, and even obligatory, for fulfilling MoI's wide-ranging important tasks. Similar findings are found in the literature where IM has been found to be important in order to 'retell of the past to make sense of the present… to explain past practice and events to justify recommendations for the future' (Rhodes and Tiernan 2014b, p. 149).

> It is very important that the state has [must have] a strong memory. It is not possible to erase this memory, but it is important to remember that it is possible to forget it. Therefore, it is vital to store information to avoid sinking into oblivion. (FPPS1, TI)

My findings pointed out opposing opinions regarding the availability of reliable information. Some of the participants had optimistic views, whereas almost half raised significant concerns.

Optimistic side advocated that there was not much significant gaps in stored information. They argued that the MoI has enormous IM on many topics, stressing formal and informal IM.

> Of course, we also have electronic and classical archives. We benefit from both of them. Our human resource is also strong. In that sense, we have an immense human archive. So, there are always a couple of people who could know what happened in past and also provide information about previous documents. Thus, there is nothing to worry about IM. (DU1, TI)

On the other hand, pessimistic participants stated that a deep-rooted traditional ministry has IM, but this IM is mostly fragmented—stored by several departments' individual repositories. In other

words, the MoI does not have a systematic shared IM. As discussed in the literature review, lack of IM is not a new issue for the MoI. According to the MoI internal audit report, IM was not always systematically recorded, transferred and preserved inside the MoI in the form of a shared repository.

> In this study, it was seen that some departments had difficulty to find even recent statistical information and documents. For example, these units did not have the precise information about the number of employees who worked in their own institutions 10 years ago. Again, within the ministry, IM is randomly stored in archives without any systematic classification. Another issue was that IM has been solely dependent on individuals. For instance, ministerial speeches and minutes of external relation meetings were kept in the notes of GS of the MoI. Changing of the GS was likely to cause losses of this IM, since there were no official documents to demonstrate IM (MoI, 2008, p. 517).

Furthermore, findings did not support proper collaboration inside the MoI contrary to the optimistic accounts reported above. Therefore, this informal IM (unsystematic IM) could be interpreted as a barrier because of excessive dependency on individuals.

> I am in no doubt about it. When you need any information, you can find it. The problem has been that unless being requested, no one could know whether or not we have the requested information. (Ceber_CI4, TI)

Yet, there was consensus on the pragmatist and reflective power of MoI bureaucracy, a distinctive finding of this research. For instance, the participants advocated that in cases of emergency, for solving issues and protecting the MoI's image, the MoI administration could coordinate departments to combine available memories. Namely, tackling daily firefighting working practice in a highly dynamic internal and external environment could provide synergy for recalling IM through better collaboration.

> When issues are unearthed and solving/addressing them becomes vital, the MoI can identify hidden memories in several departments. This is not only the case for instances of security or crisis but also for daily routine issues. (GD5, TI)

Next, enablers and barriers of IM are discussed to further clarify these issues.

Enablers of Availability of Reliable Information

First, informal IM, conveying the norms and values of the organisational oral tradition through the generation as master-apprenticeship rituals, storytelling was seen as a good strategy for

improving the competence of the junior staff.[149] These can also be seen as a type of memory whose aim is to ensure continuity: "This is the way we do things around here."

Majority of participants expressed that they shared this memory with their successors who also confirmed that sharing.

> Previous GS informed me about the priorities and concerns in a short time. I benefitted from this memory. I also shared my experience with my successor. (FGS1, TI)

Namely, master-apprenticeship practice has been the hearth of the MoI practices. Most participants shared their experience stressing the importance of informal sharing of IM. They noted that the experience and knowledge of the existing staff—'what is in their heads'—should not be ignored, in line with existing literature (Pollitt, 2009, p. 201).

Second, the findings of the study indicated that individual efforts and cautious manner ensured the storage of IM

> I ordered my juniors and staff to register and store everything systematically. I stressed that saying 'even if I write something on the napkin paper, you should put into its file'. Thankfully, they listened [obeyed] to me, and we gradually created IM. (GD5, TI)

Even some tended to store every paper, which were signed by them adopting a cautious attitude. (Yildiz_FPPS3, TI)

Third, recently, the intensive use of ICT infrastructure by the MoI has created a chance to fill the gaps with regard to IM since ICT systems allow the storage of big data. Some stated that creating portals provided a useful infrastructure for the IM.

> We have developed "Electronic Records Management System", which allowed the MoI to create electronic IM. We also benefitted from this system by storing our memory, including projects, reports, and correspondence both within and outside the MoI. (DGD 4, TI)

Barriers of Availability of Reliable Information

Concern about unsystematic shared IM existed within the MoI administration. The quotes below represent the most frequent concerns expressed by the participants:

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[149] See informal training in Chapter5.

Claiming a lack of IM inside the MoI would be unfair to the deep-rooted traditional ministry. Nevertheless, to claim a systematic shared memory would be too optimistic. Namely, sources [information] are likely to be available throughout the MoI, in case of need, but we could not locate them easily. (DU2, TI)

So it is a little bit hard to say that we have a systematically organised archive system. After producing and using information [memory] for specific aims [daily necessity or firefighting], we used to store them in the departments storage unsystematically, as if this information and documents would not be used again. If someone needs this memory, they would need to check availability and after that ask someone else to release it to them. (GD6, TI)

First, some applauded individual memory, which is also vital; however, this kind of informal IM also can be seen as unsystematic memory. It is closely related to the high turnover of prefects, a situation which has a detrimental effect on IM. Therefore, 'It is so difficult to establish prefect-based IM due to the high turnover' (DU2, TI). Important concerns related to high turnover were the lack of expert people who could maintain the IM of the MoI. The majority of the participants stressed that it was obligatory to recruit more interior expert staff to fulfil permanent duties of the MoI. (Yildiz_FPPS3, TI)

Second, ignoring IM was another issue expressed by a few participants.

One day, the GS told me that: "There are speech notes, do you want to take these? Otherwise, we will bin them." Can you believe it?! I mentioned before, we had been looking for them everywhere. They locked invaluable documents in a paper cabinet. We took them and classified them. (GD5, TI)

The participants complained about recent public administration reforms and regulations that have encourage the staff to ignore the IM, and form new regulations based on foreign countries' best experience rather than own (departmental) experience.[150]

In the reform era, the aim to diminish the role of the public sectors affected IM. Proponents of the public administration reform assumed that the sole reasons for maladministration were previous culture, practice and structure. They wished to throw away all of the past [IM] in a radical way. Therefore, for them, archives and libraries were unnecessary. (Atbas_FGD2, TI)

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[150] (Gunduzoz_GD8, TI; LA2, TI; CI4, TI)

Third, as discussed previously, the MoI administration works in a highly dynamic internal and external environment. Although recent reforms have aimed to diminish public sector roles, there has not been a significant decrease in MoI's daily workload pressure due to increasing importance of security, law enforcement and border security, all of which limit the time the prefects can use to focus on developing a systematic IM. Furthermore, unfamiliar topics such as ICT, EU relations, challenging border administration projects; have shifted the concerns to the struggle for filling the information gaps on these issues in a timely manner. Coping with and surviving have always been a priority regardless of the ability to recall IM. This quote below stressed daily pressure.

> Recently, our tempo has accelerated by [unexpected] current events. We did not have a
> chance to search the archive to establish we did yesterday [the past]. Unless we have
> recalled the previous documents [relevant to the current task], we just took on the daily
> task and passed it on as soon as possible. (DU2, TI)

Fourth, as one previous research study stressed that 'past experience is not always directly relevant to current challenges because the context may have changed' (Gleeson, 2009, p. 284), similarly, a few participants highlighted this in their conversations about IM in a dynamic external political environment.

> Could you use previous reports without any revision? No! Of course you can distil
> lessons from previous work. But, you should consider the latest concerns and situation.
> Do we do this in a proper way? No, I do not think so. Instead, we are inclined to choose
> two extreme ways: We either exactly present previous documents without revision or
> go back to the drawing board [start from scratch] ignoring invaluable previous effort.
> (GD1, TI)

Fifth, the findings identified that the lack of appropriate collaboration prevented the establishment of a shared IM. A few participants asserted that sometimes several departments were likely to work on the same issues without being aware of each other's work.

> I was in charge of finding out how to decrease red tapes and regulate public service
> standards for the ministry. After searching for two months, we understood that several
> departments including our Inspector Board had already done some work on these
> topics. (Ceber_CI5, TI)

Former chief inspectors supported this finding by putting more emphasis on the prevalent structure and tradition.

There is a mess with regard to IM. Each department has their own memory; however, whether there is a proper [systematic] memory is debatable. Also, because of high personnel turnover, there sometimes may be no who knows what happened three years ago. (Yilmaz_FGD3, TI)

In sum, in addition to the prevalent tradition that did not favour collaboration, the MoI's structure and processes seemed to obstruct collaboration.

6.2.2 Access to Information

The ability to access information (see table 2, 2b) was pointed out strongly in the interviews. Some had optimistic views. One claimed that: 'inside the MoI, we are able to access information in two shakes [easily]' (DU1, TI).

In addition to the formal policy process and established relations, informal networks (brotherhood tradition) was seen to be helpful in accessing information (recalling IM).

> Namely, you know 3-5 people who are well-known in some specific area [topics/tasks]. Mostly, while you are chatting with your colleagues, if you ask them 'We are going to work on this topic, do you know anyone who could be helpful for dealing with this topic?' Likely, one of them will point out someone referring to his previous reports or thesis. For instance, imagine someone asked about building analysis capacity, I would refer you to them. Once we contact them, we are likely to get his previous work. Even this kind of hidden memory could be revealed. (LA2, TI)

The Office of the Undersecretary and some departments, especially the Inspector Board and the Strategy Department, appeared to have better access to information regarding policy making, inspection and coordination. As mentioned above, sources were mostly available in each department's storage and human archive.

On the other hand, the critical participants asserted that due to the lack of a proper shared IM, secrecy concerns, risk awareness practice, use of information for one's on benefit, and lack of a proper collaboration practice; departments were likely to be unwilling to share their memory with other departments. It was mentioned that sharing IM with outsiders would be almost impossible. The fieldwork section of this study uncovered various instances that showed the difficulty of accessing information including internal audit reports. (FWNB) One quote demonstrated how this could be exaggerated even in case of preparation an official report.

> While we were preparing the book on the "History of the MoI", we encountered some obstacles. However, we prepared this book for MoI under the ministry's authority, even

though could not access the MoI archives. We wished to enter the PPS archive, but we could not get the approval to access that information. Can you believe this? We assumed that they were anxious to reveal some information without their control. Who are we? Why do we reveal information which could be harmful our ministry? (GD6, TI)

This could be interpreted as lack of transparency, although it should be noted that some grey reports are published every year dictated by law.

6.2.3   Conducting Research, Knowledge of Evidence Production, and Use of Information

This could be closely associated with value for knowledge and pragmatism (see table 2, 2c) Furthermore, individual style was dominant in appreciating new information. The participants reminded me that most policies come from the minister or undersecretary. If the minister or undersecretary demanded and supported advice, the administrators would struggle to search, analyse and prepare concrete suggestions. For example, a previous minister who has and academic background prompted some reports such reports on internal report on overall policy capacity (MoI, 2008) and education necessities (MoI, 2009), and tended to work with think tanks such as SETA and TESEV. However, recently ministers have not supported this kind of research. The participants highlighted that, some reports prepared during the predecessor ministers' terms would be left on dusty shelves until recent events forced the reconsideration of these reports.

On the other hand, findings revealed significant barriers for conducting research, producing knowledge of evidence and using this information in the policy process. These barriers included the administrative tradition, political priorities, busy daily life filled with firefighting practices, lack of an appropriate collaboration practices, lack of systems for accessing, appraising, and filtering information as well as preserving shared IM, etc.

First, as indicated earlier, the MoI holds valuable statistics about the population, provinces, local administrations, and NGOs. Nevertheless, evaluating these statistics to develop further policies has been a secondary issue for the MoI administration. As discussed earlier the practice of "cope and survive" is long lived within the MoI. The policies are made mostly in an ad hoc and unreflective way.

> I think that we have problems with analysing data and conducting research prior to developing policy proposals. For instance, the Civil Registry Department has valuable data. We have difficulties in analysing this data and turning them into meaningful statistics and useful information for use in improving policies and decisions. (GD6, TI).

This concern was confirmed by grey reports which highlighted the following points:

- Conducting research, evaluating data, producing proper information were pointed out as the least successful area by both internal and external stakeholders.

- There were difficulties in collecting information about the general and special conditions of provinces and districts, and producing related policies.

- There was a need to prepare population and life statistics and follow population movements.

- The MoI must conduct research, and build, collect, evaluate and produce statistical information to develop local administrations (The MoI, 2013d).

Second, in the literature, tradition and leadership are very important for 'shaping an environment [which] facilitates the intelligent use of evidence for better policy work' (Gleeson 2009, p. 211). However, the findings showed that evidence-based policy was not a high priority within the MoI administration similar to statement of one recent literature.[151] The findings signified the pragmatist feature of this traditional ministry that preferred experience over evidence.

On the other hand, an exception was Minister Aksu and Atalay eras in which it could be observed that demand from political administrators could determine strong-evidence based policy making, although some of these were not fully implemented later on.

> For instance, when Besir Atalay[152] was the minister of the MoI, specifically the RC and inspector Board produced numerous reports. This is because he pushed them to go out of their comfort zone and conduct studies on "why do we do these" and "how can we develop alternative policies?" (Atbas_FGD2, TI)

Minister Atalay confirmed this statement.

> I was not in favour of routine work. I believe in academic research and value such studies. Therefore, I encouraged my friends [prefects] to see beyond the surface. This could be possible with in-depth research. I was aware of prefects' practical background. Therefore, I made them work with academics and think tanks. (Atalay_Former minister 3, TI)

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[151] 'Despite the popular rhetoric that policies should be designed to achieve real social objectives, an effective connection [of] research evidence [and] policymaking remains elusive [stemming from four factors]: political manipulation of evidence,… the difficulties in adopting the results of research evidence when these results are subject to multiple competing interpretations; ingrained cultural differences, which can restrict communication of research evidence,… and individual policy capacity of public servants' (Newman et al., 2017, p. 157).
[152] He had academician background. (Prof)

Yet, MoI's risk awareness practice, which warned that new knowledge might bring unexpected/unwanted responsibility has been a barrier for conducting research and effectively using research findings.

> Information is power that strengthens your position and broadens your horizon, but you should be mindful of unintended responsibilities. (CI6, TI)

Thus, command and control, and solely depending on ministerial discretion and approval have been barriers to the prefects in taking the initiative for conducting research and use research evidence.

Fourth, political priorities sometimes prevent effective use of evidence (Gleeson, 2009, p. 216). The quote below is in line with this statement:

> Of course, while we are reading each inspection report, we follow governmental and ministerial priorities and check that the reports avoid mistakes or disharmony. If you ask me whether we evaluate the report in order to see the big picture and identify concerns, or determine further policies and decisions, I can say that we do not undertake such kind of evaluation in practice. (CI4, TI)

Furthermore, as discussed in the previous tradition chapter, urgent ministerial demands surrounding the practice of "hurriedness" as well as top-down policy pressure has been a main barrier to the political administrators for using the effective information in the policy process.

Fifth, as discussed in the individual analysis skills part, although information has generally been available, the MoI has been disadvantaged by the skills of its members with regard to accessing, appraising and filtering information, processes which are supposed to be vital for policy development and implementation.

> There is a problem in the systematic process of transforming data into systemic knowledge. For example, we have a lot of inspection reports, but we cannot say that these inspections are a systematically analysed and presented to the minister, or they are used to change policies. Instead, there have been complex, fragmented structure and processes dominated by individual and political influences. (CI1, TI)

Sixth, a common theme in the interviews was the challenge of finding time for policy work amid the day-to-day pressures of responding to requests for advice and administration in operational areas of the department. However, some participants agreed with the benefits of gathering evidence and beginning policy analysis early in anticipation of opportunities that might arise. They

pointed out barriers stemming from the highly dynamic internal and external political environment within the tradition of the MoI.

Finally, however, detailed knowledge was needed to conduct research on especially new policies. Lack of collaboration between different parts of the department makes gathering information difficult. Furthermore, lack of a proper shared IM as well as gaps in internal information (quantitative or qualitative data) prevented the conduct of in-depth research.

6.2.4   Evaluating Reality, Priority of the Minister, and Government Policy

As argued in the previous chapters, prefects wish to support their minister as well as his position. To what extent and how they could put this willingness into practice depend on the area and period and have been debatable. The majority of the participants applauded their effort for supporting their minister, although some criticism on individual capacity and organisational barriers was expressed (see table 2, 2d and Chapter 4 and 5 for a detailed discussion).

6.3   Knowledge System Policy Capacity

In this section, I will describe the knowledge system capacity, which is a broader level of analytical capacity.

6.3.1   Institutions for Knowledge

For MoI, this category includes universities, public research institutions, think tanks, ICT or research based private companies as institutions for knowledge (see table 2, 1c). The research findings indicated that, although there were some collaborations with knowledge institutions, the MoI has not had strong and permanent relationships with them.

> In the end, if we think of all the knowledge as a pool, we should share it with the outside
> to enlarge that information source. However, neither we nor universities did it. (CI1, TI)

Instead, there being difficulties in accessing the necessary statistical information, academic research, government reports, and information from other jurisdictions and agencies. Further, the MoI did not benefit enough from the systemic knowledge capacity. The MoI tended to use systemic knowledge where was a lack of knowledge and experience inside the MoI; specifically, the new public administration tools introduced in the reform era forced the MoI to adopt a pragmatist approach to address the demands of the reform pressure. On the other hand, the MoI

has not been willing to share its knowledge with knowledge institutions, even with other ministries. Before arguing barrier and enablers of knowledge system capacity, it is worth to mention the role of the RC.

6.3.2   Awareness of the Need for Change: Centre of Research of the MoI

Unit of Research Centre (RC) (see table2, 3b) was established in the year 2000 as 'a think tank unit with the support and approval of the MoI top administration to fill the strategic and analytical deficiency in the field of home affairs' (Sen, 2015, pp. 84-85). The necessity for the RC was mostly accepted by participants:

> We need to look at events and issues in a more analytical way. Therefore, we should not depend on our existing knowledge. Of course, the MoI has done its most tasks successfully. Yet, we would have better developed our capacity to analyse issues using different approaches. Therefore, the RC was established to get a broader knowledge on the inside and outside of Turkey. (CI2, TI)

We did not have any problems with practice. However, we need to marry our practice with theory. The RC was established to fill this gap. Actually, they could do it a bit. (LA2, TI)

According to head of RC, the RC was working in close contact with academia, civil societies and the private sector. Their activities involved extensive fieldwork, brainstorming and roundtable meetings, briefings, and visits to other countries. The RC had a relatively free and flexible space to manoeuvre; they could act outside the bureaucratic constraints, yet this solely depended on the discretion of the minister and the undersecretary, as well as their command and control. Nonetheless, this flexibility has had pros and cons, including choosing methods, flexible working times as pros; lack of permanent structure, statute and budget as cons. (GD6, TI)

The RC reported directly to the undersecretary and the Minister. After monitoring and analysing the national and international institutions as well as their reports related to Turkey, and the MoI tasks specifically, the RC presented reports to top administration and also published some of them on official websites. Members of the RC believed that they could accumulate knowledge and act as a bridge through which MoI could access systemic knowledge. (GD6, TI)

Findings revealed that the concern and demand for support have not always existed. The RC was used and supported intensively by a few ministers and undersecretaries. However, their members claimed that they could generate strategies that were significantly innovative compared to the prevalent policies of the MoI in the early 2000s—they published over 20 books and conducted

more than 20 projects. However, most of their proposed strategies could not be put into action during those years as they challenged the status quo within the MoI as well as the country.

So far, I have introduced the capacity of the RC from their standpoint and the content of their official websites. However, when I asked other participants "to what extent and how did the RC contribute to the systemic capacity of the MoI; in other words, how did they act as a bridge between the MoI and knowledge societies", the responds demonstrated mostly pessimistic views. Nevertheless, the participants respected their colleagues' efforts, although they pointed out that the RC has been losing power in the recent years.

> The RC was used effectively as an advisory centre for the ministers until 2009, but it was not able to institutionalise. Now, I do not think they can contribute our knowledge and advisory capacity due to the several reasons, including lack of expert staff, inadequate budget and more importantly, its vague status. Even, we [the Strategy Department] did not work with them on any projects and tasks.[153] (HD2, TI)

Findings revealed that with a few exceptions, prefects were not aware of the work of the Centre, although the Centre published some of them on their official website. Most of the participants have learned about their recent publications through the interviews of this study. (FWNB) This served as a sign of inadequate collaboration among the main departments of the MoI as well as the ineffective works of the RC.

> However, there could be potential. I do not think they meet our knowledge expectations. They struggle to satisfy the orders and wills of our minister and undersecretary. (Avsarbey_CI3, TI)

The final point on this issue was shared by one participant who stressed political actors' dominant role and the public service characteristics of the RC.

> You cannot expect too much. They are subject to restrictions, including political pressure and dominancy. Members of the RC, anyway, are public servants. How could they have complete independence? Could they present reports whose implications/proposals could be unwelcomed by the minister or undersecretary? Could they invite everyone to

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[153] At the moment, since head of Research Centre was appointed as acting Head of Strategy (dual responsibility), the Centre and the Strategy Department began to collaborate. Together, they prepared several official reports on the Pro-Kurdish terror attack and affiliated local institutions including the "Exploitation of Children and Women by PKK/KCK Terrorist Organization" February 2017. "Appointments to Municipalities due to terror." March 2017. Available: http://www.strateji.gov.tr/kurumlar/strateji.gov.tr/deneme/YAYINLAR/%C4%B0%C3%87ER%C4%B0K/belediyeler%20redakteSON.pdf (Retrieved 02/04/2017)

give a speech even if they have opinions against the government policies? I do not think so. Therefore, we should not heavily criticise their role. (DGD2, TI)

In sum, despite the persistent efforts made and challenge faced by the members of the Centre, the RC was not able to meet the pragmatist expectation. [154]

Pragmatism

The MoI administration tended to commission research, literature reviews, environmental scans and policy analysis to external experts (consultants or academics) when required. A few 'recognised the importance of weaving together knowledge from any and all available and relevant sources' (Rhodes and Fleming, 2017, p.27). For instance, a few newly established departments such as RC, IT, Strategy and EU Department[155] benefitted from knowledge institutions[156] rather than classical department of the MoI. As expected, the members of new departments expressed more positive opinions about collaborating with knowledge institutions than classical ones.

I found that, the majority of the prefects believed that the MoI did not need outside knowledge to fulfil their classical tasks, a finding that stresses the MoI's deep-rooted tradition of supporting well-educated members with a strong background in the field. On the other hand, the participants were well aware of the lack of methodology and theory knowledge with regard to the new public administration tools and dynamic external environment. They wished to fill these gaps by collaborating with academia, and several think tanks, and private companies until they felt to be competent about these topics. (GD5, TI)

As discussed earlier in the training section (Chapter 5), the MoI began to value international knowledge in accelerating the reform process. Sending prefects to conduct academic training (research) has been a common method for capacity building. Through this method, the MoI could benefit from international experience for implementing NPM tools.

Recently, the training departments have also begun to benefit from systemic knowledge through consulting with leading academicians. (GD7, TI)

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[154] In fact, I felt that their amateur challenge has been similar to the "the burden of Sisyphus."(FWNB)
[155] Except head of Strategy department, others have PhD degree.
[156] Members of the RC collaborated with academia and think tanks for preparing official reports. For instance, with Istanbul Technical University they conducted the 'Street Children Rehabilitation Project' and with the Institute of Public Administration for Turkey and the Middle East they conducted a project on performance measurement. Prefects applauded the contributions of the RC. (i.e. GD 6 and DGD 7, TI)

Barriers to the Knowledge System Policy Capacity

Several barriers to the systemic knowledge policy capacity were identified. These included lack of quality and capacity of the knowledge institutions, lack of willingness for collaboration, secrecy concerns of the MoI, and lack of enough time.

First, the majority of the participants asserted that systemic knowledge policy capacity has been lacking in the knowledge institutions. One harsh critic stressing deficiency of capacity and prejudices was:

> Our benefit from and collaboration with the universities has almost been absent. They
> have been isolated from the society and implementation. They have not had adequate
> capacity to administrate research projects, viz. "talk the talk ... walk the walk." (DU2, TI)

Similar to this comment, other critics focussed on the lack of field research, knowledge of context, and implementation knowledge within the knowledge institutes.

> TODAIE [the Institute of Public Administration for Turkey and the Middle East]
> contributed a bit, but I think that the universities do not properly know about Turkish
> Public Administration system. (CI4, TI)

Even a minister who had an academic background argued against the lack of capacity and willingness of universities.

> I am a sociologist. I also established a private research company before entering politics.
> I believe in evidence-based policy. Inside the MoI, we also established two RCs; one in
> MoI [the RC] and other in the Police Academy. I believed that they conducted beneficial
> research. I also sought every opportunity to collaborate with knowledge institutions. I
> met them several times, saying 'our government has a different approach, which aims to
> increase democratisation and liberty on security, and local issues, including the Kurdish
> problem. We need your contributions.' I asked my friends to collect all knowledge
> related to our security tasks including civilisation and democratisation of these tasks.
> Unfortunately, the universities could not meet our expectations. Can you believe that
> almost no contribution was made by the universities? They avoided taking a role on
> public issues; rather they were happy within their comfortable zones. (Atalay_Former
> minister 3, TI)

Second, contracted research did not always provide a good product or "add value".

When Besir Atalay was the minister, he tended to use think tanks to conduct research and prepare some reports. For instance, the "Counter Terrorism Report" was prepared by SETA [Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research]. In my personal opinion, these kind of reports were likely to be prepared to meet the expectations of the minister and broadly the government, such as those bureaucrats with trade concerns. I believe that they could not present those reports and proposals to Idris Naim Sahin who was a known opponent of the "resolution process" in whose era the government quitted the resolution process. (Yildiz_FPPS3, TI)

Third, as discussed in Chapter 5, collaboration with outside has been problematic due to several reasons.

Neither us nor the academia want to work closely with each other. For instance, the MoI administration neither invited representatives of universities and nor offered to work together on local administration reforms before regulating these issues. On the other hand, universities were not eager to conduct research on issues related to the local administration, or to collaborate with this department and vice versa. (Avsarbey_CI3, TI)

We do not know theory, they [academicians] do not know practice. Why do not we collaborate? Because, academics tend to approach issues with a mind-set that ignores our implementation experience and position. On the other hand, we underestimate and treat them as if they were our staff. In other words, we cannot speak the same language and value each other's experience and knowledge. Karaca_LA4, TI)

Fourth, considering the MoI administrative tradition, ministerial discretion and style has been important for collaborating with external knowledge institutions. As mentioned earlier, some ministers encouraged and pushed the MoI administration to work closely with external knowledge institutions, whereas others ignored and avoided to collaborate with them. [157]

Fifth, secrecy has been the most important concern for the political administrators when collaborating and share their data with external knowledge institutions. The accounts of the participants demonstrated a shared concern, namely, a lack of trust towards the outside.

You are not allowed to do everything with academics. Our ministry has been associated with security. Because most of our data that belong to citizens, the data should be protected. You should bear this concern in your mind during the research process. Therefore, you must use inside analytical capacity. (CI1, TI)

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[157] Atalay_Former minister 3, FPPS1, and FPPS3, TI.

Lastly, the role of internet within the last two decades should be emphasised when analysing the systemic analytical capacity. With a few exceptions, prefects considered the internet to be useful for accessing information and knowledge which are hardly found in both published manual documents and literature and is hardly accessed via knowledge institutions. In addition, lack of a collaboration practice and hurriedness made the participants rely on a quick scan of publicly available information on the internet rather than conducting a more systematic search by contacting universities, think tanks and other knowledge sources, similar to Hughes findings (Hughes, 2014, p.165).

> Nowadays, internet offers us invaluable sources. For instance, while we are working on regulation, we simply google it. We can find both national and international academic publications using online sources and find out about another country's experience via their web sites. (Gunduzoz_GD8, TI)

In summary, when the broad definition of the systemic knowledge capacity is considered, the findings reveal that, with a few exceptions, there has been a deficiency in systemic analysis capacity. The low supply and demand for knowledge, and lack of a collaborative attitude which provoke deficiencies in the systemic knowledge policy capacity, could be interpreted as evidence of limit of policy capacity within the MoI.

6.4   Summary of the Chapter

Findings on Individual Analytical Capacity

This chapter began by presenting important individual analytical skills for the policy practice of MoI's. These skills are summarised under two categories: Knowledge sets and skill sets (see pp. 175-176 and 183 of this thesis).

I found that prefects and relatively junior administration staff were mostly seen to be successful with regard to knowledge sets, except for being "experts on their tasks" which needs to be strengthened, especially in unfamiliar areas. Regarding first research question, prefects mostly have enough knowledge skills in order to give advice based on knowledge and experience.

On the other hand, the participants expressed disagreeing opinions on whether the MoI staff had the necessary skill sets. They raised significant concerns on conceptual, analytical and strategic skills, whereas they thought political and intuition skills as well as policy making and writing skills were seen as satisfactory. Moreover, they were praised for their counselling, communication and interpersonal skills as well as foreign language, and project administration skills.

My findings were more or less consistent with related empirical research literature, which highlighted the lack of enough skills for analysing, evaluating and implementing policy and programs; as well as deficiencies in specific technical skills for working in an analytical and strategic policy environment etc. (i.e. Gleeson, 2009 and Hughes, 2014) that cause limit to policy capacity. Regarding first research question, the findings reveals that prefects have issues to provide advice based on analytical skills.

Yet, prefects underlined that the MoI staff do not necessarily need to have all of these skills similar to international practice (Gleeson, 2009, p. 201).

In terms of staff training, it could be concluded that workplace experiences appeared to be the main method through which prefects developed the practical skills for policy development, as well as strategic and political skills, and communication skills; a finding which is similar to Gleeson's findings (ibid, p. 199). On the other hand, only a few prefects who had formal (and academic) policy or public administration training expressed that they have benefitted from such training.

Findings on Organisational Analytical Capacity

Findings about organisational analytical capacity could be evaluated with tradition of value for knowledge and academic studies. Important point I researched during interview period that to what extent tradition, structure and process of the Ministry and of course daily routine and emergency issues let to bureaucrat to think, analyse etc. More importantly, to what extend analyse/projects and research findings do affect policymaking? However most of them accepted that knowledge, academic research skills were important skills. Findings revealed different view that experience dominates evidence.

A few argued that the structure and tradition of the ministry supported academic research and creating knowledge. It should be noted that, since 1989 the MoI have sent prefects abroad to learn foreign language, improve their skills, observe foreign experiences and conduct academic research.[158] Yet, the majority claimed that the MoI has not benefited as expected due to the lack of institutionalism and a proper feedback mechanism.

Finding showed that although there existed considerable departmental memory inside the MoI's individual departments, there had been a lack of shared IM due to issues with access and collaboration. Similarly, some believed that the MoI has not had an institutional mechanism,

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[158] Every candidate of civil administrators should go to abroad during their training program for 9-12 months. Furthermore, senior ones also have been send for specific aims for relatively shorter time.

tradition and process that value information, academic research and findings. This could be interpreted as a lack of appropriate policy capacity.

The first identified reason behind a lack of strong analytical policy capacity was the everyday working practice of the busy ministry. Namely, political administrators were overburdened with emergency issues. Thus, an organisational analytical policy capacity could not be established to support individual analytical capacity and their outputs. To put it simply, they did not have sufficient time to evaluate new information.

Secondly, for juniors, strict hierarchical relations and structure, rooted within the Turkish administrative tradition, has been a barrier for improving their knowledge capacity.

Thirdly, besides the closeness to innovation, the participants reported that new knowledge might have implications for additional responsibility, and issue which conflicts with risk awareness.

Fourthly, individual style was dominant in appreciating new information. Some ministers discouraged prefects to search, analyse and prepare concrete suggestions while recently ministers have not supported this kind of research.

Finally, overall the MoI is regarded as a pragmatic organisation with regard to valuing information. There is not much evidence to support evidence-based policy. Rather, findings of this study mostly showed that information, statistics academic studies, analytical skills were important if they helped solve current problems and support firefighting. Ministers should also be pragmatist due to the prevalent power of the PM, and the unpredictable environment they must cope with and survive. Yet, the MoI pragmatism could not be understood through a Machiavellian viewpoint. Rather, its aim is to provide solutions and ease public life, as stressed by the participant prefects.

Findings on Systemic Analytical Policy Capacity

Findings pointed out significant gaps and uncollaborated conduct dominated with secrecy concerns towards outside knowledge institutions within the MoI. To be fair, unwillingness and low capacity of the universities had been problematic, as well. As expected, think tanks and others institutions have suffered from lack of capacity of freedom dominated by trade concerns. With a few exceptions, the RC could neither act as a bridge between the MoI and other knowledge institutions nor combine the theoretical and practical knowledge of the MoI.

In sum, however, findings demonstrate gaps within all level analysis capacity within the MoI. For instance, advice given to the minister could not always be adequately supported by analysis of valuable data and changes in the external environment according to both grey reports and

participants' accounts. Interestingly, the research did not corroborate concerns on the impact of low levels of analytical policy capacity on classical tasks. In fact, most prefects did not think the existing deficiencies totally disrupted the policy making and learning processes, since oral tradition and processes were assumed to mitigate for this concern. Regarding first research question, prefects could give advice on classical duties to minister whereas they could fail to give advice based on analytical skills that cause a limit to policy capacity.

Chapter 7: POLITICAL POLICY CAPACITY

Introduction

This chapter describes the political policy capacity of MoI using the adapted conceptual framework. Similar to other emprical chapters, it is divided into three sections: individual, organisational and system political policy capacity respectively.

Firstly, individual political capacity is discussed under two parts: the political leadership of ministers, and political skills of prefects. In the first part, I discuss in detail the impacts of ministers' leadership role on the policy capacity of MoI. This leadership role includes political, diplomatic and administrative roles as well as their accountability, style and relations with bureaucracy, rather than narrowly focussing on their individual political capacity. This is because the political control (characteristics of the Turkish administrative tradition) impacts almost all facets of the policy and decision making process as well as the daily practices within the MoI. In second part, I discuss two political skills of prefects, which are developed by the marriage of their prefectoral field experience and everyday practices inside the MoI. In addition, I argue whether the prefects could understand the external political environment, and meet ministers' expectation.

The second section consists of three subtopics: responsiveness and political coherance, political support, and public legitimacy and trust. This section underlines that responsiveness and minister's support have been so important for the prefects as well as for the organisational political policy capacity of the MoI.

The third section, the political system capacity, is crucial for understanding the political policy capacity of the MoI. This is because the political system capacity has the potential to affect all other capacities of the MoI, 'whose environment has been a highly complex, extremely dynamic and in many respects uncertain from the early 2000s to date' (Sen, 2015, p. 79). This section is addresses especially the second research question with a detailed discussion on the external political environment including globalisation: the EU integration process; centralisation: top-down policy; and media pressure.

7.1 Individual Political Policy Capacity

For MoI, the individual political capacity will be described under two sub-headings: political leadership and bureaucratic political capacity.

7.1.1 Political Leadership

In this part, I discuss in detail the impact of the ministers' political leadership[159] role (see table2, 7a) on policy capacity of MoI in detail rather than narrowly focussing on their individual political policy capacity. Although this approach could be seen as a distraction from political policy capacity, I opted to take a broad approach, since ministerial style, domination and discretion affect almost every aspect of policy and decision making as well as daily processes of the MoI. The ministers should be considered not only as a political boss but also as the head of the MoI administration according to the main law 3152 of the MoI. Therefore, their roles and capacities need to be considered broadly when assessing their impact on the policy capacity of the MoI.

When the national literature and grey reports published by the MoI[160] are assessed, it could be observed that the debate on political leadership is missing and even a taboo due to the paternalistic and hierarchical administrative tradition based on excellence of top. Recently, there is a debate on the absence of a political leader role in public administration in the international literature which highlights that 'they have been conspicuously absent from reviews and inquiries into the performance of the public sector' (Tiernan, 2015b, p.215).

Therefore, during the fieldwork phase, arguing and evaluating their political role was the most challenging task for the researcher. For instance, even the question of the "what is the expectation of bureaucracy from minister?" received negative reactions since the participants treated the ministers as" holy" beings.

It is not our place to comment on this; it is not our right to discuss the role of the ministers. (FGS3, TI)

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[159] Deputy Minister's role was determined by Act 3046 as a supportive political role of for the ministers. This included the responsibility of acting as a bridge between minister, political party and constituency, and acting as a representative of the minister. Yet, in MoI practice, since 2011, deputy minister's role has been vague and also was not incorporated into MoI's own main act 3152. Moreover, there were three deputy ministers, all of whom came from an undersecretary position. Therefore, they mostly serve administrative roles rather than politic roles. They partly share the power of the undersecretary. Therefore, they were considered as a second undersecretary. (Karaca_LA4, TI) But, undersecretary position has been stronger than the deputy minister's role over public servants. In addition, they are considered as bureaucratic leaders rather than political leaders. For instance, Osman Gunes, who had a strong political support, served as a temporary minister twice during general elections, since current ministers must leave their positions 3 months before general election day dictated by the Constitution and served as deputy minister once, however, the participants consistently expressed their views on his strong undersecretary role.

[160] Seen in most of the current and past official reports (e.g. MoI, 2009a, 2015a; MoI, 2010-2016c).

The second challenge was that the Turkish political actors, with a few exceptions, did not follow a tradition of writing about their political life. Within the MoI, Minister Aksu published his memories in a book titled "Thoughts on Turkey". However, this book focused on overall Turkish political life and systems with some proposals, rather than solely focusing on the ministerial experience of Minister Aksu. The second official report came during Minister Atalay's era, and was titled "Human based change in the years between 2007 and 2011". This report was similar to an activity report of the MoI, and did not serve as a distinctive publication which provided information of the minister's political life. (MoI, 2011d) Nevertheless, the emphasis of human rights based policies and increased freedom in the preface could be interpreted as the main motivation for regulations and their implementation.

As the Justice and Development Party government, we adopted the "security for freedom paradigm" as the main policy… In our [my] era, the MoI worked as a human rights ministry. Namely, our priority was to provide our citizens a better life and increased freedom regarding human rights. We succeeded in establishing significant changes by abolishing torture under our value of "zero tolerance for torture" (MoI, 2011d).

The next section describes the roles of ministers with a view of explaining their responsibility, accountability and relations with public servants and other political and bureaucratic actors as well as the external political environment.

Ministers' Hats

Rhodes categorised the roles of the ministers into four: 'policy; political; managerial [administrative]; and diplomatic' (Rhodes, 2011a, p. 52). Similar roles were identified in this study, although the policy and managerial roles of the ministers were found to be relatively less emphasised than their political and administrative, and more recently diplomatic roles. A sample account supporting this statement was:

Ministers are both the head and political boss of our administration. [161] They must meet the expectations of MPs, political parties and their constituency. On the one side, there is the MoI agenda; on the other, there are the governmental and political party agendas. The ministers have to fulfil their roles without conflicting with the senior political trend. Recently, expectations from the politicians have dramatically increased. Nevertheless, most requests can be addressed by the administration mechanism. (GD6, TI)

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[161] They are also MPs and members of ruling party.

In addition, the ministers' role and responsibilities are beyond the classical duties of the ministry, especially when considering their responsibility to coordinate and collaborate with the overall country, particularly in times of crises. (FPPS1, TI) (Chapter 5 and Appendix B)

It is important for ministers to fulfil their roles successfully. They wish to be remembered with a good reputation and maintain public trust. Therefore, they wish to successfully introduce and complete projects during their period.

> In my era, I did focus on macro projects and themes, such as transforming MoI from a security-state based institution to a human rights based one. When I look back on my experience, I can proudly claim that we were able to change lots of things, including abolishing systematic torture within the police and the gendarme force, ensuring civil monitoring of these forces, giving mandates to the local administration, and increasing collaboration with the civil society. (Atalay_Former minister 3, TI)

> Ministers want success. Therefore, they are driven to make successful reforms, and implement successful projects in order to be remembered with gratitude by the society. (FPPS1, TI)

Yet, pragmatism and short-termism are still commonplace within the ministry.

> We [prefects] want to see our success in the short-term rather than succeeding in long-term strategic goals. Similarly, due to their prefectoral background, ministers have also been impatient in receiving credit. (Karaca_LA4, TI)

Prefects must support the ministers, and vice versa. Therefore, the MoI practice could not be successful without the ministers' roles and styles. Particularly, the seniors and inner circle would not be able to administrate chaos and disagreements without ministerial support. Although it varied with the ministerial style and priorities, findings revealed that the political role of the ministers shaped their other roles in line with the increasing demands of citizens from the political actors.

Political Role

As the representative of MoI and the government, the ministers must be involved with and address political issues and related events. They must participate in parliamentary discussions and respond to MP's questions and demands as the head of the interior committee. The MoI minister is considered to be one of the strongest positions in both the ministerial cabinet and political party. In the cabinet meetings, they must present current issues and proposals, and persuade strong PM and cabinet members. Since their responsibilities are multitudinous, and beyond the

classical responsibilities of the MoI, the ministers must be ready to address any questions about territorial administrations. [162]

Furthermore, party politics and ministerial relations with party members should not be ignored. The ministers must consider political priorities and political balance within their party. In addition to the ministerial relations with the main party members[163], relations with mayors who politically represent the local people and administration, have been pivotal. The minister may show some discretion and make decisions related to local political actors and administration, such as giving them the permission to take loans over %10 of their annual budget, and making critical decisions, such as suspending mayors[164] and appointing temporary mayors in their place.

There are differences amongst ministers with regard to party politics. Some inclined to be delicate with expectations, sometimes even ignored bureaucratic concerns.

> For one minister, party people's demands were more important than anything despite his prefectoral background. He did not give the administrators a chance to argue these demands. He just ordered them to meet political party demands without any debates. (FA, TI)

Ministerial relations with constituency and home town have been as important as their relations with major political actors and institutions. This has been the case for all ministers regardless of their background (prefectoral class or not), except for Minister Atalay. This attention not only provided the ministers local public support but also afforded them political support, especially from the PM.[165]

> All ministers valued relationships with their constituency and home town. For instance, Minister Sahin monitored closely issues or events related Ordu [his hometown and constituency] so did Ministers Ala, Guler, and Aksu. On the other hand, Minister Atalay did not spare time for this kind of communication. He preferred to behave like bureaucrats rather than like politicians. Namely, he was not anxious about his political future due to his character and the strong support from the PM. (FPPS2, TI)

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[162] The new parliamentary bureau, established by the current minister Soylu, aimed to strengthen relation with Parliament. (A2, TI) (See chapter 4)

[163] The most important actor has been PM, who is also head of the party organisation, other ministers, and MPs.

[164] Although, precaution of suspension could be used certain condition regulated by Constitution and Law, there has been some subjectivity regard to party politics. On the other hand, permission of extra loan seems to be totally ministerial discretion as I observed in General Secretary's room. (FWNB) This kind of approval was likely depend of ministers' discretion. It was claimed that generally, municipalities, with same party with government/minister, could get approval easier than others. (MP 1, TI) Interestingly, ministers should allocate significant time for to sign these kind of documents which rooted tutelage authority on local administration. (GS, TI)

[165] Former PM and current President Erdogan valued this kind of relation and pushed them to deal and monitored local politics closely.

Increasing demands and expectations of citizens from politicians exacerbated the pressure the ministers as well as senior prefects, their inner circle, especially the advisors.

> Nowadays, citizens tend to make their request directly to our minister. They do not wish to solve their problems via public servants. They believe that if they can directly contact with politicians, their demands would be met and their issues would be solved faster than they would through bureaucracy. (FPPS2, TI)

On the other hand, findings revealed that due to the dominant PM, top-down tradition, busy firefighting practices, and complicated policy agenda, the ministers do not have much space to develop policy and use their own initiative. In other words, ministerial discretion is restricted by senior political authority and realities of external environment. As they depend on the PM authority and governmental agenda, political party priorities, some prefect identified the ministers as bureaucrats. The quote below explicitly describes the ministerial dependence on external pressures.

> In this government era, unlike the previous governments, political necessity forced the PM to change his ministers. For instance, if the political attitude to deal with terror issues [pro-Kurdish terror movement] need to be soft, a minister who supported the resolution process would be appointed. On the other hand, if government felt pressure from citizens or other actors and conjecture, the PM would appoint someone who believed armed fighting against terrorism. (Karaca_LA4, TI)

As detailed in the above quote, ministers, who were not able to comply with governmental priories or external environmental pressure and obligations had to leave their positions. During this research period, except for Minister Aksu, none of the ministers completed the standard period of service.[166] Most of them left their positions unexpectedly.[167]

Diplomat Role

Recently, the external relations of the ministry have increased. Indeed, during my fieldwork, I have observed that visits from foreign actors have become a routine. The official ministry website also confirms this trend. The EU integration process, Syrian Refugee Crisis, and counter-terrorism

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[166] I mean cabinet change.
[167] i.e Minister Sahin was supposed to be leave because of his opinions against "Resolution Process" with pro-Kurdish side while his followers, minister Atalay was criticised not to execute well this process. Whilst writing analysis chapter, Minister Ala resigned surprisingly. Instead of him, Minister Soylu was appointed as sixth minister of interior, except temporary minister for election period, during Justice and Development party government era between 2002- current. (2.5 years average) I do not consider serving time of temporary minister since despite of Constitutional obligatory, in practice, ministers endures their ministerial domination without using their official title.

agenda, especially against ISIS, have triggered this interactive period. Further, ministers mostly value developing external relations, especially with the EU countries and the USA.

> Our minister [Minister Ala] values building friendships with his counterpart. Even when he wrote letters to them, he preferred to sign off with his first name rather than his formal title. He believes the importance of such close relations in external affairs. (GD5, TI)

As indicated in the quote above, establishing personal friendships with foreign counterparts made the ministers happy while ensuring that they met complied with demands of the internal and external political environment.

Administrative Role

The ministers are considered central to the MoI administration and could partially use the bureaucratic authority of undersecretary. Indeed, the ministerial discretion on administration has been as dominant as their political role. The MoI's 'policies, strategies or priorities are stated to stem from and rest with the Minister' (Crawley and Kutlu, 2013, p. 11). In line with this, the leader-based Turkish tradition support ministerial discretion.

> The MoI's departments work in accordance with organisational goals, structure and regulation. However, if our ministers take initiative and tell us 'let's make this work in my way', we will obey their orders. Even, some departments could fulfil task that they have not been responsible before. (DU1, TI)

A few participants complained about this characteristic of the tradition.

> The top [ministers] should not to consider that everything must begin, continue and end with solely their command. This ministry has a tradition and IM that are represented by undersecretary. Nowadays, the ministers underestimate bureaucracy; even the undersecretary is being treated as a batman. (FPPS2, TI)

This comment triggers to ask question: "who (should) takes accountability and responsibility of the MoI's public tasks and services?"

Accountability and Responsibility of the Minister

According to Law 3056, ministers are accountable to both the Cabinet Committee [PM] and the Turkish Grand Assembly. One sample quotation reflects this:

Ministers advocate the MoI's decisions and policies as well as being accountable to the cabinet, the public and the parliament. Moreover, they are likely be scrutinised and pressured by media. (FPPS1, TI)

There was also an understanding that since the ministers are the main implementers of the government agenda, their power is a holy issue which should not be debated by bureaucracy.

We do not discuss the political preferences of the minister. Governments have a political choice whose responsibility also belongs to them. (CI2, TI)

However, there were strong opinions about ministerial roles. Findings revealed divergence in opinions on whether the ministers adequately take responsibility. Some expressed similar opinions that were in line with Weberian tradition.

Ministers take responsibility. They have to do this regardless of their willingness. This is a political issue. How could you evaluate their performance or punish their failure? They could not be punished by disciplinary rules which apply to bureaucrats. If our system determines them as the public boss, they must be held accountable. (CI4, TI)

One participant supported this side by quoting a recent speech of the (former) Minister Ala:

There was our honourable minister's speech for the Interior Committee. He told that 'if we are accountable with regard to political responsibility, we [politicians] must make decisions and also account for our preferences.' (CI4, TI)

On the other hand, some asserted that the ministers tended to avoid accountability and taking responsibilities just like as bureaucrats.

In our tradition, there is not many people, neither politicians nor bureaucrats, who wish to take on responsibilities. (FPPS2, TI)

Karaca emphasised a general concern which is in line with the overall the public administration literature.[168]

We do not have a kind of tradition that pushes the ministers to take responsibilities for their policies. They [ministers] prefer the easy way. All successes go into the ministers' record, whereas failures are considered to be clumsiness or malicious intentions of bureaucracy. (Karaca_LA4, TI)

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[168] i.e. Tiernan, 2015b; Rhodes, 2016; Mulgan, 2009.

His quote must be interpreted carefully. As discussed earlier, even when the politicians blame bureaucracy, they cannot evade the accountability to the public or the parliament.[169]

On the other hand, parliamentary pressure did not always succeed.[170] One respondent claimed that the power of strong one-party government ignores the parliamentary scrutiny.

> Unfortunately, the ruling party has come to power with an overwhelming majority, and this success has been repeated a few times. Unfortunately, because of this, they do not answer to us, and they are very good at shifting responsibility. Simply, they have abolished their accountability. Since they consider all topics as political conflict, namely an attack on government confidence, an even on PM personality, we miss real story. (MP 1, TI)

A few prefects shared this last point. They pointed out that overprotection aspect rooted from paternalistic feature harmed the perception of the MoI and minister. Namely, the minister should not take all responsibility, take the issue personally, or ignore accountability of bureaucrats in cases where inquiries are conducted.

> Of course, we expected from our minister to protect us against critics and political pressure. Namely, they should say, 'yes, it was my decision and discretion, so I take responsibility.' On the other hand, if our minister knew that prefects did not inform and support him properly, he would not be in a protective position. But in practice, they tend to protect the prefects and take critics personally. In my opinion, our state's tradition has forced them to behave like this. (Ceber_CI5, TI)

If we consider administrative tradition of the MoI, the minister's attitude could be read as risk awareness rather than the adoption of a paternalistic attitude. One MP underlined this concern:

> If bureaucratic mistakes are related to ministers or their preferences, they are likely to cover up. (MP1, TI)

In sum, findings revealed that ministers (should) take responsibility regardless of their willingness due to the prevalent Turkish administrative tradition emphasising ministerial discretion. Therefore, ministers were expected to undertake an active role to in chairing interior committee, answering parliamentary questions, participating in party conferences, meeting citizens, and

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[169] For instance, according to the minutes of a meeting of the Interior committee, members of this committee strongly rejected the representation of the MoI by the undersecretary. They insisted on the minister's participation asserting the current regulation and tradition. Their rejection was successful. The minister was forced to head the committee in the following hours. (Minutes of interior committee of Turkish Parliamentary, 2013a)

[170] See also accountability section in chapter 4.

dealing with media scrutiny. That is the MoI ministers did not have the luxury to blame the bureaucracy for failures or scandals. The ministers would lose their posts if they lose their accountability or conflict with the government agenda, particularly with the PM's priorities.

Ministers' Style

Personal style and priorities, which must immediately be decoded by the prefects, determine the bureaucratic life within the ministry, viz. "the horse neigh with regard to his liveryman". Therefore, it was no surprise that intuition was one of the most desirable skills for the prefects. Findings showed that the bureaucracy of the MoI has been apt at responding to the ministers' wishes. Their opinions, emotions[171], programme, speech, briefing reports, suggestions could be adapted according to the ministers' agenda. For instance:

> Consider two ministers for whom I wrote speeches. The first one preferred to give
> speeches supported with data, and statistics. He liked to demonstrate ministerial
> success through detailed information, while the second one commanded us to keep the
> matters as simple as possible. His speeches were restricted to a greeting followed with a
> very brief information statement, and a closing statement. After working with them, I
> could predict which sentence each would like. I should because, they are our political
> boss. (FA, TI)

Ministers were aware of the impact of their style. One sample account was:

> After a while, they adopt my style. Inside the MoI, I had not had any resistance or
> disharmony. (Atalay_Former minister, TI)

Ministerial Willingness to Control and Deal with Everything

Ministers could mostly deal with a variety of issues within the ministry; they wished to know everything within the ministry. Therefore, major policy and strategy decisions were made through a top-down approach. All the participants stated that this burden of the ministers need to be eased, although this would not be easy in practice.

> Our honourable minister accepted that he needed not sign some documents which are
> unimportant. However, while I was presenting a draft regulation for abolishing the
> requirement for some signatures, he told me "hang on a second, I know that I have been

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[171] Similarly to Turkish society, ministers could behave according to their emotions rather than rational choices. For instance, if they disliked someone from their previous experience, they tended to not choose them to work together. (FPPS3, TI) While observing Turkish parliamentary debate, they could take critics as personal rather than faithful critics on draft regulation itself.

signing a huge amount of documents. But, at least I have got a better idea what is going in MoI. Otherwise, if everyone behaves independently, how could I know about MoI and practices? We should consider this suggestion later." I got the message, and never proposed this again. He also never asked me anything about it. (FGS1, TI)

They wished to see every document, and allocated 2 or 3 hours daily to this process even they were tired. (FPPS3, TI)

My observation during fieldwork confirmed these statements.[172]

Risk Taking or Supporting Reform

A considerable number of participants argued that although the ministers seems to be in favour of reforms, in reality, they tended to avoid taking risks for making reform similar to statement of the foreign literature (Rhodes, 2011, 2014 quoted from Tiernan, 2015b, p. 216)

Ministers talk perpetually about reforms since "reform" has been an attractive word. In reality, the most important barrier for reforms has actually been ministers themselves. Their taking risk capacity and willingness has been low due to the risky political environment and centralisation. In addition, as their political faith solely depends on the PM's discretion, they mostly act cautiously. First of all, they struggle to make their own policies and put them into practice. After one or two unsuccessful attempts, if they were not able to succeed through their way, they would act like bureaucrats and would do just what the PM says. (Karaca_LA4, TI)

Furthermore, any errors made might be irrecoverable. High turnover of ministers could be an evidence of the anxiety for risk-taking regarding reforms. Some emphasized this statement by stressing the dominance of the PM in the arena.

Like everybody else, ministers do not attempt to make policies or reforms if they cannot see [predict/evaluate] ends, since they do not wish to be failure inside the Cabinet. This failure could be perceived as weakness by the PM and other ministers. (Atbas_FGD2, TI)

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[172] The GS has mainly been responsible to present every document to the minister. There were four office documentary carriers classified under several categories, such as urgent and important, topics etc. According to the General Secretary's account, there were more than 700 documents waiting to be signed by the minister. Approximately, in a day, a quarter of them were signed by the minister; and the process took two hours. In addition, some urgent documents were likely to be signed regardless of time and place. Explaining the documents and making sure they were signed on time has been challenging for the inner circle due to the busy day and dynamic working style of ministers. (FWNB)

This Habur disaster was a lesson for the successors. They [ministers] were forced to behave more cautiously. (Karaca_LA4, TI)

Four of the six ministers of the research period came from a prefectoral class[173]. Therefore, it could be beneficial to discuss this distinctive feature of the MoI.

Minister from a Prefectoral Background

In the interviews with the ministers, it was observed that although their position was political, the ministers usually considered themselves as a member of the prefectoral class.[174]

The prefectoral background of the ministers motivated members of the MoI and enabled them to easily communicate and explain the ideas to the ministers.

You speak the same language. Therefore, you could not have the difficulties outsiders would face. (GD2, TI)

On the other hand, during this period two ministers came from outside the prefectoral class. Participants who worked with one of them closely emphasised that they had to explain everything to him in detail, since he tended to be suspicious and more bureaucratic in several aspects. Moreover, he preferred to appoint a few people to his inner circle.

Besir Hodja[175] [Minister Atalay] handled everything with suspicion and cautious regardless of the topic. He had not known about the MoI and its tradition before his appointment. You did not observe this kind of suspicion amongst other ministers who were familiar with the MoI tradition. Because, they would have known that we would not deliberately make them sign for the wrong decision, as we would not want to cause irrecoverable mistakes. Of course, Besir Hodja's different [academician] background determined his style. We realised that he was not malevolent towards us but rather sceptical due to his academic character. (FPPS2, TI)

On the other hand, some participants stressed that lack of scepticism and analytical thinking and the presence of a narrow vision, prejudices and emotional experience amongst prefectoral ministers, could be barrier to producing new aspects and ideas.

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[173] All of them worked as a district governor, governor or in the central cadre. (Minister Guler and Gonul had all experience.)

[174] They were sometimes inclined to give examples from their governor experience rather than from ministerial tasks. (i.e. Former Minister 1 and Gonul_Former minister 2, TI)

[175] All participants used the title "Hodja", which means teacher, to refer to a person's academician title. Minister Besir Atalay was a professor of sociology and former Chancellor of Kirikkale University before being elected as an MP.

Sometimes, they think just like us! In my opinion, ministers should consider issues more broadly than we do. (DU2, TI)

If ministers really wish to make reforms, they should not behave and think like us. (CI2, TI)

Criticisms about Minister Atalay scepticism turned into praise when the prefects stated that many significant reports (internal audit, necessities of training, civil control of police and gendarme, democratisation process, etc.) were prepared in his period with the support of his undersecretary.[176] More importantly, his scepticism served to abolish the overburden of the ministers through delegation of authority.

We learned an important thing from Besir Hodja who asked the "why" questions. After he had asked us 'why do I have to sign this paper? Is there a regulation which necessitates my signature?' we sought to find answers. Surprisingly, we realised that a significant number of documents did not need to be signed by ministers. (FPPS3, TI)

Findings revealed prefects believed that ministers who came from a prefectoral background were supposed to know about the MoI tradition, processes and structure better than those who do not come from a prefectoral background. They pointed out mostly advantages of this experience. One sample quote was:

They know MoI its tasks, concerns and prefects, especially territorial administrations, due to their previous prefect experience. Therefore, they do not waste their time to learn about the ministry. Once they are appointed, they begin to fulfil their tasks with confidence. (DU1, TI)

A minister confirmed this thought.

Familiarity with MoI made me relieved. Therefore, once I took a peek at a file or document, I could understand what they were, what the expectation and aim of the papers were. Thus, I was able to make my decisions. I could easily just sign it or advise [command] necessary amendments. (Former Minister 1, TI)

On the other hand, a few asserted an opposing view.

Ministers who came from our profession do not know everything about the MoI central administration. Most of them had not worked in the central cadres before becoming a

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[176] (FPPS3, GD7, DU2 TI)

minister.[177] One could know local administration while another has knowledge about personnel policies. I do not think everyone knows everything about the MoI. They mostly learn by practice, just like we did. (Karaca_LA4, TI)

He also stressed the prefectoral background to be an important barrier for bureaucratic policy capacity.

Prefects could not participate in the policy making process whilst working with prefectoral minister. Why are we distracted in this process? Because, our ministers come from the prefectoral class. They are supposed to know everything about MoI, including issues and possible solutions as well as prefect opinions, better than everyone. [Contrariwise,] imagine that they were not from the prefectoral class. Once the PM requested something from our minister. Since the minister was likely to be unfamiliar with topics he would ask the bureaucrats: 'PM commanded me to find solution for this. How could we do this? Why?' However, ministers from the prefectoral background mostly do not ask these kinds of questions. Because of our respect towards both his position and prefectoral experience, our seniors also do not criticise him and his policies. (Karaca_LA4, TI)

In contrast with the dominant opinion, some pointed out that having a minister from a prefectoral background does not matter for several reasons. The first reason was related to having a vision:

In my opinion, coming from a prefectoral background is secondary. First of all, ministers should have a vision to strengthen the policy capacity of the MoI. He could view issues broadly and have long-term goals. Sometimes our ministers could not see the forest [overall picture] obstructed by the trees [daily routines, challenges, issues]. On the other hand, if the ministers have a strong vision, they could change maladministration dramatically. Could you tell me how many ministers come to this position with ideas and draft policies? (CI2, TI)

Ministers corroborated this opinion.

Of course, having prefectoral roots provides some advantages, but having vision is more important than coming from the prefectoral class. (Gonul_Former minister 2, TI)

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[177] As we consider their background, only Minister Guler and Ala had experience in the central cadres while others had a governor experience. Minister Ala had been a section director for two years and governors for 4 years, undersecretary of PM for six years before being Minister.

The second reason was related to the traditional (state notion) feature of the MoI. Some advocated that the MoI practice has been based on tradition and is beyond ministerial preference. Persistence of this tradition should not be underestimated.[178] (GD5, TI)

> In my opinion, the MoI behaves according to its tradition, and ministers know it, and respect it. Actually, they could only make tiny changes. Therefore, I believe that there are negligible differences between ministers [in terms of ministerial impact]. (DGD2, TI)

When I asked this question to Minister Atalay, his response showed that he did not also underestimate the MoI's administrative tradition.

> Although I came in from the outside, I had already known about MoI's robust tradition. Instead of clashing with this tradition, I tended to compromise this tradition with my and our government's targets. (Atalay_Former minister 3, TI)

The most important reason for diminishing individual political policy capacity was identified to the centralisation of policy making in Turkey. The prefects agreed that for more than ten years, ministers have been losing their power in policy making due to the influential PM era. (See section 7.3.1.) Example accounts supporting this notion were:

> During one party-government, politics has increased its power with concentrating it inside the PM Office. This centralisation has not left enough room for the minister to develop and implement their own policies. (FDGS, TI)

Former ministers did not interpret this centralisation as losing power but rather as team work.

> Our government has been a reformist government, especially during our first and second period. We had clear targets, government programmes and more importantly an "immediate action plan" in which we anticipated all steps needed to put our policies in practice, and I also have contributed to this plan. Our focal points were democratisation and better public administration. In cabinet meetings, we consulted these steps for long hours. The PM delivered responsibility to all ministers. As ministers, we got road maps. One of the deputy ministers was tasked with controlling and coordinating all activities. These plans were too vital to leave solely to one minister's discretion because of the interdependency of the included policies. (Atalay_Former minister 3, TI)

For ministers, similar to relation with senior political actors, relation with their prefects is important regarding policy capacity of the MoI, despite of dominant political role of ministers.

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[178] Recently, bureaucratic leadership capacity of undersecretary has been controversial topic. (See in section 5.2.1.)

Relations between the Ministers and Prefects

It is widely believed amongst prefects that the role division between ministers and bureaucrats is so clear that reflects a typical Weberian bureaucracy.

> In my opinion, politicians and bureaucrats should serve different roles. Politicians must determine policy, and as bureaucrats we should just support and implement them. (HD2, TI)

> In my 55 years' experience, I can proudly state that the MoI bureaucracy can internalise the democracy theory. Ministers know that bureaucracy is an irreplaceable element of the modern state. Bureaucracy also respect and obey political willpower. You cannot observe any conflicts in the roles. (Gonul_Former minister 2, TI)

The close relationships between high-level prefects and ministers in case of MoI could point out to a diminished dichotomy of roles.

> Relations inside MoI have been well since we know each other. For instance, our undersecretary and our minister have known each other from their hometown and faculty. The ministers know other senior prefects from his provincial experience. Thus, we have no problems with regard to close relations. (DU1, TI)[179]

As discussed earlier, having prefectoral minister strengthened optimistic opinions. Mostly, the prefects believed that relations and communication with ministers from a prefectoral class are better than those with ministers who do not have a prefectoral background. On the other hand, an account from the inner circle of Minister Atalay revealed that although he preferred formal relations with prefectoral class, his relationships with his undersecretary and inner circle could be considered to be close.[180]

On the other hand, harsh criticism was expressed by few prefects:

> My 30 years' public service experience taught me that you [as a minister] must abandon the logic of "I am top of the hierarchy and others my servants." [Ministers] are not able to govern MoI with this kind of mentality. Instead, [ministers] should value individuals and their efforts. (DU2, TI)

One supported this criticism by stressing the complementary and overlapping roles of the ministers and the bureaucrats.

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[179] Yet, this quotation could be evidence of favouritism.
[180] FPPS2, FPPS3, TI.

We could not consider state without either bureaucracy or politicians. Although our tradition provides strict hierarchical division, nowadays this division has blurred. All of us struggle to deal with issues. [Cope and survive] (GD6, TI)

Despite of few critics, relations between ministers and prefects were seen well that affect policy capacity in positive way. Meeting and (at least) understanding expectation from each other's is also focal point for their relation.

Expectations of the Minister

Findings showed that the ministers expect the ministry to support them and work in the best possible way.

My expectation from bureaucracy is simply to successfully fulfil their duties on time, speak their real opinions and provide me with advisory support. I observed their altruism and good intentions regardless of their political opinions. Mostly, they were able to fulfil their responsibilities. (Atalay_Former minister3, TI)

I required them to adopt a human-based style in their work. We came to here to serve our great nation. We worked together on a myriad of tasks. Thank God, they did not let me down. (Former minister 1, TI)

Loyalty has been another expectation. Participants confirmed this in two ways. One side advocated that the idealist bureaucracy sacrifices themselves to support his minister personal and position.

I never suspected their loyalty. They would do anything to strengthen my position. (Atalay_Former minister3, TI)

A person who gets a ministerial position should know that the MoI bureaucracy would do their best to support and protect him. (DU2, TI)

The second view stressed favouritism that requested religious loyalty to the political boss.

If someone is appointed by favouritism, of course, they must be loyal and accountable to the person who appointed them to that position. In MoI practice, favouritism has been a reality. Expectations to be promoted to a senior or a governor position feed this attitude. (CI1, TI)

The participants repeatedly identified barriers to speak the truth or take initiative as the most detrimental factors on bureaucratic policy capacity. Besides this, there have been several expectations of bureaucracy. The next section will detail these.

Expectation of Prefects

Atbas summarised expectations of the prefects in the following quote:

> Firstly, ministers as members of the Cabinet should draw general policy targets instead of interfering with daily routine administration. Secondly, the prefects expect them to prevent political actors, including other party members, MPs, local political actors especially mayors, from interfering with and directing their administrative tasks as much as possible. [Furthermore,] in case of any political or administrative problems, ministers are expected to protect their public servants against political pressure. Thirdly, after determining policies, they should encourage prefects to fulfil their responsibilities and value their efforts. (Atbas_FGD2, TI)

The majority of the participants agreed with this statement. The prefects expected the ministers to adopt a role above the bureaucratic duties.

> If ministers just act like bureaucrats, being a minister becomes meaningless.
> (Avsarbey_CI3, TI)

The participants did not explicitly express criticism on "to what extent ministers meet their expectation", probably due to the risk awareness and paternalistic tradition. Yet, excessive intervention on routine administration has been the primary criticism of the prefects, while ministerial support has been the most important point for prefects in administrating their tasks and projects.[181] Ministerial support and approval were expectations stemming from the prevalence of strong ministerial discretion, andrisk awareness

> You administrate ministry projects. Imagine, if the minister did not support you, or was not interested in this project; you would feel lonely and unarmoured. (FGD1, TI)

Namely, the prime expectations of bureaucrats from the ministers have included being listened to, having the opportunity to visit the minister, being supported in dealing with and administrate their task. Furthermore, as stated earlier, the ability of the prefects to access the minister has not been so easy. Yet, a few disagree with this assertion.

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[181] i.e. FPPS1, FGD1, GD6, TI

I did not observe such as top-down manner. Instead, each important topic was debated for long hours with ministers. Consultation has been our state tradition. Otherwise, could they [the ministers] know everything? (CI4, TI)

The prefects need timely approval from the ministers to effectively tackle daily administrative duties, or address external political pressure. Indecisiveness of the top administration render the prefects tired and less confident.

If our top decides on time, we never complain about busy life. Yet, indecisiveness and long waiting times have made us tired. (DGD3, TI)

Reform syndrome triggered another expectation which was to reserve the current situation.

Ministers should know that there has been tradition inside the MoI that should be respected. He must know that the ministry has existed before him and will exist after him. Therefore, they must recognise the ministry tradition before attempting to change some things with which they are unhappy. In my opinion, the better reform could be to preserve the current situation rather than adopting this kind of radical way.
(Karaca_LA4, TI)

According to participants' accounts, strict hierarchy prevented the establishment of appropriate communication channels. Therefore, establishing easy intercommunication, decreasing strict hierarchy and valuing bureaucratic opinions and advice have been other expectations which could serve to recover prefect's self-confidence.

We have issues about communication, hurriedness, high-level anxiety, all of which cause tensions inside the MoI. Therefore, instead of enduring strict hierarchy, ministers should facilitate communication and self-confidence of bureaucracy to decrease this tension.
(DU2, TI)

Interactive style could be associated with the demands of public advice. When I asked the question "Do ministers need bureaucratic opinions and experience?" most participants responded positively stressing the need for bureaucratic opinions and experience as well as the expected quality and style of communication.[182] (See Chapters 5 for further details)

Level of interactive relations differed among ministers, even amongst prefectoral ministers. Some ministers preferred to work in an interactive style. They liked to listen to different voices and facilitate debates. For instance, Minister Aksu expressed that he was happy to listen to different

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[182] i.e. HD2, CI4, CI2, FPPS1, Ceber_CI5, TI.

views. (Former Minister 1, TI) On the other hand, the prefects underlined that Minister Guler did allow them to debate political priorities and agenda despite of his prefectoral background. (FA, TI) Thus, confidence of the bureaucracy is likely to decrease.

> He simply did not let us debate anything related to the government agenda. Instead, he just obeyed top-down policies. Bureaucracy adopted a secretary role with regard to important regulations related to MoI. (FGS, TI)

Moreover, current senior prefects avoided making any negative comments about current [now former] minister Ala,[183] while former or passive prefects criticised his being top-down manner. [184]

> I think that recently, ministers have not listened to skilful and experienced bureaucrats. Otherwise, we would not have faced this chaos. They just implemented orders from the PM Office. Therefore, they were not able to inform the parliament and the Turkish public. (MP1, TI)

Lastly, both prefect accounts and my fieldwork observation revealed that The MoI has been an increasingly stressful place due to the characteristics of tasks, risk awareness practice, daily firefighting for long hours, and challenging and multifaceted range duties most of which are imperative to the Turkish political life. Therefore, the prefects expected the ministers to decrease stress levels inside MoI as much as possible.

7.1.2   Political Policy Capacity of the Prefects

This section, I will desribe the political skills of the prefects (see table2, 7b) The accounts of prefects identified that individual political policy capacity is a very important competency that involved a combination of intuition, and knowledge of ministerial will as well as the political environment, namely ability to predict 'what will fly and what will not fly' in the political arena (Rhodes, 2016, p. 644).

Actually, the prefects must understand the [external] political environment which contains dominant actors, issues, trend etc. We [the prefects] should also develop reflexes to respond to evolving political reality. Therefore, government programmes, including party programmes, the style and priorities of the PM, and others political factors should be considered when fulfilling our tasks. After a while, actually, we could see events such through political actors' eyes rather than through our own bureaucratic mentality dictated by our district governor experience. (HD1, TI)

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[183] He resigned in September, five months after first round of fieldwork.
[184] MP, FPPS2, Karaca_LA4, TI.

Monitoring external political environment was thought to be important in developing appropriate political skill.

> We watched Parliamentary TV and monitored PM speeches to keep up-to-date with political realities. If you missed the daily politics, you would likely have difficulty in preparing proper speeches for the minister. He also expected us to closely monitor the outside. (FA, TI)

A background of prefects supports this skill. Furthermore, the benefits of informal policy training and work experience were reported as valid ways the understood the broader political environment for policy making.

> Since they work closely with ministers[185], MPs and local political actors, they are good at political knowledge. (HD1, TI)

> Prefectoral class actually behaves and works hard like politicians to anticipate and satisfy public necessities. (Gonul_Former minister 2, TI)

Furthermore, this policy capacity was identified as the primary skill for supporting the minister, particularly for preventing chaos, and causing disharmony with governmental agenda, priorities, and PM's speeches. (A, TI) The current mechanism tends to protect the minister precarious positions by acting in agreement with the prevailing political reality. (DU2, TI) Actions against political reality were likely to fail even if they were supported by the minister.

> We prepared a 17-page report which detailed our reservations against local reforms in 2012. I presented it to the minister. We predicted everything that materialised as issues now. However, when this report was shared with the PM and Huseyin Tanriverdi,[186] our concerns were ignored because of their established policies and opinions.' (FGS1, TI)

A few asserted that there has not been enough capacity amongst the prefects.

> We have not such a skill which ease the political pressure on the minister, and support him in putting his political agenda into practice in the political arena. (DU2, TI)

Despite of a few opposite opinions, majority including all political participants agreed that prefects have appropriate political acumen capacity.

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[185] Governors and district governors are representors of the state. They represent the PM and the ministers in provinces.
[186] He was the deputy leader of the party [PM] who was responsible for implementing local reforms as a political party person.

Considering diplomatic skills, most participants also stated that although some coordination and collaboration issues existed within the MoI, the prefects had appropriate diplomacy and relationship-building skills which mostly are learned through previous field experience since the prefects had to communicate and collaborate with several political actors and stakeholders in territorial administration. Moreover, work experience in external senior public positions improved the prefects' diplomatic ability. (Ceber_CI5, TI)

I found that, some departments needed more diplomatic skills than others because they needed to collaborate and communicate with outside actors including the PM office, the parliament, other ministries, and EU and international organisations. Therefore, they needed to improve their diplomatic skills.[187] Most prefects thought they had successful diplomacy skills. Some shared their experiences which confirmed this through their observations from the meetings with the PM.[188] Moreover, some who worked on preparing legislation in the PM Office or the Parliamentary Committee on behalf of MoI asserted that they had elaborate negotiation skills which were seen to be particularly important for gaining support for policy proposals.[189] Most notably, the head of the Education Department noted that training of diplomatic skills are increasingly valued within the MoI. (GD7, TI)

In sum, the prefects mostly claimed that they have had individual political policy capacity thanks to their field experience and everyday practices inside the MoI. They pointed out that unless they could read the external political environment, they would not be able to meet expectations. These opinions were confirmed by all former ministers in the study. Moreover, prefects' individual political skills are seen more or less to alleviate internal tension.

On the other hand, a few asserted that there has been a shortage of political analysis and diplomatic skills which could be observed in the prevalent strict hierarchy, secrecy concerns, lack of proper relations with NGOs, media, citizens etc. In other words, they asserted that prefects need to improve these skills to better political advice and coordination with non-public stakeholders. Besides majority optimistic views, lack of proper relation with them could be seen as a sign of limit of political policy capacity.

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[187] GD5, DGD5, LA1, LA3, TI.
[188] i.e. Ceber_CI5, Avsarbey_CI3, DU1, CI2, LA1, TI.
[189] Gunduzoz_GD 8, LA1, LA2 and CI4, TI.

7.2   Organisational Political Policy Capacity

7.2.1   Responsiveness and Policy Coherance

As underlined in my discussion of tradition, characteristic of political control of the MoI's tradition promotes responsiveness in compliance with government's programmes and ministers' will (see table2, 8a). This area does not tolerate any mistakes and even faithful critics. Yet, findings mostly indicated that prefects could respond to ministers' demands and reflect the political reality of the day. Prefects also had knowledge of the priorities of government and minister. (See Chapter 4 and 5 for details)

Similar to the situation in foreign counterparts, there has been growing demands for political responsiveness and policy coherence within the MoI administration. However, several factors including the government and its party programmes, priorities, and commitment to strengthen the ministerial position affected the prefects, although there is no evidence of politicisation of prefects within the MoI. Majority of the prefects rejected to identify themselves as a partisan.

> No one claims that there is politicisation inside the MoI. It is not truthful to assert it. We serve our nation impartially. Of course, we seek government agenda because we are public servants who should obey political authority. (CI2, TI)

Even departments that had to work closely with the political actors denied being partisan.

> Of course, the prefects who are in charge of administrating the local administration have had relations with politicians. It is the main part of our job. But, it does not mean there has been a blurring of our public servant identity with partisanship. (GD1, TI)

This assertion was confirmed by other prefects and all former ministers.

> No! I disagree with the claims of politicisation inside the MoI. Of course, some of them did not share our political views. But, they did their job. (Atalay_Former minister, TI)

As mentioned earlier in personnel administration, mostly, the prefects did not see any issues with regard to the political choices made in appointing senior administrators. Instead, they accepted this to be normal. On the other hand, a few participants, including two prefects, and one former prefect and MP,[190] asserted opposite views. They claim that one party government destroyed the dignity of bureaucracy and make them too cautious and lack initiative. They also referred to the

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[190] Karaca_LA4, FGS1 and MP 1, TI.

personnel administration system which was claimed to directly affect the attitudes of the prefects.

> We cannot say that the MoI could preserve the Weberian characteristic. In terms of impartiality and merit of public servants, there has been politicisation inside the MoI. Thus, it inevitably damages our bureaucratic capacity. (GD6, TI)

One MP criticised politicisation, and added that even being a member of the interior committee was not seen enough for accessing proper information from the prefects.

> I do not think the prefects have become partisans. I know most of them personally. Maybe, their willingness to be promoted to a senior position made them too cautious. Yet, no one claims that there is no political pressure inside the MoI. For instance, as a member of the interior committee of parliamentary, prefects could inform us to an extent the minister allowed them. We had to consult our warm-hearted/previous channels, sometimes to secretly to get information. (MP, TI)

In sum, despite of few critics, findings did not reveal significant evidence that could be interpreted as a sign of the politicisation of the prefects within the MoI. Instead, prefects believed that their task is to carry out their minister's priorities and decisions neutrally and professionally. In other words, they shared the well-known belief of 'I am in the business of serving the government of the day at the end of the day' (Yong and Hazell, 2014, p. 103).

On the other hand, politicians are expected to support and trust bureaucracy and their competence, and value their tasks in order to provide them with the opportunity to perform and administer their programmes and projects.

7.2.2   Political Support

The MoI bureaucracy mostly appreciated political support (see table2, 8b), especially from their own minister. As mentioned in the previous section, participants mostly emphasised that minister support was closely related to taking risk and accountability for making and implementing political decisions.

> The prefects need the ministers' support especially when following regulations which require political sensibility and responsibility due to their potential to affect the lives of our citizens. In my period, this mechanism was administered well. Mostly, our minister supported our friends. (FPPS1, TI)

Ministers confirmed this opinion.

I always supported good proposals. I had already known the importance of this kind of leverage from my previous public background. The more I encouraged them [the prefects], the more I benefitted from their experience and skills. (Atalay_Former minister 3, TI)

The other political actors' support has not been as important as minister's support for the prefects. Most participants did not wish to encounter political interference. As discussed in Chapter 4, they also do not wish to share their public power with other stakeholders, is rooted in the Turkish administrative tradition.

7.2.3   Public Legitimacy and Trust

The members of the MoI, including the minister, were aware of the importance of public legitimacy and trust in their ability to fulfil their duties. Therefore, they had been delicate to citizens' requests and been able to gain their trust. In line with this, almost all participants stated that there has been strong trust amongst the public in the MoI administration and its prefects.

Prefects work as if they are the elected ones. Therefore, our citizens still expect them to solve their problems, or at least listen to them. They trust our friends rather than politicians, including the mayors. (Gonul_Former minister 2, TI)

Citizen see the prefects as the [representatives of] state. They believe in them. (Atalay_Former minister 3, TI)

Furthermore, having a field experience and low and mid-low class background strengthened these opinions.

Prefects know the traditions of the State and the Turkish society, as well as their contexts and problems better than others. This is because, they are children of peasants, workers, and public servants. Therefore, others consider them as the heart of the public administration. (Ceber_CI5, TI)

In their SWOT analysis sections, all grey reports acknowledged this by identifying "public trust" as the strongest factor for fulfilling the duties of the MoI. This perception was confirmed by recent official reports and research studies conducted by the MoI. Although there have been several concerns about coordination and collaboration with the MoI, most citizens and society groups trusted in the MoI stressing the respectable role of this traditional ministry. [191]

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[191] The MoI has been found respectable ticked up by 3030 citizens with percentage of 68.3 (TIAV, 2013, p. 31).

In sum, findings showed similarity with individual political policy capacity. Responsiveness has been the foremost feature of MoI administration. As mentioned before, willingness to fulfil tasks according to the priorities of the minister and government was identified to be obligatory for the prefects. Moreover, the participants, including the former ministers, saw overall MoI administration to be successful in terms of responsiveness and policy coherance. All participants valued ministerial support stressing its vitality. With few exceptions related to the political priorities and ministerial style, the prefects were mostly satisfied with ministerial support. They believed that if minister wished to be successful, undoubtedly, he could do it with prefects. Therefore, the minister's facilitator/supportive role would actually benefit his position. Political administrators also valued public legitimacy and support.

7.3   Political System Policy Capacity (External Political Environment)

There is a consensus in the literature that policy-making is becoming increasingly difficult due to the changing external political environment (i.e. Gleeson et al., 2009, p. 2). Although economic system, stability and crisis impacted MoI's tasks, MoI's political administrators mostly pointed out concerns about external political environment. Therefore, I will focus main external political environmental factors for the MoI regarding below list respectively:

- the increased power and pressure of globalisation on the top-down feature of the regulation (in this case, the pressure of the EU),

- top-down policy: Centralisation,

- the 24/7 media pressure.

The participants stressed that the MoI has been at the centre of this dynamic environment pressure.

> Today, three main topics were argued in the Cabinet. Two of them [the visa agreement with the EU and Syrian Refugee crisis] were directly related our ministry. This is evidence of the central role of the MoI. (Gunduzoz_GD8, TI)

Another perception was searched in MoI perception reports 2014 according to several groups of Turkish society. The head of the villages, former mayors and MPs agreed them with regard to "trust with ministry" %70.4, %68.4 and %67.8 rate respectively, whereas NGOs and lawyers were at least favourite groups with %52.8 and 24.7 respectively) (TIAV, 2014a, pp. 18, 74, 105, 142 and 170).

According to majority of the participants, including former ministers, prefects have been aware of the importance of the external political environment regarding policy and decision making as well as fulfilling their daily routines and other duties.

> Of course, external factors affect our policies and daily practice. You could not escape this reality. Instead, you have to read them carefully and prepare for them as much as possible. For instance, while you are fighting a terror attack, you must consider the EU pressure and human rights concerns. In addition, however, we already know that we have the right to fight them, so we must also implement some regulations to advocate our position better.[192] Otherwise, you must have watched the international media; they used some operational videos against us. (CI4, TI)

> Neither us [the MoI administration] nor the Globe remains the same. Everything has been changing. Therefore, you have to adapt to the new environment. We work to renew our training programmes according to this reality. (GD7, TI)

As mentioned earlier, Atbas stressed that this change in the external political environment pushed the MoI to establish a new department to tackle new issues such as immigration and technological development. (Atbas_FGD2, TI)

7.3.1   Globalisation: The Integration Process of the EU

When one wants to explore the role of the international, political and economic forces, viz. globalisation, (see table2, 9a) in shaping the national policy including the need for intergovernmental and inter-sectoral coordination for policy making, one should focus on the integration process of the EU, as since 2002 the MoI has played a pivotal role in implementing reforms to meet the membership requirements of the EU. (Atalay_Former minister 3)[193]

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[192] The MoI has published several official reports on the Pro-Kurdish terror attack and its affiliation with the local administration including "Exploitation of Children and Women by PKK/KCK Terrorist Organization" in February 2017, and "Appointments to Municipalities due to terror" In March 2017. [The MoI appointed 40 trustees amongst governors and district governors as an acting mayor to municipalities of 8 provinces, 28 districts, and 4 small municipalities. These recent reports were written in both Turkish and English, and their main aim was to explain the positions of the government and the MoI on "why they took a radical precaution to tackle terror issue?" to national and especially international observers. These reports can also be interpreted as attempts to abolish international (EU) pressure and critics against government policies in this region [south-east part of Turkey]. These reports provided ample solid evidence and statistics unlike previous official reports, a feature that complies with the current minister's style. As an insider with 5 years' experience in this delicate region, I found these attempts to be so beneficial in advocating the Turkish position against human based critics.   Available from: http://www.strateji.gov.tr/kurumlar/strateji.gov.tr/deneme/YAYINLAR/%C4%B0%C3%87ER%C4%B0K/belediyeler%20redakteSON.pdf (Retrieved 02/04/2017)

[193] The MoI has been either directly or indirectly responsible for Turkey achieving around 25 of 33 of its main obligations in this regard. Fulfilling these responsibilities needed huge efforts. Therefore, the prefects stated that they have had to spend a substantial time to develop related regulations and implementations. (GD5, TI)

This process showed characteristics relating to the governmental interest and priorities surrounding emotional factors. Most prefects drew attention to the increasing role of the PM in shaping and bridging public policies through the EU integration phase with top-down manner.

Indeed, the findings showed that the prefects thought the European countries had better administration due to their experience abroad.[194] They expressed the effects and benefits of this integration process.

> The integration process and commitment of Turkey have changed our attitude including the ministers. Instead of a state-based tradition, they tended to focus on human rights, democratisation, and good governance tools in order to attain the standards of the European Countries. Therefore, MoI bureaucracy inevitably struggled to adapt to the new era. For instance, our inspector board changed its inspection reports in line with this commitment. Additionally, our friends prepared important reports evaluating the overall EU integration process. (Avsarbey_CI3, TI)

This pressure was felt especially between the years 2002 and 2011, as Minister Atalay stressed when discussing the importance of human rights oriented transition periods. (Atalay_former minister 3, TI) The establishment of the Department of EU and External Relations was seen as an essential step for responding to the EU integration process as well as coordinating huge budget projects.[195]

> The General Secretary used to coordinate external affairs. But, we observed that this unit was so busy and had a shortage of qualified people. Therefore, we established the EU department, which was designed not only for external affairs but also for monitoring and administrating the European Integration process. (Atalay_Former minister 3, TI)

Yet, internalisation has been the main issue for the top-down policy. Most of the participants admitted that these top-down policies, their instruments and concepts sound unfamiliar since most of them come from the EU legislation.

> These plans will be prepared and implemented with the enactment of Law 5018 [demanded/imposed by EU]. Therefore, we are not able to internalise these plans yet.

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[194] 'The Westernisation of the country has been one of the prevailing aims of the Turkish modernisation efforts of the last two centuries … in the eyes of the public, politicians and academics, full membership represents the realisation of Turkey's modernization project' (Varol, 2015, p. 102).

[195] i.e This department coordinated 8 substantial projects with other departments with a total budget of €137, 840,000 (€118,940,000 provided by the EU) in 2015. (MoI, 2015c, p.93)

We have been working and struggling to get into these concepts. Still, we are not fully

successful. (HD2, TI)

Despite some barriers including resistance and insufficient capacity, the prefects asserted that they could successfully adopt the new regulations relevant to this integration process and support their minister in fulfilling their commitments because of their previous abroad experience.

In the MoI, we are lucky since we have friends who are well-educated and know the EU

through their training abroad. They are so idealist in advocating our rights in

international meetings. (FPPS1, TI)

As mentioned before, my observation in the "visa agreement meeting" confirmed these statements. Amongst several ministries, the MoI seemed to be better prepared than others. (FWBN, TI)

7.3.2 Top-down Policy: Centralisation

Similar to Turkey's international counterparts, after the year 2000, the role of the PM and his office on policy formulation and decision making and other policy stages has become more important than ever before (see table2, 9b).

The Prime Minister was able to take control of the cabinet due not only to his

constitutional authority and related legislative powers, but also due to the country's

leader-oriented political and administrative culture coupled with [the PM's] victory at

the elections…The Prime Minister's Office has [also] a crucial role to play in [the] Turkish

public administration] (Varol, 2015, p. 130, 133).

Moreover, when the recent developments in Turkey, such as the concentration of policy and decision-making on the President and PM Office, and particularly the president's exertion of a greater control over the public policies, are considered, the leader-based administration.[196] In line with this, the participants pointed out dominance of politics within the MoI. They identified both the centralisation and dominance of the PM as a necessity and consequence of this dominance.

Since the Justice and Development Party Government came to power, politics has

dominated everywhere including media and the economy. Namely, solely the

government has been the governing country, even the legislation and jurisdiction.

Therefore, a strong PM Office is obligatory to keep this transformation. (HD1, TI)

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[196] Recep Tayyib Erdogan, Former PM (17 March 2003- August 2014); current President of Turkey Republic (28 August 2014- continue)

Some of the prefects asserted that PM Office has been undertaking its policy making and coordination role in compliance with regulations and state tradition.

> According to our Constitution, the PM Office has a coordinating and policy making role. Is the Cabinet the executive branch of our country? Is our PM politically responsible for each public service? In the cabinet meeting, they make policies and decisions. Main policies are determined by the PM and every minister is expected to administrate and implement these policies and decisions. Ministers should not be expected to act outside of this main way. Therefore, instead of seeing the PM Office as a force for increasing centralisation, its role should be seen as natural. (DU1, TI)

> Ministries have likely overlapping responsibilities. Therefore, you need a coordinating organisation in the public administration. Otherwise, how could you ensure efficient coordination and collaboration amongst ministries? (LA1, TI)

All former ministers also rejected the idea of centralisation of the PM Office.

> I do not agree this claim that the PM Office dominates everything. My state minister and deputy PM experiences in the PM Office taught me that policies and decisions are made inside the ministries. The PM Office has been acting as a coordinator amongst ministries. Of course, the last word would be told by the PM. (Atalay_Former minister 3, TI)

> The ministries have the power to develop policies, if I use your term, they are the "kitchen for policy making". The PM Office mostly retouches [amend] them. The MoI minister has power over the police and gendarme, and is responsible for internal security. How could you undervalue their [MoI's] power? (Gonul_ Former minister 2, TI)

Furthermore, a few rejected the existence of the top-down approach by sharing their own experience.

> If I tell you that one Cabinet meeting on local administration reform headed by our honourable PM, which I joined, took nine hours, you could understand that the assertion of top-down policy is meaningless. In this meeting, each side of local administration presented their case. If the regulation was prepared in advance, why did they discuss it for long hours? (DGD1, TI)

Moreover, some claim that top-down policy could facilitate processes with the PM's discretion and support.

> If not for the PM's top-down manner, we would not solve problems. Our progression on the EU visa agreement was accelerated by his top command. (GD5, TI)

On the other hand, some disagree with this, and pointed out the detrimental effects of centralisation by comparing the current state with the past.

> In the past, firstly, at least 5 or 6 ministries used to work on a draft regulation. After that, this draft regulation was discussed at length. The discussions took months. Admittedly, today, there is a similar mechanism, but mentality has changed. For instance, to decrease the use of red tape, one working group was established. All of them were selected because of their concordance with the mentality of the PM Office in order to avoid potential objections. The PM Office and its political advisors dictated some drafts. Once someone resisted change, they told them 'my brother you do not know anything about it, we have already worked on it. Our PM wished this way', and they sent him back. Namely, they did not let that person to touch even a comma in the document. (Karaca_CI4, TI)

Critical prefects asserted that due to the increasing role of the PM Office and the tendency to politicise the policymaking process—not even minister was able to prevent local reforms—the MoI policy advisory capacity did not feel pressure for developing new policies. Some interior committee members have claimed that the Prime Ministry has played a dominant role even when drafting the vital regulation for the MoI. One sample quote supporting this was:

> I do not believe that this parliamentary bill—[in the] metropolitan municipality—[was] drafted by the MoI. It is so obvious that it [has] been drafted by [the] Prime [Ministry's] Office (TBMM, 2012, p. 77).

Some asserted that the top-down policy approach was exacerbated by "hurriedness" and "reactiveness" that prevented debates on recent regulations. Since the MoI had to push forward regulations in a short time, the bureaucracy was pushed to support the legitimisation process without enough preparation. (LA1, TI) Critical prefects tended to oppose reactiveness, which aims to immediately abolish past experience.

> For instance, the "General Accounting Law 1050" was regulated in 1927. Actually, this well-regulated act was able to respond to our needs. The government abolished it for the sake of integration with the EU. Since 2005, the new regulation was amended several times. This is because it was a translated [adopted from the EU practices] regulation and far away from our public administration practice. (DU2, TI)

Reactiveness is likely to conflict with the traditional characteristic of the MoI. The participants complained about the recent public administration reforms and regulations that are inclined to ignore IM. Instead, it was highlighted that the new regulations adopted from foreign countries best experience were replacing the MoI's own experience in order to solve problems.[197]

> It is impossible to close your eyes to foreign experience. But, you should discuss it properly. We have been struggling to unconsciously imitate them. This is not a realistic view. Look, most of them abandoned NPM tools, but we still repeated the adoption of these tools in our grey reports as target. (Avsarbey_CI3, TI)

Furthermore, the prefects mostly thought that these be have not been beneficial.

> Most of the reforms ignored implementation and reality. They assumed that making new regulations could automatically solve all issues. Unless you quit this mentality, you could not solve problems without considering public expectation, changes in the external environment, and your country's distinctive features [context]. Reforms related to the EU may be considered to be better implemented. (CI1, TI)

On the other hand**,** there were a few exceptions**.** The findings revealed that the prefectoral class mostly welcomed new departments[198] unless they clash with traditional values and principles.

In sum, considering above comments, differences amongst opinions could be interpreted as two different terms of the Justice and Development Party Government: the first between 2002 and 2011 which was more likely to act as a reformist and collaborative government, whereas the second period (2011-current) could be seen as a government with more centralisation. Furthermore, the MoI had a politically strong minister in the former era, with a relatively close relation with the PM and could complete their period of service.

7.3.3   Media Pressure

Nowadays, as with other countries, the constant media pressure (see table2, 9c) is an everyday reality for the MoI administration.

> Nowadays, we have recognised the CNN syndrome. We experience that our citizens monitor us via visual and social media. You cannot escape from them. (Ceber_CI5, TI)

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[197] (Gunduzoz_GD8, TI; LA2, TI; CI4, TI)
[198] However, six central departments were established in the public administration reform era after 2002, Department of IT, Department of European Union and Foreign Relations, Department of Migration Administration, Department of Association, Research and Studies Centre were welcomed whereas Department of Strategy Development (revised), and Internal Audit Unit were not.

My participants all agreed that the MoI must carefully evaluate this reality. Responding to and managing the immediate demands of the media, cannot be ignored. Some participant also stressed that this is because the top administration of the MoI are 'driven by the media', like as foreign counterparts (Tiernan and Weller, 2010, p. 230).

> Effect of media pressure has increased which is rather terrifying. Therefore, our departments and media unit scan news including international, national and local ones. Sometimes, we could observe panic if news criticised the MoI administration, especially our ministers. It became our first priority to evade such media attacks. Regardless of whether our minister responds to or refutes them explicitly, the MoI prepares brief notes about each news. (DU2, TI)

Contrariwise, a few saw being delicate with media as normal, rather than driven by the media:

> The effect of media on the Turkish State has showed a varying character. Of course, our ministers are political actors, and they are accountable to the parliament, the citizens as well as the media. So, it is normal to be delicate with media. Therefore, they spare one or two hours a day to deal with the media including contacting the media, giving interviews, building relationships with well-known journalists and columnists via their media advisors, having informal chats with them, and making press statements. (FPPS1, TI)

Departments that work in the political domain such as the GD of local administration used to prepare informational papers for the Minister almost every day to inform minister in quickest time. For example, if one mayor is accused of bribery, the minister must make a decision on whether there is a need to suspend him or her from his post.[199]

During my fieldwork, I observed that prefects were too delicate in monitoring the media. Although a few appreciated their role, most of the participants were not happy with the media pressure. Yet, findings confirmed that the prefects could more or less provide the minister the advice needed to respond to unexpected, urgent, or controversial issues appearing on the media.

> Media could target our ministry mostly in the case of negative events. Yet, in my opinion, we have been good at administrating this process and tackling them. We could respond to them successfully; sometimes directly, and sometimes through PM or President Office. Having territorial administrations, who provide valuable and detailed information on time, has been an asset. (DU1, TI)

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[199] GD2, GS of the Union, and Bilmez_DGD1, TI.

On the other hand, this was not always handled perfectly. The media was thought to be handled in a very ad hoc and unreflective way prevent its detrimental effects on the Ministry, minister and the prefects themselves. (A, TI) Findings revealed similar pattern with foreign counterparts.

The classic one is something hits the media and the minister says fix it and the department fixes it and they fix it with the first thing that comes to mind (Hughes, 2014, p.164).

Of course, we had not expected this kind of huge demonstration in case of Gezi protest. Yet, we recognised the importance of responding to the social media attack and anti-propaganda against our government. Therefore, we developed necessary measures. We stayed inside the MoI continuously for 72 hours to control the situation. Immediately, we opened social media accounts for the MoI and the Minister. Expert staff were recruited in the media unit. The minister valued informing our citizens. You know that even CNN International broadcasted [the protest] live for days. I think that we could share our position, policies and concerns with our citizens and also our foreign counterparts. (FGS3, TI)

Yet, findings revealed that, the MoI administration, including the minister, usually preferred secrecy to protect the MoI and public goods.

Last year 30% of 15000 parliamentary questions were asked to the PM, whereas almost same numbers were asked to our minister. Because of the wide range duties of the MoI, especially our security based tasks, our ministers tend not to speak too much. Instead, they prefer the "wait and see policy". Therefore, we mostly do not take initiatives to inform public properly. This passive position has exacerbated situations against the MoI administration. (FPPS2, TI)

In addition, recent dramatic developments, i.e. coup attempt, made the MoI more cautious, therefore, demands for transparency and responses to the media have inclined to retrogress.

The participants have expressed that the media has not been always been a trustful source.

Generally, the media seeks to find weaknesses or maladministration rather than reporting good things about you. (DU2, TI)

Media has become a gun rather than reflecting on issues. When we see news about our ministry or colloquies, first of all we check their reliability. Our ministers mostly approach these news cautiously because of their prefectoral experience. (DGD3, TI)

The participants firstly checked every detail of the important events or news before presenting them to the minister or undersecretary, since any mistakes misleading minister could not be tolerated. (FPPS2, TI) Yet, the prefects thought they successfully fulfilled this difficult task.

> We presented hourly information to our minister in such cases. We collect all the information from several departments, which have already had valuable knowledge and experience about this kind of news. We had to do this on time. Why? Because, the ministers account to the public, parliament, and the PM. More importantly, the media, both national and international, pushed the minister to respond to any questions regardless of time and place. (FGS3, TI)

On the other hand, a few disagreed with these accounts stressing the wide-spread risk awareness.

> Nervousness has been a reality that rather than relieving citizens and solving their problems. We wished not to be the centre of news topics and public scrutiny. Because, it could be affect our ministry and our reputation. Sensational news could terminate the ministers' and our career. (DU2, TI)

Media and public relation administration were identified as the most unsatisfactory areas in the recent perception reports conducted by the MoI. [200] Some members of the MoI confirmed this gap.

> Our ministry has preferred to stay in the dark. So, our relations with the media have been weak. (CI2, TI)

The minister's style determined the nature of the relations with media. Most ministers know that this is a high-risk area, so risk awareness makes them more cautious than normal. Mostly, ministers did not spoke widely in the public arena. (FA2, TI) They were not likely to respond immediately until the situation forces them to speak. (FGS3, TI)

> I did not like the pride of place [attention]. I also did not speak to the media too much. In my opinion, the MoI minister should be careful in making press statement because of the nature of the MoI's tasks. But, sometimes, you had to illuminate [inform] the public. For instance, there was a terrible manslaughter in Mardin. More than 30 of our citizens

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[200] The reseach on perception of media was done in an academic way by using a discourse analysis on 24 TVs and newspapers which broadcasted and published from 01/01/2013 to 10/05/2013. This report had similar results to the previous ones. While the ministers and public security were the most newsworthy, the institutional perception of the Ministry was ignored. Most of the news (44.4%) about the MoI or the minister focused on security topics including violence, public security, terror attacks, and fight against terrorism, since these issues grab the attention of both the public and politicians (TIAV, 2014b, p. viii).

were killed. There was a doubt whether it was a terror attack. After shedding some light on the event, I made a press statement at 03.00 a.m. that the incident was not terror attack, and instead was caused by a family feud. Without this press statement, we would not abolish questions and gossip. (Atalay_Former minister 3, TI)

External political environment, dynamic and secrecy based responsibilities maintained the cautionary manners. The participants were aware that they would not able to compensate for a mistake in case of unexpected events. (FPPS2, TI)

Currently, the MoI website is used to inform the public and members. There are a few brief news articles mostly about external relations and some routine announcement online. Some grey reports have been compulsorily published in line with laws.[201] However, it should be recalled that the websites and public statements have not met stakeholder expectations (TIAV, 2013, p.34).

Findings revealed that besides ignorance, lack of individual capacity on public and media relation has been barrier.

People who have been working in there [media and public relations unit] are not permanent staff; they are not even professional media members. They are mostly fulfilling secondments. Their task is solely to collect and deliver news to the minister and undersecretary without further analysis. They are not able to do this. (FPPS2, TI)

On the other hand, Ministers disagree with them and praised their colleague.

I had a very good media advisor. He mostly joined our morning meetings. He monitored the media and coordinated relations with them successfully. I valued our consultations. (Atalay_Former minister 3, TI)

In summary, findings revealed that most prefects do not trust media rather it is seen an issue, which must be handled carefully. Therefore, ministers do not prefer to speak to media unless they must do it. Instead, MoI has used official websites and reports in order to inform public. Despite of permanent challenge of the MoI, lack of adequate collaboration with media, lack of expert staff and too much cautious manner could be seen as a limit to policy capacity.

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[201] It should be underlined that in the current minister's era, public statements of the MoI have become more detailed and sometimes in English, since 03/09/2016. Recently, the MoI publishes detailed, weekly press releases on the terror operation against pro-Kurdish terror organisation. (Available: https://www.icisleri.gov.tr/15052017-22052017-tarihleri-arasinda-yurutulen-operasyonlar (last retrieved 26/04/2017)

7.4   Summary of the Chapter

I will summarise research finding to answer my research questions.

Research Question 1: Does bureaucracy give the minister the advice needed to reach a decision?

The political and administrative leadership roles of the ministers dominate everything

Political leadership is perceived as a vital component of organisational policy capacity. Similarly, when the thesis findings are interpreted in light of the regulations and grey reports, it could be said that ministers have acted as political and administrative bosses and have exercised power inside the MoI. Their individual political policy capacities determine the bureaucratic policy (advisory) capacity. The strong political position of minister was welcomed by most prefects in compliance with Turkish administrative tradition, although some of them stressed that nowadays centralisation has left them with too little space to set and implement their agenda. Thus, their political policy capacity has become less effective now than the past.

The ministers' political role dominates their other roles although they come from a prefectoral class. They have been delicate not to lose political support as well as public trust and support. Therefore, they mostly value public relationships.

Findings revealed that ministers have been micro political administrators in almost all tasks determined by strict ministerial discretion, hierarchy, and risk awareness, rather than being the head of the administration that limits to bureauctaric policy capacity.

Next, relations with prefects, except for a few expectations, were not found to be concerning for the participants.

Considering their prefectoral background, communication with a "prefectoral minister" has been easier than that with an outsider. Further, assumption of the prefectoral ministers knowing everything about the MoI was confirmed by some participants. Nevertheless, being a prefectoral minister did not always correspond to having the same style. Findings pointed out a significant difference amongst prefectoral ministers. Therefore, having prefectoral background should be considered, but not exaggerated.

With regard to their effect on policy capacity, ministers' political and diplomat role seem to allow the prefects to work without too much political intervention; however, concerns about the merit system could diminish bureaucratic individual policy capacity of the MoI. Considering ministers' administrative role, being the head of administration and their willingness to know and control

everything as well as their strict ministerial discretion were seen as a barrier for presenting and improving bureaucratic skills and for the ministers seeing the big pictures and dealing with actual issues.

Prefects have enough political policy skill

The prefects mostly believed that they have political acumen and diplomatic skills stemming from the amalgamation of their shared field experience and everyday practices of the MoI. All ministers confirmed this opinion. On the other hand, there are shortages in political policy analysis and diplomatic skills with stakeholders.

The prefects are sensitive to surprises from the external environment

When the findings of the interviews were triangulated using official documents and perception reports, it was concluded that all participants were aware of the reality of the external political environment, specifically centralisation, pressure of the EU integration process, and media pressure. They were also aware of the ramifications of the processes in the external political environment as well as the fact that the external environment could not be ignored. The prefects were thought to be mostly successful in understanding and meeting expectations.

Despite of opposite opinions against NPM waves and top-down policies of EU integration process, some saw this process as a motivating factor to improve political policy capacity of MoI. Findings also revealed that the prefects expressed that the past habits of ignoring accountability to citizens, and appreciation and perception of the citizens have been changing. These mentality changes contributed to improving organisational political capacity as well as operational systemic capacity unless these tools clashed with the traditions of the MoI. Critical prefectoral interviewees tended to criticise policy transfer from EU without further consideration of Turkish context and being too reflexive for political demand.

Participants have diverse opinions about centralisation. Some did not see any concern about PM office to determine policy stressing its coordination role whereas critical prefects asserted political dominancy and leader-based administration, as a barrier for improving policy making capacity of MoI because of the accumulation of executive and legislative powers in the (one-party) government. When the all opinions are considered, it could be said that, the accounts of participants who were mostly critical about the political atmosphere implicitly pointed out to the post-2011 era rather than the previous years (2002-2011) in which the Justice and Government Party were considered as a more reformist and democratic government.

Although there were a few exceptions, the MoI, including the ministers and prefects, saw the media as a threat rather than a bridge between them and the public. However, they agreed that the media should not be ignored. Therefore, all departments, including the inner circles of the ministers and undersecretaries, valued responding to media that pushes improving policy capacity of the MoI. Findings confirmed that the prefects could more or less provide the minister the advice needed to respond to unexpected, urgent, or controversial issues appearing on the media. Yet, lack of media-expert staff, too much risk awareness could be a limit to policy capacity.

Responsiveness and political support are the primary values

Findings showed similarity with individual political policy capacity. Responsiveness has been the chief feature of the MoI administration. Willingness to fulfil tasks according to minister and government priorities were thought to be obligatory for prefects. Moreover, the prefects saw their departments and overall MoI administration to be successful. All participants valued ministerial support stressing its vitality. Most prefects were satisfied with ministerial support that strengthen bureaucratic policy capacity. They believed that if minister wished to be successful, he could accomplish this with prefects. Therefore, his facilitator/supportive role has actually benefitted his position. Ministers were also aware of the vitality of their support.

Preserving the public trust is the key aim

Public trust has been the most important points for prefects. According to the interview findings and perception studies, the MoI has had public trust regarding the fulfilment of its duties. Considering barriers of (political) advisory capacity, public trust has been vital for MoI and prefects in confirming their self-confidence, which strengthen bureaucratic policy capacity. Findings repeatedly acknowledged that despite all pressure and deficiency, the MoI political administrators sought to protect public trust, an action rooted in Turkish administrative tradition.

Research question 2: How has the bureaucratic policy capacity of The Turkish Ministry of the Interior changed during the reform years, 2002 – 2016?

There are ramifications of the external political environment

Despite of opposite opinions against NPM waves and top-down policies of EU integration process, some saw this process as a motivating factor to improve political policy capacity of MoI. Findings also revealed that the prefects expressed that the past habits of ignoring accountability to citizens, and appreciation and perception of the citizens have been changing. These mentality changes contributed to improving organisational political capacity as well as operational systemic policy capacity unless these tools clashed with the traditions of the MoI.

Despite the denial of the dominant role of the PM Office by some, centralisation was still seen to be a barrier to taking initiatives on policies and decision. Thus, the MoI administration felt to be restricted to a narrow area because of the top-down policy making approach which prevented improvements in all levels of the policy capacity of MoI.

Although there were a few exceptions, the MoI, including the ministers and prefects, saw the media as a threat rather than a bridge between them and the public. However, they agreed that the media should not be ignored. Therefore, all departments, including the inner circles of the ministers and undersecretaries, valued responding to media that pushes improving policy capacity of the MoI.

Triumph of tradition: "Business as usual"

As previously discussed, findings pointed out that, in spite of external political pressure, the MoI administrative tradition has still preserved its tradition that should not be interpreted as a barrier. Indeed, the prefects mostly considered this tradition to be a safe haven and hearth of the Turkish public administration, while they did not favour the managerial story dictated by the persistent reform process. In other words, the MoI has continued to implement their traditional processes, viz. "business as usual". It should be underlined that political actors' unwillingness and risk avoidance have also acted as barriers to internalise and implement these reforms.

"I am in the business of serving the government of the day"

However, a few criticised politicisation inside the MoI, the majority of prefects and all former ministers did not confirm the politicisation of MoI's prefects. Instead, the participants mostly highlighted the well-known belief that 'I am in the business of serving the government of the day at the end of the day' (Yong and Hazell, 2014, p. 103).

Chapter 8: CONCLUSION OF THE THESIS

Introduction

The purpose of the current chapter is to discuss the thesis findings presented in Chapters 4-7 in light of relevant literature as well as the thesis aim, research questions, research design, and adapted conceptual model. Major themes identified in the thesis are broadly reviewed in this chapter. These themes are described in more detail in the relevant summaries of each chapter.

This chapter is structured into distinct sections. First, the remit of the research and methodology used in the thesis are briefly evaluated. Theoretical implications of research findings are then discussed. Specific attention is then paid to the conceptual model. Next, the findings of the research are presented under five main themes and whether these answer the research questions comply with research aims is discussed. The main contributions of the findings to the literature on bureaucratic policy capacity are then assessed. Lastly, possible areas for future research are suggested.

What was researched?

The thesis addresses concerns about the limits to policy capacity of public departments. To address the need for policy capacity building, the current policy capacity must first be described. The majority of existing studies focus on several dimensions of capacity; however, these are not exhaustive. Some of these are the capacity to make intelligent collective choices between policy options, and the capacity to utilise or organise resources.

On the other hand, some recent literatures systematically attempt to develop a working definition for policy capacity which encompasses the ability to make intelligent, collective decisions; to mobilise resources for the purpose of supporting policy making; to implement policy; and to coordinate government-wide policy creation.

I preferred to use this comprehensive approach whereby I referred to the "policy capacity" as an umbrella term that consists of three competencies: analytical, administrative, and political skills at individual, organisational and systemic levels. This inclusive definition generated a theoretical framework that provided improved assessment of empirical data obtained in for thesis.

For MoI case, the scarcity of empirical research on the policy capacity within the Turkish public sector meant that there was a need for conducting detailed research which adopted a holistic view on bureaucratic policy capacity of one Turkish public department (see my main aims p. 3 of this thesis). Therefore, I had identified two main research questions after conducting literature

review. "The policy capacity in a government department" formed the broad theme of this research.

Assessment of the Utility of the Framework and Methodology used in the Thesis (how was the research conducted)

Theoretical Implications and Relationship of Applicability with the Model

The (amended) framework provided a clear structure and a detailed list of elements of policy capacity for this thesis, even though the elements involved some overlap with each other to comply with the structure and practice of public administration. Further, this framework enabled a broader approach for preparing interview questions, conducting fieldwork, analysing research findings, and dealing with the interdependency of the findings and categorising the identified themes into distinct themes and subthemes.

This framework also not only focussed on prefects' ability to give advice, and identify and make policy choices but also considered their ability to perform tasks and functions in various stages of the policy process by incorporating the dynamic external political environment and administrative tradition within three interdependent resource levels under study. For instance, for first research question, "Does bureaucracy give the minister the advice needed to reach a decision?", if I focussed only on the individual capacity of prefects, it would have been easy to blame prefects for the limits to policy capacity. Alternatively, if organisational and systemic elements, including Turkish administrative tradition, external environment changes, centralisation, poor demand for public advice, were ignored in the study, the implication of the research findings would have been different. Furthermore, an awareness of overall external political environments and its dynamics were crucial for addressing the second research question. Without this awareness, one could not fully understand the determinants of existing limits and would simply hold the prefects responsible for such failures.

In summary, in light of the research findings and my insider role within the MoI, it could be asserted that the theoretical framework provided a strong model for an in-depth assessment of the bureaucratic policy capacity of the MoI. It enabled me both to analyse the ethnographic qualitative data collected for the case study of the bureaucratic policy capacity of the MoI and to provide a through description of the MOI's policy capacity and to analse the strengths and weaknesses of its capacity.

Strengths and weaknesses of the methods

Ethnographic qualitative (single case study) research design was used in this research. This method provided the several advantages as Boll and Rhodes argue elsewhere (see pp. 56-57 of this thesis). Employing this methodology, 'provide case studies of specific "events" to show ministers and civil servants "in action"' (Rhodes, 2011a) that allowed to comprehensively describe the characteristics and factors of the public (advisory) policy capacity under study and enabled me to understand political-administrators' experiences through their viewpoints. This methodology also enabled me to understand and demonstrate the policy involvement of political administrators, their organisational and systemic context and process with the explicit statements from the participants. In sum, therefore, interviewing elites and conducting observations could provide invaluable insight and findings, although the difficulties I faced during such encounters must be noted. (These are detailed later on in this chapter)

Another advantage of this research design was that it enabled me to incorporate my professional insider role (prefectoral identity) that provided me some advantages during the fieldwork.

On the other hand, the issue of the quality of "qualitative ethnographic (single case study) research" were argued in Chapter 3. I also describe how I coped these problems in Chapter 3 (pp. 67-68 of this thesis).

Overall, the methodology employed in the thesis allowed the study to focus on the everyday lives of the political-administrators which in turn allowed to describe and understand the policy capacity of the MoI in depth. Understanding the context of the MoI, where tasks are fulfilled in a dynamic, interdependent and complicated environment, could not be thoroughly done by for example a sample survey. It required a thick description. Thus, I was able to respond the research questions and meet research aims in a robust way.

Challenges and Limitations of the Thesis

Conducting this research study was challenging due to several reasons. The first challenge was the identification of literature relevant to Turkey. Majority of related published studies come from other countries, and hence stress the structures, traditions found in those countries. Due to the developing socioeconomic status and ever changing internal and external political environment of Turkey, one would expect to find more complicated and diverse findings in Turkey than in developed nations. Nevertheless, thesis findings identified some similarities with developed Western countries. (I highlighted some of them in the emprical chapters, including the impacts of external political environment, issues related to coordination and collaboration, and deficiencies of individual capacity regarding all competences, cope and survive challenge, media threat,

debate on the absence of political leader role, reactiveness and hurridness, barriers of analytical system capacities, some comman characteristics of the administrative tradition etc.)

Furthermore, the overall dearth of Turkish academic studies in this field posed a challenged. The majority of Turkish studies in the fields are descriptive and normative, and most lack a conceptual basis with the exception of a couple recent publications.[202] Indeed, there was no comprehensive academic research studies (fieldwork or other types) conducted on the policy capacity of public departments of Turkey.

As international research — based on fieldwork —, I have identified only three published study. First, Tiernan and colleagues[203] focussed on the policy advisory capacity of several ministries in Australia. Second, Craft, Howlett and their colleagues[204] examined of five policy sectors—finance, infrastructure, energy, forestry, and transportation—in two countries, Canada and the United States. Third, Howlett and his colleagues assessed all nine policy capacities of several countries.[205] On the other hand, my study is different from them because I covered all nine policy capacities of one specific case.

The second major challenge was the wide scope and complexity of the research topic. Therefore, I needed to define the scope of the study carefully by considering the multifaceted nature of the topic. I addressed this challenge by following the adapted framework, I selected departments and their members according to the framework systematically. For instance, the members of inner circle of the ministers and undersecretaries, members of the advisory departments, and heads of the departments were targeted for unpicking advisory capacity. On the other hand, deputy undersecretaries and members of the coordinator departments were approached for understanding the administrative (coordination) capacity.

The third challenge was about the accessibility of the interview participants. I successfully managed to reach and visit almost all participants due to my insider role within the MoI administration. However, not everyone accepted to participate in the study. I believe the main reason for this was that they saw this research as a potential threat to their position which they saw to be fragile. These potential participants rejected my request citing their busy agendas. Interestingly, some of them tried to provide me some information about their role and responsibilities without officially joining the interview study.[206] Several the key decision-making

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[202] i.e Varol, 2015; Feslihan 2016; Balci, 2015, and Sen, 2015.
[203] Australian Journal of Public Administration, 70 (4), 2011.
[204] Review of Policy Research, 30 (1), 2013.
[205] Policy Science, special issue, 34 (3), 2015.
[206] Due to ethical concern, these were not considered as participants.

actors (two former ministers, the current deputy minister, and current (now, former) undersecretary, and three former undersecretaries) did not agree to be interviewed due to their busy schedules and unwillingness to participate. (Due to my public servant role, I could not insist) However, I was able to access all of them. It should be noted that both the deputy of minister and undersecretary of the MoI have been appointed recently. But, I was able to conduct interviews with two former ministers and two experienced deputy undersecretaries and very informed inner circle of ministers and undersecretaries who were recommended by most of other participants. Therefore, I was able to address this gap.

The fourth challenge was that, recording of the interviews impacted the behaviour of the participants whereby they approached the questions more carefully. Four participants (current general secretary, and his deputy and Minister's political advisors) did not agree to be recorded during the interviews. I accommodated their requests by taking notes instead during these interview sessions. Furthermore, some interviewees were uncomfortable about speaking openly about what they had in their mind, and might have opted to emphasise the existing bureaucratic rhetoric. The main reason for this was the 'zero risk' ethos within the ministry. It should be noted that I managed to get some useful information from some participants after I stopped recording during the interview. In these instances, I carried on the interviews without recording and only took interview notes to show that I respect the trust they have confided to me. To further address relevant challenges, I conducted a series of semi-structured interviews with 7 deputy GDs, besides 8 GDs. In sum, I achieved to conduct semi-structured interview with 51 elite (key) participants.

Fifthly, accessing some ministry documents was rendered challenging due participants' concern and caution. Participants allowed me to see some documents only in their office after obtaining verbal approval from their senior colleagues. Although they expressed willingness to provide some information, they kindly refused to provide me with a copy of these documents. However, it should be noted that the departments of this ministry have published various documents that can easily accessed via their web sites.

In sum, despite of these challenges and limitation, this study was able to make general statements and reveal overall themes and subthemes in order to draw colourful picture of policy capacity of MoI in plausible way.

Key Findings

This section summarises the main empirical findings of the research in view of overall themes which are in line with the research questions, aims, literature and theoretical perspective.

As figure 1 demonstrates, the key findings of this thesis could be listed under five interactive and interdependent main themes for observing the dynamic, interactive, interdependent and often overlapping facets of all sub-policy capacities of the MoI.

- Dominance of the Turkish administrative tradition,

- Dominance of ministers' political and administrative leadership roles over policy capacity of MoI,

- Triumph of the Turkish administrative tradition over reform pressure,

- The impact of dynamic external political environment over policy capacity of MoI,

- The limits to policy capacity.

Figure 1: Identified Themes

It should be recalled that the main aim was to understand and describe the policy capacity of the MoI by addressing two research questions. The main findings relevant to each theme are discussed below.

Theme 1. Dominance of the Turkish Administrative Tradition

To respond all research questions, I found that the Turkish administrative tradition forms the mainstay of the themes due to its dominant role and interaction with the different elements of policy capacity. Therefore, in the denoting the themes, this tradition was placed in the central position.

Related subthemes stemming from tradition of the MoI which fall under this theme were as follows:

- Being a strict hierarchy (command and control);

- Being secrecy- and security-based ministry;

- Having state-centric notion;

- Having legalistic administration (rule of Law);

- Having legalistic form of accountability;

- Having political control (ministerial discretion, responsiveness, loyalty);

- Value for political support and public legitimacy and trust: Prioritising political and public support over legality;

- Having coping with and survive challenge;

- Experience-based instead of evidence-based policy, (i.e. valuing experience/tradition over evidence-based policy, knowledge and academic studies);

- Error correction for surprises rather than systematic evaluation;

- Having field administration, shared field experience and field based solution practice;

- Ministry of Prefects (brotherhood tradition, altruism, monopoly advisory role);

- Influence of oral tradition (internal diplomacy and informal training);

- Rejecting politicisation: impartiality, 'I am in the business of serving the government of the day, at the end of the day';

Some of these subthemes, including security-based and strict hierarchical structure, political control, and risk awareness could limit to policy capacity, while field-based solution practice, being a pioneering ministry, coping with and surviving pressure, and prefectoral altruism could drive improvements in policy capacity.

Being a strong coordinative and pioneer ministry, despite of some concerns, the MoI has an adequate administrative policy capacity to address their wide-ranging traditional tasks. Both informal internal diplomacy and personal training have been used to mitigate deficiency of training, coordination and collaboration within the MoI. Lack of appropriate collaboration and shared IM within the MoI are still barriers which are signs of the limits to policy capacity.

The goal of everyday practices within the MoI is to cope with and survive existing pressures. However, it should be noted that the MoI needs to address and every changing environment and persistent complex issues, such as Kurdish terror attacks, ISIS, and Syrian Refuge crises. The MoI can only continue to successfully address these challenges because of the storage of past experiences and strong tradition despite of having issue of shared IM.

Having territorial (field) administrations, prefects —their shared field experience and their brotherhood tradition — is the hearth of the MoI public administration. This could be interpreted as the prefects being the backbone of the MoI. [207] Their field experiences likely affect MoI's policies and decisions as well as informal training and internal diplomacy. Namely, MoI's practices and the relations amongst both the senior and low levels prefects are determined by a special tradition of brotherhood, even the prefectoral minister is perceived as being the father of the Ministry rather than as a political boss. The prefectoral ministers are especially trusted in the prefects since they are their colleagues. Brotherhood of prefects generates the respect of others, solidarity, trust, and self-confident in line with the MoI's protocols that strengthen bureaucratic administrative and political policy capacity.

Prefects are generalist administrators and although a few of them administrative leaders who have hierarchy-based power, they are not managers or they do not have enough active roles in policy leadership. Indeed, in this study, the prefects were identified to be more or less successful with regards to individual advisory, administrative and political acumen capacity.

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[207] Before being appointed into central senior bureaucratic position into MoI, all prefects inside central administration of MoI had to work in territorial administration as a district governor, deputy governor or governor, they are still elite public administrators who representative of the state and government in Turkish public administration.

The prefects still have a monopoly role inside the MoI while a few political advisors, who are mostly prefects, have supportive roles. Findings revealed that prefects could mostly provide the minister with the advice necessary to reach a decision in a restricted, policy-making area, although speaking the truth to the seniors was identified as an issue that cause a limit to bureaucratic administrative capacity.

Theme 2. Dominance of the ministers' political and administrative leadership on bureaucratic policy capacity

As a few pioneer academics pointed out that ministers' influence need to be considered when assessing policy capacity. The findings of this research highlighted that the political and administrative role of the ministers and their effect on daily administration, policy making, coordination, and diplomacy, viz. policy capacity, must be considered when describing and assessing the bureaucratic policy capacity of MoI.

Ministers, who dominate the ministry processes, have had a strong position inside the MoI. Prefects struggle to support them and their decisions. The demand of the ministers to know and control everything inside the MoI could limit policy capacity due to the resulting cautious actions of the prefects. On the other hand, good relations between ministers and prefects that are characterised by mutual trust strengthens policy capacity. I found that responsiveness—willingness to support the minister and his position—and getting political support have been a primary value for prefects. An excess of responsiveness and strict following of the opinions and orders given by the ministers, are likely to limit prefects' initiative and willingness to speak the truth to the seniors, in addition to acting as a barrier for developing individual and organisational analytical and administrative capacity.

Having prefectoral ministers facilitates communication and empathy. On the other hand, the ministers' demand to know everything about the ministry could diminish demand for the advice of the public servants, viz a limit to policy capacity.

Related sub-themes identified under this theme were:

- The Minister is the central of the administration and wishes to know and control everything going on inside the MoI;

- The minister must take responsibility of and account for the MoI administration;

- Ministers' unwillingness of risk taking and making reforms,

- Relations between politicians and prefects: responsiveness; loyalty and ministerial dominance versus coping with and surviving stresses, solidarity and trust.

- Regarding the political actors as a 'holy' being.

The findings showed that despite the deficiencies in some of their analytical skills, the prefects could mostly give advice to ministers which was needed to tackle issues, and fulfil MoI's tasks when ministers' style, and political and administrative role facilitated communication and triggered demand for public advice. In this way, the ministers could either enable or act as a barrier for policy capacity.

The research findings also indicated that ministers' administrative role has been as important as their political role. They could facilitate coordination, collaboration inside the MoI, which strengthened administrative policy capacity, whereas they could limit the policy capacity when they micromanaged the MoI or avoided giving them the authority to undertake some tasks.

Despite of overall Weberian characteristics (dichotomy) of relation, relations amongst senior level shows complimentary characteristics due to cope and survive challenge and their mutual trust. Therefore, regardless of their prefectoral background, majority of the participants praised the relationship between the ministers and prefects. This good relationship that is based on mutual trust could strengthen policy capacity despite raising criticisms of favouritism. However, this unique situation did not mean that all prefectoral ministers affected policy capacity in the same way. Indeed, the research identified significant differences among their impact.

This study also found that only a few ministers attempted to assess policy capacity and strengthen the analytical capacity of the MoI. Their drive pushed prefects to prepare some descent reports which aimed to address the analytical gaps and establish new departments. Except for two ministers, MoI's ministers did not take active roles, and were not in favour of public administration reforms. Some even opposed to these top-down reforms. This is also another representation of the triumph of existing tradition, which is explained under Theme 3.

Theme 3. Triumph of Weberian and Prefectural tradition over reform pressure

The findings indicated that the triumpts of Turkish tradition over reform pressure deserved further attention. This theme could also be interpreted as one of the answers for the second research question: "How has the bureaucratic policy capacity of The Turkish Ministry of the Interior changed during the reform years, 2002 – 2016?"

As discussed in previous chapters, persistent top-down public administration reforms have aimed to shift the mentality of the Turkish public administration towards the NPM story due to several

reasons including attaining a more effective, efficient, strategic and performance based public administration. I found that this attempt has mostly had a negligible impact on the practice and tasks of MoI. I found that persistent top-down public administration reforms has mostly had a negligible impact on the practice and tasks of MoI. This was because:

1. They did not align with the MoI's tradition and classical, secrecy and security-based tasks. Considering the tasks of the MoI and its role in the Turkish administration, most of the reforms were not expected to be put into practice. This was confirmed by one former minister, who had had a leading role in the preparation of these reforms.

2. Personal administration shows traditional character, not based on objective character. Assessing prefects' performance still belong to senior political and administrators' discretion. Furthermore, it should be stressed that neither the prefects were regarded as managers, nor MoI has been seen as a private company dominated by the several complex management schemes.

3. At the face of challenges, I observed the adoption of traditional bureaucratic routines— cope and survive through informal diplomacy, a method learned from institutional memory— rather than the utilisation of crisis management techniques. This can be seen as "triumph of tradition".

4. Prefects who rejected of politicisation still had a monopoly of advisory and administrative roles and kept their senior position and brotherhood tradition.

5. Mostly, Ministers remained unwilling to take risks and undertake reforms.

6. The research showed that new units had to comply with the MoI's tradition, otherwise, they are likely to encounter resistance.

7. Accountability, monitoring and evaluating policies and decision pointed out traditional character such as hierarchical control of undersecretary and minister rather than systematic evaluation.

On the other hand, it should be noted that this research does not claim that these top-down reforms had no impact on MoI's administration, viz. policy capacity, specifically regarding the local administration and information technology, and good governance reforms. Indeed, the prefects and some ministers internalised and put some reforms into practice if the reforms complied with MoI's tradition. For instance, some good governance tools (i.e. being human- based) were welcomed and internalised since they complied with the administrative tradition, however, some good governance tools, including participation, transparency have not adequately put into

practice because of clashing with secrecy and the state notion of the Turkish administrative tradition. Rather, they started to adopt tokenistic actions to satisfy laws and regulations.

Furthermore, it should be underlined that external political environment also tended to push the MoI to strengthen its policy capacity by establishing a new department. Establishing a new unit in the reform era was acceptable since this unit aimed to support MoI's tradition. Namely, some new departments including the department of the EU, IT, Migration, and Association strengthen policy capacity whereas the RC, Strategy Department and especially the Internal Audit Department did not make significant contributions to policy capacity because of clashing with administrative tradition of MoI.

In sum, there is a persistence and triumph of the Turkish administrative tradition against reform pressure: "Things happens as usual."

Theme 4. The impacts of dynamic external political environment on MoI's policy capacity

There are the impacts of dynamic external political environment over all themes including the administrative tradition, a finding which is important for addressing the second research question. Related subthemes were:

- The main impact of external political environment on MoI's policy capacity: centralisation, dominant PM, top-down tradition, EU and media pressure;

- Political centralisation is supported by Turkish administrative tradition;

- Diminishing of ministers' political power for policy making;

- Declining self-confidence: centralisation and local administration reforms;

On the one hand, EU integration process, migration and border administration, media pressure and expectation of citizens push MoI's capacity to improve. On the other hand, centralisation, increasing political power against bureaucracy, ministers powerless state in making policy, and reactiveness (too responsiveness to political demand) weaken the policy capacity.

Themes 5: The limits to policy capacity

Consideration of the limits to policy capacity provides a platform to assess all nine sub-policy capacities and address the research questions of the thesis. The limits to policy capacity was attributed to some characteristic of the tradition, including strict hierarchy, political control, risk awareness etc., domination of ministers' political and administration role, and impact of the external political environment, deficiency of individual, organisational, system level competences.

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Indeed, the thesis findings confirmed that for instance, focussing only on individual analytical skills and ignoring systemic and organisational analytical capacity as well as overall Turkish tradition could lead one to arrive at incorrect conclusions.

Several subthemes were identified under this theme. These were:

- (Unintended) consequence of Turkish administrative tradition: (strict hierarchy, political control, risk awareness)

- Experience overrides evidence;

- Error correction for surprises, not systematic evaluation;

- Concerns about quality of advice, insufficient feedback and learning about the quality of policy and the advice;

- Deficiency of analytical skills in all levels;

- Pragmatic approach to evidence and advice;

- Unpredictable and dynamic external political environment,

- Lack of proper coordination and collaboration with outsiders;

- Weakness of system knowledge policy capacity;

- Busy daily life: stress and tiredness;

MoI's tradition was mostly seen as a strong part of its bureaucratic policy capacity. Nevertheless, strict hierarchy, overvalue to seniority, ministerial discretion, secrecy, risk awareness, hurriedness to tackle security- and secrecy-based tasks, and responsiveness could be interpreted as signs of the limits to policy capacity as some participants pointed out.

I found that evidence-based policy is scarce within the MoI practice. Such policy is likely to contradict with strict hierarchical and daily firefighting-practices within the MoI. Instead, MoI's political-administrators share a pragmatic approach to evidence and advice.

Overall, the analytical policy capacity showed deficiencies, and this could limit to policy capacity. It should be noted that lack of sufficient analytical skills and expert knowledge on new tasks, organisational support and structure, and unwillingness of collaboration with knowledge institution, vice versa, lack of knowledge capacity inside the knowledge institutions and secrecy concerns are barriers for the policy capacity.

Findings indicated some concerns regarding the system administrative and political policy capacity including having issues regarding-career system, unpredictable external environment, and Turkish administrative tradition. Relations with stakeholders has not been satisfactory, although citizens' perception of the MoI has mostly been positive.

To respond specifically to the first research question "Does bureaucracy give the minister the advice needed to reach a decision?" I assessed whether there is sufficient bureaucratic advisory capacity (quality of advice) within MoI.

In MoI tradition, the advice provided to the minister aims to abolish the crisis and blow out the fire. Findings confirmed that prefects are remarkable firefighters. In addition, they do not need to feel anxiety about being too reactive and also having a lack of genuinely strategic policy capability. Findings revealed that the prefects are considered to know field and implementation of policies and decisions by most participants, including all ministers. Therefore, they were thought to be able to give advice when requested by the minister. Thus, despite of quality concerns, the answers of research question 1 cannot be seen as a limit to policy capacity.

Participants did not always explicitly express "error correction for surprises, not systematic evaluation". However, it was expressed that the MoI administrative tradition tended to monitor and evaluate implemented projects and tasks through a problem-feedback method rather than systematically monitoring these despite of having departments who monitor the implementation of some projects and tasks. Although, mostly, problem-feedback is seen as the best method within the MoI, critical participants' concerns about this unsystematic and stressful approach could be interpreted as a sign of a limit to policy capacity.

Findings showed that the prefects anticipate and respond to their ministers' expectation. However, it was noted that, sometimes unexpected events and situations could push the prefects to be cautious ('wait and see tactic'). Being too cautious, avoiding speaking the truth to power, and following the ministers religiously could be the weakest point of advisory capacity, and namely another evidence for the limit to policy advisory capacity.

In summary, it could be said that this research has unpicked some instances that evidence limit to policy capacity, including deficiency of all level of analytical policy capacities, strict hierarchy, risk awareness, secrecy, political control, and leader-based policy and decision making rooted in the tradition. Moreover, often their work is dominated by the "caution" motive.

Nevertheless, there were not many instances which confirmed the failure of prefects to respond to their minister's request and miss a crucial step in adapting to a new development. In other

words, prefects could keep monopoly advisory role and mostly meet expectation and give the minister the advice needed to reach a decision if minister provide opportunity to them.

Academic Contributions Made by the Research

The importance and contributions of this thesis are summarised below.

1. Describing and assessing MoI's policy capacity in an academic way could provide valuable information on its political administrators and external actors.

2. Despite some unique tasks and prefectoral tradition, the MoI could be considered as a representative case of Turkish ministerial structure and process. Therefore, this research may serve as a pioneer for assessing the policy capacities of other Turkish ministries as well as other developing countries. The theoretical framework and the research method could be used in such studies. This research could also contribute to the international literature, since research covering all nine policy capacities of the framework is scarce.

3. Research on impact of ministerial political, administrative and diplomatic roles on the policy capacity of MoI, including their prefects' background, has been studied in this research. These issues have been understudied in the literature.

4. The ministerial capacity to respond to present day problems has been a crucial issue for the Turkish government. This research demonstrated this administrative process stressing the challenges in coping with and surviving stresses as well as the prevalent administrative tradition within the ministry. Hence, it could provide valuable information to the Turkish government.

5. The value of public administration reforms has been widely debated in Turkey. However, except for a few studies, there has not been much research into this issue. Indeed, research examining the views on the success of such reforms from a public servant viewpoint has been absent. This research attempted to fill this gap. Furthermore, this research highlighted how the MoI tradition could survive against reform pressure that could can read as another distinct contribution of Turkish case to literature although the

research findings confirmed significant role of dynamic external political environment effect on MoI.

6. The most important contribution could be the finding that the informal processes of the MoI are crucial. The brotherhood tradition of the prefects has been at the heart of the policy capacity. Therefore, it should be incorporated into other elements, due to its influence on the other levels of policy capacity. In other words, the Turkish case shows outsiders to consider the unique context of the public department and value oral tradition for policy capacity, an important factor that is mostly ignored by international literature. This can also be lesson for developing countries. They might develop alternative framework to assess their bureaucratic policy capacity.

7. Ethnographic fieldwork enabled me to use my insider role and to see everyday life of the political administrators. This method also allowed me to identify Influence of oral tradition (internal diplomacy and informal training) and to identify how the MoI tradition could survive prevailing reform pressures, changes in the external political environment while fulfilling its vital security-based tasks as well as other tasks that are the hearth of the Turkish public administration.

8. The thesis underlines similarities and differencies between Westminster country and Turkey regarding bureaucratic policy capacity, especially in empirical chapters. It might be asserted that similarities –limits or enablers- are more than differencies despite obvious systemic differences. For instance, limits of analytical skills, shortage of expert personnel, issues on link between policy development and implementation, issues on monitoring and systematic evaluation, dominant role of political actor, impact of external political environment on policy capacity, reform syndrome, media pressure, issues on collaboration and cope and survive challenge shows similarities while perception of quality of advice, value being strategic, hierarchical control and accountability, leverage of the oral tradition, characteristics of the traditions, monopoly advisory role of bureaucracy, administrative role of minister, triumph of the administrative tradition can be different.

Suggestions for Further research

As discussed earlier, describing and assessing the policy capacity was the first step to strengthening the policy capacity of the MoI. For instance, the research addresses the limits to advisory and analytical policy capacity. Therefore, naturally, future research could be conducted to identify the proposals which can be used to strengthen the bureaucratic policy capacity of the MoI. For instances: "How could the policy advisory capacity of MoI be strengtened?" or "How could the analytical policy capacity be built inside the MoI?" or "How could administrative structure and processes be changed in order to assure better administration?"

Secondly, to evaluate the quality of the research and its findings and conclusions in Turkish context, more studies focussing on the policy capacity of other ministries need to be conducted. The theoretical framework and the research method could be used in such studies. Furthermore, impact of ministerial role on the policy capacity of other ministries and the success of public administration reforms from a public servant viewpoint could be assessed. Thus, comparative studies on other Turkish ministries could confirm whether the findings of this thesis are generalisable to other ministries. Further, such studies could strengthen the reliability of ethnographic qualitative single case study method.

Appendix A   Overall Turkish State Structure and Public Administration System

In this appendix section, I will briefly introduce overall Turkish state structure and public administration system that directly affect policy capacity of the MoI as demonstrated in previous analysis chapters.

Turkey has a prominent place among developing countries[208] due to its experiences in the fields of economy, culture, law, and public administration. In the last two decades, the public life in Turkey has been undergoing a dynamic transformation due to heavy internal and external pressures. Following and keeping up to date with the changes has become increasingly difficult in this climate, even for the experts in the field (summarised from EU, 2015, p. 6).

State Structure of Turkey

At the time of writing, Turkey was still operating under the 1982 Constitution[209], in which sovereignty is vested fully and unconditionally in the nation. This constitution emphasises that the 'Turkish state, with its territory and nation, is an indivisible entity, and a secular, democratic, and social state under the rule of law' (preamble of Constitution of the Republic of Turkey). 'Turkey has a republican democracy, and carries fundamental characteristics of a republic, such as separation of powers, secularism, supremacy of law, and constitutional government' (ibid, p. 7). Therefore, as depicted in the chart below, legislation and jurisdiction are separated from executive bodies.

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[208] 'Turkey has the world's 18th-largest nominal GDP. The country is a founding member of the OECD (1961) and the G-20 major economies. Since December 31, 1995, Turkey is also a part of the EU Customs Union… The economy of Turkey defining as an emerging market economy is often classified as a newly industrialized country by economists and political scientists.' (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Turkey)

[209] English version available: https://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution_en.pdf

Figure A1: State Structure of Turkey

Source: https://baskentblog.wordpress.com/2014/09/24/t-c-devlet-teskilari-semasi/

Legislation

The Republic of Turkey has had a parliamentary system since its establishment in 1923. 'Legislative power is vested in the on behalf of the Turkish nation and this power cannot be delegated.' (Article 7 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey)[210] The functions and powers of the Turkish Grand National Assembly include:

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[210] Since all following articles are from Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, I will use just "Article".

…to enact, amend, and repeal laws; to scrutinize the Council of Ministers and the ministers; to authorize the Council of Ministers; to issue decrees having the force of law on certain matters; to debate and adopt the budget bills and final accounts bills; to decide to issue currency and declare war; to approve the ratification of international treaties, to decide with the majority of three-fifths of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey to proclaim amnesty and pardon; and to exercise the powers and carry out the duties envisaged in the other articles of the Constitution (Article 87).

Jurisdiction

Judicial power in Turkey is exercised by independent courts and high judicial organs on behalf of the Turkish nation. (Article 9) Therefore, the freedom and independence of the Judicial System is protected within the constitution. The legislative and executive branches of the Turkish government must obey the courts' decisions.

The executive

The executive branch in Turkey has a dual structure. It is composed of the President of the Republic and the Council of Ministers in conformity with the Constitution and laws. (Article 8)

The President

'The President of the Republic is the head of state and represents the Republic of Turkey and the unity of the Turkish nation.' (Article 104) 'The President is elected by citizens every five years, and one can be elected for a maximum two terms.' (Article 101) The President has duties and power related to the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, and 'is responsible for ensuring the implementation of the Constitution and the regular and harmonious functioning of the organs of state.' (Article 104) Recently, one Constitutional amendment, accepted by a referendum on 16th of April 2017, will change the overall state organisation with a view to strengthen the president's position over other public authorities, including Ministerial Cabinet and Jurisdiction.

Prime Minister and Council of Ministers

The Council of Ministers (Cabinet) consists of the PM and 4 Deputies of PM and 21 line ministers who are nominated by the PM and appointed by the President (article 109), who is a part of the executive branch and therefore exercises various administrative powers with limited liability.

The fundamental duty of the Council of Ministers, which is accountable to the Parliament in the execution of this duty, is to formulate and implement the internal and foreign policies of the state.

The PM is an elected member of parliament and is usually the leader of the party with the most seats in the parliament. PM is the head of both the Council of Ministers and the Administration in general. Therefore, he or she 'is responsible for ensuring the Council of Ministers fulfil their tasks, comply with the constitution, the law, and government programmes' (articles 112 and 109).

Ministers can be assigned either from among the MPs or from outside the cabinet as long as the individuals are qualified to be elected as an MP. Ministers can be dismissed from their duties by the President upon the proposal of the PM (article 109) whenever necessary.[211] Each of them is accountable to the PM for the conduct of affairs under his or her jurisdiction and for the acts and activities of his subordinates. (Article 112) Yet, 'within the central administrations, ministers enjoy discretion, hierarchical supervision, including disciplinary authority over the decisions and actions of subordinates' (Varol, 2015, p. 218).

The State of Turkish Public Administration

Before introducing the Turkish Public Administration, it would be beneficial to demonstrate administrative principles rooted in the Turkish administrative tradition (see Chapter 4) since these principles determine the structure and processes of public administration.

The constitutional administrative principles

The Turkish administrative system is based on certain fundamental political and legal principles stated in the Constitution of 1982. The 'Administration' is within the Executive branch, but is a separate entity. It operates, however, in close relationship with the President's Office and under the supervision of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches' (EU, 2015, p. 9). The constitutional administrative principles and related constitutional articles are as follows:

- The Integral Unity of Administration (Article 3),

- Centralisation Principle (Article 123),

- De-concentration of Authority (Article 126),

- The Local Administration Principle (Article 123)

- Administrative Tutelage (Decentralization) (Article 127)[212]

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[211] http://www.invest.gov.tr/en-US/turkey/factsandfigures/Pages/LegalAndPoliticalStructure.aspx
[212] https://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution_en.pdf

The Central Administration forms the core of the administrative structure, from both structural and functional viewpoints. The strong unitary and centralised character of the State is maintained by territorial administrations which are the field organisations of the centralised state structure and administered by prefects. Therefore, the State consists of many organisations and institutions integrated under a single corporate entity. The centralised administration principle is implemented by the central organisation based in the capital city, and the field organisations are spread to the 81 provinces with a total of 951 districts of the country at the time of writing up. [213] Administrative relationships within each level are based on traditional bureaucratic hierarchy.

> Although there has been greater support for self-government and delegation of powers from the central government to provincial levels over the past decade, the structure and tradition of a highly centralised public administration persists today (EU, 2015, p. 8).

Public power is partially exercised by several public institutions or administrations which are not included in the central organisation in order to meet collective local needs. There were 51 Provincial Special Administrations, 1,397 Municipalities, and 18,330 villages in Turkey[214] at the time of writing up. The relationships of decentralised institutions under the central organisation of the State are organised on a specific relationship principle, "administrative tutelage", which is defined in the Constitution (Article 127).[215]

Public Administration Structure

Complying with underlying principles, the public administration in Turkey is divided between the central and local administrations as shown in figure A2 below.

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[213] As a unitary state, Turkey has 81provinces, and within those provinces there are 957districts, and 18.330 villages. (https://www.e-icisleri.gov.tr/Anasayfa/MulkiIdariBolumleri.aspx retrieved 11/01/2017)
[214] Ibid.
[215] However, most of the administrative tutelage, which used by prefectural class, were abolished by local administration reforms, some of the decision must be got approval by the MoI. For instance, if local administrations wish to use loan more than %10 their budget revenue, they must get minister of MoI approval.

Figure A2: The Administrative Structure of Turkey

Source: Varol, 2015, p. 213.

As it is closely relevant to the thesis, the structure of the central administration is briefly demonstrated below.

Central Administration

The central administration includes the PM Office, the Council of Ministers, and Consultative Agencies. Provincial organisations are the provincial units of the ministries. 'Each ministry is administrated in the state capital Ankara with units at the provinces serving as their field organisations under the administration of [prefects]' (Varol, 2014).

Besides PM office's main coordinator role amongst line ministries and recently being headquarter of main public policies; the general duties of the State are divided functionally and institutionally amongst 21 ministries. The ministries do not have their own corporate entities, instead they are parts of the corporate entity of the State. Ministries are similarly structured, since each ministry's structure must comply with the main law 3046.[216] Most ministries have a central organisation, field organisations, and missions abroad where relevant, and affiliated institutions. 'The central organisation of a ministry usually consists of three main service units: consultation, control, and auxiliary units' (Varol, 2015, p. 220). The MoI's shows typical characteristics of this structure.

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[216] Law regarding establishment and duty principles of ministries

Appendix B   The Unit of Analysis: The Turkish Ministry of the Interior

MoI is a central governmental department and an example of a classical Turkish bureaucratic organisation which strongly emphasises hierarchical position as the basis of status (rather than expertise) dominated by "command and control tradition."

Responsibilities

The Ministry's bureaucratic character has been 'exceptionally reinforced by the intrinsic dynamics of the security and law enforcement service domain' (Sen, 2015, p. 84). The MoI provides a wide range of public services that make the MoI perceived as 'an organisation that serves [the] public from cradle to grave' (ibid). [217] These include:

- protection of homeland security and public order,

- ensuring preservation and safety of border, coast and territorial waters;

- administration of domestic policy of homeland via supervising and coordinating territorial and local administration

- prohibition and tracking of smuggling;

- dealing with associations;

- civil registry and citizenship affairs. (MoI, 2017b, p. 11)

Its structure mainly consists of central organisations, subsidiaries and provincial organisations. This is demonstrated in the following organisation chart.

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[217] Furthermore, a wide range of main strategic targets confirms this reality.
The six strategic areas and goals distil its responsibilities and values:
1. Central Administration System: To enhance and reinforce the provincial administration and the prefectural system. [General Directorate for Provincial Administration]
2. Law Enforcement and Security: To advance and reinforce the homeland security services [with its subsidiaries and prefectural system, its governors and district governors].
3. E-government: To enable online delivery of the services provided by the Ministry. [Department for Information Technologies, General Directorate for Civil Registry and Citizenship]
4. Local Authorities: To provide efficiency, effectiveness, participation, transparency, and accountability in local authorities. [Department of Local Administration]
5. Civil Society: To obtain the development of the civil society. [Department of Association]
6. Re-organisation: To overhaul the organisational structure of the Ministry (MoI 2015-2019 strategic plan) [Department for Strategy Development, Department for Legal Consultancy, Centre for Research and Studies] (www. Icisleri.gov.tr retrieved 25/04/2016).

Figure A3: Organization Chart of the Turkish Ministry of the Interior

(Retrieved from http://www.mia.gov.tr/organization-chart, 22/06/2015)

Before focussing on the thesis's context,[218] i.e. central organisation, it should be underlined that having enormous security-based subsidiaries and provincial organisations strengthen the MoI's role in the overall Turkish public administration system since the prefectural class, who is the head of the territorial administration, not only fulfils the MoI's tasks but also fulfils, coordinates, and administrates other public departments, including representatives of the PM, as well as each minister at the provincial level.

With regards to its central organisation's complying with that of other ministries, the MoI has a traditional structure which distinguishes between units. This reflects the main functional

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[218] For the sake of this research, I do not include subsidiaries, relevant organisations, and the provincial organisation — as most of the official reports published by the MoI do deliberately. Nevertheless, the MoI's role has mostly been associated with security and law enforcement by both internal and external actors.

responsibilities of the Ministry, such as departments for main services, advisory services, support services, subsidiaries and permanent boards. A ministerial committee that is chaired and dominated by the undersecretary[219] is the supreme decision-making body that administrates the MoI.

The MoI's formal structure (see the organisation chart), though, shows 'a confusing array of different terms (department, general directorate, [centre], unit, etc.) as a result of the accretion of new units as new functions were assigned to the MoI as a result of acts of parliament and Ministerial decrees' (Crawley and Kutlu, 2009, p. 17).

Their responsibilities were defined in detail by MoI Organisation Act 3152. Yet, some of them were established and regulated by ministerial decrees during the public administration period in order to meet new challenges and expectations.[220]

Having Wide Range of Duties

Once we look at the organisational chart and duties regulated in Law 3152, one may notice a wide task range.

> The provision of a wide range of public services – i.e. while the Local Authorities Department performs regulatory functions over municipalities, the Civil Registration Department performs direct service delivery, such as the issuance of national ID cards to citizens – , and the position of the prefects as co-ordinators of the central services, such as civil registration, security and education, in provinces and districts has led to the MoI being conceived internally as "an organisation that serves [the] public from [the] cradle to [the] grave" (Sen, 2015, p. 157).

Despite of recent reforms, MoI's administrative traditions and tasks have been associated with security and law enforcement.

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[219] This committee is chaired by undersecretary with participation of the four deputy undersecretaries, the heads of the main departments, GD of Personal administration, and the head of the chief inspector board and the first legal advisors.
[220] Department for Associations (established in 2003); Department for EU Affairs and Foreign Relations (established 2000); Centre for Research and Studies (established in 2000); Department for Strategy Development (revised in 2006), Department for Information Technologies, (established in 2008), Department for Migration and Border Administration (2013); Internal Audit Unit.(2006). Later (in 2011), the responsibilities of most of them were determined in main law 3152, whereas the Internal Audit and Centre for Research and Studies were not changed by this law. For instance, due to the establishment of Ministerial approval, the Research Department's responsibilities were not defined by this law; instead, they have to fulfil their duties in line with ministerial approval. Department for Migration and Border Administration was established -another act - by article 103 of Law of 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection. Available: https://www.icisleri.gov.tr/kurumlar; http://www.goc.gov.tr/main/En_3 (retrieved 22/06/2015)

Security Domain Ministry

All of the participants agreed with this. Likewise, according to the perception of some researches, in the prefectoral system, security forces are an important part of the MoI.[221] They pointed out that the ministry's being in the security domain has increased its importance and popularity, making the Minister of the MoI an important member of the Cabinet and well known by the public (Yildiz_FPPS3, TI). They reminded me that they used to be responsible for security in the districts underlining the essentiality of security. They gave their political boss the right to make security and emergency issues a priority because of the dynamic and unpredictable atmosphere which the country is now facing.

On the other hand, some prefects complained about their being ignorant because of domination of security tasks as one representative stated that:

Here, the MoI's sole role was that of providing security. Look! In my view, i.e. the Civil Registry and Citizenship Affairs Department has accomplish great things. Is there anybody to congratulate them? No! (GD5, TI)

Furthermore, there is a lack of much opportunity for presenting their concerns or proposal to the minister or the undersecretary, requiring the approval of them in order to accomplish task or abolish concern. This issue is especially worrisome because there are some issues which might cause big problems which need to be immediately considered when they arise. Otherwise, they would not be able to prevent the detrimental effects of anything than daily security issues. (GD5, TI).

On another note, one former GD has aptly commented, the concern is that: the MoI's being a security ministry not only has flooded the daily working life of the ministry but also has made its structure and traditions acquired a security aspect.

Prefects could lose their "civil" identity while the MoI struggles to adapt its policy into one whose main aim is that of controlling security forces under the aegis of a civil authority. (FGD1, TI)

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[221] According to a research on perceptions regarding the MoI, 65.8% of 3050 citizens - including several society groups with different regional affiliations, ages, social-economic groups, educational backgrounds and genders - ticked up the question of "how could you define the MoI" as 'The MoI has been associated with security' (TIAV, 2013, p. 28). The second perception report (2014), which was based on a questionnaire which was conducted with several society groups, including heads of village, members of non-governmental organisations, mayors, politicians and lawyers, supports these findings. For instance, members of non-governmental organisations agreed with this perception at a 77.3 rate (TIAV, 2014a, p. 64).
Besides their perception, the MoI's perception report on media analysis has acknowledged this thought in real life news.
The majority (44.4%) of the news in newspapers and television regarding the MoI is related to violence, public security, terror attacks, and the fight against terrorism (TIAV, 2014b, p. viii)

However, this issue need to further consideration seeing as most of the participants stressed that some of the MoI's departments have been pioneers in the public area.

A Pioneer Ministry

Most of the grey reports prepared by the MoI echoed that the MoI has been a pioneer ministry.[222] There have been some practices that empirically support this perception, such as the recent successful crosscutting e-government projects conducted by the MoI as my findings also supported. For instance, MERNIS (information system for central citizen numbers) and e-icisleri (an electronic corresponding web). These projects triggered the creation and development of many public projects, like e-government and UYAP (national judiciary data-based system).

Both the Former Minister and the GD of the Department for Citizenship shared their experiences in presenting their projects to members of Cabinet. They both stated that their projects were enthusiastically welcomed by them (Former Minister1, TI and FGD1, TI).

Our PM listened carefully and ordered other ministers to take instance from our experience. With his support, we could implement our projects successfully. (Minister1, TI)

These projects' success seemed to rebuild prefects' confidence. Although these projects were executed in just a few departments, the members of other departments talked about them with pride.[223]

Some asserted that if their superiors gave them the opportunity to do so, the prefects would be able to show their capacity and improve upon them.[224]

Given that it not only conducts pioneering projects, but is also responsible for a wide range of duties spanning throughout the Turkish bureaucracy — most importantly those held by the prefectoral class in the districts — the MoI must naturally play a coordinative role as it has been used to since its very establishment in order to endure public services, solve public issues, and abolish crisis in provinces.

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[222] See MoI strategic plans from 2009 and 2014; as well as the annual and performance reports from 2010-2016. Ministers and undersecretaries stressed the pioneering role of the MoI in all of their prefaces. Furthermore, being pioneering was considered as one of the basic values of the MoI (see the MoI, 2014c, p. 18) In all SWOT analysis especially ICT projects and MERNIS (national identity system) were considered successful and pioneer project for other public institute (i.e. MoI, 2014b, p. 12).
[223] I.e. GD5, TI; DU1, TI; Ceber_CI5, TI.
[224] MP, GD6, TI.

A Strong Coordinative Ministry

The prefectural class who work in the districts hierarchically belong to the MoI's administration, thereby making them naturally identity with the MoI. Therefore, their wide range of responsibilities (education, security, agriculture, culture, security, social policy, crisis management, etc.) have been perceived as being the MoI's duties as well, even though there are other ministries which specifically deal with them. This, rather unexpectedly, enlarges the MoI's responsibilities, including its duty of coordinating the other ministries. For instance, crises are expected to be administrated by the MoI regardless of whether they fall under the purview of other ministries. Sample quotas were:

God save us, when an earthquake or flood or any other disaster occurs, the MoI would come to mind first, even if the disaster regards another ministry. Therefore, we should actively participate in these crises and ensure coordination. Our minister undoubtedly has to go there, conduct an investigation, and give commands to the Governor or recommendations to other ministers. (FPPS1, TI)

The MoI has undoubtedly been expected to take an active role in case of crisis because our power of coordinating is stronger than that of other ministries, even the PM's Office. In 1999, there was an earthquake which affected a huge area. Mistakenly, in advance, the Cabinet determined the Ministry of Public Works as the coordinating organisation. They were not able to coordinate urgent public services and impel the army to support them. The first week was a catastrophe. Therefore, they gave the mandate over to the MoI because of our having a good rapport with the army. As a former defence minister, I can say that the MoI and the prefects hold key roles regarding civil-military relations and other public and private organisations. Having a member of the prefectural class would enable the MoI take control in a short while. (Former Minister 2_Vecdi Gonul, TI)

Although the MoI's coordinating role is not as overarching in the districts as that of the Prime Ministry's, accounts show that prefects strongly stress the importance of the MoI's roles of coordination and pioneering.

The MoI has been sitting at the very heart of government. There is a terrific coordinative role which still exists. (DU1, TI)

Another deputy undersecretary shared his observation of a meeting that the researcher had a chance to attend with him.

You observed it last Friday [at the Visa Freedom Agreement Proceedings Meeting with the EU]. There are 58 out of 72 criteria which are related to our Ministry. The External Affair Ministry seemed pretty comfortable with our coordinating the whole affair. They know that the MoI is able to cope with them. (DU2, TI)

The MoI is seen as being one of the most reflexive and dynamic ministries due to its having well-trained and experienced members. While observing a particular meeting, I had the same feeling about the MoI's skills of coordination.[225]

There were more than ten ministries' representatives, including the Deputy Minister of External Affairs. The MoI department had been well prepared and dominated the meeting. The atmosphere was so friendly that most participants seemed to be relaxed. Furthermore, most of them knew each other. Even the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs spoke to the GDs of the MoI's departments by name. They agreed that the MoI should coordinate and monitor the process of most of their decisions. (FWNB)

Staff

The MoI has 2440 staff in its central departments.[226] This puts it into the category of large organisations. Though things have started to change recently, 'it has an overwhelmingly male workforce and [this] inevitably…dominant male culture reflects this gross imbalance' (Crawley and Kutlu, 2009, p. 9).

Location

The MoI's departments are located in seven different buildings. While some departments, such as provincial administrations, local authorities and associations, are located within the headquarters of the MoI, others, such as those regarding Departments of Strategy, Civil Registration and Citizenship, EU and Foreign affairs, Migration Administration and Public Order and Security, are located outside its headquarters due to their having a lack of capacity within central facilities.

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[225] This meeting was about the process of providing Turkish citizens the ability to travel to the EU without any visas. The, EU Department of the MoI, therefore, conducted secretarial works at that meeting. It took place in the "Recep Yazioglu Meeting Hall" on 28/03/2016 between 14.00 and 15.30.
[226] This figure excludes the Personnel of Provincial Organisations (23.815) and Subsidiaries (e.g. the Turkish National Police and Gendarmerie) (derived from https://www.icisleri.gov.tr/kurumlar/icisleri.gov.tr/Basin/2017/A%C3%A7%C4%B1klamalar/2016%20Y%C4%B1l%C4%B1%20%C4%B0dare%20Faaliyet%20Raporu.pdf retrieved 13/03/2017).

Appendix C Interviewee List and Interview Schedules

Ministers

Interview_46_ 16/04/2016_ Former Governor, Former Minister: **(Former Minister 1)**

Interview_48_ 18/04/2017_Former Governor, GD, Undersecretary of MoI, Former Head of the State Audit Court and Former National Defence Minister_Vecdi Gonul: **(Gonul_Former Minister 2)**

Interview_51_ 20/04/2017_Former Minister_Besir Atalay: **(Atalay_Former Minister 3)**

Deputy Undersecretaries

Interview_9_16/03/2016_Deputy Undersecretary: **(DU1)**

Interview_10_ 16/03/2016_Deputy Undersecretary: **(DU2)**

General Secretaries (GS) and Personnel Private Secretaries (PPS) and Advisors (A)

Interview_27_06/04/2016_Former GS, PPS, General Director for Local Administration and Governor; Member of Council of State: **(FPPS1)** (because of mostly quoted his PPS experience)

Interview_28_07/04/2016_ Former GS, Former PPS and Former Governor: **(FGS1)**

Interview_30_07/04/2016_General Secretary: **(GS)**

Interview_31_07/04/2016_ Deputy General Secretary: **(DGS)**

Interview_32_ 08/04/2016_Former chief inspector, Former GS and Former Governor: **(FGS2)**

Interview_33_ 08/04/2016_ Former GS, chief inspector: **(FGS3)**

Interview_36_11/04/2016 _ Former deputy GS, chief inspector: **(FDGS)**

Interview_37_11/04/2016_ Former Minister's Political Advisor, chief inspector: **(FA1)**

Interview_44_14/04/2016_ Minister Advisor: **(A1)**

Interview_45_14/04/2016_ Former Minister Advisor, Ministry Legal Consultant: **(FA2)**

Interview_50_20/04/2017_ Chief Inspector and Minister's Parliamentary Advisor: **(A2)**

Department of Strategy Development

Interview_1_21/03/2016_head of division of strategy: **(HD1)**

Interview_2 _21/03/2016_head of division of strategy: **(HD2)**

Interview_16_31/03/2016_head of department of strategy: **(GD1)**

General Directorate of Civil Registry and Citizenship

Interview_35_11/04/2016_Former GD for Civil Registry and Citizenship, Member of Council of State: **(FGD1)**

General Directorate of Local Administration

Interview_19_01/04/2016_Deputy General Director_M.Emin Bilmez: **(Bilmez_DGD1)**

Interview_20_ 01/04/2016_ General Director: **(GD2)**

Interview_21_01/04/2016_Deputy General Director: **(DGD2)**

Interview_42_ 13/04/2016_ Former General Director, Governor, Member of Council of State_Mevlut Atbas: **(Atbas_FGD2)**

General Directorate of Personnel Administration

Interview_5_24/03/2016_deputy general director: **(DGD3)**

Interview_24_05/04/2016_ general director: **(GD3)**

Department of Information Technologies

Interview_15_30/03/2016_head of IT: **(GD4)**

Interview_17_31/03/2016_deputy of head of IT: **(DGD4)**

Department for EU Affairs and Foreign Relations

Interview_12_30/03/2016_head of EU Department: **(GD5)**

Interview_13_30/03/2016_deputy of head of EU Department: **(DGD5)**

Interview_14_30/03/2016_deputy of head of EU Department: **(DGD6)**

Centre for Research and Studies

Interview_3_23/03/2016_head of Centre for Research and Studies: **(GD6)**

Interview_11_29/03/2016_ deputy of head of Centre for Research and Studies: **(DGD7)**

Department for Training

Interview_43_13/04/2016_head of Department for Training: **(GD7)**

Ministry Inspection Board

Interview_4_24/03/2016_chief inspector: **(CI 1)**

Interview_6 _25/03/2016_ chief inspector and deputy of head of Inspection Board: **(CI2)**

Interview_18_01/04/2016_former Head of Prime Ministry Development of Administration, chief inspector _Arslan Avsarbey: **(Avsarbey_CI3)**

Interview_34_08/04/2016_ chief inspector and deputy of head of Inspection Board: **(CI4)**

Interview_38_12/04/2016_Chief advisor of General Director of Police, chief inspector: **(CI5)**

Interview_39_12/04/2016_ chief inspector **(CI6)**

Interview_41_13/04/2016_former head of Ministry Inspection Board, Chief Prosecutor of Council of State_Halil Yilmaz: **(Yilmaz_FGD3)**

Department for Legal Consultancy

Interview_7_28/03/2016_former PPS, former deputy General Director for Local Administration, legal advisor_Mustafa Yildiz: **(Yildiz_FPPS3)**

Interview_8_28/03/2016_First chief legal advisor_Ilker Gunduzoz: **(Gunduzoz_GD8)**

Interview_25_06/04/2016_deputy of first chief legal advisor: **(LA1)**

Interview_26_06/04/2016_deputy of first chief legal advisor: **(LA2)**

Interview_29_07/04/2016_former branch of strategy and immigration department, legal advisor: **(LA3)**

Interview_47_15/04/2016_former deputy of General Director for Personnel Administration, legal advisor_Bilal Karaca: **(Karaca_LA4)**

Unit of Internal Audit

Interview_23_05/04/2016_head of Unit of Internal Audit: **(Head of IAU)**

Member of Parliament (Member of Internal Affair Committee)

Interview_40_12/04/2016_ former head of division of Personnel Administration Department, Member of Parliament: **(MP1)**

Interview_49_19/04/2017_ former deputy governor, Member of Parliament_Mustafa Yel: **(Yel_MP2)**

Union of the Turkish Municipalities

Interview_22_ former head of local administration inspection board, General Secretary of the Turkish Municipalities Union_Hayrettin Gungor: **(Gungor_GS of the Union)**

Interview Schedules

1. Interview Guide for Ministers

Perception of the Turkish Ministry of the Interior (MoI)

How could you describe The Turkish Ministry of the Interior? Its tradition and its strong and weak points?

The Leadership and Policy Styles

What were your expectations from MoI's departments?

What was your strategy to recruit your prefects and advisors? How could describe your relation with your prefects and advisers?

Do you need their advice? What is your expectation from advisers (both public and political)?

Routines

What did you prefer to work closely public or political one regard to making policy/decisions? With whom were you interaction primarily?

Inner circle

What do you think about role of your inner circle? What makes for a 'good' office?

Assessing Policy Capacity

Is assessing current policy advisory capacities inside the MoI imperative or not? (If yes)How did you get ministry policy capacity assessed?

Analysis and advice, and Responsiveness

What does good quality advice mean for you? I mean 'strategic and long term', 'informed by practicalities', 'responsive the elected government', 'coherent government visage'.

How well is/was the prefects providing high quality, responsive, professional, expert and impartial advice and support for decision making?

Coordination and policy coherence and Delivery and implementation

Could you evaluate the ability and willingness of the prefects to promptly deliver your commitments and priorities?

Limit of Policy Capacity

Could you give example occasion when:

–departmental office not enough option

-context/consequences overlooked option

-not reflect the political reality of the day?

Public Administration Reforms

What do you think about recent public administration reforms?

Regulation of "Local Administration reforms" has been debated topic since they affect Turkish administration structure and tradition dramatically. What is your opinion on these regulations?

Complicated Policy Making Environment

Policy making environment has become complicated and challenging since various trends such as civilisation, democratisation and human rights, localisation, governance, transparency and accountability dominated the public realm. Could you evaluate this trend with pros and cons?

How did you cope with these hard environment pressure?

What do you think about role of Prime Minister and his office on your policy formulation and decision making and other policy cycle stage?

To what and how the EU accession negotiations that started in 2004 affect the Ministry?

Could IT department meet expectation and contribute policy capacity of MoI?

Did prefects become politicized?

2. Interview Guide for Inner Circle (The general secretary of the MoI and Private Office, (Political) Advisers, Press and Public Relation Unit)

Policy advice: ministers

(i) Job and Roles

I assume that your key roles are/were to support minister as well as manage the flow of information between your minister and his department. How would you describe the work you did?

(ii) Routines

Can you describe a typical working day?

How often do you meet with/talk to the minister?

How is paper- correspondence, briefs, cabinet documents etc. handled by different parts of the ministry - managed both going into and coming out from the office?

Relationships: Departments, Ministers and Party

(i) Working with Departments

How was the relationship with other departments?

I imagine in your role many different types of advice pass from the department to the minister. What are the major categories of advice that typically flowed from the department(s) to your minister?

(ii) Relationships with Ministers

How could you describe your relation with minister?

What do you think the minister's role is?

How did minister's style shape the work of the office?

How do you protect the Minister's time to make sure he has 'time to think'?

The pressures of leadership are so intense. How could you support your minister to cope with the stress?

(iii) Relationships with the Party, parliamentary and Media

The Minister is one of the important member of the political party. How does the office support the interface between the political and the parliamentary wings?

How could you evaluate role of media with regard to your duties?

Did prefects become politicized?

3. Interview Guide for other Prefecs (deputy undersecretary/ general director/head of division/chief inspector/legal advisor)

Theme1: Perception of the Turkish Ministry of the Interior

How could you describe The Turkish Ministry of the Interior? Its tradition and its strong and weak points?

Theme2: The leadership and styles of bureaucrats

What are your key duties and responsibilities, particularly in respect of dealing with ministers?

Which stages are you more active for decision making?

To what extent are you conscious of positive or negative lessons to be drawn from your predecessors?

To what extend do you recruit and keep people with relevant knowledge, skills and experience? Are you happy with personal administration and education policy of The Ministry? What is the ministry's deficiencies related to personal and education?

Theme3: Support Minister/ Responsiveness

What do you think about role of Ministers?

How is your relationship with minister/deputy minister/ [undersecretary]?

Did it take times to adapt to new priorities and style of new minister?

Theme 4: Analyse and Advise

Do ministers need your advice to reach a decision? When and how? How might this have changed between 2000 and the present? Why?

Mostly, who participate to give advice to minister and make decision?

Could you give your opinion about perception of "public servants are unwillingness to put advice and options unless asked by ministers"?

To what extend could you give minister the advice needed to respond unexpected or emergent or controversial issues, especially appearing on media? Do you have any difficulties to cope with these issues?

What strategies help balance reactivity and responsiveness with the longer-term agenda in the wake of a crisis?

To what extend analyse/projects and research findings do affect your policy making?

Is Centre for Research and Studies imperative or not?

To what extend the EU accession negotiations that started in 2004 affect the Ministry?

Theme5: Limit of Policy Capacity

Recently, declining public policy capacity has been vital issue. What do you think about this issue?

Could you give example occasion when:

- ✓ departmental office not enough option

- ✓ context/consequences overlooked option

- ✓ not reflect the political reality of the day?

Could you explain your reasons of limit of policy capacity?

What would be possible results for limit of policy capacity?

What do you think about the changes to the tradition of The Ministry after the 2000s public management reforms?

Theme 6: Complicated Policy Making Environment

What do you think about role of Prime Minister and his office on your policy making and other decisions?

Regulation of "Local Administration reforms" has been debated topic since they affect Turkish administration structure and tradition dramatically. What is your opinion on these regulations?

Did you participate to make these regulations? Which stage and how? Were you happy with their policy formulation process?

What are the role of media, EU, globalization, NGOs and citizen expectation with regard to policy advisory capacity of The Ministry?

To what extend does parliamentary interior committee play role making policy/law?

Did prefects become politicized?

Theme7: Assessing Policy Capacity

What is the state of current policy advisory capacities available inside the Ministry?

How do you assess policy capacity of the Ministry/ department/unit?

Are you happy with personal administration and education policy of the Ministry? What is the ministry's deficiencies related to personal and education?

To what and how extend do you recruit and keep people with relevant knowledge, skills and experience?

What gaps in advisory capacity need to be filled inside and outside the Ministry in order to better anticipate and achieve desired policy goals?

Do prefects have ability to mobilise and coordinate around whole-of-ministry issues? What was your contribution to foster better coordination amongst to departments?

Could you evaluate recent perception researches?

Could you evaluate capacity of Department of EU Affairs and Foreign Relations?

4. Interview Guide for Stakeholders (MPs, general secretary of the Municipality Union)

Could you tell me about The Turkish Ministry of the Interior? Its tradition, its strong and weak points?

What is your comment on Ministry's policy capacity regarding collaboration and coordination with you?

What do you think about recent public administration reform?

What do you think about the changes to the tradition of The Ministry after the 2000s public management reforms? Did prefects become politicized?

Internationally and also nationally policy making environment has become complicated and challenging since various trends. Could you evaluate this trend regarding MoI with pros and cons?

What do you think about role of Prime Minister and his office on your policy making and other decisions?

Regulation of "Local Administration reforms" has been debated topic since they affect Turkish administration structure and tradition dramatically. What is your opinion on these regulations?

To what extend could you contact with the Ministry? How extend do they provide information you need?

Does Ministry need your advice/ contribution? How did you support the Ministry? Why?

If you are familiar recent perception researches conducted by MoI, could you evaluate them and their findings?

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