Reliabilism without Epistemic Consequentialism
Reliabilism without Epistemic Consequentialism
This paper argues that reliabilism can plausibly live without epistemic consequentialism, either as part of a non-consequentialist normative theory or as a non-normative account of knowledge on a par with certain accounts of the metaphysics of perception and action. It argues moreover that reliabilism should not be defended as a consequentialist theory. Its most plausible versions are not aptly dubbed ‘consequentialist’ in any sense that genuinely parallels the dominant sense in ethics. Indeed, there is no strong reason to believe reliabilism was ever seriously intended as a form of epistemic consequentialism. At the heart of its original motivation was a concern about the necessity of non-accidentality for knowledge, a concern quite at home in a non-consequentialist or non-normative setting. Reliabilism’s connection to epistemic consequentialism was an accretion of the ’80s, and a feature of vonly one of its formulations in that decade.
Sylvan, Kurt
507b57c8-e6ec-4a02-8b35-6d640b08b61c
Sylvan, Kurt
507b57c8-e6ec-4a02-8b35-6d640b08b61c
Sylvan, Kurt
(2018)
Reliabilism without Epistemic Consequentialism.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
(doi:10.1111/phpr.12560).
Abstract
This paper argues that reliabilism can plausibly live without epistemic consequentialism, either as part of a non-consequentialist normative theory or as a non-normative account of knowledge on a par with certain accounts of the metaphysics of perception and action. It argues moreover that reliabilism should not be defended as a consequentialist theory. Its most plausible versions are not aptly dubbed ‘consequentialist’ in any sense that genuinely parallels the dominant sense in ethics. Indeed, there is no strong reason to believe reliabilism was ever seriously intended as a form of epistemic consequentialism. At the heart of its original motivation was a concern about the necessity of non-accidentality for knowledge, a concern quite at home in a non-consequentialist or non-normative setting. Reliabilism’s connection to epistemic consequentialism was an accretion of the ’80s, and a feature of vonly one of its formulations in that decade.
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Reliabilism without Epistemic Consequentialism (Accepted Manuscript)
- Accepted Manuscript
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Accepted/In Press date: 4 September 2018
e-pub ahead of print date: 15 November 2018
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 424377
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/424377
ISSN: 0031-8205
PURE UUID: 63f8b414-dcdc-4029-8cad-8d5ca214f518
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Date deposited: 05 Oct 2018 11:36
Last modified: 16 Mar 2024 07:03
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