# *Elisabeth Forster*

***From Academic Nitpicking to a New Culture Movement: How Newspapers Turned Academic Debates into the Center of May Fourth***

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*Author affiliation at time of publication: University of Oxford*

**Abstract** In early 1919, people like Hu Shi or Chen Duxiu were regarded as members of an ivory-tower “faction of learning” (*xuepai*), embroiled in a debate with an opposing “faction.” After the May Fourth demonstrations, they were praised as the stars of a “New Culture Movement.” However, it was not obvious to associate the circle around Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu with the May Fourth demonstrations. This link hinged on the way newspapers like *Shenbao* reported about the academic debates and the political events of May Fourth.

After compartmentalizing the debating academics into fixed *xuepai*, *Shenbao* ascribed warlord-political allegiances to them. These made the circle around Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu look like government victims, and their “factional” rivals like the warlords’ allies. When the atmosphere became hostile to the government during May Fourth, Hu Shi’s “faction” became associated with the equally victimized May Fourth demonstrators. Their ideas were regarded as (now popular) expressions of anti-government sentiment, and soon this was labeled the core of a “New Culture Movement.” This shows that the idea of China’s national myth “New Culture Movement” emerged out of the fortuitous concatenation of academic debates, newspaper stories, and political events.

# Keywords

May Fourth Movement, New Culture Movement, *Shenbao*, factions of learning (*xuepai*), Chinese newspapers

# Introduction

In this article, I explore the role newspapers like *Shenbao* played in moving academics such as Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu into the center of the May Fourth Movement, and in thereby constructing a picture of May Fourth and New Culture that is popular until the present day.

The expression “New Culture Movement” (*xin wenhua yundong*) was only invented in the months following upon the May Fourth demonstrations of 1919.[[1]](#footnote-1) Before that, ideas like *baihua* (“plain language”), which would later be called “New Culture,” were already advocated by a circle of scholars around Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu. These scholars were mostly based at Beijing University (“Beida”). However, newspapers like *Shenbao* (*Shanghai News*) regarded this as the irrelevant nitpicking of a “faction of learning” (*xuepai*), the “New Faction” (*xinpai*). This “New Faction” was embroiled in a squabble with an opposing “faction,” the “Old Faction” (*jiupai*). By this, *Shenbao* referred to another group of academics at Beida around Huang Kan or Liu Shipei. On the eve of the May Fourth demonstrations, in April 1919, *Shenbao* even diagnosed the imminent end of the “New Faction:” It had already been “elbowed out” of Beida by their rival “Old Faction,” and ideas like *baihua* would soon become irrelevant to Chinese culture.[[2]](#footnote-2) However, after the May Fourth demonstrations, the “Old Faction,” both as a designation and as the individuals subsumed under it, had virtually disappeared from *Shenbao*’s view. The circle around Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu, on the other hand, was now identified as the “center” of the newly invented expression “New Culture Movement.”[[3]](#footnote-3)

The timing of this image upgrade suggests that May Fourth was instrumental in it. By “May Fourth,” I refer to the demonstrations that started in Beijing on May 4, 1919 and then spread to other cities in China, and by “New Culture,” I mean the cluster of *baihua*, science and democracy, Marxism, and so on. The connection between May Fourth and New Culture, however, was not obvious. As Fabio Lanza has argued, scholarship has addressed the question if the two were identical. Some, like Vera Schwarcz and Li Zehou, postulated that “New Culture” and “May Fourth” were two separate events, one about “enlightenment” the other one about “national salvation.”[[4]](#footnote-4) Others have claimed that May Fourth and New Culture shared common themes. For example, May Fourth made the New Culture agenda of writing in *baihua* more plausible, because student demonstrators started communicating with the “common people,” and *baihua* was a good tool to do so.[[5]](#footnote-5)

However, the situation was even more complicated than that, and both positions leave too many questions open. First of all, contemporaries in 1919 were both convinced and surprised that May Fourth had promoted the cause of ideas like *baihua.* The Jiangsu Educational Association, a semi-official government institution in charge of educational politics, claimed in October 1919 that the “New Culture Movement continued the May Fourth Movement.”[[6]](#footnote-6) For a young teacher in Shanghai who went by the name of Jing Guan, debating “New Faction”-style ideas was equivalent to demonstrating during May Fourth. He reported in 1920 that he approved of the student protests of May Fourth. However, in his capacity as a teacher, he felt unable – maybe too dignified – to go onto the streets and demonstrate. Consequently, he and his colleagues started “researching the question of the new woman.” By “new woman,” Jing Guan referred to an ideal of emancipated women, who were free from what was regarded as stifling Confucian family morals. This idea was supported by the group labeled “New Faction” and would later be considered part of the New Culture Movement. Jing Guan felt that in this, they were just like Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu, and that this was as valuable an anti-government protest as taking to the streets and demonstrating.[[7]](#footnote-7) These contemporary opinions deny the possibility to treat May Fourth and New Culture as unconnected.

However, at the same time, contemporaries were also surprised about the connection between the two, and this challenges the position that May Fourth and New Culture shared an obvious agenda. The intellectual Li Jinxi, for example, remembered that he “did not expect” that May Fourth would have implications for culture.[[8]](#footnote-8) Immediately after the start of the demonstrations, contemporaries did not even associate the demonstrations with Beida. Instead, they talked about how “students of schools in Beijing” were protesting, not about how “Beida” was protesting.[[9]](#footnote-9) Moreover, it was not apparent at all why May Fourth should favor the “New Faction” over the “Old Faction.” Hu Shi was classified as “New Faction” and the translator Lin Shu was, as I show below, associated with the “Old Faction.” However, officially they expressed the same opinion on the student protests: They approved of the patriotic spirit of the demonstrations, but despised the idea of students being outside of their classrooms.[[10]](#footnote-10)

Moreover, New Culture-style ideas were held by people other than the academics at Beida, and if demonstrators had developed an interest in those ideas, they would not have needed to turn to Hu Shi or Chen Duxiu. For instance, Wei Tingsheng, at the time a master’s student at Harvard, held very similar ideas about *baihua* as Hu Shi.[[11]](#footnote-11) *Baihua* and the closely related *guoyu* (“national language”) were promoted by other, even state-sponsored groups, such as the Committee for Research on the National Language.[[12]](#footnote-12) Besides, as Edward Gunn and Shi Shumei have argued, the *baihua* suggested by the circle around Hu Shi was so Westernized and Japanized that it was as incomprehensible to the “common people” as *wenyan* (Classical Chinese).[[13]](#footnote-13)

That the circle around Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu should nevertheless come to be regarded as the “center” of the “New Culture Movement that continued the May Fourth Movement” hinged on the reportage of newspapers like *Shenbao*.[[14]](#footnote-14) *Shenbao* had first framed these academics and their opponents as competing “factions of learning” and then positioned these “factions” in relation to warlord politics. In 1919, China was technically a republic, but *de facto* ruled by warlords. These were local military rulers who were continuously weaving plots against each other in an attempt to rule the “republic.” After compartmentalizing the debating academics at Beida into fixed *“*factions of learning,” *Shenbao* ascribed warlord-political allegiances to them. These made the “Old Faction” look like government allies and the “New Faction” like its opponents, who had been bullied by the warlords for years. When the atmosphere became hostile to the government during the May Fourth demonstrations, the “New Faction” became associated with the equally victimized May Fourth demonstrators, and their ideas came to be regarded as (now popular) expressions of anti-government sentiment. Increasingly more people started promoting ideas they claimed to be standing in the tradition of the circle around Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu, and soon this was labeled “New Culture Movement.”

This argument breaks through a discourse that has long shaped academic narratives about the New Culture Movement. As Milena Doleželová-Velingerová and David Der-wei Wang have pointed out, this discourse was shaped by people who were themselves involved in the New Culture Movement.[[15]](#footnote-15) This self-discourse has claimed that the New Culture Movement was a watershed moment between “old” and “modern” China, and driven by visionary intellectuals like Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu, who grasped the “teleologically unavoidable” trends of modernity.[[16]](#footnote-16) In the last two decades, this discourse has been challenged. Attention has been drawn to the multiple versions of modernity, the complex agencies involved in their making, and the role people other than the New Culture stars played.[[17]](#footnote-17) In this article, I drive these developments further: I show how the powerful notion of the “New Culture Movement” emerged out of the fortuitous and unpredictable concatenation of actions and narratives that were originally designed with different ends in mind. I also demonstrate how individual academic fates could depend on political events and newspaper stories.

# Sources

As the press gained importance at the time, newspapers provide an important perspective on the events of 1919. The sales numbers of individual publications rose, and a variety of new periodicals was founded.[[18]](#footnote-18) *Shenbao*’s influence, readership, and institutional structure make it a useful case study. *Shenbao* was one of the biggest newspapers. It was published in Shanghai and influential in shaping notions of May Fourth and New Culture in that region. For example, when someone writing under the pseudonym Cha An published the *Chronicle of the Student Protests* (*Xuejie fengchao ji*) in September 1919 in Shanghai, he almost literally repeated *Shenbao* articles.[[19]](#footnote-19) *Shenbao* was printed in Shanghai, and what I say in this article therefore mainly applies to the Shanghai/ Jiangsu region.[[20]](#footnote-20) However, *Shenbao*’s reportage also reflected narratives in other parts of North China, the domain of the Beiyang Government. *Shenbao* was read supra-regionally. It had a postal service, and appeared on the reading lists of students in Beijing.[[21]](#footnote-21) Moreover, *Shenbao*’s stories chimed with the reportage of newspapers in other parts of the country. To show this, I additionally cite newspapers that came from different political and ideological quarters and regions of Beiyang China. These newspapers are the American Catholic *Social Welfare Tiensin* (*Yishi bao*) from Tianjin, the independent *Impartial* (*Dagong bao*) from Changsha, the *Public Voice* (*Gongyan bao*) of the Anfu Club (the ruling warlord clique) in Beijing, and *Morning Post* (*Chenbao*). *Chenbao* belonged to the Research Clique, a political party headed by Liang Qichao, with long-standing good relations to the circle around Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu.[[22]](#footnote-22)

As Tang Xiaobing has pointed out, academic convention requires that a note be made on the “public-sphere” debate when talking about newspapers.[[23]](#footnote-23) This debate gained traction in the 1980s and 1990s, when the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Chinese government’s simultaneous crackdown on the student demonstrations of 1989 raised the question if mainland China would ever become a democracy. The “public sphere” and, closely related, the “civil society” that had developed in countries like Poland, the argument read, had been a precondition for democratization in Eastern Europe.[[24]](#footnote-24) Another factor was the translation of Jürgen Habermas’ book *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* in 1989.[[25]](#footnote-25) When scholars like Rudolf Wagner, Joan Judge, or Barbara Mittler explored notions of a “public sphere” in China, they often drew upon Habermas’ definition.[[26]](#footnote-26) Habermas claimed that, in 18th-century Europe, newspapers provided a space (a “public sphere”), in which “citizens” could discuss issues of public interest independently from the state.

Scholars like Eugenia Lean, Jan Kiely, Bryna Goodman, or Tang Xiaobing have moved away from this Habermasian definition in their debates of “public sphere.”[[27]](#footnote-27) Inspired by Goodman’s emphasis of an “interpenetration” of state and public,[[28]](#footnote-28) this article is not about a separation of “state” and “public,” but a reported entanglement of politics and academia. I furthermore reverse the thrust of inquiry that is usually found in explorations of a Chinese “public sphere,” which often ask how a “public” participated in politics. Instead, I explore how “public opinion,” if you will, about politics and politicians shaped the academic discourse and individual academic careers.

# Before May Fourth: A “Faction of Learning” Doomed to Fail

The New Culture Movement has been constructed into a starting point for “modern China.”[[29]](#footnote-29) However, up until early 1919, newspapers like *Shenbao* regarded ideas like *baihua* as part of an ivory-tower academic argument, held by a small group of students and professors at Beida. Among them were Hu Shi, Chen Duxiu or their students Fu Sinian or Luo Jialun, who expressed their ideas in the journals *New Youth* (*Xin qingnian*) and *New Tide* (*Xinchao*). The circle around Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu was even vehemently attacked by disagreeing academics at Beida. They rallied around Liu Shipei or Huang Kan, opposed ideas like *baihua* in favor of *wenyan*, and publicized their ideas in the journal *National Heritage* (*Guogu*). When *Shenbao* reported on these debates occasionally, it called the opposing academics “factions of learning,” and indicated that they had little relevance to society. The circle around Hu Shi was designated “New Faction” and the one around Liu Shipei “Old Faction.”[[30]](#footnote-30) In this assessment, *Shenbao* was seconded by the newspapers *Gongyan bao*, *Yishi bao*, *Beijing New Post* (*Beijing xinbao*) or *Government by the People Daily* (*Minzhi ribao*).[[31]](#footnote-31)

The academics at Beida had an ambiguous relationship to this classification. Liu Shipei wrote an angry letter to *Gongyan bao*, denying the existence of “factions” or the idea that *National Heritage* was incompatible with *New Tide*.[[32]](#footnote-32) However, the academics themselves had provided the blueprint for the newspaper classification through their polemics. The authors of *New Tide* scolded the *National Heritage* writers for “sticking to the deficient and fragmentary,” that is, for being conservatives. The *National Heritage* writers called the *New Tide* contributors murderers of the past.[[33]](#footnote-33) In March 1918, Qian Xuantong (“New Faction”) had created a fictional character named Wang Jingxuan in *New Youth,* who attacked the “New Faction” by plotting political intrigues. According to Michael Gibbs Hill, the circle around Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu could not believe their luck when the famous translator and veteran-intellectual Lin Shu started attacking *baihua* advocates in public in February and March 1919 and thus became “the living incarnation of Wang Jingxuan.”[[34]](#footnote-34)

Lin Shu’s attacks took the form of open letters and two short stories published in newspapers, and they drew media attention to the debates at Beida.[[35]](#footnote-35) In this context, stories started emerging, which entangled the intellectual discussions with warlord politics. *Shenbao* did not create these stories, but it repeated them, often with the *caveat* that these were just rumors. In March 1919, *Shenbao* observed that Lin Shu was siding with the group of academics the paper had described as “Old Faction.” It also repeated a rumor that the government had ordered the principal of Beida, Cai Yuanpei, to dismiss the “New Faction” members Hu Shi, Chen Duxiu, and Qian Xuantong.[[36]](#footnote-36)

On April 5, 1919, this story became more specific. Lin Shu, *Shenbao* claimed now without any *caveats* about rumors, had persuaded Zhang Yuanqi to threaten Minister of Education Fu Zengxiang with an “impeachment” if he did not dismiss Cai Yuanpei immediately.[[37]](#footnote-37) As a censor in the *Suzheng ting* (肅政廳,) a censor bureau of the Beiyang Government, Zhang Yuanqi could “impeach” ministers who had engaged in illegal actions.[[38]](#footnote-38) Twenty days later, *Shenbao* repeated this story. Now Zhang Yuanqi had already “impeached” the minister, and Cai Yuanpei had already “taken the blame and [offered] his resignation.” When *Shenbao* declared the “Old Faction” winners of the debates in April 1919, it was not because the “Old Faction’s” arguments were so convincing, but because Lin Shu had “dragged in politics.”[[39]](#footnote-39)

When reporting these stories, *Shenbao* journalists or other authors often employed a tentative tone and explained that they were repeating “rumors” (*chuanshuo* or *yaoyan*)[[40]](#footnote-40) that were “circulating widely” (*shengchuan*).[[41]](#footnote-41) Sometimes the academics at Beida sought to downplay these stories. But even when they rejected a rumor, this sometimes seemed to be merely official rhetoric. For example, Hu Shi stated on March 10 in *Beijing University Daily* (*Beijing Daxue rikan*) that plans to dismiss him and Chen Duxiu were “all unfounded rumors.”[[42]](#footnote-42) Nevertheless, Cai Yuanpei let Chen Duxiu go on April 10, 1919.[[43]](#footnote-43) This suggested that the previous refutations were untrue. It is therefore difficult to distinguish fact from fiction.

Scholars have analyzed the provenance of these stories and speculated about their truthfulness. While some scholars have judged them relatively credible,[[44]](#footnote-44) others have decried them as fabrications.[[45]](#footnote-45) The point, however, is not what really happened in March and April 1919, but what a newspaper like *Shenbao* claimed to be happening. This, after all, was the information contemporaries were receiving. *Shenbao*, however, held with increasing conviction that Lin Shu and the “Old Faction” were plotting with the government to oust the “New Faction,” and people interested in this could read it everywhere in the spring of 1919.[[46]](#footnote-46) Someone reading *Shenbao* before May Fourth must have therefore regarded the situation of what was called the “New Faction” as bleak.

# Turning Point “May Fourth”

Half a year later, at the end of 1919, this situation was reversed. The “Old Faction,” as an entity and as the individuals categorized under it, virtually disappeared from the gaze of newspapers, journals and their readers. People previously described as “New Faction” were upgraded into the “center” of a “New Culture Movement,”[[47]](#footnote-47) an expression that started appearing in print in autumn 1919.[[48]](#footnote-48) Numerous local intellectuals and students now started discussing the “New Culture Movement,” and a veritable star cult around the Movement’s avowed “center,” Hu Shi or Chen Duxiu, was created in the press.[[49]](#footnote-49) In the second half of 1919 and in 1920, many journals in the style of *New Youth* or *New Tide* were founded, which promoted New Culture ideas and wrote in *baihua*.[[50]](#footnote-50) Moreover, in the same year the Ministry of Education made *guoyu* a compulsory subject for the first two years of primary school. This replaced the subject of *guowen* (lit. “national written language,” that is, *wenyan*).[[51]](#footnote-51)

According to Rudolf Wagner, the designation “movement” became hugely popular after the May Fourth demonstrations and many events were declared to be “movements.”[[52]](#footnote-52) One motivation for calling New Culture a “movement” may have therefore been to follow a popular trend. Moreover, the label “movement” broke through the classification of Hu Shi’s circle as a “faction of learning.” A “faction of learning” had been something whose relevance was confined to the ivory tower. A “movement,” however, was considered to have broad social relevance.[[53]](#footnote-53) Moreover, as soon as people started referring to ideas like *baihua* as a “movement,” they also stopped talking about equally strong rivals. In sum, being called the “center of the New Culture Movement” indicated that the circle around Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu were considered the winners of the debates.[[54]](#footnote-54)

As pointed out above, the connection between “New Faction” and May Fourth was not obvious. Instead, it hinged on the way *Shenbao* was constructing the debates at Beida. The May Fourth demonstrations were of course primarily directed against Japan. However, May Fourth was also a protest against the government, which was held responsible for signing treaties that had “sold” the formerly German regions in Shandong to Japan, rather than returning them to China. Consequently, some government members were labeled “country-selling traitors,” and the atmosphere in China’s urban centers became strongly anti-government.

# Cai Yuanpei’s Resignation in Three “Acts”

In this situation, Cai Yuanpei, the principal of Beida, resigned. In the night of May 9, 1919, he secretly packed up his belongings in his office at Beida and at 5:30 am, he sneaked out of Beijing.[[55]](#footnote-55) The next day, Beida woke up and was shocked to find their principal gone. Over the next few weeks, representatives of Beida sent countless letters to his abode, first in Tianjin, then in Shanghai, asking him to return to his post. But Cai Yuanpei remained unmoved. His resignation caused a media hype all across the country.[[56]](#footnote-56) In this way, it provided an important catalyst for connecting the academic discourse at Beida with the political activism of the May Fourth demonstrations, and for turning the “New Faction” into the “center of the New Culture Movement.”[[57]](#footnote-57)

Not only did newspapers report about Cai’s resignation and the May Fourth demonstrations together. *Yishi bao*, for example, launched a column with the title “Citizens’ Diplomatic Fights,” where it reported about Cai’s resignation next to articles on the “Shandong question.”[[58]](#footnote-58) Newspapers also reinforced the warlord-political polarization of Beida’s academic debates. When a *Shenbao* reporter with the pseudonym Shuang Yu reported on Cai’s departure on May 13, 1919, *Shenbao*’s version of the rumors changed in a way that made Cai Yuanpei and the “New Faction” look even more as if they were the victims of the government. At the same time, the “Old Faction” increasingly appeared to be associates of the “country-selling traitors.” This story was apparently believed by interested circles, since it was repeated almost literally in Cha An’s *Chronicle of the Student Protests*, and similarly described by other newspapers in Beijing, Tianjin, or Changsha.[[59]](#footnote-59)

First of all, *Shenbao* constructed Cai Yuanpei into a spokesperson for the “New Faction.” When the quarrel between the circles around Hu Shi and Liu Shipei was boiling up in spring 1919, Cai Yuanpei repeated over and over again that he did not favor any one “faction,” but endorsed *jianrong bingbao* (兼容並包). This has been translated as “broad-minded tolerance,” and praised as his most visionary educational policy.[[60]](#footnote-60) In practice, it meant that Cai had employed scholars who then found themselves opposed as “New” and the “Old Faction.”[[61]](#footnote-61) *Jianrong bingbao* notwithstanding, *Shenbao* regularly displayed Cai Yuanpei as the defender of the “New Faction.” *Jianrong bingbao* almost seemed to be a formula designed as a defense of his refusal to dismiss the “New Faction” from Beida.[[62]](#footnote-62) In short, Cai Yuanpei and the “New Faction” must have appeared to be the same to *Shenbao* readers.

*Shenbao*’s reporter Shuang Yu then described Cai Yuanpei’s resignation as a gradual fall in three “acts” (*mu*) that “shook” Cai’s position.[[63]](#footnote-63) In all these acts, Cai Yuanpei was bullied by the ruling warlord clique Anfu Club and by its head, the warlord Duan Qirui. The story read: After installing a new government in Beijing in August 1918, Duan Qirui tried to oust Cai Yuanpei, by pinning an anarchist publication on him. Although Cai Yuanpei was rescued by Minister of Education Fu Zengxiang, this event “shook” his position for the first time.[[64]](#footnote-64) The second “act” was student demonstrations that flared up in May 1918. They opposed the Sino-Japanese Military Mutual Assistance Conventions, which Duan Qirui’s government had signed, and which allowed Japanese military to be stationed on Chinese territory.[[65]](#footnote-65) People in the government, *Shenbao* claimed, saw these protests as another welcome excuse to dismiss Cai Yuanpei.[[66]](#footnote-66) In this case, however, Cai was saved by the Zhili Clique, a warlord faction in rivalry with Duan Qirui’s Anfu Club. The Zhili Clique apparently saw this as another opportunity to oppose the Anfu Club.[[67]](#footnote-67) In other words, before May Fourth *Shenbao* had claimed that only Lin Shu had polarized the debates politically. Now it argued that the government’s hostility towards the “New Faction” was a long-standing and deeply ingrained problem.

The third “act” that “shook” Cai’s position was the academic disputes at Beida, which *Shenbao* had identified as the squabble between “Old” and “New Faction” in spring 1919. So far, *Shenbao*’s story had only depicted Cai Yuanpei as the government’s victim. With the third “act,” it also associated the “Old Faction” with the “country-selling traitors.” In March, *Shenbao* had claimed that Lin Shu had contacted Censor Zhang Yuanqi in defense of the “Old Faction.” Now *Shenbao* claimed that Lin Shu had reached out to Xu Shuzheng, a warlord in the Anfu Club who was widely labeled “country-selling traitor.”[[68]](#footnote-68)

*Shenbao* did not flesh out how Xu Shuzheng’s intervention at Beida looked like. But in this context scholars like Vera Schwarcz, Chen Sihe, Wang Feng, or Gao Pingshu have cited an apologetic letter by Minister of Education Fu Zengxiang to Cai Yuanpei from March 26, 1919. This letter said that some “elderly people” in the government were criticizing Cai, and that it would only cause trouble if the dispute between “Old” and “New Faction” would continue dragging in politics.[[69]](#footnote-69) *Shenbao* went on to report that Cai Yuanpei rejected any government intervention. This, however, enraged the government. Ideas were forged to “topple” (*dao*) Cai Yuanpei, and the Premier Qian Nengxun even let himself be carried away to wonder: “If Mr. Cai was dead, would the University [not] be manageable?”[[70]](#footnote-70) At around the same time, *Dagong bao* in Changsha told a story that was “widely circulating,” according to which “a certain general” wanted to burn down Beida.[[71]](#footnote-71) *Chenbao* had “certain news” that Cai Yuanpei had received death threats, and that he, Cai, had “heard” about schemes to “burn down” Beida.[[72]](#footnote-72)

The May Fourth demonstrations then were, in the *Shenbao* narrative, Cai Yuanpei’s downfall. However, they also brought him and the “New Faction,” which he defended, at the center of the political events of May Fourth. When several Beida students were arrested for demonstrating, *Shenbao* wrote, Cai Yuanpei employed all his authority to free them from prison. But Cai knew that his position was no longer tenable, since pro-Japanese politicians in the government held the “New Faction” and Cai Yuanpei responsible for the demonstrations.[[73]](#footnote-73) The reason was the government’s alleged opinion, as *Shenbao* would later explain, that the people who had caused (intellectual) trouble over the past few months also had to be the (political) troublemakers now.[[74]](#footnote-74) With the same argument in mind, *Shenbao* tied political and academic discourse together even more tightly, when reporting on Chen Duxiu’s arrest on June 15. The newspaper interpreted this arrest as the government’s “continued” crackdown on the “scholars of the New Faction,” because it was using them as a scapegoat for the troubles of May Fourth.[[75]](#footnote-75)

It would be interesting to know if the government really made this connection or if this was just another rumor. However, just like with the earlier rumors about Lin Shu’s attempts to mobilize the government, *Shenbao* readers would have seen this story, independently of whether it was true or not. In other words, even though there was no immediate connection between May Fourth and Hu Shi’s circle, the academic and political discourse were tied together through this *Shenbao* story.

# Lin Shu and the “Country-Selling Traitors”

While displaying the “New Faction” as brave government victims, this *Shenbao* narrative put people classified as “Old Faction” dangerously close to the “country-selling traitors” of May Fourth when it claimed that Lin Shu had instigated Xu Shuzheng, rather than Censor Zhang Yuanqi, to defend the “Old Faction” at Beida. I can only speculate why the narrative changed after May Fourth. Was this an intended blow against the “Old Faction?” Or was it safe to repeat a generally circulating story about Xu Shuzheng, now that he was discredited by the May Fourth demonstrators anyway? Whatever the reason, this modified *Shenbao* story cannot have been beneficial to people depicted as “Old Faction,” even though they themselves were never called “traitors.”

This connection between Lin Shu and the warlord government has often been repeated in scholarship, even though, as pointed out above, other scholars have doubted that Lin Shu really mobilized the government against the “New Faction.”[[76]](#footnote-76) How obvious was it for newspapers to make this connection between the “Old Faction” and the warlords? Again, it is difficult to distinguish between fact and fiction. Lin Shu and Xu Shuzheng were indeed friends, they shared the ideal of “old-style literature” (*guwen*), and Lin Shu was employed at a school founded by Xu Shuzheng, the Zhengzhi Middle School (*Zhengzhi zhongxue tang*).[[77]](#footnote-77) Xu Shuzheng was, moreover, a member of the ruling warlord clique, the Anfu Club, and friends with the clique’s head, Duan Qirui. It was also true that Xu was a pro-Japanese politician: in 1918 he had signed follow-up treaties to the Sino-Japanese Military Conventions, which had caused the student demonstrations of that year.[[78]](#footnote-78)

However, as mentioned before, his friendship with Xu Shuzheng did not keep Lin Shu from commending the students’ patriotic spirit during May Fourth.[[79]](#footnote-79) Besides, academia and politics were so entangled in the 1910s that it would not have been unthinkable to construct a connection between the “New Faction” and the government as well. Cai Yuanpei had been the first minister of education of the Republic, and Hu Shi sat in government-sponsored committees that promoted *guoyu*.[[80]](#footnote-80) Moreover, Liang Qichao’s Research Clique, which had long supported the circle around Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu, was even allied to the Anfu Club at the time.[[81]](#footnote-81) In short, the warlord-political polarization of “Old” and “New Faction” needed some interpretive help from newspapers like *Shenbao*.

# Victims of the Government, Unite!

While “Old” and “New Faction” were, in this way, polarized as pro- and anti-government, another group that was in the limelight of wide-spread urban attention came to regard itself as government victims: the May Fourth demonstrators. In this way, newspapers furthered the impression that the victimized “New Faction” had something in common with these demonstrators. Vera Schwarcz has pointed out that an “exhilaration of blood,” that is, an excitement about being violently suppressed by the government, emerged only after the May Thirtieth demonstrations of 1925.[[82]](#footnote-82) But Chen Pingyuan has cited Luo Jialun during the May Fourth demonstrations praising the students’ “spirit of sacrifice” in “battling with the powers of darkness with bare hands and empty fists.”[[83]](#footnote-83) The students in Beijing who were arrested during the demonstrations were only in prison for a few days. However, for privileged students, even a short time in prison doubtlessly came as a shock, and the government’s suppression of the students was a big topic in the press.[[84]](#footnote-84) In other words, being victimized by the government was an important feature in the identity of May Fourth demonstrators.

Which impression, I would like to speculate, may all this have made on someone like Jing Guan, the young teacher who claimed that his way of showing opposition to the government during May Fourth was to discuss the “question of the new woman?”[[85]](#footnote-85) Since *Shenbao* and other newspapers were targeted at, and read by, Jing Guan’s social group, there is a good chance that he was a newspaper reader, maybe even a *Shenbao* reader.[[86]](#footnote-86) Jing Guan would have read in the newspapers that an important part of the identity of May Fourth demonstrators was to be suppressed by the government. He would have read how Cai Yuanpei’s resignation was the result of the continuous bullying by the government, because Cai had bravely defended the “New Faction.” Jing Guan may have concluded that discussing “New Faction” ideas was tantamount to demonstrating against the government on the streets. It may have been for this reason that he and his colleagues “researched the question of the new woman,” while his students were marching in protest. And it may have been for this reason that it was important for him to trace the inspiration of these ideas back to Chen Duxiu or Hu Shi, when a reference to other groups would have been possible as well.[[87]](#footnote-87)

# Conclusion

After the May Fourth demonstrations, the group of academics whom the media had classified as “New Faction” experienced a meteoric rise in popularity among students and educators in China’s urban centers. The reason was not that May Fourth and the “New Faction” had goals in common, or that May Fourth evidenced the necessity of ideas peculiar to the “New Faction.” Instead, a cluster of stories surrounding Beida and the Beiyang Government went viral in the press after the resignation of Cai Yuanpei. This made the circle around Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu look as if they were the same sort of anti-government activists as the May Fourth demonstrators.

These stories had been circulating in the months preceding May Fourth, and they had claimed that Lin Shu was mobilizing his government connections to oust people like Hu Shi or Chen Duxiu from Beijing University. Before May Fourth, *Shenbao* had judged that this meant the imminent crumbling of the “New Faction” under government pressure and the victory of the “Old Faction.” After May Fourth, however, the atmosphere among intellectuals in the country turned against the government. It is understandable that under these circumstances people did not want to identify with an “Old Faction,” which was now even said to have connections with one of the government’s “country-selling traitors.” The “New Faction,” however, looked as if it had something in common with the May Fourth demonstrators: According to the *Shenbao* narrative, it had been harassed by the government for a long time, and Cai Yuanpei had bravely stood up against this government, although in the end the constant bullying had forced him to resign. Discussing new-style ideas and ascribing them to the constructed entity of Beida’s “New Faction” therefore felt like an anti-government act.

Consequently, teacher Jing Guan in Shanghai could say that, although he did not demonstrate during May Fourth, he did discuss the “question of the new woman,” just like, in his view, Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu had done. This showed his patriotic spirit and participation in the May Fourth and New Culture Movements just as well.[[88]](#footnote-88) What this demonstrates is that May Fourth and New Culture were connected, not through a necessary link, but because newspapers like *Shenbao* had constructed the disputing academics at Beida into fixed “factions of learning,” and then inscribed political allegiances to these “factions.” These perceived allegiances had implications after May Fourth that were not anticipated before: Before May Fourth, they seemed to suggest the end of the “New Faction,” afterwards they caused its dissolution as a “faction of learning” and the rebirth of its members as stars of a “movement.”

David L. Shambaugh has cited Yogi Berra’s warning that “[p]rediction is difficult, especially about the future!” *Shenbao* did not heed this admonition in April 1919. Instead the paper announced the impending end of the “New Faction” and thus became one of China’s early “predictive casualties.” In this way, the story of this article also says something about the 21st century, in which, according to Shambaugh, attempts to predict China’s nearby developments are as popular as ever.[[89]](#footnote-89) When making their prediction in April 1919, *Shenbao* was drawing on stories about political allegiances, which they themselves were reporting. Nevertheless, it was apparently impossible for them to anticipate the life these stories would develop after May Fourth, a political event that was maybe not completely unforeseeable after the anti-Japanese demonstrations of 1918 and the long-standing nation-wide concern about the Treaty of Versailles.[[90]](#footnote-90) Without wanting to commit the logical fallacy of claiming that the unpredictability of events in 1919 is foretelling the unpredictability of events in the future, *Shenbao*’s miscalculation of April 1919 may indicate the difficulties in assessing how a number of known factors, when thrown together, will play out.

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2. Xin Wei, “Riben ren zhi Jiaozhou Wanchu fenguan,” April 25, 1919. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Ye Yun, “Ji Beijing Daxue shiyeshi (xu),” September 15, 1920. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Fabio Lanza, “Of Chronology, Failure, and Fidelity,” 54. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Chow, *The May Fourth Movement*, 178; Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, *Student Protests in Twentieth-Century China: The View from Shanghai*, 204–5. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Jiangsu sheng jiaoyu hui, “Zhi zhongdeng yishang ge xuexiao, tongzhi dingqi juxing yanshuo jingjin hui shu:” 25. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Jing Guan, “Gao xin wenhua yundong de tongzhi,” 31–32. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Li Jinxi, *Guoyu yundong shigang*, 137. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Jiangsu sheng jiaoyu hui, “Kaihui jilu (May):” 21. Similarly in “Bake zhong zhi Jing xuejie xiaoxi,” May 23, 1919. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Hu Shi and Jiang Menglin, “Women duiyu xuesheng de xiwang,” 93–97; Zhang Juncai, *Lin Shu pingzhuan*, 241; Chow, *The May Fourth Movement*, 119. For a discussion of this opinion in a broader historical context, see Fabio Lanza, *Behind the Gate: Inventing Students in Beijing*, 127. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Li Jinxi, *Guoyu xue jiangyi*, shang 29–30. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Li, *Guoyu yundong shigang*, 133–34. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Edward M. Gunn, *Rewriting Chinese: Style and Innovation in Twentieth-Century Chinese Prose*, 217–296; Shumei Shi, *The Lure of the Modern: Writing Modernism in Semicolonial China, 1917-1937*, 71. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Jiangsu sheng jiaoyu hui, “Zhi zhongdeng yishang ge xuexiao, tongzhi dingqi juxing yanshuo jingjin hui shu,” 25. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. I would like to thank Leigh Jenco for her comments on this issue. See also Milena Doleželová-Velingerová and David Der-wei Wang, “Introduction,” 1–2; Timothy B. Weston, *The Power of Position: Beijing University, Intellectuals, and Chinese Political Culture, 1898-1929*, 9; Leo Ou-fan Lee, “Incomplete Modernity,” 52–53; Lanza, *Behind the Gate*, 79; Kaske, *The Politics of Language in Chinese Education*, xii. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Weston, *The Power of Position*, 9. Weston does not support, but describe, this discourse. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. David Der-wei Wang, *Fin-de-Siècle Splendor: Repressed Modernities of Late Qing Fiction, 1849-1911*; David Der-wei Wang, “Return to Go,” 257–295; Susan Daruvala, *Zhou Zuoren and an Alternative Chinese Response to Modernity*; Lydia Liu, *Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity - China, 1900-1937*; Peng Peng, *Yanjiu xi yu wu si shiqi xin wenhua yundong: yi 1920 nian qianhou wei zhongxin*; Barbara Mittler, *A Newspaper for China?: Power, Identity, and Change in Shanghai’s News Media, 1872-1912*, 284–89. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Weston, *The Power of Position*, 163–68; Wang Runian, *Yuwang de xiangxiang: 1920-1930 niandai Shenbao guanggao de wenhua shi yanjiu*, 69; Lee, “Incomplete Modernity,” 52. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Cha An, *Xuejie fengchao ji*, shang 7–9. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Mittler, *A Newspaper for China?*, 3–4; Qiu Shihuang, Wu Xinxun, and Xiang Chunwu, eds., “Shenbao.” [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. “Chuban jie xiaoxi,” March 31, 1925; Zong Jingdu, “Contemporary Drama of China,” 3. Washington, D.C. I would like to thank Paul Bevan for his comments at the Joint East Asian Studies Conference, on 5-7 September 2013 at the University of Nottingham. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. On *Yishi bao*, see Timothy B Weston, “The Formation and Positioning of the New Culture Community, 1913-1917,” 167. On *Dagong bao*, see Yu Chunmei, *Dadao wei gong: Changsha “Dagong bao” (1915-1927) yu Hunan shehui sichao*, 23. On *Gongyan bao*, see Andrew J. Nathan, *Peking Politics, 1918-1923: Factionalism and the Failure of Constitutionalism*, 147. On *Chenbao* and the Research Clique, see Peng Peng, *Yanjiu xi yu wu si shiqi xin wenhua yundong*, 207, 212. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Tang Xiaobing, *Xiandai Zhongguo de gongong yulun: yi “Dagong bao” “xingqi lunwen” he “Shenbao” “ziyoutan”*, 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Frederic Wakeman, Jr., “The Civil Society and Public Sphere Debate:” 109. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Eugenia Lean, *Public Passions : The Trial of Shi Jianqiao and the Rise of Popular Sympathy in Republican China*, 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Rudolf Wagner, “The Role of the Foreign Community in the Chinese Public Sphere,” 424–443; Joan Judge, “Public Opinion and the New Politics of Contestation in the Late Qing, 1904-1911,” 64–91; Mittler, *A Newspaper for China?*, 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Lean, *Public Passions*, 10; Kiely cited in Ibid., 7; Tang Xiaobing, *Xiandai Zhongguo de gongong yulun*, 2–4; Bryna Goodman, *Native Place, City, and Nation: Regional Networks and Identities in Shanghai, 1853-1937*, 120. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Goodman, *Native Place, City, and Nation*, 120. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Daruvala, *Zhou Zuoren and an Alternative Chinese Response to Modernity*; Rana Mitter, *A Bitter Revolution: China’s Struggle with the Modern World*; Peng Peng, *Yanjiu xi yu wu si shiqi xin wenhua yundong*. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Jing Guan, “Beijng Daxue xin jiu zhi anchao,” March 6, 1919. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. “Qing kan Beijing xuejie sixiang chao bianqian zhi jinzhuang,” March 18, 1919; Yun Chao, “Lun Daxue xin jiu zhi zheng,” April 7, 1919; Yi Sheng, “Zuijin zhi xueshu xinchao,” 107; Wang, “Xin jiu sichao pingyi,” 107. The *Gongyan bao* story almost literally repeated the *Shenbao* article. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Liu Shipei, “Liu Shipei zhi Gongyan bao han,” March 24, 1919; Guogu yuekan she, “Liu Shipei zhi Gongyan bao han,” March 24, 1919. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Fu Sinian, “Mao Zishui ‘Guogu he kexue de jingshen’ shiyu,” 1259; Zhang Xuan, “Bo Xinchao guogu he kexue de jingshen pian:” 2A. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Michael Gibbs Hill, *Lin Shu, Inc. : Translation and the Making of Modern Chinese Culture*, 220–21. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Lin Shu, “Da daxue tang xiaozhang Cai Heqing taishi shu,” 106–112; Lin Shu, “Yaomeng,” 214–16; Lin Shu, “Jing Sheng,” 488–490. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Jing, “Beijng Daxue xin jiu zhi anchao.” [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. “Jinghua duanjian,” April 5, 1919. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Yu Lunian, “Suzheng ting”; Xu Youchun, ed., “Zhang Yuanqi.” [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Xin, “Riben ren zhi Jiaozhou Wanchu fenguan.” [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. “Chen Duxiu bei bu,” June 15, 1919; Li Dazhao, “Xin jiu sichao zhi jizhan,” 144. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. “Jing xuejie you fasheng da wenti,” May 15, 1919. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Wang Guangyuan, *Chen Duxiu Nianpu 1879-1942*, 61. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Ibid., 64. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Weston, *The Power of Position*, 171–75; Vera Schwarcz, *The Chinese Enlightenment: Intellectuals and the Legacy of the May Fourth Movement of 1919*, 53. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Zhang, *Lin Shu pingzhuan*, 223; Hill, *Lin Shu, Inc.*, 221. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Chen Duxiu, “Lin Shu de liusheng jiqi,” 192; Li, “Xin jiu sichao zhi jizhan”; Cha, *Xuejie fengchao ji*, shang 7–9. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Ye, “Ji Beijing Daxue shiyeshi (xu).” [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. See footnote 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Zhu Daihen, “Ni yu tongxiang mou jun taolun xin wenhua yundong shixing fangfa shu,” 36–38; Jiangsu sheng jiaoyu hui, “Zhi zhongdeng yishang ge xuexiao, tongzhi dingqi juxing yanshuo jingjin hui shu”; “Yanshuo jingjin hui yanti zhi jieshi,” November 2, 1919; “Hu Shi zuori di Hu,” May 21, 1927. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Miao Jinyuan, “Suowei ‘xin wenhua yundong’ de chachao yu pochan,” October 20, 1920, 2; Li, *Guoyu yundong shigang*, 137; see also Chow, *The May Fourth Movement*, 178; Wen-hsin Yeh, *Provincial Passages: Culture, Space, and the Origins of Chinese Communism*, 161. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. David Der-Wei Wang, “Chinese Literature from 1841 to 1937,” 466; Ping Chen, *Modern Chinese: History and Sociolinguistics*, 22. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Rudolf G. Wagner, “The Canonization of May Fourth,” 71. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. Ibid., 78. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. Ye, “Ji Beijing Daxue shiyeshi (xu).” [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. Cha, *Xuejie fengchao ji*, shang 8; Cai Yuanpei, *Cai Yuanpei riji*, 253. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. For reports on Cai Yuanpei’s resignation, see *Dagong bao*, see “Jing xuejie you fasheng da wenti”; “Beijing jiaoyu jie xiaoxi xu wen,” May 20, 1919. *Yishi bao*: “Beijing xuesheng fu Cai Zimin liang dian,” December 7, 1919; “Daxue xiaozhang zhi cizhi,” May 10, 1919. *Gongyan bao*: “Cai Zimin dumen yangke,” June 20, 1919; “Cai Yuanpei zhi xingxing zhizhi,” May 28, 1919. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. Ye, “Ji Beijing Daxue shiyeshi (xu).” [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. “Daxue xiaozhang zhi cizhi”; “Shandong wenti yi jiejue,” May 10, 1919. See also, “Xuejie fengchao you qi,” October 5, 1919. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. Cha, *Xuejie fengchao ji*, shang 7–9; “Jing xuejie you fasheng da wenti”; “Jiaoyu zongzhang zhi zhulu,” May 20, 1919; “Daxue xiaozhang zhi cizhi.” *Chenbao* from May 13, 1919 cited in Xie Yuanxue, *Zhongguo gongchandang lishi jishi*, 734. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Weston, *The Power of Position*, 123; Chen Pingyuan, *Touches of History: An Entry into “May Fourth” China*, 154. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. Li Fan, “Liu Shipei yu Beijing Daxue,” 111. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. Shuang Yu, “Daxue xiaozhang wenti zhi guoqu, xianzai, weilai,” May 13, 1919. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. Shuang, “Daxue xiaozhang wenti zhi guoqu, xianzai, weilai.” Similar in Cha, *Xuejie fengchao ji*, shang 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. Zhongping Chen, “The May Fourth Movement and Provincial Warlords,” 140. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. Shuang, “Daxue xiaozhang wenti zhi guoqu, xianzai, weilai.” [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. Weston, *The Power of Position*, 200; Shuang, “Daxue xiaozhang wenti zhi guoqu, xianzai, weilai”; Chen, “The May Fourth Movement and Provincial Warlords.” [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. Shuang, “Daxue xiaozhang wenti zhi guoqu, xianzai, weilai.” For Xu Shuzheng being labeled “country-selling traitor,” see “Wu yue qi ri zhi guomin dahui,” May 8, 1919 in *Shenbao*; or similarly in *Dagong bao* “Xu Shuzheng fandui jujue qianzi,” November 7, 1919. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. Gao Pingshu, *Cai Yuanpei nianpu*, 186. See also Chen Sihe, “Xu Shuzheng yu xin wenhua yundong,” 277; Wang Guohua, *Xuelin sui hua: 1919 nian – 2009 nian de Zhongguo wenren jianying*, 148; Wang Feng, “Wu si qianhou de Lin Shu,” 29; Schwarcz, *The Chinese Enlightenment*, 53. It is unclear where this letter was first published. The above works only cite from an “original of the letter by Fu Zengxiang.” [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. Shuang, “Daxue xiaozhang wenti zhi guoqu, xianzai, weilai.” Similar in Cha, *Xuejie fengchao ji*, shang 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. “Jing xuejie you fasheng da wenti.” [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. *Chenbao* on May 13, 1919, cited in Xie Yuanxue, *Zhongguo gongchandang lishi jishi*, 734. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. Shuang, “Daxue xiaozhang wenti zhi guoqu, xianzai, weilai.” [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. “Chen Duxiu bei bu.” [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. Zhang, *Lin Shu pingzhuan*, 223; Chen, “Xu Shuzheng yu xin wenhua yundong,” 274; Hill, *Lin Shu, Inc.*, 221. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. Zhang, *Lin Shu pingzhuan*, 223; Hill, *Lin Shu, Inc.*, 21, 171, 220. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. Wu Xiang, “Lun Xu Shuzheng yu Wanxi junfa de xingshuai,” 18; Arthur Waldron, *From War to Nationalism: China’s Turning Point, 1924-1925*, 191; Huang Dexin, “Zhongri junshi xieding.” [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. Zhang, *Lin Shu pingzhuan*, 241; Chow, *The May Fourth Movement*, 119. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. Encyclopedia Britannica, “Cai Yuanpei”; Li, *Guoyu yundong shigang*, 144. [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. Yuan Shuyi, ed., “Yanjiu xi”; Nathan, *Peking Politics, 1918-1923*, 239–244; Peng, “Yanjiu xi yu wu si shiqi xin wenhua yundong,” 212. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. Schwarcz, *The Chinese Enlightenment*, 153. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. Chen, *Touches of History*, 53. [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. “Chajin ‘fanghai Zhi’an’ de Jihui Chuban Zhi Jingguo,” July 27, 1919; “Ge xiao xiaozhang zhi jianjue,” October 5, 1919. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. Jing, “Gao xin wenhua yundong de tongzhi,” 32. [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. Zong, “Contemporary Drama of China,” 3; Cai, *Cai Yuanpei riji*, 254. [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. Jing, “Gao xin wenhua yundong de tongzhi,” 31–32. [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. Ibid., 31. [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. David L. Shambaugh, *China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation*, 170. [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. See, for example, “Shandong wenti Zhong Ri huanwen zhi pilu,” February 22, 1919. [↑](#footnote-ref-90)