This study is built on an investigation of a large number of archival sources, but in particular the *Journals and Votes of the House of the Assembly of Jamaica*, drawn from resources in Britain and Jamaica. Using data drawn from these primary sources, I assess how the Maroons of Jamaica forged an identity for themselves in the century under slavery following the peace treaties of 1739 and 1740. I will argue that the story of the Maroons of Jamaica is more complicated than previously thought.

First, I analyse the origins of the Maroons, and the circumstances that led to them signing peace treaties with the colonial authorities. Second, I consider how the white superintendents usurped the authority of the Maroons in five official towns. Third, I scrutinize the Maroon response to the requirements of the treaties concerning suppressing slave revolts and hunting runaway slaves. Fourth, I examine the relationship between Trelawny Town and the colonial authorities. This allows me to demonstrate that while the colonial elite made concessions over land disputes with other Maroon towns, their reluctance to do so with Trelawny Town eventually culminated in the Second Maroon War of 1795-6. Fifth, I consider the relationship between Trelawny Town and runaway slaves, and the effect it had on the rise in runaway communities in western Jamaica in the nineteenth century. Finally, I explore the changing relationship between the Maroons remaining in Jamaica and the colonial authorities in the aftermath of the Second Maroon War.
As a whole, my PhD challenges the simplistic view of the Maroons as collaborators, and argues that their story was a complex one of divisions between Maroon towns, a lack of coherence, and they were often inefficient hunters of runaways. The Maroons sometimes collaborated with the colonial authorities, and then assisted runaways to escape during the Second Maroon War.
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Academic Thesis: Declaration Of Authorship

I, Michael Sivapragasam,

declare that this thesis and the work presented in it are my own and has been generated by me as the result of my own original research.

The thesis is entitled ‘After the treaties: A Social, Economic and Demographic History of Maroon Society in Jamaica, 1739-1842’.

I confirm that:

1. This work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research degree at this University;

2. Where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or any other qualification at this University or any other institution, this has been clearly stated;

3. Where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly attributed;

4. Where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given. With the exception of such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work;

5. I have acknowledged all main sources of help;

6. Where the thesis is based on work done by myself jointly with others, I have made clear exactly what was done by others and what I have contributed myself;

7. None of this work has been published before submission.

Signed: …Michael Sivapragasam...............................................................

Date: …24 May 2018.................................................................
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INTRODUCTION

The Maroons of Jamaica were communities of runaway slaves who signed treaties in 1739 and 1740 with the British colonial authorities to put an end to decades of conflict. They transformed themselves into a mountain police operating on behalf of the colonial state, and the terms of the treaties required the Maroons to suppress slave revolts and to hunt other runaways. However, while the Maroons were successful in putting down slave rebellions, they had limited success in catching runaways, who continued to form communities in the forested mountains of the island. After the treaties, the colonial authorities sought to placate the Maroon towns by accommodating their demands for land, but a departure from that policy led to the Second Maroon War of 1795-6. Following the conflict, the colonial authorities sided with planters against Maroon towns over land disputes, while the Maroons focused more on developing a diversified economy which enabled their populations to grow steadily at a time when disease ravaged Jamaica.

The Maroons had their origin in the British conquest of Jamaica from the Spaniards in 1655. The Spanish black slaves secured their freedom during the conquest, and they fought a guerrilla war against the newcomers from the mountainous interior of the island. A decade later, the white settlers in the colony established an elected Assembly, through which they ruled the island in association with a governor appointed by the British government.¹ This new island administration sought in vain to subdue the Maroons by military means. The runaway slaves survived and even thrived in independent communities in the mountainous interior for decades, occasionally living in peace, but more often than not

engaged in conflict with the colonial militias.\(^2\) The fighting intensified in the 1730s, culminating in the First Maroon War.\(^3\) When the colonial authorities realised they would not be able to defeat the Maroons, they offered them peace terms. The Leeward Maroons signed their treaty in western Jamaica in 1739, and the Windward Maroons followed suit in the eastern end of the island a year later.\(^4\)

The conflict with the Maroons of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries disrupted economic life in one of Britain’s most important colonies, and was a barrier to the colonists’ desire to settle in the fertile northern parishes, especially the undeveloped northeast.\(^5\) Jamaica’s wealth and importance grew after the colonial authorities signed peace treaties with the Maroons.\(^6\) While peace with the Maroons was just one factor that contributed to this change in fortune, the economic future of Jamaica, and its sugar planters, changed significantly for the better after the Maroons signed these treaties.\(^7\)


Historians differ on how to distinguish between runaway slaves and Maroons. Some refer to all runaways in Jamaican history, before and after the First Maroon War, as Maroons. Historians of Haiti use the term ‘maroon’ to describe any runaway slave, even those who returned to the plantation after a couple of days. Michael Craton classifies ‘true Maroons’ as those who were not only able to run away, but were also able to organise effective communities that operated with a degree of independence from colonial society. David Geggus defines the Maroons, with a capital ‘M’, as the communities of runaway slaves who chose to come to terms with the colonial Jamaican authorities in the mid-eighteenth century, while he classifies Cuffee’s 1798 runaways as ‘maroons’ with a small ‘m’. This dissertation will refer to the escaped slaves who came to terms with the colonial state in 1739 and 1740 as Maroons, but to avoid confusion, communities of runaway slaves who did not sign treaties will be referred to simply as runaways.

Early sixteenth century documents reveal that the term ‘maroon’ was in usage even before the English acquired colonies in the Caribbean. Maroons themselves are unaware how they came by the name. The word ‘maroon’ originated in the Spanish colonies, where the first runaways were native Indians the Spaniards called ‘Cimarron’, and planters later used this term to describe African slaves running away. In 1576, Andrew Barker was seeking ‘Simerons’ in Honduras, whom he described as ‘certain valiant Negroes’, having fled from the Spaniards to become their ‘mortal enemies’, while Robert Dudley’s voyage to the

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Spanish colony of Trinidad observed that ‘the Simerones of the yland traded with me’.¹⁴

Francis Drake also noted that the Spaniards in Panama called their runaway slaves ‘Symerons’.¹⁵ The planters of Jamaica eventually used the word ‘maroon’ for the runaway slaves of Jamaica, but not until the second half of the eighteenth century.¹⁶

Some historians claim that planters called runaway slaves ‘Maroons’ in the 1730s, but they base this assumption on an unsubstantiated assertion by R.C. Dallas, an early nineteenth century writer.¹⁷ The Journals of the Assembly of Jamaica reveal that before a slave revolt led by Tacky in 1760, the colonial authorities identified the Maroons as ‘negroes’ belonging to ‘negro-towns’.¹十八 In the 1750s and 1760s, Thomas Thistlewood called the Maroons of western Jamaica ‘Cudjoe’s Negroes’ in his diary.¹⁹ In the years following the treaty of 1740, the Assembly referred to Maroons from eastern Jamaica as ‘Crawford-Town negroes’, or ‘negroes belonging to Crawford-Town’.²⁰ The planters sometimes called them ‘rebellious negroes who submitted to terms’.²¹ The members of the Assembly and planters in general did not call them ‘Maroons’ until after Tacky’s Revolt.

In 1760, the first official reference to ‘marooned negroes’ was made in the Journals, highlighting the support provided by these Maroons against Tacky’s Revolt that year.²² From

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¹⁶ Some writers suggest the colonial authorities first used the term ‘Maroon’ in 1670 (Edward Long, unpublished papers in the second half of the eighteenth century, and Patterson, ‘Slave Revolts’, p. 255), while others claim it occurred in the eighteenth century (Campbell, Maroons of Jamaica, p. 2, and Hart, Slaves Who Abolished Slavery, p. 37). Edward Kamau Brathwaite states the colonial elite first used the name in 1761 [Wars of Respect: Nanny, Sam Sharpe and the Struggle for People’s Liberation (Kingston: API, 1977), p. 31]. Carey’s claim that the Maroons were named after buccaneers, because a book by a former buccaneer originally referred to them as ‘marooners’, is far-fetched (The Maroon Story, p. 154).
²¹ JAJ, Vol. 4, 2 May 1749, p. 166.
²² JAJ, Vol. 5, 18 October 1760, p. 181.
that date onwards, there was greater collaboration between the Maroons and the colonial authorities, and the name ‘Maroon’ enters the official records. The *Journals* called them ‘maroon negroes’ a few days later, a term that was used with more regularity subsequently and immediately following Tacky’s Revolt, to distinguish what the Assembly previously called those ‘negroes...that came in upon terms’ from the ‘rebellious and runaway negroes’ of Tacky’s Revolt. 

Now that the Maroons of these towns were on the side of the planters, they used the term ‘maroon’ to describe their allies in their fight against slaves who had risen in rebellion.

In the eighteenth century, members of the Jamaican planter elite, including Edward Long and Bryan Edwards, wrote a number of books and pamphlets discussing the Maroons, but they were coloured by negative interpretations of these communities of free blacks. These works are useful mainly as primary sources for the study of planter attitudes, rather than for analysing Maroon communities. Later writers such as W.J. Gardner and Alan Burns tended to label them savages, and explained away the failure of the British colonial forces to defeat the Maroons as being down to the incompetence of their white officers. Before the middle of the twentieth century, these white British writers of Jamaican history had a negative impression of the Maroons.

In the twentieth century, Maroon resistance was discussed by independence campaigners looking for role models, but writers for popular audiences struggled to present

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an accurate picture of them. A number of subsequent academic works relied heavily on these unreferenced popular histories, and repeated their errors, considerably weakening their arguments. Later popular histories present a more accurate picture of these communities. Bev Carey’s *The Maroon Story* is not an academic work, but it provides useful information not available in the professional histories. A descendant of the Moore Town Maroons, Carey wrote mainly about the neglected history of the Windward Maroons, and has the best versions of the Maroon oral history to add to the research. Richard Hart’s *Slaves Who Abolished Slavery* took the study of the Maroons beyond their involvement in Tacky’s Rebellion of 1760, and discussed the pressures on Maroon lands in the years leading up to the Second Maroon War. Hart’s work features large chunks of quoted primary sources, but it offers some useful analysis, including insights into the Maroon involvement in the Sam Sharpe Revolt of the 1830s, which does not feature in most academic works on the Maroons.

The academic scholarship on the Maroons of Jamaica

The most serious academic analysis of the Maroons of Jamaica occurred in the second half of the twentieth century, when nascent Caribbean countries were embarking on the road to independence, and the Black Power movement was beginning to take hold in West Indian countries previously ruled by white colonial elites. The new generation of Caribbean

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historians shifted the focus away from the history of the ruling elite towards the working classes of Jamaica, and in particular the slaves that made up the majority of people living in the island. Historians were first interested in the Maroons as resisters of slavery, but later academics explored other aspects of Maroon society, such as their culture, language, mode of dress, and their oral history. Despite these different approaches, we still know little about their numbers, their population growth, how they fitted into Jamaican society, and their relationship with runaway slaves. This thesis will seek to address those questions, and will show that the story of the Maroons remaining in Jamaica is more complicated than previous studies have been able to show.

The first twentieth century academics to analyse the Maroons were working in the 1970s, and they discussed communities of runaway slaves who fought the colonial authorities before signing treaties that allied themselves with the white elite. Their focus was mainly on the history of these communities up to the end of the First Maroon War, and they concluded that by betraying the blacks who remained in slavery, the Maroons lost control of their towns to white superintendents. In 1970, sociologist Orlando Patterson published *Slavery and Slave Revolts: A Sociological Analysis of the First Maroon War*, which chronicled the Maroons and their fight for freedom, culminating in the peace treaties of 1739 and 1740. Anthropologist Barbara Kopytoff’s *Jamaican Maroon Political Organisation* is an in-depth analysis of the political structure of the official Maroon towns between the treaties and Tacky’s Revolt of 1760 and charts the usurpation of Maroon authority by superintendents in both the Leeward and Windward Maroon towns. Historians such as Craton accept Kopytoff’s conclusion that superintendents quickly replaced Maroon officers as the leaders of the Maroon towns.29 This thesis will present evidence to support the argument that the superintendents eventually took control of the Maroon towns during the

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eighteenth century, but will posit that this was a gradual process depending on the strength of the rulers of each Maroon town.

Mavis Campbell’s synoptic study *The Maroons of Jamaica*, published in 1988, was the first academic work to analyse these communities up to the end of the Second Maroon War. Patterson and Campbell describe the Maroons during the First Maroon War as a resistance force fighting against colonial oppression, and they criticise Cudjoe for signing a peace treaty, with Patterson labelling the Leeward Maroon leader ‘a completely unnecessary sellout’. Historians such as James Lockett and Alvin Thompson accuse the Leeward Maroons of betraying black people. These historians have come to judgments that seem to be more emotional than scholarly, and they look for resistance fighters meeting their expectations among the Windward Maroons, emphasizing how they differed from those in the Leewards. However, this dissertation will argue that both the Leeward and Windward Maroons shared the desire for peace, willingly suppressed slave revolts, and refused to fight until paid outstanding sums.

Both Patterson and Kopytoff conclude that after the treaties of 1739 and 1740, the Maroons made a concerted decision to ally themselves with the colonial elite and became enemies of the black slaves. Craton and Werner Zips point out, however, that like other groups of runaway slaves the goal of Maroon leaders such as Cudjoe was freedom, and that no Maroon community could survive in a perpetual state of war. Consequently, they felt they had no choice but to sign treaties with colonial authorities. This thesis will support the argument that towards the end of the First Maroon War the Maroons felt that they had to

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agree to terms in order to preserve the independence of their own communities. Half a century later, tensions over planter demands for land in the wake of the Haitian Revolution caused the Second Maroon War of 1795-6, and the Maroons of Trelawny Town eventually surrendered after the other Maroon towns failed to support them. Campbell and other historians argue that by suppressing revolts and hunting runaways, the Maroons lost the support of the black slaves, which in turn resulted in the defeat of Trelawny Town in the Second Maroon War. This interpretation will be refuted in this thesis, which presents evidence to show that large numbers of slaves ran away to fight on the side of the Maroons of Trelawny Town, securing their freedom in the process.

Figure One: The physical geography of Jamaica. The mountainous interior of Jamaica has a lighter shade than the coastal areas. The Blue Mountains and John Crow Mountains in the eastern end of the island provided a refuge for the Windward Maroons, while the Cockpit Country in the west and the central mountains were safe havens for the Leeward Maroons. The Cockpit Country did not have the high elevations of the Blue Mountains of the east, but it was also a deeply forested area.

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In the 1980s and 1990s, historians argued that Jamaica’s geography enabled runaway slaves to form independent communities, which eventually became Maroon towns. The issue of ‘running away’ was a significant form of slave resistance, and James Walvin points out that this persistent problem resulted in significant financial losses for the planters.\(^{36}\) Several historians observe that the colonies of Barbados, Antigua, St Kitts and Montserrat had problems with runaways as early as the seventeenth century.\(^{37}\) That situation changed as the sugar plantation economy grew rapidly throughout the eighteenth century. In Barbados, planters put almost all the land under cultivation, leaving potential runaway slaves with limited opportunities for escape. Craton explains that in Antigua, the militia organised a successful campaign to hunt down the runaways and destroyed their communities. In contrast, Jamaica had a large amount of forested land in the inaccessible interior that runaways could use to set up independent communities (see Figure One).\(^{38}\) Jamaica’s geography played a significant role in the success of the Maroons in that island.

Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, historians believed that after 1740 the Maroons were effective in suppressing slave revolts and hunting runaway slaves. Patterson points out that the Maroons played a major role in suppressing slave revolts throughout the century that followed the peace treaties.\(^{39}\) A number of historians, including Campbell, Kopytoff, Daniel Schafer, Eugene Genovese and Richard Sheridan, maintain that the Maroons were also able to prevent slaves from escaping to the mountains, successfully curtailing the development of runaway slave communities. Patterson admits that some slaves continued to run away after the Maroons accepted peace terms, but insists that their


\(^{39}\) Patterson, *Sociology*, p. 281.
communities were small. This dissertation will show that while the Maroons helped to suppress slave revolts, they had limited success in apprehending runaways, who continued to form communities in large numbers in the island’s forested mountains of the interior.

In the last two decades of the twentieth century, historians showed an interest in looking at Maroons as more than just resisters of slavery and have focussed on Maroon cultural identity. They map the Maroon practices of adopting European customs, habits, dress and religion, and merging these traditions with their own West African survivals. Richard Price finds that throughout the region, the longer Maroon communities survived, the characteristics of new creole African-American communities eventually subsumed tribal differences. Kathleen Wilson’s article, *The Performance of Freedom*, is a piece of cultural history exploring the attire worn by the Maroons as they enacted their ‘performance of freedom’, and looked at what their clothes said about their perceptions of this liberty. Wilson highlights the fact that the clothes were a mixture of those that were British in origin and garments that resembled West African traditional attire. The Jamaican Maroons embraced West African cultural influences during the First Maroon War, but after the treaties they adopted more British customs.

Historians tended to dismiss Maroon oral history as unreliable, but an archaeological discovery changed this academic perception. Hart discusses instances where Maroon oral historians have taken information given to them by historians, misinterpreted it, and included it in a new version of the oral history. Before the 1990s, historians gave little credence to

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Maroon claims that they had ancestors who were indigenous Taino Indians. The prevailing historical narrative was that the Spaniards had exterminated the Tainos in Jamaica during the sixteenth century. In 1993, an archaeological expedition found ceramics and earthenware in old Maroon sites that were distinctly Taino in origin, and Kofi Agorsah recorded his findings in *Maroon Heritage*. This research confirmed that Tainos jointly occupied Windward Maroon towns alongside runaway black slaves. Subsequent historians now accept that the Windward Maroons have Amerindian ancestors, but only archaeologist Charles Orser seems to credit Agorsah with these findings. This thesis will be the first dedicated study of the Maroons to incorporate Agorsah’s research into the Taino ancestry of the Maroons. Agorsah’s work shows the value of oral history in the absence of archival evidence, and the scholarship now recognises the link between the Maroons and their Taino ancestry.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, anthropologists researched the existing Maroon towns to discover an oral history that could allow studies of the Maroon past to move beyond the written evidence left behind by white authors. Kenneth Bilby’s *True-Born Maroons* criticises Campbell’s work for a lack of Maroon ‘voices’, and states that an archival study of the Maroons is incomplete without hearing about their history from their own mouths. Bilby focusses primarily on the customs in the Windward Maroon town of Moore

### References


Town, and chronicles their oral histories and traditions. In another anthropological study, Jean Besson compares three rural communities in Jamaica, one of which was the Leeward Maroons of Accompong Town, and another was the neighbouring rural St James villages of Maroon Town and Flagstaff. While most of the focus of these two anthropological works is on how the present-day Maroons in Moore Town and Accompong Town live, they provide Maroon oral history that assists in filling gaps in the archival record. The vast majority of the research presented in this thesis will be archival, but it also seeks to show how Maroon oral history can help where the archival research falls short.

Most historians who study the Maroons after 1740 focus solely on the Leeward communities. While Campbell extends her study to the Second Maroon War at the end of the eighteenth century, she largely ignores the other four Maroon towns, and does not analyse their relationship with the colonial authorities after 1796. Similarly, Craton, Sheridan and other historians focus their attentions primarily on Trelawny Town after 1740. Helen McKee’s recent work on the Maroons of Jamaica looks primarily at Trelawny Town up to the conclusion of the Second Maroon War in 1796, comparing the Maroons to the Creek Indians of North America, and exploring the relationship between Trelawny Town and white settlers in Jamaica. Historians have generally neglected the Maroons who remained in Jamaica after 1796. To correct that neglect, this dissertation will provide a social, economic and

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demographic history of Maroon societies across Jamaica during the whole of the century between the treaties of 1739 and 1740 and the abolition of slavery during the 1830s.

The Structure and the Primary Sources

Part One of the thesis will discuss the Maroons of the eighteenth century, charting their conversion from communities of runaway slaves into a mountain police operating on behalf of the colonial authorities. The first chapter will argue that while the Maroons were able to resist the attempts of the colonial forces to defeat them in the years leading up to the treaties of 1739 and 1740, the continuous warfare forced both the Leeward and Windward Maroons to accept terms. After the treaties, both groups of the Maroons distanced themselves from the black slaves and their shared West African background by highlighting their Amerindian origins. Chapter Two will show that the post-treaty Maroon leaders eventually lost control of their respective Maroon towns to the colonial authorities, who then proceeded to placate the Maroons whenever land disputes arose in the eighteenth century. Some Maroon towns had a weak leadership structure, allowing the white superintendents to usurp the authority of the Maroon officers in the 1750s. Where the Maroon towns had strong leaders the colonial authorities waited for them to die, and then seized control by using clauses in the treaty that gave them the authority to appoint successors. The third chapter will argue that while the Maroons effectively suppressed slave revolts, they were less efficient in hunting runaway slaves. This chapter will produce evidence to show that runaways continued to form communities in eastern Jamaica throughout the second half of the eighteenth century. These runaways lived in communities that were similar to those run by the Maroons before the treaties, and yet the Maroons were unable to subdue them.

Part Two will describe the change in fortunes for the Maroons following the demise of Trelawny Town after the Second Maroon War, and the declining importance to the colonial authorities of the Maroons remaining in Jamaica in the nineteenth century. Chapter Four will argue that the Second Maroon War occurred because of tensions between the Maroons of
Trelawny Town and neighbouring planters over land, and that this conflict led to the Maroon officers temporarily reasserting control of their town, but they eventually surrendered after the other Maroon towns failed to support them. Despite winning several skirmishes, the Maroons of Trelawny Town were unable to maintain the guerrilla campaign that had proved so successful in the First Maroon War, and they eventually surrendered, losing their land. The fifth chapter will posit the argument that during the Second Maroon War significant numbers of runaway slaves supported Trelawny Town, outnumbering their Maroons by two to one or even three to one, as they fought against the colonial militias. After the conflict, the colonial authorities deported most of the population of the larger of the two Leeward Maroon towns, unwittingly creating ideal circumstances for slaves to run away and form communities in the forested interior. This chapter will show that following the conflict, communities of runaway slaves grew in number in western Jamaica. When the Sam Sharpe Rebellion broke out towards the end of 1831, the Maroons were efficient in helping to suppress it, but they failed to capture most of the runaways who escaped during the revolt. Chapter Six will explain that after the Second Maroon War the colonial authorities no longer accommodated Maroon complaints about land, but the Maroons were still able to achieve economic independence by developing a diverse local economy. In the first few decades of the nineteenth century, the populations of the Maroon towns grew at a time when diseases ravaged numbers of whites and blacks on the Jamaican coasts. Despite adopting European names and embracing Christianity, the Maroons resisted attempts by the colonial authorities to merge the Maroon towns into the general black population.

This thesis will utilize a number of primary sources to research the Maroons in Jamaica in the century after the conclusion of the First Maroon War. Previous historians of the Jamaican Maroons have used colonial correspondence between the governor and the Colonial Office, as well as the records of the Assembly and the Council, in chronicling the First Maroon War. The Council was composed of leading citizens appointed by the governor to assist him with running the island. The Assembly comprised members elected by
landowners, mainly white, and reflected the views of the planter class in the rural areas, as well as those of a growing mercantile class in Kingston. Each parish elected two members, with some of the more populated parishes allowed three representatives. The Journals, and later the Votes, of the Assembly were produced by local printers to record the motions passed by, and petitions heard by, the Assembly. The records of this Assembly, in particular the Journals and the Votes, provide rich primary source material about the Maroons. Part of this material consists of statistical data. This evidence is used in this thesis to help produce a new account of Maroon society, culture, politics and warfare – all of which allows us to move towards a re-interpretation of slave resistance in Jamaica.

Surprisingly, historians writing about the Maroons have so far made only limited use of the Journals and the Votes for the years following the treaties of 1739 and 1740. These documents are lengthy and a study of them is very time-consuming, which might explain why very few historians explored the records available in these volumes. However, there are reports, petitions, accounting records, and other bookkeeping entries that have helped to shed valuable new light on the Maroons of Jamaica and how they lived. This dissertation has made use of both the Journals and Votes in the century leading up to the end of slavery in Jamaica, presenting a detailed picture of the Maroons in this period. Almost every year, the Votes has an appendix that gives detailed population statistics about the Maroon towns, which has gone relatively unnoticed by historians. The purpose of these returns was to provide the governor and the Assembly with a picture of how many Maroon men were available to bear arms in the event of a slave uprising. These appendices will be analysed to give a comprehensive picture of the demographics of these official Maroon towns. While the reports about the actions of the Maroons are open to interpretation, and can represent a slant towards the colonial authorities, the raw statistics about the Maroons and their population growth are less likely to be coloured by bias. This thesis has therefore unearthed a considerable body of data from the Journals and the Votes that breaks new ground in the study of the Maroons of Jamaica.
This thesis will also make use of sources such as books, letters, diaries, reports and pamphlets written after 1740, as well as Jamaican newspaper records. One such report is a document detailing the campaigns the militia and the Maroons undertook against a community of runaway slaves in Trelawny.\(^{51}\) This report allows the researcher to determine how successful the militia and Maroons were in their attempts to capture runaways. Official correspondence between the governors and their superiors in Britain will also be utilised. These sources provide a picture of the Maroons mainly from the perspective of the white planters. Consequently, it is necessary to treat these sources with caution, and compare them to statistical data drawn from the Assembly records.

Oral history from the Maroons themselves, especially from audio and visual recordings held at the African-Caribbean Institute of Jamaica, fills gaps in the archival research. I have also conducted interviews with the Returned Maroons of Flagstaff to chronicle their oral history. This Maroon oral history can then be used to present an alternative perspective to the writings of the white planter class of Jamaica.

Schafer remarks that there were so few studies on the period after the wars with the Maroons that it would be easy to draw the conclusion that the Maroons had disappeared, and Michael Mullin observes that what is lacking in present-day writing about the Jamaican Maroons is an understanding of how they lived.\(^{52}\) An analysis of the primary sources, and in particular the *Journals* and the *Votes*, will provide a detailed picture of the Maroons in the century after the First Maroon War, including how they lived. There is limited scholarship on the Maroons remaining in Jamaica in the century between the signing of the treaties and the abolition of slavery, and this dissertation helps to correct that, providing a re-evaluation of the Jamaican Maroons within the context of slave resistance in Britain’s most lucrative sugar colony.

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\(^{51}\) *Account of a Shooting Excursion on the Mountains near Dromilly Estate, in the Parish of Trelawny, and Island of Jamaica, in the Month of October, 1824* (London: Harvey and Darton, 1825), pp. 5-10.

\(^{52}\) Schafer, ‘The Maroons of Jamaica’, p. 4; Mullin, *Africa in America*, p. 49.
PART ONE: THE MAROONS IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY JAMAICA

CHAPTER ONE: THE TREATIES AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE MAROONS

Throughout the second half of the seventeenth and the first half of the eighteenth centuries, the slaves became free by running away to the mountainous interior where they formed Maroon communities. As Andrew O'Shaughnessy points out, the very existence of independent Maroon societies was an affront to planter power and exposed the limitations of colonial authority. However, the Maroons were able to resist the attempts of the colonial forces to defeat them in the years leading up to the treaties of 1739 and 1740. This chapter will argue that the colonial elite felt compelled to offer treaties to the Maroons, and leaders such as Cudjoe were able to negotiate from a position of strength for improved terms. The white planters were unaware that the Maroons chose to accept peace terms because they felt they were unable to live in a constant state of war. After the treaties, the Maroons distanced themselves from the black slaves and their shared West African background by highlighting their Amerindian origins, as they sought to prove their loyalty to the colonial elite.

The Maroons on both sides of the island became officially free and independent by providing armed assistance against the black slaves, but to do so they eventually had to accept the authority of the colonial elite. Michael Craton and Helen McKee state that the goal of Maroon leaders such as Cudjoe was freedom, and once they had obtained that the Maroons were no longer interested in revenge or wreaking further destruction. This chapter will build on this argument by positing that the Maroons were living under stress during the continuous fighting of the First Maroon War of the 1730s, and they saw the peace terms as

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an opportunity to change this state while persuading the colonial authorities to accept their free status.

The colonial authorities offered peace terms on more than one occasion to different Maroon groups. James Lockett claims that Cudjoe and Quao were the only Maroons throughout the West Indies or Latin America to sign a treaty that led to them catching slaves. However, Orlando Patterson, Mavis Campbell and Werner Zips point out that an early Spanish Maroon named Juan Lubolo, alternately called de Bolas or Boulo in various documents, was actually the first Jamaican Maroon leader to sign a treaty with the English colonial authorities in the late seventeenth century.55 Philip Morgan and Craton observe that throughout the history of the British Empire, slaves who rebelled and resisted could not exist in a perpetual state of war, and they eventually had to come to an accommodation with white colonial society.56 This chapter will support the argument that Lubolo’s seventeenth century treaty was the precedent for the colonial elite’s offer of peace terms to Cudjoe and Quao the following century.

The colonial authorities were not able to enforce some clauses pertaining to freedom of movement. Barbara Kopyttoff, Patterson, Richard Hart, Bev Carey and Campbell argue that the colonial authorities used the treaties to effectively pen the Maroons into their towns and restrict their movements.57 But as McKee has shown in her recent work, the planters did

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not completely hem in the Maroons and there was a lot of land available for both groups.58 This chapter will build on this to reveal that Maroons set up satellite communities without any adverse reaction from the colonial authorities.

Once the Maroons signed treaties with the British, they sought to emphasize their Amerindian origins. Some historians question Maroon claims of Taino descent, because they accept the historical narrative that the Spanish exterminated the Tainos. Campbell, James Walvin and Craton dismiss the Maroon oral history of Taino descent as a fictional attempt by Maroons to distance themselves from black slaves.59 Patterson and Kenneth Bilby point out that West African cultural customs still dominate both the Leeward and Windward Maroon communities, and that the Maroons were essentially Akan in origin.60 The argument over the origin of the Jamaican Maroons reflects a wider debate about the role these Maroons played in maintaining the status quo in the island after the treaties of 1739 and 1740. McKee posits that when the Maroons allied themselves with the white planters, they distanced themselves from their former status as enemies of the colonial elite, and re-cast themselves as supporters of the Jamaican government.61 While there is truth in the argument that after the treaties the Maroons sought to distance themselves from the black slaves, this chapter will introduce archaeological evidence to show that there is a factual basis to the Taino ancestry of the Maroons. This chapter will also present data to argue that while the Maroons had a strong Akan base in the eighteenth century, their African origins were far more mixed. The story about the origins of the Maroons is not a simplistic one. It is certainly more complicated than some historians believe.

58 McKee, ‘From violence to alliance’, p. 9.
61 McKee, ‘From violence to alliance’, p. 3.
Maroon origins

All enslaved people in Jamaica took advantage of the opportunities offered by the forested mountains to escape and set up free communities. In Spanish Jamaica, many Amerindians and black slaves established Maroon communities in the island’s interior, while under the English increasing numbers of African slaves found refuge in the forests. How the Maroons defined themselves depended on who they were fighting. When the Maroons were in conflict with the colonial authorities and trying to secure their freedom in the mountainous interior of the island, they emphasized their Akan origins. Once they signed peace treaties, and started hunting runaways, many of whom were also Akan, they highlighted their Taino origins in an attempt to distinguish themselves from the slaves. After the treaties, the Maroons formed another class in Jamaican society, alongside free people of colour, ranked below the white planter society, but separate and superior to the black slaves. The Maroons reflected a number of West African origins before becoming more specifically Akan in the eighteenth century when Jamaican planters imported more slaves with those roots.

The Windward Maroons persistently claimed descent from the first known inhabitants of Jamaica, the Taino Amerindians, formerly classified as Arawaks by archaeologists. In their oral history, Maroons highlighted their descent from the Tainos to argue that they were the oldest continuous inhabitants of Jamaica, as opposed to the ‘sons of slaves’, known as abrono in the Kromanti Maroon dialect of the Akan language. Maroons claimed that the black slaves, who arrived in Jamaica after the Tainos, were not entitled to the same privileges as the Maroons. Windward Maroons consider the Tainos to be the first Maroons and claim descent from them.

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A number of early Jamaican writers dispel the myth of Taino extermination by describing the resistance of Amerindians and black slaves in the Blue Mountains in the years leading up to the treaties. When the Spaniards first settled in Jamaica in the early 1500s, they enslaved the indigenous Tainos and brought other Amerindians into the island from other parts of their empire. Shortly after 1655, some contemporary English writers claimed that the Spanish had wiped out most of the ‘Native Indians’. However, one of these writers, Thomas Malthus, admitted that the Tainos were not completely exterminated, instead observing that ‘there was not many Native Indians left’ in Jamaica at the time of the English conquest.64 A small group of Amerindians found their way to what the Spaniards called the Bastidas Mountains, later renamed the Blue Mountains by the English, where they united with runaways slaves to fight the colonial authorities. Eighteenth century writers John Thurloe, James Knight and Bryan Edwards describe English soldiers from the previous century fighting groups that comprised both African and Indian ex-slaves of the Spaniards.65 Early twentieth century writers Herbert Thomas, Frank Cundall and Joseph Pietersz maintain that under Spanish rule, indigenous Taino Indians and other Amerindian slaves ran away to the Bastidas Mountains to escape slavery, and that the early Windward Maroons were a mixture of these Amerindians and runaway blacks.66 Maroon oral history has consistently claimed Taino ancestry, and there is some support for this theory in the writings of white Jamaicans.

Archaeological evidence shows that the Maroon claims of descent from the Tainos is correct, and that there was Taino and African mixing in Windward Maroon communities. In 1993, archaeologist Kofi Agorsah led an expedition that found ceramics and earthenware in

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old Windward Maroon sites that were distinctly Taino in origin. Agorsah said the discovery confirmed that the Taino were ‘still inhabiting parts of the island at the time that the British took over the island and had, therefore, not been exterminated as has often been asserted’. The evidence shows that the Windward Maroons mixed with Tainos, and confirms that they were not descended solely from Akan slaves.

In addition to the Tainos, the Maroons may have been descended from runaway Amerindians brought into Jamaica by the Spaniards. English settlers imported enslaved Indians from the Mosquito Coast of Central America, and other Amerindians such as the Creek Indians from North America, into the West Indies colonies. In the early eighteenth century, the Assembly brought in more Mosquito Indians to fight the Maroons, and it is possible that these Indians deserted to join them. Thomas Manning, whose will created Mannings School, was one of a number of planters who owned Indian slaves in the eighteenth century. One nineteenth century writer suggested that many of the mulatto slaves freed by the Spanish in Jamaica were ‘the half-breed descendants of Indians’. According to G.W. Bridges, ‘the blood of the Mosquito Indians has been mixed with that of Africa’. It is possible that the Windward Maroons were descended not just from Tainos, but also other Amerindians imported into the island. However, while the Maroons emphasize

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their Taino ancestry, their oral history makes no mention of other Amerindian origins. While there were Amerindian survivals, the African influence dwarfed them in the years leading up to the First Maroon War.

Akan language, names and culture heavily influenced the Maroons in the eighteenth century, but when the Maroons first formed, they had a mix of West African origins. Runaway slaves supplemented the Maroon numbers in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, and consequently their ethnicity reflected the West African origins of the slaves imported into Jamaica at this time. Patterson claims that in the latter half of the seventeenth century, the largest group of slaves imported into early English Jamaica came from southwest Africa in what is now Angola and the Congo, while a significant number came from the Slave Coast, in what is now Dahomey in West Central Africa.73 P.E.H. Hair and Robin Law state that English slave traders in this period secured their cargo mainly from New Calabar or Biafra, in what is now Nigeria, and Allada on the Slave Coast, while a smaller group of slaves came from the Gold Coast. They point out that Angola did not feature as a significant place of origin for English slaves until the end of the seventeenth century.74 Historians differ on the ethnic origins of Jamaican slaves in the century that followed the English conquest of the island in 1655.

An analysis of information drawn from the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database for the last few decades of the seventeenth century shows that 40 per cent of slave ships had an unclear African origin, but that Angola and the Congo do not feature significantly among those ships whose origins are specified (see Table One). However, Patterson, Hair and Law are correct to highlight the Slave Coast of Benin and Biafra as significant sources of origin for Jamaican slaves in the latter seventeenth century, as both regions produced 17 per cent of the slaves from 1663 to 1700. While it is difficult to calculate the exact West African

73 Patterson, Sociology, pp. 135-6.
origins of the early Maroons, it is clear from the slave trade data that only a small number of slave ships came from the Gold Coast towards the end of the seventeenth century, so Akan slaves were not common in seventeenth century Jamaica.

Table One: Slave Ships to Jamaica 1663-1700. Records show that in the last decades of the seventeenth century, 46 slave ships bound for Jamaica came from Biafra and Guinea, while 47 came from Benin, 38 from West-Central Africa, 17 from the Gold Coast, and 15 from Senegambia. However, there were no records about the origins of another 108 slave ships.75

While more ships specified their port of origin as the Gold Coast in the early eighteenth century than any other port, data drawn from the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database also shows how difficult it is to calculate where all Jamaica's slaves originated. Walter Rucker observes that Jamaica began to import more Akan slaves from the Gold Coast than any other group in the eighteenth century.76 Hair and Law point out that the Gold Coast ports of Kormantin, established and fortified by the English before the conquest of Jamaica, produced a large number of Jamaican slaves in the early eighteenth century.77 However, between 1700 and 1720, more than half of slave trading ships did not specify a

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75 Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, ‘Voyages’, http://slavevoyages.org/voyages/hpsdRo07
West African port of origin, making it difficult to state with certainty where Jamaican slaves originated (see Table Two). Nevertheless, a comparison of slave ships arriving in Jamaica in the last decades of the seventeenth century to the first two decades of the eighteenth century reveals that Jamaica imported more slaves from what is now Ghana in the latter period. Between 1663 and 1700, only six per cent of slave ships to Jamaica listed their origin as the Gold Coast, while between 1700 and 1720 that figure went up to 27 per cent. The number of Akan slaves arriving in Jamaica from Kormantin ports increased in the early eighteenth century.

Table Two: Slave Ships to Jamaica 1700-1720. Records show that in the first two decades of the eighteenth century, 10 slave ships bound for Jamaica came from Biafra and Guinea, while 38 came from Benin, 15 from West-Central Africa, and 12 from Senegambia. However, the number of ships coming from the Gold Coast had increased significantly to 96. There were no records about the origins of another 186 slave ships.78

Jamaica had a large number of slave rebellions in the century following the 1655 Conquest, and planters attributed this development to the ethnic origins of their slaves. According to eighteenth century writer Hector MacNeill, many planters believed the Akan were ‘by much the most savage of all the African tribes imported into this country’.79

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78 Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, ‘Voyages’, http://slavevoyages.org/voyages/JQiKkmw
Edwards, a Jamaican planter, argued that Tacky’s leadership of a Coromantee slave revolt in Jamaica in 1760 was proof of their warlike qualities.\textsuperscript{80} The Akan were called Coromantees by Jamaican planters, who described them as a ‘warlike’ and ‘savage’ race, and they used these stereotypes to explain the reason why the Akan rebelled against their bondage more than slaves from other ethnic groups. Planters in the eastern Caribbean rejected Coromantee slaves on the grounds that they were too violent, which meant that a larger proportion of slaves from the Kormantin port ended up at the final stop of the slave traders, which was Jamaica. Despite their perceived flaws, Jamaican planters still preferred these Akan or Coromantee slaves to those from Biafra and the Igbo, whom they increasingly re-exported to the Spanish colonies and North America.\textsuperscript{81} According to Edwards, ‘the circumstances which distinguish the Koromantyn, or Gold Coast Negroes, from all others, are firmness both of body and mind; a ferociousness of disposition; but withal, activity, courage, and a stubbornness.’ The Jamaican planter claimed that the Coromantee slaves were much stronger and braver than the Igbo.\textsuperscript{82} Despite the perception that the Akan slaves could cause trouble, Jamaican planters still desired them because they believed they worked harder than slaves from other parts of West Africa.

The preponderance of Akan slaves in the early eighteenth century influenced the development of black Jamaican culture, and by extension Maroon culture. Half of the words of African origin in Jamaican dialect came from the Twi language spoken by West Africans from the Gold Coast, and the fables of Anancy have their origins in what is now Ghana.\textsuperscript{83} The Maroons used words from the Twi language in a dialect they called Kromanti, which is itself a corruption of Kormantin.\textsuperscript{84} The composition of Jamaica’s slave population became

\textsuperscript{83} Patterson, \textit{Sociology}, pp. 134-143, 153.
\textsuperscript{84} Bilby, \textit{True-Born Maroons}, pp. 17-20.
more Akan at the start of the eighteenth century, and this influx had an impact on the changing characteristics of the Maroons. They started as a group of Spanish-speaking slaves of unknown West African origin, mixed with Taino runaways, and evolved into Akan-dominated units by the time of the First Maroon War of the 1730s. However, this composition of the Maroons reflected the changing features of West African slaves in Jamaica, and did not mean that the Akan were more predisposed to Maroon resistance than any other West African group.

The Maroons most likely started as a mix of African tribes, and acquired more Akan culture and language in the eighteenth century, when planters imported more slaves from the Gold Coast. The Maroons themselves were also unsure about their origins. In the late twentieth century, the Maroons of Accompong Town at one time told Bilby they originated from Nigeria, and at another time Ghana. In 1742, James Knight wrote that ‘their Origin is very dark and obscure.’ R.C. Dallas suggested that a number of eighteenth century runaways were not Coromantees, but instead adopted the language and customs of a society that had become predominantly Akan. While the Maroons had a mix of origins, the Akan became the more dominant culture, when runaway slaves from the Gold Coast took over the leadership of Maroon resistance in the years leading up to the First Maroon War.

There is a strong Akan influence among the Maroons of the late seventeenth century and the early eighteenth century. In 1690, there was a Coromantee rebellion on Sutton’s estate in western Jamaica, and most of these slaves ran away to form the Leeward Maroons. This was at a time when only six per cent of slave ships came from the Gold Coast (see Table One). A number of male Maroon leaders from both the Leeward and

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87 Knight, *History of Jamaica*, folio 188.
Windward Maroons of Jamaica bore Akan names for days of the week, such as Cudjoe or Kojo (Monday), Quaco or Kwaku (Wednesday), Quao or Quaw (Thursday) and Cuffee or Kofi (Friday).\textsuperscript{90} Cudjoe was the Akan name of the eventual leader of the Leeward Maroons, and he was most likely born in freedom, probably the son of the leader of the rebellion on Sutton’s estate (see Figure Two).\textsuperscript{91}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{plaque_cudjoe.jpg}
\caption{Plaque commemorating Cudjoe at Accompong Town. Installed by Jamaica National Trust Commission, 1991. Some narratives, such as this Jamaican government plaque commemorating the achievements of Cudjoe, seem to accept the disputed story that Cudjoe led the rebellion on Sutton’s estate in 1690.\textsuperscript{92}}
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The origins of the Maroons varied from the English Conquest in 1655 up to the early eighteenth century, and they reflected the changes occurring in the composition of Jamaica slave society. While it is difficult to trace the exact ethnic origins of the Maroons, the largest West African influence on both the Jamaican slaves and the free Maroons in the decades leading up to the First Maroon War was the Akan culture of the Gold Coast. The Maroons of Surinam also had Akan roots, and they were proud of their Ashanti origins. The leaders of the Maroons during the First Maroon War had predominantly Akan names.

The First Maroon War

The colonial authorities failed to defeat first the Spanish Maroons, and then the Windward and Leeward Maroons, and they could only find a resolution to these conflicts by offering treaties to all Maroon communities. Ever since the English conquered Jamaica from the Spanish in 1655, runaways were able to form independent communities in the forested interior of the island, where they provided an inspiration to other slaves seeking to escape bondage. These Maroon communities flourished and attacked planters in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The treaty the English offered to Juan Lubolo served as a precedent for subsequent peace terms. The colonial authorities, who became British after 1707, proposed terms to Cudjoe and Quao in 1739 and 1740. Planters believed that their growing and lucrative sugar economy was under threat from the fighting, while the Maroons felt that the conflict severely stretched their food supplies. Cudjoe was able to make demands from a position of strength for more favourable terms, but this bravado masked the stress the Maroon communities suffered during the continuous fighting of the First Maroon War, and how close they came to defeat. All Maroon leaders accepted

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peace treaties with the colonial authorities in order to preserve the existence of their communities.

Some scholarship on the Maroons has tended to focus mainly on the First Maroon War of the 1730s, giving the impression that this was the only period of Jamaican history when they seriously troubled the colonial authorities. However, the colonial authorities of Jamaica fought the Maroons sporadically in the decades that followed 1655, with brief interludes of peace. John Thurloe wrote that most of the black slaves taken by the English from the Spanish in the 1650s had, in a matter of months, escaped to form early Maroon communities in the Blue Mountains of eastern Jamaica. In 1690, the Maroon problem also became a western one. Charles Leslie and Knight explained that a slave revolt on Sutton’s estate in Clarendon resulted in a Maroon community forming in the leeward part of the island as well. The ‘rebellious negroes’ of Sutton’s estate were able to live in the mountains of the Cockpit Country in western Jamaica, and in 1729 the Journals of the Assembly of Jamaica noted that some of them were not caught or killed until nearly 40 years later. Runaway slaves in both ends of the island were able to escape, live and avoid capture in the forested interior for decades, and from these positions they attacked planter society on a regular basis in the years leading up to the First Maroon War of the 1730s.

The untamed forested interior of the island proved to be very attractive to runaway slaves in early English Jamaica, and fostered growing Maroon communities that the colonial authorities never succeeded in defeating in battle. The fertile land in the mountains supported runaways who lived for years out of the reach of the colonial authorities.

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96 Hart, Slaves who Abolished Slavery, pp. 32-58; Black, History, p. 84.
report to the Assembly, Tobias Finch complained that ‘it will be exceeding difficult, if not impracticable, to subdue them entirely…as they are seated in vast rocky mountains, full of thickets and woods, and many of them inaccessible to white men’.\(^1\) Finch explained away the successful guerrilla campaigns of the Maroons by assigning racial characteristics to the Maroon ability to survive in the forested mountains. These circumstances contrasted with other British colonies, such as Barbados and some of the American southern states, where runaways were not able to find a suitable refuge.\(^2\) The Spaniards from Cuba, who were chasseurs to the dogs brought in to hunt the Maroons in the Second Maroon War at the end of the eighteenth century, remarked with wonder ‘that they never saw such woods for sustenance any where’, and that the Maroons ‘could live in these woods forever’.\(^3\)

Jamaica’s mountainous, forested interior provided an ideal environment for runaway slaves to establish independent communities, and the early Maroons were able to inflict significant defeats on the English settlers without suffering serious losses themselves.

The early English settlers were unable to conquer the Spanish Maroon threat, and they eventually resorted to offering peace terms. Shortly after the English conquered Jamaica, Lubolo and his Maroons even raided and set fire to the capital Spanish Town. Major Sedgwickie suggested that the colonial authorities follow the Spanish example, and offer peace terms to the Maroons. In 1609, the Spanish had signed a treaty with the Maroon leader Yanga in Mexico, and this served as a precedent to the Jamaican treaty with Lubolo. Once Lubolo agreed to terms, the English were able to remove an internal enemy, and turn his Maroons against an external threat. When Lubolo switched sides from the Spaniards to

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\(^3\) JAJ, Vol. 9, 23 March 1796, p. 461.
the English, this action effectively ended Spanish attempts to re-take the island.\footnote{Thurloe, \textit{State Papers}, Vol. IV, pp. 601-5; JAJ, Vol. 1, Appendix, p. 20; Black, \textit{History}, p. 54; Campbell, \textit{Maroons of Jamaica}, pp. 20-5; Timothy Lockley, \textit{Maroon Communities in South Carolina: a documentary record} (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2009), p. xi.} Lubolo’s men were so experienced at fighting in the mountains that Don Cristobal Ysasi, the former Spanish governor of Jamaica, believed that there was no point fighting on after Lubolo joined the English.\footnote{Cundall and Pietersz, \textit{Jamaica Under the Spaniards}, pp. 98-100; Richard Hill, \textit{Lights and Shadows of Jamaica History} (Kingston: Ford & Gall, 1859), p. 32.} Two contemporary English writers optimistically claimed that once Lubolo switched sides, the vast majority of the ‘Spanish negroes’ were now under English control.\footnote{Malthus, \textit{The Present State of Jamaica}, pp. 36-7; Captain Hickeringill, \textit{Jamaica Viewed: All the Ports, Harbours, their several Soundings, Towns, and Settlements thereunto belonging} (London: B. Bragg, 1705), pp.23-4.} The Spanish Maroons had mastered guerrilla warfare from their bases in the forested mountains, frustrating the colonial authorities in their attempts to fight them, forcing them to accept that they had to come to terms with the Maroons.

The colonial attempts to take control of the Spanish Maroons by offering them peace treaties in the seventeenth century was only a partial success, because a significant number of Maroons refused to come to terms. The colonial elite also offered peace to another early Maroon leader, Juan de Serras, but while he signed the treaty, he used it as an opportunity to arm his men to continue fighting a guerrilla war in later years. These Maroons stayed in the inaccessible central mountainous region, in the northern part of the parish of Clarendon, and continued to fight the English.\footnote{Hart, \textit{Slaves who Abolished Slavery}, pp. 4-6; Long, \textit{History of Jamaica}, Vol. I, p.279; Bryan Edwards, ‘The Proceedings of the Governor and Assembly of Jamaica, in regard to the Maroon Negroes’ [1796], \textit{Maroon Societies: Rebel Slave Communities in the Americas}, ed. by Richard Price (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 232.} The Maroons of de Serras proved to be a magnet for runaways fleeing slavery in English Jamaica.\footnote{Campbell, \textit{Maroons of Jamaica}, pp. 41-3.} The Maroons led by de Serras outlasted those who came to terms, but the colonial records stopped mentioning them at the end of the century. Slaves who ran away towards the end of the seventeenth century continued to be hostile towards the colonial establishment.
The practice of Jamaican Maroons hunting runaways started with Lubolo in the seventeenth century, not with Cudjoe and Quao in the eighteenth century. The colonial authorities paid the men of Lubolo to hunt the supporters of de Serras and recent runaways. Malthus noted that in return for hunting runaways, the colonial authorities gave Lubolo and his men land in the Caymanas region of central Jamaica. Shortly afterwards, this property passed into the hands of the Ellis family, indicating that it did not remain in Lubolo’s hands for long. Lubolo died in an ambush either by supporters of de Serras or by recent English runaway slaves, and his group of Maroons disappeared from history. Lubolo was the first Jamaican Maroon to hunt runaways and Maroons who remained at large.

The Maroons were successful in resisting the colonial militias, because they did not fight them on open fields, preferring instead to ambush them on their own terms when the militias ventured into their forested mountains. Thurloe and the Journals noted that from the safety of their mountain hideouts, the early Maroons fought and killed soldiers, raided plantations, and disrupted nearby settlements on a regular basis throughout the latter half of the seventeenth century. On a number of occasions, the elected members of the Assembly had to ‘examine the matter of the rebellious negroes’, and raised money ‘for the maintaining of…parties against rebellious negroes’. White land-owning men chose these representatives of the Assembly, and they bore the brunt of the financial efforts to defeat the Maroons, but these efforts were becoming increasingly costly and futile. Throughout the latter half of the seventeenth century, the militias were unable to defeat the Maroons in the

forested mountains, because of the success these runaway slaves had in employing guerrilla tactics.

In the early eighteenth century, increasingly large numbers of British slaves found refuge in the mountainous interior. Leslie and Thurloe claimed that ‘some hundreds of them’ had run away from the plantations to join the Maroon groups, and that these escaped slaves had swelled their ranks to ‘several Thousands’.113 British officers estimated the strength of these early Maroons in the Blue Mountains at between one and two thousand.114 The colonial authorities employed ‘black shot’, African slaves accompanying expeditions against the runaways, but they also deserted in large numbers to join the Maroons.115 In the first few decades of the eighteenth century, the elected members of the Assembly complained that for years the parishes located nearby these Maroon communities suffered regularly from slaves who ran away in large numbers.116 The large number of slaves running away to join the Maroons were a constant drain on the resources of nearby planters, and they put pressure on their colonial administrators to resolve the issue.

The conflict intensified in the early eighteenth century as Maroons went on the offensive, and from their bases at both ends of the island they launched attacks on plantations throughout Jamaica. They killed whites, burnt estates, and captured and rescued blacks from slavery in a war that escalated in the 1730s and seriously disrupted the island’s sugar economy.117 In the second decade of the eighteenth century, Governor Sir Nicholas Lawes repeatedly complained of the ‘outrages’ committed by these Maroons on ‘remote settlements’.118 The Maroons had ‘grown very formidable in the North East, North West, and South Western districts of the island, to the great terror of his Majesty’s subjects in those

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113 Atkins, Voyage to the West-Indies, pp. 178-9; Leslie, New History of Jamaica, p. 76.
116 The Weekly Jamaica Courant, 11 February 1719.
118 CO 137/13, folio 193n, 6 December 1719, Nicholas Lawes to Colonial Office.
parts’. In 1737, the Jamaican legislature complained that ‘in the parishes of Clarendon, St Ann, St Elizabeth, Westmorland, Hanover, and St James’s, they were considerably multiplied, and had large settlements among the mountains, and least accessible parts.’\textsuperscript{119} This led to a flurry of activity in the Assembly of Jamaica, which passed 44 laws to deal with the Maroon threat almost every year between 1696 and 1734.\textsuperscript{120} Despite this exhaustive legislation, the colonial authorities were unable to remove the Maroon menace.

The colonial militias not only had to fight on two fronts, but also against Maroon warriors who exhibited signs of potential unity. A contemporary writer claimed that despite attempts by some Windward leaders to reach out to the Leeward Maroons for support, Cudjoe rebuffed this overture, because he did not believe he had enough food and water to support them. According to Knight, a party of Maroons crossed the island to enlist with the Leeward Maroons, but they were turned away by a Cudjoe who ‘was apprehensive that He had not sufficient Provisions to maintain Them’.\textsuperscript{121} The Maroon communities were not a united front, and the concept of a pan-African Jamaica was alien to the Maroons.\textsuperscript{122} However, information not previously utilised by historians shows that a significant force of Windward Maroons fought on the side of the Leeward Maroons up until Cudjoe signed the 1739 treaty. Lieutenant Francis Sadler, who was present at the treaty negotiations, reported meeting ‘Captain Cuffee and a Captain of the Port Antonio Gang, who had not long before join’d them with 100 Shott’.\textsuperscript{123} There is no evidence of Leeward Maroons returning the favour, but this incident shows that there was more cooperation between the Leeward and Windward Maroons than there was between Lubolo and de Serras. In addition to difficulties fighting in the mountainous forests, and the Maroon use of guerrilla tactics, the colonial

\textsuperscript{121} Knight, History of Jamaica, folio 275.
\textsuperscript{122} Zips, Black Rebels, p. 121.
\textsuperscript{123} CO 140/29, Jamaica Council Minutes, 18 February 1739, Lieutenant Francis Sadler to the Council.
militias now had to worry about the possibility of the eastern and western Maroons uniting against them.

The fighting throughout the 1730s was continuous, and even when the colonial militias achieved a victory, they were unable to inflict serious losses. Some historians claim that there was no fighting in 1736, but colonial records describe incursions that year. Leslie and Edwards claimed that the militia killed hundreds of Maroons when they captured Nanny Town, and most historians accept this narrative. However, Maroon oral historians say that only a small number of Maroons died in this attack. New evidence reveals that Captain Dwarris reported to the Assembly that in capturing Nanny Town, he only took a total of ‘six rebellious negroes, besides two which he avers were killed, but carried away by the height and rapidness of a river wherein they were shot’. The Windward Maroons only suffered a small number of casualties during the militia’s taking of Nanny Town, and they recaptured it shortly afterwards, but it changed hands several times during the course of the First Maroon War. Colonial officials grudgingly praised the warriors of Nanny Town as ‘the best fighting men’. Despite continuously fighting the Maroons throughout the decade of the 1730s, the colonial militias were unable to significantly reduce the numbers of Maroon fighting men.

The colonial authorities feared that the Maroons could form alliances with their European enemies and destroy the island’s economy. The conflict was proving to be expensive and futile, with some contemporary estimates putting the cost at over £200,000. Edwards later argued that the First Maroon War ‘caused several plantations to

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128 CO 137/21, folio 42, 7 October 1733, ‘The further interrogation of Sarra’.
be thrown up and abandoned, and prevented many valuable tracts of land from being
cultivated’. He said that ‘the white inhabitants wished relief from the horrors of continual
alarms, the hardship of military duty, and the intolerable burthen of maintaining an army.’

The governor and the Assembly wanted to resolve this internal conflict before the Maroons allied themselves with the hated Spanish enemy. According to John Atkins, the Maroons were ‘suspected of being encouraged and supplied with Powder and Arms from Cuba’. The planters feared that if they were unable to subdue the Maroons, they would ally themselves with the Spanish, and the cost to their sugar economy would be even greater.

Most of the fighting during the 1730s took place in the eastern end of the island, between the colonial militias and the Windward Maroons. Consequently, Knight and Kopytoff theorise that the less warlike Leeward Maroons were more susceptible to collaboration with the colonial authorities. This conclusion fails to acknowledge that the Leeward Maroons launched several raids against planters during the First Maroon War. Since the Cockpit Country had less rainfall, and suffered from more dry periods than the eastern mountains, the Maroons of the west had limited water supplies. Cudjoe’s Maroons had to be more selective about when they waged war, and from Gun Hill they could see all the way to the coast of Trelawny on a clear day, and avoid approaching colonial soldiers. The Leeward Maroons engaged in a smaller number of conflicts than their Windward counterparts in the Blue Mountains, largely because of a lack of water in their environment.

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132 The Importance of Jamaica to Great-Britain, Consider’d (London: A. Dodd, c. 1740), p. 17; JAJ, Vol. 3, 3 November 1733, pp. 210-1; Leslie, New History of Jamaica, pp. 76-7, 238; Atkins, Voyage to the West-Indies, p. 245; Hart, Slaves who Abolished Slavery, pp. 66-8; Campbell, Maroons of Jamaica, pp. 75-7; Carey, The Maroon Story, pp. 245-256.
133 Knight, History of Jamaica, folio 97; Kopytoff, ‘Jamaican Maroon Political Organization’, p. 88.
136 Interviews with Flagstaff oral historians Michael Grizzle and Michael Shaw on 27 April 2015 and 28 April 2015 respectively.
Cudjoe and his lieutenants in the Leeward Maroons accepted peace terms because they feared continued warfare might result in their eventual defeat. Decades after the 1739 treaty, Cudjoe admitted in a conversation with planter Edward Long that, when Guthrie offered a peace treaty, the Leeward Maroons were ‘hemmed in and closely beset on all sides; their provisions destroyed; and themselves reduced to so miserable a condition by famine and incessant attacks’. Long’s narrative is supported by the Maroon oral history, which says that during the First Maroon War, the Maroons were so wary about using fire and smoke they had to resort to eating raw food. The Jamaican colonial authorities were not aware of their distress when they sought peace with the Maroons. Long later said, ‘the extremity, however, of their case was not at that time known to the white inhabitants.’ The Leeward Maroons were under pressure with their limited food resources, and Cudjoe accepted the peace terms in order to preserve his communities.

The peace treaties of 1739 and 1740

When it became clear that the militias were not going to succeed in beating the Maroons, the colonial government decided to offer them treaties. The Maroon officers accepted the peace terms, because, from Lubolo to Cudjoe and Quao, they did not see themselves as liberators of slaves throughout Jamaica, but rather as leaders who wanted to protect the freedoms of the members of their respective towns. The stronger Leeward Maroons were able to bargain for more advantageous terms than the Windward Maroons, a fact that embarrassed the white planter elite, who later claimed that the Maroons were the ones who sued for peace.

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138 Bilby, True-Born Maroons, pp. 131-3.
The colonial authorities made the first overture of peace, because they were intent on coming to terms with the Maroons, and they targeted Cudjoe because he had emerged as the most powerful Maroon leader. Governor Edward Trelawny drew up a treaty for Cudjoe to sign, and he authorised Colonel John Guthrie to offer terms to the Leeward Maroons. A career soldier from Cornwall, Trelawny fought with Admiral Edward Vernon in his West Indian campaign. Guthrie was a survivor of the ill-fated Scottish settlement at Darien in Panama who settled in southwest Jamaica following a shipwreck when the settlers abandoned the colony. Guthrie attacked Cudjoe’s Town, took the settlement, and renamed it Trelawny Town, while Cudjoe and the Leeward Maroons withdrew further into the mountains of the Cockpit Country. Then, when Cudjoe engaged Guthrie in a skirmish, the militia colonel

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offered peace terms to the Maroon leader. Cudjoe was initially suspicious of Guthrie’s intentions, and did not respond to their first meeting. Guthrie reported that ‘he seemed inclinable to come to terms, but I could not prevail upon him to send one of his Peoples to me, and the rest of the Rebels were in places impossible for us to force any Advantages.’ Eventually, Cudjoe and his officers accepted the offer of peace after a second meeting, and began negotiating terms (see Figure Three). The colonial authorities chose to offer a treaty to Cudjoe, because they felt that they could not defeat the Leeward Maroons.

The admission that they could not defeat the Leeward Maroons embarrassed the colonial elite. Many white Jamaicans were not pleased that the authorities chose to agree peace terms with a community supposedly more primitive than their own. More than one contemporary writer lamented that the colonial elite had to offer peace terms to ‘a band of predatory savages in the act of rebellion’. Trelawny would not admit that his regime offered terms, and he instead claimed that the ‘rebels’ were the ones who asked for peace, an explanation put forward by Dallas. The Jamaican planters found it difficult to accept that a powerful European country such as Britain had to sue for peace with a group of escaped slaves. Consequently, planter writers propagated the tale that the Maroons, and not the colonial elite, were the ones to first broach the subject of peace.

Jamaica’s planter society narrated a story about Cudjoe subjecting himself to the militia officers. Writing half a century after the event, Dallas claimed that Cudjoe responded to the peace offer by ‘embracing Guthrie’s legs, kissing his feet, and asking his pardon’, and that the Leeward Maroon leader seemed ‘to have become humble, penitent and abject’.

143 O’Shaughnessy, An Empire Divided, p. 40.
145 Dallas, History of the Maroons, Vol. 1, p. 56.
146 Dallas, History of the Maroons, Vol. 1, p. 56.
Some historians argue that the colonial authorities probably fabricated this uncharacteristic behaviour by Cudjoe to restore their morale and to preserve their image of racial superiority. Leslie, who lived in Jamaica during the First Maroon War, wrote that ‘On a Promise of Freedom and Security, the Negroes laid down their Arms, and all to a Man cheerfully submitted.’ Guthrie’s deputy, Francis Sadler, said ‘Capt. Cudjoe danced and showed a great many antic tricks, fell at col. Guthrie’s feet several times, hugged him, and had a long conference with him, and so parted.’ Accompong Town’s oral history says that after Cudjoe and Guthrie agreed to the terms, they cemented them in traditional Maroon fashion, by mixing black and white blood in a calabash bowl, and drinking it with rum, much as the Maroons did in Surinam. Guthrie had to convince Cudjoe that their offers of peace were genuine, after which the Leeward Maroons leader embraced them as friends instead of as subjects.

Cudjoe suspected that the colonial authorities were keen on peace, and he used that knowledge to his advantage, negotiating changes to clauses of the 1739 treaty relating to keeping runaways. Guthrie had not gone to Cudjoe’s Town with a treaty in hand, and had to ask Governor Trelawny to dispatch a document to him. When Guthrie informed Trelawny that Cudjoe had agreed to peace, he added that the Leeward Maroon leader insisted that Guthrie ‘shall stay here in a peaceable manner with them for ten days by which time I hope to receive your Excellency’s Commands’.

149 CO 140/29, Jamaica Council Minutes, 21 February 1739, Lieutenant Francis Sadler to the Jamaica Council; Royal Gazette, 7 November 1795; Michael Mullin, Africa in America: Slave Acculturation and Resistance in the American South and the British Caribbean, 1736-1831 (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1992), p. 50. Sadler first made these entries during the First Maroon War, and the Royal Gazette reprinted them towards the end of the century, in the middle of the Second Maroon War, as the newspaper reminisced about peace with the Maroons. Mullin argues that Sadler’s narrative indicates that Cudjoe may have been under the influence of a bit too much rum at the time, or was performing a display of Kumina, or another Akan dance with similarities (Africa in America, p. 208).
151 CO 140/29, Jamaica Council Minutes, 18 February 1739, Guthrie to the Council.
proposal of Submission’, which insisted on freedom for all the Leeward Maroon warriors. Initially, Trelawny replied, saying that, ‘I do not hesitate as to giving him his freedom and a Tract of Ground, that I would likewise give liberty to those that were born in the Woods, but I cannot yet resolve to allow liberty to those that fled from Masters.’\(^\text{152}\) Cudjoe disagreed on that point, and forced Trelawny and his man on the ground, Guthrie, to revise that clause in the treaty.\(^\text{153}\) Trelawny and the Council suggested that Guthrie hint that ‘in making the Treaty that those Negroes who are willing to return to their Masters may have liberty so to do’. However, the Council eventually dropped that clause, instead accepting that ‘if the said John Guthrie and Francis Sadler cannot obtain all or any of these points that they make a Treaty with them notwithstanding upon the best Terms they can.’\(^\text{154}\) In effect, Trelawny and the Council were the ones suing for peace, and were prepared to make whatever concessions were necessary in order to end the conflict. Cudjoe signed his treaty with an ‘X’, indicating that he was unable to read the terms of the treaties.\(^\text{155}\) However, this did not hinder Cudjoe, who argued from a position of strength, and was insistent that all his warriors secured their freedom.\(^\text{156}\)

Once the colonial authorities had secured peace with the Leeward Maroons, they could demand more exacting terms from the Maroons in the eastern end of the island. The militia leaders informed the Windward Maroons that Cudjoe had signed a peace treaty. Most likely, the Windward Maroons had already heard about the 1739 treaty from ‘Captain Cuffee’ and members of the ‘Port Antonio Gang’ whom Sadler had reported meeting among Cudjoe’s fighters. There was a minor delay when the two British commanders quarrelled over who should actually sign the treaty. After that, Robert Bennett agreed peace terms with Quao, and they signed their own treaty in 1740, following which the commanders and

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\(^\text{152}\) CO 140/29, Jamaica Council Minutes, 23 February 1739, ‘His Excellency’s Answer to Col. Guthrie’s Letters’.


\(^\text{154}\) CO 140/29, Jamaica Council Minutes, 23 February 1739.


Maroon leaders ‘cut their fingers, and mixed their blood in a calabash bowl’. The colonial authorities were unable to defeat the Windward Maroons in battle, but once they had secured peace with the Leeward Maroons, they knew their eastern counterparts would feel compelled to follow suit.

The 1739 treaty gave Cudjoe permission to keep all Maroons who had joined his town before he signed the document, but the Windward Maroons were required to return all runaways who joined them in the three years prior to Quao signing the 1740 treaty. The planters of the Assembly subsequently complained that the treaty with the Windward Maroons ‘are more advantageous than those made with captain Cudjoe, as captain Quao is obliged to return all negroes that have gone to him within three years past, to their respective owners, and captain Cudjoe is not to return any, unless the negroes themselves desire it’. In a show of strength, Cudjoe insisted on keeping the recent runaways who had joined the western Maroons, and the militia leaders conceded on this point. Cudjoe negotiated changes to clauses in the 1739 treaty, after which he swore loyalty to the colonial elite, thus preventing Quao from securing similar concessions in the 1740 treaty.

The peace treaties enabled the colonial authorities to convert the Maroons into a de facto police force for the Jamaican state. Clauses six and seven of the 1739 treaty, and clause four of the 1740 treaty have received most attention from historians; these clauses called on the Maroons to fight on behalf of the colonial authorities against rebel slaves, other communities of Maroons not yet come to terms, and invading Europeans. They required the Maroons ‘to kill, suppress, or destroy…all rebels wheresoever they be, throughout this island, unless they submit to the same terms of accommodation’. The ninth clause of the first treaty and the fourth clause of the second treaty pointed out the responsibility of the

158 JAJ, Vol. 3, 16 April 1740, p. 513.
Maroons to retrieve runaway slaves, and that they ‘shall bring in such other Negroes as shall from Time to Time run away from their respective Owners’.\textsuperscript{159} In negotiating the 1739 treaty, Trelawny had asked Guthrie to point out to Cudjoe that if they were ‘usefull as they promise in marching against any Rebels that may for the future arise...they may receive pay for their Service’.\textsuperscript{160} Chapter Two will show that by providing an income to the Maroons through the suppression of slave revolts and the hunting of runaway slaves, the treaties provided the colonial elite an avenue through which their white superintendents could usurp the authority of the Maroon officers.

The attempts by the colonial authorities to regulate where the Leeward Maroons could live were less successful. Clause five of the 1739 treaty stipulated that they ‘shall all live together within the Bounds of Trelawny Town’.\textsuperscript{161} However, the 1739 treaty did not mention that Accompong Town, established and run by Accompong during the First Maroon War, also fell under the jurisdiction of Cudjoe, and Leeward Maroons continued to establish additional villages. Dallas observed that Trelawny Town officers Johnson and Andrew Smith set up satellite communities in Westmoreland in the latter half of the eighteenth century. According to Dallas, ‘Captain Johnson, a man of much weight among them, and Captain Smith, who, with their families, had been suffered to establish themselves on the back lands in the parish of Westmoreland, adjoining estates in the neighbourhood of which they lived very peaceably’. In addition, Dallas notes that ‘there were many other Maroons residing in Westmoreland’.\textsuperscript{162} Despite the clauses in the 1739 treaty regulating where the western Maroons could live, the Leeward Maroons continued to form their own communities outside of their official towns.

\begin{itemize}
\item[160] CO 140/29, Jamaica Council Minutes, 23 February 1739, ‘His Excellency’s thoughts upon Cudjoe’s proposal of Submission’.
\end{itemize}
The clauses in the treaties that had the most significant effect were the ones pertaining to the appointment of superintendents. The eighth clause of the first treaty stipulated that the Maroons had to hand over to the colonial authorities any white person who committed a crime against them. In the second treaty, there are clauses pertaining to mediation by representatives of the colonial authorities in disputes between Maroons and white hunters over wild game. In the second half of the eighteenth century, these representatives, called superintendents, used their power to pay for parties of Maroon warriors and hunters to suppress rebellions such as Tacky’s Revolt to usurp the authority of the Maroon officers. The treaties also enabled colonial authorities to establish control over Maroon justice. Chapter Two will show that a number of Maroons challenged this transfer of authority in the two decades that followed the signing of the treaties.

Conclusion

The forests in the mountainous interior of the island provided an excellent refuge for runaway communities to flourish, and the colonial authorities constantly struggled to overcome Maroon opposition. Agorsah’s archaeological evidence, supported by observations by contemporaries, shows that runaway Taino and West African slaves mixed in their Blue Mountain refuges. West African slaves of Akan origin dominated the runaways who joined the Maroon communities, and as a result, the Maroon culture adopted the language and customs of the Ashanti. After the Maroons signed peace treaties in 1739 and 1740, they highlighted their Taino ancestry, in order to distance themselves from the Akan roots of the slaves they later hunted.

While the Maroons of the 1730s lacked unity, there were instances of Windward Maroons fighting for Cudjoe in western Jamaica. During the First Maroon War, the conflict became more intensive and continuous with few successes for the militias. The Windward

164 Chapter Two, pp. 73-6.
Maroons conducted more fighting than Cudjoe’s men, largely because the wetter weather in the east gave them more reliable water supplies. The colonial authorities felt compelled to offer peace terms to the Maroons in order to prevent them from uniting and forming alliances with the Spanish.

When Cudjoe and Quao signed peace treaties with the colonial authorities, they were following the precedent set by Lubolo, who was the first Maroon to hunt runaways. When Guthrie approached Cudjoe with a peace treaty, the Leeward Maroon leader accepted mainly because his community was suffering from the stress of continuous warfare. Dallas claimed Cudjoe grovelled when offered terms, but the evidence shows that the Leeward Maroon leader was able to pressure the colonial authorities into changing clauses relating to the retention of runaways. Once the Leeward Maroon leadership agreed to terms, the Windward Maroons felt compelled to follow suit, and consequently their treaty did not allow for similar benefits to their recent runaways. Cudjoe negotiated for better terms for the Leeward Maroons who fell under his rule, but he showed no interest in securing similar benefits for Quao and the Windward Maroons. The Maroon leaders were more interested in preserving the freedom of Maroons in their own communities than in presenting a united front against the colonial authorities.

The British colonial authorities in Jamaica failed to defeat the Maroons in battle, but through the peace treaties they worked out a compromise that allowed them to assert their authority. The colonial elite and their white superintendents were not able to enforce a number of clauses concerning the way of life in the Maroon towns, but while the Maroons nominally gained their independence, in reality they became more dependent on the patronage of the colonial authorities. Cudjoe seemed to be concerned primarily with securing the freedom of his warriors, and not with maintaining the authority of his Maroon successors in the Leeward Maroon towns. Chapter Two will show that the Maroon officers eventually lost control of their towns as the superintendents usurped the power of the Maroon leaders who succeeded Cudjoe and Quao.
PART ONE: THE MAROONS IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY JAMAICA

CHAPTER TWO: SUPERINTENDENTS REPLACE MAROON LEADERS

This chapter will show that in accepting peace terms, the post-treaty Maroons eventually lost their independence and control of their respective Maroon towns to the representatives of the colonial authorities, the superintendents, who then proceeded to placate the Maroons whenever land disputes arose in the eighteenth century. The Windward Maroons of Charles Town and Scott’s Hall had a weak leadership structure, and the white superintendents usurped the authority of the Maroon officers following the Crawford’s Town uprising in 1754. Where the Maroon towns had strong leaders, such as Nanny, Cudjoe and Accompong, the colonial authorities waited for these leaders to die, and then seized control by using treaty clauses that gave them the authority to appoint successors. Chapter One explains that Cudjoe secured the freedom of his warriors by demanding changes to clauses in the 1739 treaty, but Chapter Two will show that he did not seem to be concerned about superintendents taking over the future leadership of Trelawny Town after his death. Once the superintendents took control of the Maroon towns, the colonial authorities sought to placate the Windward Maroons by disseminating favourable rulings whenever the inevitable land disputes arose with encroaching planters. The British colonial authorities in Jamaica, having failed to defeat the Maroons in battle, conquered them instead with peace treaties.

Mavis Campbell, Barbara Kopytoff, Kathleen Wilson and other historians point out that not all the Maroons accepted their new status as the island’s mountain police, and that rebellions occurred in Maroon communities in succeeding decades.165 However, this chapter

will argue that the Maroon leaders, and a large section of the Maroon population, were eager to work with the colonial authorities, and they helped to put down the uprisings. The Jamaican narrative claims that there was a division within the Maroon leadership over the wisdom of accepting the peace treaties. A myth has grown around one of the Windward Maroon leaders, Nanny, giving the impression that she did not cooperate with the colonial authorities, or approve of hunting runaway slaves and suppressing revolts.166 This chapter will present evidence to show that when Nanny received the approval of the colonial authorities to run Moore Town, she also followed Cudjoe’s lead and supported the colonial elite. The Maroon leadership and most of the Maroon membership supported the peace treaties.

Several historians, including Michael Craton, Campbell and Gad Heuman, argue that during this period the colonial authorities, through their superintendents, consistently undermined the authority of their leaders and restricted the Maroons and their privileges.167 Kopytoff, for example, points out that the after the treaties the superintendent took over the responsibility of coordinating military activities from the Maroon officers.168 On the other hand, Helen McKee states that powerful planters negotiated with strong Maroon leaders during the second half of the eighteenth century.169 However, McKee’s premise ignores the extent to which the superintendents usurped the authority of the Maroon officers. This chapter will present evidence to support the argument that the white superintendents took

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control of the Maroon towns, but will posit that the approach varied according to the strength of the Maroon leaders of their respective towns. In effect, Maroon officers became deputies to superintendents by the last quarter of the eighteenth century, when they no longer had any independent authority of their own.

Once the superintendents had taken control of the Maroon towns from the successors of Cudjoe and Nanny, the colonial authorities made concessions to the official Maroon towns whenever land disputes arose. A number of historians maintain that white planters regularly infringed on their lands, and that the colonial authorities supported this practice.\textsuperscript{170} However, this chapter will present evidence to show that whenever there were land disputes in the eighteenth century, the Assembly often sided with the Windward Maroon towns and Accompong Town. McKee states that it was surprising that in an island where violence was common, the colonial authorities were able to avoid conflict with the Maroons until war broke out with Trelawny Town in 1795.\textsuperscript{171} She notes the Assembly's concessions to land disputes concerning the Windward Maroon towns, but fails to distinguish between these resolutions and the lack of concessions to Trelawny Town.\textsuperscript{172} This chapter will argue that in contrast with their intransigence towards Trelawny Town, the colonial authorities accommodated the land demands of the Windward Maroon towns and Accompong Town in the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{173}

The colonial authorities rejected clauses that they deemed to be unhelpful, and they ignored or failed to implement other clauses that they felt were outside of their control. Daniel Schafer claims that the leadership succession followed the dictates of the treaty,

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{171}{McKee, ‘From violence to alliance’, p. 20.}
\footnotetext{172}{Helen McKee, ‘Negotiating Freedom in the Circum-Caribbean; The Jamaican Maroons and the Creek Nation Compared’, Ph.D. dissertation, (Newcastle: University of Newcastle, 2015), pp. 87-92.}
\footnotetext{173}{For the attitude by the colonial authorities towards Trelawny Town with regards to land disputes in the eighteenth century, see Chapter Four, pp. 126-133.}
\end{footnotes}
which outlined who could succeed Cudjoe in the Leewards, and Quao in the Windwards. This chapter will argue that subsequent governors discarded the clauses concerning the Maroon leadership succession, and they appointed their preferred candidates as Maroon officers, irrespective of the dictates of the treaties. Because the superintendents could offer payment for jobs, they were able to subvert any resistance to their usurpation of the authority of Maroon officers.

Maroon resistance to the peace treaties

The change in the status of the Maroons from enemies of the planter class to allies of the colonial elite was not a smooth one, and there were disagreements within the Maroon towns over the new alliance with the colonial authorities. While Cudjoe was able to strengthen his authority over Trelawny Town after putting down the Leeward rebellion, Quao lost control of his eastern Maroon town to the colonial authorities. Andrew O’Shaughnessy claims that the peace treaties were not popular with most Maroons, who were upset about constant encroachments on their land. However, while some Maroons opposed the peace treaties and rose up in revolt in the 1740s and 1750s, new evidence shows that a significant number on both sides of the island chose to ally themselves with the colonial authorities. Most of the Maroons upheld the peace brought about by the treaties, and the suppression of the Crawford’s Town uprising signalled the start of the white superintendents asserting their authority over Maroon officers. The colonial elite was able to use the Crawford’s Town uprising, where the leadership structure was weak, to stamp the authority of the superintendents on the succeeding Maroon communities of Charles Town and Scott’s Hall.

In 1742, the first challenge to the alliance between the Maroon leadership and the colonial authorities occurred among the Leeward Maroons, just three years after Cudjoe signed a peace treaty. According to James Knight, shortly after the First Maroon War a

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175 O’Shaughnessy, An Empire Divided, p. 40.
handful of Leeward Maroons rebelled and killed some white planters.\textsuperscript{176} Edward Long explained that there were reports of ‘disturbances...among the negroes at Trelawny Town’. This revolt was allied to a slave rebellion on a Colonel Forster’s plantation, but Cudjoe and Accompong ‘had notice of their designs, and immediately armed a sufficient number of the most faithful of their people, attacked the rebels, killed some, took others, and chased the rest home to their plantations’. They delivered the rebel slaves to the colonial authorities, and, ‘likewise such of their own people as they found concerned in the said rebellion’. The colonial authorities decided not to execute two of the Maroons involved in the revolt, and sent them back to Trelawny Town, probably seeking a reconciliation with the Leeward Maroons. However, Cudjoe opted for a more serious sentence, and hanged the two Maroons.\textsuperscript{177} Cudjoe executed the Maroons because they challenged his authority, so he used the revolt to strengthen his control of the Leeward Maroons and to emphasize his loyalty to the colonial state. In putting down the 1742 revolt, Cudjoe and his deputies showed that they were even willing to discipline Maroons who still harboured intentions of fighting on behalf of runaway slaves.\textsuperscript{178} A year later, the Assembly reported to its members that ‘a negro belonging to Cudjoe had enticed and seduced several slaves’, but that this Maroon was ‘pursued and killed’ by slaves belonging to a planter.\textsuperscript{179} The rebellions against Cudjoe showed that some Maroons in western Jamaica were still hostile to the white colonial authorities, but their numbers were small. The Leeward Maroon leaders were able to crush dissent and to cement their control of their respective Maroon towns, while maintaining their unswerving loyalty to the colonial authorities.

In the aftermath of the 1742 Leeward rebellion, the colonial elite worked with the Maroon leadership to maintain peace in the Maroon towns. The governors visited the

\textsuperscript{176} James Knight, \textit{The Naturall, Morall and Political History of Jamaica}, British Library, Add. MS 12431, folio 97.
\textsuperscript{177} \textit{Edward Long papers}, Add. MSS 12431, folio 95.
\textsuperscript{179} Journals of the Assembly of Jamaica (JAJ), Vol. 3, 20 April 1743, p. 619.
Maroon towns on an annual basis, in an attempt to ensure that the Maroons were content. In the early 1750s, Edward Trelawny toured the Maroon towns and he refuted ‘evil reports’ about potential discontent, insisting instead that there was ‘a good disposition in those people, for maintaining the peace’ and there was a ‘spirit of industry amongst them’.

Charles Knowles visited the Maroon towns in 1753, ‘distributed presents among them’, and ‘found they were extremely satisfied’. Neither governor realised that tensions were simmering in Crawford’s Town, or anticipated that it would explode in the form of a rebellion later that decade.

The Crawford’s Town uprising occurred partly because the white superintendent had usurped the authority of the Maroon officers, and partly because of the governors’ decision to override the 1740 treaty in appointing a more pliant Maroon officer in charge of the Windward Maroon town. Clause 14 of the 1740 treaty named Quao (Quaw) as the leader of the Windward Maroons, and his successors as Thomboy, Apong, Blackwell and Clash.

However, Edward Crawford emerged as the leader of the Maroon town named after him in about 1746, ahead of the four successors listed in the treaty, even while Quao and Clash were still alive. Edward Crawford was the first Maroon leader to take an Anglicized Christian name and surname, and the colonial authorities favoured him, while Quao represented a Maroon faction that wanted to re-establish the authority of the Maroon officers.

Nevertheless, the colonial authorities did not try to replace Cudjoe, Accompong or Nanny as the heads of their respective Maroon towns while they lived, probably because the loyalty they commanded from Maroon warriors in their respective towns was too strong. The

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180 JAJ, Vol. 4, 18 September 1753, p. 400.
181 CO 137/25, folio 313, 26 March 1753, Governor Charles Knowles to Colonial Office.
183 Some historians believe Edward Crawford was white (McKee, ‘From violence to alliance’, p. 4; Kopytoff, ‘Jamaican Maroon Political Organization’, p. 92), while Campbell is uncertain (Maroons of Jamaica, p. 169), but Carey (The Maroon Story, pp. 386-7) points out that the evidence shows that Crawford was a Maroon officer. John Kelly was the superintendent, and Crawford was the Maroon leader (Edward Long papers, British Library, Add. MS 12435, folio 19; JAJ, Vol. 3, 25 April 1741, p. 564, JAJ, Vol. 4, 30 April 1746, p. 38, 2 May 1749, p. 166, 19 April 1755, p. 508; CO 137/27, folio 146, 12 March 1754, Knowles to Colonial Office).
Maroon leadership in Crawford’s Town was weaker, which is why the colonial authorities felt strong enough to replace Quao with Crawford while he still lived.

In 1754, supporters of Quao murdered Crawford and burnt a large part of Crawford’s Town in an attempt to retake control of it from the white superintendents. Three white men were resident in Crawford’s Town when the uprising occurred, and according to Knowles, Quao’s Maroons ‘had seized on all the Arms, and detained the three White Men, and the well disposed Negroes Prisoners in the Town’. Crawford’s wife escaped and gave a similar account of the uprising to a planter named Colin McKenzie, who was also the commanding militia officer in the parish. Those ‘well disposed Negroes’ were the Crawford’s Town Maroons who supported the colonial authorities and opposed Quao’s takeover. Evidence not previously used by historians shows that Governor Knowles sent Lieutenant Ross to bring about a peaceful reconciliation, because he had previously spent several years residing in Crawford’s Town. However, Quao’s Maroons rejected his overtures, and Ross, a former superintendent, had to leave the town, taking the white men detained by the rebels.\footnote{\textsuperscript{184} H.P. Jacobs, ‘Roger Hope Elletson Letter Book 1766-1768’, \textit{Jamaican Historical Review}, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1946), p. 216; CO 137/27, folio 146, 12 March 1754, Charles Knowles to Colonial Office; JAJ, Vol. 4, 19 April 1755, p. 508. For a detailed list of the superintendents of the Maroon towns, see Appendix Two.} In the immediate aftermath of the uprising, Quao reclaimed control of Crawford’s Town and expelled the white superintendent and his deputies.

Quao’s assertion of Maroon authority ran into opposition not just from a significant number of Maroons in Crawford’s Town, but also from Maroons from neighbouring Windward towns. The Maroon supporters of the murdered Crawford, who made up the majority in that town, allied themselves with the colonial authorities. Ross assembled a force, including ‘some of the Crawford Town Negroes to the Number of twenty three’, and attacked the Maroon town. With the help of Maroons from New Nanny Town, and those who had already relocated to Scott’s Hall, Ross defeated Quao. His force captured ‘Capt. Quaw, Adago, Mingo and Dansu’, the last of whom was mortally wounded. Ross’s force killed and
decapitated Maroon officers Bogua, Pompey and Badou. Four of Quao’s other lieutenants escaped, but they later submitted themselves to Knowles.\textsuperscript{185} When Quao attempted to re-assert his authority over his Maroon town, he received significant opposition from Maroons within his own town as well as from other Windward towns, and they allied themselves with the superintendent against Quao.

The colonial authorities were more lenient with the Maroon rebels who laid down their arms than they were with slaves who rebelled. When Tacky’s Revolt occurred in the following decade, the colonial authorities executed and transported at least 600 rebel slaves.\textsuperscript{186} No Maroons were executed or transported in the aftermath of the Crawford’s Town uprising, and the governor pardoned the captured lieutenants of Quao.\textsuperscript{187} This revolt represented the last stand by Maroon officers against the increasing authority of the white superintendents, until the Second Maroon War of 1795-6.

![Maroon population 18th century](image)

Table Three: Maroon town population growth in the eighteenth century. In 1740, Crawford Town was the second largest Maroon town, behind Trelawny Town. By 1770, Charles Town was the second largest, and Scott’s Hall the smallest. These returns contradict Bryan Edwards’ assertion that the Maroons who came to terms numbered 1,600, when in fact they numbered just over 600 when the treaties were signed.\textsuperscript{188}

\textsuperscript{185} JAJ, Vol. 4, 19 April 1755, pp. 507-8; CO 137/27, folios 146-8, 12 March 1754, Knowles to Colonial Office.
\textsuperscript{186} Orlando Patterson, \textit{The Sociology of Slavery} (Kingston: Sangster’s, 1973), p. 271.
\textsuperscript{187} CO 137/27, folios 146-8, 12 March 1754, Knowles to Colonial Office.
\textsuperscript{188} \textit{Edward Long papers}, Add. MS 12435, folio 19; Lord Lindsay, \textit{Lives of the Lindsays; or, A Memoir of the Houses of Crawford and Balcarres} (London: John Murray, 1858), Vol. III, p. 52; JAJ, Vol. 6, 8 December 1770, p.
The distribution of Maroons between the two towns that replaced Crawford’s Town reflects the strength of opposition to Quao within that Windward Maroon town. When the Maroons abandoned Crawford’s Town, most of them relocated to Charles Town instead of Scott’s Hall. In 1749, Scott’s Hall had become a separate Maroon town when a group of 26 Maroons settled there, expressing dissatisfaction with Crawford’s leadership, ‘having been desirous…to live separately from the rest’. After the uprising, supporters of Quao moved west of Crawford’s Town to join the small community at Scott’s Hall, who already comprised Maroons opposed to Crawford. Entries in the *Journals* show that Charles Town was located near to the abandoned site of Crawford’s Town, and probably took the first name of Knowles in gratitude for the governor’s help in suppressing the revolt. Charles Town represented the supporters of Crawford and Knowles, while Scott’s Hall housed the opponents of Crawford and supporters of Quao. The inhabitants of Charles Town outnumbered that of Scott’s Hall, indicating that the supporters of Crawford, and by extension the colonial authorities, were significantly greater than the supporters of Quao (see Table Three). In 1770, the Maroon population of Charles Town was 226, while that of Scott’s Hall was only 42. During the Crawford’s Town uprising, the post-treaty Maroons who accepted the colonial elite’s imposition of the authority of the superintendents through the treaties outnumbered those who resisted it. In the second half of the eighteenth century, even the Scott’s Hall Maroons became loyal supporters of the colonial authorities, and the white superintendent asserted his control in that town as well (see Appendix One and Appendix Two).

In the aftermath of the Crawford’s Town uprising, all of the Maroon towns became loyal supporters of the colonial authorities, and that allegiance reflected their shift from Afro-


189 JAJ, Vol. 4, 16 October 1751, p. 288; CO 137/27, folios 146-7, 12 March 1754, Knowles to Colonial Office.


191 JAJ, Vol. 6, 8 December 1770, p. 311.
centric to Anglo-centric names for their towns. After the treaties in 1739 and 1740, the colonial authorities were unclear about exactly where the official Maroon towns were located. McKee believes that the colonial authorities established Moore Town in 1768, but there is evidence to show that its origins were much earlier. Planter records at the signing of the treaties indicate that the Windward Maroons lived in both Crawford’s Town and ‘Nanny Town’, which Maroons referred to as New Nanny Town, because it was not on the site of the original Nanny Town besieged during the First Maroon War.\footnote{192} The colonial authorities did not identify New Nanny Town as Moore Town until 1760, when the acting governor, Henry Moore, reportedly gave the town his name.\footnote{193} The official documents of the planters referred to ‘Nanny or Moore Town’, and Trelawny Town or Cudjoe’s Town, alternating between the English and Maroon names for the same town, before the English names prevailed in colonial records.\footnote{194} The names of the Maroon towns became Anglicized, as the Maroons aligned themselves with the colonial authorities.

Figure Four: The Maroon towns of Jamaica. The Windward Maroon towns are Moore Town, Charles Town and Scott’s Hall, while Accompong Town is located in the Leewards. Trelawny Town was renamed Maroon Town in the nineteenth century.

After the destruction of Crawford’s Town in the uprising, five official Maroon towns remained in Jamaica and the colonial authorities mapped out their locations. In the 1750s, Cudjoe and Accompong still ruled their Leeward Maroon towns, which were both located in the Cockpit Country of western Jamaica. Trelawny Town was in the mountains in the southern extremities of the parish of St James, close to the border of Westmoreland, and the colonial authorities renamed it Maroon Town after they deported the occupants of that town at the end of the eighteenth century. Accompong Town is just to the south of Trelawny Town, on the border between the south-western parishes of St Elizabeth and Westmoreland. The towns of the Blue Mountain range make up the Windward Maroons. Before its destruction in 1754, Crawford’s Town was in the Spanish River area of the parish of St George, now the western half of the modern parish of Portland. Most of Crawford Town’s population relocated to the new site of Charles Town, just three miles north of Crawford’s Town, while Scott’s Hall is located in central Jamaica, in the hills of the parish of St Mary close to the border with St Andrew (see Figure Four). Moore Town, the easternmost Maroon town, is in the Blue Mountains in the parish of Portland.

Cudjoe and Nanny: The strong leadership of the early post-treaty Maroons

The colonial elite recognised and accepted the authority of strong Maroon leaders such as Cudjoe, Accompong and Nanny while they lived, but the white superintendents usurped the authority of their successors in order to gain control of their towns. They were able to do this because the Maroons lacked unity, and their communities instead displayed a tendency to fragment. Cudjoe was the overall leader of the Leeward Maroons after the 1739 treaty, but gradually Accompong Town became an independent town, separate and apart from Trelawny Town. This centripetal process was also apparent in the Windward Maroons, where Quao was the leader of a group of Maroons who occupied the towns of central Jamaica, while Nanny emerged as the leader of Moore Town in the east. Eventually, the

196 Carey, The Maroon Story, pp. 413-5.
strong leaders of Moore Town and the Leeward towns lost their authority, and their successors took up subordinate positions to the superintendents.

The first generation of leaders of the post-treaty Leeward Maroons, Cudjoe and Accompong, ruled their respective Maroon towns with complete authority, which they highlighted by the clothes they wore. Wilson observes that the clothes of the Leeward officers were a mixture of British military attire and West African traditional garments, arguing that the Leeward Maroons leaders were proud of their military dress and medals, which signified their status as chosen subjects of the king.\(^{197}\) Thomas Thistlewood, who met Cudjoe in 1750, noted in his diary that ‘he had on a feather’d hat, Sword at his Side, gun upon his Shoulder…Bare foot and Bare legg’d, somewhat a Majestic look’.\(^{198}\) Three years later, Thistlewood encountered Cudjoe again, and described him as having ‘a beaver, feathered, and a large medal hung to chain about his neck’.\(^{199}\) In 1751, Thistlewood also met Accompong, whom he called ‘Capt. Compoon’, and described him as being ‘about my size, in a Ruffled Shirt, Blue Broad Cloth Coat, Scarlet Cuffs to his Sleeves, gold buttons…and Black Hatt, White linen Breeches puff’d at the knee, no stockings or shoes on’.\(^{200}\) Towards the end of the eighteenth century, the official Maroon leader of Scott’s Hall, also named Cudjo, was described by a visitor as wearing ‘a red coat, red breeches, a gold-laced hat, shoes, and no stockings: his wife had nothing on but an Oznabrig frock’.\(^{201}\) The clothes of these Maroon officers tended to be ostentatious, featuring gold buttons, scarlet cuffs, red coats, large medals, and feathered hats. However, the Maroon officers also displayed a distinct lack of clothing on other parts of their body, such as bare feet, no stockings, and a wife who was modestly dressed. The clothes worn by these Maroon leaders, and the

\(^{197}\) Wilson, ‘The Performance of Freedom’, p. 73.
\(^{199}\) Thistlewood, \textit{In Miserable Slavery}, p. 57.
\(^{200}\) Thistlewood, \textit{In Miserable Slavery}, p. 17; Burnard, \textit{Thomas Thistlewood}, p. 23.
\(^{201}\) J. B. Moreton, \textit{West India Customs and Manners} (London: J. Parsons, 1793), pp. 134-5.
absence of clothing in other areas, indicate a mixture of British and African attire, which reflected the dual influences these two cultures had on the Maroon leadership.

Unlike the Maroon officers, the colonial authorities, through their superintendents, could offer Maroons payment for jobs. In order to maintain the peace, the colonial authorities felt that they needed easy access to the Maroon towns, and Trelawny offered the Maroons a chance to earn an income building roads.202 In 1759, for example, the Maroons built a road from Titchfield on the north coast of Portland through Nanny Town to Bath on the east coast of St Thomas-in-the-East. However, the roads to the Maroon towns often fell into disrepair, and they were ‘in several parts, scarcely passable’.203 This new road passed close to Moore Town, and it allowed the Maroons to ‘give speedy protection to the estates on each side of the Rio Grande’.204 The roads served a two-fold role; the colonial authorities had easy access to the Maroon towns in case of disturbances there, but the roads also provided Maroon forces with a speedy route to assist the colonial militias. The colonial elite succeeded in getting these roads built by paying the Maroons for their construction, thus beginning the process of usurping the power of the Maroon officers.

The lack of certainty about when Cudjoe died is indicative of the declining importance of the Maroon colonel. Campbell believes that Thistlewood’s encounters in the 1750s came shortly before Cudjoe’s death, while an Accompong Town oral historian claims his death was before that decade, and other historians say he died in the 1770s.205 Actually, Cudjoe was alive in 1760, when Thistlewood wrote in his diary about his last meeting with him.206 Long referred to an incident in 1764, when a party of Trelawny Maroons led by Cudjoe entertained Governor Lyttelton. According to Long, after this ceremony, ‘Captain Cudjoe, in the name of

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202 CO 140/29, Jamaica Council Minutes, 23 February 1739, ‘His Excellency’s thoughts upon Cudjoe’s proposal of Submission’.
206 Thistlewood, In Miserable Slavery, p. 110.
all the rest, stood forth, and addressed His Excellency aloud, desiring the continuance of the
great King George’s favour and protection, and that His Excellency, as his vice-regent,
would administer right and justice to them.’\textsuperscript{207} It is likely that Cudjoe died shortly after this
entertainment, because at the end of 1764, Thistlewood reported receiving news that
‘Colonel Cudjoe is dead some time ago’.\textsuperscript{208} Cudjoe ruled his town while he lived, but the
uncertainty surrounding the date of his death suggests that the superintendent took control
of Trelawny Town in the latter stages of the strong Leeward Maroon leader’s reign.

The clauses concerning the Maroon succession ended up having no bearing on their
future leaders, but mainly because the colonial authorities ignored them and took control of
the appointment of Maroon officers. Clause 15 of the 1739 treaty listed Cudjoe as the leader
of Trelawny Town, and his successors as Accompong, Johnny, Cuffee and Quaco, in that
order.\textsuperscript{209} However, after the deaths of Cudjoe and Accompong in the years following Tacky’s
Revolt, the superintendents who now effectively ran the Maroon towns ignored this clause
and appointed a new generation of leaders. Once the colonial elite succeeded in replacing
the Maroon officers with superintendents, they disregarded the promises they made to the
Maroons regarding leadership succession in the treaties.

The colonial elite waited for Cudjoe to die, and they then took control of Trelawny
Town following a dispute over his succession. Upon Cudjoe’s death, there was a power
struggle between his brother-in-arms, Accompong, and the colonial authorities, over the
leadership of Trelawny Town. Kopytoff and Schafer misread the entries in Governor Roger
Hope Elletson’s letter-book, and erroneously believed that the colonial authorities had
deposed Accompong as the leader of the town named after him.\textsuperscript{210} Rather, the governor
wrote in his letter-book that Accompong had assumed Cudjoe’s badge and claimed

\begin{footnotes}
\item[207] Long, \textit{History of Jamaica}, Vol. II, pp. 348-9; Thomas Southey, \textit{The Chronological History of the West Indies}
(London: Longman, Ross, Brown, and Green, 1827), Vol. II, p. 381; Clinton V. Black, \textit{The History of Montego Bay}
\item[209] Dallas, \textit{History of the Maroons}, Vol. 1, p. 64; Campbell, \textit{Maroons of Jamaica}, p. 126.
\end{footnotes}
leadership of both Trelawny Town and Accompong Town. In effect, Accompong was simply adhering to Clause 15 in the 1739 treaty which named him as Cudjoe’s successor. However, Elletson discouraged any potential unification of the two Leeward Towns, and he instructed the superintendent of Trelawny Town, John James, to take the Trelawny Town badge away from Accompong, and give it to a Maroon officer named Lewis, who became the new Maroon colonel of that town. Elletson wrote in his letter-book that James was ‘to send to Accompong to deliver back to Colonel Lewis, Johny and Colonel Cudjoes Badges’. It appears Johnny, or ‘Johny’, was the deputy of Cudjoe as named in the treaty, and Elletson gave Lewis his badge too. Elletson even went on to tell James ‘to appoint Ashamboy, Yanow, Appia, and Appenna to be Lieutenants’. On Elletson’s instructions, James allowed Accompong to remain in charge of his town, but appointed a new Maroon commander in Trelawny Town, as well as his lieutenants. While Cudjoe was alive, he was in charge of that Leeward Maroon town, but when he died, the governor assumed the responsibility of deciding who was to become the new colonel of Trelawny Town. Elletson displayed his authority over Accompong by reversing the Maroon officer’s actions, disregarding the clause in the 1739 treaty, and giving the badge for Trelawny Town to a Maroon of his choice.

Figure Five: Headstone of Roger Hope Elletson, Bath Abbey, Bath. Photo by Emily Stanback, The Gravestone Project, 2012. Elletson was governor of Jamaica during the years 1766-7.

The colonial authorities took firm control of Accompong Town when that Leeward town’s leader passed away. When Accompong himself died, probably in the late 1760s or the early 1770s, the superintendent appointed his successors. Oral historians of Accompong Town and an anthropologist who visited the Maroon town present differing narratives on the succession to Accompong, but neither mention Crankey or Muncko. In 1773, the Journals of the Assembly of Jamaica reveal that ‘Old Johnny’ and ‘Old Quaco’, listed as being 66 years old, resided in Accompong Town, and the treaty listed them as successors to Cudjoe and Accompong. However, Superintendent Alexander Forbes disregarded the clauses and appointed the 60-year-old Captain Crankey and the 40-year-old Captain Muncko as officers in that Maroon town. Johnny was clearly not a favourite of Elletson, because the governor stripped him of his ‘badge’, which he gave to Lewis in Trelawny Town. Even though he lived in Accompong Town, Elletson again disregarded Johnny for Crankey and Muncko. Neither Crankey nor Muncko seemed to be in charge of the other, but both reported to Forbes. The same status existed for the next recorded leaders of Accompong Town, Austin and White, followed by captains Foster and Wright. On Accompong’s death, the white superintendent was in charge of the town, and there was a council of Maroon officers operating under him. The governors used the superintendents to disregard the succession outlined in the treaties for Accompong Town, and appoint their own favoured Maroon officers.

The Windward Maroons suffered from centripetal tendencies that militated against their ability to unite. On separate occasions in the 1730s, the colonial records identified a number of different leaders of the Windward Maroons, including Scipio, Cuffee, Guy, Goomer, Adou, Pompey and Old Nedham’s Cudjoe. One of these ‘head captains’ was killed

213 JAJ, Vol. 6, 26 November 1773, pp. 464-5.
214 Votes of the House of the Assembly (VHAJ), 1 November 1796, p. 16, 1818, Appendix XXV, p. 235, 1833, Appendix LVIII, p. 466.
fighting the militia before the First Maroon War ended. After the treaty of 1740, Quao and his people went west of old Nanny Town, and Nanny and her people went east of it to what would later become Moore Town. It is possible that Quao was a leader of the Windward Maroons in the western Blue Mountains, and that Nanny led Maroons in the east of the mountain range, before the First Maroon War. Once the conflict ended, these two leaders probably returned to take command of their pre-war communities.

Nanny was unusual in that she was a female leader in a male-dominated society, but historians have found it difficult to separate the myth of Nanny from the facts surrounding her life. There is even some confusion about when Nanny died. Historians admit there is very little about her in colonial records, and in his first book, written in 1969, Carey Robinson questions whether Nanny existed at all, given the paucity of information about her in the planter records. In 1975, just over a decade after Jamaica’s Independence, the government commemorated Nanny as a National Heroine and that resulted in some historians creating myths about this Maroon warrior. Historians, Windward Maroon oral chroniclers, and popular writers, including Robinson, then insisted that while Cudjoe and Quao signed treaties with the colonial authorities, Nanny and her allies opposed the concept

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217 At the height of the First Maroon War, the colonial authorities rewarded a slave called Cuffee for ‘having killed Nanny, the rebels (sic) old obeah woman’ (JAJ, Vol. 3, 29 March 1733, p. 121; Hart, Slaves who Abolished Slavery, p.80). This was probably another Nanny, since a number of Maroon women bore that name in subsequent returns, including some who were clearly alive in the 1730s (JAJ, Vol. 6, 22 December 1772, p. 465; VHAI, 26 July 1797, p. 12, 1804, Appendix LXIII, pp. 331-4).
of peace with the slave-owning British, and did not hunt runaway slaves. From the limited records that existed, popular historians forged a story about a female Maroon leader who resisted the institution of slavery in Jamaica.

The argument that Nanny opposed the treaties signed by Cudjoe and Quao respectively depends heavily on the reporting of Philip Thicknesse, a member of Bennett’s militia who witnessed the 1740 treaty. According to Thicknesse, Quao had confided in him that the Windward Maroons had received news from a white militia officer that Cudjoe had accepted peace teams, but when the Maroon warrior ‘consulted our Obea woman, she opposed the measure, and said, him bring becara for take the town’. Thicknesse went on to say Nanny ordered her supporters to cut off the head of the ‘becara’, the white officer. Thicknesse’s chronicle of Nanny is the only first-hand evidence of that Windward Maroon leader, and it describes her opposition to peace. However, Nanny’s violent opposition to the ‘becara’ occurred when the Windward Maroons were still at war.

Once the Windward Maroons agreed to peace with the colonial authorities, Nanny seems to have moderated her position, and she found an accommodation with the colonial authorities, in circumstances similar to those concerning Cudjoe and Quao. Some strands of Maroon oral history speak to Nanny reluctantly accepting peace with the British. While Nanny did not sign the 1740 treaty, she was clearly no longer at war with the British and accepted a patent of land that same year, for ‘negro Nanny and the people residing with her’, comprising ‘five hundred acres of land in the parish of Portland’. The people from this plot

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221 Philip Thicknesse, *Memoirs and Anecdotes of Philip Thicknesse* (Dublin: Craisberry and Campbell, 1790), pp. 73-4.


223 CO 137/21, folio 207, 31 January 1735, CO 137/55, folio 167.


of land later made up the community of Moore Town in the Blue Mountains, accepting more Maroons from nearby Nanny Town after it was deserted.\textsuperscript{226} However, the land patent also outlined her responsibilities to the colonial Jamaican authorities, stating that Nanny was required to ‘be ready to serve us’, in the event of ‘any insurrection, mutiny, rebellion or invasion’.\textsuperscript{227} Like Cudjoe, Accompong and Quao before her, Nanny had to find an accommodation with the colonial authorities.

\begin{figure}[h]
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\caption{A plaque commemorating Nanny of the Maroons. Designed by Compass Workshop, Kingston, 1999.}
\end{figure}

Moore Town was apparently ruled by more than one Maroon leader. In addition to Quao and Nanny, there was a third Windward Maroon leader named Welcome. At the end of the First Maroon War, a planter wrote that the majority of the Maroons in the Windward Maroons were Quao's people, and that they went on to reside at Crawford’s Town, while the Maroons at Nanny Town were under the command of Captain Welcome.\textsuperscript{228} It is possible that Welcome was the military leader, and that Nanny was responsible for spiritual matters in New Nanny Town, which later took the name of Moore Town. This Welcome appears in the Maroon oral histories as a ‘first-time leader’ who eventually returned spiritually to Africa after

\textsuperscript{228} Edward Long papers, Add. MS 12435, folio 19.
his death.\textsuperscript{229} Though Nanny and Welcome shared the leadership of Moore Town, they still provided stronger leadership than the Maroon officers in neighbouring Crawford’s Town. While Nanny and Welcome lived, the superintendents did not try to usurp their authority, probably because they commanded more authority than the other Windward Maroon leaders.

When Nanny and Welcome died, sometime before 1760, the superintendent took command of Moore Town. The Windward Maroon officers listed as the successors to Quao in the 1740 treaty were Clash, Thomboy, Apong and Blackwell, but aside from Clash the others did not feature among their leaders two decades later. By the time Tacky’s Revolt broke out in St Mary in 1760, the two Moore Town captains reporting to the superintendent were Clash and Sambo, but the latter, who did not feature in the treaty, seemed to be the favourite of the governor. Other Moore Town Maroon officers reporting to the superintendent during Tacky’s Revolt were all men, including George, yet another Cudjoe, and Lisbon.\textsuperscript{230} While a woman such as Nanny could hold a commanding position in a Maroon town that adhered to Akan customs, when Moore Town fell under the control of a white superintendent, Maroon women no longer shared in the leadership structure.

Clash failed in his attempts to challenge the authority of the superintendent of Moore Town. Kopytoff claims that Clash eventually took a group of discontented Maroons to Bath, where he formed a new, separate, independent Maroon community, free from the control of Superintendent Charles Swigle.\textsuperscript{231} However, Elletson’s letter-book shows that Governor Lyttleton had given Clash permission ‘to live at the Bath for the recovery of his Health’. In addition, only a handful of discontented Maroons followed Clash to Bath, and no Maroon community started there. In the 1760s, Governor Elletson ordered Clash ‘to return to Moore Town, and remain there as he formerly did’. Clash then got into a dispute with Sambo over

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{229} Bilby, \textit{True-Born Maroons}, pp. 73, 76-7.
\item \textsuperscript{230} JAJ, Vol. 5, 3 December 1760, p. 227; Campbell, \textit{Maroons of Jamaica}, p. 128.
\item \textsuperscript{231} Kopytoff, ‘Jamaican Maroon Political Organization’, p. 93.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
the Maroon leadership of Moore Town, but Elletson and the superintendent rebuked Clash for trying to take away Sambo’s badge. Governor Elletson emphasized his authority by stating that ‘Capt. Welcomes Badge I have kept for the present.’ Clash was apparently unhappy with Elletson’s treatment of him, so the governor then told the Maroon officer that ‘as he is desirous of leaving Moore Town, that he quits that part of the Island entirely and reside elsewhere’. Elletson’s authority over the successors of Nanny and Welcome, and disregarding the clause of succession in the treaty.

The governor promoted Sambo ahead of Clash, asserting his authority over the successors of Nanny and Welcome, disregarding the clause of succession in the treaty. The colonial authorities sought to appease the Leeward Maroons by freeing relatives of their leaders from slavery. Responding to a request from Cudjoe, the colonial elite freed one of his relatives, a slave named Molly, in a gesture the Assembly described as ‘a most agreeable present’ to Cudjoe and Molly’s father-in-law, Captain Crankey of Accompong Town. Governor Trelawny also paid the sum of £80 ‘for a negro fellow Tom, a son of captain Accompong’, as a present to the Maroon leader. The colonial authorities granted these gifts to ensure that Cudjoe, Accompong, and their officers remained loyal.

While Quao and Edward Crawford lost control of their Windward towns to white superintendents in the 1750s, Cudjoe, Accompong and Nanny were able to retain the authority of their towns while they lived. There is little information to explain why there was a difference between the power of the Maroon leaders of Trelawny Town, Accompong Town and Moore Town on one hand, and the other Windward Maroon towns on the other. This trio of leaders possibly exerted a hold on the leadership of their towns because they had strong personalities. Cudjoe illustrated this dominance by crushing the rebellion in Trelawny Town in 1742. However, when Cudjoe, Accompong and Nanny died, the white superintendents also took control of their towns. Their Maroon successors were unable to counter the money

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234 JAJ, Vol. 4, 13 July 1748, p. 133.
offered by the superintendents, and the authority these representatives of the colonial authorities wielded by virtue of being able to offer financial inducements.

White superintendents take control of the Maroon towns

When the militia commanders signed the treaties, the colonial elite accepted the authority of Maroon leaders such as Nanny, Cudjoe and Accompong over the white superintendents. The Jamaican colonial elite at first acknowledged that ‘two white Men are to live with them constantly, tho’ they are to be commanded by their own head Captain.’\(^{235}\) After these strong Maroon leaders died, the superintendents took over the reins of power. The treaties allowed the colonial authorities to appoint white men to official positions in these Maroon towns and thus gain control over them in a way they could not when they were at war. Dallas and John Oldmixon wrote that the colonial authorities wanted superintendents to be located in the Maroon towns in order to ensure that they remained the allies of the colonial authorities.\(^{236}\) According to Leslie, the planters now expected that the Maroon ‘Chief’ was ‘to do nothing without the Direction of the Governor of the Island’.\(^{237}\) These superintendents then used their ability to pay for militia service against slave revolts, and the hunting of runaway slaves, to usurp the authority of the Maroon officers.

When they signed the treaties of 1739 and 1740, the colonial authorities were not aware how many towns existed under the control of the Leeward and Windward Maroon leaders. The treaties required superintendents to reside at Crawford’s Town and Trelawny Town, which the colonial authorities believed were the capitals of the respective Maroon communities, and they initially neglected the other Maroon towns. Clauses 14 in the 1739 treaty, and three in the 1740 treaty, required the appointment of two white superintendents in Trelawny Town, and four white men in the Windward towns. The number of superintendents

\(^{235}\) The Importance of Jamaica to Great-Britain, Consider’d (London: A. Dodd, c. 1740), p. 20.


\(^{237}\) Leslie, New History of Jamaica, p. 288.
was greater amongst the eastern Maroons, because the colonial authorities realised that
there was more than one official Windward Maroon town, and they had not yet recognised
the existence of Accompong Town in the west. Even a decade after the destruction of
Crawford’s Town, the *Journals* still referred to ‘Colonel Cudjoe and Captain Quaw, and the
several negroes under their command, in Trelawny and Crawfords Towns’. The stated aim of
these appointments was to ‘maintain a friendly correspondence’ with the Maroons.238 After
the treaties, the colonial authorities first sent a number of white representatives to Trelawny
Town and Crawford’s Town, until they eventually realised that they should do the same to
the other towns.

Initially, the colonial authorities sent white representatives to Trelawny Town and
Crawford’s Town, but by mid-century they began to dispatch them to the other Maroon
towns. In 1740, the governor sent four white men each to Trelawny Town and Crawford’s
Town.239 William Russell, the surgeon who was commended for bravery during Guthrie’s last
campaign against Cudjoe, was a member of the first group of four white men assigned to
Trelawny Town.240 In the 1750s, one of the four white men assigned to Trelawny Town,
George Currie, eventually took up residence in Accompong Town.241 The patent to Nanny
and her people required them to ‘keep and maintain five white men on the said land’.242
When these white representatives took up residence in the Maroon towns, no one was in
charge of the other.

The colonial authorities gradually revised the role of their white representatives, and
when Tacky’s Revolt occurred, one superintendent was in charge of each Maroon town.
After the Crawford’s Town uprising of 1754, the planters in the Assembly passed a law

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238 JAJ, Vol. 5, 31 October 1764, p. 480; Dallas, *History of the Maroons*, Vol. 1, p. 64; Campbell, *Maroons of
Jamaica*, pp. 128, 135.
239 JAJ, Vol. 3, 1 May 1740, p. 525.
241 JAJ, Vol. 4, 2 November 1752, p. 360. See Appendix Two.
enshrining the authority of a single white superintendent. With this law, the colonial elite sought to transfer the authority of the Maroon officers to their superintendents, and thus establish control of the Maroon towns, ensuring they did not again rise in revolt and threaten the prosperity of the island’s planter class. The Maroon leaders did not oppose the law, and they seemed to be more concerned about securing their freedom, than in enabling their Maroon successors to counteract the growing influence of the superintendents.

Within a generation, superintendents usurped the leadership of the Maroon parties through their use of pay packets. Evidence not previously used by historians shows that the Maroon response to Tacky’s Revolt and subsequent rebellions highlighted the change of leadership that occurred in the Maroon towns. In 1760, Tacky’s Revolt threatened the security of Jamaica, and the white superintendents, rather than the Maroon officers, commanded the Maroon contingents that came to the aid of the colonial elite. Superintendent Swigle had overall leadership of the Windward Maroon parties against the slaves, and ‘commanded several parties of the maroon negroes against the rebels’. The Maroon officers reporting to the Moore Town superintendent were Clash and Sambo from Moore Town, Quaco and Cain, the nominal Maroon leaders of Charles Town, and Cudjo and Davy, the official Maroon leaders of Scott’s Hall. In 1766, two years after the death of Cudjoe, the governor ordered Superintendent John Scott of Trelawny Town ‘to send a party of the Maroon Negroes from Trelawney Town to Colonel Lewis at Cornwall Estate’ to suppress rebellions in western Jamaica. That same year, Superintendent George Raxtead, and not an ageing Accompong, led the Accompong Maroons against the rebels in Westmoreland. The performance of the Maroons under the leadership of the superintendents against the rebellions of the 1760s helped to convince many planters that

244 JAJ, Vol. 5, 3 December 1760, pp. 226-7, 4 December 1763, p. 433; Vol. 7, 16 December 1783, p. 644.
246 JAJ, Vol. 6, 28 November 1766, p. 10. See Appendix Two.

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the Maroons could be trusted. Unlike the Maroon officers, the superintendents paid
Maroons to suppress slave revolts, and they used this financial authority to stamp their
control over their towns. By 1760, the Maroon officers were effectively junior to the
superintendents.

In the smaller towns, the colonial authorities sometimes saw no need to appoint any
Maroon subordinates. By the end of the eighteenth century, there was no Maroon officer
listed in Scott’s Hall. Cudjo and Davy had died before 1796, when the returns showed that
the superintendent ruled the smallest official Maroon town without any Maroon deputies. Where there was more than one Maroon captain, the returns from the Maroon towns no
longer mentioned which Maroon was in charge. For a number of years in the late
eighteenth century, superintendents ruled Scott’s Hall without the nominal assistance of a
Maroon officer.

The superintendents gave the Maroons opportunities to earn money selling crops
and hunting runaways. In the second half of the eighteenth century, the superintendents
provided Maroons with tickets that allowed them to go into other towns and communities and
sell their produce. Maroons also assisted superintendents such as John James, who
hunted runaways throughout Jamaica, and beyond the island’s borders. A planter named
Richard Martin hired Major James who ‘accordingly went to the coast of Cuba, where he
found the said slaves were’. James used his Maroons to hunt these slaves, and for their
efforts, the Assembly allocated the payment to ‘major John James, commandant of the
maroon-towns, the sum of 100l. in full for the hire of (Maroon) negroes’. According to
planter Bryan Edwards, ‘they were chiefly induced to remain quiet by the great

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248 VHAJ, 1 November 1796, p. 17.
249 JAJ, Vol. 6, 8 December 1770, p. 311, 26 November 1773, p. 465.
250 JAJ, Vol. 9, 23 March 1796, p. 467.
encouragement that was held out to them for apprehending fugitive slaves.\textsuperscript{252} The superintendents used payments for hunting runaways and the dispensation of tickets to markets to tighten their grip over the Maroons. Consequently, these Maroons transferred their authority from their Maroon officers to the superintendents who could provide them with an income.

When the strong Maroon leaders became old, the superintendents usurped their judicial authority. Clause 12 of the 1739 treaty and the tenth clause of the 1740 treaty gave the respective Maroon leaders the right to administer justice to their Maroon subjects, but subject to the approval of the colonial authorities.\textsuperscript{253} When Cudjoe ruled Trelawny Town, he presided over the administration of justice, such as after the 1742 rebellion, when he sentenced Maroons who disobeyed him to death. By the 1770s, the balance had shifted, and when the Assembly passed laws concerning Maroons, they instructed the superintendents to read them out and explain them to the Maroons.\textsuperscript{254} Superintendent-general Robert Brereton reported how, under his authority, ‘Mary’s Cudjoe, one of the maroon negroes, was tried and ordered to be transported, for behaving in a most rebellious manner to one Mr Orr, of St Elizabeth’s.’\textsuperscript{255} According to the oral history offered by Moore Town Maroon Colonel Wallace Sterling, if a member of their eighteenth century community committed murder, the Maroons handed him over to the colonial authorities in Port Antonio to face justice. In practical terms, Moore Town did not have the facilities to lock up a Maroon for a custodial sentence, so the Port Antonio prisons benefitted the Maroon leadership too.\textsuperscript{256} After the deaths of Cudjoe, Accompong and Nanny, the superintendents assumed the administration of justice without opposition from Maroons.


\textsuperscript{254} JAJ, Vol. 6, 21 December 1774, p. 566.

\textsuperscript{255} JAJ, Vol. 6, 26 November 1773, p. 466.

\textsuperscript{256} Interview with Moore Town Colonel Wallace Sterling, 22 April 2008, African-Caribbean Institute of Jamaica (ACIJ) archives.
When a Maroon crisis threatened to disrupt the tranquillity of the island, the colonial authorities feared a return to the warfare of the past and responded with a show of strength to discourage the Maroons from taking up arms. In 1774, a Scott’s Hall officer named Davy, who made his name hunting Tacky, was leading a team of Maroons who were scouring the arid, unsettled area of Healthshire (modern-day Hellshire) for runaways, when there was an altercation with a white captain. One of Davy’s men, Sam Grant, a Maroon from Charles Town, allegedly killed a captain of a Bristol ship named Townshend and a black slave belonging to a Captain Thompson, after which he then fled to one of the Windward Maroon towns. Evidence not utilized by historians shows that Brereton travelled to Moore Town, where he faced down an ‘open rebellion…whereupon it became very hazardous to venture to go amongst them to execute the said orders’. Admiral George Rodney was in Kingston at the time, and he sent a fleet to Port Antonio in anticipation of a Maroon revolt. Brereton then secured the arrest of Grant by warning the Moore Town Maroons of the ‘evil consequences they would bring upon themselves by a refusal’. Brereton set up a tribunal in the Maroon town, and ‘by the Maroons there, he was declared guilty, and sent down to Spanish Town’. The circumstances had changed considerably since 1742, when Cudjoe oversaw the trial and hanging of Maroon rebels. Now that the superintendent was in charge of the administration of justice in the Maroon towns, he was able to use a show of force to persuade the Maroons that they had to comply with colonial law.

The colonial authorities were still wary of ensuring the Maroons themselves did not become discontented with the new regime, so, unlike free coloureds and blacks, a Maroon could expect equitable justice from the Jamaican law courts. When the Jamaican courts tried Grant, they acquitted the Maroon of the murder of a white man, a verdict that surprised a

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258 O’Shaughnessy, An Empire Divided, p. 147.


number of planters. Dallas complained that ‘he was acquitted upon a doubt of his intention to murder, on discharging his gun in the unusual position of placing it across his arm bent, although the muzzle of the piece nearly touched Captain Townshend’s thumb, which it blew off, and could not have been of course three feet from his throat, when the charge entered.’ Dallas was incredulous that the courts acquitted Grant of murder charges, alleging that ‘it will scarcely be doubted that every point was stretched in Grant’s favour.’ Grant returned to Charles Town, where he rose through the ranks of the Maroon officer class, eventually becoming a major and nominally leader of the Maroon town, a post he held for many years. It is hard to imagine a black slave or free coloured escaping execution in the manner of Grant for killing a white man. In the eighteenth century, free blacks rarely received fair justice in the Jamaican courts. It is possible that the Spanish Town court granted him a favourable verdict in order to ensure that the incident did not disrupt the peace and tranquillity of the relationship between the Windward Maroons and the colonial authorities.

The first superintendents were subordinate to Maroon officers such as Cudjoe and Accompong so they did not receive good wages, but when the superintendents began to usurp the power of the Maroon officers the colonial authorities improved their salaries. At the beginning of the 1750s, William Trower at Crawford’s Town received the paltry sum of £25, at a time when the Maroon officers were still in charge of their towns. Edwards complained that ‘the office of superintendent…was commonly bestowed on persons of no education or consequence’. In 1763, when the superintendents had taken command of all the official Maroon towns, the Assembly saw fit to raise the salary of Trelawny Town’s superintendent to £100 a year. In the 1770s, the colonial authorities formalised the structure, allowing for one superintendent and one subordinate assigned to each town. New evidence shows that

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their annual salaries were fixed at £300 for the Trelawny Town superintendent, and £200 for the other superintendents, except for the smallest town of Scott’s Hall, where the salary was, for a short period of time, only £100 a year.\textsuperscript{266} The colonial authorities improved the remuneration of the superintendents when they usurped the authority of the Maroon officers, giving them the financial independence they needed to run the Maroon towns in the eighteenth century. Despite their increased authority, the superintendents took care to ensure that land disputes were resolved to the satisfaction of the Maroons, in order to keep the peace in an island that was prospering more than it was before the treaties.

Land disputes

After the Maroons and the colonial authorities signed peace treaties, the island economy continued to thrive, which resulted in planters seeking to increase production. Before 1740, land near the Maroon communities was in hostile territory. After the treaties, planters sought to expand their holdings in parishes that were now available for settlement; south St James, north Westmoreland and St Elizabeth, south St George, and most of Portland. In converting this virgin land into sugar and coffee estates, planters inevitably became embroiled in disputes with Maroons. However, the Assembly strove to resolve the land disputes concerning Charles Town, Moore Town and Accompong Town to the satisfaction of the Maroons. Edwards, who was also an MP in the House of Commons, said ‘they never asked a favour of government or of the assembly that was refused them.’\textsuperscript{267} Despite the planters’ desire to secure more land for plantations, the Assembly was keen on maintaining peaceful relations with the Maroons.

Jamaica’s sugar and coffee industries provided important exports to Britain in the seventeenth century, but their value increased throughout the eighteenth, after lands formerly under the influence of the Maroons became available for settlement. In the decades

leading up to the First Maroon War, the British rated the Caribbean colonies, and Jamaica in particular, as their country’s most significant overseas investment. After the peace treaties, West Indian sugar surpassed linen as the most valuable British import in the mid-eighteenth century, and the coffee imports from the region increased in importance too. In 1776, Adam Smith observed that ‘the profits of a sugar plantation in any of our West Indian colonies are generally much greater than those of any cultivation that is known either in Europe or America’. In 1784, Arthur Young claimed the sugar colonies ‘added above three million (pounds) a year to the wealth of Britain’. The number of sugar works on the island more than doubled from 180 to 377 in the three years immediately after the peace treaties. There were 419 sugar mills in Jamaica in 1739, but in half a century that number had soared to 1,061. From 1740 up until 1776, the number of plantations increased by an impressive 45 per cent, and the aggregate value of Jamaica’s annual exports quadrupled to £2.4 million. In 1739, Jamaica exported just over 33,000 hogsheads of sugar, but by 1774 that total was up to over 78,000 hogsheads, in addition to copious quantities of rum and molasses. By the time the Second Maroon War broke out in 1795, Jamaica’s economy had become so valuable that the governor expressed fears about ‘the preservation of seventy millions of British capital’. In the second half of the eighteenth century, Jamaica

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enjoyed a period of peace that contributed to the growth of the island’s sugar and coffee industries, and their wealth and importance to Britain soared.

The Maroon treaties was one of a number of factors that contributed to the increasing economic importance of Jamaica after 1740. Vincent Brown and Audra Diptee argue that the economic success of Jamaica was largely due to the peace treaties signed with the Maroons.276 During the First Maroon War, planters lamented their inability to take advantage of the fertile areas in the northeast because ‘the rebellious Negroes were seated near it’. One of the governors complained ‘that the Inhabitants have been destroyed, and wholly driven from their settlements, from Manchinele Bay to Port Antonio’.277 However, after the peace treaties, the colonial authorities boldly proclaimed that ‘the Reduction of the rebellious Slaves, gave us the earliest Presages of Future Happiness and Security’.278 A contemporary writer predicted that the ‘North-side…now that the Negroes are come in, will be made as good as most Parts of the Island’.279 According to Long, ‘this contest, which, while it lasted, seemed to portend nothing less than the ruin of the whole colony, became productive of quite contrary effects in the end.’ The planter added that ‘we may date the flourishing state of (the economy) from the ratification of the treaty’.280 Planters in Jamaica capitalised on the peace that followed the treaties to expand their sugar and coffee plantations in areas of the island that were previously under the control of the Maroons.

After 1740, planters established estates in these virgin parishes, in the areas surrounding the Maroon towns, and this led to conflicts with Maroons over land. According to Long, after the treaties, ‘the island has been increasing in plantations and opulence’.281

276 Diptee, From Africa to Jamaica, p. 10; Brown, Reaper’s Garden, p. 15.
279 The Importance of Jamaica, p. 8.
Planters in the central parishes of Clarendon and St Ann took advantage of this peace to settle in Pedro’s Valley, ‘which was formerly a place frequented by, and the harbour for, rebellious and runaway negroes’. Planters established estates in New Liguanea, which was ‘formerly the haunts of runaway and rebellious slaves’, where they were able to plant coffee on very fertile land. At the end of the century, planters from the parishes of St George, Portland, Port Royal and St Andrew still sought to develop land ‘lying between the maroon-towns of Charles-Town and Nanny-Town, where the chief hunting-grounds of the maroons lie’. The expansion of the plantation economy to the virgin territory surrounding the Maroon towns created tensions between planters and Maroons, and the Assembly often had to mediate in these disputes.

Historians differ on the outcome of rulings by the Assembly on land disputes between planters and Maroons. Craton, Campbell and Dridzo argue that the Assembly took the side of the planters in land disputes, and turned down all the Maroon claims. They focus primarily on the Maroons of Trelawny Town, and do not discuss the experiences of the Maroons of Accompong Town and at those Maroon towns in the eastern end of the island. However, McKee observes that the Assembly made concessions to the Windward Maroons over land disputes. By focussing mainly on the failed land claims of Trelawny Town, most historians have neglected the land disputes that occurred in the four other Maroon towns, and the way the colonial authorities sought to resolve these issues to the satisfaction of the Maroons.

The first disputes between planters and Charles Town occurred because the colonial authorities had not mapped out the Maroon land allocation, but the Assembly acted quickly to resolve the issue. There was no clause in the 1740 treaty either recognising a Windward
Maroon town, or specifying how much land the colonial authorities were allocating to the eastern Maroons. Unsurprisingly, it did not take long for disputes to arise between planters and Maroons in eastern Jamaica. Just over a decade after the colonial authorities resettled most of the Maroons of Crawford’s Town at Charles Town, those Maroons complained ‘of encroachments on their lands’. In 1770, a planter protested that the colonial authorities had built the relatively new Maroon town on land that was legally his. John Henderson claimed he was ‘entitled to a run of land in the parish of St George, on a part of which land the maroon negro-town, named Charles-Town, and a part of the provision-grounds belonging to the said town, are situate’. Once the Assembly ascertained that Henderson’s claim was true, they decided ‘it would be more eligible to purchase of the proprietor, at a reasonable valuation, than to suffer the maroons to be again removed from their settlement’. The Assembly paid Henderson £412 for 206 acres of land, which they allocated to Charles Town. The Assembly then had the lands of Charles Town and Scott’s Hall surveyed to prevent these problems from occurring again. The Assembly acted quickly to resolve the dispute with Henderson, and they purchased the land from the planter on behalf of the Charles Town Maroons.

McKee notes that planters became embroiled in further land disputes with Moore Town and Charles Town towards the end of the eighteenth century, but the colonial authorities also resolved them to the satisfaction of the Maroons. In 1781, the Moore Town Maroons expressed suspicions about surveyors sent by the Assembly, and, ‘as often, prevented the surveyors from proceeding upon this business’. Neighbouring planters accused the Maroons of wanting to ‘set up a boundless and arbitrary claim to all lands situate in the neighbourhood of their town, in order...to discourage settlers from coming near the town, that they may thereby have a boundless range for the purpose of hunting’.

287 Dallas, History of the Maroons, Vol. 1, p. 60; Campbell, Maroons of Jamaica, p. 127.
288 JAJ, Vol. 6, 30 October 1770, p. 283; McKee, ‘From violence to alliance’, pp. 5-6.
289 JAJ, Vol. 6, 31 October 1770, p. 284, 10 November 1770, p. 292.
290 JAJ, Vol. 6, 9, 22 December 1775, pp. 610, 629.
When the Assembly investigated the issue, they found out that of the 1,000 acres promised to Moore Town, they were only allocated 500, and the Maroons of that Windward town were understandably not pleased. The Assembly then made up the deficiency by purchasing some more land from a nearby planter, Charles Douglas, who went on to become superintendent of Moore Town a year later.\textsuperscript{292} The Assembly then donated this land to Moore Town. In 1782, John James, who was superintendent-general of all the Maroon towns at the time, had to intervene at Moore Town and Charles Town in an ‘endeavour to settle the disputes between the maroons and the proprietors of different estates in those neighbourhoods’.\textsuperscript{293} The Assembly resolved a dispute with Moore Town by doubling their allocation of communal land, but conflicts between the Windward Maroons and planters continued throughout the second half of the eighteenth century. The Assembly often resolved these conflicts to the satisfaction of the Charles Town and Moore Town Maroons, so these complaints did not boil over into open conflict.

The first dispute in western Jamaica occurred because of an oversight in the 1739 treaty, which only recognised the existence of Trelawny Town in western Jamaica, and the Assembly was proactive in finding a solution. The third clause allocated 1,500 acres of land surrounding that official Maroon town to the Leeward Maroons, but nothing specifically to Accompong Town.\textsuperscript{294} Campbell is the only historian to observe that there were land disputes affecting Accompong Town, but she does not realise that they were resolved in favour of the western Maroon town.\textsuperscript{295} The colonial authorities did not recognise the existence of two separate Leeward Maroon towns until 1756, when they acted on a complaint from Accompong Town Maroons, surveyed the 1,500 acres belonging to Trelawny Town, and allocated an additional 1,000 acres solely to Accompong Town.\textsuperscript{296} In 1784, however, Samuel Hill Smith claimed that the colonial authorities had included 376 acres of his own land in the

\textsuperscript{292} JAJ, Vol. 7, 18 December 1781, p. 437; McKee, ‘From violence to alliance’, p. 6. See Appendix Two.
\textsuperscript{293} JAJ, Vol. 7, 4 December 1782, p. 522.
\textsuperscript{294} Dallas, History of the Maroons, Vol. 1, p. 60; Campbell, Maroons of Jamaica, p. 127.
\textsuperscript{295} Campbell, Maroons of Jamaica, p. 182.
\textsuperscript{296} JAJ, Vol. 4, 24 September 1756, p. 602, 26 October 1756, pp. 644-5.
Accompong Town allocation.\textsuperscript{297} Once again, the Assembly paid off the planter with ‘the sum of 500l. as a compensation from 376 acres of land, included within the lines of Accompong’s Town’.\textsuperscript{298} The Assembly then donated the land they purchased to the Maroons of Accompong Town. When the Accompong Town Maroons expressed displeasure over the land allocated to Trelawny Town, the Assembly gave them an additional 1,000 acres.

In the latter half of the eighteenth century, planter incursions on Maroon lands created a number of tensions in western Jamaica, but the colonial authorities resolved these disputes to the satisfaction of the inhabitants of Accompong Town. In 1758, James Smith complained to the Assembly that Accompong Maroons were planting provisions on his land. Consequently, the Assembly resolved the issue with a financial offer and reported that ‘James Smith, being called into the committee, agreed to sell the said fifty-nine acres, for the use of the said Accompong’s Town.’\textsuperscript{299} Alexander Forbes, who was superintendent of Accompong Town, was one of the planters who continued to buy land near to this western Maroon town, which he would then sell to the Assembly for the use of the Maroons.\textsuperscript{300} In 1784, Superintendent-General John James had to visit the superintendent there in order ‘to settle and adjust some disputes that were rising to an alarming height between some of the inhabitants of the said parish, and the maroon residents there’. The Assembly again sent out a surveyor to run the lines of Accompong Town.\textsuperscript{301} It was difficult work, because the Maroon towns were located in hard-to-reach mountain districts, and one surveyor ‘lost a horse to excessive fatigue’.\textsuperscript{302} Land disputes occurred from time to time around Accompong Town, but the Assembly acted to ensure that the Maroons of this western town were satisfied with their resolutions. Whenever there was a dispute between the planters and the Maroons of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{297} JAJ, Vol. 8, 30 November 1784, p. 33.
\item \textsuperscript{298} JAJ, Vol. 8, 18 December 1784, p. 74.
\item \textsuperscript{299} JAJ, Vol. 5, 24, 31 October 1758, pp. 84, 89.
\item \textsuperscript{300} JAJ, Vol. 6, 7 December 1775, p. 608.
\item \textsuperscript{301} JAJ, Vol. 8, 29-30 November 1786, p. 197, 13, 27 December 1787, pp. 337, 353.
\item \textsuperscript{302} JAJ, Vol. 11, 15 October 1807, p. 576.
\end{itemize}
Accompong Town, the Assembly purchased the disputed land in question, and donated it to that Leeward Maroon town.

Conclusion

In the two decades that followed the treaties, Maroon leaders experienced challenges from Maroons because they were now allies instead of enemies of the white planter class. However, the Maroon leaders were able to draw on significant support from other Maroons under their command to put down these revolts. Cudjoe used his suppression of the 1742 revolt to strengthen his authority in Trelawny Town, but when the colonial authorities put down the Crawford’s Town uprising of 1754, the white superintendents usurped the power of the Windward Maroon leaders.

While strong Maroon leaders such as Nanny, Cudjoe and Accompong ruled the towns of Moore Town, Trelawny Town and Accompong Town, Maroon officers remained in command of their communities. These Maroon leaders accepted treaties with the colonial authorities, which provided an income for their Maroons. Nanny, like Cudjoe and the other Maroon leaders, had to find an accommodation with the colonial authorities, and that meant helping to suppress slave revolts and hunt runaways. When they died, the next generation of Maroon officers lost control of their towns to white representatives of the colonial authorities. Nanny, Cudjoe and Accompong were all dead by the 1770s, by which time the superintendents had taken control of the three remaining Maroon towns.

The superintendents, acting on instructions from the colonial authorities, wrested control of the Maroon towns from their officers mainly to ensure that they never again rose up in revolt against the planter class. By taking command of the Maroon towns, they were in a position to subvert potential challenges to colonial authority, and established a leadership structure that excluded Maroon women from any further involvement in leading the Maroon towns. The superintendents commanded Maroon parties during Tacky’s Revolt, even while Cudjoe and Accompong were still alive. These superintendents used their ability to pay for
militia duty against slave revolts and the hunting of runaways, to take the towns’ leadership away from the Maroon officers. The superintendents usurped the administration of justice, but Maroons arguably received a fairer hearing than most black or coloured Jamaicans in the courts of the eighteenth century. The colonial authorities paid superintendents poorly during the decades they reported to the Maroon officers, but once they had taken control of the Maroon towns by the last quarter of the eighteenth century, they had significantly improved their pay packets.

With the superintendents in control of the Maroon towns, the planters were able to extend their economic influence into areas previously beyond their control. The treaties of 1739 and 1740 brought peace to the island, and planters used the opportunity to settle on fertile lands that bordered the Maroon towns. This inevitably led to disputes between planters and Maroons that could have escalated into conflicts. However, the colonial authorities went out of their way to resolve these disputes in favour of the Windward Maroons and those of Accompong Town. A deviation from this policy of appeasing the Maroons, especially concerning Trelawny Town, eventually led to the Second Maroon War at the end of the eighteenth century. While the colonial elite and their superintendents were able to address the concerns of most of the Maroon towns over land, they were less successful in their efforts to compensate Maroons for hunting runaway slaves.
PART ONE: THE MAROONS IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY JAMAICA

CHAPTER THREE: SLAVE REVOLTS AND RUNAWAYS

This chapter will argue that while the Maroons effectively suppressed slave revolts after the treaties of 1739 and 1740, they were less efficient in hunting runaways. Once the Maroons signed the treaties, the colonial authorities called on them to help put down subsequent slave rebellions, and maintain the fragile status quo in the island. The treaties also required the Maroons to hunt runaways. Most historians who study the Maroons maintain that they were able to prevent slaves from escaping to the mountains in the last century of slavery and that they were effective in eliminating communities of runaways. Instead, the evidence shows that the Maroons were not successful in curbing the numbers of runaways, who continued to form communities throughout the second half of the eighteenth century.

In the century between the English conquest of Jamaica in 1655, and the peace treaties of 1739 and 1740, Jamaica experienced a significant number of slave revolts, which contributed to the rise of Maroon communities in the mountainous interior. Orlando Patterson observes that, before the treaties, Jamaica and Brazil were the two colonies that experienced a more continuous stream of intense slave revolts than any other colony in the New World. Historians including Mavis Campbell, Michael Craton, and Eugene Genovese

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304 Patterson, Sociology, p. 273.
agree that most of the slave revolts in Jamaica occurred in the decades leading up to the signing of the Maroon treaties.\textsuperscript{305} Richard Sheridan shows that slaves outnumbered their white owners by more than ten to one in the eighteenth century, and that this numerical imbalance contributed to the unstable situation.\textsuperscript{306} Consequently, Christer Petley points out that the slaveholders saw uprisings as serious challenges to their fragile social order and authority, and they often suppressed these rebellions with great brutality.\textsuperscript{307} A number of historians argue that despite this brutality, the slaves were never completely subdued and resisted in a variety of ways, including running away.\textsuperscript{308} Those who ran away on a long-term basis became Maroons, who later resorted to violent resistance in order to protect their freedom.

There was only one major rebellion in the second half of the 1700s, but Tacky’s Revolt of 1760 was arguably the biggest challenge mounted by rebellious slaves in the British West Indies in the eighteenth century. Craton, Campbell and Richard Hart agree that the Maroon response to Tacky’s Revolt was the biggest test of their loyalty to the colonial authorities. The Maroons lived up to expectations, efficiently assisting the colonial militias in suppressing Tacky’s Revolt, as well as a number of subsequent further rebellions across the island during the rest of that decade, and this chapter will support this argument.\textsuperscript{309} Patterson posits that the period of relative peace that followed was largely the result of the

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Maroons assisting the colonists to avert further rebellions.\textsuperscript{310} Helen McKee suggests that the colonial authorities preferred a Maroon police force, because it was cheaper than maintaining a standing army.\textsuperscript{311} While the militias and the slaves who made up the ‘Black Shot’ were only summoned in times of need, the Maroons were a standing army that supplemented small regiments of British soldiers, which swelled during wartime. While the Maroon response to Tacky’s Revolt and its aftermath convinced most planters that these Maroon communities would be reliable allies against slave rebellions, the Maroons were less efficient in hunting runaways.

This chapter will present evidence to show that the Maroons did not hunt runaway slaves in significant numbers between the signing of the treaties in 1739-40 and Tacky’s Revolt in 1760. Campbell, Daniel Schafer and Hart believe the Maroons started hunting individual runaways in significant numbers as soon as they signed the treaties.\textsuperscript{312} Craton states that only a minority of Maroons were required to hunt runaways at any one time, while McKee explains that the Maroons hunted escaped slaves more extensively after the 1760s.\textsuperscript{313} This chapter will build on McKee’s work to show that the Maroons only became more engaged in hunting runaways after Tacky’s Revolt, when the Assembly improved their compensation package.

Even when the colonial authorities attempted to address issues of financial remuneration, the Maroons had limited success hunting runaway slaves. Sheridan claims that the colonial authorities effectively sealed off the interior of the island as a refuge for runaways when they signed treaties with the Maroons.\textsuperscript{314} Patterson states that after 1740 there were no longer any opportunities in the interior of the country for future runaways,

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{310} Patterson, Sociology, p. 281.
\bibitem{313} Craton, Testing the Chains, p. 93; McKee, ‘From violence to alliance’, p. 12.
\bibitem{314} Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, p. 221; Sheridan, ‘Caribbean Plantation Society’, p. 408.
\end{thebibliography}
because the Maroons were now on the side of the whites.\footnote{Patterson, Sociology, p. 279.} However, Patterson and Campbell both admit that after the Maroons accepted peace terms from the white colonial authorities, some escaped slaves were still able to form communities, but they claim that their numbers were small.\footnote{Patterson, Sociology, pp. 263-4; Campbell, Maroons of Jamaica, pp. 157-9.} These historians were not aware that Ancoma and Three-Fingered Jack formed communities of runaways, and that these groups continued to thrive for years after the Maroons killed their leaders. This chapter will present evidence to show that these runaway communities troubled the colonial authorities for a number of years in the second half of the eighteenth century.

population. Barry Higman points out that by the end of slavery itself in the 1830s, planters had only classified about one per cent of the slaves registered to owners as long-term runaways on an annual basis. It is telling that only a small percentage of slaves chose to form their own independent communities in the mountainous interior of the island. However, small though the percentage was, given that the slave population of Jamaica was in excess of 300,000, this still meant that from year to year, up to 3,000 slaves were classified in one way or another as long-term runaways. This chapter will show that these runaways continued to form communities in the forested mountains of the interior, despite the presence of the Maroon towns. The Maroons were less effective in hunting runaways than they were in putting down slave revolts.

Maroons suppress eighteenth century slave revolts

During the First Maroon War of the 1730s, the runaway slaves who made up the Maroon communities of the island’s mountainous interior were adversaries of the white colonial elite, but the post-treaty Maroons became willing soldiers for their former enemies. In the second half of the eighteenth century, they crushed rebellions mounted by their former allies, the black slaves. However, the partnership was a problematic one. The Maroons had difficulty winning the complete trust of the planters, and even after Tacky’s Revolt, some planters still viewed the Maroons with suspicion, largely because they had been adversaries in the past. The Maroons were also discontented with the Assembly’s repeated failure to pay for services rendered on a timely basis, and this affected their willingness to fight for the colonial authorities.

While historians agree that the Maroons effectively crushed slave rebellions when they occurred, they differ on when they first demonstrated their loyalty. Only Schafer, Hart, Craton and Bev Carey highlight the fact that from as early as 1745, the Windward Maroons

assisted the colonial authorities in putting down a small slave rebellion.\textsuperscript{321} Campbell was unaware of the role the Windward Maroons played in suppressing this revolt, when she advanced the theory that the Leeward Maroons were more willing to put down slave rebellions than their eastern counterparts.\textsuperscript{322} In 1745, the Windward Maroons proved how loyal they were to the colonial elite when they put down a little-known rebellion in the south-eastern parish of St David.

Officers from the militia and not the Maroon towns commanded Maroon parties against runaway slaves as early as five years after the treaties. Shortly after he personally signed the treaty with Quao, Colonel Bennett raised a ‘party of forty shot’ from the official Maroon town of Crawford’s Town to track down ‘the runaway negroes, who had made a new settlement upon Yallahs-River’. There, the parties, including Maroons from eastern Jamaica, ‘surrounded the rebel negroes’ and captured them. Bennett commended the Windward Maroons, saying that they were superior to the other parties raised for the purpose.\textsuperscript{323} It is possible that Maroon leaders such as Nanny approved of the use of her Maroons to suppress this slave revolt since she was probably alive when this rebellion occurred. It is likely that a majority of the Windward Maroons supported the new command structure, much as they did in response to the Crawford’s Town uprising a decade later, when Quao’s attempts to regain control proved to be futile.\textsuperscript{324} The colonial records and the Maroon oral history do not tell us how the Maroons felt about this new arrangement, but the absence of significant opposition seems to indicate that they saw this new hierarchy as an opportunity to earn an additional income. Five years after the treaty with the Windward Maroons, Bennett had begun the process of usurping the authority of Quao by offering something the Maroon


\textsuperscript{322} Campbell, \textit{Maroons of Jamaica}, pp. 155-6.


\textsuperscript{324} Chapter Two, pp. 54-7.
officer could not. The rank-and-file post-treaty Maroons had become foot soldiers in the British army, receiving pay for services rendered in the suppression of slave revolts.

The post-treaty Maroons accepted that the governor was at the top of the command structure, representing the British monarch in Jamaica, and that the next line of command was the superintendent. The new leadership structure was illustrated in 1766, when Governor Roger Hope Elletson issued orders to Scott’s Hall’s superintendent, Benjamin Brown, ‘that you send a Party consisting of Twenty four Maroon negroes from Scotts Hall to be at Major McLean’s House’, where they would be incorporated into the officer’s militia. Elletson added that ‘in case you cannot furnish such a Number of Shot from Scotts Hall you are then to send the inclosed letter to Mr Ross the Superintendent of Charles Town for him to assist you in making up that Number.’325 The Maroon officer, a colonel or captain, who was in command of the Maroon town before the treaties, now reported to the superintendent, who answered to the governor. Superintendent-general Robert Brereton expected as much loyalty and discipline from his Maroons as he would his white militia soldiers.326 The Maroons fought alongside the white militia against slave rebellions, and appeared to have no difficulty accepting the authority of the white superintendent.

Tensions arose between the Windward Maroons and the colonial authorities over unpaid bills, which led to them demonstrating a reluctance to fight for the colonial elite. In 1760, Tacky led a Coromantee rebellion that involved over a thousand slaves, and this revolt resulted in the deaths of about 60 whites and hundreds of blacks, as well as the execution and deportation of hundreds more black slaves.327 Governor Henry Moore sought to trap Tacky’s St Mary rebellion in the middle, by ordering Maroons from Scott’s Hall to attack ‘by another road from the Eastward’, while a party of Leeward Maroons ‘were directed to enter by the west’.328 Edward Long complained that the Scott’s Hall Maroons, who were the first

326 Chapter Two, pp. 74-5.
327 Patterson, Sociology, p. 271.
party to arrive, ‘under pretence that some arrears were due to them, and that they had not been regularly paid their head-money allowed by law, for every runaway taken up, they refused to proceed against the rebels, unless a collection was immediately made for them’. While the Windward Maroons had no difficulty accepting the authority of a white superintendent instead of a Maroon officer, they showed discontent over delays in outstanding payments.

Historians believe that the Scott’s Hall Maroons were the only ones to complain about pay issues during Tacky’s Revolt. Campbell posits the view that because Long presented no evidence of discontent among the Leeward Maroons, this was proof that the Windward Maroons were less enthusiastic about fighting Tacky’s men than their western counterparts. McKee suggests that the best relationship between the Maroons and white planters occurred in the western parishes of St James and Trelawny. However, evidence not previously used by historians from the Journals of the Assembly of Jamaica shows that the relationship between the Leeward Maroons and neighbouring planters and the colonial elite was no different to that of their Windward counterparts. The Leeward Maroons also demanded the resolution of outstanding payments before they agreed to fight for the colonial authorities against Tacky and his rebels. In letters written to the Assembly, Captain James Crean reported to the Assembly that in Westmoreland the Leeward Maroons were not happy when the colonial authorities summoned them, and they ‘were somewhat discontented and mutinous’. The Leeward Maroons demanded higher pay than the ‘slave shot’, and they ‘behaved well, but seemed to be discontented for want of their money, and at other times refused to go out against the rebels’. Maroons in both parts of the island were not happy with the way the Assembly paid them for hunting runaways in the two decades after the

330 Campbell, Maroons of Jamaica, pp. 155-6; McKee, ‘From violence to alliance’, p. 4.
331 JAJ, Vol. 5, 12 November 1761, p. 284.
signing of the treaties. The militia officers had to resolve issues of pay for both the Leeward and Windward Maroons before employing them in fighting Tacky and his slave rebels.

The Assembly paid the Leeward Maroons better possibly because of their efficiency and the greater number of rebellions they faced in the western end of the island in the decade that followed Tacky’s Revolt. In 1760, the Assembly acknowledged debts of 228l. 4s. 4d. due to the windward-town negroes, for their pay whilst employed in parties, during the late rebellion in St Mary’s. In comparison, ‘the charge of the parties fitted out from the leeward negro-towns, for the like service, will amount to a much larger sum, and that the sum of 500l. annually appropriated for the use of parties, will not be sufficient for that purpose.’ A generation later, a planter in western Jamaica named Samuel Vaughan reminisced that ‘in the rebellion of 1766, the maroons brought in the head or the person of every slave in rebellion in the space of a month’. The uprising in Westmoreland was crushed by a party ‘composed chiefly of maroon negroes’ from Accompong Town. The Leeward Maroons were ruthless and efficient in suppressing the revolts of the 1760s, and that may have contributed to their comparatively large pay packets.

The Assembly continued to be tardy in paying the Maroons promptly for services rendered during the suppression of Tacky’s Revolt and during its aftermath, which led to more Maroon complaints about pay. There were outstanding sums owed to the Windward Maroons, such as Charles Town leaders Yaw (Yeaow), Frank and Quashey, for capturing runaway slaves who were a part of Tacky’s Revolt and delivering them to the ‘Kingston Gaol’. In the mid-1760s, Elletson expressed concern over the delays taken in resolving this issue, insisting that ‘they may be paid what-ever it shall appear they are entitled to

332 Craton, Testing the Chains, p. 137.
334 JAJ, Vol. 9, 22 September 1795, p. 373.
receive’. The financial records of the Journals reveal that these debts carried over from one year to the next, and ended up amounting to more than a thousand pounds. It took until the 1780s for the Assembly to pay off those debts for services rendered during Tacky’s Revolt. The Assembly’s delays in paying outstanding bills concerning Tacky’s Revolt eventually contributed to the lukewarm efforts of the Maroons in hunting runaway slaves.

Figure Seven: A plaque commemorating Tacky’s Revolt. Located in Port Maria, St Mary.

Planners praised the Maroons for their efficient response in helping the militias to put down Tacky’s Revolt. Long commended the fighters from the official Maroon towns, who ‘contributed their share towards the speedy suppression’ of Tacky’s Revolt, adding that ‘the seeds of rebellion were in a great measure rendered abortive, by the activity of the Marons (sic), who scoured the woods, and apprehended all straggling and vagabond slaves.’ Even Bryan Edwards, who occasionally described the Maroons in negative terms, admitted

that ‘the Maroons, in suppressing the revolt of 1760, was considered, at the time, in a very favourable point of view’.\footnote{Bryan Edwards, \textit{The Civil and Commercial History of the British West Indies} (London: T. Miller, [1801] 1819), Vol. I, p. 233.} Long reported that ‘Tacky, their leader, having separated from the rest, was closely pursued by lieut. Davy of the (Scott’s Hall) Marons, who fired at him whilst they were running at full speed, and shot him dead.’\footnote{Long, \textit{History of Jamaica}, Vol. II, p. 457; Craton, \textit{Testing the Chains}, p. 136; Gott, \textit{Britain’s Empire}, p. 32.} The Maroons eventually defeated and killed Tacky, who later became a hero in independent Jamaica (see Figure Seven). Tacky’s Revolt was the most dangerous slave uprising in the British West Indies, until Sam Sharpe’s rebellion in 1831-2, and it was an opportunity for the Maroons to take the side of black slaves and overthrow the white regime. However, when the Maroons turned up to fight on the side of the colonial authorities, once pay disputes were settled, they proved to the colonial elite that the government of Jamaica could rely on them to help the militias suppress slave rebellions on their behalf.

Despite their efficient response to Tacky’s Revolt, planters such as Edwards were suspicious about the loyalty of the Maroons in the years that followed. Planters accused the Maroon warriors of cowardly behaviour during the course of the fighting against Tacky. In 1796, the main criticism came from Edwards, an MP who told the House of Commons that, in his recollections of the 1760 Rebellion in St Mary, ‘I became acquainted with these people, and I soon observed that they were suspicious allies, and would, some time or other, become very formidable enemies’.\footnote{T.C. Hansard, \textit{The Parliamentary History of England} (London: T.C. Hansard, 1818), Vol. XXXII, p. 1226.} The Jamaican planter complained that some Maroons produced a collection of human ears that they had taken from already dead slaves, falsely claiming payment for rebels killed.\footnote{Edwards, \textit{Proceedings}, pp. xxxvi-xxxvii.} However, Edwards formulated his arguments 36 years after the event, during a parliamentary debate on the Second Maroon War with William Wilberforce, when the abolitionist was criticizing Jamaican planters for failing to Christianise and ‘civilise’ the Maroons.\footnote{Olwyn Blouet, ‘Bryan Edwards and the Haitian Revolution’, \textit{The Impact of the Haitian Revolution in the Atlantic World}, ed. by David Geggus (Columbia: University of South Carolina, 2001), p. 47.} Edwards was born in 1743, and was just a teenager when
Tacky’s Revolt occurred in 1760, so his recollections could have been coloured by experiences in the decades that transpired between this rebellion and his speech in the House of Commons. Edwards, who had also written an uncomplimentary narrative of the Second Maroon War, and was a member of the West India Lobby, argued that the Maroons were a cowardly, untrustworthy race, who did not deserve the same rights as white men.\textsuperscript{346} It is possible that Edwards fabricated this argument in an attempt to counter the abolitionists in their drive towards ending slavery.

White Jamaican planters criticized Maroon tactics during Tacky’s Revolt, but their approach reflected a lack of understanding of guerrilla warfare. Theodore Foulks, a nineteenth-century writer, stated that the Maroons lacked courage, and were only successful before the treaties because they ‘never ventured to attack the British troops in open country, but taking advantage of fastnesses and defiles, often poured a destructive fire on their enemies’.\textsuperscript{347} Edwards claimed that during the course of fighting Tacky’s rebel slaves in 1760, British soldiers mocked the Maroons, because ‘immediately on the attack, the whole body of them had thrown themselves flat on the ground, and continued in that position until the rebels retreated’.\textsuperscript{348} In contrast, Maroon oral historians express pride in their mastery of these tactics.\textsuperscript{349} The Maroons were better exponents of guerrilla tactics than the white militia, and this was one of the main reasons why the colonial authorities were unable to defeat them.\textsuperscript{350}

There were divisions between members of the planter class over the loyalty of the Maroons during the second half of the eighteenth century. In 1766, slave informers told


\textsuperscript{347} Theodore Foulks, \textit{Eighteen Months in Jamaica; With Recollections of the Late Rebellion} (London: Whittaker, Treacher, and Arnott, 1833), p. 88.


\textsuperscript{350} Craton, \textit{Testing the Chains}, p. 131.
elected members of the Assembly that the Maroons had made a deal with the leaders of a slave conspiracy to ‘divide the country they had conquered, among themselves’. They also claimed that ‘the maroons had made choice of the woods and uncultivated parts, which they preferred as being most proper for hunting in.’

In the 1770s, planters accused the Maroons of being involved in more slave conspiracies. Some white planters dismissed these reports, with Long pointing out that ‘the account of the defection of the Maroons was so improbable, that the white people would not give any credit to it’. Long had an admiration for warriors who could fight in the forests and mountains, which he demonstrated when he expressed his wonder at the silent tracking methods used by Indian trackers in their pursuit of the Maroons in the 1730s.

In 1790, the wealthy planter William Beckford, a cousin of Long’s wife, took a different view from his in-law, and accused the Maroons of still providing safe havens to some runaways. In 1792, as civil war raged in neighbouring St Domingue, a Jamaican governor once again expressed ‘doubts of the loyalty of the Maroons’. Despite Maroon support to the colonial authorities during and after Tacky’s Revolt, planters still questioned the loyalty of the Maroons throughout the second half of the eighteenth century. The Maroons believed that they had proven their loyalty to the colonial authorities, but sections of the planter class still distrusted them, and this uneasy alliance eventually exploded in the form of the Second Maroon War in 1795-6.

While the Maroons helped the colonial authorities to crush the 1760s rebellions, they could not subdue the spirit of independence that lived on long after they had killed Tacky himself. As long as 40 years after the revolts of the 1760s, newly arrived slaves knew all

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356 CO 137/90, folio 404, 2 February 1792, Balcarres to Colonial Office.
about Tacky, and these rebellions served as an inspiration to them.\textsuperscript{357} For example, towards the end of the eighteenth century the Assembly reported that two slaves named Daniel and Harry took inspiration from Tacky’s rebellion and murdered their owner, William Thompson, in St Thomas in the Vale. The courts executed one of them for his crime while the other committed suicide before he could stand trial.\textsuperscript{358} Even though the Maroons had helped to defeat Tacky’s Revolt, the memory of this rebellion lived on among the slaves. This was the most dangerous slave revolt since the signing of the treaties and both the Leeward and the Windward Maroons responded with their support, helping to suppress the rebellion. However, while the Maroons were efficient in putting down revolts, they had less success in hunting runaway slaves.

The Maroons as hunters of runaways

In much the same way some Maroons chose not to come to terms in the seventeenth century, other runaways stayed at large in the eighteenth. The colonial authorities employed the Maroons who had signed the treaties of 1739 and 1740 to disperse communities that had similar origins to their own.\textsuperscript{359} Members of the planter class accepted that the Maroons were better than the white militias at guerrilla warfare and fighting in the forests of Jamaica, and they propagated the view that black warriors were more racially suited to the wild terrain of the Blue Mountains and the Cockpit Country. During the First Maroon War, Tobias Finch told the Assembly the Maroons were able to live in ‘thickets and woods’ that were ‘inaccessible to white men’.\textsuperscript{360} However, the evidence reveals that Maroons had limited success in hunting runaways. The Maroons only started hunting runaways in large numbers in the decade following Tacky’s Revolt, but the colonial authorities struggled to find a system of paying Maroons promptly. The Maroons consequently became less efficient in hunting

\textsuperscript{358} Votes of the House of the Assembly of Jamaica (VHAJ), 23 November 1799, p. 90.
\textsuperscript{360} JAJ, Vol. 3, 26 March 1736, p. 339.
runaways than they were in suppressing slave revolts, and unsurprisingly in the second half of the eighteenth century runaway slaves were still able to form communities in the mountainous interior.

Despite rewards offered by the treaties of 1739 and 1740 for the apprehension of runaway slaves, there were few instances of Maroons hunting them in the two decades before Tacky’s Revolt. In the 1740s, Charles Cobbett described a group of 20 slaves from Kingston and Port Royal, who fled to the mountains, ‘committing many Murders with Impunity’. They successfully resisted the soldiers and militia sent against them ‘till they were first routed by the late rebellious Negroes that submitted in 1739’. In 1754, Thomas Thistlewood wrote about ‘a white man, with Wild Negroes armed, and 2 Baggage Negroes, from Trelawny Town’, who sought ‘to bring in Woodcocks’s Negroes who are now out’. Before 1760, planters used the term ‘wild negroes’ to describe Maroons who had come to terms. Three years later, Thistlewood referred to Maroons capturing ‘that villain Bowman’, before shooting and bayoneting him. George Currie, one of the white men residing in Accompong Town, led a small party of Maroons in apprehending runaway slave Quaco Venter. There are only limited references to Maroons apprehending runaways before 1760.

Individual planters were responsible for paying for captured runaway slaves between 1740 and 1760, but the Maroons were not happy with the system. Planters would contact the superintendent of a given Maroon town and would offer a reward for the capture of a particular runaway, giving his name and description to the hunters. Upon apprehending the escaped slave, the Maroons would carry the runaway to the planter, who would then issue the financial reward to the Maroons. If they killed the runaway, the Maroons would take his

363 Burnard, *Thomas Thistlewood*, p. 145. Thistlewood’s claim that the Maroons cut out the man’s heart, and then roasted and ate it, might have been embellished, since there is no Maroon oral history to support the practice.
pair of ears to the planter to claim payment. In the 1760s, the Assembly offered Maroons the sum of three pounds per runaway: a large sum. The planters, however, had problems with the method of remuneration. Edwards and Dallas alleged that the Maroons would kill their captives, 'oftentimes bringing home the head of the fugitive, instead of the living man'.

According to one later writer, 'Maroons were paid for the slaughter of the negroes according to the number of their victims, receiving a stipulated price for every pair of negroes' ears which they were able to produce'. The Maroons often returned parts of the bodies of slaves, rather than bringing them back alive, when the planters would have preferred to receive their living property. The planters were dissatisfied with this system of compensation, because they believed that the Maroons unnecessarily killed the runaway to get their rewards.

The Maroons expressed their dissatisfaction with the system of remuneration for the apprehension of runaways, because the planters failed to pay them in a timely manner. The Assembly introduced mile-money to discourage Maroons from killing runaways, by paying them for each mile they carried the living slave. The colonial authorities paid the Maroons 'at the rate of one shilling per mile for the first five miles, and six-pence per mile afterwards'.

This was in addition to the 40-50 shillings the Maroons were entitled to receive from the authorities per returned slave. This payment scheme would probably have worked, if the planters lived up to their obligations to pay the Maroons for returned runaways in a prompt manner. From as early as 1741, Trelawny issued orders to Maroons to hunt a group of runaways, but they then complained to him that they were not being properly paid to do so, which meant that the governor had to pay them outstanding sums out of his own pocket. Maroons from both ends of the island expressed their reluctance to fight against Tacky’s Revolt until the Assembly paid them sums owed to them by planters for catching

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runaways.\textsuperscript{370} The system of payment for the apprehension of runaway slaves had broken down. The planters were responsible for paying the Maroons for hunting runaway slaves between 1740 and 1760, but the Maroons complained about monies owed, and consequently very little hunting of runaways occurred in these two decades.

After Tacky’s Revolt, the colonial elite sought to address Maroon complaints about monies owed when they instructed gaolers to pay Maroons for apprehended slaves. The colonial government shifted the responsibility for paying Maroon hunters from the individual planter to the colonial state apparatus. This measure initially succeeded, because there was more evidence in colonial records of Maroons hunting runaways. In 1767, Governor Elletson commissioned a search party from either Scott’s Hall or Charles Town to hunt down 25 runaway slaves who had escaped from Caymanas Estate.\textsuperscript{371} A year later, Elletson ordered the superintendent at Accompong Town to put out a Maroon party to hunt down ‘several of the Negroes belonging to Oxford plantation in the Parish of St Elizabeth (who) have in a daring and most refractory manner committed many Robberies there’.\textsuperscript{372} Captain Hynes employed a number of Maroons to hunt runaways at this time.\textsuperscript{373} The Maroon oral history has numerous stories about hunting runaway slaves.\textsuperscript{374} In the decades after 1760, some Maroons developed a reputation specialising in hunting runaways. Captain Davy, the Scott’s Hall officer who killed Tacky, hunted escaped slaves all over Jamaica, including the south coast.\textsuperscript{375} The improved payment system led to an increase in reports of Maroons hunting runaways in the years following Tacky’s Revolt.

While there are no statistics to show how many runaways the Maroons apprehended after Tacky’s Revolt, the fact that the gaolers soon ran into difficulties paying them for

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item 375 Dallas, \textit{History of the Maroons}, Vol. 1, p. 129.
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returned slaves indicates that the Maroons captured larger numbers than they expected. After 1760, whenever a Maroon party apprehended a runaway, it would carry the fugitive, or a pair of ears if the escapee was dead, to the parish gaoler. The gaoler would then pay the Maroons ‘party money’, which was essentially their fee for capturing these runaways. The gaoler would then recoup his expenses from the planter to whom the runaway slave belonged. If no slaveholder claimed the runaway, the gaoler could then sell the captured runaway as a slave. Long stated in 1774 that ‘the Marons...apprehended all straggling and vagabond slaves, that from time to time deserted from their owners’. In the 1770s, the number of runaways brought in by the Maroons had increased so significantly that gaolers in other parishes found themselves paying ‘considerable sums of money to the maroon negroes, and others, taking up such slaves’. In addition, the gaolers had difficulty recouping payments made to Maroons for runaways killed by them. Consequently, the gaolers soon found themselves owing Maroons significant sums of money for the capture of runaways.

It did not take long for the Maroons to express their displeasure at the gaolers owing them money for lengthy periods. In 1766, the Assembly took note of rumours that some of the Maroons ‘were disgusted at the little notice taken of them by the white people’. In 1767, Elletson received complaints ‘that many inconveniences arise from the want of the party Money to the Maroon Negroes of Trelawney Town being regularly paid’. Elletson then relieved the gaolers of Westmoreland of the responsibility of paying the Maroons, and he instructed ‘the Deputy Receiver General at Savanna la Mar to pay all such party Accounts as shall be presented to him’. In 1770, William Ross, the superintendent-general for all the Maroon towns, noted in a visit that ‘the negroes of all the towns complain, that the country is in arrear to them, and beg to be paid.’ These debts often amounted to more than a

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378 JAJ, Vol. 5, 6 August 1766, p. 595.
380 JAJ, Vol. 6, 8 December 1770, p. 311.
thousand pounds a year. The parish system of payment, which had replaced the individual responsibility of the planter, had also failed to work when the Maroons apprehended larger numbers of runaways.

Table Four: Budget for Maroon parties 1775-96. The Assembly started budgeting for Maroon parties to hunt runaway slaves in 1775 and they usually allocated £500 a year for these parties. In the mid-1780s, a series of hurricanes and droughts ravaged south-western Jamaica, destroying the provisions grounds of the slaves, leading to thousands of them dying from hunger and starvation. Under these circumstances, slaves were more likely to be tempted to run away and forge a new life living in the Cockpit Country, where they felt they stood a better chance of finding food than by starving on the plantations of western Jamaica. The Assembly consequently increased their budget for Maroon parties during those years.

In the mid-1770s, the centralised colonial government of Jamaica took on the responsibility of paying the Maroons, and for a decade there were few complaints from the Maroons. An analysis of the money budgeted by the Assembly reveals that they usually allotted £500 a year to pay Maroons for hunting runaways (see Table Four). Beckford and Edwards said that the Maroons regularly featured in parties to hunt runaway slaves in the last decades of the eighteenth century. Dallas spoke highly about ‘the frequent scowering

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of the woods by the Maroons, in search of run-away negroes'. However, a decade after the Assembly took on the responsibility of paying for captured runaway slaves, the Maroons resumed their complaints about delays.

The Assembly's long bureaucratic procedure of paying for hunting runaway slaves led to more complaints from Maroons. Under the centralised system, planters would ask the Assembly in Spanish Town to apprehend certain runaways, and the governor would then instruct the superintendent of a given town to assemble a party. Upon apprehending or killing the runaways, the superintendent would send the bill listing the Maroons awaiting payment to Spanish Town, and on receipt of funds he would then dispense them to his Maroon warriors. This process was a lengthy one, and in 1785, William Brodbelt, superintendent of Scott's Hall, complained that ‘the whole body of the maroons…absolutely refuse to obey any order to go in pursuit of runaway or rebellious slaves, unless the amount of the prior order is paid to them in cash’. In 1789, the Maroons of Moore Town claimed that ‘they were ill used by the white people’. The time taken between the submission of bills and the payment for services frustrated the Maroons who often had to wait years for their money. Throughout the 1790s, the Assembly owed outstanding sums to Maroons for returned runaways. In 1797, the Windward Maroon officer Sam Grant complained that the Assembly owed him large sums of money for catching runaways. In the last two decades of the eighteenth century, the Maroons also protested about money owed to them for fixing the roads to their town, and it took the Assembly several years to address those concerns. Like the individual planters and the gaolers before them, the colonial authorities ran into difficulties paying the Maroons for capturing runaway slaves. The Maroons were not satisfied with the system of remuneration for the capture of runaways, and this discontent most likely

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384 JAJ, Vol. 8, 8 December 1785, p. 135.
387 JAJ, Vol. 10, 28 November 1797, p. 36.
contributed to their failure to prevent the formation of runaway communities in the late eighteenth century.

Eighteenth century runaway communities and Three-Fingered Jack

The Maroons had limited success in defeating runaway communities or capturing their members, and fresh groups of slaves continued to escape from the plantations and find refuge in the mountainous interior. Some historians believe that after the treaties the only runaways were sole bandits.\textsuperscript{389} Evidence not previously utilized by historians shows that an escaped slave named Ancoma formed a group of runaways that thrived in the mountains of central Jamaica for years, and that Jack Mansong, also known as Three-Fingered Jack, was in fact a leader of a runaway community that existed for years after the Maroons killed him in the early 1780s. The existence of these runaway communities proved that the Maroons largely failed in their attempts to apprehend escaped slaves.

During the course of the First Maroon War, the Windward Maroons were an amalgamation of several communities, and not all of them came to terms with the colonial authorities. In 1733, the governor wrote that ‘the Rebels seem to be dispers’d into small gangs’.\textsuperscript{390} When the Windward Maroons signed the treaty of 1740, according to the governor’s information the entire population of the eastern Maroons was supposed to be about ‘490 persons, men, women and children’.\textsuperscript{391} However, an analysis of the records reveals that there was a significant discrepancy between the actual number of inhabitants of the official Maroon towns and the governor’s initial figures. In the returns of 1740, the official Windward Maroon population in Crawford’s Town and Moore/Nanny Town came to a total of just over 300 (see Table Five). It is possible therefore, that nearly 200 runaway slaves who fought in the First Maroon War remained at large in the eastern side of the island alone.

After 1740, the colonial authorities hired the Maroons who came to terms to capture and


\textsuperscript{390} CO 137/20, folio 116, 13 January 1733, Robert Hunter to Colonial Office.

\textsuperscript{391} CO 137/56, folio 236, 30 June 1739, Edward Trelawny to the British government.
disperse their former allies, runaway slaves who formed communities in the Blue Mountains, but who had not signed the treaty.

Table Five: Windward Maroon population in the eighteenth century. The population of the Windward Maroons grew steadily throughout the second half of the eighteenth century. In 1740, the population of Crawford’s Town was 233, and Moore Town was 70. In 1770, there were 226 Maroons at Charles Town, 136 at Moore Town, and 42 at Scott’s Hall. In 1797, Charles Town had 289 Maroons, Moore Town 245, and Scott’s Hall 45. The 1788 figure for Scott’s Hall, which lacks detail, is probably erroneous.392

The communities of Windward Maroons who did not come to terms continued to attract runaway slaves. When Quao signed the treaty of 1740, Trelawny admitted that throughout the island there were ‘some sculkers in small bodies of ten or twelve which we cannot now fail to reduce’.393 Trelawny was probably downplaying the numbers who had not come to terms, because his earlier information indicated that they might have numbered about 200. Slaves ran away from their estates to join those communities that had not agreed to peace. In 1741, a number of slaves fled plantations in Clarendon and St Elizabeth and settled ‘behind Smoaky-Hole, in the parish of Clarendon, and behind Porus and Mayday-hills, and had also, in the parish of St George, done the like’. The governor sent out orders to

392 Edward Long papers, Add. MS 12435, folio 19; Lord Lindsay, Lives of the Lindsays; or, A Memoir of the Houses of Crawford and Balcarres (London: John Murray, 1858), Vol. III, p. 52; JAJ, Vol. 6, 8 December 1770, p. 311, 26 November 1773, pp. 465-6, Vol. 10, 1 November 1797, p. 5.
393 CO 137/56, folio 236, 30 June 1739, Edward Trelawny to Colonial Office.
the Crawford’s Town Maroons, as well as Cudjoe and Accompong in the west, to ‘pursue, take, and destroy’ them.\textsuperscript{394} However, there is no evidence that the Maroons were successful in carrying out these orders. In the second half of the eighteenth century, runaway slaves were able to form new communities in the mountainous interior, including in parishes that were supposed to be under the control of the official Maroon towns. In 1754, William Trower, a former superintendent of Crawford’s Town, complained about a slave rebellion assisted by ‘rebellious negroes in the parish of Portland’, some of whom were still at large two years later.\textsuperscript{395} Even though Moore Town was also located in the interior of east Portland, the Maroons of this town were unable to subdue this community. While we cannot quantify how many runaways stayed out and did not come to terms, it is possible that the eastern runaways in the years immediately after 1740 numbered in the hundreds.

In the second half of the eighteenth century, gangs of runaway slaves continued to form in the forested mountains of the interior, and they often attacked plantations from these bases. Most historians of Jamaican slavery make no mention of Ancoma, but members of the Assembly discussed his group of runaway slaves on several occasions. In 1755, a plantation in St Thomas-in-the-East ‘had been infested by wild or runaway negroes’. A year later, there were reports in the \textit{Journals} that these ‘wild and rebellious negroes’, led by Ancoma, subjected another plantation in that parish to a series of attacks.\textsuperscript{396} Ancoma captured two women, including a Maroon from Charles Town, and they eventually brought about his downfall. Both women conspired to kill Ancoma in 1759, and the Assembly rewarded them for their success.\textsuperscript{397} However, the destruction of Ancoma did not lead to the demise of his gang of runaway slaves.

Even when the Maroons killed the leaders of these gangs of runaways, the communities persisted. In 1762, three years after the death of Ancoma, the Assembly reported that, in St Thomas-in-the-East, where Ancoma used to be based, ‘a great number

\textsuperscript{394} JAJ, Vol. 3, 29 April 1741, p. 566, 1 May 1741, p. 568.
\textsuperscript{396} JAJ, Vol. 4, 22 January 1756, p. 554.
\textsuperscript{397} JAJ, Vol. 5, 23 October 1759, p. 148; 1 November 1759, p. 149.
of runaway negroes’ had ‘infested’ Bath and its surrounding areas and were ‘very insolent and troublesome’. 398 Shortly afterwards, Elletson twice ordered the superintendents of Scott’s Hall and Charles Town in one case, and Moore Town in the other, to put together a party of Maroons to hunt down these runaways. 399 There is no evidence about the success of these parties, despite the killing of Ancoma.

In the century that followed the treaties, the colonial authorities believed that the Maroons were more successful than the militia in hunting runaways because they were ‘well acquainted with all passes, bye ways, high-roads, and the situation of properties’. 400 However, throughout the eighteenth century, runaway slaves continued to set up communities that defied the colonial establishment and the Maroons who hunted them. In 1774, at Above Rocks, on the border of the parishes of St Andrew and St Mary, not far from Scott’s Hall, planters complained that there were ‘many tracts of uncultivated lands’, which were ‘only haunts for runaway negroes, belonging to both the towns of Spanish-Town and Kingston’. 401 Towards the end of the eighteenth century, planters made more efforts to create coffee plantations in the interior, so that ‘the retreats of the runaways that have been and still are formed there, will be found out and destroyed’. 402 The colonial authorities were aware of significant numbers of runaway slaves in the hills, and despite the presence of the official Maroon towns, these communities continued to form in the interior throughout the eighteenth century, where they thrived for years.

398 JAJ, Vol. 5, 4 November 1762, p. 368.
400 VH AJ, 1829, Appendix LVII, p. 491.
401 JAJ, Vol. 6, 26 November 1774, p. 532.
402 JAJ, Vol. 8, 3 November 1790, p. 583.
Historians who maintain that the Maroons were successful in preventing runaway slaves from forming independent communities in the forested interior were largely unaware that Three-Fingered Jack, also known as Jack Mansong, was not a lone bandit. This notoriety came from a stage show about Three-Fingered Jack that received great acclaim at the Theatre Royal Haymarket, Covent Gardens and Victoria theatres, running for nine years. Its promoters claimed it was an ‘accurate description’ of events, and that Jack operated on his own, a narrative accepted by historians such as Campbell. According to Alan Eyre, he was in a number of respects Jamaica’s equivalent of England’s Robin Hood. Consequently, Jamaican government monuments to Jack Mansong refer to him as a lone bandit, rather than a leader of a community of runaway slaves (see Figure Eight). Plays

Figure Eight: A plaque commemorating Three-Fingered Jack. Erected by the Jamaica National Trust Commission, Bull Bay, 1978. The plaque accept the myth that Three-Fingered Jack, also known as Jack Mansong, was a solitary fighter, while the evidence shows that he was the leader of a gang of runaway slaves.

\[\text{Figure Eight: A plaque commemorating Three-Fingered Jack. Erected by the Jamaica National Trust Commission, Bull Bay, 1978. The plaque accept the myth that Three-Fingered Jack, also known as Jack Mansong, was a solitary fighter, while the evidence shows that he was the leader of a gang of runaway slaves.}\]


about Three-Fingered Jack gave the impression he was a lone runaway slave, and historians accepted this narrative.

Historians complain that there is limited information about the real Jack Mansong in colonial records. Diana Paton observes that newspaper articles about Three-Fingered Jack gave little background information about the runaway himself.406 Benjamin Moseley wrote the only accurate contemporary account of Three-Fingered Jack, as part of a general work on sugar at the end of the eighteenth century, but his comments were no more than a passing reference.407 Subsequent writers embellished and exaggerated Moseley's comments, and this interpretation of Jack as a lone bandit has gone down into Jamaican legend. However, new evidence shows that there is enough information in the records of the Assembly to build a picture of Three-Fingered Jack.

Jack Mansong was the leader of a group of runaway slaves, which troubled the colonial authorities so much that they offered financial rewards for Jack and members of his community. Assembly representatives complained in the Journals that Three-Fingered Jack's 'gang' thrived in the eastern Blue Mountains in the 1780s, and that they fought and killed members of several parties sent against them. Jack Mansong was an escaped slave who led a gang that 'for many months past, committed many robberies, and carried off several negro and other slaves from the windward roads, into the woods, and have also committed several murders'. At the end of 1780, the Assembly offered 'a reward of one hundred pounds for apprehending the said negro, named Three-Fingered-Jack; and also a reward of five pounds, over and above what is allowed by law for apprehending each and every negro man slave belonging to the said gang'. This reward indicates that in addition to Jack Mansong there were other gang members worth catching. At the start of 1781, the


Assembly then offered freedom to any slave who killed Three-Fingered Jack, and added another £200 to the reward. Jack Mansong was not a loner. Rather, he led a gang of runaways who fought the colonial authorities from the forested mountains of eastern Jamaica over many years.

Towards the end of 1781, the Superintendent of Scott’s Hall, Bernard Nalty, led a party of six Windward Maroons that killed Jack Mansong and captured some members of his gang. Contemporary writers and historians state that, according to legend, a Scott’s Hall Maroon named Quashee, also known by the Christianised name of James Reeder or Readu, killed Jack Mansong in a sole hand-to-hand combat between the two men, and secured his freedom as a result (see Figure Nine). However, this interpretation is incorrect because

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the Maroons secured their freedom officially when they signed the peace treaties in 1739 and 1740. A party of Maroons, and not an individual, was responsible for killing Jack Mansong. Moseley and Burdett explained that Reeder received assistance from another Maroon named Sam, the son of Captain Davy, and ‘a party of their townsmen (from) Scots Hall Maroon Town’. In 1816, William Carmichael Cockburn, an officer at Charles Town, claimed to have been the Little Quaco, who, along with fellow Maroon Sam Grant, ‘shot the outlaw in the belly while he was engaged with Reeder’. Contrary to legend, a party of Maroons who were already free killed Jack Mansong, but they again experienced delays in collecting their rewards.

Delays in payments for the killing and apprehension of runaway slaves also affected the distribution of rewards for the death of Three-Fingered Jack. Following the demise of Jack Mansong, parties of Maroons from Scott’s Hall and Moore Town complained that the Assembly was slow in paying them the advertised rewards. It was not until 1783, two years after the death of Jack Mansong, that the Assembly eventually paid the Maroon hunters their outstanding rewards. The delay in paying the Maroons for killing Three-Fingered Jack often angered Maroons who made a career out of hunting runaways.

A Maroon who successfully hunted a notorious runaway such as Three-Fingered Jack could achieve financial independence. In 1798, a Maroon named John Reeder petitioned for relief late in life, detailing his record of hunting Jack Mansong in the past, as well other notorious runaway slaves. In 1801, the Assembly granted him an annual payment in his old age as a pension for services rendered. A few years later, Reeder complained that £12 ‘will not allow him food and common clothing during the year’, and that sum was later increased first to £20, and then £30. Reeder even received gunpowder from the

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410 Moseley, A Treatise on Sugar, pp. 175-6, Burdett, Exploits of Mansong, p. 46n.
411 JAJ, Vol. 7, 18 December 1781, p. 437, 1 March 1783, p. 584; Campbell, Maroons of Jamaica, p. 158.
colonial government in his retirement. Reeder eventually died in Charles Town around 1816, and one of the Maroon town’s officers, Nathaniel Beckford, buried him and received £30 from the Assembly for the expense, even though Reeder was not listed in the town’s returns in the years prior to his death. That same year, Cockburn asked for and received a belated pension of £20 a year from the Assembly for his role in the killing of Jack, an annual payment that continued after the abolition of slavery. The Assembly rewarded Reeder and Cockburn for killing Jack Mansong with pensions that lasted for the rest of their lives. The financial rewards for successfully pursuing a wanted runaway played a significant role in allowing the superintendent to usurp the authority of the Maroon officers. By selecting Reeder and Cockburn as members of the Maroon party to hunt down Three-Fingered Jack, Superintendent Nalty provided these two Windward Maroons with a financial independence their Maroon officers could not give them.

When the Maroons killed Jack Mansong, they also captured several members of his community of runaway slaves and delivered them to the colonial authorities. The Yallahs Bay court tried ‘five of the runaways of Three-Fingered-Jack’s party’ and ordered their executions. The Yallahs Bay court arraigned one of the captured gang members for ‘being in open rebellion with a late rebellious negro man slave named Three-Fingered Jack, and with him and others committing sundry robberies upon the king’s high roads and private

414 JAJ, Vol. 13, 26 November 1816, p. 60, 2, 18 December 1816, pp. 65, 103. The Maroon’s name was John, not James, Reeder. Since there is no John Reeder among the returns of any of the Windward Maroon towns, he most likely lived outside of Moore Town, while remaining registered to this official Maroon Town. There were a number of Maroons with that surname in Moore Town at the end of the eighteenth century (VHAJ, 20 November 1798, pp. 84-5, 1799, Appendix IV, pp. 361-2).
properties’. The court proceedings prove that Jack Mansong was not a lone bandit, but rather the leader of a band of runaway slaves.

Other groups of runaway slaves fragmented from Jack’s gang and continued to trouble the colonial authorities. In the mountains of eastern Jamaica, ‘two gangs of desperate rebellious slaves’, led by Dagger and Toney respectively, ‘for several months past, committed many daring robberies, and carried off, into the woods, several slaves from the Windward and Cambridge-Hill roads’. Evidence not previously utilized by historians shows that Dagger, ‘an accomplice of Three-Fingered Jack’, remained a runaway for a decade, and his gang committed many ‘daring’ robberies and several murders. In the 1780s, the Assembly reported that ‘repeated parties have been sent out against the said leaders of their gangs, without any success.’ The Assembly offered rewards of £100 pounds and £50 pounds for Dagger and Toney respectively, and £10 each for members of their gangs. The Maroons did not manage to capture or kill Dagger, but they did succeed in driving him out of the mountains, and the militia eventually apprehended him when he was hiding as a runaway in the large town of Kingston. There, in the 1790s, the courts tried and convicted Dagger, and sentenced him to transportation. While the Maroons apprehended these gang leaders, they were less successful in destroying their runaway communities.

The planters continued to experience problems with runaway slaves towards the end of the eighteenth century. In 1791, planters in the parish of St Ann presented a petition to the Assembly, requesting the colonial government to cut a road into the mountainous interior in order to make it easier to establish plantations, while also ‘cutting off the retreat of the rebels to the woods’. Reeder was a member of the party that hunted Toney, and he also pursued two other renowned escaped slaves named Tom and Bacchus, but there are no reports of success in these ventures. Jack Mansong’s gang continued to flourish under a number of

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419 VHAJ, 1 December 1791, p. 108.
420 JAJ, Vol. 10, 28 November 1798, p. 179.
leaders, and while Dagger was eventually apprehended, there is no record that the colonial authorities were able to capture Toney, Tom and Bacchus.

Conclusion

By signing the treaties of 1739 and 1740, the Leeward and Windward Maroons agreed to suppress slave revolts and hunt runaway slaves. The number of revolts declined in the second half of the eighteenth century, as the Maroons fulfilled their treaty obligations to suppress slave rebellions. Initially, there were divisions among planters over whether to trust the loyalty of the Maroons, and some of them expressed their suspicions through criticisms of their guerrilla warfare tactics. However, the Maroons proved their loyalty through their assistance in putting down a small revolt in eastern Jamaica in 1745, and the much larger and more dangerous Tacky’s Revolt of 1760, as well as subsequent rebellions in the decade that followed.

The Maroons were not as successful in hunting runaway slaves as the colonial authorities wanted them to be, largely because the Maroons were unwilling to engage steadily and effectively in this work. The evidence shows that throughout the eighteenth century, runaway slaves such as Ancoma and Three-Fingered Jack formed and led communities of runaways in the mountains of central and eastern Jamaica. The existence of these communities suggests that the Maroons had only limited success in hunting runaway slaves in the second half of the eighteenth century. While the Maroons succeeded in killing the leaders of these groups of runaways, they were less successful in routing their communities. These runaway communities instead flourished under new leaders such as Dagger and Toney, and continued to cause problems for the colonial authorities.

Communities of runaways thrived under Ancoma and his successors in the 1750s and 1760s, and then under Three-Fingered Jack and his deputies in the 1770s and 1780s, in the forested mountains of eastern Jamaica.

The Maroons were initially reluctant hunters of runaway slaves. They did not pursue runaways in significant numbers before 1760, and only increased their efforts after the
Assembly improved the remuneration process. However, payment problems persisted, and the Maroons continued to complain about delays for the duration of the eighteenth century. Quarrels over outstanding payments for hunting runaways, combined with unresolved complaints concerning land disputes surrounding Trelawny Town, eventually contributed to a Second Maroon War at the end of the century. Chapter Four will address the causes of the Second Maroon War, which had its roots in the discontent over what the Maroons of Trelawny Town felt was the unfair treatment they received from the colonial authorities.
PART TWO: THE SECOND MAROON WAR AND NINETEENTH CENTURY JAMAICA

CHAPTER FOUR: MAROON OFFICERS RETAKE CONTROL OF TRELAWNY TOWN

The Second Maroon War of 1795-6 occurred because of tensions between the Maroons of Trelawny Town and neighbouring planters over land. This chapter will argue that in the years leading up to the Second Maroon War, the colonial authorities diverged from their previous policy of appeasing Maroon demands for land. The governor’s fears about the growing slave revolt in neighbouring St Domingue influenced him into taking a more confrontational approach with the Maroons of Trelawny Town. During the conflict, Maroon officers temporarily reasserted their authority over the white superintendents appointed by the governor, but Trelawny Town’s future began to look bleak after they failed to secure the support of the other Maroon towns while Accompong Town even took up arms on the side of the colonial authorities. Despite winning several skirmishes, the Maroons of Trelawny Town were unable to maintain the guerrilla campaign that had proved so successful in the First Maroon War and they eventually surrendered, losing their land.

The failure of the colonial authorities to resolve land disputes to the satisfaction of Trelawny Town culminated in conflict. Michael Craton and Jean Besson point out that in the years after the Maroons signed the treaty of 1739 planter encroachment on Trelawny Town created a lot of tension, and that led to the Second Maroon War.421 Abram Dridzo claims that the western planters provoked a confrontation with Trelawny Town, but he provides no evidence to support that premise.422 Helen McKee instead argues that the Maroons of

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Trelawny Town contributed significantly to the outbreak of hostilities by demanding more land, jeopardising the good relationship western planters had with Trelawny Town.\textsuperscript{423} Chapter Two has shown that when disputes over land occurred in the eighteenth century the Assembly purchased the disputed land in question from the planter, and then donated the land to the Windward Maroons and the Maroons from Accompong Town.\textsuperscript{424} McKee claims that the Assembly applied this appeasement policy to all Maroon towns, including Trelawny Town.\textsuperscript{425} This chapter will present evidence to show that, on the contrary, when land disputes occurred with Trelawny Town, the Assembly broke from tradition and did not purchase land on behalf of the Maroons of this western town. David Ryden points out that in the 1790s, British colonies such as Jamaica capitalized on the St Domingue crisis to double their sugar production during that decade. Ryden notes that in the last decade of the eighteenth century, Jamaican planters established new estates in frontier lands, such as those bordering the Maroon towns.\textsuperscript{426} This chapter will support the argument that the planters sought to expand their estates in western Jamaica in the 1790s, but will show that Trelawny Town’s lack of success in its applications for land throughout the second half of the eighteenth century was in stark contrast with other Maroon towns, and therefore, further helps to explain their conflict with the colonial authorities.

Other factors contributing to the conflict included the appointment of an inexperienced superintendent, the governor’s concerns about the St Domingue revolt, and the sentencing of two Maroon thieves to be whipped. Mavis Campbell argues that Governor Balcarres and Superintendent Thomas Craskell were not able administrators and were insensitive to the needs of the Maroon towns, and their heavy-handed and incompetent responses to the demands of the Maroons of Trelawny Town played a major role in causing

\textsuperscript{424} Chapter Two, pp. 77-84.
the Second Maroon War. Besson highlights the whipping of two Maroons, the spark that actually ignited the conflict, as another main cause, while Craton emphasizes an overreaction by the colonial governor to fears concerning the St Domingue slave revolt. This chapter will argue that while these issues contributed to the outbreak of the Second Maroon War, the main cause was tension over land in western Jamaica.

In contrast with the First Maroon War, the Trelawny Town rebels did not have the support of Maroons from other towns and they actually had to fight against warriors from another Leeward community, Accompong Town. Historians have debated the reasons why the Maroons of Accompong Town fought alongside the colonial authorities against Trelawny Town. R.C. Dallas and the Maroon oral history claim that a dispute over the possession of a written copy of the cherished 1739 treaty was at the heart of the animosity between these two Leeward Maroon towns. Campbell dismisses this story as trivial, but her alternative, that the dispute had its roots in an attempted coup against Cudjoe half a century before the Second Maroon War is speculative because there is no evidence in either the Maroon oral history or in the colonial records that this was an issue. Werner Zips, Craton and Besson argue that competition for land and hunting rights contributed to the two Leeward Maroon towns taking up opposing sides during the Second Maroon War. This chapter will present evidence to support the argument that the Accompong Maroons allied themselves with the colonial authorities against Trelawny Town for economic reasons, including the desire for Trelawny Town’s land. The Maroons of Accompong Town benefitted economically from their allegiance with the colonial authorities, securing pay as soldiers and trackers against their

428 Craton, Testing the Chains, pp. 211-4; Besson, Transformations, p. 41.
430 Campbell, Maroons of Jamaica, p. 220. For a description of the attempted coup, see Chapter Two, pp. 52-4.
Leeward brethren and a short-term monopoly to hunt runaways in the immediate aftermath of the Second Maroon War.

For the duration of the Second Maroon War, the Windward Maroons remained neutral, effectively denying Trelawny Town a potential ally. Katherine Dunham’s claim that the Windward Maroons rose up in support of Trelawny Town has no evidence to support it. Campbell observes that no other Maroon town supported Trelawny Town during the conflict, but, along with Craton, she points out that the Windward Maroons were also reluctant supporters of the colonial authorities. This chapter will support this argument and will point out that the Maroons of eastern Jamaica paid for their reluctant cooperation when the Assembly denied them opportunities to hunt runaway slaves in the years immediately after the Second Maroon War.

Militia attacks on the food and water supplies belonging to the Maroons of Trelawny Town played a significant role in their surrender. John Fortescue and Roger Buckley claim that the Maroons surrendered after a dozen of their warriors had fallen in the final skirmish. However, there is no evidence of Maroon losses of that magnitude to support that claim. While Craton and Rachel Herrmann argue that the colonial militia’s destruction of Maroon provisions grounds contributed to the surrender of the Trelawny Town Maroons, Campbell did not believe that was the decisive factor. This chapter will build on the work of Herrmann and others to show that while the Maroons of Trelawny Town were not defeated in battle, they surrendered largely because Colonel George Walpole had effectively destroyed their provisions grounds on their communal land.

The Causes of the Second Maroon War

Though the factors contributing to the outbreak of the Second Maroon War included the Haitian Revolution, the appointment of a paranoid lieutenant-governor in the Earl of Balcarres (see Figure Ten), the replacement of a popular superintendent, and disputes over land between Maroons and planters, the tensions in Trelawny Town erupted into war when a magistrate unwisely ordered the whipping of two Maroons convicted of killing pigs belonging to a planter.

Figure Ten: Colonel Alexander Lindsay, Earl of Balcarres, 1825. The Earl of Balcarres was governor of Jamaica from 1795-1801. He later purchased three coffee plantations, and became one of Jamaica’s absentee proprietors. Those plantations became the starting points for more than one slave conspiracy, and the colonial authorities ironically called up the Charles Town Maroons to quell unrest on Balcarres Estate in 1824.436

Jamaica’s white settlers and the governor differed over the main threat posed by the Haitian Revolution to the island. In the last decade of the eighteenth century, the island’s settlers were more fearful of the influence of the St Domingue revolt on the island’s slaves than on the Maroons. In 1791, the Assembly of Jamaica put national rivalries to one side and donated £10,000 to the St Domingue planters, to help them in their efforts to re-establish

Free blacks and coloureds played a leading role in the early stages of the Haitian Revolution, so the Jamaican colonial elite took action against those who fled from Hispaniola. The Assembly tried to prevent free blacks and coloureds from St Domingue from landing in Jamaica, out of fear that they would spread the spirit of rebellion among the slaves of the British colony. However, the flood of non-white refugees continued and the colonial authorities of Jamaica took repressive measures against them. By 1794, the Jamaican colonial authorities had imprisoned 270 free blacks and persons of colour from St Domingue in a prison ship. Later that same year, the Jacobin government in France abolished slavery throughout their colonies, and Jamaican planters feared the transmission of St Domingue freedom to the British island. G.W. Bridges observed that Jamaican planters were ‘apprehensive that the terrific example of their neighbours would rouse their slaves to rebellion’. In the first half of the 1790s, the planters who ran the Assembly took action against free blacks and coloureds from St Domingue, and not the Maroons, in their response to the early days of the Haitian Revolution.

Balcarres was thrown into this volatile situation, and he had a paranoid belief that the Haitian Revolution influenced Maroon discontent in Trelawny Town. The new governor constantly complained about perceived impacts from revolutionary France, and he responded by shipping ‘multitudes of French people’ from Jamaica back to St Domingue. According to Dallas, ‘the public mind was considerably agitated by the affairs of St Domingo, by an apprehension of the contagion of revolutionary principles spreading to Jamaica.’

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437 Journals of the Assembly of Jamaica (JAJ), Vol. 9, 10 December 1791, p. 62.
438 JAJ, Vol. 9, 6 December 1791, p. 50.
Dallas also noted that Balcarres ‘was also actuated by these motives’. In a speech to the Assembly in September 1795, shortly after the Second Maroon War started, the governor expressed the view that ‘he had reason to believe hostility had been long premeditated by the Maroons, and at the instigation of the Convention of France.’ Even after the Second Maroon War ended, in May 1796, Balcarres wrote a letter to planter Foster Barham, sticking to his stance that ‘the island swarmed with multitudes of French people of colour that had been introduced to raise insurrection’. In contrast with many white planters, the governor believed the Haitian Revolution inspired the Trelawny Town Maroons to rise up in revolt.

Many contemporary writers did not agree with the governor’s conviction about French involvement in the discontent at Trelawny Town. Some historians accept that Balcarres was right to suggest that the slave revolt in St Domingue influenced discontent at Trelawny Town, but others reject that premise. Dallas notes that the colonial authorities were concerned about ‘reports that Frenchmen and people of colour were conspiring with the Maroons’, but he goes on to say the evidence showed the Maroons ‘had not been tampered with by the French’. There was some activity by French Revolutionary spies, but this was of a limited nature and it was not successful. In 1797, members of the Assembly reported in the Votes of the House of the Assembly that French spies admitted failure in their ‘attempts to corrupt the Maroons of Charles Town’ in the eastern end of the island. The Second Maroon War occurred in western Jamaica, and the French said nothing about attempting to influence the Leeward Maroons. It was not the revolt itself, but the governor’s insistence on associating

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this dispute with the uprising in the French colony, which played an important role in causing the Second Maroon War.

The peace treaties of 1739 and 1740 opened up virgin lands, which planters converted into estates to grow crops such as sugar and coffee, and this led to land disputes with the Maroons of Trelawny Town. The planter Edward Long wrote that Trelawny Town had a rich resource of unsettled land, claiming that ‘there remain about ninety eight thousand (acres) for cultivation’. In 1775, the Assembly built a road between Trelawny Town and Accompong Town as ‘an encouragement for others to settle in that remote part of the country’. In 1776, there were only 10 settlements in the mountainous regions of south St James, but just 14 years later the number of plantations had increased six-fold with a total of just under 5,000 acres under cultivation. There was a dual purpose to this encroachment. The Assembly reported that while it would open up virgin territory to the possibility of sugar and coffee plantations, the Maroons ‘will be surrounded by a band of white settlers, whose vicinity may tend to civilise them’. The Jamaican sugar economy grew steadily during the second half of the eighteenth century, and planters sought to capitalise on that demand by establishing new estates in parts of the island formerly under the control of Maroons.

In contrast with the Windward Maroons, when land disputes occurred with the Maroons from Trelawny Town, the Assembly did not purchase the disputed land for the Maroon town. In 1758, a Trelawny Town Maroon captain named Furry, ‘belonging to Trelawny-Town, had separated himself from said town, and built houses, and planted provisions’ on the land of St James planter Mark Hardyman. Governor Elletson intervened and worked out a compromise where Furry and his followers would vacate the land and

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449 JAJ, Vol. 6, 16 December 1775, p. 618.
450 JAJ, Vol. 9, 3 November 1790, p. 583.
return to Trelawny Town, in return for financial compensation from the Assembly. In 1770, Furry complained, through the Trelawny Town superintendent, that despite removing from the land as promised, he and his men still had not ‘received any pay or allowance for the falling, clearing, and planting, the said thirty acres of land, or for building the said fourteen houses’. Shortly after that complaint, the Assembly allocated £150 to the Trelawny Town superintendent to pay Furry and his men. While the Assembly eventually compensated Furry and his men for having to leave Hardyman’s land, the lengthy delays in paying them probably contributed to the discontent in Trelawny Town.

Tensions between the Maroons of Trelawny Town and neighbouring planters boiled over in disputes over surveys and boundaries. In the 1770s, the Assembly sent surveyors to map out the 1,500 acres allotted to Trelawny Town, but the Maroons expressed dissatisfaction with the surveyor’s work, claiming that their provisions grounds were omitted, and that a ‘great part of that which was run out for them, is rocks and cock-pits’. In 1791, a planter named David Schaw complained that animals belonging to the Maroons destroyed the provision grounds of the slaves on his estate, and that the Maroons ignored his appeals to help build a dividing fence. In the years leading up to the Second Maroon War, there were a number of tensions between planters and Maroons over issues surrounding land.

In the latter half of the eighteenth century, the population of Trelawny Town grew to such an extent that they came into conflict with neighbouring planters over land issues. In 1792, Montague James and his captains petitioned the Assembly in a document written and supported by their superintendent, claiming that most of their current allotment was mountainous, rocky and unsuitable for cultivation. The petition stated that the land had ‘become so exhausted, as to be totally insufficient and inadequate to the support of the

453 JAJ, Vol. 6, 24 November 1770, pp. 298-9, 8, 20 December 1770, pp.313, 332; Campbell, Maroons of Jamaica, pp. 183-5; McKee, ‘From violence to alliance’, p. 4.
454 JAJ, Vol. 6, 11, 19 December 1770, pp. 376, 386; Dallas, History of the Maroons, Vol. 1, p. 128.
present number of maroons, who, in the meantime, are greatly increased’. Craton argues that these petitions showed that the lands allocated to the Maroons had poor soils, and therefore the Maroons could not farm properly on them. However, the population of Trelawny Town grew significantly in the second half of the eighteenth century, which instead seems to indicate that the Maroons had no problems feeding themselves, so the land was probably not as poor as Montague James claimed. The petition explained that the population of Trelawny Town had increased to a point where Maroons felt compelled to trespass on adjoining plantations.\textsuperscript{456} An analysis of the Maroon population of Trelawny Town shows that it grew from 276 in 1740 to 655 in 1795 (see Table Six). Trelawny Town’s population had grown so large that some of their Maroons set up new villages outside of their town. In 1792, the Assembly reported that some Trelawny Town Maroons had relocated to a new village they called ‘New-Town’, which still fell under the auspices of the superintendent of Trelawny Town.\textsuperscript{457} The numbers of Trelawny Town Maroons outstripped their land, and they wanted more to cater to their hunting and agricultural needs.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Year & 1738/9 & 1770 & 1773 & 1795/7 \\
\hline
Population & 276 & 311 & 655 & 700 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Trelawny Town population 18th century.}
\end{table}

\textbf{Table Six: Trelawny Town Maroons in the eighteenth century.} The population of Trelawny Town grew from 276 in 1739 to 414 in 1773, and further to 655 at the start of the Second Maroon War.\textsuperscript{458}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{456} JAJ, Vol. 9, 7 March 1792, p. 86; Campbell, \textit{Maroons of Jamaica}, p. 189; Craton, \textit{Testing the Chains}, pp. 93-4. \\
\textsuperscript{457} JAJ, Vol. 9, 10 March 1792, p. 97; Dallas, \textit{History of the Maroons}, Vol. 1, p. 81. \\
\textsuperscript{458} \textit{Edward Long papers}, Add. MS 12435, folio 19; Lindsay, \textit{Lives of the Lindsays}, Vol. III, p. 52; JAJ, Vol. 6, 8 December 1770, p. 311, 26 November 1773, pp. 465-6, Vol. 10, 1 November 1797, p. 5.
\end{flushright}
Samuel Vaughan, a member of the Assembly, was acting in his own interests protecting his estate of Vaughansfield when he recommended the dismissal of the Maroon petition for more land. Vaughansfield bordered on Trelawny Town, and his colleagues in the Assembly complied with Vaughan’s request. New evidence reveals that Vaughan justified turning down the petition by arguing that ‘there is a very rapid settlement and cultivation taking place in that part of the island.’ Jamaican planters significantly increased sugar production in the 1790s, as they sought to take advantage of the destruction of French plantations in St Domingue, and western Jamaica had available land for conversion into sugar estates. Vaughan probably persuaded other members of the Assembly to dismiss the petition, because he wanted to protect his own estate, and this action brought him into conflict with the Trelawny Town superintendent.

John James and his son were the white superintendents of Trelawny Town for three decades, and their long association generated respect from the Maroons there. John James came from a family that owned estates in the parish of Hanover, and the colonial authorities appointed him superintendent in 1767 to replace Thomas Burke, who was unpopular both with the Maroons and the surrounding planters. When the colonial authorities promoted John James to superintendent-general of all the Maroon towns in 1779, he appointed his son, John Montague James, to run Trelawny Town (see Table Seven). According to Dallas, the Maroons ‘loved, venerated, and feared’ James, and ‘had he been born a Maroon, he could not have been better acquainted with their character, disposition, and prejudices’.

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459 JAJ, Vol. 9, 6 December 1792, pp. 174-5, 22 September 1795, p. 371; VHAJ, 6 December 1792, p. 160.
460 Ryden, *West Indian Slavery*, p. 221.
respected, the colonial authorities were able to maintain a peaceful relationship with the largest Maroon town.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year start</th>
<th>Year end</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>First name</th>
<th>Middle name</th>
<th>Surname</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1761</td>
<td>1767</td>
<td>Supt.</td>
<td>John</td>
<td></td>
<td>Scott</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1767</td>
<td></td>
<td>Supt.</td>
<td>Thomas</td>
<td></td>
<td>Burke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1767</td>
<td>1787</td>
<td>Supt.</td>
<td>John</td>
<td></td>
<td>James</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1773</td>
<td></td>
<td>Act. Supt.</td>
<td>Thomas</td>
<td></td>
<td>Leamy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1779</td>
<td>1788</td>
<td>Asst. Supt.</td>
<td>John</td>
<td>Montague</td>
<td>James</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1788</td>
<td>1792</td>
<td>Supt.</td>
<td>John</td>
<td>Montague</td>
<td>James</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1793</td>
<td>1795</td>
<td>Supt.</td>
<td>Thomas</td>
<td></td>
<td>Craskell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1795</td>
<td></td>
<td>Asst. Supt.</td>
<td>John</td>
<td></td>
<td>Merody</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table Seven: Superintendents of Trelawny Town. John James was Superintendent of Trelawny Town from 1767 to 1779, and when he became Superintendent-General, his son, John Montague James, took over the running of Trelawny Town. Some historians confuse John James and his son with Maroon colonel Montague James, because of the similarities of their names. Hugh Paget corrects those errors, and this table, drawn from evidence in the Journals, supports Paget’s explanation. Thomas Craskell replaced both of them in 1793. Superintendents desired an appointment at Trelawny Town, because it paid more than other posts, and it was the only salary that was equal to that of the superintendent-general.464

When the colonial authorities removed the James family from Trelawny Town, they no longer had an experienced official in the Maroon town able to act decisively to resolve land disputes. In the 1790s, Vaughan upset the balance of peace in Trelawny Town when he secured the removal of the long-standing superintendent of the Leeward Maroon town. The James family had supported the Trelawny Town Maroons in their requests for more land, but when John James and his son complained about outstanding salaries, Vaughan instigated

an investigation arguing that they were breaking an unenforced regulation requiring them to reside in the Maroon town. Vaughan capitalized on the paranoia surrounding the St Domingue revolt to seek to have the James family disciplined, and he claimed Maroons filed ‘repeated complaints’ about their absence. However, there was no evidence in the Assembly records of any Maroon complaints about the James family, and throughout the eighteenth century superintendents regularly lived outside of the Maroon towns, largely because there were no houses that met their satisfaction in these towns. In 1792, arising from the Assembly’s investigation, members asked the governor to remove John James and his son, and declared that ‘the said superintendent has not complied with the law, passed the last session, for the government of the maroons’. In promoting the cause of planters seeking to establish estates in western Jamaica, Vaughan consequently undermined the authority of the superintendent in Jamaica’s most important Maroon town.

Vaughan installed the inexperienced Thomas Craskell as superintendent of Trelawny Town and expected him to side with the planters in land disputes, but Craskell failed to command the respect of the Maroons. When the Trelawny Town Maroon officers expelled Craskell following a trivial incident over the flogging of two Maroons, they renewed their requests for more land. Before the Second Maroon War, Maroon leader Montague James (see Table Eight) reported to the James family, and Dallas claimed that the colonel of Trelawny Town had no real authority, and was, ‘in fact, considered in no better light than as an old woman’. That would change once the Second Maroon War began. Shortly after the appointment of Craskell, Montague James and his captains accused the new superintendent

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466 Dallas, History of the Maroons, Vol. 1, p. 137.
468 JAJ, Vol. 9, 21 December 1792, pp. 201-2.
of cowardice, demanded his removal, and called for the restoration of John James.\textsuperscript{470} The Maroons believed that the elder James would support their claims for more land, unlike Craskell. Former superintendent John James helped the Trelawny Town Maroons to draw up their demands and reminded them of any concerns they had forgotten.\textsuperscript{471} Under the guidance of the elder James, the officers of Trelawny Town repeated their requests for more land.\textsuperscript{472} Craskell was weak and inexperienced, and he was unable to prevent Montague James from reasserting the authority of the Maroon officers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year recorded officer</th>
<th>Year end</th>
<th>Highest rank</th>
<th>First name</th>
<th>Surname</th>
<th>Father</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1739</td>
<td>1764</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Cudjoe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1764</td>
<td></td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Lewis</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Quashee</td>
<td>Johnny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1767</td>
<td></td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Cudjoe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. 1792</td>
<td>1812</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Montague</td>
<td>James</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1792</td>
<td></td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>John</td>
<td>Jarrett</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>Zachary</td>
<td>Bayly</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1792</td>
<td></td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>James</td>
<td>Lawrence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table Eight: Trelawny Town Maroon Officers. Montague James was colonel of Trelawny Town from at least 1792 until his death in Sierra Leone. There is no accurate record of the Maroon officers between 1767 and 1792.\textsuperscript{473}

At the end of the eighteenth century, the Maroons of Trelawny Town were seething over land encroachment by planters, the disappearance of their hunting grounds, the change


\textsuperscript{471} CO 137/95, folio 146, 16 August 1795, ‘The Examination of John Merody’; JAJ, Vol. 9, 22 September 1795, p. 369.

\textsuperscript{472} JAJ, Vol. 9, 22 September 1795, p. 370. When the elder John James later offered his services at the outbreak of the Second Maroon War, Balcarres ignored him, having not forgiven him for helping the Maroons to present their demands. The former superintendent died after an illness the following year (Dallas, Vol. 1, pp. 206-210; JAJ, Vol. 9, 22 September 1795, p. 369).

of superintendent, and the rejection of their latest petition for more land. Consequently, a seemingly minor issue sparked the Second Maroon War. In July 1795, a magistrate in St James ordered the flogging of two Maroons of Trelawny Town for shooting a couple of tame hogs belonging to a neighbouring planter. The Maroons were furious, not because of the sentence itself, but because runaways brought to book by the Maroons carried out the sentence, and these slaves enjoyed extracting their revenge. Even planters such as the wealthy John Tharp condemned the magistrates for passing that provocative sentence. The Maroons used this opportunity to revive their demands for more land, once again stating that ‘the land originally granted them for their subsistence was worn out, and being not sufficient for their support’. They added that ‘they therefore claim from the island an additional quantity of land, and say that the adjoining lands, the properties of messieurs Vaughan and Schaw, would suit them.’ The Maroons threatened to destroy the two plantations nearest to them and all the white people living there.  The ill-advised decision by the magistrates to have two Maroons whipped by former runaway slaves was the spark that converted a simmering dispute over land into outright war.

The planters, including Vaughan and Schaw, wanted to avoid war, and they suggested that Balcarres should agree to the request by the Maroons to revisit the law about public whippings, give the Maroons more land, and reinstate John James as superintendent at Trelawny Town. Vaughan was now prepared to sell some of his own land to Trelawny Town to avoid war. Craskell himself conceded that ‘if the measure of my removal would render the maroons a less troublesome body and a less dangerous one, by complying with their wishes, I shall most cheerfully acquiesce in it.’ When the governor appeared to delay on the point of reinstating John James, the custos of St James called on him to act urgently, because the Maroons believed that the delay was to ‘collect force’ and that they doubted ‘the

peaceable intent of the whites’. However, Balcarres resorted to a show of force against the Maroons, much to the displeasure of a number of planters in western Jamaica, who believed that the governor had over-reacted to the demands of the Trelawny Town Maroons. In July 1795, before the outbreak of war, Tharp worried that because of a ‘few trifling causes of discontent, the maroons were actually in a state of rebellion’. Bridges concluded that ‘the Maroon war would never had taken place had not the prevailing terror of the times enlarged the scene of action, by representing the danger much more serious than it really was.’ The planters of western Jamaica wanted to appease the Maroons by offering them more land in order to avoid conflict, but Balcarres overruled them and his over-reaction to the land crisis in Trelawny Town resulted in war.

Figure Eleven: Engraving of Captain Leonard Parkinson. Commissioned by Bryan Edwards, 1796. Parkinson was a captain of the Trelawny Town Maroons during the Second Maroon War.

A significant number of the Maroons of Trelawny Town also wanted to avoid a conflict with the colonial authorities. Vaughan, who lived near to Trelawny Town, claimed that there were divisions within the Maroon town about the wisdom of going to war.\(^{478}\) Six Maroon captains went to Spanish Town on the advice of a number of St James planters and magistrates to discuss their grievances and to seek a resolution, but Balcarres ordered their arrest and imprisonment and they stayed there for the duration of the war. Shortly afterwards, 37 Trelawny Town Maroons, including old Montague James, and two of his young captains, James Palmer and Leonard Parkinson (see Figure Eleven), went to Montego Bay to seek peace, but they were also imprisoned.\(^{479}\) The Maroons were keen to discuss peace terms, but when the governor imprisoned their representatives, war became inevitable.

After those arrests, the Maroons no longer trusted peace initiatives coming from the white colonial authorities. Craskell suggested that Palmer and Parkinson be sent back to Trelawny Town to convince the others to give up, but once those two captains had informed the rest of Trelawny Town how badly they were treated, the Maroons set fire to both of their towns and retreated into the Cockpit Country. Later, the colonial authorities released Montague James as a part of a peace initiative, but the Maroon colonel followed the examples of Palmer and Parkinson and refused to return.\(^{480}\) During the conflict, Trelawny Town Maroons made another peace overture to Colonel William Fitch, but when they discovered that Balcarres had ordered the transfer of their imprisoned colleagues to a ship, that initiative came to naught.\(^{481}\) Once the Maroons saw how Balcarres treated their leaders, they took up arms. According to Dallas, the Maroons were only ‘forced into hostilities on a

\(^{478}\) JAJ, Vol. 9, 22 September 1795, pp. 372-4.

\(^{479}\) Dallas, History of the Maroons, Vol. 1, pp. 172-5.


principle of self-preservation’.  

Balcarres missed an opportunity to avoid war when he arrested Maroons who sought a peaceful resolution.

The Second Maroon War

When the Second Maroon War broke out in 1795, the people of Trelawny Town found themselves isolated. The Maroons of Accompong Town declared their allegiance to the colonial authorities and they gained economically from that decision, while the Windward Maroons remained neutral. A number of other groups fought on the side of the colonial militias to gain improved rights, but despite the forces arrayed against them, the Trelawny Town Maroons suffered fewer casualties than the colonial militias in the guerrilla war that followed.

Maroons from Accompong Town maintain that a long-running dispute over the 1739 treaty was at the heart of the conflict between the Leeward Maroon towns. However, there was inter-mixing between these two Maroons towns; when the war broke out, a woman from Accompong Town was visiting Trelawny Town, and another Accompong woman had married a Trelawny Town man. Both women told Colonel George Walpole that ‘they were desirous of going to Accompong’ when the war ended, and the colonial authorities granted those requests.  

There is no evidence of an acrimonious relationship between Accompong Town and Trelawny Town in the years leading up to the Second Maroon War.

Accompong Town declared their support for the colonial authorities when the Second Maroon War began because they had more to gain financially from such an alliance, than from taking the side of Trelawny Town and potentially losing all their privileges. Dallas observed that ‘the Accompons…publicly testified their disapprobation of the people of Trelawney Town’. The Maroons of Trelawny Town appealed to Accompong Town for support, but the Accompong Maroons instead declared their allegiance to their

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superintendent, Alexander Forbes. In addition, Forbes had a financial interest in supporting the colonial authorities after he secured the contract to provide supplies to the soldiers fighting Trelawny Town. In the eighteenth century, there was competition between the Maroons of Accompong Town and those from Trelawny Town for the right to hunt runaways in western Jamaica. A planter in south St James or north Westmoreland putting together a team to hunt runaways could appeal for Maroon support from either Trelawny Town or Accompong Town, given their close proximity to each other. Thomas Thistlewood, who lived in Westmoreland, near Accompong Town, entertained Maroon hunters from Trelawny Town on several occasions in the eighteenth century. The Maroons of Accompong Town stood to gain economically from gaining sole rights to hunt runaways in western Jamaica.

The Maroons of Accompong Town proved their loyalty to the colonial authorities at the start of the conflict. John Stewart claimed that the Accompong Maroons withdrew from the Second Maroon War, because ‘they were at best a doubtful and unwilling ally’, while Craton believes they were neutral. The evidence refutes both conclusions, but fears persisted at the time of a potential alliance between the two Leeward towns. To thwart a feared Leeward alliance the governor sent the Thirteen Light Dragoons, under the command of Colonel Walpole, to Accompong Town as a precaution. When the regiment arrived, the Maroons of that Leeward town proved their loyalty by training Walpole’s men in the art of tracking. At the start of the Second Maroon War, the colonial authorities armed the

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486 Campbell, Maroons of Jamaica, pp. 219-220; Hart, Slaves Who Abolished Slavery, p. 177.

Maroon warriors from Accompong Town suffered significant losses in the Second Maroon War. When Forbes sent Accompong's Captain Chambers to Trelawny Town to persuade his Leeward brothers to surrender, Captain Palmer shot him, and cut off his head, an incident that most likely exacerbated relations between these two Leeward Maroon towns.\footnote{Lindsay, *Lives of the Lindsays*, Vol. III, p. 64; Dallas, *History of the Maroons*, Vol. 1, p. 205; Besson, *Transformations*, p. 44.} The Accompong warriors reported to Colonel William Fitch, a British Army officer who led the Eighty-Third (County of Dublin) Regiment of Foot, and who took up his post in Jamaica that same year. Half of this regiment went to St Domingue to try to capture the French colony, while Fitch led the other half in forays against Trelawny Town.\footnote{Edward Bray, *Memoirs and Services of the Eighty-third Regiment (County of Dublin) from 1793 to 1907* (London: Smith, Elder, 1863), pp. 2-3.} Newly arrived in Jamaica, Fitch did not listen to advice from his Accompong allies. In September 1795, Accompong Maroons Reid and Badnage advised Fitch in vain against progressing deeper into the Cockpit Country, and the Trelawny Town Maroons killed 18 in an ambush, including Fitch, Reid and Badnage.\footnote{Dallas, *History of the Maroons*, Vol. 1, pp. 220-6; Lindsay, *Lives of the Lindsays*, Vol. III, pp. 66-7; Hardwicke Papers, Vol. DLXVIII, Add. MS 35916, folio 184, 27 September 1795, Balcarres to Lady Hardwike; Stewart, *Island of Jamaica*, p. 13.} It is possible that Fitch underestimated Trelawny Town and the ability of their Maroons to fight an effective campaign.

Accompong Maroons earned an income from fighting against Trelawny Town. Maroons from Accompong Town were paid weekly salaries for the duration of the conflict.\footnote{VH AJ, 1797, Appendix XVIII, pp. 291-2.} The Assembly paid hundreds of pounds to the Accompong Maroons during the course of the war, including compensation to the families of Reid and Badnage.\footnote{JAJ, Vol. 9, 23 September 1795, p. 375, 30 September 1795, pp. 392-3; Dallas, *History of the Maroons*, Vol. 1, p. 230.} Maroons of Trelawny Town, who now live in Flagstaff as ‘Returned Maroons’, still call the Accompong Maroons...
traitors more than two centuries after the conflict. For Accompong warriors, the financial rewards of fighting for the colonial authorities outweighed any loyalty to their cousins in Trelawny Town.

Most of the Maroons in eastern Jamaica stayed neutral during the Second Maroon War, but the governor was suspicious of their intentions. Balcarres claimed that the Trelawny Town Maroons were trying to secure the assistance of the Windward Maroons, and called on the latter to reaffirm their loyalty. The Charles Town Maroons did so in September, but ‘a party of ten Maroons from Nanny Town’ visited the Trelawny Town rebels to express their support. Fearing that other Windward Maroons might follow suit, Balcarres ordered the relocation of a party of Charles Town Maroons to Kingston under the command of Sam Grant. However, they returned home shortly afterwards, complaining about insufficient rations. A decade later, it emerged that these Maroons relied on the advice of a rebellious obeah-man named Captain during the war, and that ‘when a part of the Charles-Town maroons afterwards went to Kingston, and left it without orders and in haste, it was at the insistence of Captain who sent for them.’ Balcarres later admitted his plan to invite Moore Town warriors to Kingston, trap them and deport them, failed when they did not stay, a narrative supported by the oral history of that Maroon town. Towards the end of the conflict, Balcarres accused the Windward Maroons of refusing to obey his orders. In March of 1796, when it became clear that the war was over, all Windward Maroon warriors ‘made their submission, and, on their knees, in the presence of commissioners, have sworn allegiance to his Majesty’.

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496 Interview with Flagstaff oral historian Michael Grizzle (27 April 2015); Interview with Flagstaff oral historian Michael Shaw (28 April 2015).
but the eventual surrender of the Trelawny Town Maroons broke their spirit, and they submitted to the authority of the governor and his Assembly.

Some individual Maroons from Trelawny Town and the Windwards aided the colonial authorities during the conflict. In 1796, the Assembly paid Captain William White from Charles Town £12 for services during the Second Maroon War. A year later, the Assembly paid another Charles Town Maroon, James Grant, probably the son of Sam Grant, £19 for ‘sundries supplied a party of militia’. A Trelawny Town captain named Thomas Shirley chose to fight against Maroons from his own town. Dallas claims Shirley offered his services freely, but there is evidence to show that the Assembly awarded him an annuity of £15 a year after the conflict. The colonial authorities allowed Shirley to stay and live in Jamaica, and he relocated to Charles Town with his family, where he served as a captain until his death just before the end of the century. A number of Maroons from several towns therefore followed the example of Accompong Maroons and earned an income by fighting against Trelawny Town.

The colonial authorities punished the Windward Maroon towns for delaying their declaration of support. In 1798, in the aftermath of the Second Maroon War, the Assembly passed a law banning them from using firearms. The Assembly’s decision to ignore the Windward Maroons when assembling parties to hunt runaway slaves not only financially hurt the Maroons, but also affected the earnings of their superintendents. These superintendents complained that their own personal earnings were suffering from the punishment meted out to their Maroons. At the start of the nineteenth century, a number of ‘magistrates, vestry, freeholders, and other inhabitants of Portland’ worried that this

503 JAJ, Vol. 9, 6 December 1796, p. 602.
504 JAJ, Vol. 10, 12 December 1797, p. 59, 18 December 1797, p. 76.
508 VHAJ, 16 November 1798, p. 68.
punitive action against the Windward Maroons had allowed ‘several bodies’ of runaways to be ‘secreted in the woods’, and that they ‘have in consequence become a great annoyance to the back settlers’. The petitioners from Portland suggested a reprieve, allowing the Windward Maroons to carry firearms once more, and ‘to go out in parties in search of runaways’. The petitioners feared that if the colonial authorities adopted ‘a contrary conduct’, it would ‘leave them open to the machinations of any incendiaries’. Through the Portland petitioners, the Windward Maroons pleaded with the Assembly ‘to place them on the same footing as they were before the rebellion of the Trelawny maroons, and they promise faithfully to conduct themselves as to merit the approbation of the house’. In 1804, the Assembly finally relented, and began to offer the Windward Maroons jobs hunting runaways once more. They had effectively disciplined the Windward Maroons for six years, by withdrawing financial payments for tasks such as hunting runaway slaves.

The Maroons of Accompong Town who fought on the side of the colonial authorities during the Second Maroon War reaped the benefits after its conclusion. In the years that followed the conflict, the Accompong Maroons had all the jobs when it came to hunting runaway slaves in western Jamaica. For the better part of a decade, the Assembly gave the Accompong Maroons the sole right to hunt runaway slaves in eastern Jamaica, which used to be the preserve of the Windward Maroons. At the end of 1797, the pay-bill for Maroons from that town alone had risen to over £290. However, Accompong Town only had 33 men capable of bearing arms after the Second Maroon War, and they were unable to effectively police the island’s forested interior. In the decade that followed the Second Maroon War a runaway named Cuffee was able to form a significant community in western Jamaica. The Maroons of Accompong Town supported the colonial authorities in return for sole rights to hunt runaway slaves, but their numbers were insufficient to police them

510 JAJ, Vol. 10, 22 November 1797, p. 29, 21 December 1797, p. 93.
511 JAJ, Vol. 10, 1 November 1797, p. 5.
512 Chapter Five, pp. 182-6.
effectively, which might help to explain why the colonial elite later restored the Windward Maroons to their former status.

The colonial elite rewarded the free men of colour who took part in the Second Maroon War by lifting some restrictions on their status.\textsuperscript{513} A minority of free men of colour took up arms for Trelawny Town, but most fought in the militia against the Maroons.\textsuperscript{514} A leading free coloured in nineteenth century Jamaica, Richard Hill, boasted that free black and ‘mulatto’ soldiers distinguished themselves to such an extent that the community of free coloureds were rewarded with ‘the right of testimony against Europeans in cases of assault’.\textsuperscript{515} In the eighteenth century, free men of colour forged a career in the militia in such numbers that the colonial authorities formed separate companies for them. A mulatto soldier named John Bruce reported that in November 1795 ‘the brown infantry company of the parish of Westmoreland’ engaged a party of Maroons and killed several of them.\textsuperscript{516} Mulattoes and free blacks, including Black Pioneers who had migrated to Jamaica after fighting on the side of the British in the American War of Independence, received annual pensions for fighting in the Second Maroon War. Some free black soldiers, like Thomas Hanlon, and the unnamed husband of Rebecca Blake, paid the ultimate price in the campaign against the Maroons, and their widows had to apply to the Assembly for assistance.\textsuperscript{517} Through their alliance with free men of colour, the white elite strove to protect


\textsuperscript{514} John Williams and another unnamed free coloured joined the Trelawny Town Maroons, and they tried to pass themselves off as Maroons when they surrendered after January 1, but without success (JAJ, Vol. 9, 20 April 1796, p. 495). In late 1796, Williams went on trial in Savanna-la-mar, and while it is unclear what happened to him, there are records of his incarceration there in April 1797 (VHAJ, 1796, Appendix XIX, p. 282, 12 December 1797, p. 285).


\textsuperscript{516} JAJ, Vol. 9, 2 March 1796, p. 436.

their dominance of Jamaican society. The colonial authorities rewarded the free coloureds for their loyalty by lifting some of the restrictions on them.

The colonial authorities failed to defeat Trelawny Town in battle because Maroon warriors used guerrilla tactics to win a number of skirmishes, much as their ancestors did during the First Maroon War (see Figure Twelve). When the conflict broke out, the governor did not expect the Maroons to offer much resistance. Balcarres ordered the Trelawny Town Maroons to submit themselves and beg for mercy, confident that ‘two or three hundred uneducated Maroons’ would be no match for the ‘twelve to fifteen hundred regular troops then at his command, supported by several thousands of militia’. Dallas wrote that ‘Lord Balcarres must have been entirely unacquainted with the Maroon mode of war’, and he

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519 Campbell, Maroons of Jamaica, pp. 216-7; Craton, Testing the Chains, p. 215.
clearly underestimated their fighting abilities.\textsuperscript{520} Stewart criticised the British army’s ‘absurdity to traverse the mountainous roads with drums beating’. He said that ‘the sound of these instruments could answer no other end than to warn the Maroons to keep out of the way, or to throw themselves into a convenient ambush’. In addition, ‘the red coats were too conspicuous an object to the Maroon marksmen, who seldom missed their aim.’\textsuperscript{521} W.J. Gardner pointed out that ‘the drum and fife gave warning of the lurking foe’.\textsuperscript{522} The colonial forces did not understand the guerrilla tactics employed by Trelawny Town.

The colonial authorities suffered greater casualties than the Maroons during the course of the Second Maroon War.\textsuperscript{523} The fighting began in August of 1795 when the Maroons attacked a free coloured militia party within a mile of Vaughansfield, and forced it to retreat with two dead and six wounded.\textsuperscript{524} When colonial militias tried to push further into the Cockpit Country from the occupied Trelawny Town, Maroon ambushes waylaid them, inflicting significant losses on the parties. One ambush resulted in the deaths of senior officers, including Colonel Sandford, Colonel Gallimore, and Lieutenant Tomlinson.\textsuperscript{525} In the first two weeks of the Second Maroon War, the Maroons had killed 65 soldiers, and after two months of fighting, ‘not a Maroon was known to be have been killed’, while the Maroons operated ‘almost without being seen’. In succeeding months, the Trelawny Town Maroons ambushed more parties, and among the militia dead were officers such as Major Godly and Lieutenant Richards. The colonial authorities suffered a number of setbacks in the fighting with the Maroons of Trelawny Town, and Balcarres explained them away by blaming them on the incompetence of his dead officers.\textsuperscript{526} In the first few months of the Second Maroon

\textsuperscript{520} Dallas, \textit{History of the Maroons}, Vol. 1, p. 175.
\textsuperscript{521} Stewart, \textit{Island of Jamaica}, p. 317.
\textsuperscript{524} Dallas, \textit{History of the Maroons}, Vol. 1, p. 185.
War, the colonial militias struggled to come to grips with the guerrilla tactics employed by the Trelawny Town Maroons.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Decrease</th>
<th>Increase</th>
<th>Number of Maroons</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total 1795</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stayed in Jamaica</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
<td>597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died on ship</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td>580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died in winter</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td>561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babies born Nova Scotia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number in 1797</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died in Second Maroon War</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table Nine: Numbers of Trelawny Town Maroons, 1795-7. In 1795, the Trelawny Town population numbered 655, broken down into 133 men, 201 women, and 321 children. Evidence not previously utilized by historians shows that 58 Trelawny Town Maroons stayed in Jamaica. In addition, 17 died on the ship’s journey from Jamaica to Nova Scotia, 19 died in the first Canadian winter, and five babies were born to Maroons in Nova Scotia. That meant that 566 Maroons should have been in Nova Scotia. In 1797, surgeon John Oxley counted 550 Maroons, which meant that the difference of 16 is the number who probably died during the Second Maroon War.

When a new commander took over the colonial militia, he also initially struggled to cope with Maroon tactics. Following the death of Fitch, the colonial authorities appointed George Walpole to the command of the forces arrayed against Trelawny Town. Walpole was an English aristocrat, the son of the earl of Orford; the grand-nephew of Britain’s first prime minister, Sir Robert Walpole; and grandson of William Cavendish, Duke of Devonshire. In

527 Chapter Four, pp. 153-4.
1792, George Walpole became lieutenant-colonel of the Thirteenth Light Dragoons, and he arrived in Jamaica in 1795 in command of this regiment. Initially, like Fitch before him, Walpole was unable to secure a significant military victory over Trelawny Town. An analysis of population statistics indicate that only about 16 Maroons died during the entire Second Maroon War (see Table Nine). It was not until November 1795 that Balcarres could report the rare good news that a militia party led by Lieutenant Williams had ‘killed seven of them and wounded many’. But the colonial forces failed to secure an outright victory against Trelawny Town in any engagement, and towards the end of the conflict Walpole reported that in about 20 skirmishes they had killed less than 32 Maroons in total. Walpole’s estimate was close to the probable true death toll, which indicated that the losses suffered by Trelawny Town during the Second Maroon War were much less than those experienced by the colonial forces.

The Second Maroon War adversely affected the plantation economy of western Jamaica by disrupting the business of growing sugar and coffee. Jacob Graham had taken possession of a coffee estate in rural St James after the First Maroon War at a place called Lapland. Graham’s estate was ruined by the Second Maroon War, and during the conflict he lost ‘all the houses, stores, and buildings on the said plantation, except the negro-houses, which they burnt and destroyed on the 22d October following’. In December, John Young complained that on his coffee plantation in rural Trelawny, ‘his dwelling-house, out-offices, and provision-grounds, were burnt down, and entirely destroyed’. Between August and November 1795, the Maroons plundered, burnt and destroyed plantations such as Schaw’s estate, Catadupa, Nairn, Ginger-hill, Kenmure, Mocha and Brandon. Plantations abandoned during the course of the conflict included Springfield, Lebanon, Auchindolly,

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533 JAJ, Vol. 9, 2-29 November 1796, pp. 534, 555, 569, 586.
Strahlia, Pantre-Pant and Coldspring. The Trelawny Town Maroons killed a number of white plantation owners and their workers and destroyed the crops at several estates, including Vaughansfield. Contemporaries complained about ‘the horrible barbarities of these savages’. It is not surprising, therefore, that a number of planters resorted to paying off Maroons in order to protect their estates. Maroons attacked and destroyed a number of plantations during the course of the Second Maroon War, killing many who worked there, in contrast to the colonial forces, who were unable to kill significant numbers of Maroons.

The successes of the colonial militias were limited mainly to the destruction of Maroon property. Early in the campaign, the militia occupied Trelawny Town, leading Balcarres to boast prematurely that they had defeated the Maroons. A further attack on Trelawny Town’s satellite town in Westmoreland only succeeded in destroying the houses of Captains Johnson and Andrew Smith, and they ‘carried their families to Trelawny Town, vowing vengeance and retaliation’. The Maroons just moved further inland to a place they called New Town, and they were able ‘to return to their haunts with very little risk to themselves’. Walpole claimed that ‘there seems to be little chance of any but a Maroon discovering a Maroon.’ In contrast with the Maroons, who destroyed plantations and killed their workers, the colonial militias only succeeded in burning down Maroon houses, which spurred Maroon retaliation.

The surrender of Trelawny Town

The course of the Second Maroon War turned when Walpole’s scorched-earth policy ensured that the Trelawny Town Maroons were unable to maintain their guerrilla campaign.

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536 CO 137/96, October 27, 1795, Balcarres to Portland; Campbell, Maroons of Jamaica, p. 225.
540 JAJ, Vol. 9, 29 March 1796, p. 461.
At the beginning of the conflict, the Maroons of Trelawny Town had sufficient provisions. On one raid on the Cockpit Country, soldiers found ‘ground provisions for more than six times their numbers’.\footnote{Lindsay, \textit{Lives of the Lindsays}, Vol. III, pp. 13-4, 57; Dallas, \textit{History of the Maroons}, Vol. 1, p. 234; JAJ, Vol. 9, 30 September 1795, p. 392; VHAJ, 6 March 1799, p. 57.} However, according to Dallas, once the rainy season finished at the end of 1795, Walpole sought to ‘deprive them of the resource of water’ in order to ‘secure an advantage that must tend to a termination of the war’.\footnote{Dallas, \textit{History of the Maroons}, Vol. 1, p. 179, pp. 244-5, Vol. 2, p. 138; Lindsay, \textit{Lives of the Lindsays}, Vol. III, p. 74.} In addition to dwindling water supplies, the Maroons suffered further when Balcarres instructed the militias to destroy their provisions grounds.\footnote{Lindsay, \textit{Lives of the Lindsays}, Vol. III, pp. 60-1, 77-8, 81; JAJ, Vol. 9, 2 March 1796, p. 441; Fortescue, \textit{The 17th Lancers}, p. 83.} Under Walpole, the colonial militias changed their tactics, and the Maroons of Trelawny Town suffered from a reduction in their supply of food and water. The Maroons were persuaded to finally surrender by the importation of hunting dogs from Cuba.\footnote{Campbell, \textit{Maroons of Jamaica}, p. 229.} The slaves were terrified of the Cuban dogs when they arrived on the Jamaican shores. According to Dallas, ‘the muzzled dogs with the heavy rattling chains ferociously making at every object, and forcibly dragging at the chasseurs, who could hardly restrain them, presented a scene of a tremendous nature, well calculated to give a most awful colouring to the report which would be conveyed to the Maroons.’ The Trelawny Town commander Johnson ‘received intelligence by some of the negroes, the certainty of which was afterwards evinced by the speedy information given to him of the arrival of the chasseurs’. Johnson had spies and supporters among the slaves, who transmitted information to him on a timely basis of the arrival of the hunting dogs and their handlers from Cuba. Before the dogs arrived, Johnson ‘thought himself equal to any force that could be brought against him: but no sooner did he hear of the arrival of the chasseurs, that he quitted his position’.\footnote{Dallas, \textit{History of the Maroons}, Vol. 2, pp. 120, 123, 126-7, 130.} While some Maroon bands fancied continuing the fight despite difficulties
with supplies of water and food, the arrival of hunting dogs convinced them that further fighting was futile.

The inability of the Trelawny Town Maroons to get a regular supply of ammunition hampered their attempts to prolong the fighting. In the 1830s, Maroons in Sierra Leone told visitors that the shortage of ammunition forced them to surrender.\(^{546}\) During the First Maroon War, Maroons had bought ammunition from black and Jewish confederates in the market place, but after the peace treaties, the Maroons had become dependent on the white colonial authorities for supplies of ammunition.\(^{547}\) When the colonial authorities cut off that supply, they were unable to go back to their previous sources of ammunition. Limited ammunition, combined with Walpole’s importation of hunting dogs from Cuba, added to the discomfort caused by attacks on Maroon food and water supplies, induced the Maroon surrender.


\(^{547}\) Campbell, *Maroons of Jamaica*, p. 73.

\(^{548}\) Edwards used this print to illustrate the surrender of the Maroons, but this is misleading, because it is from an original painting in the possession of Sir William Young Bart, which actually depicts the signing of the 1773
The process of surrender by the Maroons of Trelawny Town was a long, drawn-out affair, and they failed to meet the deadline imposed by the governor. Just before Christmas, Walpole offered terms of surrender to Montague James, and the colonel swore an oath that the colonial authorities would not transport the Maroons off the island (see Figure Thirteen). On 28 December 1795 however, Balcarres added a proviso, insisting that all the Maroons should surrender by New Year’s Day. On 1 January, Walpole had reported that ‘only Smith, Dunbar, Williams, and two boys, are here’, and had met the deadline for surrender. They took their time coming in, because most of them were suspicious of the ‘white faith’. By mid-February, the records showed that approximately 563 Maroons were in custody in Montego Bay, St Ann’s Bay, Falmouth and Kingston. Militia officers later rounded off that number to approximately 400, concluding that the excess Maroons were runaway slaves. Eventually, all the Trelawny Town Maroons surrendered, and the Second Maroon War ended, but they missed the initial deadline.

Governor Balcarres expressed the view that the colonial authorities should not allow the Trelawny Town Maroons to remain in the island, fearing a potential alliance between them and the other Maroon towns, and he used their delay in surrendering as an excuse to deport them from Jamaica. The governor exploited a loophole in the treaty, and, backed by the Assembly, the colonial authorities ruled that ‘all the Maroons who surrendered after the 1st of January, including Johnson and his party, ought to be shipped off the island.’ The Assembly voted 21-13 in favour of transporting the Trelawny Town Maroons to Nova

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peace treaty between the British crown and the so-called Black Caribs of St Vincent. [http://collections.rmg.co.uk/collections/objects/254622.html#IM0gXPZpRnBX1rX.99](http://collections.rmg.co.uk/collections/objects/254622.html#IM0gXPZpRnBX1rX.99) (Retrieved 10 August 2018).


550 JAJ, Vol. 9, 2 March 1796, p. 438.


Scotia, awarding £25,000 to cover expenses, and Balcarres shipped them off before waiting for the approval of the Colonial Office. Furious that his oath counted for nothing, Walpole turned down the offer of a commemorative sword from the Assembly, resigned his commission and went back to England, where he acquired a seat in the House of Commons. He continued to complain about the deportation, but to no avail. Balcarres used the lengthy delays experienced by the Trelawny Town Maroons in surrendering to overturn Walpole’s promise not to deport them.

Before the Second Maroon War, planters had argued in favour of appeasing the Maroons of Trelawny Town, but at the end of the conflict, contrary to McKee’s arguments, they whole-heartedly supported the governor’s decision to deport them. Thomas Coke proclaimed that the presence of Balcarres ‘was perhaps one of the happiest events which the island had ever experienced’. In a 1796 parliamentary debate, Bryan Edwards justified the decision to deport the Trelawny Town Maroons by claiming they had ‘violated their allegiance, and entered into a bloody and cruel war, without provocation’, and were, as a result, ‘unfit to remain in the island’. Edwards portrayed the Maroons as a group of savages who murdered ‘without mercy all such white persons as attempted to make any settlements near them, not even sparing even the women and children’. Robert Sewell, the island’s agent in Britain, said that the Trelawny Town Maroons were ‘delinquents, transported from thence for their crimes’. Once the Second Maroon War had ended, most planters of Jamaica supported Balcarres when he deported the majority of the Maroons of Trelawny Town.

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555 Campbell, Maroons of Jamaica, p. 236; McKee, ‘From violence to alliance’, pp. 15-7.
559 VHAJ, 8 November 1798, p. 34. Douglas Brymner, The Jamaica Maroons, How They Came to Nova Scotia, How They Left It (Ottawa: Royal Society of Canada, 1895), p. 87.
Historians and contemporary writers disagree on how many Maroons were deported, while the Colonial Office was uncertain. Most historians believe that the colonial authorities of Jamaica deported all but a handful of Trelawny Town Maroons to Nova Scotia in 1796. Even the oral histories of Accompong Town say that either all the Trelawny Town Maroons, or all but two men, were deported. Historians, contemporary writers and Maroon oral historians all believe that hardly any Trelawny Town Maroons escaped deportation.

Three groups of Trelawny Town Maroons who had surrendered before the conclusion of the Second Maroon War secured permission to stay in Jamaica. Balcarres demanded the surrender of Trelawny Town Maroons in August, and about ten percent of them complied. New evidence shows that in November 1795, three months after war broke out, 29 mulatto Maroons changed their status to free coloureds and left the Maroon town. That same month, the *Journals* reveal that the Assembly also allowed three petitioners and their families, totalling 10, to pursue new lives as free blacks in Trelawny. Edwards observed that another group of 14 Trelawny Town Maroons, mainly women, petitioned to relinquish their Maroon rights. The Assembly took the decision to grant this last petition at the end of the war, and supplied them with ‘clothing and suitable support’. These three groups of Maroons totalled 53, and the Assembly rewarded these Maroons with

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563 CO 137/95, folio 104, 8 August 1795.


565 VHAJ, 19 November 1796, pp. 69-70.


567 JAJ, Vol. 9, 14 December 1795, p. 421.
a £500 ‘donation’. In 1796, a matter of months after becoming free coloureds, the Jackson family were no longer able to rely on the communal Maroon life to survive, and complained to the Assembly that they were ‘without the means or abilities of supporting themselves’. The Assembly granted each of these 10 Maroons a pension of £10 each for the rest of their lives. Three groups of Maroons secured permission to stay in the island, but they had difficulty adapting to the challenges of surviving as free coloureds in nineteenth century Jamaica.

As many as 58 Trelawny Town Maroons avoided deportation to Nova Scotia and stayed in Jamaica, and those who stayed in the Maroon towns seemed to have fared better than those who renounced their status and became free coloureds. In addition to the 53 who became free blacks, some Trelawny Town Maroons eventually settled in Charles Town and Accompong Town with their children. The colonial authorities granted Thomas Shirley a pension for fighting against his native Trelawny Town, and allowed him to settle in Charles Town with his family. Those who went to Accompong Town were Ruth Dennis, Mary Shaw, Nancy (Ann) Grey, and Sarah Clarke. It is possible that the two women who asked permission to leave Trelawny Town and return to Accompong Town at the end of the conflict were among this group. They were lucky to escape deportation, because within hours of Walpole giving them permission to go to Accompong Town, Balcarres had issued orders for them to be sent to Montego Bay. Walpole then did not think it necessary to pursue them in Accompong Town, and Balcarres soon forgot about them. All four made their appearance in that Leeward town’s records of 1807, but the returns state that they had been claiming ‘the protection of Accompong-Town since 1796’.

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568 Edwards, Proceedings, p. 16.
569 JAJ, Vol. 9, 19 November 1796, p. 559.
571 JAJ, Vol. 9, 12 April 1796, p. 482; Dallas, History of the Maroons, Vol. 1, p. 187n.; VHAJ, 1 November 1796, p. 11, 26 July 1797, p. 11.
573 VHAJ, 1807, Appendix XXVII, p. 255, 1817, Appendix XLII, p. 299.
did not have to apply to the state for financial assistance, and they utilized the communal
Maroon land to support themselves. After the experience of the Trelawny Town Maroons
who became free coloureds, it is unsurprising that only a minority of Maroons followed their
example and renounced their Maroon status, preferring instead to stay within the relative
economic security of their communities.

The Second Maroon War threatened Jamaica’s economic prosperity, and the conflict
proved to be very expensive to the island.\textsuperscript{574} Gardner puts the overall cost of the War at half
a million pounds.\textsuperscript{575} During the conflict, towards the end of 1795, the Assembly imposed ‘a
tax by the poll, and on certain wheel-carriages, and on trades, supercargoes, and masters of
vessels, and on offices and houses, and applying the same towards defraying the expences
\textit{(sic)} occasioned by the present rebellion of the maroons of Trelawny-Town’. The Assembly
also applied to the British government for a loan of 200,000 guineas in order to make cash
payments towards bills arising out of the war.\textsuperscript{576} At the end of the conflict, the Assembly felt
that the free population of Jamaica had suffered from so much taxation during the Second
Maroon War, that they could not bear any further taxes.\textsuperscript{577} The defeat of the Maroons of
Trelawny Town came at considerable expense to the island’s administration.

In attempting to meet the expenses caused by the Second Maroon War, the
Assembly put the land of the Trelawny Town Maroons up for sale, ending any claims the
Maroons of Accompong Town had to it. In 1796, 1,200 acres of the land allocated to the
Trelawny Town Maroons did not fetch high prices.\textsuperscript{578} These lots went for less than 20
shillings an acre, ‘while some were sold as low as ten shillings an acre’, and total revenue
from the sale of the Trelawny Town lands came to £1,067 and 10 shillings. There is no

\textsuperscript{575} Gardner, \textit{History of Jamaica}, p. 236.
\textsuperscript{576} JAJ, Vol. 9, 22 December 1795, p. 434.
\textsuperscript{577} JAJ, Vol. 9, 5 March 1796, p. 445.
\textsuperscript{578} JAJ, Vol. 9, 23 April 1796, p. 509, Vol. 11, 12, 17 December 1804, pp. 270, 283, 18 December 1806, p. 546.
evidence explaining what happened to the remaining 300 acres. In 1809, Gilbert Mathison claimed that the land belonging to Trelawny Town was ‘useful only for provisions and timber’. McKee drew the conclusion that the land of Trelawny Town was not good for farming. However, while it was not suitable for sugar or coffee, it was arguably the most fertile land in the island and it produced the crops the Maroons required. The Maroons of Accompong Town wanted to add Trelawny Town’s 1,500 acres to their 1,000. To their disappointment, the colonial authorities ruled that the land belonging to Trelawny Town was ‘forfeited by their rebellion’. The Accompong Maroons, who helped to suppress the rebellion of their fellow Maroons, ironically lost their claim to the land of Trelawny Town when the colonial authorities sold it.

Conclusion

In the second half of the eighteenth century, the colonial authorities diverged from their previous policy of appeasing Maroon demands when handling land disputes with Trelawny Town. When the St Domingue revolt broke out, and Jamaican planters established sugar and coffee estates on western frontier lands to take advantage of the fall in production in the French colonies, they came into conflict with Trelawny Town. The failure of the colonial elite to resolve these disputes to the satisfaction of Trelawny Town led to the outbreak of the Second Maroon War. A prominent St James planter, Samuel Vaughan weakened the authority the Assembly had over Trelawny Town when he engineered the dismissal of John James, a superintendent respected by the Maroons. The colonial authorities then replaced him with the incompetent Craskell. When the Maroons expelled Craskell from Trelawny

582 Zips, Black Rebels, p. 125. The present-day Accompong Maroons claim that the colonial government promised the Leeward Maroons 15,000 acres, instead of the 1,500 acres listed in the treaty, and that when the first draft of the treaty went to Board of Trade and Plantations, a colonial administrator erased one of the zeroes (Carey, The Maroon Story, p. 337). This story seems apocryphal, because in the petitions of the eighteenth century, the Trelawny Town Maroons always spoke of their land as encompassing the smaller figure of 1,500 acres (JAJ, Vol. 6, 24 November 1770, p. 298, Vol. 9, 7 March 1792, p. 86).
583 JAJ, Vol. 9, 23 April 1796, p. 509.
Town, western planters initially preferred to placate their demands with more land, but Governor Balcarres falsely claimed that the St Domingue revolt instigated the Maroon uprising, and his overzealous show of force exacerbated a minor protest into a conflict that engulfed western Jamaica.

Trelawny Town fought the Second Maroon War with a number of disadvantages that did not exist during the First Maroon War. During the conflict of the 1730s, the Leeward Maroons could rely on support from other Maroon towns, the sale of gunpowder from Jewish merchants and free coloureds in the towns, and support from the runaway slaves. In the Second Maroon War, they could no longer get gunpowder from those sources. Trelawny Town failed to secure the support of the other Maroon towns, and Accompong Town even took up arms against them. The Maroons of Accompong Town benefitted economically from their allegiance with the colonial authorities, securing pay as soldiers and trackers against their Leeward brethren, and they enjoyed a short-term monopoly hunting runaways in the immediate aftermath of the Second Maroon War. The Windward Maroons remained neutral, effectively denying the Trelawny Town Maroons another potential ally. Chapter Five will show however, that though slave soldiers in the Black Shot did not desert to join Trelawny Town as they did during the First Maroon War, runaways still joined the rebel Maroons in large numbers. The Trelawny Town Maroons did not have a regular supply of ammunition, and though they won a number of skirmishes, they were unable to maintain the guerrilla campaign that had proved so successful in the First Maroon War.

The Maroons of Trelawny Town were not defeated in battle, but they surrendered largely because Walpole destroyed their provision grounds, brought in hunting dogs that frightened the Maroons, and he restricted their access to ammunition. The governor exploited a loophole in the terms of surrender to deport most Trelawny Town inhabitants. By removing Trelawny Town, the colonial authorities ensured that the remaining Maroon towns would be loyal allies in the nineteenth century. However, the deportation of Trelawny Town
left only one Maroon town in western Jamaica, and as Chapter Five will show, Accompong Town had difficulty controlling the growing problem of runaway slaves in western Jamaica.
PART TWO: THE SECOND MAROON WAR AND NINETEENTH CENTURY JAMAICA

CHAPTER FIVE: RUNAWAYS IN THE WEST

This chapter will argue that in the nineteenth century, increasingly larger numbers of slaves ran away to secure their freedom in the forested mountains of western Jamaica. In the eighteenth century, the spirit of marronage thrived in eastern Jamaica, and inspired by the tradition of Jack Mansong’s gang, large groups of runaway slaves continued to set up communities in south-eastern Jamaica in the following century. In contrast, western Jamaica did not experience a wide-scale establishment of significant communities of runaway slaves in the eighteenth century, but during and after the Second Maroon War of 1795-6, runaways escaped to the Cockpit Country, changing the course of the history of marronage in that region. Abram Dridzo and David Geggus state that while the St Domingue revolt was taking place in the neighbouring French colony there was no sign of rebellion in Jamaica. However, this chapter will show that historians have hitherto ignored the impact of marronage in western Jamaica, and that the Second Maroon War is a misnomer because runaway slaves outnumbered Maroons by two to one or even three to one as they fought on the side of Trelawny Town against the colonial militias. After the Second Maroon War, the colonial authorities deported most of the population of the larger of the two Leeward Maroon towns, unwittingly creating ideal circumstances for slaves to run away and form communities in the forested interior. Following the conflict, communities of runaway slaves grew in number in western Jamaica, and matched the problem of runaways in the eastern end of the island.

After the 1739 treaty, the colonial authorities and the planters relied on the Leeward Maroons to police the mountainous Cockpit Country. Chapter Three shows that in the eighteenth century, problems with runaway slaves occurred mainly in eastern Jamaica, while Assembly records had no reports of runaways forming communities in the western end of the island. The authorities devoted more attention to perceived threats from the larger communities of runaways led by Ancoma and Three-Fingered Jack, than they did to the smaller groups in western Jamaica. Mavis Campbell describes the small Congo Settlement, which survived in the Cockpit Country in the 1770s, but maintains that the presence of the Maroons of Trelawny Town inhibited most runaways from forming large communities in western Jamaica. Helen McKee argues that communities like the Congo Settlement could only exist if the Maroons allowed them to do so. This chapter will show that the Maroons were only partially successful in crushing the small number of runaway communities in western Jamaica in the eighteenth century, and that the runaway communities grew significantly when the Second Maroon War broke out.

Many historians claim that the Maroons had alienated the slaves by hunting runaways, and consequently they refused to support the Maroons, and that is why Trelawny Town lost the Second Maroon War. They argue that the Maroons succeeded in the First Maroon War because they had the support of the runaway slaves, but failed in the Second Maroon War because they had betrayed them to their white masters. At the start of the

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585 The Importance of Jamaica to Great-Britain, Consider’d (London: A. Dodd, c. 1740), p. 20.
Second Maroon War, the Earl of Balcarres, the governor of Jamaica, claimed that if the colonial militias were successful in destroying the provision grounds of the Maroons, they would have to resort to raiding those belonging to the slaves, consequently worsening the rift between these two groups. Alan Burns, Geggus and Campbell accept the governor’s line of reasoning at face value. This chapter will present evidence to show that the government forces also destroyed the provisions of the slaves in equal measure, and that the militias alienated the slaves as well. Michael Mullin argues that contemporaries at the time did not believe that the Maroons and the slaves were natural enemies, and he states that most slaves would become Maroons if they could. This chapter will build on Mullin’s interpretation, and posit the view that though there was an adversarial relationship between the Maroons and the slaves in the second half of the eighteenth century, once the Second Maroon War broke out slaves ran away to fight on the side of Trelawny Town.

Any animosity between the Maroons and the slaves during the course of the eighteenth century did not prevent them from seeking alliances, and the slaves utilized the Second Maroon War as a means of resisting slavery. Geggus, Richard Hart and Richard Gott all note cases of slaves trying in vain to get Maroon support for rebellions. This chapter will show how that situation changed during the Second Maroon War, when Trelawny Town assisted runaway slaves. Geggus argues that while Jamaican slaves were probably aware of the ramifications of the St Domingue revolt, the presence of record levels of British troops in the West Indies prevented a similar rebellion from occurring in Jamaica, and that the British colony was relatively peaceful in the 1790s. However, this chapter will


present evidence to argue that slaves expressed their resistance by running away to Trelawny Town during the Second Maroon War, where they then fought for their freedom.

Most historians believe that the slaves did not support the Trelawny Town Maroons at all during the Second Maroon War, or that only a small number fought on their side. Dridzo and Eugene Genovese claim that the Maroons of Trelawny Town fought alone, without support from runaway slaves. Dridzo, ‘A Planter’s Conspiracy?’, p. 25; Genovese, From Rebellion to Revolution, p. 68. Daniel Schafer, Campbell and Geggus maintain that the numbers of runaways who supported the Trelawny Town Maroons were not significant. Schafer, ‘Maroons of Jamaica’, p. 191; Geggus, ‘The Enigma of Jamaica’, pp. 279, 288; Campbell, Maroons of Jamaica, p. 222.

Helen McKee said that just a few hundred runaway slaves joined the Maroons, while Gott and Michael Craton claim that no more than 200 runaway slaves fought on the side of Trelawny Town in the Second Maroon War, indicating that this was only a small number of runaways. Michael Craton, Testing the Chains: Resistance to Slavery in the British West Indies (New York: Cornell University Press, 1982), p. 211; Gott, Britain’s Empire, p. 116; McKee, ‘Negotiating Freedom’, p. 55.

However, even that number of runaways would outnumber their Maroon allies. This chapter will point out that Trelawny Town had less than 150 men capable of bearing arms, and that the numbers of runaway slaves fighting on their side could have been as many as 400.

This chapter will posit the view that marronage grew significantly in western Jamaica after the Second Maroon War. Geggus distinguishes between the runaways who made up a community led by a runaway slave named Cuffee and the Maroons of Accompong Town that they fought, arguing that Cuffee’s band comprised ‘maroons’ who formed a community in the land vacated by the Trelawny Maroons, and lived as the latter had before they came to terms. David Geggus, ‘Enigma of Jamaica’, pp. 275n, 285-6. Geggus describes the Maroons who came to terms after the First Maroon War as ‘Maroons’ with a capital ‘M’, while he classifies runaway slaves who formed communities after 1740 as ‘maroons’ with a small ‘m’.

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593 Dridzo, ‘A Planter’s Conspiracy?’, p. 25; Genovese, From Rebellion to Revolution, p. 68.
596 David Geggus, ‘Enigma of Jamaica’, pp. 275n, 285-6. Geggus describes the Maroons who came to terms after the First Maroon War as ‘Maroons’ with a capital ‘M’, while he classifies runaway slaves who formed communities after 1740 as ‘maroons’ with a small ‘m’.
colonial authorities. This chapter will refute this argument, suggesting instead that large numbers of runaways who fought for Trelawny Town did not surrender, but joined Cuffee’s community. Whereas slaves did not run away in western Jamaica in significant numbers in the second half of the eighteenth century, the Second Maroon War created opportunities for large numbers of runaways who were prepared to escape from slavery and establish independent communities in the Cockpit Country.

This chapter will argue that marronage had a significant impact on western Jamaica after the Second Maroon War. Contemporary and twentieth century writers have downplayed the numbers of runaway slaves in Cuffee’s community, claiming this as further proof that the runaways did not support the Maroons in significant numbers. Orlando Patterson and Hart both accept claims by contemporaries such as Bryan Edwards that Cuffee was a minor runaway leader of a small number of men. This chapter will show instead that Cuffee’s runaway community acted as a magnet for large numbers of slaves seeking to escape in western Jamaica, and that, in the years the followed, more runaway communities formed in that part of the island. When the colonial authorities deported the larger of the two Leeward Maroon towns, the smaller Accompong Town was unable to police growing numbers of western runaways. The culture of resistance changed significantly from one where there was little marronage in eighteenth century western Jamaica to a situation where large numbers of slaves were prepared to defy the white colonial elite and their Maroon allies to establish communities in the Cockpit Country.

In the eighteenth century, Windward Maroon towns encountered significant resistance from runaway communities in eastern Jamaica, led by notorious escaped slaves such as Jack Mansong. In the nineteenth century, runaway slaves continued to form

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597 Campbell, Maroons of Jamaica, p. 227.
599 Chapter Three, pp. 107-117.
communities in the south-eastern end of the island, in the arid, undeveloped shrubs of Healthshire (now called Hellshire). Hundreds of escaped slaves lived in this Healthshire community, which comprised arguably the largest runaway community since the Second Maroon War. This chapter will show that runaways in the Healthshire community outnumbered the Maroon warriors of eastern Jamaica. The existence of the Healthshire community, and other runaway groups in eastern Jamaica, meant that despite the presence of the Windward Maroon towns of Moore Town, Charles Town and Scott's Hall in the Blue Mountain range, slaves were still able to run away and form independent communities in eastern Jamaica.

While the Maroons were efficient in suppressing the Sam Sharpe Rebellion, they were less successful in hunting runaway slaves who took advantage of this uprising. Mary Turner makes no mention at all of Maroon involvement in the Sam Sharpe Rebellion, while Patterson points out that the Maroons helped to suppress all revolts, and Craton argues that the Maroons played an important role in crushing the rebellion. None of these historians analyse how successful the Maroons were when they hunted the runaways that resulted from the Sam Sharpe Rebellion. Hart claims that Sam Sharpe would not have been able to form a separate community of runaway slaves in the Cockpit Country because of the existence of the Maroons of Accompong Town. Campbell states that none of the runaway communities survived up to emancipation, thanks to the Maroons who effectively hunted them down on behalf of the colonial authorities. This chapter will present evidence from the Journals and Votes of the House of the Assembly to show that when the governor called up the Maroons they performed their task effectively, but that they were not successful in hunting runaway slaves after the Sam Sharpe Rebellion.

601 Patterson, Sociology, p. 281; Craton, Testing the Chains, p. 311-2.
603 Campbell, Maroons of Jamaica, p. 159.
Western Runaways in the eighteenth century

During the second half of the eighteenth century, runaway communities in western Jamaica were smaller in number and size than those that troubled the colonial authorities in the eastern end of the island. R.C. Dallas stated that in the 1770s a community of runaway slaves called the Congo Settlement formed in the Cockpit Country, until the Maroons of Accompong Town eventually broke it up two decades later. Dallas noted that ‘notwithstanding the vigilance and activity with which fugitives were pursued by the Maroons, a small body of them did actually establish themselves in the mountains, where they had raised huts, and made provision-grounds, on which some had lived for upwards of twenty years.’ According to Dallas, ‘the Congo Settlement was discovered in the late war by a party of Maroons crossing the country, and was dispersed.’ It was not therefore until the Second Maroon War that Accompong Maroons discovered this community of runaways, while they were fighting their Leeward Maroon cousins from Trelawny Town. Dallas, who praised the Maroons for hunting runaways, admitted that they had not succeeded in preventing this community from forming. He noted that once the Maroons had dispersed these communities, some runaways returned ‘to the estates which they formerly belonged’, while others surrendered with the Trelawny Town Maroons at the termination of the Second Maroon War. However, Dallas is the only contemporary writer to discuss the Congo Settlement, and there are no complaints about this community in the records of the Assembly and the governor. The colonial elite were apparently indifferent about the formation of the Congo Settlement, and they probably transmitted this lack of concern to the Leeward Maroons, who saw no need to hunt these runaways if the authorities were not prepared to pay them to do so. When these groups were small, the colonial authorities did not seem to have considered it to be worth the expense to seek out and destroy them.

In the 1790s, there was another community of runaway slaves which was so small the colonial authorities once again did not summon the Leeward Maroons to disperse it. A runaway slave named Brutus escaped from a workhouse in the parish of Trelawny and formed a settlement in the mountains with 18 other runaways. New evidence shows that the community existed untroubled for months, and from there Brutus even conspired with estate slaves to launch attacks on the white population. Another dozen runaways formed another community under the leadership of an escaped slave named Quashey, who later merged his group with Brutus’ own. From their vantage point in the hills, they could ‘see many settlements in this parish’, and therefore be in a position to react to any parties sent after them. While the Assembly put up financial rewards for the capture or killing of leaders of eastern runaway communities, they did not offer rewards for the capture of Brutus or Quashey. Western planters raised concerns about these groups, but it was largely the militia, and not the Leeward Maroons, who took limited action against them. The militia eventually captured Brutus, but there is no evidence that they apprehended any other members of his community. In the 1790s, the colonial authorities were more worried about the slave revolt in the nearby French colony of St Domingue than in sending expeditions against these western runaways. The colonial authorities treated runaway communities in eastern Jamaica more seriously than the small western groups, probably because the western runaways were smaller and therefore less threatening to planter activities.

Despite the Maroon practice of hunting runaway slaves for half a century, these runaways were quite prepared to ally themselves with Trelawny Town once war had broken out. Successful runaways such as Brutus served as an inspiration to other slaves seeking freedom. Planters acknowledged that some of the runaways who surrendered after the

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607 CO 137/90, folio 404, 2 February 1792, Balcarres to Dundas; Geggus, ‘The Enigma of Jamaica’, p. 277.
608 Paton, No Bond, p. 27.
Second Maroon War had been ‘missing from the estates for years’. Their absence pre-dated the Second Maroon War and these escaped slaves may have come from the communities of Brutus and Quashey. The Trelawny Town Maroons and these long-term runaways fought alongside each other during the Second Maroon War. The Maroons of Trelawny Town were unsuccessful in tracking down these runaway slaves before the Second Maroon War, but once the conflict broke out they were able to find each other and form alliances. Chapter Three shows that the Maroons were not efficient hunters of runaway slaves largely because the financial rewards were not a significant inducement.

Insufficient financial arrangements may have contributed to the lacklustre approach from the Maroons to hunting these small groups of western runaways. In addition, the Accompong Maroons were the ones who broke up the Congo Settlement, so it is not surprising that runaways from this Settlement, and the communities of Brutus and Quashey, went on to fight for Trelawny Town in the Second Maroon War. During this conflict, Trelawny Town were the opponents of the Accompong Maroons, and runaway slaves allied themselves with the Maroon town that offered them the best opportunity for freedom.

Some contemporary writers were of the view that there was great animosity between the slaves and the Maroons, because the latter made a profession out of hunting runaways. Planters made those claims from as early as 1742, when Cudjoe and Maroons from Trelawny Town helped the colonial authorities to put down a slave revolt. A committee reporting to the Assembly gloated that ‘the Coromantee slaves, the most turbulent nation of the negroes, are convinced by it, that they have nothing to trust from them, but to be delivered up, and put to death, if they make any efforts for their liberty’. Writing at the end of the eighteenth century, Dallas alleged that ‘the general animosity between the Maroons and the slaves, resulting from the office of the former in apprehending the latter, had been

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610 Chapter Three, pp. 101-7.
invariably maintained from the time of their treaty. Colonial writers, before and after the Second Maroon War, claimed that the black slaves were sworn enemies of the Maroons and would not cooperate with Trelawny Town during the conflict.

There was some animosity between the Maroons and the slaves arising from the Maroon practice of hunting runaways. Even as late as the 1930s, a white man who lived in Moore Town wrote that the Maroons looked down on black Jamaicans because of their more recent slave ancestry, and called them a ‘down-trodden race’. There are also several recorded cases of slaves siding with the white colonial authorities against the Maroons. During the Second Maroon War, the Maroons captured slaves, but some of them escaped their clutches, found their way back to their estates, and warned their owners. It is possible that these slaves had actually joined the Trelawny Town Maroons, but changed their story in order to minimise the possibility of punishment once recaptured by white planters.

At the end of the Second Maroon War, Balcarres and some of his officers maintained that the Maroons eventually agreed to deportation, because, if freed, the Maroons feared that the slaves and free coloureds hated them so much they would cut the Maroons to pieces. This claim was unfounded. New evidence shows that as many as 58 Trelawny Town Maroons did indeed stay in Jamaica, and they did not come to harm. In fact, a large number of these Trelawny Town Maroons actually renounced their Maroon status, became

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614 Jeffrey Fortin claims that Maroons continued to raid plantations for food and women in the latter half of the eighteenth century, and that white men were required to live in the Maroon towns to stop such raids [“An Act of Deportation”: The Jamaican Maroons’ Journey from Freedom to Slavery and Back Again, 1796-1836', *Paths of the Atlantic slave trade; interactions, identities and images* (New York: Cumbria Press, 2011), p. 78; “Blackened Beyond Our Native Hue”: Removal, Identity and the Trelawney Maroons on the Margins of the Atlantic World, 1796-1800’, *Citizenship Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2006), p. 9]. However, there is no evidence to support that assertion.
free coloureds, and merged with Jamaica’s free black population.617 These Maroons had no
difficulty merging with the free black population, and do not seem to have come to harm.

A significant number of black slaves secured their freedom by fighting for the colonial
authorities against slave rebellions, and they did not desert during the Second Maroon War.
Slaves fought in regiments such as the Black Shot against other groups of rebels and
runaways. When these slaves died in action, planters often claimed compensation for these
losses from the Assembly.618 During the First Maroon War, many members of the Black Shot
deserted to join the Maroons in their free communities in the mountains.619 However, Black
Shot slaves remained loyal to the colonial authorities during the Second Maroon War.620 A
number of slaves distinguished themselves fighting the Maroons, and the Assembly
rewarded the families of those who fell in combat.621 In return, Trelawny Town Maroon
parties ambushed and killed slaves who fought alongside their white masters.622 In the
system of bondage that existed in Jamaica, slaves were able to use the Black Shot to
improve their lives and those of their families. In addition, many Black Shot slave fighters no
longer saw desertion to Trelawny Town as an avenue to freedom.

The animosity between slaves and Maroons over the hunting of runaways did not
stop some rebel slaves from seeking to forge alliances with the Maroons in the century that
followed the treaties of 1739 and 1740. During the course of a slave conspiracy in Hanover
in 1776, the slaves tried to get the support of the Maroons of Trelawny Town. Unsurprisingly,
those attempts failed, and the Leeward Maroons allied themselves with the colonial
authorities when news of the conspiracy broke. Only two individual Maroons joined the
rebellion, and the Maroon leaders handed them over to the colonial authorities for trial. In the
end, the courts acquitted both Maroons and threw out the slave informant’s testimony.623 It is

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617 Chapter Four, pp. 152-3.
618 JAJ, Vol. 4, 26 April 1755, p. 511; Vincent Brown, *The Reaper’s Garden: Death and Power in the World of
621 JAJ, Vol. 9, 17 December 1795, p. 425, 22-4 March 1796, pp. 455-6, 469.
possible that the colonial authorities reached that verdict, because they wanted to maintain good relations with the Maroons who were their allies against slave rebellions. In 1791, the organisers of a planned slave uprising in western Jamaica once again tried to get the Trelawny Town Maroons on their side. The rebels were then ‘astonished to see (the Maroons) join the companies in the Square’ in the heart of Montego Bay, to help put down the potential slave uprising.\footnote{CO 137/90, folios 139-140, 1791, ‘Of an intended insurrection of the Negroes and the confession of Duncan’.


During the Sam Sharpe Rebellion of 1831-2, the rebel general Gardner attempted to get the support of the Maroons of Accompong Town, but Maroon Colonel Andrew White and Superintendent John Hylton handed over Gardner’s emissaries to the St Elizabeth regiment, and they were eventually tried at YS Estate and shot.\footnote{Theodore Foulks, \textit{Eighteen Months in Jamaica; With Recollections of the Late Rebellion} (London: Whittaker, Treacher, and Arnott, 1833), p. 88; Votes of the House of the Assembly (VHAJ), 13 November 1834, p. 152; Gardner, \textit{History of Jamaica}, p. 276.\footnote{Lindsay, \textit{Lives of the Lindsays}, Vol. III, pp. 22, 60; Dallas, \textit{History of the Maroons}, Vol. 1, pp. 126-7.\footnote{VHAJ, 1829, Appendix LVII, p. 490. In \textit{Liberty’s Exiles: The Loss of America and the Remaking of the British Empire} (London: Harper Press, 2011), p. 269, Maya Jasanoff alleges that the source of the Trelawny Town Maroons’ anger came from legislation by the Assembly to keep them apart from the slaves. There is no evidence to support that theory.}} For decades after the Maroons signed the treaty of 1739, many slaves rising in revolt believed that their best chances of success lay in getting the support of the Maroons, and they often pursued that avenue, no matter how unlikely it was that they were going to succeed, and despite the evidence that the Maroons consistently supported the colonial authorities.

There were instances of close relationships between the Maroons and the slaves in the years leading up to the Second Maroon War. In common with the plantation owners and their white employees, the Maroons often entered into sexual liaisons with slaves on neighbouring estates. Contemporary writers alleged that about 20 slave women on the York estate and a similar number at the Canaan estate had children by Maroon men.\footnote{Lindsay, \textit{Lives of the Lindsays}, Vol. III, pp. 22, 60; Dallas, \textit{History of the Maroons}, Vol. 1, pp. 126-7.\footnote{VHAJ, 1829, Appendix LVII, p. 490. In \textit{Liberty’s Exiles: The Loss of America and the Remaking of the British Empire} (London: Harper Press, 2011), p. 269, Maya Jasanoff alleges that the source of the Trelawny Town Maroons’ anger came from legislation by the Assembly to keep them apart from the slaves. There is no evidence to support that theory.}} Years later, one superintendent claimed that these liaisons compromised the loyalty of these Maroon men, who ‘cannot easily be induced to take up the estates’ negroes bordering on their town (because) they are too intimate and friendly’.\footnote{VHAJ, 1829, Appendix LVII, p. 490. In \textit{Liberty’s Exiles: The Loss of America and the Remaking of the British Empire} (London: Harper Press, 2011), p. 269, Maya Jasanoff alleges that the source of the Trelawny Town Maroons’ anger came from legislation by the Assembly to keep them apart from the slaves. There is no evidence to support that theory.} According to a slave who later gave evidence, the main reason determining whether the slaves joined the revolt or not had
little to do with any resentment towards the slave-hunting practices of the Maroons, but more
to do with their chances of success, and fears about what would happen to them ‘if the
whites got the upper hand’.628 There is evidence of Maroons forging relationships with
slaves, but the many members of the latter group were fearful about what would happen to
them if they supported a failed revolt.

Table Ten: The Leeward Maroon men in the eighteenth century. The men capable of bearing arms from Trelawny Town outnumbered those from Accompong Town throughout the century.629

In the eighteenth century, only small numbers of runaways flocked to the Cockpit
Country. While Trelawny Town existed, there was a large number of Maroon men capable of
bearing arms in western Jamaica and available to hunt runaway slaves, but when the
colonial authorities deported them the much smaller Accompong Town did not have the
manpower to police the forested mountains of the Cockpit Country. Analysis of the Maroon
populations in the eighteenth century shows that in the two western official Maroon towns of
Trelawny Town and Accompong Town, the number of Leeward Maroon men capable of
bearing arms fluctuated between 132 and 166 (see Table Ten). The vast majority of those
men belonged to Trelawny Town; of the 166 Leewards men capable of bearing arms in the

629 Edward Long papers, Add. MS 12435, folio 19; Lindsay, Lives of the Lindsays, Vol. III, p. 52; JAJ, Vol. 6, 8
1790s, 133 belonged to Trelawny Town and only 33 to Accompong Town. The deportation of the Trelawny Town Maroons significantly reduced the number of Maroon men available to keep runaway slaves from forming communities in the nineteenth century.

Runaways during the Second Maroon War

The picture of slave resistance in western Jamaica changed during the course of the Second Maroon War, when hundreds of slaves flocked to Trelawny Town to fight for the Maroons. When the Second Maroon War broke out in 1795, many planters expressed fears that if the Maroons were successful in their rebellion, large numbers of runaway slaves would flee the estates to join them. Dallas worried that the Maroon cause would become ‘a rallying point for every discontented slave’. The governor was afraid that ‘half the negroes on every estate were ready to revolt’. Balcarres and the planters in western Jamaica noticed that slaves were becoming restive, and expressed concern that they would rally to the banner of the Trelawny Town Maroons. Trelawny Town Superintendent Thomas Craskell admitted that ‘from the general intercourse which the Maroons have with the plantation negroes all over the country, they might influence a considerable part, if not all of them.’ The custos of Trelawny, John Tharp, and another governor-appointed official, Accompong Town Superintendent Alexander Forbes, both echoed Craskell’s fears. On the eve of the Second Maroon War, the colonial elite no longer boasted about the chasm between the slaves and Maroons, but instead expressed concern about slaves running away to fight on the side of Trelawny Town.

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Colonial writers continued to voice fears about escaped slaves fighting for Trelawny Town throughout the Second Maroon War itself. Balcarres admitted in a dispatch to the Duke of Portland that the Maroons were ‘a power commanding at their pleasure the aid of the plantation negroes’. The governor expressed concern that ‘there are many disaffected negroes all around them, not naturally so but all corrupted by them.’ Other Jamaican planters echoed the governor’s fears. Thomas Barritt worried about ‘slaves running away from three or four estates’, and claimed that they had ‘joined the said Maroons’. Thomas Coke, a contemporary writer, complained that ‘many of the fugitive slaves had been seduced by them’. Edwards worried that the Maroons would ‘increase by runaways’, and even if ‘you destroy them to five, those five will be a rallying point for more runaways to resort to’. A planter named Shirley wrote to the governor about ‘slaves who have joined the Maroons’, but Balcarres claimed that most of those slaves had afterwards returned. The Assembly echoed the governor’s concerns in reports they received about slaves running away to join the Maroons from estates such as Catadupa, Lapland and Kenmure, and other places of business, such as the houses of carpenters. During the course of the Second Maroon War, planters complained about slaves deserting their plantations for Trelawny Town.

The colonial authorities received persistent reports of runaway slaves fighting on the side of Trelawny Town. By the end of 1795, after five months of fighting, Balcarres acknowledged that any loss sustained by the Trelawny Town Maroons ‘has not been felt much, as their numbers of fighting-men are recruited by Coromantee runaways, who have joined them’. The Assembly reported that during the conflict a runaway named Bowman

635 Hardwicke Papers, Vol. DLXVIII, Add. MS 35916, folio 184, 27 September 1795, Balcarres to Countess of Hardwike.
640 JAJ, Vol. 9, 2-4, 9 November 1796, pp. 534-8, 541.
destroyed plantations and did ‘infinite mischief’.\textsuperscript{642} Balcarres wrote about the capturing of ‘a runaway negro, who had voluntarily joined the Maroons and left them this morning’. The Maroon leader Johnson promoted two runaways named Cudjoe and Casacrui to the rank of captain. The militia killed another escaped slave fighting for the Trelawny Town Maroons, and the Assembly started offering monetary rewards for the capture and killing of runaways.\textsuperscript{643} Once the Assembly had procured dogs from Cuba, the animals and their handlers captured a runaway who had joined the Maroons. Dallas admits that the failure of the authorities to score any victory against the Trelawny Town Maroons in any engagement led to reports that a ‘very large body’ of slaves intended to run away and join them.\textsuperscript{644} Reports of runaways fighting on the side of Trelawny Town inspired more slaves to escape from the estates for the lure of freedom in the Cockpit Country.

The Jamaican government practice of destroying the provisions grounds on the estates would have angered many of the slaves who tended and developed their crops on these plots of land. Balcarres claimed that when the Maroons destroyed the provisions grounds on the estates in their raids they alienated the slaves.\textsuperscript{645} However, the militias spent a lot of time destroying the provisions grounds belonging to slaves on the neighbouring estates, on the governor’s orders, to prevent them from falling into the hands of the Maroons. Petitioners Isaac Lascelles Winn, and his nephews Richard and William Hillary, complained that Walpole ‘ordered the provisions on their settlement, called Lebanon, to be destroyed’. John Stirling and William Gordon also pointed out that Walpole had destroyed the provisions grounds on their estate, and petitioned for compensation. Laetitia Mahony protested that Colonel Lawrence of the Westmoreland regiment ordered that ‘such provisions should be dug up and destroyed, in order to prevent the maroons from deriving any benefit from them’.\textsuperscript{646} The \textit{Journals of the Assembly of Jamaica} do not report how the


\textsuperscript{644} Dallas, \textit{History of the Maroons}, Vol. 2, pp. 131, 161.


\textsuperscript{646} JAJ, Vol. 9, 22-4 November 1796, pp. 562-3, 571, 1 December 1796, p. 594; Hardwicke Papers, Vol. DLXVIII, Add. MS 35916, folio 200, 23 May 1796, Balcarres to Foster Barham.
slaves felt about the militia destroying their provisions grounds, but it is likely that these actions would have alienated large numbers of them, who then saw an allegiance with the Maroons of Trelawny Town as an opportunity to secure their freedom.

Some contemporaries maintained that the number of runaway slaves who supported the Maroons of Trelawny Town was not significant. Dallas initially believed that the Maroons would find slaves more likely to join them in places like Clarendon, rather than in areas where they had recaptured runaways, such as western Jamaica. This writer claimed that western slaves would display greater animosity towards the Trelawny Town Maroons than those from central parishes such as Clarendon. Dallas stated that only about 100 slaves joined the Trelawny Town Maroons during this war. However, that assumption proved to be false, because the Trelawny Town Maroons received a lot of support from runaway slaves in the western parishes. At the start of the War, Balcarres wrote that ‘forty negroes are missing from one estate; it is possible they may have joined the Trelawney Maroons.’ He later expressed concerns about another 54 joined the Trelawny Town Maroons from St Elizabeth. Dallas himself notes another instance when 40 runaway slaves joined the Maroon party led by Johnson. Craskell’s assistant, John Merody, eavesdropped on a conversation between two Trelawny Town Maroons which revealed ‘that about one hundred estate negroes were ready and willing to join them’. Two free mulatto carpenters, who were working at Trelawny Town at the time of the outbreak, separately claimed that 150 runaways had joined the Maroon revolt. The numbers of runaways reportedly fighting on the side of the Maroons grew the longer the war went on.

The governor admitted in his correspondence that large numbers of runaway slaves supported Trelawny Town in the Second Maroon War. The planter Shirley reported to

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colonial authorities that 400 runaways had joined the Trelawny Town Maroons. Balcarres initially dismissed Shirley’s claim as an exaggeration, and blustered ‘If four hundred negroes joined them, instead of two hundred, it would not give me a moment’s uneasiness.’ However, by December the governor was expressing concern when he received further claims of 300 Maroon fighting men and 200 runaways fighting against his forces.652 If the reports the governor received were accurate, then the numbers of fighting men described by Balcarres do not correlate with the 1795 returns, which listed only 133 Trelawny Town men capable of bearing arms, a small increase from 112 half a century before (see Table Eleven). That meant that the reported 300 Maroon warriors really included at least another 150 runaways. Added to the 200 runaways in the governor’s reports, several hundred more escaped slaves were probably fighting on the side of Trelawny Town at the end of 1795. In May of 1796, in correspondence with his sister Lady Hardwicke, Balcarres revised the estimated number of runaways fighting on the side of the Maroons up to 400, approximately three times the Trelawny Town men capable of bearing arms.653 The reports the governor received from his officers highlighted the large numbers of runaways escaping to Trelawny Town.

![Trelawny Town population in Jamaica](image.png)

**Table Eleven: Trelawny Town population by gender in the eighteenth century.** At the end of the 1730s, Trelawny Town had 112 men, 85 women, and 79 children. In the mid-1790s, there were 133 men, 201 women, and 321 children.654

The number of runaway slaves fighting on the side of Trelawny Town grew as the Maroons surrendered over the course of 1796. At the end of 1795, Colonel Walpole offered terms to Trelawny Town, but when the time came to turn themselves in Balcarres and his officers initially stated that no runaways surrendered. Instead, the runaways pretended to be Maroons and Balcarres later expressed frustration that ‘no runaways have been surrendered by the maroons; they came in in the character of maroons.’ However, at the start of the New Year, Balcarres reported that there were 123 runaways in custody, mainly from among those found pretending to be Maroons. In mid-March, militia officers reported to the Assembly that they had sent about half of them from St Ann’s Bay to Kingston on board a ship bound for Kingston. Writing in May, Balcarres stated he had in his gaols about 600 Maroons and around 200 runaways. The 600 Maroons included less than 150 Maroon men, and most of the remaining three-quarters were women and children (see Table Eleven). Later that month, Balcarres said his forces had ‘taken and disbanded four hundred slaves who had joined them in rebellion.’ While the governor’s correspondence inaccurately attributed French involvement in Trelawny Town, court records support admissions in his letters that large numbers of runaways fought on the side of this Leeward Maroon town.

The court records indicate that many runaway slaves were executed or transported for sale into slavery in Cuba for fighting alongside the Maroons. In April 1796, the Assembly ominously suggested that ‘all runaway slaves, who joined the Trelawny maroons in rebellion, ought to be dealt with according to law.’ The courts sentenced runaways from the estate of Kenmure to death and transportation, the latter sentence meaning that the colonial

657 CO 137/96, 1 January 1796, Balcarres to Portland; Campbell, Maroons of Jamaica, p. 222.
658 JAJ, Vol. 9, 23 March 1796, p. 467.
660 JAJ, Vol. 9, 20 April 1796, p. 494.
authorities re-sold those runaways as slaves to Spanish colonies.\textsuperscript{661} On 16 May, the courts passed the sentence of execution on a slave named McKenzie for ‘joining the maroons’, after which his head was sent 19 miles ‘to be stuck up on his master’s property, as an example to others’. It is unclear whether the colonial authorities hanged McKenzie before beheading him. Another half a dozen suffered the same fate as McKenzie shortly afterwards, and in October, the authorities executed another 27.\textsuperscript{662} The Receiver-General reported to the Assembly that on 30 September alone, the courts sentenced 33 slaves ‘to be sold for transportation’.\textsuperscript{663} The punishment for slaves fighting alongside Trelawny Town was severe.

The court records indicated that about 150 runaways were convicted for fighting on the side of Trelawny Town during the Second Maroon War. In late May, the Savanna-la-mar court reported to the Assembly that 108 runaways in custody for fighting alongside the Trelawny Town Maroons ‘were sent to the respective parishes they belonged to; to be tried’. Mullin calculates that, in all, the courts sentenced 75 slaves to execution for their role in the conflict, while court records show that between 51 and 61 were punished ‘for being parties concerned in the late rebellion of the Trelawny Maroons’.\textsuperscript{664} In 1796, there were significantly more slave executions and transportations in these parishes than for any other year in the 1790s. These slave executions and transportations came mainly from the western parishes of Trelawny, St Elizabeth, St James, and Westmoreland, as well as Clarendon, all areas affected by the Second Maroon War.\textsuperscript{665} The records are incomplete, with only partial evidence of acquittals, but the courts punished just under 150 runaways for fighting alongside the Maroons.

The courts may have acquitted the other runaways in custody, to save the colonial government from reimbursing slaveholders the cost of executed or exiled slaves. In the

\textsuperscript{661} JAJ, Vol. 9, 9 November 1796, p. 541.
\textsuperscript{662} VHAJ, 1796, Appendix XXI, pp. 281-2, 285.
\textsuperscript{663} JAJ, Vol. 9, 15 December 1796, p. 625.
\textsuperscript{664} CO 137/104, folio 53, 23 March 1800, Council Minutes; Mullin, \textit{Africa in America}, p. 298.
\textsuperscript{665} VHAJ, 15 December 1796, pp. 208-9.
month of March 1796, there is a report of the courts acquitting 14 runaway slaves in just one sitting.\textsuperscript{666} There is no evidence quantifying the acquittals, and it is possible that the number was higher. If the governor’s reports were accurate, the number of runaways in custody after the Second Maroon War amounted to between 200 and 400. Since the courts sentenced about 150 of them, the acquittals could account for anywhere between another 50 and 250 runaway slaves. However, the numbers of runaway slaves convicted and acquitted does not include those who did not turn themselves in.

The punishments meted out to the Maroons differed from the sentences handed down to the runaway slaves who fought on their side. The colonial authorities did not execute a single Maroon for the role he played in the fighting. Two Trelawny Town Maroons, either James Palmer or James Williams, and a man named Cudjoe, were put on trial.\textsuperscript{667} The outcome is unclear, since the names of Williams and Palmer both appear on the list of Trelawny Town Maroons who went to Nova Scotia.\textsuperscript{668} The Maroons were deported first to Nova Scotia in 1796, and then to Sierra Leone in 1800. The runaways who fought on their side were more harshly treated than the Maroons.

Most of the Trelawny Town Maroons expressed a degree of loyalty towards those runaways who fought on their side. One Maroon captain named Andrew Smith identified some of the runaways to the authorities in an attempt to curry favour, and was among the Maroons commended in January by Walpole for ‘fidelity to the public cause’. However, there is no proof that others followed suit, and the Maroons regarded Smith as a traitor in Nova Scotia, and on the subsequent voyage to Sierra Leone. In a letter to his half-brother from Nova Scotia in 1797, Smith complained that the Maroons hated him and that they wanted to kill him. He did not get on with other Maroon captains, and according to Walpole, ‘treats

\textsuperscript{666} VHAJ, 1796, Appendix XXI, p. 311.
\textsuperscript{667} VHAJ, 9 December 1796, p. 181; JAJ, Vol. 9, 16 December 1796, p. 627.
\textsuperscript{668} Grant, \textit{Maroons in Nova Scotia}, p. 196.
Palmer and Parkinson with great contempt’.669 Smith’s case of collaboration with the colonial authorities to identify runaways seems to have been an isolated one, and there were more cases of collusion between Maroons and runaways in captivity. In one instance, the officers in charge of accepting the surrendered Maroons were reluctant to separate them from the runaways, for fear that they may become ‘very much alarmed and discontented’. In another case, a Maroon captain named Shaw warned a white officer named James not to try to separate them, or ‘he cannot be answerable for them, that they will attempt an escape’.670 Aside from Smith, the Maroons did not readily give up the runaway slaves who fought on their side.

Many runaway slaves who fought on the side of Trelawny Town did not surrender, and they were causing problems to the planters in western Jamaica from as early as mid-1796. At the end of January, Balcarres expressed concerns to Colonial Secretary Henry Dundas about ‘several runaways in the woods between Mocho and St Elizabeth’s, but not any maroons’. In February, following the surrender of a number of Maroons and runaways, Balcarres was frustrated that a further 150 runaways ‘are still out; some, however, have come in, but I have not as yet been able to discover where the main body of them are gone to’.671 In mid-March, William Quarrell claimed that all the Maroons and runaways had surrendered, but that same month Walpole observed that ‘a vast number, I believe, of runaways are out’. Walpole further admitted that about 24 Maroons and about 80 runaway slaves were bearing arms, attacking, killing and wounding white men.672 In late 1796, long after the war was over, Balcarres expressed concern that ‘near one hundred runaway negroes have lately appeared armed’, and that they had concealed themselves ‘for a long

space of time after the conclusion of the Maroon war’.673 As late as 1798, planters were complaining that runaway slaves who had joined the Maroons were still at large.674 The governor noted that one runaway named Hercules ‘was out in the Maroon Rebellion, and has continued out ever since’.675 This Hercules would later become a leader of a community of runaway slaves. Some residents of rural western Jamaica today claim descent from runaways who fought on the side of the Maroons of Trelawny Town.676 Many runaway slaves who fought for Trelawny Town evaded capture, creating communities that would later come to feature in planter records.

The number of runaways fighting for Trelawny Town most likely outnumbered the 133 male Maroon warriors from that town. In addition to about 150 runaways who received sentences from the courts, Balcarres and Walpole estimated that another 100-150 runaway slaves remained at large. Added to the possible acquittals of between 50 and 250, the total number of runaway slaves who fought on the side of the Trelawny Town Maroons came to anywhere between 300 and 550. Contrary to the narrative espoused by most historians, large numbers of runaway slaves used any opportunity to secure their freedom, even if that meant allying themselves with Maroons who formerly hunted runaways a few years before. The Second Maroon War created arguably more runaway slaves than any single event after 1739, and the runaways who fought on the side of Trelawny Town outnumbered Maroon warriors. The estimate of about a hundred runaway slaves being at large was probably accurate, because a group of runaways that size caused the colonial authorities a number of problems shortly after the Second Maroon War.

674 VHAJ, 23 November 1798, p. 99.
675 CO 137/100, folio 56, 20 July 1798, Balcarres to Portland.
Cuffee and runaways after the Second Maroon War

The spirit of marronage was revived in western Jamaica when the numbers of runaway slaves increased significantly during and after the Second Maroon War. The deportation of the Maroons of Trelawny Town created a vacuum in the Cockpit Country that was filled by runaway communities in the region. Just two years following the conclusion of the Second Maroon War, the planters and Governor Balcarres were complaining about a community of runaways that was terrorising western Jamaica. In 1798, a slave named Cuffee escaped from the Peru estate, owned by James McGhie, and led his runaways to the forests of south Trelawny at a place that was formerly under the control of the Trelawny Town Maroons.677 Balcarres believed that a number of Cuffee’s runaways either fought on the side of Trelawny Town or secured their freedom during the Second Maroon War.678 After Cuffee, a number of runaway communities established themselves in the Cockpit Country in the nineteenth century.

Unlike previous post-treaty communities of runaway slaves, Cuffee’s men were well armed. Planters expressed the concern that ‘the maroons must have left in the woods…an immense quantity of ammunition’.679 Exiles from Trelawny Town claimed that a shortage of ammunition contributed to their surrender.680 However, the Maroons still possessed enough ammunition to leave a supply for their runaway allies. In late 1796, Balcarres complained that the Trelawny Town Maroons had only surrendered weapons of poor quality, and ‘that they left in the woods other arms’.681 The Trelawny Town Maroons may have given arms to Cuffee’s runaway slaves, refuting claims by Campbell that these Maroons betrayed the

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679 JAJ, Vol. 10, 13 June 1798, pp. 107-111; CO 137/100, folio 20, 17 June 1798, Balcarres to Portland.
680 Chapter Four, p. 149.
runaways who fought on their side. Upon surrendering, the Maroons of Trelawny Town appear to have left most of their weapons with the slaves who fought on their side, and these runaways may have joined communities such as those led by Cuffee.

Cuffee’s community raided plantations for supplies and waged war against their former owners. Planters received reports that ‘the mountains where the rebellion exists are covered with provisions’. As a result, Cuffee’s community was able to thrive for years outside the control of the colonial authorities. Planters reported that because of Cuffee’s attacks ‘many of the back settlements are already abandoned, and the families of some of the proprietors of the estates in that vicinity are removing to situations of more safety.’ Cuffee and his band of runaway slaves ‘descended from his haunts in the Trelawny mountains, and committed depredations on the settlements in the neighbourhood’. Balcarres complained that ‘upwards of 30 Settlers have been driven from their Habitations’. More runaways rallied to Cuffee’s banner, and some planters even expressed the fear that this group might be more dangerous than the Second Maroon War. In London, the Colonial Office worried about the rise of Cuffee, and the Duke of Portland voiced his concern about ‘the increased alarm occasioned by the outrages committed by the runaway slaves’. While the communities of the Congo Settlement and Brutus barely got a mention in colonial records, Cuffee’s community attracted the attention of the British government. The attacks launched by Cuffee’s group of runaways caused significant disruptions to the way of life of the inhabitants of coastal western Jamaica, who were only just recovering from the economic setbacks of the Second Maroon War.

Despite initial attempts by Balcarres to downplay the numbers of slaves running away to join Cuffee’s community, the colonial authorities eventually admitted this group was a bigger threat than any other western group of runaways since 1739. At first, the governor

684 VHAJ, 13 March 1799, p. 96.
said that ‘the force of Cuffee I have every reason to think is 43.’ Later, he added that ‘it is supposed that there is another party very near him, of 30 rebels more, under the command of a Negro who has been out since the Maroon Rebellion.’ Colonial records indicate that Cuffee’s community comprised more than 43 slaves. Planters filed reports of a party of 50-60 ‘well armed’ runaway slaves attacking plantations. In addition to these numbers, members of the Assembly said they had received reports that Cuffee’s men were joined first by ‘twenty other negroes’, and then by ‘twenty more’. There were complaints that slaves ran away on a daily basis to join Cuffee. In the first three months of 1798, more than twice as many slaves ran away in Trelawny than in all of 1797. The writings of contemporaries referred to Cuffee’s community of runaway slaves numbering about 100 and causing problems to the planter class of western Jamaica. Many slaves ran away to join Cuffee’s community, and their numbers grew so large that this group caused a number of problems to western planters.

Cuffee’s community defied attempts by the colonial forces and the Accompong Maroons to subdue them. An initial party of militia from the parish of St James ‘came up with the rebel Negro Cuffee and his gang’, but Balcarres reported with regret that ‘this very favourable opportunity of putting an end to the rebellion was entirely lost’. The governor did not provide any further details, but we can assume that the runaways escaped into the Cockpit Country, and that they re-formed the community once the militia left. Urged on by the planters, Balcarres put together another force, including Maroons from Accompong Town, because of ‘their knowledge of the country’, after ‘high rewards’ were offered to them. This party came across ‘a little town of huts, capable of holding more than 100 Negroes, with many well-beaten trails leading to it and from it in various directions’.

685 CO 137/100, folio 16, 17 June 1798, Balcarres to Portland.
686 JAJ, Vol. 10, 13 June 1798, p. 112.
688 CO 137/100, folio 16, 17 June 1798, Balcarres to Portland.
689 VHAJ, 30 November 1798, p. 133; JAJ, Vol. 10, 13, 18 June 1798, pp. 108-9, 111-2, 116; CO 137/100, folio 20, June 1798, Balcarres to Portland.
690 CO 137/100, folio 55, 20 July 1798, Balcarres to Portland.
Accompong Maroons had therefore only found a group of uninhabited huts and they failed to capture Cuffee’s men. This description indicates that far from being a small group of 43 escaped slaves, Cuffee’s community housed more than a hundred runaways, and they had a well-defined series of paths which enabled them to both attack coastal plantations and to escape assaults on their settlements by the colonial forces.


Cuffee’s community was larger than any group of runaways in western Jamaica in the eighteenth century, enough to occupy several makeshift villages. The colonial authorities found out that Cuffee’s community was headquartered at a place called High Windward, and that this village ‘had a small stream running near it’, which served the purpose of providing the runaways with a regular supply of water. High Windward was located in that part of the Cockpit Country that was at the junction of the four parishes of Trelawny, St Ann, Clarendon, and what was then a larger St Elizabeth, in what would later become Manchester (see Figure Fourteen). However, upon interrogating a captured runaway named Patty, the colonial authorities later discovered that while this was the main town, it was only one of four
or five towns that Cuffee’s group utilised. According to Patty, ‘wherever they walk, they build little Huts’. The colonial authorities had difficulty tracking down the runaways, because ‘Cuffee’s party are by no means stationary, (and) they move about frequently from place to place’.\textsuperscript{691} Cuffee and his men often raided western plantations in order to secure food supplies. The runaways called one of their towns Bellyfull-Town, because that is where they would eat their provisions after successful raids on Edward Fleming’s estate.\textsuperscript{692} While Cuffee’s men may have been exacting revenge on their former owners when they attacked these plantations, it seems that their main goal was to capture food supplies and ammunition. Cuffee’s group of runaways was so large that they occupied several towns, which militated against the efforts of the colonial militias to track them down in a specific location.

Cuffee’s community had a revolving leadership structure, which made it difficult for colonial authorities to identify and remove potential leaders. The correspondence of the governor classified Cuffee as ‘their Headman’. However, Patty informed her captors that the male runaways ‘are all occasionally Headman’.\textsuperscript{693} The governor’s correspondence and reports in the Assembly’s Journals discuss Patty’s information, but we have no data from Cuffee’s community itself to verify her revelations. But if Patty’s information is correct, Cuffee’s community provided the colonial forces with an unfamiliar leadership structure which made it hard to overthrow.

In the years following the Second Maroon War, other runaways followed the lead from Cuffee and established independent communities in the Cockpit Country. In May 1798, a recaptured runaway slave informed the colonial authorities that there were three separate groups of runaways. In addition to Cuffee’s main group, there was one led by ‘a young

\textsuperscript{691} JAJ, Vol. 10, 13 February 1801, p. 514, 30 October 1801, p. 597; CO 137/100, folio 70, 15 July 1798, Balcarres to Portland.
\textsuperscript{692} CO 137/100, folios 70-1, 15 July 1798, Balcarres to Portland.
\textsuperscript{693} JAJ, Vol. 10, 13 February 1801, p. 514, 30 October 1801, p. 597; CO 137/100, folio 70, 15 July 1798, Balcarres to Portland.
Congo Negro man, who was a shipmate of one of those of Mr McGhie’s Negroes that were hanged after the Maroon War. Contemporary writers later reported that the name of the Congo runaway was Peter, that he had escaped from a plantation owned by a man named Franklyn, and that his community was located in the western hills of the Cockpit Country. In the aftermath of the deportation of the Maroons of Trelawny Town, several communities of runaway slaves established themselves in the mountainous forests of the Cockpit Country. It is possible that members of these three runaway communities came from the escaped slaves who fought on the side of Trelawny Town during the Second Maroon War, but did not surrender at the conflict’s conclusion.

Once slaves escaped and became members of Cuffee’s community of free runaways, they exacted revenge on western planters by destroying their estates. Edwards claimed that the numbers of slaves who ran away and joined Cuffee’s group was small, and that the damage they inflicted was an exaggeration because fear was ‘a wonderful magnifier of danger’. However, the planters whose estates suffered from Cuffee’s attacks would have disagreed with Edwards. Cuffee and his men destroyed plantations in the parish of Trelawny, such as Venture, Cox-heath pen, Pantre-Pant and Oxford estate. Cuffee’s attacks in the months of March through to June 1798 ruined the estates of more than a dozen planters, and burnt down the homes of a number of white and free coloured inhabitants. Some planters claimed that the hardship caused by Cuffee’s rebels was ‘much worse than (that) occasioned by the maroons’, and a number of whites were killed and ‘severely wounded’ by Cuffee’s men. Balcarres offered a reward of £300 to anyone who could bring Cuffee to justice. However, neither the colonial militia nor the Maroons were able to

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694 CO 137/100, folio 5, 4 May 1798, Examination of a Negro man named Peter; Edwards, History, Vol. IV, p. 100; JAJ, Vol. 10, 13 June 1798, p. 113. In The Birth of African-American Culture: an Anthropological Perspective (Boston: Beacon Press, 1992), p. 43, Sidney Mintz and Richard Price explain that a ‘shipmate’ was a terms used by slaves to describe other slaves who were transported in the same slave ship as themselves.


697 The Diary and Kingston Daily Advertiser, 20 July 1798; CO 137/100, folio 66, 20 July 1798, Balcarres to Portland.
capture or kill Cuffee. Edwards is alone in his attempts to downplay the numbers involved in Cuffee’s community, because it was the subject of significant coverage in the Journals and Votes, as well as the governor’s correspondence and local newspapers. The damage caused by Cuffee and his band of runaway slaves significantly disrupted the business of planters in western Jamaica, and provided inspiration to slaves who wanted to escape from bondage.

While members of the Black Shot did not join the Trelawny Town Maroons during the Second Maroon War, they fled in significant numbers to join Cuffee’s rebels. The white planters who captained the Black Shot complained of a number of desertions to Cuffee’s community. In June 1798, Captain Lauchlan McLaine of the St James Black Shot reported that ‘five of my men deserted me, in a most cowardly manner last night, when I expected to come into action with the rebels.’ 698 Slaves from the Black Shot deserted to join Cuffee’s community, much as they did in the First Maroon War, when they fled to become a part of the Maroons. The marronage of Cuffee’s community proved attractive to many slaves in western Jamaica, and runaways were prepared to fight both the white colonial elite and the Accompong Maroons in order to secure their freedom.

Black Shot members who did not desert secured some successes against Cuffee’s community. In July, slave soldiers of the Black Shot reportedly killed a couple of the ring-leaders of the runaway community named Prince and Hercules, and captured three women. Hercules had previously escaped slavery to fight on the side of Trelawny Town during the Second Maroon War.699 There is no record of any Black Shot members securing their freedom because of this minimal success, but a planter named George Murray received £160 from the Assembly in ‘compensation of a negro named Manuel, a cart-man, who died when on service against the negro rebels, Cuffee and his associates’.700 Black Shot soldiers

698 VHAJ, 13 June 1798, p. 20.
699 VHAJ, 1798, Appendix LX, p. 327, 5 November 1799, p. 21; JAJ, Vol. 10, 29 November 1798, p. 185, 19 December 1798, p. 245; CO 137/100, folio 72, 15 July 1798, Balcarres to Portland.
700 VHAJ, 6 December 1799, p. 144.
had some successes against Cuffee’s community, but the limited rewards they received did not prevent them from deserting when the opportunity arose.

When the colonial authorities employed the Accompong Maroons against Cuffee’s community, the runaways were able to weather their attacks. The Maroons captured Major, a leader of the runaway community, and Captain John Grant of the Trelawny Black Shot boasted to the Assembly that the militia, ‘with the assistance of the Accompong Maroons, scoured the forests, reduced the rebels, or drove them into their interior recesses, where they could be heard of no longer’. Edwards claimed that Cuffee’s ‘rebels were entirely hunted down, and that part of the island was restored to tranquillity’. However, evidence not previously utilized by historians reveals that while Cuffee’s rebels no longer attacked plantations, the Maroons did not capture Cuffee or most members of his community. By August of 1798, after trying for half a year, Balcarres admitted that ‘the Parties in search of the Negroe Cuffee have not been able to lay hold of him.’ The colonial records reported that the Maroons and their allies captured and killed no more than half a dozen rebels. Because of this failure to apprehend Cuffee, most of the settlers who had suffered at the hands of Cuffee’s men refused to return to their lands. One planter who did return to his plantation, a Peter Scarlett, ‘was shot dead, sitting in his parlour’ by an assailant who was never caught, and was probably from Cuffee’s group. The colonial authorities and the Accompong Maroons only killed and captured a handful of Cuffee’s community, and throughout the nineteenth century the vast majority of Cuffee’s group remained at large and continued to live in the Cockpit Country. While the Accompong Maroons were not able to capture most members of Cuffee’s community, they nonetheless inflicted enough damage to persuade the leadership to seek to avoid further conflict with the planter class on the coast.

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703 CO 137/100, folio 132, 12 August 1798, Balcarres to Portland.
704 CO 137/100, folios 54-5, 20 July 1798, Balcarres to Portland.
705 CO 137/100, folio 132, 12 August 1798, Balcarres to Portland; Geggus, ‘The Enigma of Jamaica’, p. 287.
in order to allow their community to survive. Cuffee provided inspiration for other slaves seeking freedom.

Runaways in the nineteenth century

In the nineteenth century, runaways continued to form communities in eastern Jamaica, while in the west the success of Cuffee’s community inspired slaves to escape to the Cockpit Country in larger numbers than they did in the previous century. In eastern Jamaica, the Windward Maroons had to regain the trust of the colonial authorities, which they did when they eventually crushed the Healthshire community. In the west, the white colonial authorities and their Maroon allies were unsuccessful in their attempts to defeat and capture most of Cuffee’s community, and they had similar difficulties with other groups of runaways in the decades that followed the Second Maroon War.

Even after Cuffee’s community was no longer a threat, runaway slaves continued to flee to the island’s mountainous interior. In 1810, the Assembly reported that Maroons from Accompong Town were in pursuit of six slaves who had killed their master, a Mr Jennings of Mayday, and had fled into the mountains.\textsuperscript{706} One planter in the parish of Westmoreland, Matthew ‘Monk’ Lewis, wrote in 1816 of a notorious runaway he called the Eboe Captain who had fled to the mountains pursued by a ‘Captain Roe’, probably James Rowe, of Accompong Town, who intended to bring the Eboe Captain back dead or alive.\textsuperscript{707} There are no reports to confirm that either venture was successful. The Assembly reported that runaway slaves formed a community near Reach Falls, not far from Moore Town, at the eastern end of the Blue Mountains.\textsuperscript{708} At the turn of the century, slaves ran away to the Blue Mountains and the Cockpit Country despite the presence of the official Maroon towns.

\textsuperscript{706} JAJ, Vol. 12, 27 November 1810, p. 300.
\textsuperscript{708} VHAJ, 27 November 1799, p. 109.
In the nineteenth century, planters complained about runaway communities in both ends of the island. G. W. Bridges wrote that thousands had run away and were ‘living in the state of barbarous banditti, while the Legislature was passive, and the Maroons idle’.\textsuperscript{709} Stewart moaned about ‘the hordes of runaway slaves who collect in the woods’.\textsuperscript{710} In 1829, John Hylton said he was ‘informed of places very inaccessible where runaways have established themselves in houses, and have planted provision-grounds, which amply sustain them’. A committee led by western planter Richard Barrett concluded that there was still ‘a great number of runaway slaves concealed in the towns and interior of the island’.\textsuperscript{711} The spirit of marronage thrived after the Second Maroon War, when runaway communities caused a number of problems for Jamaican planter society.

Runaway slaves established a large community in the Cockpit Country, which the Maroons of Trelawny Town once policed before their deportation at the end of the eighteenth century. Lewis complained that ‘many settlements of run-away slaves have been formed’ in the years following the Second Maroon War, and a St James missionary pointed out that ‘runaways were not unfrequent’.\textsuperscript{712} In 1812, a community of runaways started ‘when a dozen negroes, with a few women’ escaped into the Cockpit Country, and created a village curiously named Me-no-Sen-You-no-Come ‘amongst such fastnesses of the cliffs and woods, adjoining to such fertile soils in the valleys’. While the community of Me-no-Sen-You-no-Come grew from its start of less than 20 runaway slaves, there are no figures to quantify how many more runaways joined them. However, the runaways erected 14 buildings with shingle roofs and wood floors, raised poultry, hogs and ‘brought nearly two hundred acres of land into profitable bearing, and had afforded an example of good farming, their land described as being thickly planted with provisions’. If each of the 14 huts housed an average of four persons, the community may have numbered 50-60 runaways. A militia commander

\textsuperscript{710} Stewart, \textit{Island of Jamaica}, p. 322.
\textsuperscript{711} VHAJ, 1 December 1829, p. 133, Appendix LVII, p. 489-491, 1830, Appendix LVI, p. 359.
named Lieutenant-Colonel Scott observed ‘that the number of runaways is great’ in this community, and that Warren and Forbes were the headmen. Me-no-Sen-You-no-Come also conducted a thriving trade, and the village was visited by ‘the negroes of different estates…in the practice of going with asses to exchange salt provisions with the runaways for their ground provisions’. The community of Me-no-Sen-You-no-Come succeeded to such an extent that the runaways were able to confidently trade with coastal slaves on their market days without fears of reprisals from the colonial authorities.

Even with the Accompong Maroons on their side, the colonial authorities were unable to suppress the communities established by runaways in the Cockpit Country. The members of the Me-no-Sen-You-no-Come community occupied the mountainous forests of the western end of the island ‘peaceably, industriously, and comfortably, when, after quiet possession for eleven years, it became known’ to the colonial authorities. In October 1824, the colonial militias tried to destroy this community, but the only groups that had any success were the Black Shot and the Maroons from Accompong Town. Patterson and Campbell claim that the Maroons were successful in destroying this runaway community. However, evidence from the Assembly shows that while the Maroons killed their leader Warren, for which an unnamed warrior received a reward of £50, they only brought in the ears of four more dead runaways. Superintendent Philip Smith led the party of Maroons from Accompong Town, and his Maroon deputy, Andrew White, then a captain, received a reward of £150 ‘for the apprehension of two, and the destruction of one (Billy Schaw) rebellious slaves’. The Black Shot, also under the command of Superintendent Smith, received rewards of £500 ‘for the capture of ten rebellious slaves’, but there is no record of any slave being awarded his freedom for this accomplishment. In all, the parties captured just 12

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713 Account of a Shooting Excursion on the Mountains near Dromilly Estate, in the Parish of Trelawny, and Island of Jamaica, in the Month of October, 1824 (London: Harvey and Darton, 1825), pp. 5-10; Cornwall Chronicle, 13 November 1824, p. 785; Mullin, Africa in America, p. 59; Campbell, Maroons of Jamaica, p. 159.
714 Account of a Shooting Excursion, p. 5.
715 Cynric Williams, A Tour through the island of Jamaica, from the Western to the Eastern End, in the Year 1823 (London: Thomas Hurst, 1827), p. 244.
runaway slaves, and the rest escaped further into the Cockpit Country.\footnote{JAJ, Vol. 14, 25 November 1824, p. 313, 21 December 1826, p. 738; Patterson, Sociology, p. 264; Campbell, Maroons of Jamaica, p. 159.} According to an anonymous contemporary writer, ‘the rest directly changed their habitations, and found, in the back districts of Trelawny, a place similar to that which they had left.’\footnote{Account of a Shooting Excursion, p. 5.} The number of slaves captured or killed was similar to the total that started the settlement, but the community had grown so large that the survivors were able to re-occupy Me-no-Sen-You-no-Come when the Maroons left.

The attempts by the Maroons of Accompong Town to scour the surrounding countryside for the remaining runaways proved futile. After the Maroons left Me-no-Sen-You-no-Come to return to Accompong Town, a number of the runaways returned to the village and rebuilt huts. According to the *Cornwall Gazette*, in February of the following year, Superintendent Smith said he retook the settlement, ‘but from their having received information of the advance of the Maroons, I was not enabled to do the execution I expected’. This time, Superintendent Smith and White, and their parties, succeeded only in killing one man, and capturing two women and three children.\footnote{Account of a Shooting Excursion, pp. 5-10, 15; JAJ, Vol. 14, 21 December 1826, p. 738; Cornwall Gazette, 18 February 1825; Mullin, Africa in America, p. 59; Patterson, Sociology, p. 264; Campbell, Maroons of Jamaica, p. 159.} The oral history of the descendants of these runaways states that when the Accompong Maroons approached these communities, they once again simply relocated to another part of the Cockpit Country.\footnote{Jean Besson, Transformations of Freedom in the Land of the Maroons: Creolization in the Cockpits, Jamaica (Kingston: Ian Randle, 2016), pp. 47, 271-6.} There is little evidence about how the runaways lived in the Cockpit Country, but they seemed able to feed themselves from crops and provisions in the fertile interior, and most of them were able to successfully avoid capture. In the nineteenth century, the lure of independence and free land in western Jamaica encouraged many slaves to escape from bondage and establish communities in the Cockpit Country, where the Accompong Maroons were unable to capture most of them.
While Accompong Town had proven their loyalty during the Second Maroon War, the colonial authorities initially distrusted the Windward Maroons at the turn of the century. In 1804, once it became clear that the small number of warriors at Accompong Town could not cope with the numbers of runaway slaves across the island, the colonial authorities accepted the oath of loyalty sworn by the Windward Maroons and lifted the ban on them hunting runaways.\textsuperscript{720} However, many planters still distrusted the Windward Maroons and advocated dispersing their communities. Governor Balcarres confidently predicted that the Trelawny Town deportation would result in ‘the extinction of the rest, by mixing them in the mass of the free people’.\textsuperscript{721} In 1796, Edwards also supported the proposal to disband the remaining Maroon towns, telling the House of Commons that he personally disapproved of the idea of ‘confining the Maroons to separate communities’.

Cynric Williams expressed his suspicions about the loyalty of the remaining Maroon towns.\textsuperscript{723} On a visit to Charles Town at the turn of the century, Governor Nugent experienced a war exercise, described by his wife as ‘so savage and frightful that I could not help feeling a little panic, by merely looking at them’.\textsuperscript{724} Some planters and members of the colonial establishment distrusted the Maroons remaining in Jamaica and they advocated merging the communities with the free black and coloured population.

When threatened by a slave revolt or conspiracy, the colonial authorities sided with the Maroons, and abandoned plans to disband the Maroon towns. In 1807, a slave informant named Frank claimed that the Maroons of Charles Town were supposed to supply the slaves with gunpowder. Upon a slave firing a gun, the conspirators expected ‘the maroons would all rise for them, and take the country’. The Maroon leaders implicated were Major

\textsuperscript{720} Chapter Four, pp. 140-1.
\textsuperscript{721} Lindsay, \textit{Lives of the Lindsays}, Vol. III, p. 117n; Hardwicke Papers, Vol. DLVIII, Add. MS 35916, folio 203, 23 May 1796, Balcarres to Foster Barham.
\textsuperscript{723} Cynric Williams, \textit{A Tour through the island}, p. 89.
\textsuperscript{724} Maria Nugent, \textit{Lady Nugent’s Journal}, ed. by Philip Wright (Kingston: University of the West Indies Press, 2002), pp. 72, 75, 94.
Robert Bentham, also known as Bunting, and Captain William White, officers at Charles Town. White had died at the age of about 61 that year, so he could not be cross-examined. A free black woman claimed that just under 20 slaves, ‘armed with guns and cutlasses, came to her house in Buff-Bay, and inquired the way to Charles-Town’. However, William Anderson Orgill, who presided over the case, and whose son later became a superintendent at one of the Maroon towns, concluded that there was no evidence ‘to criminate the Maroons in the slightest degree, nor do I believe really that they were any way concerned’. Eventually, Orgill said that Frank’s allegation ‘was not from any actual knowledge, but mere conjecture’. Orgill spoke to Colonel Sam Grant and other Maroon leaders at Charles Town, and they told him they were ready, ‘in case any of the negroes should go out, to pursue them and bring them in’. Even though Frank’s testimony was enough to secure his freedom, Orgill did not believe his accusations against the Charles Town Maroons. Despite the experience of the Second Maroon War a decade before, the colonial authorities still appear to have trusted the word of Maroons remaining in Jamaica over the testimony of the slaves, especially when threatened with revolt.

Table Twelve: Windward Maroon men in 1819. The total number of Windward Maroon men capable of bearing arms was 169. Charles Town had 63 men, Moore Town 88, and Scott’s Hall 18.

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727 VHAJ, 25 November 1819, p. 95.
The planters’ suspicion of the Windward Maroons diminished after the latter dismantled a large runaway community that was able to exist untroubled among the arid shrubs of south-eastern Jamaica for years. In 1819, the Assembly received reports that a large group of runaway slaves thrived in Healthshire for years. Led by a certain Scipio, known also by his Akan name of Quashie, these runaways raided plantations for cattle ‘and committed several outrages’. The colonial authorities sent parties against them repeatedly without success, until, eventually, they called up the Maroons to flush them out in operations that lasted another half a year.\footnote{Bridges, *Annals of Jamaica*, Vol. II, pp. 348-9; Stewart, *Island of Jamaica*, pp. 322-3; JAJ, Vol. 13, 2, 26 November 1819, 18 December 1820, p. 537.} The Assembly put a reward of £100 on the head of Scipio and £25 each ‘for apprehending each of his associates, named Cudjoe, Leicester, and Old Anthony’. In all, the Windward Maroons apprehended 600 members of the Healthshire community, most of whom were men, and the colonial authorities put some of them on trial. However, it turned out that 300 of them were not runaways and the courts eventually freed them, meaning that another 300 were escaped slaves.\footnote{JAJ, Vol. 13, 2-4, 25 November 1819, pp. 320-2, 366, 18 December 1820, p. 536; VHAJ, 1820, Appendix XXV, p. 238, 1821, Appendix LXIV, p. 298.} Free blacks and coloureds were happy to live and work with runaway slaves, and made up half of the community. However, the runaway slaves in the community of Healthshire alone almost doubled the men in the Windward Maroon towns. In comparison with the 300 runaways apprehended, only 169 men were capable of bearing arms in the three official Windward Maroon towns (see Table Twelve). The spirit of marronage thrived in eastern Jamaica despite the presence of three official Maroon towns in the Blue Mountains, and large numbers of slaves ran away to join these communities.

The superintendents of the Maroon towns were unanimous in expressing the view that the Maroons achieved very little when it came to retrieving runaways. Hylton alleged that his own Accompong Maroons ‘know of the runaway establishments which exists in many fastnesses in the interior’. The superintendents of Charles Town and Scott’s Hall
shared Hylton’s views. Despite the destruction of the Healthshire community, the Windward Maroons had limited success hunting runaways in the nineteenth century, much like the previous century. Hylton implied that while the Accompong Maroons under his charge knew where the runaways were located, they did not show the desire to capture them. Hylton also claimed that in 1829, shortly after he became superintendent at Accompong Town, he found out that a female runaway from a Jamaican pimento plantation was harboured by a Maroon, until the superintendent returned her to her owner. However, such attempts were rare and often unsuccessful, and the Assembly received very few reports of runaways hiding among the Maroons. Hylton had an acrimonious relationship with his Accompong Maroons, so his statements may have been coloured by his animosity towards them. The criticism of the Maroons and their inability to capture significant numbers of runaway slaves by their own superintendents is indicative of the Maroon failure to subdue the spirit of marronage among runaways.

In the nineteenth century, the colonial authorities used the same system of reimbursing Maroons for captured runaways as they did in the 1780s and 1790s, and the Maroons continued to complain about similar delays in payment. Individual planters hired and led the Maroons on a private basis, when the numbers of runaways were too small to be of concern to the Assembly. In 1832, an eastern Jamaican planter named Robert Quelch led a group of Maroons into the Blue Mountains in the parish of St Thomas-in-the-East in pursuit of runaway slaves. However, the Maroons often complained that when they were sent out by planters, ‘they are not sufficiently and timely paid’. The Maroons were reluctant to pursue small groups of runaways on behalf of individual planters, because the financial rewards were smaller. Hylton explained that the calling out of parties ‘gives so much dissatisfaction,
that it is an absolute punishment for a superintendent to receive an order to send a party out’.\textsuperscript{736} It appears that in the nineteenth century, Maroons objected to being called out to hunt runaways, because they had more lucrative economic pursuits to follow.\textsuperscript{737}

This inefficient system of paying Maroons impeded their ability to hunt runaways up until the end of slavery itself. The Maroons occasionally accepted bribes from captured runaways, when they were able to better the price. According to Hylton, the problem lay in the fact that the Assembly paid the Maroons 'not for services rendered, but for the period of their being out'.\textsuperscript{738} Superintendents suggested that, in addition to mile-money, 'head-money' would address concerns about inadequate pay. Thomas March, the long-serving superintendent of Scott's Hall, also complained that when the planters sent them out, 'it frequently happens that they cannot obtain exact information as to the places they are to search, which makes them unsuccessful'.\textsuperscript{739} The Assembly did not hear these complaints until 1830, and they had not addressed these problems when the British government passed the Emancipation Act three years later.

In the nineteenth century, large numbers of slaves ran away to live in the forested mountains of the interior. Barry Higman calculates that every year, approximately 3,000 slaves ran away from their owners.\textsuperscript{740} The spirit of marronage was so strong in the first three decades of the nineteenth century that the official reports listed about 2,000 runaways at large on an annual basis. In 1819, the colonial forces confined 2,555 to the workhouses for running away, growing to 2,980 in 1828 before declining to 1,874 in 1831.\textsuperscript{741} In addition to those runaways confined to workhouses, an almost equal number of escaped slaves evaded capture on a yearly basis. In 1824, the Assembly reported that 2,291 runaways were at

\textsuperscript{736} VHAJ, 1829, Appendix LVII, pp. 489-491.
\textsuperscript{737} See Chapter Six.
\textsuperscript{738} VHAJ, 1829, Appendix LVII, pp. 489-491.
\textsuperscript{739} VHAJ, 1830, Appendix LVI, pp. 358-361.
\textsuperscript{741} JAJ, Vol. 13, 30 November 1819, p. 375; VHAJ, 23 December 1828, p. 243, 24 February 1831, p. 130.
Two persistent runaways from Mesopotamia estate in Westmoreland were women named Harriet and Mary, who ran away several times from 1814 to 1819. The Maroons caught them and returned them to Mesopotamia, but Harriet later escaped for good in 1818 at the age of 49. Estates in Westmoreland continued to report runaways throughout the 1820s. In 1827, the parishes of Vere and St Elizabeth alone accounted for 122 and 120 runaways respectively. However, because these records were incomplete, the number of runaways was probably higher. Hylton estimated that while 2,000 runaways were 'in the fastnesses of the country,' another 2,000 were probably in Kingston and Spanish Town, and another 2,000 ‘in negro-houses and negro-grounds’. If Hylton’s figures are accurate, then the number of runaways is twice Higman’s estimate and was closer to two per cent of the slave population. This indicates that it is possible that between three and six thousand runaway slaves lived in the mountainous interior of Jamaica in the years leading up to the Sam Sharpe Rebellion, hidden in the forests of the Blue Mountains and the Cockpit Country.

The Maroons and the Sam Sharpe Rebellion

In 1831-2, western Jamaica experienced the Sam Sharpe Rebellion, which was the most serious challenge to slave society in the British West Indies since Tacky’s Revolt. Despite the intensity of the uprising, the Maroons did not participate in putting down the Sam Sharpe Rebellion until the New Year. This is in contrast with their early involvement with suppressing the revolts of the 1760s. The bloodshed that followed, in conjunction with the militia’s attacks on white missionaries, played an important role in persuading the House of

744 Dunn, A Tale of Two Plantations, p. 96.
747 Chapter Three, pp. 93-99.
Commons in Britain to abolish slavery. While the Maroons were successful in putting down the revolt, they were ineffective in hunting runaways in the rebellion’s aftermath.

**Figure Fifteen: A view of Montego Bay.** Painted by Adolphe Duperly, c. 1830s. This print shows slaves destroying sections of Montego Bay during the Sam Sharpe Rebellion of 1831-2.

The early action against the Sam Sharpe Rebellion took place without Maroon involvement (see Figure Fifteen). The planters had become complacent since the Haitian Revolution, and the revolt caught them by surprise. Over 20,000 slaves rose up at the end of 1831 and their revolt cost the county of Cornwall in excess of one million pounds, with most of the damage occurring in the parishes of St James and Hanover. The governor, the Earl Belmore, first summoned the West India Regiment to fight the rebels, putting them under the command of Colonel William Grignon, an attorney who ran several plantations in

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St James.\textsuperscript{751} Grignon was in charge of the Salt Spring estate where the uprising began. At
the beginning of the revolt, Grignon led the militia against the rebels at Belvedere estate, but
he then ordered a retreat, which left the rebels in command of the western interior.\textsuperscript{752} The
West India Regiment, made up of free blacks, first saw action at the very start of January,
and then fought alongside loyal slaves and the militia in succeeding months.\textsuperscript{753} In spite of the
combination of forces fighting the rebels, they did not immediately subdue them.

Despite their success in putting down Tacky’s Revolt, the Maroons were late joining
the fight to suppress the Sam Sharpe Rebellion. The officer in charge of the British forces,
Major-General Sir Willoughby Cotton, came from an aristocratic family, and he saw action in
the Napoleonic Wars where he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel.\textsuperscript{754} Cotton did
did not hold the Maroons in high regard, but when Grignon’s men experienced setbacks
against the rebels he bowed to the advice of local planters. Cotton summoned the Maroons
of Accompong Town to engage the rebels during the second week of January.\textsuperscript{755} The
Maroon experience of fighting in the mountainous interior played an important role in helping
the colonial authorities to suppress the Sam Sharpe Rebellion.\textsuperscript{756} The slave rebels were not
skilled in the guerrilla warfare that characterised the Maroon resistance of the previous
century.\textsuperscript{757} That did not mean that the Maroons had everything their own way when they took
on the rebels. In January, when Superintendent Hylton led the Accompong Maroons in an
attack on rebel slaves in Catadupa, they had to withdraw, because ‘he found them too
strong’.\textsuperscript{758} That setback was a minor one however, and during the course of the revolt the

\textsuperscript{751} Christer Petley, \textit{Slaveholders in Jamaica: Colonial Society and Culture during the Era of Abolition} (London:
\textsuperscript{752} Henry Bleby, \textit{Death Struggles of Slavery} (London: Hamilton, Adams and Co, 1853), pp. 9-11; Craton, \textit{Testing
the Chains}, p. 308.
\textsuperscript{756} Petley, \textit{Slaveholders}, p. 110.
\textsuperscript{757} Mary Turner, \textit{Slaves and Missionaries} (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982); p. 157; Hart, \textit{Slaves Who
Maroons proved to be ‘exceedingly useful and efficient allies, and were used chiefly as riflemen’. The Maroons were ‘well acquainted with every track in the woods, and all the caves and hiding places’. The Maroon warriors ‘easily traced the negroes, and often succeeded in surprising large bodies’.\(^{759}\) The Maroon skill in guerrilla warfare proved useful in putting down the Sam Sharpe Rebellion.

The Accompong Maroons defeated the main slave generals of the Sam Sharpe Rebellion. While the revolt was inspired by a Baptist slave-turned-preacher named Sam Sharpe (see Figure Sixteen), the fighting in the rebellion was led by his deputies. In one skirmish, the Maroons of Accompong Town killed one of Sharpe’s deputies, Campbell, and

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\(^{759}\) Foulks, *Eighteen Months in Jamaica*, p. 87.

went on to capture 27 runaway rebels. When the army regulars were under siege at the Maroon Town barracks, formerly Trelawny Town, and had difficulty receiving their supplies ‘without molestation’, a group of Maroons killed seven and captured 47 rebels, opening up the supply lines. Dehany was arguably the most capable of the rebel leaders, but eventually he and his followers, ‘unable to contend with the Accompong, were compelled by hunger to disperse, and successively fell into our hands’. The Maroons of Accompong Town defeated Sam Sharpe’s leading generals and helped to bring the revolt to a conclusion.

Once the main rebel army had been defeated and dispersed, the governor summoned the Windward Maroons to help round up the remnants of the resistance. Maroons from Charles Town and Moore Town landed at Falmouth, and since the Accompong Town Maroons were fighting in the Cockpit Country, Cotton sent the Windward Maroons into the ‘lowlands’ where they ‘accelerated the capture of the dispersed fugitives’. Maroons from eastern Jamaica killed and captured a number of rebels, including another leader named Gillespie. In a Maroon petition filed a few years after the event, Maroon Major Thomas Thompson explained how this group ‘undertook a long and tedious march to the disturbed district, which so awed the rebellious negroes that they soon laid down their arms’. One of the last leaders of the rebels, Gardner, surrendered after hearing that the Charles Town Maroons had joined the fight against them. The Windward Maroons therefore played a significant role in demoralising and routing the last of the opposition, including some of the rebel leaders.

The economic devastation suffered by the island during the course of the Sam Sharpe Rebellion led to the planters blaming the missionaries for their misfortune. The revolt

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761 Hart, Slaves Who Abolished Slavery, pp. 309, 313.
762 VHAJ, 13 November 1834, p. 153.
763 VHAJ, 13 November 1834, p. 153.
765 VHAJ, 21 November 1836, p. 102.
766 VHAJ, 1832, Appendix XVIII, p. 316.
created so much damage to plantations in western Jamaica that in 1834, the British government gave Jamaica a loan of £300,000 to aid ‘individuals who suffered in the late rebellion’.\textsuperscript{767} Affected planters blamed the missionaries for their sufferings during what they called the ‘Baptist War’, but when the missionaries narrated the attacks they suffered at the hands of the planters, they won the support of a sympathetic House of Commons.\textsuperscript{768} During the course of these hearings, the missionaries accused the allies of the planters of exercising brutality against the slaves.

Missionaries highlighted the brutal methods used by the Maroons in support of the colonial elite. Baptist missionary John Clarke wrote that, in addition to daily pay for fighting on behalf of the colonial authorities, the Maroons also received rewards for the numbers of ears they cut off the rebel slaves that they had killed.\textsuperscript{769} Henry Bleby, a Methodist missionary, alleged that ‘scores of slaves innocent of all participation in the revolt were shot by Maroons, for no other purpose than to obtain their ears for sale.’\textsuperscript{770} Craton claims that some colonial officers acted to prevent the Maroons from cutting off the ears of rebels for bounty money during this conflict.\textsuperscript{771} It is possible that the bad treatment the missionaries received from the island’s colonial authorities could have coloured their reminiscences about the allies of the colonial militias. However, so many slaves died in the aftermath of the revolt that several plantation owners had to resort to petitions to the Assembly for compensation for slaves killed by Maroons.\textsuperscript{772} The missionaries narrated tales of Maroon brutality following the conclusion of the Sam Sharpe Rebellion, and similar accusations would later be made against the Maroons after the Morant Bay Rebellion three decades later.\textsuperscript{773}

\textsuperscript{767} VHAJ, 6 June 1834, p. 19.
\textsuperscript{770} Bleby, \textit{Death Struggles of Slavery}, p. 21.
\textsuperscript{771} Craton, \textit{Testing the Chains}, p. 311.
\textsuperscript{772} VHAJ, 1832, Appendix XVIII, p. 355.
The colonial authorities employed the Maroons to hunt runaways resulting from the revolt, and Windward Maroons consequently discovered runaway communities that had thrived in the John Crow Mountains for years. In 1832, on the east coast, outside Manchioneal, Maroons looking for slaves running away during the Sam Sharpe Rebellion stumbled across ‘a town, comprising twenty-two houses, twenty, thirty, and forty feet long, sufficient to contain five hundred people, on the Carrion-Crow hills’. These were runaways ‘who had for years been living in the fastnesses in the interior’. This makeshift village of runaways had been in existence for a number of years preceding the Baptist War. This shows how ineffective the Windward Maroons were in dispersing runaway communities in the eastern mountains in the years leading up to the Sam Sharpe Rebellion.

The Baptist War created a large number of runaway slaves who took refuge in the mountainous interior, where they were able to live off the land. Theodore Foulks claimed that rebel slaves fleeing into the mountains had difficulty surviving on what was ‘but a scanty store of paltry vegetable and fruit, totally insufficient for the subsistence of even a small body of men’. However, Bleby reported that in the aftermath of the Sam Sharpe Rebellion, black slaves fled to the mountains, and that ‘thousands of negroes were in the fastnesses of the country’. Earl Belmore, the governor, complained about ‘those lawless bands who have fled to the woods, from whence they maintain a desultory warfare’. In April 1832, the Assembly reported that ‘a portion of the maroons, as well as a detachment of the island militia’, were used to pursue ‘such of the rebellious slaves who have not surrendered themselves, but remain out, and are sheltered amongst the almost inaccessible forests and fastnesses in the interior districts of the island’. Rebels took refuge in ‘the Cockpit Country, known to the Accompong as being formerly places of retreat to the Trelawny maroons, and

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774 VHAJ, 12 April 1832, p. 133.
777 Bleby, *Death Struggles of Slavery*, p. 34.
778 VHAJ, 22 March 1832, p. 80.
779 VHAJ, 26 April 1832, p. 197.
the theatre of their war’. It appears that hundreds of slaves took advantage of the rebellion to flee to the interior of the island, especially areas formerly policed by Trelawny Town. On the arrival of regular troops, while large numbers of runaways returned to their estates, smaller bands of determined rebels remained at large.

The runaways resulting from the Sam Sharpe Rebellion troubled planters in western Jamaica in the years following the revolt. Even after the British government passed the Emancipation Act, Hylton and the Accompong Maroons hunted rebels ‘in those parts contiguous to the late scene of the rebellion, and several daring characters were secured and delivered to justice’. Parties, which included Maroons, went on a daily basis ‘to scour the mountains’, but they were not always successful and they often returned from their hunts empty-handed. In 1834, Hylton complained to the Assembly that ‘there still continued a number of dangerous characters, whose past atrocities deterred them from surrendering themselves, and the fastnesses of the interior and sea coast remain infested by them and other runaways’. In the aftermath of the Sam Sharpe Rebellion, western Maroons continued to have difficulty capturing slaves who escaped to mountainous forests previously frequented by Cuffee’s community and Me-no-Sen-You-no-Come.

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Table Thirteen: Runaways captured by Maroons in the 1830s. The records are incomplete, but the numbers of runaways filed by superintendents were minuscule when compared to the estimates of the numbers of runaways at large on an annual basis.

780 VHAJ, 13 November 1834, p. 153.
781 VHAJ, 31 October 1834, p. 99.
782 McMahon, Jamaica Plantership, p. 100; Hart, Slaves Who Abolished Slavery, p. 308; Waddell, Twenty Nine Years, p. 65.
783 VHAJ, 31 October 1834, p. 99.
In the 1830s, annual returns of the Maroon towns revealed that the runaways captured by the Maroons were small in comparison to the total number at large (see Table Thirteen). In 1830, Maroons from Accompong Town brought in 76 runaway slaves, and there were probably another 76 who were ‘taken up as stragglers (and) carried to their owners or lodged in the workhouse’. In 1831, Moore Town Maroons captured 27 runaway slaves, while a year later ‘the number of runaways taken by said maroons may be about thirty, not including those apprehended under martial-law.’ In 1833, they brought in 130 runaways, ‘but as maroons frequently deliver runaways to their owners and the workhouses, without reporting to their superintendent, the exact number cannot be stated’. In 1835, only ‘four deserters were taken and delivered to justice’ by Maroons from Accompong Town. These returns are a small fraction of the numbers of runaways who remained at large on an annual basis. The Maroons therefore did not effectively police runaway slaves in the last decades of slavery in the nineteenth century. Hundreds, and possibly thousands, of slaves were able to avoid further bondage during the four-year Apprenticeship period that followed the Emancipation Act.

When the British government passed the Emancipation Act in 1833, the Assembly decided to stop paying for the capture of runaways. The Apprenticeship ran from 1834-8, but when Hylton submitted bills for payment to Maroon parties for hunting runaways in December 1834, the Assembly rejected his petition. Despite the Assembly’s reluctance to pay Maroon parties to hunt runaways, they still supplied the Maroon towns with muskets, gunpowder and flints. From 1836 to 1840, the Assembly reduced the contingency budget for Maroon parties from £800 to £400. Despite the budget reduction, the Assembly still owed Maroons outstanding sums for the duration of the Apprenticeship. Between 1835 and

785 VHAJ, 1830, Appendix LVI, pp. 358, 362.
786 VHAJ, 30 November 1831, p. 149, 22 November 1833, p. 186, Appendix LVIII, pp. 452, 461, 473,
787 VHAJ, 17 November 1835, p. 65.
788 VHAJ, 11 December 1834, p. 246.
1838, the Assembly incurred annual debts to the Maroons that ranged from just £80 to as much as £500 a year. At the conclusion of the Apprenticeship, the Assembly owed Maroon parties between £800 and £1,500, before eventually reducing those debts to £168 by the end of the decade. The unsatisfactory payment regime employed by the colonial authorities to reimburse Maroons for hunting runaway slaves contributed to their poor returns right up to the end of the Apprenticeship.

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Conclusion

The Maroons ultimately failed to prevent the formation of communities of runaway slaves in the decades following the treaties of 1739 and 1740. While runaways troubled the colonial authorities in eastern Jamaica throughout the eighteenth century, in western Jamaica the problem was a minor one. However, the advent of the Second Maroon War created an avenue for hundreds of slaves to run away in western Jamaica, and in the nineteenth century both sides of the island suffered from increasing problems with runaway communities.

The Windward Maroons were unsuccessful in dispersing runaway communities in the eighteenth century, and they continued to be plagued with runaways in eastern Jamaica throughout the nineteenth. In western Jamaica there were very few communities of runaway slaves in the eighteenth century, partly because Maroons from Trelawny Town and Accompong Town successfully policed the Cockpit Country. In the latter half of the eighteenth century, the small groups of the Congo Settlement and Brutus were the only communities of runaways to establish themselves in the forested mountains of western Jamaica. The Second Maroon War changed the course of marronage in the western end of the island.

While the Maroons of Trelawny Town hunted runaway slaves before the conflict, once the Second Maroon War broke out these Maroons encouraged slaves to run away and fight on their side. Many slaves who fought on the side of Trelawny Town secured their freedom, and benefitted from the weapons and ammunition these Maroons left behind. During the war, hundreds of slaves ran away to fight for Trelawny Town, and their numbers were so large that they may have outnumbered their Maroon allies by two or three to one. Many of the slaves who secured their freedom during the conflict then established independent runaway communities. Cuffee initially waged war against the white planters, until conflict forced them to retreat further into the Cockpit Country. Healthshire and Me-no-Sen-You-no-Come sought to survive by trying to avoid provoking the colonial authorities.
After the Second Maroon War, the colonial authorities deported most of the population of the larger of the two Leeward Maroon towns. This left the smaller Accompong Town with the responsibility of patrolling the Cockpit Country, and they did not have the numbers to suppress the runaway communities that established themselves in the forested mountains of western Jamaica. The Accompong Maroons failed in their attempts to capture significant numbers of runaway slaves in the large communities of Cuffee in 1798 and Me-no-Sen-You-no-Come in the 1820s. The colonial authorities had failed to address the issues of remuneration for captured runaways, and consequently the Maroons were not enthusiastic about fulfilling this clause of the treaties.

The changing face of marronage in western Jamaica also affected the Maroon response to the Sam Sharpe Rebellion of 1831-2. Maroons of Accompong Town efficiently helped the colonial authorities to put down the revolt, capturing its leaders and mopping up the rest of the resistance, but they were unable to subdue many of the runaways who secured their freedom from the Sam Sharpe Rebellion. Hundreds, and possibly thousands, of slaves ran away to the Cockpit Country, setting up independent communities that lasted until the complete emancipation of the slaves in 1838. The colonial forces, including the Maroons, were unable to quell the spirit of marronage that thrived throughout the slave population in the decades leading up to the emancipation of the slaves. Many black slaves took advantage of the deportation of Trelawny Town to secure their freedom and establish independent communities in the island’s forested interior.
This chapter will show that while the colonial authorities displayed more confidence in their attempts to undermine the Maroons in the nineteenth century, the Maroon towns achieved economic independence by the time the British abolished slavery in the 1830s. Confident of their dominance over the Maroons following their successful deportation of Trelawny Town, the colonial authorities took a harder line against the remaining Maroon towns and they stopped making concessions to the Maroons in land disputes with planters. However, the Maroons were able to use their existing land to grow a diverse range of crops and to support their growing population. In the nineteenth century, the Maroons attempted to distance themselves from black slaves by adopting European names, religion and customs, and they resisted attempts by the colonial authorities to merge them with the general black population after emancipation. The Maroons therefore maintained thriving independent towns based upon a diversified economy and survived attempts to dismantle their communities.

When land disputes occurred in the nineteenth century, the colonial authorities sided with the planters against the Maroons. Kenneth Bilby and Mavis Campbell argue that when the colonial authorities deported the Maroons of Trelawny Town, they effectively brought the remaining Maroon towns into line, because they feared that if they transgressed they might suffer a similar fate.  

However, most historians chose to end their study of the Maroons after the Second Maroon War, and as a result, they do not assess the impact this conflict had on the relationship between the colonial authorities and the remaining Maroon towns.

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This chapter will build on the work of Campbell and Bilby, but will posit that the colonial authorities did not completely subdue the Maroon towns.

This chapter will present evidence to show that the Maroons were able to secure a level of autonomy by developing a diversified economy on their communal land in the nineteenth century. Michael Craton and Campbell accept the Maroon arguments about the poor quality of their land, and that the colonial authorities oppressed them by restricting them to these lands. Other historians point out that the Maroons successfully farmed their lands, and they easily fed themselves from the crops they grew. Michael Mullin states that the Maroons had a diversified economy, including agriculture, hunting wild game, fruit gathering, blacksmithing and livestock management. Helen McKee notes that the Maroons valued their communal land highly. Rachel Herrmann and R.C. Dallas observe that the Maroons had secured the right to farm and sell their produce, and to hunt and rear their own livestock, which enabled them to maintain a certain level of autonomy. Isaac Curtis claims that Maroon farming practices were so successful that Maroon produce became a major source of food on the island. While there is no evidence to support Curtis’s conjecture, this chapter will show that the Maroons exploited the fertile conditions of their land to grow a variety of crops, and they sold their excess produce in the slave markets on the coast.

From this economic platform, the population of the official Maroon towns grew consistently in the century that followed the treaties of 1739 and 1740. Vincent Brown, Trevor Burnard, J.R. Ward, Orlando Patterson and Barry Higman point out that Jamaica’s

development as a colony was hindered because death rates exceeded birth rates for both the slaveholders and their slaves.\textsuperscript{798} Patterson asserts that the natural rate of population increase in the Maroon towns between the two wars was low as well.\textsuperscript{799} However, this chapter will use evidence from the \textit{Votes of the House of the Assembly of Jamaica} to show that the Maroon population growth was significant, not only in the eighteenth century, but also in the nineteenth, among the four official Maroon towns remaining in Jamaica. The Maroons thrive on the crops grown on the communal land, and their numbers consequently grew at a time when there were high death rates among slaves and slaveholders.

The Maroons embraced European naming patterns and religion in the first half of the nineteenth century. Campbell explains that at the start of the eighteenth century, a number of the Maroons had African names and no surname, but after the treaties they acquired names that were largely European and they adopted the surnames of surrounding plantation owners. Campbell argues that this changing habit represented a Maroon desire to move up the ladder of civilisation by becoming more European, and that their mimicry of European names reflected a collective that was no longer confident in its culture.\textsuperscript{800} However, this chapter will use evidence from the Maroon returns in the \textit{Votes} to show that while the Maroon leaders adopted European names in the half-century between the treaties and the Second Maroon War, African names were still common among ordinary Maroons, and did not fade away until the Maroons converted to Christianity at the turn of the century. Daniel Schafer observes that the Maroons resisted all attempts to convert them to Christianity in the


\textsuperscript{800} Campbell, \textit{Maroons of Jamaica}, p. 255.
eighteenth century, but in the nineteenth, they gradually began to embrace the new faith.\footnote{Daniel Schafer, ‘The Maroons of Jamaica; African Slave Rebels in the Caribbean’, Ph.D. dissertation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1974), p. 225.} This chapter will argue that at the turn of the century, Maroon conversion to Christianity played a more pivotal role in their shift from Ashanti names and religion than their desire to adopt more European customs.

No historian has assessed the influence of the different versions of Christianity in the Maroon towns in the nineteenth century. When the Maroons embraced Christianity, most of the Maroon towns opted for the Church of England, which was the branch of Protestantism accepted by most of Jamaica’s slave-owning planters. This chapter will present evidence to show that in Scott’s Hall the inhabitants did not accept the Anglican Church, but instead embraced the Baptist non-conformist faith most popular with black slaves. Significant numbers of free coloureds lived in Scott’s Hall, and they may have influenced the Maroons of that town to convert to this non-conformist evangelical version of Protestantism. This chapter will posit the view that the limited numbers of Maroon slaves in this town might have been a factor behind Scott’s Hall adopting the faith of those who opposed slavery.

The Maroons and British culture

After the Second Maroon War, the Maroons shifted away from African traditions to British customs. When the Maroons signed the treaties of 1739 and 1740, their leaders had mainly African names and practised African religions, but in the early nineteenth century they mirrored those of neighbouring white planters. In the early 1800s, many Maroons embraced Christianity and renounced their African religions, but like the black slaves before them the version of Christianity some of them eventually adopted included West African survivals.

African names were popular among Maroon leaders in the early eighteenth century, at a time when most slaveholders stripped their slaves of their African names. At the end of the First Maroon War, Maroon leaders had mainly names of Akan origin, such as Cudjoe,
Accompong, Quao and Nanny. During Tacky's Revolt of the 1760s, the Maroon officers were called Quaco, Cain, Clash, Sambo, Cudjo, Davy, Cuffee and Tulluppanny, of which about half were African in origin. In contrast, there was a much smaller percentage of African names among eighteenth century slaves. In 1778, for example, on the York Plantation only 13 per cent of African-born slaves and 29 per cent of creole slaves had an African name. Burnard explains that the slaveholders took on the responsibility for naming the slaves and their children, and they often denied them the right to keep their African names. Because the early eighteenth century Maroon leaders had control of the naming patterns of their children, they kept the Akan names that were popular among the Maroons.

In the second half of the eighteenth century, Maroon leaders gradually discarded their sole African names for both a first name and a surname. In 1753, only a half of one per cent of slaves in Jamaican inventories had two names. Much like the Jamaican slaves, mid-eighteenth century Maroon officers often had just one name. Freed people chose to discard their slave and African names for those of European derivation, in an attempt to identify more with free whites than black slaves. Bryan Edwards noted that a similar change in Maroon naming practice was 'in imitation of the other free blacks'. New evidence shows that in the Maroon towns remaining in Jamaica at the end of the eighteenth century after the deportation of Trelawny Town, only one Maroon officer had an African name, Afee Cudjoe of Charles Town, while seven others had names such as William White, Robert Austin and

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804 Burnard, 'Slave Naming Patterns', p. 326.

805 Burnard, 'Slave Naming Patterns', pp. 328, 339.

Charles Harris (see Appendix One). Maroon leaders followed the practice of freed people in rejecting African and slave names for European forenames and surnames, in an attempt to identify closer with free white people rather than black slaves.

When Maroon leaders adopted the names of neighbouring planters, they sought to curry favour with these rich white men. McKee explains that Maroon leaders mimicked the names of nearby planters and leaders of white society. By the mid-1790s, Edwards observed that ‘of late years a practice has universally prevailed among the Maroons...of attaching themselves to different families among the English’. The Maroons desired ‘gentlemen of consideration to allow the Maroon children to bear their names’, and that ‘Montague James, John Palmer, Tharp, Jarrett, Parkinson, Shirley, White, and many others, are names adopted in this way’. Trelawny Town Colonel Montague James may have taken his name from his superintendent and John Tharp was one of the richest planters in western Jamaica. Other Maroon leaders such as William Gray and Kean Osborn probably took the names of planters who owned estates between Charles Town and Scott's Hall and in St Thomas-in-the-East respectively. St James planter Samuel Vaughan claimed that in return, these Maroons ‘receive occasional benefits’ from the planters whose names they had taken. The planters allowed the Maroons to use their names in return for which they sought to exercise influence over the Maroon leadership.

While nearly all the Maroon leadership moved away from sole African names towards European forenames and surnames in the late eighteenth century, it took longer for all of the

807 Votes of the House of the Assembly of Jamaica (VHAJ), 20 November 1798, pp. 81-8.
808 McKee, ‘Negotiating Freedom’, p. 86.
811 JAJ, Vol. 9, 22 September 1795, p. 372.
general Maroon population to follow suit. By 1798, 15 per cent of Maroons still had only one African name. That year, there were 753 Maroons residing in official towns, and while 357 Maroons had two European names, 113 had one African name, while 52 had both an African and a European name (see Table Fourteen). A lot of elderly Maroons had just one African name, while younger Maroons tended to have a European forename and a surname. In Moore Town, there were four Maroon women classified as ‘old’, who were between the ages of 62 and 102, bearing the African names of Couba, Mimba, Yabbah and Abba. In the same town, 113 out of 130 of the Maroons under the age of 20 had both a Christian first name and a European surname. In this respect, the Maroons were similar to freed people. Upon gaining freedom, Jamaican slaves often sought to acquire both a forename and a surname to complete their escape from the stigma of slavery. At the end of the eighteenth century, Maroons were beginning to reject their Akan names in favour of English forenames and surnames.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Children</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Two European names</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One African name</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One European name</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One African, one European</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table Fourteen: Maroon names in 1798. Out of 750 Maroons, 357 Maroons had two European names, while 113 Maroons had one African name. The returns first gave detailed names of the Maroons in 1798, nearly 60 years after the treaties.

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812 VHAJ, 20 November 1798, pp. 84-5.
813 Burnard, ‘Slave Naming Patterns’, p. 342.
814 VHAJ, 20 November 1798, pp. 81-8.
Towards the end of the eighteenth century, the Maroons copied the naming traditions of the white planters and not the black slaves. Burnard notes that in the parish of Kingston between 1722 and 1758, white parents gave 48.2 per cent of baptised white boys the four names of John, William, Thomas and James, and 57.8 per cent of white girls were called Mary, Elizabeth, Ann and Sarah.\(^815\) Evidence not previously used by historians shows that in 1798, 38.8 per cent of Maroon males also had those four names, and there were more Maroons named either John, William, Thomas or James, than Cudjoe. Similarly, 41.1 per cent of Maroon females were called Mary, Elizabeth, Ann and Sarah. The most popular female Maroon names were Mary and Elizabeth or their variants, while Ann and Sarah were less popular, but the only African name with equal numbers as the latter two was Couba or Juba.\(^816\) In 1753, the Spanish Town archives reveal that despite slaveholders taking responsibility for naming slaves, the most popular names were still Akan, with Quashie, Quaco, Jack, Cuffee and Cudjoe dominating male names, and Jenny, Couba, Mimba and Nanny prevailing among females.\(^817\) The Maroon naming traditions moved away from the Akan names towards a narrow band of forenames popular with the white planters.

The Maroon trend towards adopting European names was accelerated when they accepted Christianity in the early nineteenth century. Burnard observes that when slaves converted to Christianity, they abandoned their African names in favour of European ones.\(^818\) Similarly, most Maroons who had African names swapped them for British ones upon conversion. In 1827, Quashie Osborn adopted the forename Charles, and the Charles Town Maroons Sambo Oakley, Cooba Bernard, Nanny McGinnes and the Richards sisters, Quasheba and Wanica, changed their first names to James, Jane, Charlotte, Sarah and Mary respectively.\(^819\) Sometimes, converted Maroons would change both names, even if that surname was of European origin. In 1829, Quaco and Quao McGregor became Richard and

\(^{815}\) Burnard, ‘Slave Naming Patterns’, pp. 326-7.
\(^{816}\) VHAJ, 20 November 1798, pp. 81-8.
\(^{817}\) Burnard, ‘Slave Naming Patterns’, p. 337.
\(^{818}\) Burnard, ‘Slave Naming Patterns’, p. 338.
\(^{819}\) VHAJ, 1827, Appendix XXXV, p. 331.
Robert Hartley respectively. The missionaries' conversion of the Maroons to Christianity hastened their adoption of European naming practices.

By the time the colonial authorities emancipated the slaves at the end of the 1830s, nearly all the Maroons had a Christian first name and a European surname. In 1839, out of a total Maroon population of 1,565, all but 30 Maroons had both a British first name and surname. Only two Maroon children had just one African name while four had one European name. In 1798, there were thirteen Cudjoes in the Maroon towns, but 40 years later there was just one. At the end of the eighteenth century, there were twelve Mimbas, Nannys and Phibbas each, but in 1839 that number had declined to three Mimbas, seven Nannys, and no Phibbas. In contrast, there were seven Phoebes and ten Nancys. In the course of 40 years, Phibba had become Phoebe, Nancy surpassed Nanny, and the next generation of Maroons had largely European names.

Even Maroons who had European names changed them on converting to Christianity. This is in common with the black slaves, who were so keen to change names upon conversion that they even shed their sole Christian names, such as Isaac, Adam, Frederick and Grace, for completely different first names and a surname. Among the Maroons, Nancy Gilliard changed her name to Cecilia Bryan, Peter Young became Richard Miller, and Siney Gordon adopted the name of Jane Cargill. However, Maroons often answered to both their former and new names. Burnard notes that West Africans often bore several names during their lifetimes. This practice so confused one superintendent that he erroneously double-counted Maroons under different names. In common with free blacks and coloureds, the Maroons used their conversion to Christianity as an avenue to distance

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820 VHAJ, 1829, Appendix XLIV, p. 428.
821 VHAJ, 20 November 1798, pp. 81-8, 1839, Appendix XLVI, pp. 382-415.
824 Burnard, ‘Slave Naming Patterns’, p. 344.
825 VHAJ, 1840, Appendix X, p. 49.
themselves from the slaves by adopting European naming customs, but they still maintained
the West African tradition of using multiple names.

Though missionaries made their appearance in Jamaica in the latter half of the
eighteenth century to minister to the slaves, they did not attempt to convert the Maroons until
after the Second Maroon War. The missionaries who converted the black slaves of Jamaica
were largely Baptists, Wesleyan Methodists and Moravians.826 By 1825, Christianity made
inroads into the slave population, and Robert Young claimed that while the practice of obeah
was common in Jamaica during the eighteenth century, it was in decline in the nineteenth.827
However, the missionary neglect of the Maroons drew criticism from British members of
parliament in the aftermath of the Second Maroon War. In 1796, abolitionist William
Wilberforce stated that the implementation of Christian values in Trelawny Town would have
prevented the Second Maroon War from occurring.828 Edwards countered by claiming that
the Maroons, with their insistence on polygamy, made it difficult to teach them Christianity,
adding that ‘if a clergyman was to be sent to them, instead of listening to his doctrines, they
would eat him up.’829 While there is no evidence of Maroons cannibalizing a missionary, the
Maroons practised polygamy. In the eighteenth century, missionaries showed little interest in
converting Maroons to Christianity, but following the Second Maroon War missionaries
began to frequent the Maroon towns. It is possible that they were following Wilberforce’s
suggestion, and believed that if they converted the remaining Maroon towns to Christianity,
they could prevent any future conflicts from occurring.

When the Maroons signed the treaties, they practised religions that were largely
West African in origin, and for most of the eighteenth century, they adhered to those beliefs.

The Maroons of Moore Town worshipped a creator god named Yankipon, and ancestor worship was a key part of their Kromanti religion. The religions practised by the Leeward Maroons differed from those of the Windward Maroons in a number of ways. The sacred sites of the Accompong Maroons were only accessible to ‘true-blood’ Maroons, a prohibition that did not exist in Moore Town. Unlike the Leeward Maroons, oral historians in Moore Town claim that some of their spiritual practices come from their Taino ancestors. However, Maroon oral historians know very little about the early Kromanti religions, because the missionaries were so successful in converting the Maroons to Christianity at the start of the nineteenth century.830

While the Maroons remained faithful to their Kromanti faith in the eighteenth century, after the Second Maroon War they embraced Christianity in significant numbers. Bilby maintains that Christianity started to make an impact on Maroon towns in the middle of the nineteenth century, and won more converts in the decades that followed.831 However, the evidence shows that Maroons began to accept Christianity at the end of the eighteenth century. In 1795, Superintendent Alexander Forbes wrote that the younger Maroons from Accompong Town were all baptised as Christians during the Second Maroon War.832 It is possible that the Maroons of Accompong Town began to accept Christianity to prove that they were loyal to the colonial authorities during the conflict.

Following the Second Maroon War, evangelists converted Maroons to Christianity in significant numbers. The Windward Maroons followed the lead of Accompong Town and accepted missionaries into their towns at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The Maroons of Moore Town were initially suspicious of the missionaries, fearing the intention was to herd them into a house, and deport them from the island.833 However, during the

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early nineteenth century, the Maroons gradually distanced themselves from the religions of West Africa, which they associated with the slaves.\textsuperscript{834} Most of the early converts in Accompong Town were the young, but very few officers embraced Christianity.\textsuperscript{835} Dallas observed that while the older Maroons stuck to their African religion and customs, they ‘have no objection to their children being brought up Christians’.\textsuperscript{836} During the course of the nineteenth century, the Kromanti practices faded and were supplanted by Christian beliefs.\textsuperscript{837} Later Maroon leaders who converted to Christianity then began suppressing the ‘heathen’ Kromanti practices, and missionaries encouraged their converts to abandon their Kromanti ceremonies.\textsuperscript{838} The evangelists succeeded in converting the children of the Maroons to Christianity, which resulted in a decline in the traditional Kromanti rites of the Maroon towns.

While embracing Christianity as their new faith, the Maroons did not completely abandon their West African beliefs, even though the missionaries branded those religions as heathen. The black slave population included aspects of their West African religions in a version of Christianity that was foreign to many missionaries.\textsuperscript{839} According to W.J. Gardner, ‘native Baptist churches became associations of men and women who, in too many cases, mingled the belief and even practice of Mialism with religious observances’.\textsuperscript{840} The Maroon experience was similar to that of the black slaves. In Accompong Town, the Maroons communed with their ancestors who fought in the First Maroon War at their Peace Cave, a practice that continues today. Accompong Maroons still believe that ancestors such as Accompong ride through the town named after him.\textsuperscript{841} Despite the dominance of Christianity,

\textsuperscript{834} Carey, \textit{The Maroon Story}, p. 184.
\textsuperscript{835} VHAJ, 1829, Appendix LVII, p. 489.
\textsuperscript{837} Bilby, \textit{True-Born Maroons}, p. 418.
\textsuperscript{838} Bilby, \textit{True-Born Maroons}, pp. 342, 417-8.
\textsuperscript{840} Gardner, \textit{A History of Jamaica}, p. 358.
\textsuperscript{841} Bilby, \textit{True-Born Maroons}, pp. 171, 449.
the Kromanti beliefs live on in forms of Christian religion that embrace West African survivals. In the 1850s, the traditions of Revival and Pentecostalism grew out of the merging of West African religions with Christianity. By the early twentieth century, most of the Maroons of Accompong Town were Presbyterian while Charles Town and Moore Town Maroons remained Anglicans, until the Revival churches gained popularity in the Maroon towns later that century. Revival churches are now the most popular form of Christianity in Moore Town. The Afro-Christian spiritual healers, known as ‘myalists’, were discouraged by British missionaries, but their brand of Christianity blended with Kromanti ceremonies and strongly resembled the Moore Town worship of Yankipon.842 The Bongo cult in eastern Jamaica in the early twentieth century, related to Kumina, had its origins in the Maroon towns of the Blue Mountains.843 While the Maroons chose Christianity over their Kromanti beliefs in the nineteenth century, they included a lot of their Kromanti customs and traditions in their version of Christianity.

Most of the Maroons who embraced Christianity chose the established Anglican faith of the white planters over the non-conformist Protestantism popular with the black slaves. In 1826, the Assembly gave Colin Donaldson, rector of the parish of St George, a financial grant ‘to devote his attention to the maroons dwelling in his parish’. The Anglican rector wrote glowingly about being ‘respectfully received and attended to at all times by the maroons of Charles-Town’.844 In 1828, at Accompong Town, the Anglican Church Missionary Society established ‘the means of instruction, which they rapidly availed themselves of’.845 By the 1830s, most of the inhabitants of Moore Town were members of the Church of

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844 VHAJ, 7 November 1826, p. 113.
England. The Maroons chose to identify themselves with the white planter class, and consequently embraced the Anglican Church.

Table Fifteen: The number of slaves owned by Maroons. This number increased gradually, passing the 100 mark in the 1820s, and did not go below that level until the end of slavery in 1833. For a time, Maroon officers owned more slaves than Maroon women, but that changed when women became the largest Maroon slaveholders by 1818. Non-Maroons living in Maroon towns owned large numbers of slaves in the 1820s, but their numbers declined as emancipation approached. The Maroons were possibly more receptive to the Church of England because that religious institution endorsed slavery. Richard Burrowes, the Anglican schoolmaster in Charles Town, was a supporter of the system of slavery, and he owned a slave while he resided in the Maroon town. The Anglican Church considered the black slaves to be intellectually incapable of understanding concepts of the Christian faith, and as a result did

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not try to convert them. In 1796, superintendents reported to the Assembly that in two Maroon towns there were 26 slaves. There were 68 Maroon slaves across the four official towns in 1807, growing to 89 in 1818, and 117 in 1824, before peaking at 123 in 1829. Thereafter, the number of slaves in the Maroon towns gradually declined until emancipation in the 1830s (see Table Fifteen). Maroons probably hired their slaves out to plantations during crop season as a part of ‘jobbing gangs’. A superintendent described one Scott’s Hall slave as ‘working out’. The Maroons owned increasing numbers of slaves in the nineteenth century, and most likely embraced a branch of the Protestant faith that endorsed the practice.

The colonial authorities initially tried to prohibit Maroon towns from acquiring slaves, but the Maroons ignored this regulation. The Maroons began purchasing slaves in the 1740s, and in 1773 the superintendent-general reported that there were ‘about twenty slaves in all the towns, belonging to the maroon officers, which they do not care to acknowledge or give me an account of’. Initially, the colonial authorities overlooked the issue. When the Assembly first inquired into Maroon slave ownership, they eventually dismissed the claim that the Maroons had slaves as ‘groundless’. In 1805, however, the Assembly could no longer ignore the growing number of Maroon slaves, and they raised the matter with the governor ‘in order that such a stop may be put to an evil of so alarming a nature’. The planters did not approve of the Maroons acquiring slaves, and wanted to monitor it. However, despite their concerns, the colonial authorities did nothing to stop the Maroons from holding slaves, and the superintendents seemed to be similarly relaxed about the issue. Thomas Wright, superintendent of Moore Town in the 1830s, had eight slaves of his own in

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850 VHAJ, 1823, Appendix XCVIII, p. 474.
852 JAJ, Vol. 6, 26 November 1773, p. 466.
the town, and he obviously saw no reason to curtail the practice of Maroons also owning slaves. Attempts by the colonial authorities to curb Maroon ownership of slaves were half-hearted.

Restrictions on Maroons purchasing slaves were not enforced by the colonial authorities. Abolitionist Thomas Fowell Buxton and historian Richard Sheridan believe that the Maroons abided by a law in 1792, which forbade them from buying slaves, and levied fines of £100 on anyone who sold slaves to the Maroons. Buxton claims that the slaves of the Maroons only increased by natural births as a result. On the contrary, the evidence shows that the Maroons purchased slaves up until abolition in the 1830s. One superintendent claimed that he could find out who sold the Maroons their slaves, and as a result ‘produce such proofs as lead to conviction’, while another said that he believed those in his town ‘were all fraudulently possessed in the first instance’. New evidence shows that Maroons could only increase their slaves by buying them. In 1811, Charles Town Maroons Colonel Giscome, ‘Old Price’ and Mary Wallen did not own any slaves between them, but a year later Colonel Giscome owned five slaves, Old Price six and Wallen three, most of them adults. From 1818 to 1825, Moore Town Maroon officer Samuel Phillips had increased his slave holdings from six to 10, and only one was young enough to have been born between those years. His brother Charles also hired a 35-year old slave named Robert Clarke ‘from a free man, named John Moon’. These Maroons increased their numbers of slaves through hire and purchases, not natural increase in births.

855 VHAJ, 1831, Appendix XLV, pp. 364-5, 1832, 20 November 1832, p. 92, 29 October 1834, p. 75.
857 VHAJ, 1830, Appendix LV, pp. 360-2.
860 VHAJ, 1833, Appendix LVIII, p. 452.
The Maroons did not register their slaves, so they lost them when the British government passed the Emancipation Act in 1833. Because most Maroon slaves were not registered, the Maroons paid no taxes for them. At emancipation, of the 99 slaves in Charles Town, only 38 of them belonged to Maroons, with the rest owned by non-Maroon residents of the town. At the beginning of the Apprenticeship, there were 61 Maroon apprentices in Moore Town, 14 in Accompong Town, and only one in Scott’s Hall. Higman claims that the Maroons were paid compensation for their slaves in 1834. On the contrary, new evidence reveals that in early 1835, the Moore Town Maroons complained that a special magistrate named McGregor came to the town ‘and declared all the negroes of petitioners free’. The Moore Town Maroons demanded compensation for their 59 apprentices through Superintendent Wright, but by late 1836, ‘no such reparation had been made’. The Assembly agreed that ‘a most serious grievance and great injustice had been done’, and that ‘the British government cannot do otherwise than compensate the injury’. However, the British government dismissed the claim, saying that the Maroons had not registered their slaves in 1832, and were therefore not entitled to any compensation. The Maroons chose not to register their slaves in order to avoid paying taxes on them, but their actions resulted in the colonial authorities not compensating them when the Emancipation Act was passed.

The exception to the Maroon trend towards the Church of England occurred in Scott’s Hall, which came under the influence of Baptist missionaries. A large number of free coloureds, also known as ‘Residenters’, lived in this smallest of official Maroon towns, and some of them may have been Baptists (see Table Sixteen). Between 1827 and 1832, over 30 free coloureds resided in Scott’s Hall, making up between a third and a quarter of the Maroon town’s population. An Anglican school existed at Scott’s Hall, but the Baptist mission

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861 VHAJ, 1830, Appendix LVI, pp. 358-362.
862 VHAJ, 29 October 1834, p. 75; Higman, Slave Population, p. 73.
863 Higman, Slave Population, p. 47.
865 VHAJ, 25 February 1837, pp. 263-4, 31 October 1837, pp. 52-3.
alongside it ended up having the greater influence. In the 1830s, Baptist missionary William Whitehorne set up a ‘Mico school station’ at Scott’s Hall, after which Benjamin Luckock and John Clarke reported that the Maroons there ‘are now become civilized, have built themselves a chapel, and send their children to school’. The superintendent, ‘who seems to be a religious man’, hosted a Baptist minister who ‘comes over from a neighbouring mountain to preach to them (and) has persuaded many of them to leave off rum, and to become teetotallers’. The visitors claimed that a Maroon of Scott’s Hall, on becoming a Christian, ‘married the mother of his children, with whom he had lived unlawfully – who was once a slave’. The Maroons of Scott’s Hall became Baptists instead of Anglicans.

Table Sixteen: Residents of Scott’s Hall 1827‐33. In 1827, 38 free people, called ‘Residenters’ by the superintendents, lived alongside 79 Maroons at Scott’s Hall. The Residenters gradually declined in number until there were just 25 in 1833, by which time the Maroon population had increased to 93.

Very few Maroons owned slaves in Scott’s Hall, because most of the town’s slaves were in the possession of Residenters. Between 1818 and 1827, non-Maroons in Scott’s Hall owned between 37 and 46 slaves, and when the populations of the Residenters were

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866 VHAJ, 1832, Appendix LVI, p. 388.
added to their slaves, they outnumbered the Maroons. In Scott’s Hall, though Maroons outnumbered Residenters alone by more than two to one in 1817, the ‘free people’ owned 39 slaves compared to just two possessed by Maroons. The Baptists were critics of the institution of slavery, and the Maroons of Scott’s Hall probably found it easier to adopt the Baptist faith because very few of them owned slaves.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, many illiterate Maroons encouraged their children to acquire an education from the church schools. Kathleen Wilson argues that Maroon officers embraced the clothes worn by British officers in order to promote their status within the Maroon towns. However, new evidence shows that the Maroons also improved the status of their children by utilizing the schools offered by missionaries. In 1826, the children from Charles Town had to travel to the Anglican charity school in Buff Bay, and the distance was so great ‘that it causes much loss of time and inconvenience’. The rector appealed to the Assembly for a grant ‘to enable the maroons to complete a building, which is intended to be erected for the purpose of religious instruction, to be used as a school-room for children and adults, and occasionally a place of public worship’. When Maroon children had difficulty travelling to his school, the Assembly paid Burrowes to move to Charles Town. In 1832, his school, which combined ‘reading with religious instruction’, had 80 children. In the 1830s, the Anglican Church Missionary Society ran a school in Moore Town that had approximately 117 pupils, of which 82 were male, and 79 were children, and where reading was combined with religious instruction. The Maroons embraced

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870 JAJ, Vol. 13, 28 November 1817, p. 163.
872 VHAJ, 7 November 1826, p. 113.
873 VHAJ, 1832, Appendix LVI, p. 454.

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Christianity not just to allow them to identify with British customs, but because of the educational opportunities afforded to their children by the church schools.

There was a regular turnover of schoolmasters of the Windward Maroon church schools, and the Maroons and their superintendents constantly complained about the state of their buildings. The Moore Town school had a succession of white schoolmasters named Ebenezer Collins, Richard Forbes and James Pallett, and it suffered from poor maintenance. In 1836, the Anglican Maroons at Moore Town petitioned the Assembly for help building ‘a chapel and school house’ on town land, and the Assembly agreed to their request, but the money voted for their construction did not meet the costs. Moore Town ended up with a building that was in a ‘dilapidated state’, where ‘they feel they are no longer safe in assembling together for divine worship’. In 1840, the superintendent reported that the chapel was ‘falling down from age and bad materials that built it’. The Charles Town church school also had a turnover in schoolmasters. In 1828, Burrowes resided in Charles Town, but five years later the catechist Hampson Winter had taken his place. The poor maintenance of these church schools occurred because of the downturn in the Jamaican economy from the 1820s until emancipation, which also resulted in the Maroons seeking alternative sources of income.

Maroon land and economy

In the nineteenth century, the colonial authorities no longer settled disputes by awarding plots of land to the Maroons. However, the Maroons who remained in Jamaica continued to flourish, using their existing land to grow a variety of crops and hunt the wild boar to make ‘jerk’ pork. After the Second Maroon War, the Maroons showed less interest in hunting runaway slaves, and they spent more time developing an independent economic existence.

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875 VHAJ, 4 November 1836, p. 38, 17 December 1836, p. 191, 24 October 1839, p. 27.
876 VHAJ, 1840, Appendix X, p. 49.
Once the colonial authorities had deported the Maroons of Trelawny Town, planters felt more confident about encroaching on the lands of those Maroons who remained. Previously, the Assembly resolved disputes with the Windward Maroons by buying the land from the planter, and donating it to the Maroons.\textsuperscript{878} The Charles Town Maroons continued to suffer from planter incursions during the nineteenth century, but this time the colonial authorities were not receptive to their complaints.\textsuperscript{879} In 1798, Maroons of Charles Town complained about planters encroaching on their lands, but the Assembly ignored their concerns. The Assembly were probably confident in the knowledge that the memory of the deportation of Trelawny Town after the Second Maroon War served as a deterrent for the Maroons of Charles Town.\textsuperscript{880} In 1830, the superintendent of Charles Town reported that of the 1,500 acres allocated to the town, no more than 200 acres were in cultivation. He argued that the Charles Town Maroons were not making proper use of their lands, and that planters would make better use of it.\textsuperscript{881} There is no verification of the superintendent's claims, and it is possible that he made them with a view to getting his hands on Maroon communal land.

After the colonial authorities deported the Trelawny Town Maroons at the end of the eighteenth century, planters persistently infringed on the lands belonging to Charles Town.

When the Windward Maroons trespassed in the nineteenth century, the Assembly responded more vigorously. In 1816, the governor reported to the Assembly that since ‘frequent complaints having been made of encroachments committed by the Charles-Town maroons on the adjacent properties, his grace thought it expedient that the lines of Charles-Town should be run’. In 1821, following another land dispute, the Assembly subjected the Scott's Hall Maroons to a land survey.\textsuperscript{882} In both disputes, the colonial authorities did not

\textsuperscript{878} Chapter Two, pp. 80-2.
\textsuperscript{879} Academic studies on the Maroons make little mention of land disputes in the nineteenth century. The only land dispute that caught the attention of Campbell was that between Scott’s Hall and neighbouring planters in 1844 (Maroons of Jamaica, pp. 166-7).
\textsuperscript{880} JAJ, Vol. 10, 30 November 1798, p. 197.
\textsuperscript{881} VHJ, 1830, Appendix LVI, p. 361.
\textsuperscript{882} JAJ, Vol. 13, 12 December 1816, p. 81, 28 November 1821, p. 621, 11 December 1821, p. 682.
award any additional land to the Maroons, but instead commissioned land surveys which clarified the land that belonged to the neighbouring planters.

Despite the show of loyalty displayed by the Maroons of Accompong Town during the Second Maroon War, the colonial authorities did not take their side in land disputes in the nineteenth century. The Accompong Maroons had a dispute with Superintendent John Hylton that remained unresolved when slavery ended in the late 1830s. In 1829, Hylton ordered a survey on the lands belonging to Accompong Town, complaining that the Maroons were trespassing on his own land, and that they ignored his protests. The surveyor, Philip Morris, agreed with the Accompong Town Maroons that ‘the grant of one thousand acres not being now sufficient for their number…and that their land was very rocky to the north and west, with cockpits and inaccessible rocks’. Morris suggested that the Maroons apply through Hylton for ‘a further grant of three or four hundred acres’, especially when, ‘considering the times, lands in that quarter is not worth more than 40s. per acre’. Hylton did so, but the governor turned down the request. The Accompong Maroons then renewed their complaint about ‘the insufficiency of their lands for their support, and that hunger would drive them to the woods, and oblige them to abandon their town, if the petitioner would not allow them the use of his land’. Once again, the colonial authorities did not respond to the complaints from the Maroons of Accompong Town. With the deportation of Trelawny Town, the colonial authorities felt they could confidently reject Accompong Town’s plea for more land.

Ignored by the colonial authorities, the Maroons instead cultivated a range of crops on their existing land, disregarding the regulations imposed upon their farming practices by the treaties. Clause four of the first treaty and clause two of the second treaty addressed what the Maroons could grow, where they were allowed to sell their produce, and what

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883 VHAJ, 1830, Appendix LVI, p. 363.
884 VHAJ, 1829, Appendix XLV, p. 440, 1829, Appendix LVII, p. 489.
885 VHAJ, 1830, Appendix LVI, pp. 356-7.
permission they needed to make those sales. The 1739 treaty listed the crops Maroons were permitted to grow as ‘Coffee, Cocoa, Ginger, Tobacco and Cotton’, but the 1740 treaty just said that the Maroons could grow anything except sugar cane.\footnote{Dallas, \textit{History of the Maroons}, Vol. 1, p. 60; Campbell, \textit{Maroons of Jamaica}, pp. 127, 135.} While Maroon interest in sugar cane was limited mainly to personal use, some of them brewed rum from cane without a licence. In 1826, Robert Gray Kirkland, the collector of ‘spiritious duties’ for the parish of St George, complained that he was ‘uncertain as to his line of duty in regard to collecting the duties on rum sold by the Charles-Town maroons’.\footnote{VHAJ, 25 October 1826, p. 64.} There is no evidence that the colonial authorities took any action against the Maroons for growing produce not permitted by the treaties. The colonial authorities had little accurate information on the Maroon towns at the end of the First Maroon War, which may explain why the clauses in the treaties pertaining to Maroon farming practices were unenforced. The colonial elite’s attempts to regulate the farming and mercantile practices were half-hearted at best, probably because their economic pursuits did not threaten planter activities.

The Maroons used their land to develop a diversified agricultural economy, which ensured that they did not go hungry. Campbell and Craton claim that the land allotted to Maroons was of poor quality.\footnote{Campbell, \textit{Maroons of Jamaica}, pp. 164-173; Craton, \textit{Testing the Chains}, pp. 94-5.} They base their argument on the Maroon complaint that ‘the land allotted for them is steep and hilly’, and that ‘this has occasioned many disputes between them and the white settlers, by their stock trespassing on the cane-pieces, and the cattle of the white settlers ruining their provision-grounds’.\footnote{JAJ, Vol. 6, 28 November 1776, p. 664.} However, the Maroons may have exaggerated their plight, in order to improve their case for getting more land. The Maroons grew a variety of crops on their communal land, from which they were able to sustain their communities. During the First Maroon War, at a time when sugar plantations focussed on a single crop, the Windward Maroons grew a diverse range of produce, such as ‘Coco, Sugar Canes, Plantains, Mellons, Yams, Corn, Hog and Poultry’, which they had in
abundance. After the treaties, observers noted that the Maroons grew ‘Cocoes, Yams, Plantains’, as well as corn, raised ‘small stock’, and hunted wild cattle. Their ‘Plantane Walks’ were often located at high, remote elevations, and between the rows of plantains the Maroons could grow ‘cocoas’ in the shade of their leaves. In 1830, the Accompong Town superintendent reported that his Maroons cultivated ginger, coffee and pimento in small quantities, and reared cows and horses for sale. The Maroons developed a diversified subsistence economy, from which they were able to feed themselves at a time when there were no slave rebellions to provide their warriors with an income.

In addition to feeding themselves, the Maroons also earned an income from the sale of crops in Jamaica’s markets and for export. Writing 40 years apart, Dallas and Luckock observed that the Maroons were proficient at ‘manufacturing tobacco’ and growing arrowroot, which they then sold in the markets of the towns and ports. In the nineteenth century, Maroons cultivated arrowroot in considerable quantities, since it required little investment capital and was relatively easy to grow. Superintendent Robert Gray said arrowroot was ‘peculiarly well calculated for the maroons of this town, who had the additional advantage of living within two miles of the wharf at Buff-Bay’. A London ship named *Fortitude* regularly bought arrowroot from the Charles Town Maroons. In 1818, the Maroons of Charles Town produced 900 pounds of coffee, and they made £400 from the sale of this crop to a Captain John Martin. That year, the Maroons also sold arrowroot and coffee in the local markets to the value of £1,800. In 1830, Scott’s Hall’s Superintendent Thomas March reported to the Assembly that Maroons earned an income from growing arrowroot, in

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890 CO 137/21 folio 42, 7 October 1733, ‘The further interrogation of Sarra’.
893 VHAJ, 1830, Appendix LV, p. 364.
895 VHAJ, 1819, Appendix XLIII, p. 297.
addition to hunting runaway slaves and working on roads. 896 When the Maroons became increasingly disillusioned with the payment system for the pursuit of runaways, they made an income from growing and selling a diverse range of crops.

In addition to growing crops, the Maroons became well known for hunting wild boar and using the meat to make jerk pork. In a practice dating back to the seventeenth century, the hog was ‘cut open, the Bones taken out, and the Flesh is gash’d on the inside into the Skin, fill’d with Salt, and expos’d to the Sun, which is called Jirking’ (see Figure Seventeen). 897 This practice started with the Tainos, after which free blacks, slaves, and white hunters all jerked pork in the seventeenth century. 898 However, most of these groups eventually gravitated towards imported pork products, leaving the Maroons as the only group left cooking pork in this traditionally Jamaican style. Maroons hunted wild boars in significant numbers in the years leading up to the emancipation of the slaves in the 1830s. 899 John Stewart, who lived in Jamaica in the early nineteenth century, observed that a number of

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896 VHAJ, 1830, Appendix LV, p. 359.
897 Hans Sloane, A Voyage to the Islands Madera, Nieves, St Christophers, and Jamaica (London: 1707), p. xvi.
Maroons made a career out of ‘hunting the wild hog, or shooting the ringtail’.900 Richard Hill, a free coloured stipendiary magistrate during the Apprenticeship of the 1830s, wrote to a friend describing how the Maroons used snares composed of saplings and nooses to catch wild hogs.901 They used dogs for hunting, but had no ‘Cocks, that their Crowing might not betray them’.902 Hill described how he would often see a Maroon carrying ‘on his back, braced round his shoulders, and suspended by a bandage over the forehead…the wicker cradle, that held enclosed a side of jerked hog, which he sold passing along, in measured slices, to ready customers’.903 According to Dallas, when the Maroons sold their jerk pork, they used the income earned to buy supplies for their farms in their respective towns.904 The Maroons continued to make and sell jerk pork even after other sections of Jamaican society lost interest in this form of cooking.

When the demand for jerk pork went into decline, the Maroons had a diversified range of income-generating alternatives. Edwards noted that in addition to hunting wild boars, the Maroons also caught, ate and sold ‘land-crabs, pigeons, and fish’.905 During the War of 1812, supplies of timber were no longer forthcoming from North America, and the Maroons of Charles Town found it ‘much more profitable to get staves, shingles, and boards from their own woods for sale than to hunt wild hogs’. When the war ended, these Maroons returned to the practice of jerking pork. That was a short interlude, because before the decade was out, the Charles Town Maroons found the cultivation of coffee and arrowroots to be more lucrative than hunting wild pigs, and some temporarily became farmers instead of hunters.906 After emancipation, Hill explained that ‘American bacon in the provision shops

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902 The Importance of Jamaica, p. 17.
903 Gosse, A Naturalist’s Sojourn, p. 398.
905 Edwards, Proceedings, p. xxxii.
906 VHAJ, 1819, Appendix XLIII, pp. 297-8.
have driven out of the market the jerked hog of the Maroons’.\(^9\) The more successful members of the black peasantry began to ‘consume to a very great extent…salt pork, which is brought chiefly from America’.\(^8\) In Accompong Town, the western Maroon town’s declining use of jerk pork coincided with a fall in the numbers of wild hogs in the Cockpit Country. However, wild hogs still populate the eastern Blue Mountains in significant numbers, and jerk pork thrived in the Windward Maroon towns.\(^9\) When the market for jerk pork was in decline, the Maroons were able to resort to other crops, produce and employment to meet their economic needs.

Despite the restriction on their movements placed on them by the treaties of 1739 and 1740, a number of Maroons lived or worked outside of their proscribed towns without fear of reprisals. The treaties stated that Maroons should not be within ‘three miles of any settlement’ without permission from their superintendent.\(^10\) However, Edwards noted that in the late eighteenth century, Mr Gowdie, ‘who lived within a few miles of Trelawny Town’, had employed a Maroon to be an overseer on his plantation.\(^11\) In the years that followed, entries in the Votes show that a number of Maroons took up residence on various estates, taking on employment there.\(^12\) At the start of the nineteenth century, the returns listed four Maroon men who were ‘skulking or employed in Liguanea’.\(^13\) The purpose of these entries in the Votes was to highlight how many Maroons capable of bearing arms were available in the event of a slave rebellion, and the superintendent seemed unsure what these four Maroons were doing outside of their town. Over the next couple of decades, the superintendents became more tolerant of Maroons looking for jobs outside of their towns. In 1820, 59

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\(^9\) Gosse, A Naturalist’s Sojourn, p. 397; Sibbald David Scott, To Jamaica and Back (London: Chapman and Hall, 1876), p. 177.


\(^10\) Campbell, Maroons of Jamaica, pp. 127, 137.


\(^12\) VHAJ, 1829, Appendix LVII, p. 490.

Maroons from Accompong Town sought employment in nearby towns such as Santa Cruz and Burnt Savanna, or the adjacent parish of Westmoreland.914 Between 1816 and 1824, the number of Maroons living outside of Charles Town fluctuated from 29 to 48, and they tended to reside in places like Spanish River, Annotto Bay and Kingston.915 It seems that the colonial authorities overlooked this Maroon breach of the treaties, in order to maintain a good working relationship with their allies.

Some Maroons sought their fortune abroad, while others moved to the coastal towns. Thomas Richards of Moore Town migrated to America and worked as a sailor, while Peter Brown was listed as having ‘gone to sea’, or was a sailor living at one time in Charles Town and at another in Moore Town. James Algo migrated to England, but he eventually returned to Jamaica, choosing to live in Kingston, before finally returning to Accompong Town in 1833.916 As some of the Maroons sought employment outside of Jamaica, the colonial authorities decided not to enforce the clauses restricting their movements. In the nineteenth century, the Maroons no longer needed to hunt runaways to earn an income, since they could grow crops on their fertile land and hunt wild hog to jerk pork in the forested interior. Their attempts to forge a new economic identity independent of the pursuit of runaway slaves contributed to a population explosion in the Maroon towns.

**Maroon population growth**

The Maroon population increased significantly in the second half of the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth. This was in contrast with both the black slaves and white settlers, whose populations suffered from high death rates. The Leeward Maroon population

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914 VHAJ, 1820, Appendix LXII, p. 334.
also increased during the 1780s, at a time when both the white slaveholders and the black slaves in the west suffered from natural disasters.

The diversified economy of the Leeward Maroons enabled them to survive challenges from the changing weather that devastated western Jamaica. During the 1780s, a series of hurricanes and droughts ravaged south-western Jamaica, destroying the estate provisions grounds, with around 16,000 slaves dying from hunger and starvation. While some estates had an ample supply of provisions grounds, others focussed more on their main crops such as sugar and coffee. On those plantations with limited provisions grounds, more slaves died from starvation following the hurricanes that hit the western parishes in the 1780s. These estates were unable to replace the destroyed provisions with their usual

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917 Edward Long papers, Add. MS 12435, folio 19; Lord Lindsay, Lives of the Lindsays; or, A Memoir of the Houses of Crawford and Balcarres (London: John Murray, 1858), Vol. III, p. 52; JA, Vol. 6, 8 December 1770, p. 311, 26 November 1773, pp. 465-6, Vol. 10, 1 November 1797, p. 5.


920 Black, History of Jamaica, pp. 118-9, 122.
supply from North America, because the War of Independence had interrupted it. The Maroons of Accompong Town, located on the border of St Elizabeth and Westmoreland, were able to feed themselves in between hurricanes, and they did not suffer significantly from these natural disasters. Between 1773 and 1788, the population of the Leeward Maroons increased from 517 to 753 (see Table Seventeen). The diversified economy of the western Maroons allowed their population to continue to grow at a time when the slaves in that part of the island were dying in large numbers from starvation.

Table Eighteen: Maroon population growth by gender in the eighteenth century. Between 1739 and 1796, the number of women and children grew at a faster rate than the population of men capable of bearing arms. It is uncertain what contributed to this disparity between genders.

In the late eighteenth century, the total population of the official Maroon towns doubled from 664 to 1,288 between the two wars. The number of men capable of bearing arms grew slowly from 273 in 1740 to 319 in the 1790s, while the population of Maroon women almost doubled from 211 to 416. It is possible the slow increase in men may have been due to some Maroon warriors renouncing their status and migrating to the coast in search of jobs. The growth in the number of their children was phenomenal in the latter

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924 Chapter Six, p. 250.
half of the eighteenth century. There were 180 children in the five Maroon towns at the end of the First Maroon War, but that number had mushroomed to 653 at the start of the Second (see Table Eighteen). The superintendents took tallies solely of the Maroons living in these towns, so non-Maroons did not supplement their numbers. The Maroon towns were largely exclusive communities, and their numbers grew through natural increase. The Maroon populations grew in the mountain retreats on both sides of the island, nourished by the diversity of crops at their disposal.

In the eighteenth century, slaves had a high death rate, and slaveholders imported more to increase their numbers. Slave deaths exceeded births on the properties owned by Thomas Thistlewood in Westmoreland.925 At another Westmoreland plantation called Mesopotamia, over half of the 248 slaves inventoried in 1736 were dead by 1762, at a time when the slaves on this plantation who died outnumbered those who were born by two to one.926 At Worthy Park, between 1783 and 1796, slave deaths outstripped births every year, during which time 229 slaves died, while only 99 were born.927 This is in contrast with the Maroon towns, where the Maroon population grew in the eighteenth century.

In the nineteenth century, the number of slaves in the island went into decline. Higman calculates that Jamaica’s slave population declined from over 350,000 in 1808 to about 315,000 in 1832.928 In 1807, the British government abolished the slave trade, and the Jamaican authorities could no longer increase the slave population on the island by importation. Plantations experienced a decline in their slave populations in the decades that followed. After 1820, on the Mesopotamia plantation, there were 230 deaths against 125 recorded births, meaning that by 1834 that estate’s slave force had shrunk to 316.929

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926 Dunn, *A Tale of Two Plantations*, pp. 30-7, 75-6, 476.
returns of slaves filed in the Assembly shows a decline from 323,827 in 1808, to 313,814 in 1815, and then further to 297,186 in 1834 (see Table Nineteen). Harsh and brutal treatment, as well as diseases such as yaws, linked to malnutrition, contributed to the decline in the slave population. 930 Child mortality remained a serious problem on the sugar estates. 931 Following the abolition of the slave trade, the population of Jamaica's slaves went into steady decline.

Table Nineteen: Slaves in Jamaica 1808-34. Assembly records show the slave population declined from 323,827 in 1808 to 297,186 in 1834. 932 Disease was also a factor in the high death rates among the white inhabitants of Jamaica at this time. 933 During the eighteenth century, slaveholders died at a rate of over ten per cent a year. 934 Dr William Sells claimed that ten per cent of the white people in his neighbourhood alone died from influenza between 1811 and 1813. 935 In 1833, according to Theodore Foulks, ‘that scourge of Jamaica, known by the name of Yellow Fever…destroyed

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931 Mullin, Africa in America, p. 53.
933 Higman, Slave Population, p. 129.
934 Brown, Reaper’s Garden, p. 17; Christer Petley, Slaveholders in Jamaica: Colonial Society and Culture During the Era of Abolition (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2009), p. 27.
thousands of Europeans’. While the black slaves and white slaveholders suffered from high death rates, the population of the Maroon towns grew significantly.

The total population of the Maroon towns grew from 853 to 1,563 between 1808 and 1841. Accompong Town, Moore Town and Scott’s Hall doubled, from 238 to 436, from 310 to 665 and from 51 to 105 respectively. The growth of Charles Town was smaller, from 254 to 391 in 1831, after which it decreased to 357 in 1841. It is possible that some Maroons from Charles Town may have renounced their status and migrated to the coast in search of employment.

The population of the Maroon towns continued to grow throughout the nineteenth century. The Maroon numbers steadily increased from 853 in 1808 to 1,149 in 1821, then 1,380 in 1831, and 1,563 at the time of the last returns from the Maroon towns in 1841 (see Table Twenty). The Maroon population did not suffer the high death rates of the black slaves and white slaveholders, probably because they lived in the mountains, where tropical disease-carrying mosquitoes were rare. In addition, their diversified economy enabled them to feed themselves sufficiently, unlike the black slaves who suffered from diseases linked to

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938 Chapter Six, p. 250.
malnutrition. The overall growth in the population of the Maroon towns appears to indicate that the Maroons lived in a healthy environment.

Some historians have discussed the increase in Maroon numbers in comparison with the declines experienced by the black slaves. Mullin selects two years in the eighteenth century two generations apart, and analyses what the population growth of the official Maroon towns meant in terms of offering a better way of life, compared to the nasty, brutish and short lives of the slaves. However, there was very little detail in the eighteenth century returns from the official Maroon towns, and that limited Mullin’s analysis. Buxton and Sheridan analyse the populations of the official Maroon towns, comparing eighteenth century statistics with the population growth in the nineteenth century, and conclude that the Maroon population increased by 30 per cent from 1817 to 1829. Sheridan argues that Maroon populations grew significantly compared to the slaves, largely because the slaves were poorly treated and suffered from poor nutrition, which in turn affected their fertility rates. Mullin, Sheridan and Buxton all conclude that the Maroon population increased while the slaves declined, because the Maroons were free and the slaves were not.

Sheridan’s explanation does not take into account the death rates among white slaveholders, which were also high. The families of rich white planters had high death rates, and a significant mortality rate among their children. Charles Price, one of the wealthiest planters of the eighteenth century, fathered 13 legitimate white children, and 10 of them died before the age of 20. Between 1756 and 1778, the family and descendants of Edward Manning were almost completely wiped out by disease and illness, leaving his grand-nephew Edward Manning Paplay as the sole survivor. Attorney-General Robert Byndloss,  

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940 Sheridan, ‘Maroons of Jamaica’, pp. 157-170. In *The Maroon Story*, p. 521, Carey presents population statistics for Maroon towns between 1809 and 1834, but there are addition errors and no accompanying analysis, while Buxton and Sheridan were only marginally inaccurate. Their study claims that the Maroons numbered 1,031 in 1817, when the returns counted 1,037, and that they had increased to 1,334 in 1829, when they had actually numbered 1,332.  
941 Craton and Walvin, *Worthy Park*, p. 50.  
942 JAJ, Vol. 12, 7 November 1815, pp. 701-2.
who died in 1753, fathered at least eight legitimate white children, but none reached
adulthood, and by the turn of the nineteenth century, the Byndloss name had vanished
completely from Jamaica. In contrast with Maroon families, white slaveholders had high
death rates.

Compared to the Price family, four Trelawny Town families living in Accompong
Town fared better. Slaveholder numbers often benefitted from an influx of white settlers from
Britain, but while there are cases of Maroons moving in and out of their official towns, the
superintendents chronicled the immigrants in the Maroon towns as a separate population,
allowing historians to accurately assess increases in Maroon numbers. It is generally difficult
to trace the families of the Maroon towns, because the records of the superintendents list the
men, women and children according to name and age, with no reference to family
connections. The main role of these returns was to list the number of men capable of
bearing arms in the event of a slave uprising. As a result, it is usually hard to compare death
rates in Maroon families to those of white slaveholders. However, the returns show that four
women from Trelawny Town re-settled in Accompong Town, and they trace their families
over four decades. The distinct cases of Ruth Dennis, Mary Shaw, Nancy (Ann) Grey, and
Sarah Clarke first appear in the records of 1807, and Superintendent Hadley D'Oyley Witter
named all four in the 1814 returns, along with their children, who inherited their status as
Trelawny Town Maroons residing in Accompong Town.\textsuperscript{943} The Trelawny Town families were
treated separately from other Accompong Maroons, allowing us to trace these four women
and their children up until the last returns in 1841, to see how their death rates compared to
that of the Price family.

The four Trelawny Town Maroon women produced a large number of children
between them. Ruth Dennis, registered as a ‘sambo’ Maroon, gave birth to seven children
between 1805 and 1822, and there were records of them still living in the superintendent’s

\textsuperscript{943} VHAJ, 1807, Appendix XXVII, p. 255, 1814, Appendix XV, p. 221.
returns of 1841, except Elizabeth Dennis, also called Polly Reid or Rowe, who had relocated to Falmouth the year before. Mary Shaw had six children, and though she herself probably died in 1818 at the age of 38, all of her children were in the returns as still alive in 1841, aged between 26 and 42. Grey died in approximately 1828, aged about 57, and she had two children; a son who was registered blind in 1824 and probably died in 1831, and a daughter named Ann Dinham who was still a teenager in 1841. Clarke probably died in 1829 aged 49, and she had five children and two grandchildren, but they all moved out of Accompong Town to the parishes of St James, St Elizabeth and Trelawny, and then disappeared from the records. These four Maroon women gave birth to 22 children between them.

The survival rate of the children of these four Trelawny Town Maroon women in Accompong Town compares favourably to that of the wealthy planter Charles Price. While Price lost 10 of his 13 legitimate children before the age of 20, the four Maroon women had 22 children between them, and 13 of them celebrated their sixteenth birthdays in Accompong Town before 1841. One of them probably died young, while the other eight moved out of Accompong Town, and the records lost track of them, so while they may have died it is also possible that they lived. The Price family and the Accompong Maroons did not go for want of food, and did not suffer the abuse that afflicted the black slaves. However, the Prices may have suffered from mosquito-borne diseases, while the Maroon towns are located in the high elevations of the mountains where mosquitoes are rare. The Maroons had better living conditions in the mountainous interior than both the slaves and the slaveholders who lived on the flat lands, and consequently their children had a better chance

944 VHAJ, 1840, Appendix LVI, p. 411. A sambo was three-quarters black, one-quarter white.
945 VHAJ, 1824, Appendix XCVIII, p. 478, 1831, Appendix XLV, p. 376.
of attaining adulthood. This economic independence enabled the Maroon towns to resist a number of challenges in the nineteenth century.

Outside pressures on Maroon towns in the nineteenth century

The Maroon towns of Jamaica are unusual in that, along with those in Surinam, they are the only Maroon communities to have survived to this day. Most Maroon communities in the Americas disappeared or merged with the free black population after emancipation in their respective territories. In the nineteenth century, free black, coloured and white men moved into the Jamaican Maroon towns in significant numbers in the first two decades of the century, forming relationships with Maroon women, but their influence was negligible because they merged with the Maroons and adopted their customs. After emancipation, the colonial authorities attempted to merge the Maroon towns into the general black population, but without success. The Maroon towns of Jamaica withstood pressure from a number of outside factors.

In the early nineteenth century, free blacks and coloureds lived in the Maroon towns as ‘Residenters’ despite initial efforts by the colonial authorities to discourage the practice. Campbell explains that most free blacks and coloureds chose to live in urban areas such as Kingston and Spanish Town. When free blacks elected members of the Assembly, they did so from areas where they had significant numbers, such as Kingston and Montego Bay. However, Gad Heuman notes that in 1812, free coloureds outnumbered or matched the number of whites in rural parishes, such as Westmoreland, St George and St Thomas-in-the-East, parishes where the Maroon towns were located. A number of these rural free

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951 Heuman, Between Black and White, p. 7.
coloureds chose to reside in the Maroon towns, and at the start of the nineteenth century, Dallas observed that many non-Maroons lived and worked there. In 1830, a survey of Accompong Town, on the border of St Elizabeth and Westmoreland, reported that ‘upwards of an hundred persons from other towns being admitted after the present allotment was ceded by treaty’, and that these ‘several private persons have built houses and are cultivating provisions on the public lands’. In 1837, a superintendent of Moore Town complained that a number of Residenters were labourers who came and went as they pleased, and that many were ‘of bad character’, so he expelled them. This action had little effect, because these free blacks and coloureds returned to Moore Town shortly afterwards. While the superintendent threatened to expel residents from the town, he failed to do so on a long-term basis, probably because of the ties these free blacks and coloureds had with the Maroons there.

Table Twenty-one: Residents of Scott’s Hall 1817-33. In 1817, 33 free people, called ‘Residenters’ by the superintendents, lived alongside 73 Maroons at Scott’s Hall, increasing gradually until the population of non-Maroons there peaked at 45. The number of free people then declined from 40 in 1826, to 25 in 1833.

953 VHAJ, 1830, Appendix LVI, pp. 357, 364.
954 VHAJ, 1837, Appendix XXX, p. 197.
The free blacks and coloureds in Scott’s Hall’s formed a larger percentage of their population than in the other Maroon towns. The number of free blacks in Scott’s Hall was equal to about half its Maroon population between 1817 and 1833 (see Table Twenty-one). In 1825, there were 68 Maroons and 46 Residenters living in Scott’s Hall, after which the Maroon population grew and the non-Maroon population did not. In 1839, there were 97 Maroons and 43 non-Maroons residing in Scott’s Hall, and a year later 102 Maroons and 46 Residenters.\(^956\) In 1839, Candler described Scott’s Hall as ‘a negro town…where, in thirty-four cabins, about two hundred of the Maroons reside’.\(^957\) However, this total does not resemble the returns filed by the superintendent, and probably means that Candler was unable to distinguish between the Maroons and non-Maroons. Charles Town also had a significant population of Residenters. The total number of free people living at Charles Town fluctuated from 51 in 1821 up to 100 in 1827, and down to 71 in 1831, before increasing to 94 by the time the Emancipation Act was passed.\(^958\) However, unlike Scott’s Hall, the Maroon population of Charles Town always significantly outnumbered the Residenters. In 1833, when there were 94 Residenters, the total number of Charles Town Maroons was 348.\(^959\) By the time the records ended following the termination of the Apprenticeship, only 36 non-Maroons lived in Moore Town.\(^960\) Though a significant number of Residenters settled in Scott’s Hall and Charles Town, they never outnumbered the Maroons in those two towns, and the Maroons were consequently able to maintain their identity.

Many of the Residenters living in Scott’s Hall were free coloureds who married Maroon women. Moore Town oral historians claim that their traditions banned them from

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956 VHAJ, 1839, Appendix LVI, p. 405, 1840, Appendix X, p. 58.
957 Luckock, Jamaica: Enslaved and Free, p. 87.
959 VHAJ, 22 November 1833, p. 186.
960 VHAJ, 1839, Appendix LVI, p. 397.
marrying free blacks. However, the evidence contradicts this assertion. In 1811, 'a free man of colour named Allen' had taken a Maroon woman as his wife, and lived in Moore Town. By 1816, two Maroons of each gender had free coloured non-Maroon partners living with them in Moore Town. Scott's Hall's long-serving superintendent, Thomas March, said that most of that Maroon town's free people were men 'who live with Maroon women' and married them. Children inherited their Maroon status from their mothers. The Residenters who settled in the Maroon towns eventually intermarried and adopted Maroon customs, and their unions did not dilute the culture of the towns, but rather produced more Maroons.

A number of these Residenters were possibly Maroons who chose to renounce their status to live as free coloureds. In 1840, the most common Maroon surnames in Scott's Hall were Nugent, Mahoney, Crawford, Latibeaudiere, Valentine, Hermit, Ellis and Woodhouse. Two-thirds of Residenters in Scott's Hall also shared these eight surnames. They were mainly men, and were probably Maroons who had renounced their status in order to be free to travel around the island in search of employment. In 1810, for example, Maroons Samuel Wright and Francis Robertson went before the court in Black River, and renounced their Maroon status, in order to live as free coloureds on the Jamaican coast. However, after finding life difficult outside of the Maroon towns, they chose to return to Accompong Town to live as Residenters. Between 1814 and 1817, the number of Maroons from Charles Town who had 'taken the benefit' and renounced their status as Maroons varied between 42 and 63, of which about half chose to return to the town, along with another 13 free people who

962 VHAJ, 1811, Appendix XXXVIII, p. 216.
963 VHAJ, 1816, Appendix V, p. 245.
964 VHAJ, 1830, Appendix LVI, p. 358.
967 VHAJ, 1810, Appendix XXXVIII, p. 287.
had no Maroon affiliations. The Maroon population of Charles Town probably flatlined in
the nineteenth century because a number of their Maroon men renounced their status in
order to be free to seek employment elsewhere.

From one year to the next, between a dozen and two dozen free people residing in
the Windward Maroon towns also served as members of the island’s militia. Two Charles
Town Maroons, a father and son, both named Patrick Anderson, renounced their status as
Maroons, but they continued to live there and became members of the militia. Anderson
junior remained a Maroon until 1824, when he took the benefit. However, he seems to have
become a Maroon again, because in 1831, he ‘resigned his lands’ again, along with two
other Maroons named John Gordon and John Burrowes. The town’s hero in the campaign
against the Healthshire runaways, John McGinnes, later renounced his Maroon status and
became a free person and a member of the militia, but he continued to reside at Charles
Town. Though these Residenters were Maroons who had renounced their status, they still
participated in Maroon parties.

The free coloureds who migrated to the Maroon towns found employment working for
Maroons. In the years leading up to the Second Maroon War, two free mulatto carpenters
worked in Trelawny Town. Four of the free people living in Moore Town in 1833 were also
carpenters. Other Residenters included a disbanded soldier and a mason. One native
of St Domingue named ‘Maria Jean, alias Mary Jones’, or John, who received her certificate

969 VHAJ, 1821, Appendix LXIX, pp. 343-4, 1824, Appendix XCVIII, p. 465, 1827, Appendix XXXV, p. 333, 1829,
Appendix XLIV, p. 424, 1833, Appendix LVIII, p. 461.
970 VHAJ, 1831, Appendix XLV, p. 369.
971 VHAJ, 1823, Appendix XXXVIII, p. 37, 1824, Appendix XCVIII, p. 465, 1825, Appendix LII, p. 314.
974 VHAJ, 1818, Appendix XXV, p. 227, 1821, Appendix LXIX, pp. 344-5, 1822, Appendix XV, p. 275, 27
407, 23 November 1827, 1828, Appendix LIII, pp. 363-4, p. 65, 30 November 1831, p. 149, 1833, Appendix
LVIII, pp. 460-2.
of residence in 1793, became a Residener at Charles Town and later acquired a slave.975 Free blacks and coloureds who settled in the Maroon towns often worked for Maroon employers, and therefore adopted Maroon culture and customs.

A number of white men took up residence in the Maroon towns, where they formed family relationships with Maroon women. This practice reflected a similar reality in Jamaican society. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, white estate employees often struck up relationships with black females, both slaves and free.976 One bookkeeper in the 1830s boasted having 12 ‘negro wives’ in a six-month period.977 Moore Town oral histories chronicle similar relationships between white men and Maroon women.978 The returns listed James Munro as a ‘white person’ living in Scott’s Hall and Charles Town in the 1830s and 1840s.979 George Ludwig, a German who was a former assistant superintendent, chose to remain in Accompong Town, and had several quadroon children with an unidentified mulatto Maroon woman. However, Ludwig’s children inherited their mother’s status and the superintendent registered them as Maroons.980 George Ludwig’s quadroon son, Charles Ludwig, was born a Maroon in 1810, moved out of Accompong Town with his mother five years later, and then became a private in Accompong Maroon parties on his return to the town at the age of 17.981 George, his son, and his daughter Isabella appear in Accompong Town’s final returns in 1841.982 When white men had children with Maroon women, they retained their Maroon status. Like the free coloureds before them, the white residents of the Maroon towns did not significantly change Maroon culture.

980 VHAJ, 1833, Appendix LVIII, pp. 470-1, 1834, Appendix XXIII, p. 419.
981 VHAJ, 1813, Appendix XXVII, p. 242, 1815, Appendix XXXV, p. 301, 1827, Appendix XXXV, p. 343.
After 1834, a number of Maroons found alternative employment outside of the
Maroon towns. With the advent of the Apprenticeship system, the colonial authorities
established a police force that was 600 strong, made up mostly of free blacks and coloureds.
Many Maroons who gravitated to the towns eventually joined this police force.\footnote{VHAJ, 7 October 1834, p. 6; Herbert Thomas, The Story of a West Indian Policeman (Kingston: Gleaner Co, 1927), p. 292.} In 1836,
three parties of Moore Town Maroons planted 20 acres of land for newly arrived Scottish
immigrants at the nearby community of Altamont at a rate of £27 per acre.\footnote{VHAJ, 23 November 1837, pp. 147-151.} Now that
Maroons no longer had the opportunity to earn an additional income hunting runaway slaves,
they sought alternative employment.

After the Apprenticeship period ended, the colonial authorities tried in vain to merge
the Maroons with the newly freed black majority. The influx of free blacks, coloureds and
whites into the Maroon towns did not significantly change the culture of the Maroon towns,
so the colonial elite tried to legislate for their assimilation. The colonial authorities first
attempted to reform the Maroon laws in 1830, to 'render the maroons more serviceable to
the island'.\footnote{VHAJ, 7 December 1830, p. 160.} In 1837, Edward Jordon, one of the first free coloureds elected to the
Assembly, led a committee that attempted to implement changes to the Maroon towns. The
Windward Maroons were initially receptive to the move, because they wanted the legislation
to remove the restrictions on their ability to move around the island.\footnote{VHAJ, 7 December 1840, p. 160.} However, when in
1842 the Assembly passed a law to assimilate the Maroons into the black population by
splitting their territory into individual plots, the Maroons resisted.\footnote{VHAJ, 4, 24 November 1841, pp. 81-2, 189.}
The Charles Town
Maroons signalled their opposition to any attempt to take 'from them the lands which they
hold by the solemn pledge of a treaty, lands on which they were born, and which contain the

bones of their ancestors'. The Assembly heard reports that Maroons opposed integration, because they hated the idea of being ‘in a worse position than the recently emancipated apprentices’. The Maroons resisted attempts by the colonial authorities to split up their communal land and sell them as individual plots.

While the Maroon Lands Allotment Act succeeded in appropriating some of the lands belonging to Charles Town and Scott’s Hall, the more remote Maroon Towns of Accompong Town and Moore Town just ignored the legislation. These laws resulted in more than one dispute between the Charles Town Maroons and the colonial authorities at the end of the nineteenth century and during the twentieth century. The Maroons of Moore Town may have agreed to some private ownership of land, but they had an unwritten rule that stated they could only sell their land to a fellow Maroon. The colonial authorities only put the Act into practice in a handful of cases. The Maroons of Accompong Town, and to a lesser extent Moore Town, have ownership of their communal property to this day.

The colonial authorities had limited use for the Maroons in the first few decades after the end of the Apprenticeship. In 1842, when a minor disturbance occurred in Kingston, the colonial authorities called out the West India Regiments to suppress it. The Regiments were based in Kingston, and were therefore better placed to respond than the Maroons in the mountainous interior. In 1848, there was a riot among ex-slaves in St Mary, and Maroons numbered among the rioters. The colonial authorities saw little point in continuing to chronicle the number of Maroon men capable of bearing arms, and they abolished the post

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988 VHAJ, 9 November 1837, p. 102, 24 December 1841, p. 345.
989 VHAJ, 24 October 1839, p. 27.
991 Bilby True-Born Maroons, p. 352.
992 Interview with Sterling, ACJ archives.
of superintendent in the 1850s. In 1859, there was a disturbance involving black settlers in Westmoreland at a place called Florence Hall. The rioters burnt down the police station in the area, and they threatened to attack the Maroon settlement at Accompong Town. In post-slavery Jamaica, the colonial authorities did not feel the need to call on the martial support of the Maroons, until a large rebellion took place in Morant Bay.

When a significant revolt occurred in 1865, the Maroons played a major role in helping to suppress the Morant Bay Rebellion. The Maroons of Moore Town and those who resided out of the town in Hayfield once again allied themselves with the colonial government, playing their last role as a militaristic outfit for the white colonial authorities by putting down the revolt and capturing the leader, Paul Bogle. The governor praised the Maroon response, but their cruelty in suppressing the revolt attracted a lot of criticism. The colonial authorities never again called out the Maroons and they abandoned proposals to form the Maroons into a military ‘clan’. The four remaining Maroon towns of Accompong Town, Moore Town, Charles Town and Scott’s Hall entered the twentieth century as remote villages located in the mountainous interior that were largely forgotten until Jamaica became independent in 1962, when they attracted the attention of a new generation of scholars, and their role has been re-assessed ever since.

**Conclusion**

During the course of the nineteenth century, the colonial authorities no longer supported the Maroons in their land disputes, instead taking the side of the planters. In response, the Maroons concentrated on developing their local economies on their existing communal land,

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growing a wide variety of crops and hunting wild boars for jerk pork for the purposes of subsistence, for sale in local Jamaican markets and for export via visiting ships. Because the Maroons were able to support themselves from their agricultural pursuits, their population flourished.

Numbers in the Maroon towns grew consistently in the century that followed the treaties of 1739 and 1740, at a time when the black slave population in Jamaica declined, and the white settlers suffered from significant losses from disease. Maroon families had lower child mortality rates than both wealthy white planters and their slaves. This appears to indicate that the Maroon towns benefitted from their locations in the mountainous interior, where they did not suffer from the mosquito-borne diseases that afflicted slaves and slaveholders alike on the coast.

After the Second Maroon War, the colonial authorities attempted to integrate the Maroons into Jamaican society, encouraging them to replace their African names and religion with European ones. After the treaties, a number of Maroons still practised West African religions and had Ashanti names, but throughout the eighteenth century, they increasingly gave their children European names. In the nineteenth century, many Maroons embraced Christianity because of the educational opportunities it offered to their children. However, despite the attempts by the colonial authorities to encourage the Maroons to replace their African customs with European ones, what emerged was a creole blend of the two cultures. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, missionaries attempted to suppress the West African religious traditions, but the Maroons found a new expression in a faith that merged the two religions from the two continents.

In the nineteenth century, a significant number of free coloureds moved into the Maroon towns, but their influence on Maroon life was minimal. When the Maroons opted for Christianity, most of them chose to adopt the Anglican faith of the white colonial elite, which also endorsed the growing slave-owning practices of the Maroons in the nineteenth century.
The exception was Scott’s Hall, which fell under the embrace of the Baptists, probably because of the large number of Residenters who lived in this Maroon town. However, these Residenters, who were mainly free blacks and coloureds, eventually adopted Maroon customs, married Maroon women, and their children became Maroons. Many of the Residenters were Maroons who renounced their status and became free coloureds, but, finding life difficult on the coast and in the cities, they moved back to the Maroon towns where they lived and earned an income while sharing in the communal land. After the emancipation of the slaves, the colonial authorities tried to merge the Maroon towns with the general black population, but the Maroons resisted these attempts and their communities survive to this day.
CONCLUSION

While historians portray the Maroons of Jamaica up until the peace treaties of 1739 and 1740 as slaves fighting for freedom against an oppressive slave society, after the treaties the historiography discusses why the Maroons became collaborators and how this group effectively prevented subsequent runaways from forming independent communities. However, the evidence shows that the story of the Maroons in the century leading up to emancipation is more complicated than that. While the Maroons helped the colonial authorities to suppress slave revolts, they were far less successful in subduing runaways. In the one hundred years that followed the mid-eighteenth century treaties, runaway slaves were able to set up independent communities in the forested interior of the mountains, where they lived like Maroons for years and even decades. As this thesis has shown, this is a significant but often overlooked element of marronage – an important aspect of slave resistance that characterised society within Britain’s premier slave colony in the Caribbean.

The early Maroons served as an inspiration for enslaved people of all races in Jamaica. While the Maroons spoke the Akan language and their leaders had Ashanti names, the Maroon story of resistance featured marronage from all enslaved people in the island. Slaves from all ethnic groups took advantage of the opportunities offered by the forested mountains to escape and set up free communities. Maroon oral history and archaeological evidence show that Maroons have Taino ancestry, but West African origins predominate with the Akan culture becoming more visible when runaway slaves from the Gold Coast took over the leadership of Maroon resistance in the years leading up to the First Maroon War.1003 When the Maroons signed treaties with the colonial authorities, they emphasized their Amerindian roots to distance themselves from the black slaves.

Nearly all Maroon leaders felt they had to agree to peace terms with the colonial authorities. When historians are critical of Cudjoe for accepting terms, they ignore the fact that he was not the first Maroon leader to agree to peace and collaboration. The colonial elite could only find a resolution to these conflicts by offering treaties to all Maroon communities, starting with Juan Lubolo of the seventeenth century Spanish Maroons, and continuing with Cudjoe in 1739 and Quao in 1740. Juan de Serras was the only Maroon leader to use an offer of peace terms to relocate and continue fighting, but he did so in the seventeenth century when the English forces were not as strong as they became in the eighteenth. After the intensive, continuous fighting of the First Maroon War of the 1730s, during which time there were few successes for the militias, the colonial elite felt they could not win this conflict, and they offered terms to the Maroons. Criticism of the decision by the Maroons to come to terms ignores the reality that these runaway slaves could not survive in a state of continuous warfare, but Cudjoe did so only after successfully demanding changes to the provisions of the 1739 treaty, in order to protect the freedom of recent runaways who joined his forces. Cudjoe, Quao and Nanny all accepted peace mainly because their communities were suffering from stress caused by the war, and they were more interested in preserving their own towns than in presenting a united front against the colonial authorities.

The usurpation of Maroon control in their own communities indicates that while Cudjoe and Quao negotiated their treaties of 1739 and 1740 from a position of considerable political strength, having fought the colonial militias and regular imperial troops to a standstill, they and their successors suffered a decline in their power and prestige in the years that

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followed. The treaties, by linking the Maroons to the interests of the colonial state, specifically through the policing of slavery, and by installing white European superintendents in Maroon communities, allowed for the gradual erosion of Maroon authority over many years – less dramatic than a sudden defeat in battle, but no less devastating in the long run. The superintendents used their power to pay for parties of Maroon warriors and hunters to suppress rebellions such as Tacky’s Revolt to take control, and when challenges were made to the new order in the Leewards in 1742 and in Crawford’s Town in 1754, a significant majority of Maroons supported the new order. When strong Maroon leaders such as Nanny, Cudjoe and Accompong died, the next generation of Maroon officers lost control of Moore Town, Trelawny Town and Accompong Town to the superintendents. Accompong tried to implement the terms of the 1739 treaty by claiming control of Trelawny Town, since he was Cudjoe’s named successor, but his actions were rebuffed by Governor Elletson. The governors discarded the clauses concerning the Maroon leadership succession, and they appointed their preferred candidates as Maroon officers, installing superintendents at the top of the command structure.

In order to maintain the new leadership structure which saw the Maroon officers reporting to the superintendent, who then took his orders from the governor, the colonial authorities had to ensure that peace was maintained by resolving land disputes to the satisfaction of the Maroons. Once the treaties of 1739 and 1740 ended the continuous conflict of the First Maroon War, planters used the opportunity to settle on fertile lands that bordered the Maroon towns, and this inevitably led to disputes between planters and Maroons that could have escalated into violent conflicts. Some historians have asserted that the colonial authorities tended to side with planters against the Maroons over land disputes.1005 However, this dissertation has presented evidence to show that the Jamaican

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Assembly went out of its way to resolve these disputes in favour of the Windward Maroons and those of Accompong Town throughout the eighteenth century. The colonial authorities only deviated from this policy of appeasement with land disputes concerning Trelawny Town. When the St Domingue revolt broke out, Jamaican planters established sugar and coffee estates on western frontier lands to take advantage of the fall in production in the French colonies, but they came into conflict with Trelawny Town. A population boom in this Leeward Maroon town led to increased demands for more land, but when the Assembly reversed Furry’s attempts to start a new community, they set in motion a chain of events that would result in the Second Maroon War. The Assembly dismissed a Maroon petition for more land, removed the long-standing superintendent of the Leeward Maroon town, and in the process upset the balance of peace at Trelawny Town. It is therefore necessary to note that it was this specific change in the general policy towards the Maroons of western Jamaica that helped trigger the Second Maroon War of 1795-6. Far more than historians once thought, that dispute was in large part the consequence of a divergence of a long-established policy that had helped keep the peace between planters and Maroons for two generations.

The new financial structure implemented by the colonial authorities through their superintendents ensured that when conflict occurred, most Maroon towns would be reluctant to give up ready sources of income. Consequently, when the Second Maroon War broke out, Trelawny Town found itself isolated, a situation that contrasted with the loose alliances between the Maroon towns that had existed during the First Maroon War. Historians debate why the Accompong Maroons chose to fight for the colonial authorities, but in the end they

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Craton, Testing the Chains, p. 213; McKee, ‘From violence to alliance’, pp. 6-7, 17-8; Dridzo, ‘A Planter’s Conspiracy?’, pp. 21, 25. Craton maintains that the colonial authorities accommodated the Maroon demands for land in the eighteenth century, but McKee points out that the Assembly often purchased land for the Maroons. However, McKee was unaware that the colonial authorities only deviated from this policy of appeasement with land disputes concerning Trelawny Town.
recognised that they stood to benefit economically from their allegiance with the colonial elite, and they did not want to lose that source of income.\textsuperscript{1007} The Maroons of eastern Jamaica temporarily paid for their loose and non-committal cooperation with and sympathy for the Trelawny Maroons when the Assembly denied them opportunities to hunt runaway slaves in the years immediately after the Second Maroon War, but they were reinstated when the colonial authorities realised that the Accompong Maroons were unable to police the entire island. The pay the Maroons secured working for the colonial authorities militated against them forging alliances with Trelawny Town when war broke out.

Despite the forces arrayed against them, the Trelawny Town Maroons suffered fewer casualties than the colonial militias in the guerrilla war that followed. Only about 16 Trelawnys died during the entire Second Maroon War, while Trelawny Town warriors killed a significantly larger number of militia members and destroyed a number of plantations, killing whites and slaves who worked there. However, though they won a number of skirmishes, the Trelawny Town Maroons were unable to maintain the guerrilla campaign that had proved so successful in the First Maroon War, and they surrendered largely because Colonel George Walpole destroyed their provision grounds, brought in hunting dogs, and restricted their access to ammunition. By removing Trelawny Town, the colonial authorities ensured that they no longer had to make concessions to the remaining Maroon towns when land disputes arose with encroaching planters. Some historians have maintained that the colonial authorities deported all but a handful of Maroons from Trelawny Town, but evidence from the \textit{Journals of the Assembly of Jamaica} and texts written by R.C. Dallas and Bryan Edwards suggest that as many as 58 Maroons from this Leeward town remained in Jamaica after 1796, where they either merged with the free coloured population or took up residence in

other Maroon towns. Their defeat demonstrates three things; first that the strength of the Maroons against the colonial authorities had diminished since the 1730s, second that the Maroons needed to act together in order to defeat the planters and the British, but third that even the Trelawny Maroons standing alone were too strong for the whites simply to crush them by force. They were, effectively, tricked into a surrender, because Governor Balcarres, with the support of most Jamaican planters, overturned Walpole’s promise not to deport them. However, the deportation of Trelawny Town weakened the ability of the Accompong Maroons to police the Cockpit Country.

One of the main aims of this thesis has been to assess the work of the Maroons as a mountain police force after the treaties. How effective was this group at capturing runaways and suppressing slave uprisings? All treaties required Maroon leaders to assist the colonial authorities with suppressing slave revolts and hunting runaways. The colonial authorities paid the men of Lubolo to hunt the supporters of another band of Maroons led by Juan de Serras. After the treaties of 1739 and 1740, the Maroons crushed some minor rebellions in the 1740s; helped to put down Tacky’s Revolt and subsequent risings in the 1760s; and played an important role in suppressing the Sam Sharpe Rebellion of 1831-2. However, they had limited success in apprehending runaways, and throughout the eighteenth century, escaped slaves such as Ancoma and Three-Fingered Jack formed and led communities of

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runaways in the mountains of central and eastern Jamaica. Writers past and present were unaware that Jack was not a lone bandit, but was in fact a leader of a community of runaway slaves.\textsuperscript{1009} While the Maroons succeeded in killing Jack and the leaders of these groups of runaways, they were less successful in dismantling their communities, which continued to flourish under new leaders such as Dagger and Toney, and they often outnumbered the Maroon men capable of bearing arms. The existence of these substantial runaway communities, whose size and significance have gone unrecorded and unrecognised in much of the scholarship, shows that the picture of running away and of marronage was far more complicated in Jamaica than has generally been acknowledged. The evidence that this thesis has showcased on the various runaway communities in Jamaica during the eighteenth century demonstrates not only that the Maroon towns had less success in hunting runaways than previous historians realise, but also that the Maroons were far from the only successful African fugitives from the plantation system: a number of other runaway communities established themselves and thrived in the century that followed the treaties.

The Maroons were unenthusiastic about hunting runaway slaves, because the colonial authorities struggled to establish an efficient system of paying them for services rendered. All the systems of payment employed floundered on the colonial establishment’s inability to pay the Maroons on a timely basis. In the first two decades, individual planters contracted Maroons from nearby towns to catch runaways; between 1760 and the mid-1770s it was the responsibility of the gaolers; and after the mid-1770s, the Assembly took on the responsibility for payment for apprehended runaways. The Maroons were dissatisfied with remuneration for captured runaway slaves, and this discontent may have contributed to the Maroon lack of success in hunting runaways. Partly as a consequence of this inefficient

system, but also because of other factors, not least the size and geography of the island, runaways at large numbered in the thousands in the decades that followed the treaties, despite the presence of the Maroons.

While the existence of the two Leeward Maroon communities of Trelawny Town and Accompong Town before the Second Maroon War ensured that western Jamaica did not initially have a serious problem with runaways, during the conflict large numbers of slaves ran away and secured their freedom. Historians believe that very few slaves ran away to fight for Trelawny Town during the Second Maroon War. However, the evidence reveals that Maroons helped hundreds of slaves to escape from bondage, and their numbers were so large that they may have outnumbered their Maroon allies by two or three to one. Slaves used any opportunity available to secure their freedom, even if it meant fighting on the side of Maroons who were their hunters in the years preceding the conflict. Not all historians have ignored this aspect of the Second Maroon War. Michael Mullin’s work and that of Michael Craton and David Geggus all note the significance of ‘rebellious runaways’ in western Jamaica. Even so, the wider significance of this group, who rebelled and formed larger communities in Jamaica at the height of the St Domingue Revolution, has tended not to have been recognised. It was not only the Maroons of Trelawny Town who challenged white authority in Jamaica at this moment, and the name given to the conflict in the 1790s, ‘The Second Maroon War’, is a misleading misnomer.

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Runaway slaves established communities during the Second Maroon War, and at the start of the nineteenth century. The deportation of Trelawny Town left only one Leeward Maroon town in the island, and the smaller Accompong Town had difficulty controlling the growing problem of runaways in western Jamaica. Large numbers of escaped slaves who fought for Trelawny Town did not surrender, but joined a runaway community led by a former slave named Cuffee, from which they raided plantations in the west and provided a magnet for further runaways. The Accompong Maroons were unable to subdue Cuffee’s community, which became a bigger problem to western planters than any runaway community since the 1730s, and throughout the nineteenth century the vast majority of Cuffee’s group remained at large and continued to live in the Cockpit Country. As such, the deportation of the Trelawny Maroons did not lead to the depopulation of this region of the Jamaican interior, and it is perhaps not much of an exaggeration to suggest that it was groups like Cuffee’s, much more than the Accompong Maroons, still actively engaged in hunting new runaways, who stood as beacons of hope to the majority of people still caught up in slavery on the sugar plantations in the early nineteenth century.

After the Second Maroon War, runaways continued to form communities in the forested mountains of the interior, and yet historians have written little about these communities that plagued the white slaveholders of Jamaica in last few decades of slavery. In the early nineteenth century, the Maroons tried to disperse the communities of Me-no-Sen-You-no-Come community in the Cockpit Country and Healthshire in south-eastern Jamaica, but while they successfully routed the latter, they were unsuccessful in dispersing the former. The Maroons helped to suppress the Sam Sharpe Rebellion, but a significant number of rebels ran away to live in the Cockpit Country, where they formed communities that persisted until the Apprenticeship period that followed the abolition of slavery. The superintendents of the Maroon towns were unanimous in expressing the view

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1012 Patterson, Sociology, p. 281; Craton, Testing the Chains, p. 311-2; Hart, Slaves Who Abolished Slavery, pp. 263-4; Campbell, Maroons of Jamaica, p. 159.
that the Maroons achieved very little when it came to retrieving runaways. The passing of the Emancipation Act ended any interest the colonial authorities had in recapturing them after 1834. One way or another, therefore, the Maroons did not solve for the planters the problem of runaways in the vast Jamaican interior. If anything, the number of runaways increased as the population and plantation frontier expanded northward and into the eastern and western ends of this large and mountainous colony. The Jamaican landscape always offered opportunities to runaways, the Maroons always offered an example for would-be runaways to follow, and the treaties that the colonial authorities signed with the Maroons in 1739 and 1740 therefore failed to live up to one of the major expectations of their white signatories.

Dissatisfied with the remuneration they received from hunting runaways, the Maroons focussed more on earning income from their land, and food was an important part of their culture, as was the principle of self-sufficiency. In the nineteenth century, the colonial authorities felt more confident in turning down the claims of the Maroons arising from land disputes with planters, and this change in policy undermined the ability of the Maroons to expand their land-holdings. However, the Maroons were able to grow a wide variety of crops on their existing communal land, and that diversified economy enabled the Maroons to not only feed themselves sufficiently, but to also grow crops for sale in local and export markets. Already fairly self-sufficient in the eighteenth century, the Maroons continued to develop a wide range of economic activities, to the point where they were able to reduce their interest in the less economically rewarding pursuits of hunting runaways. Maroons grew crops such as coffee, tobacco and arrowroot for sale to white settlers, hunted wild boar in the mountainous interior, and they sold jerk pork in the coastal markets. When the market for jerk pork was in decline, the Maroons were able to resort to other crops, produce and employment to meet their economic needs. By pursuing a diverse range of agricultural opportunities, the Maroons were able to maintain a certain level of independence at a time when the colonial authorities did not support their claims.
As well as shedding new light on conflicts between Maroons and whites, and on the Maroons as a mountain police force, this thesis has also presented new evidence on the character of Maroon society and culture. Before the First Maroon War, Akan culture prevailed in naming traditions, religion, and what they called their towns, but by the start of the nineteenth century, more Maroons had acquired European names and religions, and their towns had Anglicized names. The Maroons embraced Christianity not just to identify with British customs, but also to use the church schools to allow their children to improve their employment prospects outside of the Maroon towns. A majority of the Maroons embraced the Anglican Church of the white planter class, aspiring to belong to the same faith as their employers. They also felt more comfortable with a branch of Protestant Christianity that supported the institution of slavery. The missionaries converted the next generation of Maroons to Christianity, but the Maroons did not completely abandon their West African beliefs, even though the missionaries branded those religions as heathen. Scott’s Hall became Baptist and Revival churches eventually took hold in the larger Maroon towns. While the Maroons eventually adopted European customs, they adapted them and gave them a distinct creole character, in the process maintaining their independence.

The strength and independence of the Maroons was closely connected to their ability to maintain their numbers. The diversified economy of the Leeward Maroons enabled them to survive challenges from the changing weather that devastated western Jamaica, and their population increased significantly in the 1780s, when the slaves in that part of the island were dying in large numbers from starvation. Maroon populations grew steadily throughout the nineteenth century before emancipation, while the numbers of black slaves in Jamaica declined and the white settlers suffered from significant losses from disease and outward migration. This growth refuted Orlando Patterson’s assertion that the natural rate of population increase in the Maroon towns was low.\footnote{Orlando Patterson, ‘Slave Revolts’, pp. 279-280.} The Maroon populations thrived not just because of their diverse economy, but also because they resided in mountain retreats
that did not suffer from mosquito borne diseases, which enabled them to strengthen their communities and maintain a level of independence.

Because the Maroon towns thrived and their numbers grew, they were able to resist attempts by the colonial authorities to merge them with the free black population. The towns experienced an influx of non-Maroons, particularly in Scott’s Hall and Charles Town, but though the immigrants included free blacks and coloureds known as ‘Residenters’, as well as white men, the newcomers adopted Maroon culture and their children often became Maroons. The colonial authorities eventually abandoned their attempts to bring about the dissolution of the four remaining Maroon towns, and they all persist to this day.1014

When the Maroons signed peace treaties with the colonial authorities in 1739 and 1740, they were acting to preserve the freedom of members of their communities, while the white colonial authorities sought to use their new allies to hunt runaways and put down slave revolts. To achieve this objective, the colonial authorities sought to placate the Maroons by making concessions on land issues, but a divergence from that policy led to the Second Maroon War. A poor payment structure and a less than enthusiastic Maroon approach to hunting runaways meant that large communities of escaped slaves were able to thrive in the vast forested interior of Jamaica for decades, untroubled by the colonial authorities, and providing inspiration to slaves seeking to escape bondage. After the deportation of the Maroons of Trelawny Town, the colonial authorities sided with planters in subsequent land disputes, while the Maroons gradually diversified their local economy to such an extent that they no longer relied on hunting runaways for a major source of their income. Their independence enabled them to reject attempts by the colonial authorities to merge their towns into the general black population, and ensured their longevity.

APPENDIX ONE

Maroon leadership in the official Maroon Towns 1739-1810

The early Maroon leaders had just one name, and most of these names were West African, and specifically Akan in origin. The last Maroon leader to have an Akan name was Afee Cudjoe, the old officer of Charles Town who was a young man at the time of the peace treaties of 1739 and 1740. However, at the end of the eighteenth century, the leaders of the Maroon towns had both a Christian name and a surname, and they were European in origin. All Maroon leaders born after the treaties had British names. The Journals and Votes of the House of the Assembly of Jamaica were primarily used to compile this record.\(^{1015}\)

Crawford's Town

| 1740 – 1746 | Captain Quao (Quaw) |
| 1746 - 1754 | Captain Edward (Ned) Crawford (d. 1754) |

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Charles Town

- c. 1760: Captain Quaco
- c. 1760: Captain Cain
- c. 1776: Colonel George Gray
- c. 1796: Lieutenant-colonel Afee Cudjoe (b. c. 1717)
- c. 1796 – c. 1808: Major/Colonel Samuel (James) Grant (b. c. 1741 d. c. 1808)
- c. 1796 – c. 1805/7: Captain William White (b. c. 1745 d. c. 1805/7)
- c. 1797: Captain Thomas Shirley (b. c. 1747 d. c. 1798)
- c. 1807: Lieutenant-colonel James Giscomb (b. c. 1741)
- c. 1807: Major John Gordon (b. c. 1746)
- c. 1807: Major Robert Bentham (b. c. 1751)
- c. 1807 – c. 1808: Captain Thomas Prince (b. c. 1746 d. c. 1808)
- c. 1807: Captain Thomas Ball (b. c. 1776)

Moore Town (Nanny Town)

- c. 1738 – c. 1760: Captain Welcome
- c. 1740 – c. 1742: Leader Nanny
- c. 1760 – c. 1767: Captain Clash
- c. 1760 – c. 177(?): Captain Sambo
- c. 1797: Captain/Colonel Charles Harris (b. c. 1726)
- c. 1797: Captain/Lieutenant-colonel Adam (b. c. 1728)
- c. 1807: Captain John Sambo (b. c. 1749)
- c. 1807: Captain James Phillips (b. c. 1751)
- c. 1808: Captain John Ellis (b. c. 1746)
Scott’s Hall

c. 1760 - c. 1793  Captain Cudjo

c. 1760 - c. 1793  Captain Davy

c. 1773    Officer Jemmy

c. 1791    Colonel George Gray

c. 1807 – c. 1809  Captain John Gordon (b. c. 1756 d. c. 1809)

c. 1809    Captain Peter Ellis (b. c. 1771)

Trelawny Town

Circa 1739 - c. 1763/4  Colonel Cudjoe

c. 1763/4    Colonel Lewis

c. 1767    Captain Cuffee

c. 1767    Captain Tuluppanny

1767    Captain Robin

1767    Captain Long Quashee

1767    Captain Cudjoe

C. 1792 – 1811/2  Colonel Montague James

c. 1792    Captain John Jarrett

c. 1792    Captain Zachary Bayly

c. 1792    Captain James Lawrence

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1016 JAJ, Vol. 9, p. 43. George Gray apparently relocated from Charles Town to Scott’s Hall.
Accompong Town

c. 1739 - c. 1770s  Captain/Colonel Accompong

c. 1739 – c. 1767  Captain Johnny

c. 1773  Captain Crankey

c. 1773  Captain Muncko

c. 1773 – c. 1808  Captain/Colonel John Foster (b. c. 1744 d. c. 1808)

c. 1797  Captain Robert Palmer

c. 1797  Captain/Colonel Robert Austin (b. c. 1748)

c. 1807  Major Samuel Smith (b. c. 1761)

c. 1807  Captain Thomas Salmon (b. c. 1754)

c. 1807 – c. 1808  Captain John Miles (b. c. 1759 d. c. 1808)

c. 1807  Captain Richard Clarke (b. c. 1767)

c. 1807  Captain Henry Ricketts (b. c. 1769)

c. 1808  Captain John Delaroache (b. c. 1754)
APPENDIX TWO

The superintendents of the Maroon Towns up to 1841

The Journals and Votes of the House of the Assembly of Jamaica were primarily used to compile this record. The chronicle of superintendents from the treaties of 1739 and 1740 until 1804 is a patchy one. However, after 1804 there is an accurate line of succession of the superintendents.

Trelawny Town

c. 1740 Dr William Russell

c. 1761 – 1767 John Scott

c. 1766 John Kidd

c. 1766 William Carson

c. 1767 Thomas Burke

1767 (March) - 1787 John James

c. 1773 Thomas Leamy

c. 1779 - 1792/3 John Montague James

1792/3-1795 (Dec) Thomas Craskell


### Accompong Town

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Name</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1740 - c. 1752</td>
<td>George Currie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. 1760</td>
<td>John Kelly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. 1764</td>
<td>John Delaroache</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. 1767</td>
<td>William Delaroache</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. 1767</td>
<td>John Slater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. 1768</td>
<td>Jeremiah Gardiner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1773 - c. 1797</td>
<td>Alexander Forbes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. 1797 – 1803/4</td>
<td>Alexander Forbes junior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1803/4 – 1805/6</td>
<td>Obadiah H. Clements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1805/6 – 1806/7</td>
<td>Charles De Bosse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1806/7 – 1808</td>
<td>Charles Pight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1808 (Feb) – 1813/14</td>
<td>Edan Mitchell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1813/14 - 1817</td>
<td>Hadley D’Oyley Witter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1817 (Jan-July)</td>
<td>George Rose (d. 1 July 1817)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1817 - 1819/20</td>
<td>Joseph Fowkes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1819/20 - 1826</td>
<td>Philip Smith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1826 (Aug) - ?</td>
<td>John Hylton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1841</td>
<td>Thomas Hylton</td>
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</table>

### Crawford's Town

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>c. 1745</td>
<td>George White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. 1748</td>
<td>Francis Ross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. 1752</td>
<td>William Trower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. 1754</td>
<td>John Kelly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. 1754</td>
<td>Richard Godfrey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. 1754</td>
<td>William Kennedy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Charles Town

c. 1759  Patrick Fleming

c. 1763 - c. 1769  Francis Ross

c. 1773 – c. 1792  Peter Ingram

1792 (March) – 1795 (Oct)  John Ingram

1795 (Oct) - 1801  James Anderson (d. 1801)

1804 – 1806  Philip Ellis

1806 – 1808/9  Peter Grant

1808/9 – 1811/12  William Dove

1811/12 – 1816 (April)  Edward Pinnock Wallen

1816 (April) - 1827  Robert Gray

1827 (Oct) - 1829  Alexander Gordon Fyffe

1829 - 1831  Leonard Baugh

1831 - 1833  Alexander Gordon Fyffe

1833 - ?  Robert Baugh

1839  John Neilson

Moore Town (Nanny Town)

c. 1758 - c. 1782  Charles Swigle

1782 (March) – 1804 (April)  Charles Douglas

1804 (April) - 1824  George Fuller (d. c. 1824)

1824 - 1827  John Anderson Orgill

1827 (June) - 1830  George Minot (d. c. 1830)

1830 - ?  Thomas Wright
Scott’s Hall

c. 1764       Edward Cresswell

   c. 1766       Benjamin Brown
   c. 1767       John George
   c. 1773       William Trower
   c. 1776 – c. 1782    Bernard Nalty
   c. 1782 – c. 1785    Daniel Fisher

   1785 (Jan) – c. 1787    William Virgo Brodbelt
   1787 (June) – 1792/4    John Spence Brodbelt
   1792/4 – c. 1796       Edmund Pusey March

c. 1796 – c. 1797  John March

   1797 (Aug) – 1831 (May) Thomas March (d. 16 May 1831)

1831 (May) - ?    Philip Thomas Livingston

Superintendent-General of All Maroon Towns

   1770 - c. 1772    William Ross
   1772 (Nov) – c. 1779    Robert Brereton
   c. 1779    John Fergusson

   1779-1792/3    John James
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