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Faculty of Humanities

**THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
ANGLO-GASCON WINE TRADE**

c.1348–c.1453

Volume 1 (of 2): Thesis

Robert Blackmore

Submitted for the qualification of PhD in History

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ABSTRACT

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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ANGLO-GASCON WINE TRADE c.1348–c.1453

Robert Andrew Blackmore

The trade in wine between Gascony, part of the Plantagenet-held duchy of Aquitaine (1152–1453), and the kingdom of England, emerged and evolved with a political union between the two. This thesis examines the political economy of this relationship from the Black Death (1348–9) to the end of Plantagenet rule, in order to increase our understanding of how politics interacted with the late medieval economy to influence the distribution of wealth and power within society, and vice versa.

To this end this thesis asks first what English crown policies were towards the trade. Secondly it questions what the effects of these policies might have been, particularly for those political elites with vested interests in the trade in England and Gascony. Finally this thesis asks how the wine trade impacted the political relationship between England and Gascony, particularly with regards questions of loyalty to the crown.

This study finds that the development of the wine market's structure over the final century of Plantagenet rule was almost entirely dictated by the reactive requirements of contemporary politics. The crown decided the terms of merchant participation in the trade, granted commercial privileges, imposed price, exchange or export controls; and manipulated currency. Such intervention primarily resulted from pressure applied by the various interested parties: English merchants and ship-owners; as well as that of an ever-narrowing group of lords, ecclesiastics and burgesses, based in and around Bordeaux. New quantitative evidence, principally from Bordeaux's customs books and constables' accounts, indicates that commercial and economic benefit largely followed the pattern of political influence. In so doing English policy generated both greed and grievance, and these fed partisan conflict and rebellion in the duchy. Thus, the wine trade is demonstrated to be a key facet of the relationship between Gascony and England, and vital to our understanding its history.

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Academic Thesis: Declaration Of Authorship

I, ...ROBERT BLACKMORE..... [please print name]

declare that this thesis and the work presented in it are my own and has been generated by me as the result of my own original research.

[title of thesis]THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ANGLO-GASCON WINE TRADE c.1348–c.1453.....

I confirm that:

- 1. This work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research degree at this University;
- 2. Where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or any other qualification at this University or any other institution, this has been clearly stated;
- 3. Where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly attributed;
- 4. Where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given. With the exception of such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work;
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- 6. Where the thesis is based on work done by myself jointly with others, I have made clear exactly what was done by others and what I have contributed myself;
- 7. Either none of this work has been published before submission, or parts of this work have been published as:

R. Blackmore, 'Profit out of "desolation": the Anglo-Gascon wine trade (1368–1381)', in *Anglo-Gascon Aquitaine: Problems and Perspectives*, (ed.) G. Pépin (Boydell and Brewer: Woodbridge, 2017), pp. 121–140.

Signed:

Date: ...14/09/2018.....

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Abbreviations

ADG	Archives départementales de la Gironde
AHG	<i>Archives Historiques du Département de la Gironde</i>
BHO	<i>British History Online</i>
<i>Cal. Letter Books</i>	<i>Calendar of Letter-Books of the City of London</i>
CCR	<i>Calendar of Close Rolls</i>
CFR	<i>Calendar of Fine Rolls</i>
CGD	<i>Collection générale des documents français qui se trouvent en Angleterre</i>
<i>C. Inq. Misc</i>	<i>Calendar of Inquisitions miscellaneous</i>
CPR	<i>Calendar of the Patent Rolls</i>
C _v	Coefficient of variation
FEG	<i>Fasti Ecclesiae Gallicanae</i>
fr.	franc(s)
GSR	<i>Calendar of Gascon Rolls</i>
<i>lsd bord.</i>	<i>livre, sous or denier bordelaise</i>
<i>lsd tour.</i>	<i>livre, sous or denier tournois</i>
LIS	List and Index Society
ODNB	<i>Oxford Dictionary of National Biography</i>
PROME	<i>Parliament Rolls of Medieval England</i>
PPC	<i>Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council of England</i>
RJ	<i>Registres de la jurade</i>
SR	<i>Statutes of the Realm</i>
TNA	The National Archives
TOF	<i>The Online Froissart</i>

Note: Dates are based on the modern calendar years (new year begins 1 January), and years of account are Michaelmas (29 September) to Michaelmas, unless otherwise stated.

1. Introduction

*Sans la comunicacion et marchandise dudit royaume d'Angleterre, Boudeaus ne peuet estre Boudeaus, car il n'y auroit point assemblée de marchans ne de marchandises.*¹

Without communication with and the merchandise of said kingdom of England, Bordeaux could not be Bordeaux, for it would not be the gathering place of merchants nor of goods.

Régnauld Girard, *Memorandum to Louis XI*, c.1465

The bond between Gascony and England, based on commerce, is especially worthy of study because of its remarkably persistent appearance in much of the broader history of England and France throughout the High to Late Middle-Ages. The relationship played a key role in both in causing the habitual wars between the two kingdoms, and served as a necessary part of their diplomatic relations, for about three hundred years. The words of Régnauld Girard, a French royal official, had the singular purpose of persuading his king, Louis XI (r.1461–83), of this salient fact in around 1465. It was above all one commodity, wine, for which the English, the ‘ancient enemies of the king’, came to Gascony. Power in the region, and beyond, depended on this trade. Like Louis, only by fully understanding the wine trade, can we ourselves properly comprehend the history of preceding centuries.

1.1 The origins of the market

The great Anglo-Gascon wine trade was, from its beginnings in the twelfth century, a manifestation of politics in the European economy. Gascony, in modern south-western France, was certainly always a territory apt for the concentrated cultivation of *Vitis vinifera* and the production of wine from its fruit. Viticulture had been introduced by the Romans more than a millennium before, and the perfect combination of geology: limestone, clay, glacial gravel; and a warm climate tempered by the Atlantic winds; meant that by the time of the poet and rhetorician Ausonius (c.310–c.395 AD) he could aptly term the region his ‘patria, insignem Baccho’ (‘homeland, famed for wine’).² Yet it was not until a convergence of political and military events in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries that a large export economy developed. The duchy of Aquitaine, which incorporated Gascony, was appended to the English crown from the accession of Henry of Anjou as King Henry II of England on 25 October 1154.³ It had been transferred as a consequence on the new king’s marriage, two years previous, to Eleanor of Aquitaine, heiress to Guillaém X, duke of Aquitaine,

¹ *Archives Historiques du Département de la Gironde*, LVI (Paris, 1925–6), pp. 34–42, at p. 35.

² *Ausonius*, (eds.) L.L.D. Capps, T.E. Page, W.H.D. Rouse (London, 1919), I, p. 283.

³ T.K. Keefe, ‘Henry II (1133–1189), king of England, duke of Normandy and of Aquitaine, and count of Anjou’, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* [hereafter *ODNB*] (Oxford, 2004) <<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-12949>>.

and former wife of King Louis VII of France (r.1137–1180).¹ It was to remain attached, almost without interruption, for just under three centuries, until 1453, when it fell under the rule of the French crown at the end of the Hundred Years' War (1337–1453).

England was always a potentially viable export market for continental wine producers because it had insufficient viticulture of its own and strong demand. For the short-lived Angevin Empire of Henry II (r.1154–89) and his son Richard I (r.1189–9) it was the wines of Anjou and Poitou, those nearer those kings' native country, that tended to dominate. These were shipped north from the port city of La Rochelle on the Atlantic coast. It was to be another set of political and military events that was change this in Gascony's favour. The reign of Henry's younger son John (r.1199–1216), brought a series of disastrous defeats at the hands of Philip II Augustus of France (r.1180–1223) during which most of the Plantagenet lands in France, apart from southern and western Aquitaine, were lost.² Finally in August 1224 Philip's son Louis VIII (r.1223–6) captured what remained of Plantagenet Poitou and La Rochelle from Henry III (r.1216–72).³ Gascony's ports, particularly the city of Bordeaux and town of Bayonne, thereafter rose to prominence through strategic necessity. Fortuitously this shift coincided with a period of Europe-wide demographic and economic growth. The export trade, led by Anglo-Gascon merchants and shipping, grew apace, stimulated by burgeoning English demand for wine. In order to supply it, a dramatic expansion of vineyard land took place that accompanied the establishment of *bastides*, new settled towns, across the region.⁴ Particularly significant was the growth of production in the *Haut-Pays* (the 'high country'), an all-encompassing term representing all the lands to the east of the archdiocese of Bordeaux along the upper Garonne, Lot, Tarn, and to an extent the Dordogne, rivers. This became, in the words of Michael Postan, 'the largest region of specialised viticulture ever known in European history'.⁵

Thus, in only a century, a commercial system had grown which represented the greatest economic asset of the English crown on the continent. It has been calculated that, by 1324, taxes on the wine export trade fed annual ducal revenues greater than those collected from all England's shires combined.⁶ As its value grew Gascony was also brought firmly to the fore of broader European politics. The 1259 Treaty of Paris confirmed the vassalage of the English king to the

¹ J. Martindale, 'Eleanor [Eleanor of Aquitaine], suo jure duchess of Aquitaine (c.1122–1204), queen of France, consort of Louis VII, and queen of England, consort of Henry II', *ODNB* <<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-8618>>.

² J. Gillingham, 'John (1167–1216), king of England, and lord of Ireland, duke of Normandy and of Aquitaine, and count of Anjou', *ODNB* <<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-14841>>.

³ H.W. Ridgeway, 'Henry III (1207–1272), king of England and lord of Ireland, and duke of Aquitaine', *ODNB* <<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-12950>>.

⁴ See F. Boutouille, 'La vigne et le négoce du vin en Bordelais et Bazadais (fin XIe-début XIIIe siècle)', *Annales du Midi: revue archéologique, historique et philologique de la France méridionale*, 112:231 (2000), pp. 275–98.

⁵ M.M. Postan, *Essays on Medieval Agriculture and General Problems of the Medieval Economy* (Cambridge, 1973), p. 18.

⁶ M. Vale, *The Angevin Legacy and the Hundred Years War 1250–1340* (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 141–2.

French for the tenure of Aquitaine, but the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries saw repeated quarrelling between the two crowns over the extent of the sovereignty of each, particularly the validity of legal appeals to the French king via the *parlement* of Paris, which directly undermined ducal authority.¹ Whilst this mostly took the form of disputes over legal technicalities of feudal tenure, issues of commerce were never far away. In 1292–3 an appeal by Normans regarding their feud with Anglo-Gascon seamen precipitated a French annexation of most of the duchy that lasted nine years, before Edward I (r.1272–1307) was finally able to recover it only by negotiation. In 1324, the War of Saint-Sardos between Charles IV (r.1322–8) and Edward II (r.1307–27) broke out over the foundation, sponsored by the French crown, of a new *bastide* near the eponymous small village in the Agenais.² The conflict lasted just six weeks and was a military disaster for the English. It led to the loss of a number of towns in the east of the duchy and contributed to Edward's removal from power in 1326.³

The succession of Edward III (r.1327–77) in England and Philip VI of Valois (r.1328–50) in France did nothing to alter the trajectory of rising tensions over the future of what remained of Plantagenet Aquitaine, not least because the debate over the latter's succession and Edward's possible claim to his throne kept issues of sovereignty persistently relevant. Frictions generated by the *parlement* of Paris accelerated through the 1330s. Finally in 1337, under the pretext of Edward's protection of a dissident, Philip ordered the confiscation of all remaining Plantagenet lands held of the French crown.⁴ Thus commenced the Hundred Years' War. With it the great commercial enterprise that had grown in scale and prosperity since 1224 began to unravel. Yet this was not to be one continuous process, the wine trade would see periods of resurgence, and even as it shrank – the political importance it held was to become all the greater.

1.2 Historiography and new research

The significance of the wine trade was recognised by modern scholarship relatively late. Henri Pirenne observed in 1933 that its centrality in the history of the French economy was equivalent to that of the wool trade to the English.⁵ His short article on the subject, written at that time, dealt with the trade generally and only commented very briefly on the Anglo-Gascon trade. Pirenne's reflection was then furthered in 1947 by Eleanor Carus-Wilson who noted that its study, with regards Gascony especially, had been largely ignored.⁶ Their assessment overlooked both

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 4, 6.

² *The War of Saint-Sardos 1323–1325: Gascon Correspondence and Diplomatic Documents*, (ed.) P. Chaplais, Camden 3rd Series, 87 (London, 1954), pp. ix–xiii; also see Vale, *Angevin Legacy*, pp. 183, 232–42.

³ J.R.S. Phillips, 'Edward II [Edward of Caernarfon] (1284–1327), king of England and lord of Ireland, and duke of Aquitaine,' *ODNB* <<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-8518>>.

⁴ Vale, *Angevin Legacy*, pp. 257, 260.

⁵ H. Pirenne, 'Un grand commerce d'exportation au moyen age: les vins de France', *Annales d'Histoire Economique et Sociale*, v (1933), pp. 225–43, at p. 225.

⁶ E.M. Carus-Wilson, 'The Effects of the Acquisition and of the Loss of Gascony on the English Wine Trade', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 21:63 (1947), pp. 145–54, at p. 145.

Francisque Michel's 1867 and Théophile Malvezin's 1892 works on trade, and Désiré Brissaud's highly pertinent 1875 book on the communal government and administration in Bordeaux, though both lack the detail and theoretical framework of more modern scholarship.¹ Of greater significance was the work of Frank Sargeant, published in 1918, which studied English regulation during a large part of the fourteenth century.² His narrative was comprehensive, making use of the extensive English chancery records and London letter-books, but made few solid conclusions as to English policy, and unfortunately ended with the death of Edward III in 1377.

Nevertheless, one scholar in particular took up Pirenne's and Carus-Wilson's challenge. Margery James produced a series of pioneering articles the 1950s that now form the core of wine trade scholarship.³ Using the customs receipts recorded in the Bordeaux constables' accounts, James compiled: the now generally accepted trade volume statistics for fourteenth and fifteenth century exports from Gascony (Figures 1 and 2); English imports by port; as well as some English price and shipping cost data.⁴ James's conclusions were many, but significantly she described the severe contraction of trade during the trinity of demographic catastrophes of the fourteenth century: wars, plagues and famines. She also posited a certain recovery in the 1350s and 1360s, then another collapse in the 1370s before stabilising at a lower level in the fifteenth century.⁵ Despite its importance, a flaw of James's scholarship is how separate the trade was kept from Anglo-Gascon relations and the greater historical narrative, particularly political or economic. She treated the wine trade as a commercial enterprise set apart from events, only relevant because of the impact they had on the wine supply or shipping costs.⁶ She had little time for the problems of governance. Moreover, since James many aspects of late medieval economies have become better examined. These she was not able to include. For example, the work of John Munro, Harry Miskimin, John Day or Peter Spufford, concerning the impact of monetary policy and a shifting money supply, have never been integrated.⁷

¹ F. Michel, *Histoire du commerce et de la navigation à Bordeaux, principalement sous l'administration Anglaise*, 1 (Bordeaux, 1867); T. Malvezin, *Histoire du commerce de Bordeaux depuis les origines jusqu'à nos jours*, I-II (Bordeaux, 1892); D. Brissaud, *Les Anglais en Guyenne: L'Administration Anglaise et le mouvement communal dans le Bordelais* (Paris, 1875), particularly, pp. 153–94.

² F. Sargeant, 'The Wine Trade with Gascony' in *Finance and Trade Under Edward III*, (ed.) G. Unwin, (Manchester, 1918, repr. 1962), pp. 257–311.

³ M.K. James, 'The fluctuations of the Anglo-Gascon wine trade during the 14th century', *Economic History Review*, 2nd series, 4:2 (1951), pp. 170–196; *ibid.*, 'Les activités commerciales des négociants en vins gascons en Angleterre durant la fin du Moyen Âge', *Annales du Midi*, 65 (1953), pp. 35–48; *ibid.*, 'A London merchant of the 14th century', *Economic History Review*, 2nd series, 8:3 (1956), pp. 364–76; *ibid.*, 'The medieval wine dealer', *Explorations in Entrepreneurial History*, 10:2 (1957), pp. 45–53. These were then collated into a single highly influential volume after her death, *ibid.*, *Studies in the Medieval Wine Trade*, (ed.) E.M. Veale, (Oxford, 1971).

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 32–36, 55–59, 94–118.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 15, 26–28, 28–40.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 22–26.

⁷ J.H. Munro, 'Bullionism and the Bill of Exchange in England, 1273–1663: A Study of Monetary Management and Popular Prejudice', in *The Dawn of Modern Banking* (London, 1979), pp. 169–215; *ibid.*, *Wool, Cloth and Gold: The Struggle for Bullion in Anglo-Burgundian Trade, 1340–1478* (Toronto, 1973); H.A. Miskimin, *Money, Prices and Foreign Exchange in Fourteenth Century France* (London, 1963) *ibid.*, *Money and Power in Fifteenth-century France* (New Haven, 1984); J. Day, 'The Great Bullion Famine of the Fifteenth Century', *Past & Present*, 79 (1978), pp. 3–54; P. Spufford, *Money and its Use in Medieval Europe* (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 339–62.




Figure 1 Total wine exports from Gascony (tuns). **Source:** James, *Studies*, pp. 32–3, 55–6, also see Appendix 3.1. **Note:** Years are blank where no totals are available.




Figure 2 Total wine imports into England (tuns), all origins. **Source:** James, *Studies*, pp. 57–9, also see Appendix 3.4. **Note:** Years are blank where no totals are available.

After James further studies were embarked on only sporadically. In France, first Yves Renouard and Jean-Pierre Trabut-Cussac, and later Jean-Christophe Cassard, contributed further scholarship, but these focused on the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century, or the mid-fifteenth century, but neglecting the period in between.¹ Roger Dion added some influential research on the viticulture of the elites and then of France more broadly but with little new on the Gascon trade.² In the last few decades very little new scholarship has arisen – apart from Susan Rose on the wider trade, which drew heavily from earlier works, and Sandrine Lavaud on the trade in the Bordelais using surviving French sources, though neglecting those in England.³

By contrast, we are on more solid ground with the historiography of politics and society of Plantagenet Gascony. Eleanor Lodge's 1926 work should be the first point of call, providing a full historical narrative from the Angevin kings to the loss of Bordeaux in 1453.⁴ She was also the author of extensive articles on the barony of Castelnau in the Médoc in 1907, and on the archbishopric of Bordeaux and chapter of Saint-André in 1912, of which the latter had profound influence.⁵ Although it was not central to her study, Lodge regularly remarked on the importance of the wine trade to the political bond of Gascony to English – especially with regards the loyalty of the towns, Bordeaux in particular.⁶ A similar approach was taken by the vast array of scholarly contributions that, in 1965, coalesced into a volume on the history of Bordeaux, under the direction of Yves Renouard and Charles Higounet.⁷ The wine trade with England was briefly stated to be integral to understanding the highs and lows of the city's fortunes in this period as the basis of the wealth of her elites.⁸

Robert Boutruche deserves a special place in any discussion of the historiography of medieval Gascony. He was an avid follower of Marc Bloch (who advised on his thesis) and as such a member of the *Annales* school which stressed the importance of long-term social change over any 'top-down' narrative. His ground-breaking 1947 book provides an extensive socio-economic study

¹ Y. Renouard, 'Les conséquences de la conquête de la Guienne par le roi de France pour le commerce des vins de Gascogne', *Annales du Midi*, 61:1 (1948), pp. 15–31; *ibid.*, 'Les relations de Bordeaux et de Bristol au moyen âge', *Revue historique de Bordeaux et du Département de la Gironde*, 7 (1957), pp. 97–112; *ibid.*, 'Le grand commerce des vins de gascogne au moyen âge', *Revue Historique*, 221:2 (1959), pp. 261–304; J.-P. Trabut-Cussac, 'Les coutumes ou droits de douane perçus à Bordeaux sur les vins et les marchandises par l'administration anglaise de 1252 à 1307', *Annales du Midi*, 62:1 (1950), pp. 135–50; J.-C. Cassard, 'Les flottes de vin de Bordeaux au début du XIVe siècle', *Annales du Midi*, 95 (1983), pp. 119–33; *ibid.*, 'Vins et marchands de vins gascons au début du XIVe siècle', *Annales du Midi*, 90 (1978), pp. 121–40.

² R. Dion, *Histoire de la vigne et du vin en France des origines au XIXe siècle* (Paris, 1959); R. Dion, 'Viticulture ecclésiastique et viticulture princière au Moyen âge', *Revue Historique*, 212:1 (1954), pp. 1–22.

³ S. Rose, *The Wine Trade in Medieval Europe 1000–1500* (London, 2011); S. Lavaud, *Bordeaux et le vin au Moyen Âge: Essor d'une civilisation* (Bordeaux, 2003).

⁴ E.C. Lodge, *Gascony under English rule* (London, 1926).

⁵ *Ibid.*, 'The Barony of Castelnau, in the Médoc, during the Middle Ages', *The English Historical Review*, 22:85 (1907), pp. 93–101; *ibid.*, 'The Estates of the Archbishop and Chapter of Saint-André of Bordeaux under Plantagenet rule', in *Oxford Studies in Social and Legal History*, III, (ed.) P. Vinogradoff (Oxford, 1912), p. 56.

⁶ For examples, see *ibid.*, *Gascony under English rule*, pp. 153–4, 158–9.

⁷ *Histoire de Bordeaux*, sous la direction de C. Higounet, 3, *Bordeaux sous les rois d'Angleterre*, sous la direction de Y. Renouard, avec la collaboration de J. Bernard, P. Capra, J. Gardelles, B. Guillemain, J.P. Trabut-Cussac (Bordeaux, 1965).

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 423–31.

of the Bordelais.¹ That he concentrated on this area encompassing the archdiocese of Bordeaux is unsurprising, since his principal primary sources were the estate accounts of the archbishopric stored in the Archives départementales de la Gironde.² Heavily influenced by Lodge and using much of the same archival material, Boutruche chronicled the various periods of destruction wrought on the Bordelais by war, plague, and famine, over the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries - and in particular its vineyards - interspersed with brief phases of recovery. He concluded that, with the dramatic fall in population, there had been a severe decline in the fortunes of the noble and established knightly class, but an increase in those of the Bordeaux bourgeoisie. He explained how the former suffered from falling seignorial revenues and the rising costs of war, whereas the latter flourished through their commercial interests, particularly in the wine trade. In his brief foray into politics Boutruche noted that pensions and annuities paid with the proceeds of taxation on wine kept some Anglo-Gascon lords loyal even in their decline, and that some even involved themselves in the wine trade themselves.³ Yet such matters were not a major part of his work.⁴ A flaw in Boutruche was his tendency to underuse the surviving primary sources in England, and as an *Annalist* he remained largely sceptical as to the importance of governmental intervention in the economy, particularly monetary.⁵ He was also, like his contemporaries, greatly influenced by impact of the two world wars in his own lifetime and so his analysis often veered into the melodramatic, but nevertheless his previous research is critical to this thesis.

Complementing Boutruche are the political analyses of Plantagenet Gascony produced by Malcolm Vale, both his influential article on the last days produced in 1969, and his subsequent 1970 book on its final half century.⁶ Vale was very clear as to the economic value of wine trade and recognised particularly the importance of trade from the *Haut-Pays*, but unfortunately otherwise refers to commerce very rarely.⁷ Moreover, he downplayed Boutruche's assessment of the importance of annuities to the Anglo-Gascon elites, and overall Vale's narrative of the last years makes more of conflict among nobles and problems of inheritance, than issues of trade.⁸ Vale influenced all subsequent scholarship, particularly the 1994 book by Robin Harris intended as a post-conquest continuation of Vale's work, and more recent studies by Guilhem Pépin.⁹ Likewise

¹ R. Boutruche, *La Crise d'une société: seigneurs et paysans du Bordelais pendant la Guerre de Cent Ans* (Paris, 1947, repr. 1963); also *ibid.*, 'La crise d'une société: seigneurs et paysans du Bordelais pendant la guerre de Cent Ans', *Annales. Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations*, 2-3 (1947), pp. 336-48; *ibid.*, 'The Devastation of Rural Areas during the Hundred Years War and the Agricultural Recovery of France', in *The Recovery of France in the Fifteenth Century*, (ed.) P.S. Lewis, (trns.) G.F. Martin (London, 1971), pp. 23-59.

² Archives départementales de la Gironde (hereafter ADG), E 236-241; also edited by Leo Drouyn and published in *Archives Historiques du Département de la Gironde*, XXI-XXII (1881-2).

³ Boutruche, *La Crise*, pp. 350-1, 353-5.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 130-61.

⁵ For example, see *ibid.*, pp. 268-9.

⁶ M. Vale, 'The Last Years of English Gascony, 1451-1453: The Alexander Prize Essay', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 19 (1969), pp. 119-38, at 128-31; *ibid.*, *English Gascony 1399-1453: A Study of War, Government and Politics during the later stages of the Hundred Years' War* (Oxford, 1970).

⁷ *Ibid.*, *English Gascony*, pp. 11-36; also important is Vale's work on the century preceding the Hundred Years' War: *ibid.*, *The Angevin Legacy and the Hundred Years War 1250-1340* (Cambridge, 1990).

⁸ *Ibid.*, *English Gascony*, pp. 119, 202-3.

⁹ R. Harris, *Valois Guyenne: A Study of Politics, Government and Society in Late Medieval France* (Woodbridge, 1994), preface ix; G. Pépin, 'Patis et souffertes en Bordelais et Bazadais (1391-1439): le prix

Margaret Wade Labarge's provocatively titled *Gascony: England's first colony* (1980) owed a great deal to Vale and Boutruche, especially the latter's assessments of social change, though it does provide particular focus on the 'two main currents of support', the commercial classes and lesser Anglo-Gascon nobility.¹

The need for new research

There are tremendous gaps in such modern scholarship with respect to links between trade and politics within the relationship between England and Gascony. There are ideas as to the wider significance of the wine trade which have been conjectured but not followed up on and whole areas unapproached. Given the importance both Vale and the wider historiography has given to the part financial or economic weakness played in reversals of English fortunes during the Hundred Years' War, such as in the 1370s or 1440s, this is surprising.² Some studies of the wine trade as commerce have been put forward, and the political history of the period from an English or Gascon perspective has been dealt with, but the two have not been successfully integrated. In order to rectify such deficiencies what is presented in this thesis is an in-depth examination of the political economy of the wine trade. A 'political economy' has a multitude of definitions. Before the twentieth century it used to encompass all economics, instead now it more commonly means a study of the 'economic problems of government', and 'relationships between individuals and society and between markets and the state.'³ For the purposes of this thesis, it should show how politics interacted with the late medieval economy to influence the distribution of wealth and power within English or Gascon society, and vice versa.⁴

The time-frame of this study is specified as from *circa* 1348 to *circa* 1453. This covers the period from the arrival of the Black Death (1348–9) until the final fall of Bordeaux to the French at the practical end of the Hundred Years' War (October 1453). The beginning point was chosen

de la paix pendant la guerre de Cent Ans', *Revue Historique de Bordeaux et du département de la Gironde*, 20 (2014), pp. 13–39; *ibid.*, 'Petitions from Gascony: Testimonies of a Special Relationship', in *Medieval Petitions: Grace and Grievance*, (eds.) W.M. Ormrod, G. Dodd, A. Musson (York, 2009), pp. 120–34; *ibid.*, 'Les Soudans de Preissac ou de la Trau: de Clément V à l'ordre de la Jarretière', *Les cahiers du Bazadais*, 187 (2014), pp. 5–72; *ibid.*, 'The Parliament of Anglo-Gascon Aquitaine: the Three Estates of Aquitaine (Guyenne)', *Nottingham Medieval Studies*, 52 (2008), pp. 131–64; *ibid.*, 'The Relationship between the Kings of England in their Role as Dukes of Aquitaine and their Gascon Subjects: Forms, Processes and Substance of a Dialogue (1275–1453)', unpublished D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford (2007); *ibid.*, 'Towards a New Assessment of the Black Prince's Principality of Aquitaine: A Study of the Last Years (1369–1372)', *Nottingham Medieval Studies* 50 (2006), pp. 59–114.

¹ M.W. Labarge, *Gascony, England's First Colony 1204–1453* (London, 1980), pp. 206–7.

² Vale, *English Gascony*, p. 219. For other examples, see R.A. Griffiths, *The Reign of King Henry VI: The Exercise of Royal Authority, 1422–1461* (London, 1981), pp. 109, 114, 119, 377, 394, 406; W.M. Ormrod, *Edward III* (London, 2013) p. 516, 524–9; J. Sumption, *Divided Houses: The Hundred Years' War III* (London, 2009, repr. 2012), pp. 511–2.

³ 'Political, adj. and n.', *OED Online* (Oxford, 2016), <<http://www.oed.com/>>; 'political economy', *Encyclopædia Britannica Online* (2016), <<https://www.britannica.com/topic/political-economy>>.

⁴ For an excellent introduction to the interaction of politics and business in the Middle-Ages, see E.S. Hunt; J.M. Murray, *A History of Business in Medieval Europe, 1200–1550* (Cambridge, 1999), particularly pp. 75–98, 205–9. Perhaps the most influential recent work on the political economy of late medieval and early modern Europe is S.R. Epstein, *Freedom and Growth: The Rise of States and Markets in Europe* (New York, 2000).

because the onset of plague resulted in a significantly increased level of governmental intervention in the economy. Some leeway (through the *circa*) has been given to allow discussion of the years since the opening of war in 1337 due to this event's critical impact on the trade, as evaluated by James, but this will not be part of the main focus of the study. The thesis then covers the subsequent final hundred years or so from the mid-fourteenth to mid-fifteenth centuries because the effects of earlier events play out across that entire period, and should only be understood as part of one greater narrative. Episodes of particular note are: the rise and fall of the principality of Aquitaine (1362–72); the reversion to a duchy and French invasions of the 1370s; the Lancastrian succession and further Valois invasions in the first decade of the fifteenth century; then the short period of Plantagenet resurgence before the political and economic crises of the 1430s and 1440s. Since even 1453 does not mark the end of the wine trade with England, here some short analysis of the years after the Valois conquest are required to understand how their handling of the trade compared with their predecessors.

To approach such a seemingly broad study, with such an extended timespan, some focussed research questions are required. First, there is the need to ascertain what English crown policies were, whether intended or unintended, towards the Anglo-Gascon wine trade. This was approached by Sargeant for a part of the fourteenth century but my intention was to expand this analysis to include the last century of Plantagenet rule, with wider areas of the political economy such as: commercial privileges; price, exchange or export controls; and monetary policy, approached in detail.

A second question follows which asks what the effects of these crown policies might have been, particularly for those political elites with vested interests. These were: the English crown, nobility, royal officers, and mercantile communities; and also the Anglo-Gascon ecclesiastic or secular lords, and the burgesses in towns and cities throughout Gascony. These first two questions require an emphasis on the extent to which the wine trade was controlled to favour certain groups or otherwise encourage rent-seeking within it, which is to say behaviour in pursuance of economic rents, gains made without creating new wealth.¹ Examples of rent-seeking in a late medieval economy might be anything from petitioning for a privilege in a market to the right to extract tolls or otherwise transfer unearned wealth at the expense of others.

Finally, this thesis embeds these causes and effects back into the historical narrative by asking how the wine trade impacted the political relationship between England and Gascony, particularly with regards questions of loyalty to the crown, and whether this contributed to the final loss of Plantagenet Gascony in 1451–3. There are many ideas from modern economics and developmental studies which will be pertinent in this discussion, many of which fall under the category of 'resource curse' theory.² While this was generally applied to commodities such as

¹ For comprehensive explanations of rent-seeking, see R.D. Congleton, 'The nature of rent-seeking', in *Companion to the Political Economy of Rent Seeking*, (eds.) R.D. Congleton, A.L. Hillman (Cheltenham, 2015), pp. 3–9; and also A.L. Hillman, 'Rent seeking as political economy', in *ibid.*, pp. 9–18.

² See M. Ross, 'The Political Economy of the Resource Curse', *World Politics*, 51:2 (1999), pp. 297–322. At its most simple this describes how 'economies with abundant natural resources tended to grow less rapidly

metals and hydrocarbons and their place in the modern economy, this chapter will demonstrate how certain aspects can apply to wine as the abundant commodity in the medieval Gascon economy. Indeed, some recent scholarship includes cash crops, those agricultural products grown explicitly for profit, such as we can certainly describe medieval wine.¹ Bringing in such modern theory can add fresh perspectives to long-established historical narratives.

1.3 Sources and methodology

We must begin with a brief clarification of terminology. ‘Aquitaine’, ‘Gascony’ and also ‘Guyenne’, are often used interchangeably in both medieval sources and modern scholarship. Each has long histories with subtle meanings but in truth all three can be used to describe lands within the Plantagenet duchy. Malcolm Vale chose to describe Aquitaine and Guyenne as ‘political or administrative’ units whereas Gascony is defined by the common linguistic heritage of its inhabitants.² The geographical areas they described usually overlapped. Gascony, where Gascon was spoken, stretched from the Garonne River to the Pyrenees Mountains. Yet it has been explained how populations with perceptible Gascon identity also stretched a certain distance to the north of the lower Garonne and Dordogne rivers. Guyenne as a geographic entity comprised the Bordelais (territory around Bordeaux) along with the Bazadais, and parts of the Agenais, Périgord and Quercy to the east.³ Because this identity was so widely held, this thesis will add the prefix the ‘Anglo-’, hence ‘Anglo-Gascon’, when it is particularly necessary to specify those in, or something associated with, loyalty to the English crown. When describing the geographical region this thesis will use the term ‘Gascony’, but will use the term ‘Aquitaine’, derived from the Roman province *Gallia Aquitania*, or simply ‘the duchy’, when describing the territory in purely political terms. For the larger principality of Aquitaine of 1362–72, an entirely political entity under Edward of Woodstock, the Black Prince (1330–76), ‘the principality’ will apply to the wider polity, but with Gascony remaining the same within it.

Vale objected to the terms ‘English Gascony’ and ‘English Bordeaux’ on the basis that they anachronistically suggest notions of national identity and colonialism.⁴ He preferred instead to use the adjectival ‘Plantagenet’ to denote areas and places in allegiance to the English crown. It can

than natural-resource-scarce economies’, J.D. Sachs, A.M. Warner, ‘Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth’, Development Discussion Paper no. 517a, Cambridge: Harvard Institute for International Development, (1995).

¹ For example L.P. Markowitz, ‘The Resource Curse Reconsidered: Cash Crops and Local Violence in Kyrgyzstan’, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 29:2 (2017), pp. 342–58.

² Vale, *Angevin Legacy*, p. 6.

³ For further information on these definitions, see G. Pépin, ‘Does a Common Language Mean a Shared Allegiance? Language, Identity, Geography and their Links with Polities: The Cases of Gascony and Brittany’, in *Contact and Exchange in Later Medieval Europe: Essays in Honour of Malcolm Vale*, (eds.) H. Skoda, P. Lantschner, R.L.J. Shaw (Woodbridge, 2012), pp. 79–102; and also see: G. Pépin, ‘Les cris de guerre “Guyenne!” et “Saint Georges!”: L’expression d’une identité politique du duché d’Aquitaine anglo-gascon’, *Le Moyen Âge*, 112 (2006), pp. 263–81.

⁴ Vale, *Angevin Legacy*, p. 6.

however be argued that such distinctions became increasingly irrelevant in later periods. For example, by the beginning of the fifteenth century it was not unknown for the administration in Bordeaux to designate such territory ‘lieux anglais’ or ‘English places’.¹

Such subtleties are important especially since this thesis begins first of all with the English political sources. Almost never do we find succinct manifestos for the policies that organised and impacted the market, laid out neatly by the protagonists for historians to interpret, nevertheless common themes can be seen. First, by working through the different layers of control: diplomatic; regulatory or statutory intervention; as well as the instruments of patronage and privilege which impacted the trade, a regulatory narrative can be constructed showing how such decisions defined and shaped the market. As an institution, parliament was growing in importance through the fourteenth century – especially in commercial matters – so petitions, discussions and decisions recorded in the parliamentary rolls are the principal source for initial research into the attitudes and policy of the English crown and political elites towards trade with and within Gascony.² When enacted, decisions were then transferred to the statute rolls which are therefore a necessary complimentary source.³ In addition there are also some further details of petitions to the king and deliberations recorded in the proceedings of the privy council which relate to trade.⁴ These discussions sometimes led to decisions which were then solidified as ordinances. Crown policies towards the duchy were principally expedited through chancery and writs or letters patent were recorded in the Gascon rolls.⁵ They contain important new evidence for economic policy, such as records of licences issued for prohibited trade goods to be exported to Gascony to trade for wine (also sometimes surviving in the Patent and Close Rolls).⁶ Licences represent, as permits to avoid non-tariff barriers to trade, not a record of actual exports, but concrete measures of the demand in Gascony for the particular commodity concerned and of the willingness of the crown to allow supply to meet that demand (Appendix 2). From all these records it is possible to establish a broad narrative of English governmental involvement in managing the wine trade or deciding on the economic policies which affected it over the period concerned.

In terms of evidence of direct political involvement in Gascony, the sources are equally extensive. The Gascon rolls contain records of the lands, rights and privileges granted to individuals, corporations or towns within the duchy - and many petitions from Gascons requesting

¹ The National Archives (hereafter TNA), E 101/184/12, fol. 1r. For extensive discussion regarding the constitutional status of the duchy of Aquitaine under the English crown, see P. Crooks, ‘State of the Union: Perspectives on English Imperialism in the Late Middle Ages’, *Past & Present*, 212:1, (2011), pp. 3–42; for that specifically regarding the principality of Aquitaine, see D. Green, ‘Lordship and Principality: Colonial Policy in Ireland and Aquitaine in the 1360s’, *Journal of British Studies*, 47:1 (2008), pp. 3–29.

² *Parliament Rolls of Medieval England* [hereafter *PROME*], (eds.) C. Given-Wilson, P. Brand, S. Phillips, M. Ormrod, G. Martin, A. Curry, R. Horrox (Woodbridge, 2005), *British History Online* [hereafter *BHO*] <<http://www.british-history.ac.uk/no-series/parliament-rolls-medieval>>.

³ *Statutes of the Realm* [hereafter *SR*], vols. 1–2 (eds.) G. Eyre, A. Strahan (London, 1810).

⁴ *Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council of England*, vols. 1–6, (ed.) H. Nicholas (1834–37).

⁵ TNA, C 61; also calendared [hereafter *GSR*] as part of the Gascon Rolls Project, <<http://www.gasconrolls.org/>>.

⁶ *Calendar of the Close Rolls* (London, 1909–41); *Calendar of the Patent Rolls* (London, 1910–11).

these are also preserved in the National Archives in London.¹ These could involve the provision of tax-free trading privileges, rights to levy customs or take a portion of customs, and appointment of commercial offices, all of which were granted to lords, knights, ecclesiastics, towns and their burgesses (Appendix 1). Supplementary letters and charters, also survive in the Archives départementales de la Gironde and are reproduced in numerous available edited editions.² Also useful in this regard are documents, surviving in the Gironde and Bordeaux municipal archives, containing the customs, the economic, social and legal rules and regulations which formed a town or city's constitution.³ All such rights recorded in these varied sources allowed those on whom they were conferred the ability to profit directly from the main economy of the duchy, and to benefit from trade links with England. Evaluating how, why, and when these concessions were given, as well as assessing their relative and changing value, forms an important part of the thesis.

Because it aims at evaluating the consequences of crown policy for vested interests the project required solid new economic evidence. The account books of the constables of Bordeaux, the principal financial officers of the duchy, and those of their subordinates, were regularly sent to the exchequer in England to be audited, and constitute some of the best evidence for commercial and economic life of Gascony in the period. The originals are preserved at the National Archives, or in some cases their summaries have been reproduced and published.⁴ Not only to they contain the best statistical evidence for the wine trade, volumes exported and taxes paid, they also show what sums were paid to and by key Gascons involved in the wine trade, in particular the payment of shares of ducal revenues (as annuities, grants or wages) to individuals. In addition, they contain numerous mentions of wine prices paid at Bordeaux, which are used to build, along with price references from other sources, a dataset of wholesale Gascon wine prices for the period (Appendix 8.1). This is far more extensive than has previously been available, such as that provided by Boutruche.⁵ There are limited prices accumulated for a small number of *Haut-Pays* towns such as Agen, Bergerac, Riscle, and Montréal-du-Gers, but these were not always under Plantagenet rule. The main price dataset newly presented in this thesis consists of 159 wholesale prices in Bordeaux and Libourne, dated between 1337 and 1466, sourced from: the accounts of the archbishops of Bordeaux; those of the city's constables and *jurade*; and of the *confrérie* of Saint-Michel. Others

¹ TNA, SC 8 (Ancient Petitions) and SC 1 (Ancient Correspondence).

² *Archives Historiques du Département de la Gironde* (hereafter *AHG*), (Bordeaux, 1859–1933).

³ *Livre des coutumes*, (ed.) H. Barckhausen, *Archives municipales de Bordeaux* (Bordeaux, 1890); *Livre des bouillons*, *Archives municipales de Bordeaux* (Bordeaux, 1867); *Chronique et coutumes de Bazas*, (ed.) M.E. Piganeau, *Archives Historiques du Département de la Gironde*, XV (Bordeaux, 1875).

⁴ TNA, E 101 (King's Remembrancer: Accounts Various), stored in a variety of sub-classes; also some exist in print, see *Collection générale des documents Français qui se trouvent en Angleterre*, I, (ed.) J. Delpit (Paris, 1847), pp. 132–76 (accounts covering the years 1363–1370); T. Runyan, 'The Constabulary of Bordeaux: the Accounts of John Ludham (1372–73) and Robert de Wykford (1373–75). Part I', *Mediaeval Studies*, 36 (1974), pp. 215–258; T. Runyan, 'The Constabulary of Bordeaux: the Accounts of John Ludham (1372–73) and Robert de Wykford (1373–75). Part II', *Mediaeval Studies*, 37 (1975), pp. 42–84; J.R Wright, 'The Accounts of John Stratton and John Gedeney, Constables of Bordeaux, 1381–1390', *Mediaeval Studies*, 42 (1980), pp. 238–307.

⁵ Boutruche, *La Crise*, pp. 150–2.

come from the handful of surviving agreements between merchants, notarised documents such as bills of sale or lading, or recognizances for debts outstanding.¹

Approaching prices is beset with problems which need to be addressed. The chief difficulty is self-evidently the small size of the dataset which reflects the limited surviving sources. It is also heavily weighted towards Bordeaux, 146 (91.8%) observations relate to exchanges in the capital. This reproduces the relative importance of the city and port. Unfortunately, just 27 (17%) provide specific dates within a given year, though even this is sufficient to indicate strong seasonal variation. Prices were lowest in late autumn and early winter, then from the late spring to early autumn they were about 50% higher. It is likely those without a date were from the first period, since the market was most active in November and December. In these two months alone, well over half the year's transactions took place in Bordeaux.²

Medieval quantitative units are also problematic. In this market these were in theory the same as those also traded in England, the tun (or ton), notionally a large barrel with a volume of 252 statutory English gallons, estimated by Renouard to carry c.900 modern litres, and the pipe, of 126 gallons.³ Constantly re-issued regulations in England required that measurements specified by statute be enforced by officials.⁴ That these represent actual barrels has been disputed, most recently by Lavaud.⁵ Instead it is suggested that the tun represented a widely-held unit of account. That in 1445 English merchants specifically complained that in Gascony tuns were then being 'made of smaller measure than the English gauge', implies some standardisation within and between markets was definitely expected though hardly guaranteed.⁶ Quality is another difficult variable. Light red 'claret' was most expensive and most traded (95.6% of transactions), the remainder lower-priced white and dark red cheaper still, but no source notes any other quality

¹ ADG, G 310; G 503; G 2280; G 2302; H 735; H 736; H 1187; 3 E 4807; TNA, E 101/179/9; E 101/179/14; E 101/180/9; E 101/182/10; E 101/182/9; E 101/185/11; E 101/187/12; E 101/189/6; E 101/189/8; E 101/189/12; E 101/192/8; E 101/691/3; E 364/67; E 364/21; E 364/27; E 364/67; *AHG*, XXI (1881), pp. 8, 100–101, 217, 390–1, 447, 461, 651; *AHG*, XXII (1882), pp. 146, 160–2, 287, 336, 356, 372, 378, 420, 473; *RJ*, I, pp. 21, 165, 271, 275, 281, 285, 354; *Registres de la jurade: délibérations de 1414 à 1416 et de 1420 à 1422* [hereafter *RJ*, II], (ed.) H. Barckhausen, *Archives municipales de Bordeaux* (Bordeaux, 1883), pp. 137, 276, 339–340, 415–9, 579; *Livre des bouillons*, I, p. 558 (no. CLXXIII); 'Petite chronique de Guyenne jusqu'à l'an 1442', *Bibliothèque de l'école des chartes*, 47 (1886), pp. 53–79, at pp. 65–6; Malvezin, *Histoire du commerce de Bordeaux*, p. 255; J. Bernard, F. Giteau, 'Compte du trésorier de la ville de Bordeaux pour 1442 (février – août)', *Bulletin philologique et historique (jusqu'en 1610) du comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques*, année 1961 (1963), pp. 179–215, at pp. 192, 194; for the *Haut-Pays* towns of Agen, Bergerac, Riscle, and Montréal-du-Gers the prices are from *Jurades de la ville d'Agen (1345–1355)*, (ed.) A. Magen (Auch, 1894), pp. 3, 50, 193–4, 203–4, 210, 215, 224, 227, 301–2; *Les Jurades de la ville de Bergerac*, I, 1352–1485, (ed.) G. Charrier (Bergerac, 1892) pp. 20, 69, 79, 77, 102, 120, 174, 185, 202, 226; *Comptes consulaires de la ville de Riscle de 1441 à 1507*, (eds.) P. Parfouru, J. de Carsalade du Pont, *La Société historique de Gascogne* (1886–1892), pp. 3, 10, 22, 49; *AHG*, XXIX (1894), pp. 296, 299, 302, 307, 311–2, 324, 330, 336, 339; *AHG*, XXXI (1896), pp. 79, 96, 109, 123; *AHG*, XXXII (1897), pp. 19, 69.

² 54.8% of consignments left in these months, this is calculated based on 2,933 transactions involving the Bordeaux church and a sample of fourteen burgess families, see Appendices 4.1.5 and 4.3.2.

³ James, *Studies*, xvi; Y. Renouard, 'La capacité du tonneau Bordelais au Moyen Âge', *Annales du Midi*, 65:23 (1953), pp. 395–403.

⁴ *SR*, 1, p. 350 (31 Edw. III, st. 2, c. 5); *SR*, 2, p. 222 (2 Hen. VI, c. 14); p. 313 (15 Hen. VI, c. 17).

⁵ Lavaud, *Bordeaux et le vin*, pp. 29–42.

⁶ TNA, SC 8/199/9901.

grade.¹ This suggests that especially high-priced wine was sold only to elites and constituted only a small fraction of the total. Furthermore, short-lived wholesale price controls in England in 1382–3 allowed merchants a difference of only 6.9% between the ‘best’ and ‘common’.²

In addition to prices, also provided with this thesis is a dataset of exchange rates between the pound sterling and the principal Anglo-Gascon currency, the *livre bordelaise* (Appendix 6.3). This aims to improve on those figures provided by Spufford and Vale.³ These are important because the nominal price was quoted in money of account (*livres, sous, deniers*), or in francs fixed at 25 *sous*, in 86.2% of the price dataset. Though a number of sources for exchange rates have been used, the best available is the official exchange rate used in the accounts of the English administration. This was also followed by most institutions for valuations on their own books and at times also a legal requirement for all foreign exchange transactions.⁴ As a consequence most rate observations are drawn from the constables’ actual accounts, or those enrolled into other exchequer archives.⁵ Such records also contain details of coinage production at the Bordeaux mint, which had previously only been used by Mary Rechenbach up until the end of the reign of Edward III (d.1377).⁶ These can be used to adjudge the various fluctuations in the money supply and so are also presented in this thesis as evidence for the interaction between commerce and Anglo-Gascon monetary policy (Appendices 6.1–2).

The trade volumes set out by Margery James remain important (Appendices 3.1, 3.4).⁷ Where relevant they are re-examined and can be added to from previously neglected primary sources. James, for example, mainly aimed to find quantities for single agricultural and accounting years (generally starting at Michaelmas, 29 September) found in the account books or rolls sent back by the constables of Bordeaux for storage in the exchequer, but largely ignored the figures totalled for the constables’ whole tenures which were then enrolled in the foreign accounts rolls.⁸ In addition, during the course of this research, a huge amount of new detail on specific exports has

¹ Based on price data in Appendix 8.1.1. It should be noted that where the type of wine is not explicitly stated, but is highly-valued, it is included in the ‘claret’ category because this was the most commonly traded wine.

² ‘Richard II: November 1381’, item 107, *PROME, BHO; SR*, 2, pp. 18–19 (5 Rich. II, c. 4).

³ P. Spufford, *Handbook of Medieval Exchange* (London, 1986), pp. 207–8; Vale, *English Gascony*, p. 244.

⁴ ADG, G 2302, fol. 94v; *AHG*, XIII; XXI, p. 390; *RJ*, II, pp. 28–32, 270–2.

⁵ TNA, E 101/167/16; E 101/179/9; E 101/179/14; E 101/179/15; E 101/180/1; E 101/180/9; ; E 101/182/9; E 101/187/12; E 101/189/6; E 101/189/12; E 101/191/6; E 101/189/8; E 101/189/9; E 101/189/12; E 101/191/11; E 101/192/8; E 364/51; E 364/55; E 364/59; E 364/63; E 364/67; E 364/70; E 364/75; E 364/84; E 364/91; E 364/92; also P.J. Capra, ‘Le Léopard et le Guyennois d’or, monnaie d’Aquitaine’, *Annales du Midi*, 72 (1960), p. 398; *Ibid.*, ‘L’histoire monétaire de l’Aquitaine anglo-gasconne aux temps du Prince Noir 1354–1372’, *Bulletin et Mémoires de la Société d’Archéologie de Bordeaux* 64 (1968); *Ibid.*, ‘Les espèces, les ateliers, les frappes et les émissions monétaires en Guyenne anglo-gasconne aux XIVe et XVe siècles’, *Numismatic Chronicle*, 7 Ser. 19 (1979), pp. 139–53; *Ibid.*, ‘Recherches sur la valeur des monnaies dans le Bordelais au temps de la lieutenance du Prince Noir 1354–7’, *Bulletin philologique et historique*, (1957), pp. 417–563.

⁶ See M.C. Rechenbach, ‘The Gascon Money of Edward III: A Study in Monetary History’, Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Maryland (1955).

⁷ James, *Studies*, pp. 32–6, 55–9, 94–118.

⁸ TNA, E 364/51; E 364/55; E 364/59; E 364/63; E 364/67; E 364/70; E 364/75; E 364/84; E 364/91; E 364/92.

been unearthed from Bordeaux's customs books (Appendix 4).¹ Over 3,500 transactions between 1348 and 1449 have been noted and analysed. Each recorded details of a cargo shipment on a ship leaving Bordeaux: the names of each official exporter associated with each shipment, its quantity, and its tax status. The correct interpretation of the latter, the tax codes used in the customs books, is critical to this thesis. Beside all shipments, and in the totals entered in the constable's accounts, was noted one of six abbreviated tax categories in almost all cases, a brief explanation of these is given in Table 1.

Table 1 Common tax categories in the Bordeaux customs books, from c.1350–1453.

Abbreviated Tax Code	Meaning	Origin of wine
Fr'	Produced under franchise	Directly from estates held by an individual/institution with privileged status
Cust' Iss'	Paid the custom and transaction tax	Outside of estates held by and individual/institution with privileged status (pre-1372)
Cust' Iss' b'	Paid the custom and a reduced transaction tax	Bought from estates held by an individual/institution with privileged status
Cust' Iss' non b'	Paid the custom and a raised transaction tax	Bought from estates held by an individual/institution without privileged status
Cust'	Paid only the custom	Bought outside of the boundaries of Bordeaux, so exempt from the transaction tax
Privil'	Paid a privileged rate of tax	From a privileged town, usually in the <i>Haut-Pays</i> , beyond the Bordelais

Source: As explained in the accounts of Richard Rotour, TNA, E 101/180/9, fos 7r, 26r, 44r, 61r, 74r; and in the *Livre des coutumes*, pp. 363–5, 606–7.

Mostly Gascon names appeared beside shipments, not necessarily because they were the legal owner of the wine en route abroad, though they in some cases could be, rather it was because provenance mattered to the rate of tax levied. For example, it was always necessary for those shipments marked 'Fr' to have the name of the producer in order to prove the goods were entitled to get certain tax privileges. The English merchants, who had usually already bought the wine, only occasionally appear with 'Cust Iss' or 'Cust Iss non b' where no advantage was to be gained in naming a Gascon originator. Even in such circumstances, because of the importance of privileges to the management of the trade, it is clear there was some convention among ducal customs officials towards naming Gascons.

Though customs books only survive in a usable form for around a third of the last hundred years of Plantagenet rule, they nonetheless constitute the best available source for the wine export business out of Bordeaux in this period. The exporter details give concrete evidence of the scale of

¹ These are mainly in the National Archives under TNA, E 101/167/16; E 101/170/17; E 101/173/4; E 101/602/3; E 101/180/2; E 101/182/6; E 101/182/6; E 101/183/11; E 101/184/19; E 101/185/9; E 101/188/14; E 101/190/6; E 101/191/3; E 101/192/1; E 101/194/3; E 101/195/19.

commercial interests of specific individuals, or families, from the large shipments of lords and officials, to the single tun or pipe of the small grower. Export data pertaining to a chosen sample of particular nobles, non-nobles and towns across the period have been harvested from the books and will provide the core evidence for the Anglo-Gascon elites' changing involvement in the wine trade. These are often set out as 'annual' exports based on the accounting year (e.g. 1372–3), which in reality reflect the shipments relating to a single vintage (e.g. August–September 1372) over the subsequent twelve, or more commonly six or seven months.

Apart from those sent to the exchequer in London almost all of what comprised the rest of the duchy's administrative records in Bordeaux have been lost. Some material survives for nobility in the Archives départementales de la Gironde and Archives des Pyrénées-Atlantiques, a proportion of which is published.¹ These records provide some limited details as to economic activity, the best of which relates to the church and urban communes. The estate accounts of the archbishopric of Bordeaux, stored in the Gironde archives and published, constitute the principal source of evidence for the management of a lordship and its estates in medieval Gascony.² Although beginning considerably earlier, they do cover many years of the last century of Plantagenet rule and these financial accounts are extremely valuable. For the communes, the registers of meetings of the *jurades* in Bordeaux (surviving for the years 1406–9, 1414–6, 1420–2) and for Bergerac (1352–1485) are particularly important sources.³

*

In this thesis the evidence and methodologies brought to bear on the political economy of the wine trade are inherently interdisciplinary, being both political and economic. Using these to understand the causes and effects of political decision-making, and how these interacted with the market, both for participating individuals and in groups, is challenging enough today, but is all the more so given the differences and distance between the late medieval world and our own. That said, these were not necessarily as great as we might suppose. The dynamics of human behaviour in government, and in markets, can be shown to remain remarkably consistent across time. Indeed, greed for profits, and grievance at losses are ubiquitous motivators, not just today or in the Late Middle-Ages, but throughout history.

¹ For example, see *Documents sur la maison de Durfort (XIe–XVe siècles)*, (ed.) N. de Peña, 2 vols (Bordeaux, 1977); *Le Trésor des Chartres d'Albret. I. Les archives de Vayres*, (ed.) J.B. Marquette (Paris, 1973).

² *AHG*, XXI–XXII (1881–2).

³ *Registres de la jurade: délibérations de 1406 à 1409* [hereafter *RJ*, I], (ed.) H. Barckhausen, *Archives municipales de Bordeaux* (Bordeaux, 1873); *Registres de la jurade: délibérations de 1414 à 1416 et de 1420 à 1422* [hereafter *RJ*, II], (ed.) H. Barckhausen, *Archives municipales de Bordeaux* (Bordeaux, 1883); *Les Jurades de la ville de Bergerac*, I, 1352–1485, (ed.) G. Charrier (Bergerac, 1892).

2. Politics and policies

The king of England held full customary rights over commerce in his own realm as sovereign and in Gascony as duke of Aquitaine. These rights allowed a huge variety of charges and duties to be applied at every stage along a barrel of wine's route from vineyard to consumer. By the mid-fourteenth century these included: the *grande coutume*, the principal customs duty for export from Gascony; the *issac*, a tax on transactions in Bordeaux; *killage*, a charge on all new ships using the harbour; and the *royan*, on all ships leaving the Gironde estuary. When shipped into England wine was taxed at certain times: the new custom (*butlerage*) as duty on foreign importers; *tunnage*, a further subsidy agreed via parliament; and the *prise* (*prisage*), a levy of a certain quantity for use by the crown.¹ Such taxation is perhaps the most visible example of royal intervention in the wine trade, and its various forms will be discussed in due course. Yet the crown also needed to manage the competing interests of its English and Anglo-Gascon subjects and so was required to exercise some control over markets in order to do so. Its highest level of control was through its application of trade agreements in treaties or truces with other powers. However most intervention in the market derived from conventional political channels, and encompassed what we might identify today as a mixture of regulatory and statutory control.

The various structures of the political system in England, through which regulatory control over the wine trade was applied domestically, were the same as is generally understood by diverse scholarship, and do not require long discussion.² For our purposes, it was petitions from interested parties to the king directly, or via the royal council, or parliament, that drove most intervention – royal decisions were then enacted either via writs, letters patent or close, through chancery. Plantagenet rule in Gascony operated, as Guilhem Pépin explained, principally through the personal relationship between the king, as duke of Aquitaine, and his Gascon subjects.³ The primary mechanism by which this functioned was again, as in England, the petition.⁴ The monarch himself received petitions and, though always absent from the duchy, performed his role as

¹ *The King's Customs: an Account of Maritime Revenue and Contraband Traffic in England, Scotland, and Ireland, from the Earliest Times to the Year 1800*, (eds.) H. Atton, H.H. Holland, 1, (New York, 1908, repr. London 1967), pp. 8–14, 23–35; Trabut-Cussac, 'Les coutumes ou droits de douane perçus à Bordeaux', pp. 135–50; Sargeant, 'The Wine Trade with Gascony', pp. 281–6; Rose, *The Wine Trade*, pp. 46–53.

² The historiography of late medieval English politics is vast, for an overview, see M.H. Keen, *England in the later Middle Ages: A political history* (1973, repr. London, 2003); W.M. Ormrod, *Political Life in Medieval England, 1300–1450* (Basingstoke, 1995). For a good analysis of English political culture, see A. Ruddick, *English Identity and Political Culture in the Fourteenth Century* (Cambridge, 2013); M. Hicks, *English Political Culture in the Fifteenth century* (London, 2002).

³ See G. Pépin, 'The relationship between the kings of England and their role as dukes of Aquitaine and their Gascon subjects: forms, processes and substance of a dialogue (1275–1453)', unpublished DPhil thesis (Oxford, 2007).

⁴ Examples of petitions to the king from Gascons involved in the wine trade are particularly numerous for the first half of the fourteenth century: TNA, SC 8/114/5673, SC 8/124/6175, SC 8/233/11635, SC 8/284/14197, SC 8/284/14198, SC 8/285/14222, SC 8/285/14223, SC 8/286/14300, SC 8/287/14343, SC 8/288/14385, SC 8/294/14682, SC 8/317/E249, SC 8/317/E289, SC 8/322/E543, SC 8/327/E856; fewer survive from later periods though SC 8/229/11407, the appeal from the people of Bordeaux in 1373, is one notable exception.

overlord directly without alienating his sovereignty to any subordinate authority.¹ Political intervention in Gascony was again made by the king through writs, letters patent or close, through chancery, and recorded on the Gascon rolls, often without any discernible discussion in council or parliament. These were then implemented in Gascony by the English officials based in the *Château de l'Ombrière* in Bordeaux or, when instructed, by a royal council in the duchy comprising key nobles, knights, and ecclesiastics. Commercial privileges in production and exports from the duchy itself were thus bestowed on Anglo-Gascon elites and others, and this will be discussed in detail in this study. Rules that could be broadly described today as regulatory law were also applied in this manner. This included the management of the customs regime, and the day-to-day bureaucracy overseeing international trade, the issue and application of trade licences lifting prohibitions on goods shipped to and from the duchy. Moreover wider economic policies which might impact on trade, such as monetary policy, were administered by such means, though these might also involve the English exchequer. When political consent for decisions required a greater representative assembly, the Three Estates of Aquitaine, or its subset from the Bordelais or the Landes, was called.² Such a process was required in 1413, for example, in order to raise unusually high taxes on the wine trade.³

In terms of the legislature and the implementation of statutory law it was the great councils or parliaments in England that mattered. As the latter's importance increased across the period key rules governing the wine trade were increasingly applied under statute from England. Despite their status as subjects of the English crown the Gascons themselves were not directly represented at these assemblies. Parliamentary records indicate that some Gascon petitions were brought forward before sessions. Knights of the shire were usually appointed to receive them and also lords temporal and spiritual were regularly selected as triers.⁴ Yet Pépin has calculated that of a sample of Gascon petitions from the reigns of Edward II (r.1307–27) and Henry VI (r.1422–61) only c.9% were tried in parliament, the remaining c.90% of appeals from the duchy being by the council and chancery alone.⁵

It should be admitted that in the study of medieval commerce the efficacy of regulations and trade rules is hard to discern. There is little doubt that where inconvenient they were often simply disobeyed or avoided - a reality demonstrated by the need for repeated re-issue of similar rules or the confirmation of existing legislation. The plethora of customs officials in English ports responsible to the exchequer give a sense of strong supervision, but such roles were as often as not farmed out to private individuals who might show rather less enthusiasm for following rules than

¹ Many such petitions survive in the National Archives, for example TNA, SC 8/229/11407. For more on Gascon petitions, see Pépin, 'Petitions from Gascony', pp. 120–34.

² For the only extant work on the Three Estates of Aquitaine, see Pépin, 'The Parliament of Anglo-Gascon Aquitaine: the Three Estates of Aquitaine (Guyenne)', pp. 131–64.

³ *GSR*, C 61/114: 35.

⁴ For example: 'Richard II: May 1382', items 6,8, *PROME*, *BHO*.

⁵ Pépin, 'Petitions from Gascony', pp. 120–34, at p. 131.

for pursuing their own profit.¹ The kings' butlers were probably the most important individuals in the import trade but, as shall be shown, even they were not above circumventing rules in their role as the largest buyer in English markets, as supervisor of the *prise*, a royal levy of one or two tuns of wine per ship arriving in England, and later other customs duties also.² In Gascony the wine export trade was a more rigidly crown-run affair. The constable of Bordeaux, the chief financial officers of the duchy, second in seniority only to the seneschal, sat above a hierarchy of officials for whom a large proportion of their work was the overseeing of the wine trade. The constable, controllers, their clerks and lieutenants were responsible to their superiors in the exchequer in London and were required to send extensive financial accounts with supporting documentation and customs books back for audit. The post of gauger, responsible for quality control, was one of the few to be assigned to individuals not in direct government employ.³

Despite this there were, during voyages beyond the home ports in England and Gascony, potentially long periods during which there was no official oversight. The only serious intrusion that was made regarded the management of marine protection during periods of pronounced conflict at sea. It is unclear however, despite James's efforts, quite to what degree convoys to and from Gascony were organised directly by government officers. She was quite right when she observed in the Bordeaux customs accounts that an increasingly high number of ships' cargoes were processed by officers on single days.⁴ In some cases convoys could be organised locally such as in 1353, when Edward III instructed the sheriffs to order the wine ships from London bound for Gascony to assemble at the 'Port of Chalcheford' (probably Calshot at the southern end of Southampton water).⁵ This could be more widely applied. In 1384 and 1385 ships from eastern ports en route to buy wine were instructed 'by advice of John de Gedeneye, lieutenant of the constable of Bordeaux' to form up into a fleet at Sandwich then later Isle of Wight.⁶ Admirals of the wine fleet were sometimes centrally appointed to organise and lead convoys, as was done in early 1356, but more usually leadership was prearranged privately.⁷ For example in, in 1415 shipmasters and merchants already in Gascony collectively appointed their own admiral and swore an oath to maintain a convoy until they reached England, though this was also done under the auspices of the constable in Bordeaux.⁸ Such organisation certainly appears to have been growing from the fourteenth to fifteenth centuries. The quantity of stock shipped during the January off-

¹ R.L. Baker, 'The English Customs Service, 1307–1343: A Study of Medieval Administration', *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, New Series*, 51:6 (1961), pp. 3–76.

² For details of the *prise*, see J.J. McCusker, Jr, 'The Wine Prise and Mediaeval Mercantile Shipping', *Speculum*, 41:2 (1966), pp. 279–96, at p. 279; *The King's Customs*, (eds.) Atton, Holland, 1, pp. 8–12, 14.

³ TNA, SC 8/161/8029; *AHG*, XVI, pp. 166–9; *GSR*, C 61/117: 27; C 61/91: 105–6; C 61/107: 93; C 61/111: 71; C 61/112: 82. For more information on fifteenth century ducal appointments, see F. Bériac, 'Les officiers et l'administration dans le duché d'Aquitaine (c. 1430–1451)', *Cadres de vie et sociétés dans le Midi médiéval. Mélanges en l'honneur de Charles Higounet* (Toulouse, 1990), pp. 337–48.

⁴ James, *Studies*, p. 125; for James' sub-chapter on wine fleets, see *ibid.*, pp. 124–33.

⁵ 'Folio xi: Aug 1353', in *Calendar of Letter-Books of the City of London: G, 1352–1374*, (ed.) Sharpe, pp. 13–25, *BHO*; for the identification of Chalcheford, see W. Cunningham, *The Growth of English Industry and Commerce: During the Early and Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 1890), p. 304.

⁶ *CCR*, 1381–1385, pp. 480–1; *CCR*, 1385–1389, pp. 12–3.

⁷ On 2 February 1356 one Robert de Ledrede was named admiral of the fleet, TNA, C 61/68, m. 2.

⁸ E.M. Carus-Wilson, *Medieval Merchant Venturers* (London 1954, repr. 1967), p. 35.

season fell from 17.9% to 4.1%, or from April through September from 5% to 1.3%.¹ For the cathedral chapter of Saint-André in Bordeaux the median number of days on which their wine was shipped per vintage dropped from 10.5 to 7.5.

Convoys did not necessarily entail day-to-day governmental control over trade. There was still room for various illegal activities to flourish or mercantile disputes to develop whether in port or en route. The fact that these could occur across multiple jurisdictions, or none at all, led to long made suppositions regarding to the existence of *Lex Mercatoria*, ‘law merchant’, a set of agreed international rules expressly for the rapid resolution of trade disputes.² Emily Kadens recently challenged the view of commercial scholars which described a sophisticated and universal commercial law with its own formal courts. Instead in her opinion ‘law merchant’ largely consisted of the occasional tolerance of maritime customary law, or the laws of other jurisdictions of the foreign merchants involved.³ In the matter of the wine trade, the main body of customary rules which operated were the so-called ‘Sea Laws of Oléron’, by which admirals of wine fleets were empowered to adjudicate over disputes.⁴ This twenty-four clause document dated from the late-thirteenth century and was probably originally derived from court decisions made in Bordeaux, but proliferated over the subsequent two centuries, and expressed various conventions regarding business on the sea-route concerned in this study.⁵ It sought an equitable relationship between shipmasters and ship-owners, merchants and mariners, both at sea and in port, and provides precious details of the ideal responses of a merchant venture to various regular occurrences, such as the hiring of crew, disagreements over authority or loss of cargo. It was undoubtedly international. The document itself suggests that it would apply in all waters from Flanders to Bordeaux, while it is probable it also applied in Iberia. There is little encoded that required interactions with any authority in particular, or that contradicted English or Anglo-Gascon jurisdictions. The Sea Laws remained remarkably unchanged and accepted, so it was largely political intervention on shore, rather than the regulation of ongoing enterprises, that shaped the wine trade. This came fundamentally through conventional avenues of power: king, council, and parliament; and, as such, was vulnerable to sharp changes in policy brought about by shifting influences over government or by economic expediency. This chapter charts what policies the crown pursued which might organise or otherwise impact the market, and explains their context.

¹ Based on 2,933 consignments of wine shipped by ecclesiastical and burgess exporters, split between 1348–86, and 1402–49; see Appendices 4.1.5 and 4.3.2.

² See H. Berman, *Law and Revolution. The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition* (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 333–56.

³ E. Kadens, ‘The Medieval Law Merchant: The Tyranny of a Construct,’ *Journal of Legal Analysis*, 7:2 (2015), pp. 251–89, at p. 278.

⁴ *English Historical Documents: Volume 3: 1189–1327*, (eds.) D.C. Douglas, H. Rothwell (London, 1953, repr. 1975), pp. 1005–10. Admirals of the wine fleet could be appointed with full powers to dispense justice under ‘maritime law’, for example, see TNA, C 61/68, m. 2.

⁵ Oléron is a large island off the Atlantic coast, near La Rochelle, past which all wine ships would have to pass.

2.1 Regulating market access

2.1.1 English ascendancy and the Bordeaux wine staple, c.1302–99

An important dynamic in the commercial politics surrounding the wine trade across the fourteenth century was the relative dominance of Gascon or English merchants. The energetic competition between these two groups in the international trade between duchy and kingdom was to trigger critical regulatory legislation from the mid-century onwards.

Gascon traders in England enjoyed from the crown, as Margery James put it, ‘favour which manifested itself in the bestowal of exceptional privileges’. Through these the king acted as the protector of their interests in the wine trade, ensuring that by 1300, ‘the Gascon merchant vintner enjoyed a virtual monopoly of the market’.¹ Because they were then so dominant in both export and import, the trade was in effect regulated for half a century under the rules codified within the 1302 charter granted by Edward I *de libertatibus concessis mercatoribus vinetariis de ducatu Aquitaniae* and the *Carta Mercatoria* of 1303.² The first guaranteed Anglo-Gascon merchants’ freedom to ship wine into England, to sell it anywhere, and the right of residency with their goods. The king also underwrote any commercial contracts made, and guaranteed that any disputes over debts or otherwise would be addressed speedily. In all criminal cases, apart from capital crimes, merchants were tried by a jury, half of whom were to be Gascons. Gascons were also exempted from the *prise*. In exchange for these rights they were to pay the new custom, a duty of 2s sterling per tun, though there was also a guarantee that no further taxes would be added. Critically, the charter also included a clause which forbade the re-export of Gascon wine from England without royal licence, showing that the crown even then expected the kingdom to be the primary market. The subsequent 1303 charter, the more famous *Carta Mercatoria*, extended many of the same rights to other foreign merchants trading in other goods.³

Despite such protections the Gascons thereafter lost their supremacy in the international wine trade. The proportion of stock they handled fell considerably, from over three quarters at the beginning of the century to only around a third a generation later, a shift which Sargeant, James, and Lloyd all observed.⁴ Their market share was capably absorbed by English merchants and shipping, who then for most of the first half of the fifteenth-century had practically no significant competition. Renouard suggested that at that time about three-quarters of vessels shipping out of

¹ James, *Studies*, pp. 70–1.

² ‘De Libertatibus Concessis Mercatoribus vinetariis de Ducatu Aquitaniae’, in *The Red Book of the Exchequer*, (ed.) H. Hall (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 1060–4; *Munimenta Gildhallae Londoniensis: Liber Custumarum*, Rolls Series, 12:2, (ed.) H.T. Riley (1860), pp. 205–11; *GSR*, C 61/108: 26.

³ The *Carta Mercatoria* was revoked in 1311 under pressure from English interests in London and the *Cinque* ports, but was then reinstated in 1322, see Sargeant, ‘The Wine Trade with Gascony’, pp. 270–6.

⁴ James, *Studies*, pp. 70–84, 160–95; Sargeant, ‘The Wine Trade with Gascony’, pp. 257–311, at pp. 299–301; T.H. Lloyd, *Alien Merchants in England in the High Middle Ages* (Brighton, 1982), pp. 84–96; also see A. Beardwood, *Alien Merchants in England 1350–1377: Their Legal and Economic position* (Cambridge, 1931).

Bordeaux was owned and manned by the English.¹ These estimates of the proportions of shipping can be easily confirmed by a simple survey of the origins of the ships recorded in the Bordeaux customs books for any given year. For example, of the 153 ships that left the city's harbour carrying wine between April 1355 and March 1356, 90 ships came from England or Wales, about 60% of the total. Their closest competitors were the 11% of vessels that still came from Gascon ports and around the same from Brittany.² Just under half a century later, and the customs book covering the period between November 1402 and April 1403 recorded that 174 vessels from England or Wales left with wine, by then 78% of the 223 exporting ships. A share of 6.9% was still Breton, though this was matched by ships from the Channel Islands. Gascon shipping had become negligible.³ Their merchants could continue to freight with English or other foreign ships.⁴ Yet where available the official records do confirm the decline in their market share in England, and by the period 1438–40, just 3.7% of all wine imported into the kingdom was in the custody of Gascons.⁵

The precise reasons for such a pronounced decline in their direct involvement in overseas commerce are unclear. James explained it entirely in terms of 'the rise of native [English] competition, expressed in a host of vexatious and restrictive practices, [which] thus proved stronger in the end than the guarantees of 1302'. She portrayed a narrative of constant attacks on Gascon businesses in England and a gradual erosion of privileges they possessed from the crown. This is exemplified by the fact that, from 1327, freedom from the royal *prise* was extended to all London merchants thus depriving aliens of their major tax advantage in the biggest market whilst still having to pay the new custom.⁶ English commercial aggression was certainly significant, but their ascendancy was helped greatly by a further two factors. Firstly, shipping from the southern city of Bayonne was probably hindered by the partial silting up of the Adour River, which had begun as early as 1313.⁷ This made the passage from the ocean to the city's port and ship-building facilities progressively more difficult. The negative impact of such topographical shifts is well understood for other maritime centres.⁸ Secondly, the outbreak of war with France in 1337, and the closeness

¹ *Bordeaux sous les rois d'Angleterre*, pp. 547–8, 552–9; also see: Vale, *English Gascony*, p. 19.

² TNA, E 101/173/4, fos 1r–38r.

³ TNA, E 101/185/11, fos 1r–61r.

⁴ When importing into England in the 1350s and 1360s the Bordeaux merchant Raymond deu Casse transported just 37.5% of his stock in Gascon holds whereas 60.2% was carried in English holds and just 2.3% using a Breton carrier: TNA, E 101/80/3, mm. 1–2; E 101/80/6, m. 1; E 101/80/9, mm. 1–3; E 101/80/11, mm. 1–3; E 101/80/12, mm. 1–2; E 101/80/15, mm. 1, 3; E 101/80/16, m. 2; E 101/80/17, m. 1; E 101/81/8, m. 8

⁵ Only 528¼ of the 14,231 tuns of wine imported between September 1438 and September 1440 were stated as in the possession of Gascons in the records of the new custom, TNA, E 101/81/16 (compare with totals from James, *Studies*, p. 58). This was a 16.5% share of all foreigners' imports.

⁶ James, *Studies*, p. 83.

⁷ J.B. Bailac, *Nouvelle chronique de la ville de bayonne, par un Bayonnais*, I (Bayonne, 1827), p. 58.

Bayonne was the second largest city in the duchy and a significant hub of ship-building and ownership from whence came most Gascon shipping, see Labarge, *Gascony*, p. 10; also see S. Rose, 'Bayonne and the King's Ships, 1204–1420', *The Marine's Mirror: The International Quarterly Journal of The Society for Nautical Research*, 86:2 (May 2000), pp. 140–7.

⁸ For example, see G. Draper, P. Draper, F. Meddens, P. Armitage, G. Egan, *The Sea and the Marsh: The Medieval Cinque Port of New Romney Revealed Through Archaeological Excavations and Historical*

of conflict in the 1340s, had a knock-on effect on Gascon involvement overseas. The sudden decline in the volume of the wine export trade, 77.6% in the first year of the war, eroded the very basis for the investment in and accumulation of capital in ship-building, ship-owning and mercantile enterprises in the duchy.¹ By contrast the English economy barely suffered any of the direct damage from warfare, lost infrastructure or displaced labour, which impacted the continent. This left the remaining trade acutely vulnerable to takeover by English investors, within still relatively prosperous mercantile communities, whom could still pool sufficient capital to build and maintain ships and sustain buoyant business interests.

Such was the direction of market participation in the mid-fourteenth century as substantial changes in English crown policy towards the wine trade took place. These arrived with the wave of post-Black Death (1348–9) economic legislation which aimed to stabilise volatile prices and wages.² The 1351 Statutes of Labourers and Provisors were the most prominent of these, and probably the most widely discussed.³ James instead highlighted a statute of the same year which opened up trade in the kingdom to all Englishmen and foreign merchants, supposedly creating an even playing field in which rising wine prices would be curtailed by ‘healthy competition between wholesalers’, as she put it.⁴ This resurrected a law from 1335, and abolished any subsequent rules that curtailed commercial access ‘wherever this may be, whether it is a borough, vill, sea port, fair, market or other place in the same realm’.⁵ It really was rather a moot point to enhance competition by fixing equality of market access for English and Gascon merchants at a point when the former were already out-competing the latter. This was why, as James observed, ‘these measures were clearly ineffective’.⁶ In reality the 1351 reforms should not be construed as liberating the free market as we would understand this today, for one the very next clause discussed at that year’s parliament dealt with ‘forestalling’, a crime that would be probably now considered normal market behaviour. It meant to literally buy ‘before the stall’, to intercept and buy up goods cheaply from producers or from other traders, anticipating higher prices, and then sell them at a greater profit.⁷ Such hated speculative behaviour was explicitly blamed for raising prices in the English import trade.

Largely overlooked by previous studies, with the exception of the work of Frank Sargeant, were those policies codified in an English statute formulated at the great council of September 1353. These established trade rules which would remain in force largely unchanged for the

Research, Pre-Construct Archaeology Monographs 10 (London, 2009); S. Rose, ‘The Value of the Cinque Ports to the Crown 1200–1500’, in *Roles of the Sea in Medieval England*, (ed.) R. Gorski (Woodbridge, 2012), pp. 41–58, at p. 55.

¹ Exports suddenly declined from 74,053 tuns in 1335–6 to just 16,577 tuns in 1336–7, see Appendix 3.1. For the discussion of this fall with reference to *Haut-Pays* trade, see Chapter 3.4.3.

² J. Hatcher, ‘England in the Aftermath of the Black Death’, *Past & Present*, 144 (1994), pp. 3–35 at pp. 10–11; S.L. Waugh, *England in the Reign of Edward III* (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 109–13.

³ ‘Edward III: February 1351’, items 46–7, *PROME, BHO*.

⁴ James, *Studies*, p. 21.

⁵ ‘Edward III: February 1351’, item 43, *PROME, BHO*.

⁶ James, *Studies*, p. 21.

⁷ For more on contemporary conceptions of ‘forestalling’, see D. Wood, *Medieval Economic Thought* (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 138–43.

subsequent 92 years, and have profound consequences.¹ The precise reasons for the timing of its enactment are unclear, no petitions relating to it survive. Again it was a year of new economic legislation coming as it did in the same year as the establishment of the wool staple.² Previous charters largely regulated Gascon, and other foreign wine merchants in England, whereas the 1353 statute mainly dealt with the English in Gascony. The aforementioned dramatic shift towards participation in the trade by English merchants probably made it prudent to table further rules to govern their behaviour in the market.

The feature of the statute considered most important by Sargeant was the inclusion of a clause that again expressly prohibited ‘forestalling’, and furthermore ‘engrossing’ wine, this time in Gascony.³ To ‘engross’ was simply to purchase goods in bulk and hold them to drive up the price to extract a monopoly rent.⁴ These clauses mirrored stronger rules established by the ordinance of the staple aimed at preventing the speculation in wine as it was imported into England.⁵ Yet the new wine statute also barred English merchants and their agents from establishing a permanent presence in Gascony, or from travelling out before the ‘common passage’ of the wine fleets. This restricted them to trading within two official trading periods, the first when the new vintage was sold in the autumn or winter and the second sale of the so-called ‘reek’ wines in the spring.⁶ Thus this was, in effect, a ban on forward contracts. There were also, by this time, deep-rooted communities of English merchants in Bordeaux, as Sandrine Lavaud has demonstrated, so it would not be surprising if competing interests in the duchy had encouraged such restrictions.⁷ For, as Sargeant observed, this had the effect of handing the internal trade in Gascony to Anglo-Gascon merchants themselves, particularly those of Bordeaux.⁸

The key part of the clause also restricted English merchants to operating in, and exporting out of, only Bordeaux and Bayonne. This was to be enforced by the seneschal and constable in the *Château de l’Ombrière*, with the threat of confiscation and imprisonment. Since the city of Bayonne and its surrounding area had only a minor involvement in wine production directly, with just a 1.24% share of the export market at the trade’s height in 1306–7, this effectively set Bordeaux as the staple port for wine exports in 1353.⁹ It was to be the same as was reported by John [I] Paston over a century later in a memorandum to the Sheriff of Norfolk, ‘like as Caley is a stapill of wolle here in England, so is that [Burdews] made stapill of wyne’.¹⁰

¹ *SR*, 1, p. 331, (27 Edw. III, st.1, c.5–7); *TNA*, C 61/66, m. 16 (no. 17); this is briefly discussed by Sargeant, ‘The Wine Trade with Gascony’, pp. 257–311, at p. 299–301; Margery James barely considered this legislation at all, see James, *Studies*, p. 21.

² ‘Edward III: September 1353’, *PROME*, *BHO*.

³ Sargeant, ‘The Wine Trade with Gascony’, pp. 257–311, at pp. 299–301.

⁴ Wood, *Medieval Economic Thought*, pp. 138–43.

⁵ ‘Edward III: September 1353’, item 15, *PROME*, *BHO*.

⁶ James, *Studies*, pp. 7, 164–5.

⁷ S. Lavaud, ‘Une communauté enracinée: les Anglais a Bordeaux a la fin du moyen age’, *Revue historique de Bordeaux et du département de la Gironde*, 1 (2002), pp. 35–48.

⁸ Sargeant, ‘The Wine Trade with Gascony’, pp. 257–311, at p. 300.

⁹ In 1306–7, just 1,155 tuns of 93,452 tuns exported from Gascony as a whole came from Bayonne, see James, *Studies*, pp. 2–3, 32.

¹⁰ *Paston Letters and Papers of the Fifteenth Century*, 1, (ed.) N. Davis, (Oxford, 1971), p. 106.

A core purpose of the establishment of a staple was fiscal. In other words, it was to ensure efficient collection of customs duties by a ducal administration with only a small number of officials in its employ. This had been the motive for a previous piece of regulation, in force from 1347 to 1349, which had restricted all wine exports to only Bordeaux or Libourne in the Bordelais, and Bayonne to the south, or Cap Breton (nearby on the Landes coast), on penalty of two gold *écus* per tun - the stated purpose for which had been to collect taxes for the war effort.¹ Evidently this restriction had been considered successful enough to be extended and made permanent. Thereafter all merchants and ships bearing barrels of Gascon wine were to be channelled past the *Château de l'Ombrière* to ensure that they paid the principal taxes at export. In the early 1350s, the main customs duty, the *grande coutume*, was fixed at 13s 4d *bordelaise* (then 4s *sterling*) per tun. The *issac*, a transaction tax charged on all wine exchanged within the boundaries of Bordeaux, was added at a rate of at 6s 8d (then 2s 8d *sterling*).² In addition a custom called *killage* (or keelage) was then paid at 10s *bord.* (2s *sterling*) paid per ship using the harbour for the first time, and those vessels newly built or exchanged. *Royan* was a charge of 2½d *bord.* (then ½d *sterling*) per tun levied for the right of passage out of the Gironde estuary.³ These taxes all were levied consistently throughout the last century of Plantagenet rule.

Bordeaux had always tended towards a natural monopoly over wine exports on account of geography, being situated an ideal point on the Garonne near the confluence with the Dordogne. These were the two rivers on which the cumbersome barrels of wine could be transported easily down from the hinterland and the *Haut-Pays*. As well as being a great producer itself in its environs, the city was also a great market for goods, and a source of labour, being by far the most populous urban area of the duchy with a population of, according to Renouard, over 20,000 taxpayers at the beginning of the fifteenth century.⁴ It was not only the centre of Plantagenet power in the region, home to the duchy administration, but was also the principal port for the arrival of English expeditionary forces. These factors made it the ideal port for the export of Gascon wines to foreign markets, a role which reciprocally fed the city's prosperity, attracting goods in exchange and capital from overseas. The act of 1353 made the economic protection of Bordeaux official policy. By forcing producers and merchants to bring their wares to Bordeaux, it increased their transport costs and compelled them to pay the tolls and customs en route, increasing the overall costs of wine from outside the Bordelais and giving a significant competitive advantage to those producers closer to the city.

¹ GSR, C 61/59: 76.

² TNA, E 101/173/4, fos 128v–129r.

³ For example, see TNA, E 101/179/9, fol. 6r.

⁴ *Bordeaux Sous Les Rois D'Angleterre*, pp. 433–43, 452.

Table 2 Wine exports from ports downstream of Bordeaux, excluding Libourne, 1305–37.

Accounting and shipping year	Total exports (tuns)	Share of total exports (%)
1305–1306	8,000	8.18
1306–1307	9,941	10.64
1308–1309*	11,597	11.29
1335–1336	5,058	6.83
1336–1337	3,506	21.15

Source: Calculated by the author from James, *Studies*, pp. 32–3, 55–6.

Note: In 1308–9 (*) 9,126 tuns are known to have been exported from Libourne.

A wine staple by definition excluded other ports from the greater part of the trade. This would of course effect the significant urban centres with access to the sea, such as at Blaye on the northern bank of the Gironde estuary, Bourg or Libourne on the Dordogne, but also any smaller settlements with convenient harbours on either side of the *Entre-Deux-Mers* or northern bank of the *Médoc*. Even if one excludes Libourne, on average over 10% of wine was shipped overseas from such places in the three decades before the Hundred Years' War (Table 2). In 1308–9, the year of record exports historically, the total share of Bordeaux's rivals was 20.2% if we then include Libourne. Furthermore there are indications that, as war began in 1337, in our last comparable data before the late 1340s, these lower ports were increasing greatly in importance. Thus, by the appearance of the 1353 rules, potentially upwards a fifth of Gascon port capacity was shut out of the wine trade, and upwards of a fifth of commerce was moved to Bordeaux.

Libourne in particular was in a position to dispute the increased precedence of the capital. The town had an equal right based on the practicalities of geography to serve as a port of embarkation for the duchy, placed as it was on the lower Dordogne close to the confluence with the Garonne, and with a concentration of wine production nearby. The 1353 statute meant that the wine previously exported directly from Libourne's port had to be transported the 18 miles (29 km) to Bordeaux, as the crow flies, if it was to be sold to and shipped by English merchants. By early 1355 representatives from Libourne, Bergerac and Saint-Émilion had all complained that the *Château de l'Ombrière* had insisted this apply even to non-English merchants and sought remonstrance from the king.¹ The effects are plain to see in the constable's records covering the year 1357–8 during which time some 2,130 tuns produced in vineyards up the river Dordogne were first shipped to the capital before being exported overseas. In comparison, during the same period a mere 83½ tuns left from Libourne. This meant a colossal 96.1% of the region's exports were re-routed.² Even those vineyards closest to the town could have their produce diverted to Bordeaux. In the early fifteenth century large shipments of wine from Fronsac, a castle only just outside Libourne, were being

¹ TNA, C 61/67, m. 12.

² TNA, E 101/173/4, fos 65v–91r, 93v, 94v–128v; totals on fos 128v–129r.

transported to the capital instead of using the nearer port, to be then shipped on to England.¹ By 1436, the town's mayor himself had to ship five tuns of his wine this way, paying the highest level of duty, in order to sell abroad.² It is true that some quantities of wine were also always able to be exported directly from Libourne's port via non-English merchants, with the payment of a special customs charge of 10*s bord.* or later 1 gold *écu* per tun, though its elites would regularly petition for the reductions or exemptions of this tax.³ Relief was granted in 1377, 1387, 1397, 1400, and 1414, with guarantees they would be allowed to load wine as some compensation for the town's misfortunes.⁴ Though those few ships involved were never English, and so limited in number.⁵

The towns of Bourg and Blaye would complain that the trade rules contravened their own ancient privileges and would petition the king to be allowed to export, but with mixed success. Blaye suffered from the exclusion from the trade until November 1416 when Henry V granted the right of export for nobles, burgesses and ecclesiastics, provided that they paid the necessary customs dues at Bordeaux.⁶ In the mid-1370s, the people of Bourg had a petition, protesting the damage that the application of the 1353 statute had caused, discussed in the English Parliament, and by 1377 it was ordered that the mayor, jurats and citizens of the town be given some restitution.⁷ In fact Bourg gained only a temporary exemption on export taxes, as recorded in the accounts of the constable Richard Rotour for that year.⁸ The place of this town in the wine trade remained contentious. In 1408 it was reported to the royal council of Henry IV, by Sir Thomas Swynbourne (c.1357–1412), the constable of Fronsac, and Pons, lord of Castillon, that the people of Bourg had exported their wines via French-occupied La Rochelle to the detriment of Bordeaux. This complaint was then upheld by the council.⁹ These episodes are strong evidence that the ducal authorities took the enforcement of the Bordeaux wine staple seriously, and that the numerous smaller towns and castles with access to the sea must have suffered similarly without exemptions to the monopoly.

By contrast, the 1353 statute brought about a major improvement in Bordeaux's fortunes as a market for wine. The quantity of wine exported that had paid the transaction tax, the *issac*, increased significantly in subsequent years, both in real terms and as proportion of the export market.¹⁰ This tax was paid on wine bought or sold within the boundaries of Bordeaux itself, usually traded by the Bordelais themselves rather than bought elsewhere and then conveyed to the port to be shipped. The new rules encouraged wine to be brought to Bordeaux to be sold, for

¹ TNA, E 101/185/11, fos 36v, 45r.

² TNA, E 101/192/1, fol. 60v.

³ The people of Bourg complained that, 'the constable of Bordeaux has recently proclaimed that no ships or merchants may load wines into ships except at Bordeaux and Bayonne, to their great damage and manifest disinherittance, such that they can barely live or sustain their poor estate', TNA, SC 8/227/11339; *GSR*, C 61/90: 15–16; C 61/120: 39.

⁴ *AHG*, XVI, pp. 61–3.

⁵ TNA, E 101/602/3, fol. 48r; E 101/180/2, fol. 43r.

⁶ *GSR*, C 61/117: 41–42.

⁷ TNA, SC 8/290/14462; *GSR*, C 61/90: 17; *AHG*, XVI, pp. 60–1.

⁸ TNA, E 101/180/9, fol. 26v.

⁹ *PPC*, 3, pp. 46–8 (this is incorrectly dated 1423).

¹⁰ See Appendix 3.3 for *issac* payment statistics.

example, in 1357–8, 43.1% of wine that had been transported down the Dordogne, and diverted to Bordeaux, appear in the customs books as having been legally sold in the capital.¹ Through such additions the market in Bordeaux grew exponentially. The wine exchanged which went on to be exported grew in value from 50,296*l* 6*s* *bord.* (£13,066 6*s* 8*d* sterling) in 1355–6 to 105,515*l* 16*s* 8*d* *bord.* (£21,103 3*s* 4*d* sterling) by 1357–8, a nominal increase of about 110%. By 1372–3 this market's value had grown further to 191,791*l* 10*s* *bord.* (£38,358 6*s* sterling), a whole 61.35% of all exports. The size of this market would vary considerably over the following decades, suffering one particularly low point in 1373–4, probably the result of a devastating plague and famine in the city.² Nevertheless, as shall be shown, it would offer the wealthier residents of Bordeaux great opportunities for profitable speculative trading for most of the remainder of Plantagenet rule.³

Meanwhile, the restrictions on English merchants within the statute of 1353 were not the only trade barrier protecting the Bordelais from the *Haut-Pays*. Exactions on trade were made everywhere, their multiplicity was a critical feature of the market. Almost every town, castle or fortified position on the Garonne and Dordogne, such as Rions on the former or Vayres on the latter respectively, would charge local customs dues and tolls on wine travelling downstream.⁴ These rights were ruthlessly exploited by those in control of them, be they local lord or *routier*. Charles Higounet showed that already by 1326 some 48 tolls were exacted on the Garonne between Toulouse and Bordeaux.⁵ Jean Favier later noted that all such charges represented 'both a customary tax and a form of extortion'.⁶ Even the commune of Bordeaux itself extracted its own tolls on commerce with both its hinterland and beyond, to this was added a 2*s* *tour.* per tun charge first granted by the crown in 1343, then from 1348–61, from 1373 onward.⁷ Such revenues, when situated in Anglo-Gascon territory, were assigned by the crown and formed part of its powers of patronage. This will be discussed in greater detail below.⁸

After the collapse of the principality of Aquitaine in November 1372, new official exactions were also introduced on barrels of wine arriving from French-held territory, newly defined as the *Pays-Rebelles*. A levy, or tithe, of a tenth of all wine was taken at Saint-Macaire or Cadillac, of wine produced in enemy lands on route down the Gironde to be exported through Bordeaux. Royal officials would then sell this wine themselves on the open market, the proceeds to be added to ducal finances. The same tax was also imposed at Libourne a few years later on all barrels shipped down the Dordogne.⁹ These tithes thereafter acted as a 10% tariff on imports of wine into the duchy and provided further economic protection for the wine producers of the

¹ TNA, E 101/173/4, fol. 129r.

² *Bordeaux Sous Les Rois D'Angleterre*, p. 409.

³ See Chapters 2.3.2 and 3.4.1.

⁴ For details of the tolls at Rions and Vayres, see *AHG*, XXIII, pp. 438–42.

⁵ C. Higounet, 'Géographie des péages de la Garonne et de ses affluents au Moyen Âge', in *Villes, Sociétés et Économies médiévales*, (ed.) C. Higounet (Bordeaux, 1992), pp. 421–44, at 443–4.

⁶ J. Favier, *Gold and Spices: The Rise of Commerce in the Middle Ages*, (trns.) C. Higgitt (London, 1998), p. 14.

⁷ Sargeant, 'The Wine Trade with Gascony', p. 285.

⁸ See Chapter 2.2.

⁹ TNA, E 101/179/9, fol. 6v; E 101/180/9, fos 7, 26; *GSR*, C 61/96: 33–34; C 61/107: 39, 87; C 61/109: 178–179; C 61/113: 153–154.

Bordelais. This was in effect increased by the French counter-tariff that followed in 1406. This imposed their own 10% tithes on all wine passing the frontier into the duchy and English merchandise exported into the *Haut-Pays*. It was levied at La Réole on the orders of Jean, duke of Berry (1340–1416) ostensibly to fund defence, but also expressly in retaliation for English trade barriers and the damage this had caused the town.¹ These combined to produce a prohibitive 19% tariff on any trade across the frontier.

In short, the aggregate burden of taxes and tolls increased considerably the further away from Bordeaux wine came. There are occasional references to the smuggling that inevitably resulted. For example, in 1411 a Bordeaux burgess was pardoned for exporting wine from Bordeaux avoiding customs thirty-two years previous, having twice been imprisoned for the crime.² Such acts were prevalent enough to warrant direct intervention by the crown. In an undated fifteenth century letter to the ducal council in Gascony, the king lambasted lax customs officers for permitting evasion of the custom duties at Bordeaux, and threatened confiscation for the wrongdoers.³

It cannot be claimed that the 1353 legislation, which began this accumulation of economic protections for the Bordelais, was necessary laid out for one single overall purpose. Concerns over efficiency of tax collection, and rising wine prices were clearly important motives.⁴ In terms of commercial politics, Sergeant plainly saw the legislation of the early 1350s as ‘a transfer of the balance of privilege’ from the English to the Gascons.⁵ This is not quite right. The crown had had to recognise the growing position of English merchants, and envisaged a trade system structured such that this group predominantly handled the carrying of wine back to the kingdom, but that Gascon merchants retain their commercial position in the duchy, particularly those of Bordeaux. This could provide some subtle balance between the interests of the King’s English and Anglo-Gascon subjects, the nexus set at the dockside in Bordeaux.

Yet with English capital increasingly dominant in the international wine market, it is unsurprising that matters pertaining to trade with Gascony, argued from an increasingly English perspective, should then appear for discussion before the king, council and parliament. Although English mercantile communities, whose appeals would dominate, were once said to constitute many people holding a ‘diversity of opinions’, when united, they could wield significant political influence.⁶ They had the advantage over their competitors of being allowed to enter both local politics as aldermen or even becoming urban members of parliament and lobbying directly.⁷ This had clearly solidified by the 1360s as the crown began explicitly to favour English merchants over Gascons in international trade and domestic markets in England. It is likely that events following the Treaty of Brétigny (1360) had some bearing on this because there were efforts to treat the new

¹ *AHG*, I, p. 310.

² *GSR*, C 61/113: 68.

³ *AHG*, XVI, pp. 264–5.

⁴ For more on wine prices, see Chapter 2.3.

⁵ Sergeant, ‘The Wine Trade with Gascony’, p. 299.

⁶ *SR*, I, p. 384 (38, Edw. III, st.1, c.10).

⁷ R. Holt, G. Rosser, *The Medieval Town in England 1200–1540* (Abingdon, 1990), p. 149.

sovereign entity controlling Gascony, Edward, the Black Prince's principality of Aquitaine (1362–72), as separate.¹ This shift in political status coincided with the rise of the principal English merchant organisation with a vested interest in the trade, the 'men of the mystery of the vintry' in London, later to be known as the Worshipful Company of Vintners. This guild of great wine traders 'of expert knowledge' as Margery James described them, for whom Gascons were both suppliers and competitors, gained their royal charter in 1363.² They were immediately permitted considerable political and regulatory influence, not least the right to consult on rules governing wine sales in England and the setting of the assize retail price in London. Since the city was the largest market for Gascon wine overall, this then meant this one group of merchants could influence the setting of an overall guide price and therefore the actual profitability of the export trade from Gascony.

The vintners' charter guaranteed their dominance over domestic sales by banning Gascons from the profitable English retail trade in which they had been involved for over a century.³ Foreigners were instead limited to dealing wholesale with English merchants or directly supplying royal and noble households.⁴ A statute arising out of the parliament of October 1363 also required that English merchants be restricted to one form of merchandise only, again part of further efforts to constrain social change in post-Black Death England.⁵ This limited the international and domestic wine trade to specialised vintners, with a further explicit aim of instituting an oligopsony for these merchants, to restrict the number of merchants active in Gascony and so lower export prices through their increased buying power.⁶ The legislation only had a limited success, perhaps it was insufficient to counteract any upward pressures on Gascon prices, or if it did any economic advantage was appropriated by the vintners as increased profits. Under pressure from the broader English merchant community the regulation was soon discarded, non-vintners returned to the trade within eighteen months and this was officially endorsed at the parliament of 1365.⁷ Gascon merchants were later also allowed to return to the retail trade, although this did not include the kingdom's taverns.⁸

It was reported in England that prices remained high through to the later 1360s, a fact that is usually attributed, by scholars such as Sargeant, to strong domestic demand in Gascony, perhaps

¹ R. Barber, *Edward, Prince of Wales and Aquitaine: a biography of the Black Prince* (London, 1978), p. 171; Labarge, *Gascony*, p. 149.

² *CPR*, 1364–1367, pp. 6–7; *CCR*, 1364–1368, p. 74; for a full history of the Vintners' company, see A. Crawford, *A History of the Vintners' Company* (London, 1977); for Margery James' perspective, see James, 'The medieval wine dealer', pp. 45–53, at pp. 46–7; *ibid.*, *Studies*, pp. 161–2.

³ *CCR*, 1364–1368, p. 76. The London vintners could sell their wares to 'tied taverns' ensuring regular and reliable retail sales, S.L. Thrupp, *The Merchant Class of Medieval London* (Michigan, 1948, repr. 1962), p. 7.

⁴ *CCR*, 1364–1368, p. 76; 'Folio cxxxix b: Dec 1364', in *Calendar of Letter-Books of the City of London: G, 1352–1374*, (ed.) R.R. Sharpe (London, 1905), pp. 169–78, *BHO*.

⁵ 'Edward III: October 1363', item 23, *PROME, BHO*; *CCR*, 1364–1368, pp. 75–76; *SR*, 1, pp. 379 (37 Edw. III, c.5), 380–382 (37 Edw. III, c.8–14); also see C. Dyer, *Making a Living in the Middle Ages: the People of Britain 850–1520* (Yale, 2002), pp. 283–4.

⁶ It was stated in the regulation that 'because of the great multitude of people of divers trades who come thither, [Gascons] put the wines at a higher price', *CPR*, 1364–1367, p. 6.

⁷ 'Edward III: January 1365', item 28, *PROME, BHO*; *SR*, 1, p. 384, (38 Edw. III, st.1, c.11).

⁸ Sargeant, 'The Wine Trade with Gascony', pp. 257–311, at pp. 307–8.

at the flamboyant courts of the Black Prince.¹ The Bordeaux *grande coutume* had also increased during this time to 20s *bord.* per tun, and an equivalent rise in the *issac*, in order to raise funds for the prince, contributed also.² High prices provoked new radical rules brought in after the English parliament of May 1368. The most dramatic change was that henceforth all English merchants were banned from purchasing wine in Gascony. At first this appears to be a surprising reversal in policy, but the stated intention was actually to transfer the burden of shipping costs onto Gascon merchants, who would pay to transport the wine, but were still barred from retail.³ Some initial reports at the time suggested this had a beneficial effect on prices, but it is nevertheless clear that the results of this regulation for the wine trade and Plantagenet Gascony more broadly were disastrous.⁴ Export levels suffered only a moderate fall in the year Michaelmas (29 September) 1368 perhaps because the act was slow to take effect or because merchants initially defied or avoided the ban, but the following year, as war with France resumed, wine exports from Bordeaux collapsed.⁵ The long-standing decline in the handling of overseas trade by Gascons could not be turned around immediately and they could never have hoped to supply England's demand themselves. There were anxious petitions for this regulation's speedy repeal amidst accounts of wine remaining unsold in Bordeaux.⁶ It was reported to the English parliament in June 1369, probably by the Gascons themselves, that because of the legislation of the previous year 'great misfortunes and damages have come to the inhabitants of Gascony, who for the most part live off this trade [in wine]'.⁷ In addition, the Black Prince himself conveyed that the legislation had harmed his principality's wine exports and consequently the customs revenues he could generate.⁸ His claims appear to be corroborated by the prince's accounts which show a 48.8% fall in his revenues from the wine trade during the years in 1369–70 compared with average annual takings during 1363–7, though it is possible one cause of this was the reversion of the *grande coutume* to the earlier rate of 13s 4d *bord.* per tun in 1368–9.⁹ The Prince's position was calculated to shore up support for his cause among the Bordelais, who would benefit greatly, at a time when numerous Gascons elsewhere were defecting to the French king.¹⁰ Opponents of Edward's stature meant the total prohibition of English merchants was soon phased out, though significantly one clause remained that prevented traders dealing in fewer than 100 tuns from Gascony, again passing a high

¹ *CPR*, 1364–1367, p. 6; Sargeant, 'The Wine Trade with Gascony', pp. 257–311, at p. 306. See Chapter 2.3 for a full discussion regarding wine prices.

² *Livre des bouillons*, pp. 147–8.

³ 'Edward III: May 1368', item 17, *PROME, BHO*; *SR*, 1, p. 389, (42 Edw. III, c.8).

⁴ 'Edward III: June 1369', item 23, *PROME, BHO*.

⁵ Exports fell from 28,264 tuns in 1368–9 to 8,945 tuns in 1369–70; see Appendix 3.1.

⁶ *SR*, 1, p. 391 (43 Edw. III, c.2); also see Sargeant, 'The Wine Trade with Gascony', pp. 257–311, at pp. 309–10; Lodge, *Gascony under English Rule*, p. 173.

⁷ 'Edward III: June 1369', item 23, *PROME, BHO*.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 23; *SR*, 1, p. 391 (43 Edw. III, c.2).

⁹ *Livre des bouillons*, pp. 147–8; customs returns calculated from *Collection générale des documents français qui se trouvent en Angleterre* [hereafter *CGD*], 1, (ed.) J. Delpit (Paris, 1847), pp. 134–7 (no. CCXXIII). Revenues averaged £5,848 13s 4d sterling per year during 1363–7, but £2,996 12s 2d sterling per year in 1369–70.

¹⁰ *Les Grandes chroniques de France: chronique des règnes de Jean II et de Charles V*, 12, (ed.) R. Delachenal (Paris, 1916), pp. 109–111; also see Barber, *Edward, Prince of Wales and Aquitaine*, pp. 181, 185–6, 206–11.

market share to only the wealthiest London vintners. Petitions from the wider mercantile community in 1372 complaining that ‘this practice is to the great increase of the price of the said merchandise [wine], and to the damage and loss of ships and of all the realm’, were ignored.¹

Wider English policy was revealed by the response to an extensive petition submitted by the Bordeaux *jurats* and burgesses in 1373 that comprised sixteen requests of which only around half were upheld. Those that affected the wine trade in Gascony itself, concerning their advantages in the region and the raising of funds for the city, were upheld. It was also granted that a monopoly over the right to ‘make and receive contracts and charters for ships loading in the city’ held by a notary called William de Welcombe, be broken up. Yet those impacting trade with England which would allow Gascon merchants to compete with the English, such as a request for exemption from the combined ancient and new custom, were denied.² The government’s ambiguous position was sustainable simply because, by the reign of Richard II (r.1377–99), England was such a dominant market for Gascon wine. This was a position actually enforced by clauses within the charters of 1302–3 that barred the re-export of wine from England without special licence. This restriction was then extended to English merchants in 1353 and further re-enforced by a later statute enacted after the Merciless Parliament of 1388.³ A proclamation of 1356 actually forbade the transportation of ‘wines of Gascony to any other country than England’, though it is unclear how long this remained in force and to what effect.⁴ Sargeant perceived there was a consistent ‘policy’ which underlay such regulations, aimed to prevent wine being sold into Flanders.⁵ War was to have a large effect also, as this periodically closed off access to alternative trading partners in enemy territory. Attempts by merchants to trade with the enemy, or through their ports, were curtailed, as experienced later by Bourg.⁶

The balance also required that the English remain largely dependent on Gascony for their supply. There were some limited competitors. The white wines of Poitou, commonly exported via the port at La Rochelle, had been popular with the English since the Angevin empire.⁷ Demand for this product was evidently still high, for while this supply officially closed periodically to England due to the conflict, the French, Bretons and Flemish continued their own parallel trade in Poitou wine around north-west Europe.⁸ Then, whenever possible, such as when the English controlled the region (1360–72) or during short periods of truce, English merchants visited La Rochelle and bought wine.⁹ Further competitors of Gascony were the two major kingdoms of the Iberian

¹ ‘Edward III: February 1371’, item 30, *PROME, BHO*; ‘Edward III: November 1372’, items 20, 48, *PROME, BHO*.

² TNA, SC 8/229/11407; *GSR*, C 61/86: 30–2, 40–1, 45–6.

³ *Munimenta Gildhallae Londoniensis*, 12:2, (ed.) Riley, pp. 205–11; *GSR*, C 61/108: 26; ‘Folio iii: Sept 1352’, in *Calendar of Letter-Books of the City of London: G, 1352–1374*, (ed.) R.R Sharpe (London, 1905), pp. 1–13, *BHO*; *SR*, 2, p. 53 (11. Ric. II. c.7).

⁴ ‘Folio xli b - 13 March 1355–6’, in *Calendar of Letter-Books of the City of London: G, 1352–1374*, (ed.) Sharpe, pp. 51–67, *British History Online*.

⁵ Sargeant, ‘The Wine Trade with Gascony’, pp. 257–311, at p. 303.

⁶ *PPC*, 3, pp. 46–8.

⁷ Rose, *The Wine Trade*, pp. 46, 62.

⁸ J. Craeybeckx, *Les vins de France aux anciens Pays-Bas* (Paris, 1958), pp. 81–123.

⁹ TNA, C 61/74, mm. 1–4; C 61/101, m. 13, C 61/103, m. 6.

Peninsula on the Atlantic seaboard, Castile and Portugal. Both produced and exported wine in significant quantities. As Wendy Childs has shown, Castile had supplied a small but noteworthy portion of England's wine market at the beginning of the fourteenth century, and upwards of third of all wine handled by foreign merchants in the early 1350s, but this trade was unreliable.¹ The 1360s did see another substantial Spanish advance into English markets, both carrying their own wines and engaging their ships and capital in the Gascon trade, but these commercial links were hindered by civil war later in the decade, and ceased entirely with ejection of King Pedro and the installation of an ally of the kings of France, Henry of Trastámara, to the throne of Castile and León. Some engagement resumed in the 1390s with the right for Castilian ships and merchants to travel up the river Gironde with their goods conceded by treaty.² Nevertheless, their involvement in English or Anglo-Gascon trade did not reach a significant level again until the 1470s, long after the duchy of Aquitaine had been lost by the Plantagenets.³

Through the 1386 Treaty of Windsor, the second treaty of alliance with Portugal, England expressly allowed the Portuguese freedom to travel, reside and trade in not only England but Gascony also.⁴ There is little evidence of the Portuguese establishing themselves in Gascony for any length of time, nor displacing English merchant interests, for Portugal, like Castile, did not export sufficient quantities of wine to make any great impact until well into the second half of the fifteenth century.⁵

The dearth of competition for Gascon wine in England was therefore securely established at least for a time. During the years 1428–31, some 46,247 tuns of wine were exported from Bordeaux. Meanwhile 33,770 tuns were imported into England, almost all of which were Gascon.⁶ Thus over 70% of the duchy's exports were absorbed by the English market.

2.1.2 Lancastrian reforms and attacks on Anglo-Gascon interests, 1399–1453

With the Lancastrian succession in 1399 the structure of the market itself passed unchanged to the new incumbents. This was despite a tempestuous political situation not just in England, but in Gascony, where many saw the usurpation as an opportunity to desert their Plantagenet overlords.⁷ Partly as a consequence of this instability, the start of the fifteenth century did usher in some marked changes in the crown's exploitation of the wine trade. Henry IV (r.1399–1413) made greater use of commerce as a vehicle for financial patronage in Gascony than had his predecessors

¹ W.R. Childs, *Anglo-Castilian Trade in the Later Middle Ages* (Manchester, 1978), pp. 126–36.

² *PPC*, 3, p. 47.

³ Childs, *Anglo-Castilian Trade*, pp. 126–36.

⁴ M. Vale, 'The Treaty of Windsor (1386) in a European context', in *The Treaty of Windsor (1386) and 620 Years of Anglo-Portuguese Relations*, 2006, I (2008), p. 7.

⁵ W.R. Childs, *Trade and Shipping in the Medieval West: Portugal, Castile and England: a series of lectures in memoriam for professor Armindo de Sousa*, given in the University of Porto, November 2009 (Porto, 2013), pp. 99–118.

⁶ See Appendices 3.1 and 3.4.

⁷ Vale, *English Gascony*, pp. 27–54. See also Chapter 4.2.

– as shall be discussed below.¹ To ensure that this mechanism was effective, the new king did give the needs of the trade due attention, even at the highest levels of diplomacy. Indeed the terms of the truce of July 1407, made with the duke of Brittany, specified ‘that all his subjects, merchants and others may come in safety by sea and land to the said realm’.² Brittany, of course, lay on the route of the wine ships had to take and so such compliance was important.

Henry also made a show of addressing corruption. The parliament which saw the deposition of Richard in October 1399 also saw the prosecution of his supporters and their perceived criminal behaviour. This included the supposedly fraudulent collusion between the former king’s treasurer John Waltham, bishop of Salisbury, and the king’s butler to manipulate the taking of the wine *prise*. Once a levy to supply the substantial royal household it was often resold at a healthy profit for treasurer and butler. This had damaged English merchants who saw not only their wine effectively confiscated, but then sold in turn in direct competition with their own sales.³ Repeated efforts had been made to curtail this practice through the long reign of Edward III, all of which proved unsuccessful.⁴ Richard II had then extended the levy to 10% of all wine landed across the whole country and this was reported, at the parliament of October 1399, to have led to ‘the great destruction, oppression and ruin of the poor estate of the merchants’.⁵ Importing Gascon merchants, exempt under the *Carta Mercatoria*, had benefited so long as Richard remained in power, but lost out once the *prise* was returned to normal levels after the usurpation.⁶

Henry V (r.1413–22), upon succeeding his father, aimed to develop a close bond with his Gascon subjects, as demonstrated in his affectionate communication with elites within the duchy that survive.⁷ Yet, at the same time, there were also indications that the new dynasty had strong links with the London Vintners. John Stow recounted an anecdote which placed all the sons of Henry IV: the young prince Henry (V), Thomas, duke of Clarence (1388–1421), John, duke of Bedford (1389–1435), and Humphrey, duke of Gloucester (1390–1447), at supper with ‘Marchantes of London in the Vintrey’, sometime before 1407.⁸ Their host was Lewis John (d.1442), a wealthy vintner and financier who, in a textbook example of regulatory capture, was also: deputy butler from 1402 to 1407; collector of customs and subsidies of London from 1404 to 1413; master worker of the Mints in London and Calais from 1413 to 1422; and also later served as

¹ See Chapter 2.2.

² TNA, E 30/366; *CCR*, 1405–1409, pp. 347–8.

³ C.J. Given-Wilson, ‘Purveyance for the Royal Household, 1362–1413’, *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 56:134 (1983), pp. 145–63, at p. 156; also see *The King’s Customs*, (eds.) Atton, Holland, 1, p. 24.

⁴ *SR*, 1, p. 323 (25 Edw. III, st.5, c.21); *SR*, 1, p. 392 (43 Edw. III, c.3).

⁵ ‘Henry IV: October 1399, Part 1’, item 160, *PROME, BHO*.

⁶ *Munimenta Gildhallae Londoniensis*, 12:2, (ed.) Riley, pp. 205–11; James, *Studies*, p. 4.

⁷ *PPC*, 2, (ed.) H. Nicholas (1834), pp. 264–6.

⁸ John Stow, ‘Vintrie warde’, in *A Survey of London*, (ed.) C.L. Kingsford (Oxford, 1908), pp. 238–50, *BHO*. The meeting must have taken place been before 1407 as a new ballad sent by Henry Scogan was read at the event, and the poet died that year, see D. Gray, ‘Scogan, Henry (c.1361–1407)’, *ODNB* <<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-24847>>.

an MP, sheriff and ambassador.¹ Though Stow was writing considerably later, the suggestion of such a meeting between the gathering of prominent vintners and the princes, who were to dominate the political landscape over the subsequent forty years, could not pass without comment. For, as result of such closeness with the Lancastrian regime, English merchants with interests in wine began to interfere more directly in Anglo-Gascon affairs. For example, at the parliament in October 1416, merchants petitioned on behalf of William Clifford, constable of Bordeaux, to request that the ‘town and castle of La Réole’ and its hinterland, recently retaken from the French, be re-enforced.² This town and its environs had been responsible for huge wine production for export to England early in the previous century and the London vintners were clearly keen it would resume this role.³ The king’s response was positive, ordering ‘a remedy for this as soon as it can properly be done’.⁴

One particular antagonism for English merchants was the propensity for the Bordeaux and Bayonne communes to impose municipal taxes that directly impacted their commercial interests. As has been suggested by Lodge, Bordeaux in particular had enjoyed a certain increase in autonomy into the fifteenth century, with greater participation in organising and funding the defence of nearby towns in the Bordelais, her *filles*.⁵ In this regard, in December 1406, the *jurade*, Bordeaux’s executive council, had raised a 1 franc per tun levy to finance military action against the Louis [I] (1392–1407), duke of Orléans, then laying siege to Bourq. An equivalent tax was imposed in October 1415, and the following month a petition from English wine merchants was presented at parliament while the king was still occupied in northern France after the Agincourt campaign.⁶ They demanded to be ‘free and discharged from all kinds of payments and new taxes in the city of Bayonne’ and ‘that no tax should be imposed on English merchants in either the city of Bordeaux or the city of Bayonne’. Of particular grievance was an *ad valorem* 5% import duty on goods arriving in Gascony, a long-standing fiscal institution which had been periodically imposed on non-Gascon merchants for a number of decades.⁷ John, duke of Bedford, and the council, declined to rule on the issue without further details, preferring to defer the matter to his brother, the king.⁸ Henry V stood up for the Anglo-Gascon communes in this case, but during the long reign of his son, Henry VI, such conciliatory attitudes began to be eroded. The import

¹ L.S. Woodger, ‘JOHN, Lewis (d. 1442), of London and West Horndon, Essex’, in *The History of Parliament: the House of Commons 1386–1421*, (eds.) J.S. Roskell, L. Clark, C. Rawcliffe, (Woodbridge, 1993). Lewis also embarked on the 1415 Agincourt expedition but was invalided home after the siege of Harfleur. For a good explanation of regulatory capture, see M.E. Levine, J.L. Forrence, ‘Regulatory capture, public interest, and the public agenda. Toward a synthesis’, *Journal of Law Economics & Organization*, 6 (1990), pp. 167–98.

² ‘Henry V: October 1416’, item 18, *PROME, BHO*.

³ That there was a street in London named ‘Le Ryole’, dating from the early fourteenth century testifies to the importance this town held to the wine trade, ‘Sheriffs’ Court Roll, 1320: Membrane 26’, in *London Sheriffs Court Roll 1320*, (ed.) M. Stevens (London, 2010), pp. 94–7, *BHO*.

⁴ ‘Henry V: October 1416’, item 18, *PROME, BHO*.

⁵ Lodge, *Gascony under English rule*, p. 158. The towns of Blaye, Bourq, Libourne, Saint-Émilion, Castillon, Saint-Macaire, Cadillac and Rions were named *filles* of Bordeaux from at least the 16th century, see Gabriel de Lurbe, *Chronique bourdeloise* (Bordeaux, 1594), fol. 31v.

⁶ *RJ*, I, pp. 141, 151; II, p. 263; ‘Henry V: November 1415’, item 11, in *PROME, BHO*.

⁷ For that from 1376, see TNA, E 101/180/9, fol. 8v.

⁸ *Ibid.*; *GSR*, C 61/112:88.

taxes lasted the attack of English interests only until the parliament of September 1429, where particularly xenophobic feelings towards foreign merchants contributed to their abolition.¹

For, as the English fortunes in the Hundred Years' War deteriorated in the 1430s, the political climate in England was becoming ever more hostile for overseas interests. It was not long until the developing anti-Gascon attitude among the English merchant community became explicit in political discourse. At the parliament of May 1432 an extensive petition by English merchants, submitted via the commons, complained that 'whereas in the past when the wines of Gascony and Guyenne were well and honestly made as they ought to be, they were then clear, fine, good to drink and kept well', now the wines were arriving in an appalling condition for which they entirely blamed Gascon merchants and producers. These were wines being sold by 'those from the same land who know of the said deception, or by other English merchants who have no knowledge of this'.² That petitioners cited poor wine sold to such prestigious customers as 'the king our sovereign lord and to the other lords and gentlemen' indicates that this petition had some very significant support. The solution presented, and agreed to by the king, was greater oversight and control, that letters be sent by privy seal to the seneschal in Gascony ordering that in all centres of wine production and trade in the duchy experts be 'appointed to examine, check and inspect that the aforesaid and all other new wrongs and deceptions in the making of wine be completely removed and withdrawn'. In addition all wines would be barred from entering the export market without extensive quality control and being certified at source with documentation and marks confirming their origin. The following year, at the July 1433 parliament, English merchants made efforts to bar all foreigners from acting as commercial brokers in the kingdom, directly specifying wine trading, citing their 'dishonesty' in making 'grievous, evil and dishonest agreements and contracts of usury'.³

Opposition to foreign merchants was far from new. After the attacks on them and their property in London during the Peasants' revolt of 1381 the crown had needed to re-enforce protections for foreign merchants in England.⁴ Such protections and privileges needed to be regularly re-confirmed, such as in 1382, 1388, 1401, 1420 and 1423.⁵ Yet even by these standards, during the last decades of the Hundred Years' War aggression towards foreign businesses by their English competitors was swiftly becoming the norm. This was a shift especially evident in the contemporary political poem the *Libelle of Englyshe Polycye*.⁶ Written in the wake of the duke of Burgundy abandoning the English cause after the congress of Arras (1435) and the subsequent siege of Calais (1436), this was not inherently anti-commerce, but instead advocated strong crown

¹ 'Henry VI: September 1429', item 29, in *PROME, BHO*.

² 'Henry VI: May 1432', item 43, *ibid.*; TNA, SC 8/336/15860.

³ 'Henry VI: July 1433', item 51, *PROME, BHO*; TNA, SC 8/26/1284.

⁴ 'Memorials: 1381', (Letter-Book H. fol. cxxxiii), in *Memorials of London and London Life in the 13th, fourteenth and 15th Centuries*, (ed.) H.T. Riley (London, 1868), pp. 449–51, *BHO*; 'Richard II: November 1381', item 107, *PROME, BHO*.

⁵ *GSR*, C 61/119: 83.

⁶ 'Libelle of Englyshe Polycye', in *Political Poems and Songs Relating to English History, Composed during the Period from the Accession of Edward III to that of Richard III*, 2, (ed.) T. Wright (London, 1861), pp. 157–204.

intervention and investment with a view to English control over trade routes and markets, rather than re-taking lost territory on the continent.¹ The tract may have had some limited influence on the truce of Tours, agreed with the French in 1444, as among the many conditions negotiated, were a number of clauses that carefully set out the rules of trade between the territories of Lancastrian France and the lands controlled by Charles VII (r.1422–61).² Yet the *Libelle*'s attitude with regards to competition with foreign merchants was undoubtedly jingoistic and fed off growing public sentiment.

Despite all this the Gascons in England managed to remain exempt from the vast array of legislation in 1439 monitoring and controlling foreign businesses.³ Then finally, in 1445, three damning petitions brought forward by English merchants through parliament bemoaned the wine trade's serious decline and offered immediate radical solutions.⁴ One petition, representing 'all the merchants of this realm buying and selling wine from the parts of Gascony and Guyenne', complained bitterly of the continued poor quality of the wines.⁵ Some were so badly made that whole clusters of grapes were said to have been found floating in the barely filled barrels, and that much of the liquor continued to ferment en route. Their condition was so bad that a full 10% of a merchants' cargo would need to be discarded on arrival in England. There were even complaints that the barrels sold to them by their Gascon suppliers were routinely undersized.⁶ The petitioners again demanded stronger quality control ordinances but now also compensation for losses incurred by English merchants to the considerable sum of £1,000 sterling. This amount was to be raised from Gascon merchants in the duchy and also in England, whom the petitioners held personally responsible. No clear decision on this petition appears to have been made by the crown at the February parliament itself, but it was sent to the lords for further discussion.

The second and third petitions were pleas to radically de-regulate the market for wine in the duchy itself.⁷ One complained that, because of the number of taxes and tolls levied, merchants had 'not been permitted to buy wine grown in the *Haut-Pays*' for many decades to their 'great damage'. The other blamed specifically the wine staple, by which they were 'compelled to buy their wines and sell their merchandise at Bordeaux and Bayonne and nowhere else', for a collapse in trade volume and relentlessly rising prices, which in turn caused the 'destruction' of both 'merchants and navy.'⁸ That outcome, at least, appears accurate. In the shipping season 1435–6 some 146 ships left the port at Bordeaux carrying wine, but by 1443–4, this had fallen to just 85 ships.⁹ A decline of 41.8% in less than a decade is too large to be explained by a shift in the

¹ J. Scattergood, 'The Libelle of Englyshe Polycye: the nation and its place', in *Nation, Court and Culture: New Essays on Fifteenth-Century English Poetry*, (ed.) H. Cooney (Dublin, 2001), pp. 28–49, at pp. 47–9.

² *CCR*, 1441–1447, pp. 232–5.

³ *SR*, 2, pp. 303–5 (18 Hen. VI, c.4).

⁴ 'Henry VI: February 1445', items 44–45 (45–46), 50 (51), *PROME, BHO*.

⁵ TNA, SC 8/199/9901.

⁶ Exporters from Gascony had tried previously (c.1442) to avoid customs payments by shipping wine in hogsheads (*barriques*) of one quarter tun; thereafter tax be paid no matter the size, see *AHG*, XVI, pp. 264–5.

⁷ TNA, SC 8/190/9467; C 49/26/8.

⁸ 'Henry VI: February 1445', item 45, *PROME, BHO*; TNA, SC 8/190/9467.

⁹ TNA, E 101/192/1, fol. 62v; E 101/194/3, fol. 77r.

composition of the fleet alone, such as an increase in the carrying capacity of each vessel, and must represent a serious recession in commercial activity. Indeed, a letter from Sir Robert Roos and Thomas Beckington to the king in 1442, as the two visited the duchy, reported that English merchants had not ‘souffred to passe hither for the vintaige in suche tyme as they have be accustomed in yers before’.¹ As a solution the petitioners requested that ‘all manner of wine of the said duchy under the king’s obedience, may come freely down to the said ports, and the said English merchants may hereafter freely buy and sell wine and all other merchandise in the said parts of Guyenne and in every place’, ‘without paying any other charge or imposition’, and that they might ‘thereafter freely buy the wine of the *Haut-Pays* there at all such times.’ The initial response from the crown, that entered in the parliamentary roll, was that the ‘the king will consider this further’, and the petition passed to the lords.² After some delay, for prevarication or debate, a decision was made statute agreeing to the petitioners’ requests in full.³ At one stroke this abolished the historic rules governing wine purchases, freed up the trade in *Haut-Pays* wines and allowed exports from all ports, enforced by heavy fines for anyone, duchy officials or otherwise, who opposed the reformed market.

The effects of these sudden modifications of market rules are evident in the export figures from Gascony. As English merchants were once again permitted to access markets beyond Bordeaux, the quantity of wine bought outside the boundaries of the capital and only brought to port to be shipped rose from 2,141 tuns in 1443–4 to 5,638 tuns in 1448–9, an increase of over 163%.⁴ The port at Libourne, which had been in effect closed for over a decade, reopened and supplied 123½ tuns to the overseas market. These years were no mere anomalies, such wines outside the purview of the Bordeaux burgesses constituted an average of 2,752 tuns per year during 1442–1446 rose to 3,908 per year during 1446–1451.⁵ Given that the latter also includes the tempestuous last years of the Plantagenet duchy, with the resumption of war with France from 1449, it is clear a dramatic shift had occurred. By contrast the importance of Bordeaux as a marketplace, in which wine was traded amongst its residents before export, declined steadily in this same period. Over the years 1435–9 such stock constituted 34.2% of exports, over 1442–6 this was 24.6%, and 1446–51 just 20.5%.⁶ All such changes were in part also due to the truce of Tours that brought peace, albeit brief, with France in May 1444. Nevertheless the act of 1445 represents the zenith of English regulatory intervention in the wine trade. It ushered in a short Indian summer of commercial prosperity until the French invasion and capture of Bordeaux in 1451. But in doing so English interests directly attacked those of Bordeaux. It overhauled rights and privileges in Gascony granted as patronage by the English crown over the previous century, privileges that not only shaped the wine market but also defined the relationship between kingdom and duchy.

¹ *A Journal by One of the Suite of Thomas Beckington*, (ed.) N.H. Nicolas (London, 1828), p. 51.

² ‘Henry VI: February 1445’, item 45, *PROME, BHO*.

³ *SR*, 2, p. 343 (23 Hen. VI, c.17).

⁴ TNA, E 101/194/3, fol 77r; E 101/195/19, fol. 77v.

⁵ TNA, E 364/84, m. 20; E 364/91, m. 13.

⁶ TNA, E 364/75, m. 5, 5 dorso; E 364/84, m. 20; E 364/91, m. 13.

2.2 Giving patronage and privilege in Gascony

2.2.1 Trade privileges

The role of the London's *mystery* of the Vintry guild in solidifying the ascendancy of English merchants after 1363 has already been mentioned. Yet both Vale and Lodge noted that while some guilds were prominent in Bayonne, in particular the Society of Mariners (established 1213), they held no significant economic or political influence in Bordeaux or other Gascon towns.¹ There was no equivalent to the *mystery*, nor any other commercial organisation specifically dedicated to wine-trading, even though associations such as the *confrérie* of Saint-Michel in Bordeaux comprised a great number of members who were wine merchants.² Instead it was the communes themselves, with their local commercial rules embedded within their historic customs, which performed similar functions to the guild elsewhere in Europe. They provided the necessary unity among urban populations which allowed their collective interests to hold sway in the perennial political and economic tussle with secular and ecclesiastical lords. This was especially true in towns overwhelmingly specialised in the wine trade, such as Bordeaux, the towns of the Bordelais, and those of the *Haut-Pays* which were linked into the Anglo-Gascon market. Most of Bordeaux's wealthiest burgher families depended on wine production and exports for their fortunes.³ Their members dominated the various councils of the commune: the *jurade*, its executive body; as well as the larger assemblies of the thirty and three-hundred. It was through this route that Bordeaux's merchants would appeal to the crown for privileges; as they did extensively in 1373.⁴

Bordeaux as a commune had been established in a position of exceptional privilege by the statute of 1353. By effectively setting the point of sale to and exports by English merchants to this city exclusively, and forbidding such merchants from making advance purchases either in the Bordelais or the *Haut-Pays*, the legislation left the handling of regional trade almost entirely in the hands of the Bordelais merchants. It also focussed all the capital investment which surrounded the wine trade in and around the city. All the infrastructure necessary for storage and onward distribution would be concentrated there. Moreover, as has been mentioned, the prevalence of tolls and heavy transport costs incurred by wine brought to Bordeaux for export would give the wines of the commune itself an automatic competitive advantage.

In addition, further privileges were bestowed upon Bordeaux's burghers themselves. A *burgher* was not simply any urban resident, but one of a distinctly advantaged status. Altogether they numbered, at Renouard's suggestion, perhaps only 1,500 people within a resident population of around 20,000 tax payers.⁵ To qualify required, according to the city's *Livre des bouillons*: to be a house-holder in the city; to achieve a required level of revenue; to gain the approval of the *jurade*;

¹ Lodge, *Gascony under English Rule*, pp. 152–3, 159–60; Vale, *English Gascony*, p. 25.

² See Chapter 4.3.

³ See Chapter 3.4.1.

⁴ TNA, SC 8/229/11407.

⁵ *Bordeaux sous les rois d'Angleterre*, pp. 450–2. The non-tax paying population was probably considerably higher.

and to take the relevant oath.¹ Because the first two requirements could be inherited, and the *jurade* could self-select established families, this status became the foundation stone of oligarchy.

The privileges of burgesses in the wine trade were many. First they monopolised sales and exports from the port in Bordeaux during the key period from the harvest in August–September through to Martinmas (November 11).² Wines traded by any other inhabitant of the Bordelais, or from the *Haut-Pays*, were excluded until after this date. Since most Gascon wine in this period did not keep for much more than a year, this privilege guaranteed the Bordeaux burgesses the best prices both when selling to merchants or if selling their wares themselves overseas.³

From 1373, as part of the extensive petition to the crown largely on commercial matters, the burgesses requested their monopoly be extended until the Christmas after the vintage, an appeal subsequently referred by the king and council on to the seneschal and constable in the *Château de l'Ombrière*. Their decision was that though their control over sales remained until only Martinmas, a prohibition on the arrival of *Haut-Pays* wine would be placed until Christmas, a right confirmed by 1388. At that time the French had largely occupied this wider region, and reduced Anglo-Gascon territory to little more than the Bordelais and a coastal strip to Bayonne. So for the king this was an obvious moment to reward loyalty and punish ‘rebels and enemies during their rebellion’, as residents of the lands lost were then termed.⁴ Such restrictions remained in place until 1445, apart from a short period for a few years after the rules were relaxed for the towns and lordships of the Bazadais in 1427.⁵ Also granted to the commune of Bordeaux in 1373 was the right to charge a further 4*s tour*. (the principal money of account of the king of France) per tun on any wines produced in the lands from the *Pays-Rebelles*, be it up the Garonne or Dordogne rivers, to which the burgesses themselves were exempt.⁶ This was also re-confirmed as a permanent fiscal right in 1388.⁷ The Bordeaux burgesses also gained, from 1397, a monopoly over the wines sold at taverns in the city itself from Pentecost (usually May/June) until Michaelmas (29 September), a right previously granted to all Bordeaux inhabitants.⁸ Their wines would again command the best price domestically as supplies became scarce in the run up to the new harvest. This was granted by John of Gaunt (1340–99), duke of Lancaster, as he attempted to garner support for his role as duke of Aquitaine, which had been strongly opposed in Bordeaux.⁹

Lastly, the burgesses held exemptions, for the export of wines they produced only, from the two main taxes imposed at the city’s port, the *grande coutume* and the *issac*. These tax advantages had been held by various inhabitants of Bordeaux, in some form or another, since 1205

¹ *Livre des bouillons*, pp. 381–2.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 180–1; *Livre des coutumes*, pp. 318–9, 617–8.

³ Renouard, ‘Le grand commerce’, pp. 261–304, at p. 282. Renouard cites some efforts at long-term storage, but this was rare and as today would apply to a small minority of wines, see *ibid.*, ‘Le Vin Vieux au Moyen Âge’, *Annales du Midi*, 76:68–69 (1964), pp. 447–55.

⁴ TNA, SC 8/229/11407; E 101/179/15, fol. 17r; GSR, C 61/86: 40; *Livre des coutumes*, p. 428; *Livre des bouillons* pp. 180–1.

⁵ GSR, C 61/122: 15.

⁶ GSR, C 61/86: 45.

⁷ *Livre des coutumes*, p. 428.

⁸ *Livre des bouillons*, pp. 195–6, 268.

⁹ See Chapter 4.2; also Vale, *English Gascony*, pp. 27–54; Lodge, *Gascony under English Rule*, pp. 108–11.

during the reign of King John.¹ They had however been gradually refined to apply just to those with burgher status in the city, a restriction made clear by Edward III in 1336, when he demanded ‘those bringing wine to the port of that city, who do not enjoy the ancient privilege, to pay the custom’.² That said, the crown stopped short of permitting burghers to export tax-free wine not grown by them, but shipped in from elsewhere, and this right was declined when petitioned for in 1373.³ Instead they regained, from this time, a discount on the *issac*, which they had held earlier in the century. The top rate had been raised to 16s 8d *bord.* during the principality but for stocks bought from those with privileges the old rate of 6s 8d *bord.* still applied.⁴ This represented a tax deduction of 60% on burgher wine traded in Bordeaux.

Since most duty was charged at fixed sums per tun or pipe rather than *ad valorem*, they would, if passed on, have constituted a higher proportion of export prices in years when these were low. The same applied with other duties or *petit coutumes* which were paid by all, even the burghers, such as the *royan*, and the *killage*.⁵ A fixed gauger’s charge of 5d *bord.* was also paid on every tun exported.⁶ In 1361–2 prices were relatively low at around 10l *bord.* per tun of claret, and if as Boutruche estimated taxes added 2l 10s *bord.* they constituted 25% of the export price.⁷ Thus in good years the privileges of the burghers gave a significant boost in profit margins compared with their competitors. Even when prices were high, such as in the 1370s, when taxes would comprise a comparatively smaller proportion of the price, around 11% on average, those same burghers were still able to undercut non-burghers when margins tightened.

As well as considerable commercial advantages, burgher status also gave the holder a role in civic governance and so was altogether a potent right of patronage which the king could utilise. For besides the city’s own traditions by which it was conferred, it was also a right that the king was able to grant by letters patent from England.⁸ This would become particularly contentious. In 1375 a faction of influential Bordeaux burghers led by Sir Johan Colom (d.1377) had petitioned the king and obtained a letters patent to exclude nobles and gentry from the *jurade* and to prohibit them from holding burgher status.⁹ There had been a gradual influx of Anglo-Gascon nobility, and knights, into the city since the outbreak of the Hundred Years’ War, and especially since the general collapse of the principality of Aquitaine in the early 1370s. Their increasing influence in municipal politics and competing interests in the wine trade had caused great discontentment

¹ *Livre des bouillons*, p. 156.

² TNA, C 61/48, m. 5. For more on the evolution of customs duties, and of the rights of exemption, on the wine trade in the thirteenth century, see Trabut-Cussac, ‘Les coutumes ou droits de douane perçus à Bordeaux’, pp. 135–50.

³ TNA, SC 8/229/11407.

⁴ *Livre des coutumes*, pp. 363–5, 606–7; for example records of these taxes, see TNA, E 101/180/2, fol. 42v; E 101/182/6, fol. 84r; E 101/184/19, fol. 76r; E 101/194/3, fol. 77r.

⁵ T. Runyan, ‘The Constabulary of Bordeaux: the Accounts of John Ludham (1372–73) and Robert de Wykford (1373–75). Part II’, *Mediaeval Studies*, 37 (1975), pp. 42–84, at p. 51; *Livre des coutumes*, p. 610; *GSR*, C 61/92: 19; C 61/119: 19.

⁶ *GSR*, C 61/121: 13; C 61/121: 29; C 61/117: 27.

⁷ For prices, see Appendix 8.1; Boutruche, *La Crise*, p. 151.

⁸ *Livre des bouillons*, pp. 381–2

⁹ TNA, SC 8/205/10238; SC 8/210/10483; *GSR*, C 61/88: 82; also see P. Chaplais, ‘À propos de l’ordonnance de 1375 sur la bourgeoisie et la jurade de Bordeaux’, *Annales du Midi*, 65:21 (1953), pp. 113–8.

among the older established families of Bordeaux bourgeoisie, whom Colom represented. This move was immediately opposed by another faction in Bordeaux led by those nobles and gentry who were excluded, who declared in a petition to the king in 1375 that the loss of their status was 'likely to lead to their ruin'.¹ The decision was eventually successfully overturned in 1377–8 for Archambaud de Grailly (d.1412), the *capital* de Buch, who recovered burgess status by letters patent and thus henceforth held the right to its beneficial commercial protections and tax advantages.² The Grailly family were long entitled to these privileges as lords of Puy-Paulin in Bordeaux, and it is clear that the *capital* felt he risked a great deal by their loss.³ The appellants' position was upheld, partly because at that time the *capital* was sending wine to England and then importing back to Gascony large quantities of vital grain (c.1000 quarters), weapons and armour - partly of course, it was because the *capital* was also a great lord, with equivalent influence.⁴

After this episode it became comparatively less common for the king to order, by letters patent, that esquires, knights and nobles be made burgesses in Bordeaux, though this did still occur. Usually these were figures particularly closely aligned to the Plantagenet cause, such as Johan de Béarn, lord of Hontanx, having petitioned the king in 1405, Guilhem-Ays de Fronsac, who did so in 1407, or Bernat de Lesparre, lord of Labarde, in 1417.⁵ Most grants were given in response to such petitions, but some, such as that of Galhart d'Arsac in 1432, were unsolicited rewards, 'because of his good service'.⁶ The crown made such allies burgesses right up until Galhart [IV] de Durfort, lord of Duras and Blanquefort in March 1451.⁷ There were, however, limits to this avenue of patronage. The petition and subsequent grant had to justify the appointment in relation to the rules of the city. As such there were examples where the ownership of property within the city, the intention to reside there, or an ancestral claim to the status were made clear.⁸ Evidently, for the most part, the king would not risk upsetting burgess interests by circumventing such conventions and intervening too frequently in the management of their city's franchise.

That being said it was hardly an exclusive status for mercantile elites and crown nominees, for ecclesiastics, both individuals and institutions, held similar commercial advantages to those of the Bordeaux burgesses. Under canon law the church was, in theory, not supposed to be taxed arbitrarily by lay rulers though this had long been challenged by the latter.⁹ In Gascony exemptions

¹ TNA, SC 8/262/13070.

² TNA, SC 8/222/11067; SC 8/223/11143; *GSR*, C 61/91: 50.

³ TNA, SC 8/274/13667; SC 8/277/13849; SC 8/274/13659; SC 8/159/7934; *GSR*, C 61/91: 50.

⁴ TNA, E 101/80/2, fol. 38r; *GSR*, C 61/91: 40, 42, 81.

⁵ TNA, SC 8/182/9073, item 3; *GSR*, C 61 110: 39; C 61/111: 109; C 61/117: 74; see Pépin, 'French Offensives of 1404–1407', p. 29.

⁶ *GSR*, C 61/124: 123.

⁷ *GSR*, C 61/138: 63. The House of Durfort were amongst the most loyal to the English cause of all Gascon noble families in this period. Gaillard [III] Durfort even became seneschal of Gascony 1399–1415, Vale, *English Gascony*, pp. 41–2. Also see M.J. Favre, *Précis historiques sur la famille de Durfort Duras* (Marmande, 1858).

⁸ *GSR*, C 61/97: 66; C 61/111: 109; C 61/124: 123.

⁹ See J.H. Lynch, *The Medieval Church: A Brief History* (Abingdon, 1992), p. 318; W.M. Ormrod, 'The West European Monarchies in the Later Middle Ages', in *Economic Systems and State Finance: The Origins of the Modern State in Europe 13th to 18th Centuries*, (ed.) R. Bonney (Oxford, 1995), pp. 123–60, at p. 132–3; Brissaud, *Les Anglais en Guyenne*, p. 178.

had to be granted and regularly re-confirmed by the king. The very secular origin of ecclesiastical trade privileges is clear. It was conferred as a quasi-burgess status, referred to as ‘a franchise on the great custom of Bordeaux and issac’, their shipments marked ‘Fr’ in the customs books.¹ Indeed, even the benefices, usually portfolios of wine-yielding property that individual ecclesiastics acquired, were to some extent dependent on a secular overlord, namely the king of England. For example, in 1387 a papal bull sent from pope Urban VI (1318–89) to Richard II requested the support of the king’s officials in the *Château de l’Ombrière* in order that a canon gain the endowments assigned him.² Such influence would remain. In 1438 Henry VI gave a monastic corrody to one Richard Logan as a reward for service.³ These actions were in themselves a form of patronage.

All the major ecclesiastical institutions of Bordeaux had tax privileges on their wines confirmed by the Black Prince. The senior ecclesiastics and collegiate chapters of Bordeaux were, along with the archbishop, the greatest seigneurial landholders in the Bordelais and their patronage reflects their political importance. The chapters of Saint-André, established at the city’s cathedral, and of the church of Saint-Seurin, just outside the city walls, the two most wealthy and powerful of these, gained confirmation of burgess status for their exports from 1357.⁴ In addition the abbey of Sainte-Croix (from 1357), the hospital of Saint-Julien (from 1416) and of Saint-Jacques (from 1400), also held an equivalent to the franchise and exported to a lesser degree.⁵ From the late fourteenth century onwards the crown began to give extra concessions to religious houses for specifically charitable purposes in the form of licences to purchase and export precise quantities of wine tax-free, between 12 and 40 tuns.⁶ It was less common to give tax advantages to ecclesiastics far from Bordeaux itself. Saint-Émilion, on the north bank of the Dordogne just to the east of Libourne, was one exception, where the Franciscan friars of that town gained the right to export their wine without customs or tolls in 1383.⁷ The motivation for the crown to extend ecclesiastical commercial privileges so widely cannot be ascertained precisely. Partly, of course, it was a customary recognition of their spiritual authority, but also the church in Gascony was, for the most part, a strong supporter of Plantagenet rule. Archbishops of Bordeaux were often drawn from noble families allied to the English crown, Amanieu de La Mothe (abp. 1351–60), Jean (abp. 1409–10) and David de Montferrand (abp. 1413–30) for example.⁸ Therefore to give the church a stake in a prosperous economic relationship between Bordeaux and the English was prudent.

¹ *GSR*, C 61/115: 15, C 61/119: 85; for an example of a franchised shipment, see TNA, E 101/602/3, fol. 7v.

² TNA, SC 7/34/19.

³ *AHG*, I, p. 392.

⁴ *GSR*, C 61/115: 14–5; C 61/120: 18; C 61/119: 85–6; *AHG*, IV, pp. 116–8.

⁵ *AHG*, III (1861), p. 60; *GSR*, C 61/97: 58; C 61/108: 134; C 61/108: 132; C 61/115: 16; C 61/119: 8 [Sainte-Croix] C 61/117: 6; C 61/117: 32; C 61/119: 87 [Saint-Julien] ; C 61/107: 152; C 61/120: 21 [Saint-Jacques].

⁶ *GSR*, C 61/107: 130; C 61/107: 130; C 61/117: 5; C 61/129: 24–5; C 61/129: 135.

⁷ *GSR*, C 61/97: 38.

⁸ *Fasti Ecclesiae Gallicanae* [hereafter *FEG*]: *Répertoire prosopographique des évêques, dignitaires et chanoines des diocèses de France de 1200 à 1500, Tome. XIII, Diocèse de Bordeaux*, par F. Lainé, avec la collaboration de H. Labarthe, S. Lavaud, J-M. Matz, V. Tabbagh (Turnhout, 2012), pp. 197–202; Bailey, ‘Les Châteaux de Landiras et de Montferrand—Part One’, pp. 81–93, at p. 84.

It was likewise sensible that some minor concessions be granted to Bordeaux's rival export hubs so commonly prejudiced against by the crown. Discounts were allowed on the duty Libourne paid on that town's meagre exports, particularly in times of military crisis, with receipts to be used to rebuild defences.¹ Other towns were encouraged with special privileges to produce wine for export provided they respected the staple. Saint-Émilion benefited from a concession in 1408 giving the town's elites exemption from customs dues on its wines exported from the capital.² This was granted in the aftermath of the French invasions of 1404–7, and was certainly intended to shore up support for the king on his northern frontier.³ The inhabitants of La Réole, were given similar tax-exemptions. These rights had been negotiated by Henry de Grosmont, earl of Derby (later earl, then duke of Lancaster), during his campaigns of 1345–6, to secure the loyalty of the town.⁴ These were re-granted in 1417, 1427 and 1441 ostensibly for the same purposes.⁵ The first two offered to the town to galvanize support during Anglo-Gascon offensives which pushed to reconquer the surrounding Bazadais, *Entre-Deux-Mers* and southern Périgord,⁶ and the latter when under threat of the French invasion that would arrive in 1442.⁷ Saint-Macaire, a vital bastion marking the border between the Bordelais and the *Haut-Pays* gained special concessions by letters patent in 1348, 1425 and 1450 which gave exemption from tax for 'the wine growing within one league around their town'.⁸ The first two grants occurred subsequent to recapture by the Anglo-Gascons, and the last was offered in anticipation of the attack on the Bordelais by Charles VII in 1451.⁹ As Capra succinctly put it, the crown's 'attention was always fixed upon the advantages given to the fluvial towns which formed the spine of Anglo-Gascon domination'.¹⁰

James correctly identified the *Haut-Pays* as the key area of viticultural production of the pre-Hundred Years' War era. She observed that it was the steep decline in the supply of wine from this region that brought about such a pronounced recession in international trade out of Gascony with the outbreak of conflict in 1337.¹¹ Although the *Haut-Pays* as a geographical space can be defined as anywhere to the east of the Bordelais, the archdiocese of Bordeaux – and could include towns of the Périgord such as Bergerac, and La Réole in the Bazadais – production largely centred on the towns further to the east still. These were generally situated higher on the Garonne River, and also its major tributaries, the Lot and Tarn, mostly in the historic province of the Agenais. James identified many towns as major producers for exports in 1306–7, for example: Marmande, Le Mas-d'Agenais, Port-Sainte-Marie, and Agen on the Garonne; Clairac, Villeneuve and Cahors

¹ TNA, SC 8/227/11339; *GSR*, C 61/90: 15–6; C 61/120: 39; *AHG*, XVI, pp. 61–3.

² *GSR*, C 61/112: 46.

³ See G. Pépin, 'The French Offensives of 1404–1407 against Anglo-Gascon Aquitaine', *Journal of Medieval Military History*, 9 (2011), pp. 1–40.

⁴ TNA, SC 8/243/12134; *GSR*, C 61/59: 29–30, 32, 36–7, 42, 45, 53, 61.

⁵ *GSR*, C 61/117: 44; C 61/122: 15; C 61/130: 77.

⁶ Vale, *English Gascony*, pp. 96–7.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 123.

⁸ *GSR*, C 61/120: 43; *AHG*, XVI, pp. 123–8.

⁹ Vale, *English Gascony*, pp. 96–7, 179.

¹⁰ P.J. Capra, 'Un conflit sur les droits commerciaux de La Réole et du Bazadais en 1354–1355', *Revue Historique de Bordeaux et du Département de la Gironde*, 9:4 (1960), pp. 213–20, at p. 218.

¹¹ James, *Studies*, p. 15.

on the Lot; and Gaillac, Rabastans and Montauban on the Tarn.¹ The English crown had been engaged in a long-term policy of encouraging these towns to produce for export via Gascon ports. Each was provided with special privileges allowing their wines access to Plantagenet Gascony if currently beyond its frontiers, and, most significantly, deductions off customs duties as it left the duchy. These could vary by time and place but in the 1350s the privileged rate *grande coutume* for most towns was *5s 4d bord.*, the *issac 2s 8d.* per tun. This combined to *8s* per tun where normally *20s* was paid, giving a discount of 60% on export duty.² By the time of the principality, in the 1360s, this privilege had been reduced. Most wine would have to pay the *grande coutume* at *2s 8d* sterling *guyennois* and *issac* at *16d* sterling *guyennois* per tun, or *4s* sterling *guyennois* (still *20s bord.*) combined. The privileged *Haut-Pays* towns paid a combined duty of *3s 1½d* sterling *guyennois* (*15s 7½d bord.*).³ For convenience this was the precise value at the time of one gold franc, a coin that circulated in Valois territory, but this constituted a much reduced 21.88% discount.⁴ After war with the French crown returned in 1369, and intensified over the subsequent decade, much of Plantagenet-held *Haut-Pays* was lost, the tax-discount removed entirely on captured towns and the 10% tariff added on all imports from what was from then on termed the *Pays-Rebelles*.⁵ The combination of the lost privileges and added taxes constituted the imposition of a punitive trade barrier between the region and its main export hub at Bordeaux.

Despite these policies, neither the English government nor mercantile interests in England ever forgot that it was viticultural production in the *Haut-Pays* which had driven the boom in the wine trade to the beginning of the fourteenth century. After the military reverses of the 1370s it was policy that wine from these parts again flow to Bordeaux. The powers invested in Edward of Norwich (1373–1415), earl of Rutland, as king's lieutenant in Aquitaine in 1401, contained the instruction:

To grant and accept that the wines of the Haut-Pays of this duchy can be brought to Bordeaux, paying, by advice of the king's council there, some taxes for the support of the war and salvation of the land, if they are not against the reasonable privileges of the land.⁶

This appeared almost verbatim within documents appointing lieutenancies of Gascony until the end of Plantagenet rule in 1453 which suggests this was as near to an established commercial strategy, clearly expressed, across such a long period.⁷ Such a policy was always going to be difficult, not least because the ducal authorities were expected to encourage the wine trade, in order to support financially the pursuance of war, in the very same region ravaged by war. The

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

² TNA, E 101/173/4, fol. 128v.

³ TNA, E 36/80, p. 403.

⁴ TNA, E 43/245.

⁵ For example, it was stated in a 1399 petition that the Agenais towns of Caumont, Castelmoran, Castel Senheur, Dubort Saint Pierre, Coveux, Fauillet and Gontaud, had all lost their discounted rate of duty on account of having 'rebelled', TNA, SC 8/252/12597.

⁶ GSR, C 61/108: 92.

⁷ GSR, C 61/113: 130; C 61/114: 41; C 61/129: 84; C 61/138: 37; C 61/139: 17.

stipulation that this policy should not trample on the established privileges of the Bordelais was also likely to be a considerable hindrance. The very *Haut-Pays* towns that had been previously so productive had also lost their own privileges that had encouraged them to be so. An exception was Port-Sainte-Marie (dep. Lot-et-Garonne) situated on a bend of the Garonne deep inside the French-held Agenais below a vast plateau containing concentrated viticultural production. This town remained in English hands into the fifteenth-century and as such retained a privileged custom status, paying just 16s 8d *bord.* or 40 silver *blancs* per tun in total, despite having to cross the frontier that would have required payment of the tithe, or a gold *écu* per tun to pass by.¹

These broader concessions may have been beneficial to the king in securing the support of a handful of key locations, but it was a blunt tool with regards patronage and would implicitly reduce revenues by exempting whole regions and groups from ducal taxation. The granting by the crown of licences for tax exemption to individuals and permits to buy wine in the outside Plantagenet-held Gascony were by their nature a more focussed use of patronage. The earliest dates from January 1372 but the majority were issued from the early 1380s through until the early 1410s encompassing the period between the post-principality crises and Lancastrian re-conquests when Anglo-Gascon territory was at its least extensive. Their purpose appears to match the overall policy to promote the trade with the *Haut-Pays*, now controlled by the enemy. They gave the right to trade, to transport a specific quantity of wine, for a length of time, and was sometimes just a permit to trade or could be a licence that the wine could be exported tax-free. Such licences represented a tangible financial gain to the recipient and many were given explicitly to reward good service to the crown, and indicated as much in their wording. For instance in January 1382 Mondon Ébrard, a Gascon squire, was granted a licence to export 100 tuns annually for life free of all taxation in Gascony and England ‘for his good service to the king’s grandfather and father, and to the king in his wars’ but also in compensation for any losses in said conflicts.² Similar licences were granted to Englishmen, for example in September 1382, Robert Cholmondele, a squire to the king, was allow to export 60 tuns tax-free ‘for his good service’.³ After the Lancastrian succession many were given to senior officials within the duchy to help support themselves.⁴ The constable Henry Bowet for instance, was allowed the unprecedented licence in November 1401 to transport any volume he wished, without paying any taxes in Gascony or in England, for his life and those of his heirs.⁵ Even Edward of Norwich, earl of Rutland, was allowed a one-off licence to export 300 tuns exempt of customs and tolls ‘in help and support of his household’, though much of this was probably consumed by his entourage and retainers rather than sold.⁶

In the summer of 1383, three of the most influential Gascon nobles still allied to the Plantagenet cause received licences to trade huge quantities of wine, simply granted ‘for his profit’.

¹ TNA, E 101/185/11, fos 26r, 26v, 28v, 32v, 39r, 41r, 42v, 45v, 46v, 47r, 48r, 50v, 51r, 54r, 55r, 57r, 57v, 60v.

² GSR, C 61/95: 76; C 61/95: 125.

³ GSR, C 61/96: 33–4.

⁴ GSR, C 61/108: 107–8.

⁵ GSR, C 61/109: 68.

⁶ GSR, C 61/108: 123–4.

Guilhem-Ramon de Madaillan (d.c.1391), lord of Rauzan, was given licence to export annually 2,000 tuns of wine from the *Pays-Rebelles* for the next 6 years, although still he had to pay the highest rate of the *grande coutume* and the 10% levy on wine passing from enemy lands.¹ With recent French advances Rauzan was by then a particularly strategically important castle in the *Entre-Deux-Mers*, south of Saint-Émilion. Around the same time his brother-in-law Florimont, lord of Lesparre (d.c.1394), received a licence to trade annually 10,000 tuns of wine from the *Pays-Rebelles* for 10 years, paying the tithe but with a 50% discount on the *grande coutume*.² Last but by no means least, in exchange for an annuity of 1,500*l bord.* that was outstanding, Arnaut-Bernat [IV] de Preissac (d.1394), *soudan* de la Trau, was granted the right to export 3,000 tuns from the *Haut-Pays* under French control over three years, provided he pay the usual tithe and customs dues.³

The licences also could take on a wider political use. In November 1409, Jean V (1389–1442), duke of Brittany, was granted a letters patent allowing him to transport 100 tuns from the *Pays-Rebelles* down the Garonne and export them without paying any customs.⁴ The exact purpose is unclear but we can speculate that such grants found good use as inducements during diplomacy with the twenty-year-old duke. The licence was then renewed the following year, and its use can be confirmed by duke's shipments appearing in the Bordeaux customs books with his franchised tax status and 'per patentem', recording that the privilege was given by letters patent, indicated in the margins.⁵ Other key English allies in the region also gained, such as Carlos de Beaumont, the so-called *alférez* of Navarre, illegitimate son of the Navarrese prince Louis of Évreux, who was given licence in June 1407 to export 120 tuns of wine from the *Pays-Rebelles* annually for life without paying any customs, tithes or tolls. Although Carlos had to pay 100 francs per year for the privilege, his shipments were to be given 'priority before any others who had such licence'. A significant advantage indeed.⁶

Licences could be directed with a military strategy in mind. The later enterprises of Sir Bertucat d'Albret (d.1383), an illegitimate brother of Arnaud-Amanieu (1338–1401), lord of Albret, were highlighted by Jonathan Sumption in this regard.⁷ This sometime English ally and sometime routier, Sir Bertucat planned a great counter-offensive in the French-occupied *Entre-Deux-Mers* in 1381, for which purpose he gained private financing from Italian merchant bankers and London vintners, secured on the basis that he held licences to export wine from the *Pays-*

¹ GSR, C 61/97: 22. For more on the history of the Madaillan family, see M. Campagne, *Histoire de la Maison de Madaillan, 1076 à 1900* (Bergerac, 1900).

² GSR, C 61/97: 39, 94. For more on Florimont, lord of Lesparre, see J. Rabanis, *Notice sur Florimont, sire de Lesparre, suivie d'un précis historique sur cette seigneurie, de notes et éclaircissements* (Bordeaux, 1843).

³ GSR, C 61/96: 110–1. For further details on the *soudans* de la Trau, see G. Pépin, 'Les Soudans de Preissac ou de la Trau: de Clément V à l'ordre de la Jarretière', *Les cahiers du Bazadais*, 187 (2014), pp. 5–72.

⁴ GSR, C 61/113: 5.

⁵ TNA, E 101/184/19, fos 61v, 73v; GSR, C 61/113: 40.

⁶ GSR, C 61/111: 106; C 61/112: 107; C 61/114: 42; C 61/116: 38; C 61/117: 55; C 61/119: 4, 88.

⁷ Sumption, *Divided Houses*, p. 694.

Rebelles down both the Dordogne and Garonne.¹ On 26 November 1409, in the aftermath of the major French offensives of the previous years, Gassion de Meyrac, lord of Théobon, was given licence to trade 100 tuns of wine from enemy lands tax-free ‘in order better to defend, repair and resupply his place and fortress of Théobon’ against the very same enemies.² In such ways the wine trade was never far removed from war.

2.2.2 Endowments and offices

The direct assignment of revenues was one of the most regularly utilised levers of patronage by the king in Gascony. Incomes and annuities paid from wine customs were granted to both Anglo-Gascon or English individuals for a specific number of years, for life, or in perpetuity. In the latter case the right to financial gain from commerce formed part of the holder’s inheritable rights, and could be passed down to heirs albeit with royal confirmation, though the right to alienate was withheld, and so it could not be sold or otherwise transferred at will. As with other royal endowments these could be forfeited in the event of rebellion, returning into the possession of the crown for to be re-assigned to those more loyal.³

The political significance of these incomes has been a point of contention amongst historians. Boutruche was sure of their importance in ensuring the loyalty of the Anglo-Gascon nobility.⁴ By contrast, Nicole de Peña was sceptical of their earlier significance in the fourteenth century.⁵ Vale agreed with regards the fifteenth, describing such grants as being worth only between 10 marks and £40 sterling per year and so unlikely to have been significant to the recipient.⁶ In fact some were much larger than this or drawn directly at source from customs, and so not always obvious. Moreover Vale did not fully take into account the impoverishment of the nobility and knights, an idea central to Boutruche’s work.⁷ The mere fact that the pensions tended to be reliably paid, even with the hand-to-mouth nature of duchy finances, is indicative of their importance. Therefore these deserve further discussion.

Some significant revenues assigned to key figures stand out. From 1337, precisely the beginning of the war, Arnaud (II) de Durfort (c.1275–1340), lord of Frespech, gained an income of 500 marks (£333 6s 8d) sterling every year from the customs charged at Saint-Macaire on all wines

¹ TNA, E 42/52; E 101/128/17. For more on Bertrucat d’Albret, see N. Savy, *Bertrucat d’Albret: Ou le destin d’un capitaine gascon du roi d’Angleterre pendant la guerre de Cent Ans* (Pradines, 2015).

² *GSR*, C 61/113: 14, 15.

³ For example: *GSR*, C 61/132: 115.

⁴ Boutruche, *La Crise*, pp. 350–1.

⁵ N. de Peña, ‘Vassaux Gascons au Service du Roi d’Angleterre dans la première moitié du XIV^e siècle: Fidélité ou esprit de profit?’, *Annales du Midi: Revue archéologique, historique et philologique de la France méridionale*, 88:126 (1976), pp. 5–21, at p. 21; *ibid.*, ‘Le roi d’Angleterre et les villes d’Aquitaine au début du XIV^e siècle’, *Annales du Midi: Revue archéologique, historique et philologique de la France méridionale*, 102:189–190 (1990), pp. 257–74.

⁶ Vale, *English Gascony*, pp. 202–4, particularly p. 203.

⁷ Boutruche, *La Crise*, pp. 247–342, 351.

transported down the Garonne from the *Haut-Pays*.¹ When insufficient this amount was underwritten by the *Château de l'Ombrière* treasury.² Despite subsequently defecting to the French this income was re-confirmed for his son Arnaud (III) in 1345 as part of the settlement with Henry of Lancaster (c.1310–61), earl of Derby, during his successful campaigns, as the Durforts re-joined the fold.³ This was a sizeable income worth 1,666*l* 13*s* 4*d* *bord.* per year at 1350s exchange rates. For comparison the archbishop of Bordeaux, often considered the greatest landowner in Gascony, only had total average annual revenues of 4,437*l* *bord.* (£887 8*s* sterling) over the period 1354–1368.⁴ It also gave the family a direct stake in the wine trade, especially that with the *Haut-Pays* where they also held many estates.⁵ The Durforts were an influential family and would count a seneschal, Gaillard [III] Durfort, lord of Duras and Blanquefort (d.1422) among their number, an office unachieved by any other Gascon in this whole period.⁶

The Montaut family, the lords of Mussidan, had been holders of an income from the wine customs at Blaye, but in 1356, after the establishment of wine staple at Bordeaux made these insufficient, the 600 tuns worth of tax per annum they were owed was to be paid from the *grande coutume* at Bordeaux, revenues valued at around 400*l* *bord.*⁷ Although this right was forfeited when Raymond (II) de Montaut (c.1335–1406), submitted to the French in 1377 after the battle of Eymet, this revenue was regained in 1410 by his daughter Maria de Montaut and her husband Johan de Gramont and was paid as a fixed disbursement in gold of 600 écus (1,000*l* *bord.*) per year.⁸ It was also retained by their successors, being finally granted to Francès de Gramont, lord of Gramont and Mussidan in 1441, before again reverting to the crown in 1444 on account of that lord's rebellion.⁹

From 1340, Bérard d'Albret and his heirs, the lords of Langoiran, Vayres and Rions, a cadet branch of the house (lords) of Albret, were granted an annual income of £130 sterling (then worth 1,950*l* *bord.*) drawn from the customs at Vayres and Rions on the lower Dordogne and Garonne respectively.¹⁰ These sums would continue to be generated by this family until the submission of Bérard (III) d'Albret (d.1379) to Louis, duke of Anjou (1339–84) at Saint-Macaire in October 1377, when they were returned to the crown and re-assigned.¹¹

By contrast, in 1368, that most loyal Anglo-Gascon lord, Jean [II] de Grailly (d.1376), the *capitain* de Buch, gained a grant from the Black Prince of 15*d* *bord.* per tun for life from a custom

¹ *Documents sur La maison de Durfort (XIe–XVe siècles)*, (ed.) N. de Peña, 1 (Bordeaux, 1977), p. 444 (no. 749).

² *Ibid.*, p. 519 (no. 858).

³ *Ibid.*, p. 554 (no. 916); *GSR*, C 61/57: 82; also see: K. Fowler, *The King's Lieutenant: Henry of Grosmont, First Duke of Lancaster 1310–1361* (London, 1969), pp. 62–5. Arnaud (III) was later vicomte of Labourd.

⁴ Lodge, *Gascony under English Rule*, p. 193. The revenues of the archbishop are calculated by the author from figures presented in Boutruche, *La Crise*, p. 263.

⁵ *Documents sur la maison de Durfort*, I, introduction, XXX.

⁶ Vale, *English Gascony*, pp. 41–2; also see M.J. Favre, *Précis historique sur la famille de Durfort Duras* (Marmande, 1858).

⁷ *GSR*, C 61/117: 27; TNA, SC 8/161/8029.

⁸ *GSR*, C 61/113: 55; C 61/117: 38; C 61/131: 18; C 61/117: 27; TNA, E 101/189/12, fol. 106r.

⁹ *GSR*, C 61/131: 18; C 61/132: 115; TNA, E 101/192/8, fol. 41r.

¹⁰ *AHG*, XXIII, pp. 438–42.

¹¹ *Les archives de Vayres*, pp. 784–5 (nos 631–2).

taken on wine transported through Cadillac on the Garonne below Saint-Macaire. His successors after him would gain $2\frac{1}{2}d$ *bord.* per tun.¹ Claims on the customs at Cadillac were made by and granted to his heirs in the house of Grailly-Foix through to Gaston de Foix (d.1455), *capitain de Buch*, and count of Longueville and Benauges in 1440 – a strong supporter of the Plantagenet cause to the last.² Although seemingly a small grant, if sufficient quantities were to arrive from outside the Bordelais the income accrued by the Graillys could be significant. Thus as with the Durforts, it gave them a strong incentive towards the re-conquest or pacification of the Bazadais and Agenais to ensure this, which they periodically achieved. Such incomes might equally encourage defence. In 1441 the same Gaston de Foix was given a further income on the wines and a vast array of other goods passing through the town of Castillon de Périgord, on the Dordogne, in order that he repair its defences and ‘avoid it being lost to the king’s enemies’.³

The house of Montferrand, the lords of Montferrand and later *soudans de La Trau*, were also amongst the nobles important to the Plantagenet cause gaining incomes from wine, especially in the fifteenth century.⁴ In April 1400, Bertrand [II] de Montferrand (c.1345–1409/10) gained the right to draw $6d$ *bord.* per *livre* (2.5%) on the value of wine from the *Pays-Rebelles* passing through Langoiran and Podensac on the lower Garonne.⁵ In the same month he gained an annual income of £40 sterling (then $300l$ *bord.*) paid from the *grande coutume*. These concessions continued to provide an income for the Montferrands until the fall of Bordeaux to the French in 1451.⁶

The timing of these and many other grants leaves us little doubt that their purpose was to ensure support for Henry IV subsequent to his deposition of Richard II in 1399, at which time there was a significant increase in patronage for a number of years (Figure 3). Another spike occurred during 1405–8 to coincide precisely with the campaigns of the Bernard [VII] (1360–1418) count of Armagnac and then duke of Orléans, which threatened what remained of the duchy.⁷ Indeed, most of the new incomes granted on wine customs and other new privileges in the last decades of Plantagenet rule date from autumn 1399 until around 1410. New annuities worth $8,570l$ *bord.* (£1,142 10s sterling) per year were given in this period alone, as well as fractional shares of customs of indeterminate value.⁸

¹ *AHG*, VI, pp. 371–2.

² *GSR*, C 61/131: 85; C 61/130: 21; C 61/130: 22.

³ *GSR*, C 61/131: 85.

⁴ Bailey, ‘Les Châteaux de Landiras et de Montferrand—Part One’, pp. 81–93, at p. 89; D.A. Bailey, ‘Les Châteaux de Landiras et de Montferrand and Their Seigneurial Families—Part Two: Two Families—One Destiny’, *Advances in Historical Studies*, 2:3 (2013), pp. 156–66, at p. 156.

⁵ *GSR*, C 61/107: 140; C 61/116: 16; *TNA*, C 81/662/434.

⁶ For instance in 1438, Bertrand [III], lord of Montferrand (1380–1435/46) was paid, in lieu of the £40 sterling, a total of 600 gold francs (by then valued at $750l$ *bord.*) directly from the *grande coutume*, see *TNA*, E 101/192/8, fol. 41r.

⁷ For full details of these campaigns, see Pépin, ‘The French Offensives of 1404–1407’, pp. 1–40.

⁸ See Appendices 1.3–4.




Figure 3 Total number of privileges given in the wine trade in Gascony per year (burgess or other similar status, incomes, offices, tax exemptions, special import/export licences), 1350–1453. **Source:** Appendix 1.

These were disbursements the *Château de l'Ombrière* could ill-afford, but were nevertheless necessary because the Lancastrian succession had provoked a political crisis in Gascony, partly the result of longstanding antagonisms between the duchy's elites and Henry IV's father, John of Gaunt, duke of Lancaster.¹ That said, grants were needed to support longstanding allies as much as garner new support, indeed, a good number of grants explicitly record that they were made on account of 'good service to John of Gaunt and to the current king'.² Expressly martial conditions of grants appear especially prevalent after the succession, as full continental war with France was resumed after the repudiation of the truce of Leulinghem, which had held to some degree from 1389 to 1402. In that latter year Bernat [IV] de Lesparre (c.1370–1419), lord of Labarde, gained 120 gold *écus* per year (200*l bord.*) on the customs at Libourne, taxed on wine from the *Haut-Pays* coming down the Dordogne.³ Then the following year he was granted a further £100 sterling per year (750*l bord.*) on the wine custom at Aiguillon, high on the Garonne, provided it could be retaken.⁴ This amounted to a substantial income, and even when the latter failed to materialise because the town was still in enemy hands, the equivalent was paid out of the *grande coutume* instead.⁵ In July 1406, Sir Johan de Montlau (c.1375–c.1440), lord of Montlau, was given a revenue of 140 gold *écus* (233*l 6s 8s bord.*) per annum from the *issac*, provided he himself occupy nearby Saint-Émilion then maintain and defend the town against the French and pro-French

¹ See Chapter 4.2.

² *GSR*, C 61/108: 119; C 61/116: 16; C 61/107: 83; C 61/108: 107; C 61/108: 108; C 61/111: 13; C 61/118: 33; C 61/113: 111–112; C 61/118: 33.

³ *GSR*, C 61/116: 16, C 61/109: 137.

⁴ *GSR*, C 61/109: 136.

⁵ *GSR*, C 61/113: 16.

routiers.¹ This decision came just before the 1406–7 offensive by the duke of Orléans in the northern marches of the duchy.² It must have been expected that Saint-Émilion was a target, and required supplementary defence. The English knight Sir John Tiptoft (d.1443), later Baron Tiptoft, who had actually served briefly as royal butler from 1407, and held estates in the Bordelais, also gained an income from the *issac* on taverns and revenues of the Bordeaux market in October 1408.³ This Lancastrian stalwart also then held the office of seneschal of the Landes, and the keeper of the castle of Dax in the vulnerable southern marches of the duchy, and this income could have been intended to aid him in this task.⁴

Such top officials holding posts within the government of the duchy, the seneschals and constables, could command large salaries paid from the collective incomes of the treasury, however such men were also major beneficiaries of additional incomes derived directly from wine customs.⁵ This became increasingly common from the Lancastrian succession onwards, perhaps as a guarantee of wages where the duchy's finances could not be relied upon, or as an extra incentive to agree to serve and remain loyal overseas. In November 1399, William Langbrook, who had been constable 1390–6 but had returned for another term that year, was given *2½d bord.* per tun and *200l bord.* per year to be taken from the *coutume royan*.⁶ This amounted to that entire tax. In February 1400 his predecessor and successor as constable Henry Bowet (d.1423), who rose to prominence in the service of John of Gaunt, was allocated the proceeds of three parts of the revenues of the market of Bordeaux and also gained *4d bord.* in the *livre* (1.66%) of all merchandise passing Langon on the Garonne.⁷ This practice then continued through to the end of Plantagenet rule, with the constables and controllers often given incomes from this source.⁸ Some, such as John Pykborne, controller in the 1440s, also received incomes from the *issac*.⁹

Financial rewards were an ever-increasing drain on the ducal purse. This was epitomized by the case of Bernard Angevin (d.1478). An influential Gascon in the administration during its last decades, he, at various times, served as regent, councillor, constable and as a controller of wine customs, and was later made the lord of Rauzan, Puyols and Blasimount.¹⁰ In 1430 he received from a grateful king £10 sterling from the first take on the custom each year on top of his 15 marks

¹ *GSR*, C 61/111: 43.

² Pépin, 'The French Offensives of 1404–1407', pp. 1–40, at pp. 17–30.

³ L. Clark, 'Tiptoft, John, first Baron Tiptoft (c.1378–1443)', *ODNB* <<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/27470>, accessed 8 Sept 2016>; *GSR*, C 61/119: 69; *AHG*, XVI, pp. 110–1. These rights and incomes were then reconfirmed in 1422 and 1425, *AHG*, XVI, pp. 112–8.

⁴ The Landes had been attacked by the French previously in 1404, see Pépin, 'The French Offensives of 1404–1407', pp. 1–40, at pp. 7–9.

⁵ Constables commonly earned wages of 4s sterling a day, the same as a baron would be paid on campaign. The two controllers were paid 2s sterling a day, the same as a knight, and the constables' lieutenants were paid 1s a day. For examples, see TNA, E 101/180/9, fos 29v–30r; E 101/187/12, fos 8v–9r.

⁶ Runyan, 'The Constabulary of Bordeaux', pp. 42–84, at p. 51; *Livre des coutumes*, p. 610; *GSR*, C 61/92: 19.

⁷ See T.F. Tout, 'Bowet, Henry (d. 1423)', rev. J.J.N. Palmer, *ODNB* <<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/3062>>; *AHG*, XVI, pp. 166–169; *GSR*, C 61/91: 105; C 61/107: 93.

⁸ *GSR*, C 61/131: 98; C 61/132: 36; C 61/131: 100; C 61/133: 7.

⁹ *GSR*, C 61/107: 44; C 61/128: 25–6; C 61/133: 7.

¹⁰ TNA, C 61/133B. For more on the career of Bernard Angevin, see the notes of Jean Barennes held in ADG, 4 J 1247.

wages.¹ By 1438, Angevin had accumulated revenues for himself of 1,523*l* 15*s* 10*d* *bord.* from the ducal treasury.² This was paid at a time when the constable's books reveal huge portions of ducal income written off on account of incursions by French forces under Charles [III] (1407–71), lord of Albret, and those of the Castilian routier Rodrigo de Villandrando (d.1457), and when the constable had actually needed to borrow almost exactly the same amount to pay for defence.³

Some offices appeared well on their way to becoming sinecures. The office of gauger in Bordeaux, supposedly responsible for the quality control of exported wine, came with a fee of 5*d* *bord.* for every tun shipped, regardless of provenance. This mirrored a similar role in London, but unlike in England where it was a clerk's position, in Gascony it was given to senior figures. It was assigned to Auger de Montaut (1305–59), lord of Mussidan, in April 1356 as part of a package of financial benefits given to this important nobleman in return for the castle of Blanquefort, recently returned to the Durforts.⁴ After his son and successor Raymond de Montaut submitted to the French after the battle of Eymet in 1377 this too was forfeit and instead given to the great beneficiary of this tempestuous period – Sir John de Stratton (c.1340–95).⁵ This Cheshire knight and former retainer of the Black Prince (from 1362) settled in Gascony, served as constable 1381–6, and gained the title lord of Landiras by marriage.⁶ Montaut evidently refused to vacate the office when he returned to Plantagenet loyalty, as it required a letters patent to the king's lieutenant in the duchy to eject him in 1381.⁷ In February 1400, after Stratton's death, the office was also given along with his lands to the constable Henry Bowet, and his heirs in perpetuity, as part of the Lancastrian efforts to secure support among those experienced in administering Gascony.⁸ After his return to England this policy continued with the appointment, with Bowet's initial approval (by now bishop of Bath and Wells, later archbishop of York), of Pey de Contis in 1406, an obscure squire from Bayonne for 'the good service he did to John of Gaunt and the current king'.⁹ A dispute between Contis and Bowet over money allowed Raymond de Montaut's daughter to regain the gauger revenues for herself, requiring royal intervention to restore Contis to the office.¹⁰ Then in February 1426 the office passed by inheritance to the archbishop's heir Nicholas Bowet.¹¹ That it should be a

¹ '...because of the small wages he had received and of the great work he had done in the king's service, of £10 sterling each year on 25 December by the hand of the constable of Bordeaux from the first revenues of the wine custom levied at the city of Bordeaux, notwithstanding the annual wages of 15 marks.... he receives as king's councillor from the first revenues of the wine custom of Bordeaux', *GSR*, C 61/125: 7; C 61/125: 6. Both were paid methodically from wine receipts, see Walter Colles' receipt book of 1434–5, TNA, E 101/191/11, fos 11v, 14r.

² TNA, E 101/192/8, fos 35, 38v–39r.

³ TNA, E 101/192/8, fos 22v, 24r, 26v, 45r; Labarge, *Gascony*, p. 210.

⁴ TNA, SC 8/161/8029; *GSR*, C 61/117: 27.

⁵ *GSR*, C 61/91: 105–106, C 61/95: 29; *AHG*, XVI, pp. 166–9.

⁶ For genealogical details, see Wright, 'The Accounts of John de Stratton and John Gedeney', pp. 238–307, at pp. 243–4; also see D.A. Bailey, 'Les Châteaux de Landiras et de Montferrand and their Seigneurial Families—Part One: Setting, Medieval History, and Genealogy', *Advances in Historical Studies*, 2:2 (2013) pp. 81–93, at p. 82–3; also Boutruche, *La Crise*, p. 134.

⁷ *GSR*, C 61/95: 29.

⁸ *GSR*, C 61/107: 93; *AHG*, XVI, pp. 144–6.

⁹ *GSR*, C 61/111: 71.

¹⁰ *GSR*, C 61/112: 82.

¹¹ *GSR*, C 61/121: 13; C 61/121: 29; *AHG*, XVI, pp. 139–41.

source of such dispute indicates how potentially lucrative it could be relative to the other sources of income available in the duchy. Yet given the complaints in 1432 and 1445 as to the dramatic deterioration of the quality of Gascon wine it is clear the office no longer functioned as to its original purpose, but was simply a means of generating cash.¹ The other lesser posts in the management of the wine trade that were assigned by the crown to Gascons paid reasonably well, between 50 and 120 gold francs per annum (62*l* 10*s*–150*l* *bord.*), such as that of clerk of the constable of Bordeaux ‘in charge of the levy the customs on the wine’, and the controller of the tithes on wine arriving from enemy lands at Saint-Macaire, or the equivalent customs at Libourne.² These were never inherited yet were equally contentious. The control of the latter tithe was particularly sought after for it evidently allowed access to significant funds, deemed sufficient to raise a further 500 marks sterling (2500*l* *bord.*) in 1409 to repair the ailing defences of the town.³ As part of the wave of new Lancastrian appointments, Guiraut Provost, the captain and a burgess of the Dordogne town was employed in the post from December 1399, but refused to give it up when a certain esquire, Johan Ayrat, was appointed as his replacement in September 1404.⁴ It required the intervention of the king remove him.

*

Such wrangling over wages and annuities was not unique to the wine trade, indeed it was a common feature of the late medieval economy, much as were the constant efforts by towns and guilds to gain trade advantages. These were all, in the modern estimation, economic rents on the wine trade, that is to say unproductive revenues exacted from the economy. Incomes from commerce were either rents redistributed from the crown’s own customary exactions, or newly imposed tolls to satisfy a local lord. Trade privileges manipulated the market and gave the holders revenues far above what would be otherwise possible, at the expense of other market participants and consumers. Even by contemporary standards it must be concluded that political intervention in the wine trade was largely defined by rent-seeking, a great deal of energy was spent extracting a greater share of existing wealth rather than investing to grow the economy. Indeed, the sheer amount of work chancery devoted to addressing requests for such rents illustrate their importance to the political system. Moreover because economic rents were, in effect, coercively-extracted value above the normal profit necessary for the trade to take place – the long term effect was almost certainly either to have raised prices or to have had a deleterious effect on the scale of the wine trade.

¹ TNA, SC 8/336/15860, SC 8/199/9901; ‘Henry VI: May 1432’, item 43, *PROME, BHO*; ‘Henry VI: February 1445’, item 46, *PROME, BHO*.

² *GSR*, C 61/107: 87; C 61/109: 178–9; C 61/113: 153–4; C 61/111: 77; C 61/114: 18; C 61/114: 20; C 61/119: 3.

³ TNA, SC 8/187/9342; SC 8/269/13409; *GSR*, C 61/108: 29; C 61/113: 23.

⁴ *GSR*, C 61/109: 178–9; C 61/113: 153–4.

2.3 Influencing prices

2.3.1 English prices and price controls

Much of the interaction between government and market to some extent concerned prices. Wine prices in England were unstable. The cost of a tun of wine in the kingdom could vary considerably year-on-year because of its dependence on foreign imports and because the wine itself was so perishable, being usually discarded after not much more than a year.¹ The coefficient of variation (C_v), a common measure of market volatility in modern economics, was 31.4% for annual means of domestic wine prices between 1250 and 1499 in terms of silver, far higher than more durable goods such as wool cloth (26.9%), though lower than locally grown staples such as wheat (40.2%).² Meanwhile the long-term trend was for consumer prices to rise steadily in nominal terms, from £3–5 sterling per tun during c.1250 to c.1340 rising to £7–10 during 1400 to 1500 (Figure 4, overleaf). If adjusted for the quantity of pure silver this represented fifteenth century prices largely levelled out. The stand-out exception to these trends was a period of significantly higher and more volatile prices from the late 1330s until the early 1380s. During these four decades average prices rose far beyond the normal trend, a first great spike coincided precisely with the outbreak of the Hundred Years' War in 1337 and another in the years immediately following the arrival of the Black Death in 1348–9, when prices in England more than doubled. Margery James understood most changes in price in terms of shifts in supply from Gascony through the effects of war and plague on production and transmission of stocks, rather than demand in England.³ Whilst such supply shocks were important, and will be discussed below, to ignore demand shocks entirely is short sighted. The onset of plague mortality produced an increased GDP per capita and the mobilisation of previously hoarded wealth that, may have contributed to the increased demand for luxuries such as wine amongst consumers in England and Gascony from 1349.⁴

¹ Renouard, 'Le grand commerce', pp. 270–3, at p. 282; *ibid.*, 'Le vin vieux au moyen âge', pp. 447–55.

² The coefficient of variation (C_v) is the ratio of the standard deviation (σ) relative to the mean (μ) of a dataset, expressed here as a percentage (%):

$$C_v = \frac{\sigma}{\mu} \times 100$$

The English price dataset used here are those provided by G. Clark, *English Prices and Wages, 1209–1914* (2003), <gpih.ucdavis.edu/files/England_1209-1914_(Clark).xls>. It should be noted that Clark's prices are gathered from observations of all types of wine, not only Gascon, and are from sources across England, both retail and wholesale. They also would include both export and import taxes. This is therefore most useful for the overall trends.

³ James, *Studies*, pp. 19–31.

⁴ Hatcher, 'England in the Aftermath of the Black Death', pp. 3–35, at pp. 17–8, 25–6, 33; Hunt, Murray, *History of Business*, p. 139; C. Dyer, *Standards of Living in the Later Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 1989), p. 159.




Figure 4 Mean wine prices in England, all types, in pounds sterling per tun, 1250–1500.

Source: Calculated by the author from G. Clark, *English Prices and Wages, 1209–1914* (2003), provided in Appendix 9.1.

The rise in price was as obvious to contemporaries as it is observable in the modern data, though they themselves blamed neither the war nor the plague. Instead it was stated at the parliament of October to November 1362 that the ‘connivance of various men’ was at fault and the commons called for an ‘inquiry into foreign people’.¹ It is this sentiment that sparked decades of political action. To some extent the statute of 1353 that established the Bordeaux staple, and certainly those restricting the merchants purchasing wine in Gascony in 1363 and 1368, were all reactions to high prices.² There were also efforts to tackle the problem directly by the imposition of price controls. Retail prices for wine in England, those paid at taverns or in markets in small quantities, had for centuries been fixed by assize to a penny rate per gallon.³ These rates were local though usually followed a lead set by London, the largest market. Historically this was 2–4d sterling per gallon, but under the influence of the newly established *mistry* of the Vintry official retail assize prices in London had briefly reached 10d sterling per gallon (£10 10s sterling per tun)

¹ It was declared that ‘wine and other victuals in the cities of London, York, Bristol, Hull, Boston and all other cities, boroughs and towns of the realm are so dear and fixed at so great a price for individual profit’, ‘Edward III: October 1362’, item 19, *PROME, BHO*.

² *SR*, 1, pp. 331, (27 Edw. III, st.1, c.5–7), 379 (37 Edw. III, c.5), 389 (42 Edw. III, c.8); see Chapter 2.1.2.

³ *SR*, 1, p. 50 (6 Edw. I, c.15); p. 264 (4 Edw. III c.12); Sargeant, ‘The Wine Trade with Gascony’, pp. 257–311, at p. 302; James, *Studies*, p. 23; J. Davis, *Medieval Market Morality: Life, Law and Ethics in the English Marketplace, 1200–1500* (Cambridge, 2014), pp. 248–50.

in both 1373 and 1380 as a response to wholesale price spikes, these explicitly blamed on speculative trading by both merchant ‘sellers’ and ‘buyers’ in the overseas trade.¹

Then at the parliament of late 1381, early 1382, a centrally-enforced maximum retail price of just 6d sterling per gallon was imposed, with some small consideration given to variations in transportation costs with distance.² In addition maximum wholesale prices in England were set for the first time, well below the prevailing price level, at 100s sterling per tun for the ‘best wine’ (£5 sterling) and 7 marks per tun for the ‘common wine’ (£4 13s 4d sterling). This still allowed retail merchants in England a mark-up of between 26%–35% depending on quality, but might threaten the margins for the overseas wholesale trade. The statute clearly stated that this imposition was intended to be in effect for only 12 to 24 months, hoping that ‘it should happen that cloth, and other commodities of the kingdom go to seek wine and other things which we shall need’. Special provision was made ‘always that no trouble shall arise through this ordinance for the town of Bordeaux, nor for our other lieges and places’. Yet when these rules were allowed to expire this legislation continued to hold some influence over the setting of prices. The retail price, fixed at 6d per gallon in London, remained in place apart from one short term rise in the 1390s, and this created a low price ceiling for retail sales in the capital of £6 6s sterling per tun which remained in place for the remainder of the Plantagenet tenure of Aquitaine.³

The achievement of effective price controls should always be doubted in any economy. Wholesale stocks would be checked by gaugers, for quality and quantity control, but such officers lacked the resources to oversee all transactions. The enforcement of sales among taverns and retailers was easier as this followed strict established procedures of checks and punishments dating back to Edward I.⁴ The usual consequences of efforts to suppress the price of a good irrespective of supply and demand, are to create shortages in the legitimate market and generate strong incentives to smuggle the good and sell them instead at higher black market prices. Shortly after the 1381 act was put into effect the period of high average English prices did come to an abrupt end, falling significantly over the next couple of years, becoming increasingly stable, and re-joining the long-term trend (Figure 4). The controls may therefore have had some dampening effect on prices, indeed, James’s cited examples of wholesale prices in England between 1405 and 1453 averaged £5 16s 4d per tun, not far above the mandated maximum of 1381, and well below the retail price ceiling.⁵ Volatility was much reduced also. The C_v in terms of silver fell from 26% in 1335–84 to just 16.1% over 1385–1449. It is difficult to prove, but it is certainly expected price controls would have come at an overall cost to supply. Sure enough exports from Gascon ports did fall from an

¹ ‘Folios cxii – cxx: Sept 1318’, in *Calendar of Letter-Books of the City of London: E, 1314–1337*, (ed.) R.R. Sharpe (London, 1903), pp. 134–43, *BHO*; ‘Folio xxxv: May 1376’, in *Calendar of Letter-Books of the City of London: H, 1375–1399*, (ed.) R.R. Sharpe (London, 1907), pp. 24–32, *BHO*; ‘Folio cxx b - April 1380’, in *ibid.*, pp. 127–47, *BHO*.

² ‘Richard II: November 1381’, item 107, *PROME, BHO; SR*, 2, pp. 18–9 (5 Rich. II, c.4).

³ James, *Studies*, pp. 50–2, 60–3. The 6d sterling per gallon assize price meant a £6 6s sterling per tun retail price assuming a standard tun of 252 gallons, though there would have certainly been some loss for sediment and spoilage.

⁴ Davis, *Medieval Market Morality*, pp. 248–50.

⁵ Calculated by the author from James, *Studies*, pp. 64–7.

average of around 20–30,000 tuns during the Brétigny period (1360–9) to 10–15,000 tuns per year in the first half of the fifteenth century.¹

2.3.2 Gascon prices: the measure of the market

In Gascony annual wholesale prices, whether for export or domestic sale, fluctuated even more violently than in England with a C_v when valued in terms of silver of 33.6% in 1335–84, dropping only slightly to 31.5% over 1385–1449.² If intra-annual variation is included observed volatility rises ever higher.³ For after grape harvests took place between mid-August and the end of September, prices of wine in Bordeaux and Libourne remained high in the early autumn when only the wine from the nearest vineyards in the suburbs, followed by that from across the Bordelais, began to come up for sale in significant quantities.⁴

If such seasonal cycles of the agricultural calendar had a powerful effect, so too did the politically-imposed market structure and merchant behaviour. The 1353 statute forbade the English themselves from engaging in advanced purchase agreements ahead of the official trading periods, or from buying merchandise outside of Bordeaux, so it was ensured that there would be what Sargeant termed ‘an abnormal demand’. This was an overwhelming concentration of buyers in the city only at specific times, keen to ship wine back to England promptly to sell in turn at the best prices to the wealthiest customers there.⁵ Consequently, soon after the harvest, during their protected sales period, the richer burgesses bought up the product of poorer burgesses’ vineyards to resell at greater prices to these English merchants, as evidenced by the increasing proportion of exported wine taxed with the *issac*.⁶ The higher this share, the more speculative the export market was, behaviour which would certainly count as archetypal ‘forestalling’. Likewise, the tactic of actually preventing the loading of English ships until higher prices were paid, when reported in 1359, was described as such.⁷ These were likely the very practices, ‘connivances’, so bemoaned at the parliaments of 1362, and 1368.⁸

After the Bordeaux burgesses’ monopoly over sales ended at Martinmas (11 November) a relative glut of wine in the city would moderate prices during its busiest sales period.⁹ Bordeaux’s surviving customs’ books indicate that 53.7% of consignments, 54.8% by volume, were shipped in

¹ See Appendix 3.1.

² These C_v calculations are for transactions of claret wine or those considered to be so; based on prices in Appendix 8.1.

³ Including price variation within the year gives a C_v of 40.7% in 1335–1384 and 39.7% in 1385–1449.

⁴ The accounts of the archbishop of Bordeaux record the harvest in 1361 occurring between last week of August and the end of September depending on the location of the parish, see *AHG*, XXI, pp.651–2, 685–92.

⁵ Sargeant, ‘The Wine Trade with Gascony’, pp. 257–311, at p. 301.

⁶ See Appendix 3.3 for *issac* payment statistics. See also Chapter 3.4.1 for burgess trading habits.

⁷ TNA, C 61/72, m. 6.

⁸ ‘Edward III: October 1362’, item 19, *PROME, BHO; SR*, 1, pp. 331 (27 Edw. III, st.1, c.5–7), 379 (37 Edw. III, c.5), 389 (42 Edw. III, c.8).

⁹ For the burgess monopoly, see Chapter 2.2.1.

November and December each year.¹ By early spring, prices in Gascon ports began to rise again as exports combined with domestic consumption to reduce the quantity of wine available for purchase, and as any replenishment of supply from the hinterland dried up. By the summer prices were frequently 50% higher than in winter as merchants and domestic consumers chased the little residual wine stocks remaining in the city. Any prudent speculators who had hoarded wine in their cellars across the city until the later part of the agricultural year would find eager buyers and fat profits. Indeed this too was institutionalised by the Bordeaux burgesses, who after 1397, held another monopoly over the wines sold at taverns in the city from Pentecost to Michaelmas.²




Figure 5 Mean wholesale wine (claret) price in the Bordelais, in *livres bordelaise*.

Source: Appendix 8.1.1.

Total annual supply clearly originated in regional agricultural productivity. Unfortunately there is no single commentator in Bordeaux whose diaries survive, as there are for Paris, to provide continuous first-hand evidence of the weather and state of grape harvests.³ There are instead sporadic individual references to: extremely cold winters in Bordeaux of 1354, 1363–4 and 1404–8; bad wheat harvests in 1374; flooding of rivers in 1404, 1430, 1435 and 1441; all suggestive of terrible vintages. By contrast: early harvests in 1355 and 1361; prompt harvests in 1378, 1382,

¹ This is calculated based on 2,933 transactions, between 1348 and 1449, involving the Bordeaux church and a sample of fourteen burgess families, see Appendices 4.1.5 and 4.3.2.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 195–6, 268.

³ *Journal d'un Bourgeois de Paris, 1405–1449*, (ed.) H. Champion (Paris, 1881); *A Parisian journal 1405–1449 / translated from the anonymous Journal d'un bourgeois de Paris*, (trns.) J. Shirley (Oxford, 1968).

1383, 1393 and 1413; all indicate excellent yields.¹ The grape harvest in 1376 was described by the burgess of Libourne in his chronicle as being the ‘grant binada’ or ‘great vintage’.² Such reports are difficult to interpret both because of a tendency towards hyperbole and because they are usually observations from single locations. With regards the latter production could well have been impacted by some short term weather events which struck the wider continent. H.H. Lamb highlighted the Europe-wide storms and freezing weather of the winter 1431–2, said to have killed vines.³ Harry Miskimin likewise observed the wider impact of the weather in 1406–10 and 1438–39.⁴ Such implied correlation should however be treated with care as weather could have an equal or greater impact on shipping than harvests. By contrast climactic changes across longer periods are potentially far more prominent in the price data. Bruce Campbell, in compiling decades of climactic research, has stressed the importance of an anomaly in the 1340s and 1350s that brought very wet weather and low summer temperatures to Europe.⁵ Such conditions could certainly be expected to lower grape yields and drive up prices, indeed the trends in England and Gascon price data certainly do not preclude that possibility.

Weather was not, of course, the only event in these years which could have disrupted the wine supply. Observers will also scour wine price fluctuations for signs of the recurring outbreaks of *Yersinia pestis*, and the regular famines that came in their wake. Such episodes are reported by an array of chronicles to have hit Bordeaux in 1348–49, 1355, 1361–2, 1364, 1368–71, 1373–4, 1401–2 and 1411–2.⁶ Unfortunately price observations in Gascony are lacking for the initial great outbreak, estimated to have killed 30–50% of Europe’s population, though Clark’s price data for England indicate prices there more than doubled.⁷ Its effects on agriculture were likely as described by Henry Knighton in England, that a shortage of labour due to the mortality forced up wages, whilst a proportion of crops remained unharvested, reducing supply, such that market prices at the ports of the duchy rose correspondingly.⁸ In Gascony this was quickly offset by declining domestic

¹ M. McCormick, J. Kabala, A. More, L. Grigoli, B. Maione-Downing, L. Hofer, B. Rennix, M. Waldinger, ‘Draft 3: Western European Climate from Written Sources, ca. 1300 to ca. 1500 - REPORTS,’ *DARMC Scholarly Data Series, Data Contribution Series 2015-2*. DARMC, Center for Geographic Analysis, Harvard University, Cambridge (2016); Report IDs: 2626, 2996–7, 2997, 3143–4, 3192, 3213, 3247, 3366–7, 3478, 3815, 3897, 3941, 4040, 4062, 4187, 4326, 4468, 6045, 6072, 4588–9, 4590, 4712, 4854, 4958, 6387, 6540, 6602–3.

² ‘Petite chronique de Guyenne’, pp. 53–79, at p. 63.

³ H.H. Lamb, ‘Britain’s Changing Climate’, *The Geographical Journal*, 133:4 (1967), pp. 445–66, at pp. 459–64.

⁴ Miskimin, *Money, Prices, and Foreign Exchange*, pp. 64–5, 67.

⁵ B.M.S. Campbell, *The Great Transition: Climate, Disease and Society in the Late-Medieval World* (Cambridge, 2016), pp. 277–286; also see *ibid.*, ‘Nature as Historical Protagonist: Environment and Society in Pre-industrial England’, *Economic History Review*, 2nd series, 63:2 (2010), pp. 281–314.

⁶ ‘Petite chronique de Guyenne’, pp. 53–79, at 62–3; *The Anonimale Chronicle: 1333 to 1381*, (ed.) V.H. Galbraith (London, 1927), p. 74; *Petite chronique de Périgueux (1385–1415)*, (ed.) C.-H. Piraud, *Bulletin de la Société historique et archéologique du Périgord*, CXXX (2003), pp. 326–7; *St. Albans Chronicle*, (ed.) V.H. Galbraith (Oxford, 1937), pp. 58–9.

⁷ G. Christakos, R.A. Olea, M.L. Serre, H.-L. Yu, L.-L. Wang, *Interdisciplinary Public Health Reasoning and Epidemic Modelling: The Case of Black Death* (Berlin, Heidelberg, 2005), pp. 228–9; Clark, *English Prices and Wages*.

⁸ Henry Knighton, *Chronicon Henrici Knighton Vel Cniithon, Monachi Leycestrensis*, 2, (ed.) J.R. Lumby (London, 1889–95), pp. 58–65.

demand, due to mortality, and disrupted export demand, probably resulting in a corresponding price crash soon after.

As for the impact of war, Postan credited the ‘direct effects of military operations’ with a ‘faithful reflection in the statistics of fourteenth century exports’.¹ This is also true of prices. Fluctuations can, crudely at least, chronicle the most frenetic periods of pronounced military activity. During the opening years of war between 1337 and 1341 nominal prices in Bordeaux rose 212.2%. In the mid-1350s they rose again, and this coincided with the campaigns of the Black Prince across the region.² There was a price rise of 114.1% during 1377–80 in the wake of invasions into the heart of the duchy by the duke of Anjou, defeat at Eymet and loss of territory, the previous year.³ Prices also rose in a similarly spectacular fashion during 1405–8 to coincide precisely with the campaigns of the Bernard [VII] (1360–1418) count of Armagnac and then duke of Orléans, and again in 1421 while the Anglo-Gascons were engaged in offensive operations retaking some territory adjacent to the Bordelais.⁴

It should be made clear that the link between war and price was not necessarily a consequence of direct destruction of productive capacity. Victor Davis Hanson’s arguments regarding the limited impact of soldiers on the vines themselves hold some sway here.⁵ Of particular relevance was that armies of the period were usually small and rarely stayed in one area for long. Instead fixed capital assets such as wine-presses, vats, barns, cellars, carts, cranes, and barrels were destroyed with fire by troops passing through, even if at speed. The presence of soldiers, particularly those that were hostile, interrupted harvests, and forced the fracturing of larger markets in the short-term by blocking roads or deterring merchants from passing near them. In short, where disease and famine were destroyers of labour, war was the destroyer of capital.

All too often only the impact of war on supply is discussed.⁶ Unfortunately it is less often commented on how any money spent in the support of households, armies or garrisons could find its way into the wine market through expenses on victuals, and this would force up prices for merchants in its ports. This would best explain the rise in prices in Bordeaux as the Black Prince’s victorious army returned to city in the autumn of 1356, and subsequent fall after the Prince left for England the following spring. Likewise, this is why his large court in the 1360s generated

¹ M.M. Postan, *Medieval Trade and Finance* (Cambridge, 1973), pp. 168–9.

² See H.J. Hewitt, *The Black Prince’s expedition of 1355–1357* (Manchester, 1958).

³ *Les Grandes chroniques de France*, 12, (ed.) Delachenal, pp. 186–8; Jean Froissart, *Chronicles*, MS Stonyhurst 1, fos 357r–v, 358r, *The Online Froissart* (hereafter *TOF*) <<http://www.hrionline.ac.uk/onlinefroissart>>, (eds.) P. Ainsworth and G. Croenen (Sheffield, 2013).

⁴ Pépin, ‘The French Offensives of 1404–1407’, pp. 1–40; Vale, *English Gascony*, p. 86.

⁵ V.D. Hanson, *Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece* (Berkeley, 1998), pp. 68–71. Hanson’s scepticism was multifaceted. He asserted that vines could not easily be trampled underfoot. They could not be burned from April to November each year as their shoots were green and could not be ignited. In those months the manpower and physical labour required to cut down the thousands of vines would be too high for the small armies involved. If cut down, the roots would need to be also dug out otherwise new growths would appear the following spring. Areas in which vines were destroyed could be replanted with cuttings and bear fruit within three years.

⁶ This limited perspective can be seen in comments by both Christopher Allmand and Michael Postan, each from his own military or economic viewpoint respectively: C. Allmand, *The Hundred Years War: England and France at War c.1300–c.1450* (Cambridge, 1988, repr. 1989), pp. 122–3; Postan, *Medieval Trade and Finance*, pp. 168–9.

complaints by English merchants at the time that their suppliers could get better prices domestically.¹ Such demand effects could equally apply in French-held territory. In 1442, prices in Riscle were 26.6% higher than in Montreal-du-Gers, despite being just 25 miles (40.25 km) apart, because the French king and his army were nearby.²

The critical point is, as Epstein rightly noted, that, ‘price volatility is strictly speaking a function of the efficiency of urban supply structures and the elasticity of demand rather than of harvest output’.³ In other words what mattered was the degree to which supply and demand naturally responded to sudden price changes.⁴ This dictated the scale of the overseas trade. As a commodity, wine in Gascony was an everyday necessity with inelastic demand, but this only absorbed a small proportion of supply. In northern markets it was an expensive luxury, with ale and later hopped-beer viable substitutes. Thus with the exception of that proportion of wine destined for the wealthiest of consumers, namely the English king and magnates, demand for the bulk of exports could be expected to be very elastic indeed. As such, Lodge was incorrect when she stated that ‘English demand for wine was constant’.⁵ Some was constant - but not all.

It has long been observed how difficult it can be to reverse engineer statistical evidence for price elasticity of demand for exports from historic price and quantity data, for the simple reason that much of this information is lost amongst all the other countless variables.⁶ Nevertheless, such rudimentary observations of export prices and totals as we have which coincide do suggest that the wine market was indeed very price elastic for most of the period.⁷ This is in fact corroborated by the habitually higher volatility of prices in Gascony than England since this suggests merchants were not able to pass on all price rises. Politics exacerbated such effects. The 1353 bar on English merchants making forward contracts for purchases or trading outside of Bordeaux, prevented their agreeing longer term prices or passing costs back to suppliers. This became the remit of the duchy’s merchants alone. Moreover, the aforementioned irregularly adjusted price controls at retail in England further constrained the international merchants’ price flexibility there. Add to this restrictions that prevented there being competing export markets in which to sell at higher prices, and predictably any brief increase in domestic demand or disruptions in supply disproportionately affected the scale of overseas trade each year. Indeed, this is what we see export data, especially if more than one of the three disasters of plague, famine or war hit the duchy simultaneously, such as occurred in 1372–3, 1405–8, and 1438.⁸

Though Hayek famously observed that prices contain information that inform future supply, the degree to which the wine supply was price elastic, or would also respond to price

¹ *CPR*, 1364–1367, p. 6; ‘Edward III: May 1368’, item 17, *PROME*, *BHO*.

² *Comptes consulaires de la ville de Riscle*, p. 10; *AHG*, XXXII, pp. 19, 22.

³ Epstein, *Freedom and Growth*, p. 42.

⁴ Price elasticity = change in quantity / change in price.

⁵ Lodge, *English Gascony*, p. 153.

⁶ D.K. Sinha, ‘Can We Measure Elasticity of Demand From Time-Series Data on Prices and Quantities?’, *AP - Asia Pacific Advances in Consumer Research*, 1, (eds.) J.A. Cote and S.M. Leong, Provo, UT: Association for Consumer Research (1994), pp. 213–9.

⁷ Appendix 8.3.

⁸ See export data in Appendix 3.1.

changes, could vary.¹ This was again because of the political constraints on the market. When export prices were either low, or high everywhere in the region, it became unprofitable, because of economic barriers, to source wine from more distant areas of production, leaving exports entirely monopolised by producers and middlemen close to port. Where export prices were high at the entrepôt, but low elsewhere, it became possible to bring wine to port from further afield, but in such times the producers and middlemen close to port could still sell at the high price, but incurred none of the transport costs, taxes and tolls. They thus gained economic rent equivalent to the costs imposed on their competitors by the market. The long-term effect was to erode wider viticultural production and trade where unprotected by privileges. These outcomes are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. Driven by high prices, there was of course also the prospect of instead planting more vines to increase supply. Areas in which vines were destroyed or degraded could be replanted with cuttings and bear fruit within three years, and reach full yield in around five years.² Capital assets could be rebuilt or replaced. Yet sufficient labour and capital had to be found and with their attrition through plague, famine and warfare, this could be a challenge. Nevertheless, Boutruche observed countless attempts at the replanting of vines and rebuilding infrastructure in the Bordelais, particularly by the richest of Bordeaux: the ecclesiastical institutions and mercantile elites.³ This may further explain why nominal prices rarely stayed high for more than a few years.


As was the case in England, longer-term price shifts were often hidden by short and medium-term fluctuations. In fact it can be estimated that the nominal price trend (Figure 6(a) – overleaf) indicates increases in two phases. There was a doubling of prices from 1350 to 1380, before they levelled off for forty years until the late 1410s when prices began to rise again until the mid-1450s when they then fell sharply at the end of the Anglo-Gascon period. In sterling terms Gascon prices rose at a far greater rate after the opening of the Hundred Years' War and after the Black Death, very much in step with the price trajectory in England. Likewise there was a great price moderation by the 1380s, prices in English currency fell, at first steadily, and then apace, against the nominal trend. Valuation in terms of precious metals (Figure 6(b) – overleaf) implies very different trends across the period. Prices in gold rose steeply, compared with silver, from the mid-1340s to the early 1380s, after which both fell fairly consistently. Indeed, despite short periods of high prices and volatility it is clear that from about this time wine prices were stagnant or falling in all but nominal terms, both in the Bordelais and in the *Haut-Pays*.⁴ The explanations for such divergent trajectories lie in England crown intervention, both in the specifics of exchange in Anglo-Gascon trade itself and through the application of their wider economic policies.

¹ F.A. Hayek, 'The Use of Knowledge in Society', *American Economic Review*, 35:4 (1945), pp. 519–30, at p. 525.

² Hanson, *Warfare and Agriculture*, pp. 70–1; Ashenfelter, Storchmann, 'Wine and Climate Change', pp. 2–3.

³ Boutruche, *La crise*, pp. 179–91, 201–9, 215–31, 312–3, 402–5.

⁴ Prices in Montréal-du-Gers fell from an equivalent of £1 5s sterling per tun in 1438 to an average of 19s in 1442, and 17s 5d in 1448; see Appendix 8.2.

(a) *l bord.* and sterling

(b) Gold and silver




Figure 6 Wholesale wine (claret) prices in the Bordelais, valued in (a) *l bord.* against £ sterling, and (b) grams of pure silver against grams of pure gold; with polynomial trends. **Source:** Appendix 8.1.1.

2.4 Outlining forms of exchange

2.4.1 Licit and illicit exchanges

Any description of the various methods by which wine was paid for is likely to be a gross oversimplification, their complexity is evidenced by the fact that exchanges in Bordeaux were usually managed by professional brokers.¹ Nevertheless some key features of exchange were prominent. At its most simple, the merchant, English or otherwise, arrived in Gascony bringing goods to sell, and with the proceeds bought wine, which was then transported to England or elsewhere. Once sold in overseas markets profits were used to purchase more goods, and the cycle began again. Other Anglo-Gascon exports were remarkably few. Sargeant emphasised the importance of domestically produced salt from the pans at Soulac, at the northern end of the Médoc peninsular, or those of poor quality at Bayonne, but these had to compete with the main European source just to the north in the Bay of Bourgneuf.² Gascon honey was regularly shipped, but in comparatively small quantities, and both blue woad dye from near Toulouse and Spanish iron were re-exported, mainly from Bayonne, but these were supplies which were vulnerable to changes in political and military circumstance.³

By contrast, as Margery James long ago observed, there was no limit to the different goods required in Gascony that England, in particular, could supply.⁴ There was a persistently strong demand for foreign food in the duchy. This was a direct result of the level of specialisation in viticulture above all other agriculture. The claim from an oft-quoted early-fifteenth century petition that the duchy ‘so lacking in corn cannot sustain itself for a quarter of a year’ without imports was largely representative of the period as a whole.⁵ Grain, particularly wheat, was constantly in demand, as was fish, butter, cheese, bacons, tallow, and cattle whole.⁶ Bordeaux’s small cloth industry did not require wool but being far from the main areas of medium-to-high quality manufacture in Flanders and Italy, there was strong demand for such cloth, which could then be re-exported into the *Haut-Pays*, Iberia and elsewhere.⁷ Gascony was likewise deficient in any highly developed mining, industrial metals such as lead, tin and sea coal were also needed from abroad.⁸

¹ For examples of the work of wine brokers in the Bordelais, see *AHG*, XXII, pp. 356, 379, 400, 417.

² Sargeant, ‘The Wine Trade with Gascony’, pp. 257–311, at pp. 257–8; A.R. Bridbury, *England and the Salt Trade in the Later Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1955), pp. 42–3, 51, 56–75.

³ Childs, *Anglo-Castilian Trade*, pp. 107–8, 112–9, 124–5; for the level of Gascon honey exports, see Appendix 3.6.

⁴ James, *Studies*, pp. 166–8.

⁵ Quoted in Vale, *English Gascony*, p. 48.

⁶ For examples: *GSR*, C 61/74: 105; C 61/86: 70; C 61/91: 34, 72; C 61/105: 25; *CPR*, 1364–1367, p. 324; *CCR*, 1396–1399, p. 185.

⁷ Cloth also reached Italy by this route. There are references dated 1385 and 1400 from the papers of Francesco di Marco Datini, the merchant of Prato and Florence, which refer specifically to ‘cloth of Bordeaux’ (Archivio di Stato di Prato - Fondo Datini: Fondaco di Pisa, busta 541, inserto 2, codice 504625; Fondaco di Genova, busta 792, inserto 4, codice 701809–10). This was high-value so probably actually English cloth, re-exported via Bordeaux, and finally sold in Pisa and Genoa.

⁸ *Bordeaux sous les rois d’Angleterre*, pp. 421–2; for examples: *CPR*, 1361–1364, p. 496; *GSR*, C 61/86: 77; C 61/93: 63; *CPR*, 1367–1370, p. 33.

Moreover, all and sundry goods which constituted unspecified small merchandise, cargoes of ‘parvarum mercandizarum’, could also be sold in Gascony’s ports.¹

If more convenient or if ready money was in short supply such goods could be directly exchanged for wine by barter arrangement, but generally cash payment was specified.² As such, the trade goods with the greatest liquidity, gold and silver in coin or other form, would also be a popular feature of deals. Yet, as is to be expected given the considerable unit value of the wine to be purchased and volatility of prices, credit played a great part in facilitating exchange. Michael Postan attributed the same long chains of sale credit to the wine trade, as he did for the wool trade.³ Indeed, Margery James embraced this view wholeheartedly, as have most historians agreed in turn.⁴ Each supplier would defer payment with only a little actual ‘money down’, debts which would then be redeemed one after another once the wine was paid for by the consumer. Re-payments were made using the proceeds from the sale of returning goods or remitted in cash, though not it seems using bills of exchange. These innovative financial instruments, beloved of Italian merchants and modern scholars on account of their use in transferring capital and the issuance of debt in equal measure, were only rarely used in Anglo-Gascon exchange.⁵

Evidence for debts is piecemeal, as it survives mainly when agreements were under dispute and would therefore surface in legal documents. Such cases are most plentiful from the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries though enough examples do appear right through the period until the end of Plantagenet rule to indicate that this system continued to some degree.⁶ English merchants in particular could build up huge debts with their Gascon suppliers before remonstrance were made via petition to England or legal proceeding begun in Bordeaux. For example, a prominent London Vintner, John Michel, ran a credit line in the 1360s of 1,000 marks (£666 13s 4d sterling) with a consortium in Aquitaine which included a merchant, a lord, and a bishop.⁷ John de Wesenham, another English merchant, had a similar arrangement. Such activities required a level of trust that was perhaps sufficient to avoid the need for bills of exchange at all. If trust failed, as it did in the above cases, in theory debts of both parties could be recognized legally in England or Gascony, and appealed to the king via petitions if re-payments were not forthcoming.

¹ *GSR*, C 61/91: 35.

² Numerous examples of different forms of exchange appear in the archbishop of Bordeaux’s accounts, see *AHG*, XXII, pp. 372–3.

³ Postan, *Medieval Trade and Finance*, pp. 5–11 particularly p. 6; M.M. Postan, ‘Credit in medieval trade’, *Economic History Review*, 1st series, 1:2 (1928), pp. 234–61.

⁴ James, *Studies*, pp. 78, 281–7. This view was perpetuated by Vale, *English Gascony*, p. 15.

⁵ There is one notable later example dating from 1409 when Francesco Ugucione, cardinal and archbishop of Bordeaux, repatriated wine trade profits via one Philip de Albertis, a Florentine merchant based in London, *CCR*, 1405–1409, p. 430. For more on bills of exchange, see Hunt; Murray, *History of Business*, pp. 63–67; N.J.G. Pounds, *An Economic History of Medieval Europe* (London, 1974), pp. 415–20. For recent work on their use for the issuance of interest-bearing debt, see A. Bell, C. Brooks, T. Moore, ‘Cambium non est mutuum: exchange and interest rates in medieval Europe’, *Economic History Review*, 2nd series, 70:2 (2017), pp. 373–96.

⁶ G. Unwin, ‘London Tradesmen and their Creditors’, in *Finance and Trade under Edward III*, (ed.) G. Unwin (Manchester, 1918, repr. 1962), pp. 19–34, at pp. 20–2; *ADG*, G 2280, nos 5, 7.

⁷ *CCR*, 1360–1364, p. 408; *CCR*, 1374–1377, p. 115.

Numerous examples of successful cases exist.¹ Furthermore, it was evidently customary in the duchy that, in the event of someone's property being seized by the crown, the ducal authorities were obliged to pay that person's debts off first as a matter of priority.² In good times this rule would have been great reassurance on a commercial route with such strong interconnected indebtedness. Yet this image of exchange in the wine trade is an idealised one. War, rebellion and disputes between mercantile communities would completely erode trust. Vital chains of credit failed irrevocably if participants too often reneged on their deals. In such events a cascade of insolvency would then collapse the wine trade, and leave any recovery constrained by a 'credit crunch'.

The choice of what to transport for the reciprocal journey was critical to the wine market, though a powerful influence or constraint was the crown itself – which could encourage or forbid the export of a good from England. The principal preoccupation within English political discourse with a bearing on export controls was the question of money.³ By the mid-fourteenth century, a set of monetary and fiscal policies now known as bullionism, the precursor to early-modern mercantilism, began to inspire market intervention. At their heart bullionist rules were formulated with a desire to retain gold and silver coinage in England, along with un-minted bullion, plate or any other manifestation of precious metals. John Munro explained that the role of metals as the realm's money supply was already well understood, but it was believed that they were in themselves inherently wealth, or at least 'claims to wealth'.⁴ Despite knowledge of what monetary policy meant for the domestic economy, he suggested that such concerns were frequently fiscal, driven by the wish to ensure adequate finance for the extremely costly episodic war with France.⁵ England had exported huge quantities of its money supply to the continent in the opening years of the conflict, particularly through the financing of fruitless military expeditions in Flanders and Edward III's generous subsidies for his allies. It is estimated the king expended well over £500,000 sterling on the war during the period 1337–42.⁶ But such events were ephemeral, what really mattered were the economic forces at play over the longer term.

Most of the strongest currency flows would originate in mercantile activities and these influenced the kingdom's current and capital accounts, as would be understood by modern economists, and, in their own terms, by contemporaries.⁷ With regards the former, the current

¹ For examples, see TNA, C 131/48/19; C 131/212/1; C 241/76/279; CP 40/642, rot. 132 dorso; CP 40/664, rot. 122, ADG, G 2280, nos 5, 7 [English debts to Gascons]; GSR, C 1/44/220; C 1/64/871; C 1/64/1109 [Gascon debts to the English].

² TNA, SC 8/289/14408.

³ This was openly stated as policy in *CPR*, 1364–1367, pp. 6–7, 76.

⁴ For a full explanation of the late medieval policy of bullionism, and its economic consequences, see J.H. Munro, 'Bullionism and the Bill of Exchange in England, 1273–1663: A Study of Monetary Management and Popular Prejudice', in *The Dawn of Modern Banking* (London, 1979), pp. 169–215; Munro, *Wool, Cloth and Gold*, pp. 11–41.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 11–3.

⁶ J. Sumption, *Trial by Battle: The Hundred Years' War I* (London, 1990), pp. 197–200, 363; J. Bolton, *Money in the Medieval English Economy* (Manchester, 2012), pp. 174–5.

⁷ The current account and capital account are the two main component parts of the balance of payments. The current account includes both the balance of trade, and the net transfers of cash in or out of an economy, for

account, we shall see that one of its chief mechanisms would become increasingly embedded in policy, that imbalances of trade lead to precious metals naturally flowing abroad where exports were of insufficient value to match imports. Harry Miskimin considered such imbalances as the key cause of late medieval money flows, and dismissed previous suggestions that Gresham's law drove poor currency abroad.¹ Munro in turn suggested that, to a great extent, precious metals flowed between medieval economies because of monetary policy combined with merchant arbitrage behaviour.² Put simply, if the price paid for gold or silver at foreign mints were higher than the face value domestically, merchants would attempt to take coins out of the economy to profit from the difference. If this net capital outflow became too strong coin production in domestic mints would decline or even cease entirely. Miskimin denied that flows could also be heavily influenced by the so-called 'bimetallic ratio', though this is still regularly used as an explanation by scholars such as Peter Spufford.³ This ratio was the relative difference in the value placed on gold and silver in an economy, and if this differed too greatly between different territories, this could have, in theory, dictated which direction each metal travelled as merchants again profited from arbitrage.⁴

It is certainly plausible that, by the mid-fourteenth century, despite running a persistent trade surplus thanks to the wool trade, England was suffering greatly from the regular currency devaluations and debasements of its continental neighbours.⁵ The reduction of the quantity of precious metal minted relative to their monies of accounts (*denier*, *sous*, and *livre* or penny, shilling and pound) raised the mint price and drew gold and silver to their mints. The counter to such actions, to avoid the loss of money supply and consequent deleterious price deflation, would be reciprocal devaluations to match the mint prices of their neighbours. This Edward III had done in 1335 and 1344, but such a policy had become politically untenable in England. Parliament was unwilling to accept any further protective devaluation of sterling.⁶ Increasingly represented, English importers and consumers evidently constituted a powerful enough lobby to fight the decline in sterling's intrinsic value. Likewise the nobility would naturally oppose any erosion in the value of their cash rents. The mint price was thus set at one pound for 259g of silver in 1350 and it remained fixed at this level until 1411.⁷

Instead capital and foreign exchange controls were required to prevent the flight of specie to foreign mints, or indeed any other mercantile money flows.⁸ Such regulations had been imposed periodically in some form since the thirteenth century, but had not been overly

example the repatriation of profits to investors. The capital account reflects the net capital flowing in and out of the economy.

¹ Miskimin, *Money, Prices and Foreign Exchange*, pp. 38–41, 117–9. For a discussion of Gresham's law (traditionally that 'bad money drives out good'), see Wood, *Medieval Economic Thought*, pp. 127–8.

² Munro, *Wool, Cloth and Gold*, pp. 25, 31–3.

³ Spufford, *Money and its Use*, pp. 274, 365, 271–2, 281–2, 387, 295, 341–2, 353–5, 369–70.

⁴ This was also the ratio between the quantity of gold that one unit of the money account represented, and the quantity of silver.

⁵ For the persistence of England's trade surplus, see Spufford, *Money and its Use*, p. 162.

⁶ Munro, *Wool, Cloth and Gold*, pp. 34–5.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 60–62; Clark, *English Prices and Wages*.

⁸ Munro, *Wool, Cloth and Gold*, pp. 34–5.

prohibitive or long lasting.¹ Indeed for some years rules had been relaxed. In 1344, when Edward III introduced the gold noble (worth 6s 8d sterling), the first successful English gold specie, he allowed their export.² This was because, as Munro suggested, its ‘use in foreign trade might thus keep silver within England’.³ In 1353, the Statute of the Staple had eased the restrictions on currency exports further, allowing merchants to pay for wine in Bordeaux with new English gold and silver coinage without restriction and Gascons to remit profits.⁴ Numerous examples of such cash transactions survive in the accounts of the archbishopric of Bordeaux in the years that followed.⁵

By 1363 the English government had evidently decided to put a stop to any coin or bullion leaving the kingdom, instead it became official policy that the export of trade goods, particularly cloth, should be encouraged in the exchange for Gascon wine.⁶ The timing of this policy shift is suggestive as to its cause, as it came soon after the establishment of the principality of Aquitaine in July 1362.⁷ There was evidently some hope that this new sovereign entity assert some economic independence from England.⁸ Specie exports were banned abruptly in January 1364 for those without a royal licence issued in chancery.⁹ The same year this particular legislation was enacted it was necessary that 71 licences be issued for this purpose with a total value of £5,388 6s 8d sterling ‘to buy wines of the coming year in Gascony’.¹⁰ As part of their now central place in the wine trade, the members of the *mistry* of the Vintry in London succeeded in gaining a substantial proportion of this concession from the crown in the form of a shared licence to export £2,000 sterling in coin ‘to buy wines of the coming year’.¹¹ None were given to Gascon merchants, who from 1363 were legally required to export goods to the value of the wines they had imported.¹² This was a clear indication of their declining influence in Westminster. Instead they were officially licensed to export £3,676 10s 7d in goods in 1364, in exchange for 1,454 tuns of wine with a value of £8,724 wholesale (they were not

¹ Ibid., ‘Bullionism and the Bill of Exchange’, pp. 169–215, at p. 192.

² The gold noble was introduced after the failure of the over-valued leopard and double leopard coins in the first half of 1344, *CCR*, 1343–1346, p. 575. See Spufford, *Money and its Use*, pp. 281–2; also see M. Allen, *Mints and Money in Medieval England* (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 81–2.

³ Munro, ‘Bullionism and the Bill of Exchange in England’, pp. 169–215, at p. 192. Spufford also suggested England then had accumulated a large surplus of gold, Spufford, *Money and its Use*, p. 282.

⁴ *SR*, 1, p. 338 (27 Edw. III, st.2, c.14); ‘Edward III: September 1353’, item 18, *PROME, BHO*.

⁵ *AHG*, XXI, pp. 100–1, 390–1.

⁶ ‘Edward III: October 1363’, item 7, *PROME, BHO*. In July of 1364 it was declared that ‘licence is given to the merchant vintners of England to buy cloth’ and the ‘merchants of Gascony bringing wine to England to buy...cloth throughout the realm, and take it out of the realm to Gascony and elsewhere there to be sold to their profit, and of the money thereof arising to buy wines there and bring them into the realm to sell therein and make their profit without disturbance’, *CCR*, 1364–1368, p. 76.

⁷ TNA, E 30/1105.

⁸ Green suggests this in terms of reducing English fiscal expenditure on Gascony, see Green, ‘Lordship and Principality’, pp. 3–29, at p. 21.

⁹ It was announced that ‘all persons who cross [the sea] diligent scrutiny be made that they do not take with them gold or silver in money or mass, jewels or letters of exchange’, *CPR*, 1364–1367, p. 76.

¹⁰ *CPR*, 1364–1367, pp. 13, 15–7.

¹¹ *CPR*, 1364–1367, p. 15.

¹² ‘Edward III: October 1363’, item 7, *PROME, BHO*; *CCR*, 1360–1364, pp. 542–3.

permitted to sell at retail that year).¹ This prompts the question of how these Gascons repatriated the further c.£5,000 sterling in proceeds. Lloyd broached this very same issue for this community's dealings earlier in the century, suggesting that a triangular trade was established with Flanders though he himself conceded there is little evidence to support this.² More likely they bought more cloth than that appearing in the licence records, or as James suggested, they preferred to take back gold and silver illegally.³ At the end of 1364 the enrolment of licences for exporting specie for trade ceased so it is unclear whether the rules had been tightened such that none were issued. Lloyd himself highlighted how this lack of records obscures the extent of licit or illicit export of coinage.⁴ Requests in parliament that coinage might be taken to Gascony to trade indicates it was broadly enforced, though we can also be certain that some merchants would circumvent any exchange controls since legislation in 1368 explicitly stated that one of its aims was to stop those who 'take a great amount of gold out of the land'.⁵

The policy of excluding precious metals from the wine trade must have appeared workable largely because the rise of the English cloth industry had been so dramatic. Edward III's self-imposed embargoes of wool, between 1336 and 1338, in an effort to manipulate Flemish political loyalties, caused an accumulation of cheap wool in England and periodically closed its market to Flemish cloth.⁶ This, as Carus-Wilson explained, protected the nascent English manufacturers from foreign competition, and with low export duties, domestic production became highly competitive abroad.⁷ Customs records show annual exports of 1,300 cloths in 1353–5 rising to above 6,000 by 1361–3.⁸ Flemish retaliatory protectionism was regular, so, even though some of this increased cargo would have gone to Iberia or elsewhere, 'the principal market for England's cloth was Gascony', as Carus-Wilson made clear. Renouard and his colleagues noted that this coincided with a pronounced decline in cloth-making in Bordeaux.⁹ The takeover of the Anglo-Gascon cloth market by English exports was then aided further in 1363 by regulations explicitly permitted that 'the merchant vintners of England and Gascony' involve themselves in the craft of 'draperie' in exception to the recent law restricting such diversification.¹⁰ Thereafter the cloth exports of many English port towns visibly

¹ *CPR*, 1364–1367, pp. 47–59; *CCR*, 1364–1368, p. 76; 'Folio cxxxix b - Dec 1364', in *Cal. Letter Books: G*, pp. 169–178, *BHO*. For the export and price figures used here, see James, *Studies*, pp. 34, 37; goods valued using prices from Clark, *English Prices and Wages*.

² Lloyd, *Alien Merchants in England*, pp. 92–3.

³ James, *Studies*, p. 78.

⁴ T.H. Lloyd, 'Overseas Trade and the English Money Supply in the Fourteenth Century', in *Edwardian Monetary Affairs, 1279–1344*, (ed.) W.J. Mayhew (Oxford, 1977), pp. 96–124, at p. 115.

⁵ TNA, SC 8/297/14827; 'Edward III: May 1368', item 17, *PROME*, *BHO*; *SR*, 1, p. 389, (42 Edw. III, c.8).

⁶ Carus-Wilson, *Medieval Merchant Venturers*, p. 243.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 243–4, 246; *ibid.*, 'Trends in the Export of English Woollens in the Fourteenth Century', *The Economic History Review*, 2nd series, 3:2 (1950), pp. 162–79, at pp. 166, 168; Bolton, *The Medieval English Economy*, pp. 197–8; E. Miller, J. Hatcher, *Medieval England: Towns, Commerce and Crafts, 1086–1348* (New York, 1995, repr. Abingdon, 2014), p. 123; J.H. Munro, 'Industrial Protectionism in Medieval Flanders: Urban or National?' in H.A. Miskimin, D. Herlihy, A.L. Udovich (eds.), *The Medieval City* (Yale, 1977), pp. 229–67, at p. 231.

⁸ Carus-Wilson, *Medieval Merchant Venturers*, p. 248.

⁹ *Bordeaux sous les rois d'Angleterre*, pp. 421–2.

¹⁰ *CCR*, 1364–1368, p. 75.

accelerated.¹ To begin with these shipments were controlled by the issuance of licences. Plymouth was collectively licensed to export ‘2,000 cloths of colour and 2,000 other packs of cloths’, and the merchants of Boston were given licence to trade cloth to Gascony without a limit specified.² The enrolment of cloth licences also ceased at the end of 1364, though in this case it is clear enough exports continued but that permits were no longer processed through chancery. Carus-Wilson estimated that during the years 1353–68 the mean annual rate of export growth was 18%.³ Moreover, decade-by-decade, exponential growth can be seen in cloths shipped overseas from towns such as Bristol for the rest of the century.⁴

To supplement the trade in cloth, the crown encouraged fish exports to pay for wine, ‘in order to keep the money in England’.⁵ The English shipped stock-fish (air-dried cod) from Cornwall and Devon, and in 1364 Gascons were directed to specialise in exporting herring from the North Sea.⁶ Grain was another matter. Capra showed how especially susceptible Gascony was to famine because of its specialisation in viticulture.⁷ Wheat prices were habitually higher than England, which was largely self-sufficient, and profits from its export to the duchy grew with the outbreak of the Hundred Years’ War, as other sources of Gascon imports were cut off.⁸ For centuries there had been some legal restrictions on exports according to success of the harvest, but the level of violence directed at the large exporters of grain to Bordeaux, such as during the 1347 food riots, suggests quite how large this export trade had become.⁹ Indeed, Kermode has claimed by the ‘mid-fourteenth century corn was the largest single export to Gascony’.¹⁰ The aftermath of the Black Death prompted some constraints in the 1350s then finally in 1360 exports were forbidden, except for shipments to Gascony and Calais but then only with a licence.¹¹ Wine merchants received most of these, provided, that an oath was given in chancery, adequate security was offered, and a receipt acquired from the constable in

¹ For example, exports from Bristol in 1363–64 were 2,742 cloths, rising to 5,407 cloth in 1364–65; from Exeter exports rose 602¼ to 1,212½; from Boston 419 to 970, and from Kingston-Upon-Hull exports rose from 514¾ to 1,655 cloths all over the same period, Beardwood, *Alien Merchants in England*, pp. 163, 166, 175, 176.

² *CPR*, 1361–1364, pp. 492, 496, 500, 497, 510–1, 521–2; *CPR*, 1364–1367, pp. 13, 15–7, 25, 32, 47. Many licences state explicitly that the purpose is for the cloth to be taken ‘to Gascony, to buy wines of the coming year’ (e.g. *CPR*, 1364–1367, p. 16).

³ Carus-Wilson, ‘Trends in the Export of English Woollens’, pp. 162–79, at pp. 168.

⁴ Childs, *Trade and Shipping*, p. 159.

⁵ *CPR*, 1364–1367, pp. 6–7.

⁶ *CCR*, 1364–1368, p. 74; *CPR*, 1361–1364, p. 496; *CPR*, 1364–1367, pp. 32, 47, 50, 59; ‘Edward III: October 1363’, item 7, *PROME*, *BHO*.

⁷ P. Capra, ‘Au sujet des famines d’Aquitaine au XIVe siècle’, *Revue historique de Bordeaux* 4 (1955), pp. 1–32.

⁸ Appendix 8.4 for relative wheat prices in England and Gascony.

⁹ J.S. Lee, ‘Grain Shortages in Late Medieval Towns’, in *Commercial Activity, Markets and Entrepreneurs in the Middle Ages*, (eds.) B. Dodds, C.D. Liddy (Woodbridge, 2011), pp. 63–80, at p. 47; during the 1347 famine rioting broke out in the ports of Bristol, Lynn, Thetford, Boston and across Kent, see B. Sharp, *Famine and Scarcity in Late Medieval and Early Modern England: The Regulation of Grain Marketing, 1256–1631* (Cambridge, 2016), pp. 56–87.

¹⁰ J. Kermode, *Medieval Merchants: York, Beverley and Hull in the Later Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 1998, repr. 1999), p. 177.

¹¹ *CCR*, 1354–1360, p. 190; *CCR*, 1360–1364, p. 244; for more on this ground-breaking legislation see R.E. Prothero, *English Farming, Past and Present* (Cambridge, 2012), p. 442.

Bordeaux to confirm that the grain had arrived.¹ The issuance of licences for grain, beans and peas post-1360 show how demand for English food in Gascony varied, and also the willingness of the crown to allow its export (Figure 7). Times of truce with France generally resulted in fewer licences being sought, as English grain competed with nearer supplies on the continent.




Figure 7 Licensed exports of staple foods from England to Gascony (quarters of grains, beans and peas), compared with English wheat prices (shillings sterling per quarter), 1360–1453. **Source:** for export licences, see Appendix 2 and for the prices, G. Clark, *English prices and wages, 1209–1914* (2003), provided in Appendix 9.2 **Note:** During 1404–6 the crown issued ten ‘licences of transport’, allowing unspecified quantities of victuals to be shipped.

When such supplies were cut off, as they were in 1372 when the Saintonge and Angoumois were lost to the French crown, English exports promptly increased to replace the lost food supplies.² At the same time, cloth exports briefly declined from England, as merchants adapted to shifting demand in the duchy.³ This was momentarily reversed during the truce of 1375–7, but as war returned in earnest, so did applications for grain licences. This process largely repeated itself over the following 75 years - periods of famine or acute military activity

¹ GSR, C 61/87: 7, 15. A very great number of these receipts survive, for example, see TNA, C 47/25/7.

² *Les grandes chroniques de France*, 12, p. 167; Sumption, *Divided Houses*, pp. 154–5.

³ For such declines in cloth exports see Carus-Wilson, ‘Trends in the Export of English Woollens in the Fourteenth Century’, pp. 162–79, at p. 172; *ibid.*, *Medieval Merchant Venturers*, pp. 253–4; Beardwood, *Alien Merchants in England*, pp. 168–9, 176.

in Gascony, when demand would have been particularly high, exports of grain were generally allowed. Only in some years of extreme shortage in England, when high prices there precluded both the political will to allow licences and presumably the necessary margins to drive merchants to request them, does licence issuance cease.

Thus the narrative of export regulations was not overwhelmingly one of restriction – government intervention also encouraged trade. Decisions at the English parliament of October 1377 permitted the export, without licence, of victuals, cloth, and other such goods as diverse as goats and belts, a likely recognition that Gascony was in dire need of English goods in the aftermath of French invasions.¹ Two years later Richard II allowed the merchants of Bordeaux to ship wine to Flanders, exchange it for Flemish goods, and ship them back to Gascony via English ports without paying customs duties or being disturbed by English officials. Though this latter concession only remained in force for a decade.²

For those involved in or influencing English government gold and silver remained the major concern. Longstanding complaints from the Tower of London mint of a total lack of bullion were heard at the 1381–2 parliament, alongside further petitions from the wider commons reporting a dearth of coinage.³ These all indicated a growing crisis in the money supply. Deflation had taken hold, for, as Nightingale noted, aggregate prices in England would fall by 17.5% through the 1380s.⁴ Though monetary scholars would later claim that these were the first signs of the coming Europe-wide bullion famines, at the time England's own unfavourable terms of trade were blamed.⁵ Richard Aylesbury famously explained this in his report, described by Munro as 'the first enunciation of the famous balance of trade theory'.⁶ It was openly stated that the value of exports had declined to such an extent that it was insufficient to match imports.⁷ This inspired even tighter controls of capital exports and currency exchange. Bills of exchange were banned for most transactions, even papal tax remittances. Those exempt, such as lords and prelates, required a licence.⁸ Decisions at the November 1390 parliament

¹ 'Richard II: October 1377', item 36, *PROME, BHO; GSR*, C 61/91: 34.

² *GSR*, C 61/93: 57, 61.

³ TNA, SC 8/19/932; SC 8/271/13512; 'Richard II: November 1381', items 26, 39, 42, Appendix 1–2, *PROME, BHO*.

⁴ P. Nightingale, 'Gold, Credit, and Mortality: Distinguishing Deflationary Pressures on the Late Medieval English Economy', *Economic History Review*, 2nd series, 63:4 (2010), pp. 1081–104, at p. 1091.

⁵ The origins of this new crisis were in the decline in the production of central European silver mines and the long-running balance of trade deficit with the Middle-East and Asia in pursuance of luxury goods such as silks and spices, see Spufford, *Money and its Use*, pp. 339–62; also see Day, 'The Great Bullion Famine of the Fifteenth Century', pp. 3–54. This basis for the bullion famine theory has been challenged by Nathan Sussman, see N. Sussman, 'The Late Medieval Bullion Famine Reconsidered', *The Journal of Economic History*, 58:1 (1998), pp. 126–54. Sussman argued against deficits as the cause of shortages of specie, rather that increased hoarding was more significant. Nevertheless, the position of Spufford and Day is still largely accepted.

⁶ Munro, *Wool, Cloth and Gold*, p. 44.

⁷ Aylesbury declared that the kingdom, 'which is empty of riches and of all other wealth because of what has already occurred and arisen in the said kingdom for many reasons; namely, the removal and withdrawal of gold and silver money from the kingdom', 'Richard II: November 1381', item 26, *PROME, BHO*.

⁸ 'Richard II: November 1381', item 107, *ibid.*; *SR*, 2, p. 17 (5 Rich. II, c.2).

extended exchange rules further and required any foreign merchant selling into England to also buy goods to the equivalent value within three months of the first transaction.¹

Such bullionist policies were reinforced as the war with France receded through the 1390s and the crown felt able to loosen control of the export of strategic resources. At the parliament of January 1394 the crown upheld a petition through the commons which requested that grain exports be allowed without licence.² Consequently the licences that had re-appeared on the Gascon rolls since the 1380s ceased to be recorded after 1395.³ Similarly, a specific type of highly-valued worsted cloth was allowed to be exported without going via the Calais staple, greatly reducing transaction costs.⁴ Also from the 1370s, tin began to occasionally appear in licences for export to Gascony.⁵ This metal was extremely highly valued abroad, not least the production of bronze for cannons, and also valuable pewter vessels.⁶ Europe's best source of tin had been England's west country since ancient times, and it was this metal that is often credited, second only to wool, with the kingdom's strong export earnings.⁷ Production had boomed in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth century, and tin exports began to be licensed for huge quantities, often around 100 thousand weight, such as in 1379, 1398 and 1400.⁸ In 1403, Henry, Prince of Wales (later Henry V), requested he export 50,000 pieces of tin 'to buy wine for the prince's household in England'.⁹ Tin export requests thereafter went into decline, the last large licence, for 40 thousand weight was granted in 1411, after which licences were only for small amounts, usually just tableware until 1446 when a large shipment weighing 50,000 pounds was licensed.¹⁰

Licence-free trade in food lapsed after the final repudiation the truce of Leulinghem in 1402 as strategic requirements again constrained English exports. This regime remained in place though the crisis years of 1404–7, when licences for large quantities of grain were requested, even some unlimited licences were issued particularly for shipment to Bayonne.¹¹ Such was the need for grain that the Bordeaux *jurade* resurrected a rule which required that with every two tuns of wine transported in from the French-occupied *Haut-Pays*, one tun of wheat must be brought also. This continued to be enforced for at least the next decade, though limited by the scale of the *Pays-Rebelles* wine trade.¹² After these crises subsided, issuance returned to a more moderate level until

¹ 'Richard II: November 1390', item 7, *PROME, BHO*.

² 'Richard II: January 1394', item 39, *ibid*.

³ *GSR*, C 61/104: 63.

⁴ 'Richard II: January 1394', item 42, *PROME, BHO*.

⁵ *GSR*, C 61/93: 63; C 61/104: 61; C 61/105: 18; C 61/108: 1; C 61/109: 104; C 61/113: 70; C 61/113: 84; C 61/119: 53; C 61/125: 89; C 61/134: 30.

⁶ K. DeVries, R.D. Smith, *Medieval Military Technology* (Toronto, 1992, repr. 2012), pp. 147–56; R. F. Homer, 'Tin, Lead and Pewter', in *English Medieval Industries: Craftsmen, Techniques, Products*, (eds.) J. Blair, N. Ramsay (London, 1991), pp. 57–80.

⁷ Postan, *Medieval Trade and Finance*, pp. 171–2; M. Kowaleski, *Local Markets and Regional Trade in Medieval Exeter* (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 17–8.

⁸ *GSR*, C 61/93: 63, C 61/105: 18, C 61/108: 1

⁹ *GSR*, C 61/109: 104.

¹⁰ *GSR*, C 61/113: 70, C 61/113: 84, C 61/119: 53, C 61/125: 89, C 61/134: 30.

¹¹ Bayonne was allowed, 'to acquire the victuals they lack because of the war, as they could not until now get victuals from the kingdom of England', see *GSR*, C 61/109: 140–1; C 61/110: 8; C 61/110: 10–11; C 61/110: 18; C 61/110: 52; C 61/111: 76; C 61/111: 85; C 61/111: 92.

¹² *RJ*, I, pp. 387, 398, 400; II, pp. 309, 314–5, 319, 323, 325.

the spikes in the number of grain export licences recorded in the Gascon rolls of the early to mid-1420s.¹ At the parliament of February 1426 the commons of Kent petitioned that victuals and other merchandise, especially grain, be permitted to be exported abroad, particularly Gascony, without the costs of obtaining a licence. The Crown ordered the statutes of 1394 be upheld, namely the free export of corn, though the issue of the free export of all merchandise was deferred.²

After his usurpation of the English throne, Henry IV had, to begin with, largely continued his predecessors' policies on exports. At the 1401 parliament a further effort was made to prevent 'foreign merchants as well as denizens' from transferring specie or bullion from England.³ There was some cause, for only the previous year Bernat Rey, a merchant of Bordeaux, had been caught trying to take 304 gold *écus* out of the kingdom.⁴ Further powers were given to customs officers to punish such merchants who carried more than just their travel expenses with them. In 1402 this was reinforced further with the offer of a huge reward to any who discovered and reported the smuggling of coin or bullion amounting to one third of any seized.⁵ It was also agreed that the 'searchers' who enforced customs rules in England's ports should be employed by the crown and not be paid by nor socialise with the merchants they inspect.⁶ This was the very least one would expect, by way of regulations, to ensure their efficacy.

In 1411, in a rare break from previous crown policy, Henry allowed the limited defensive devaluation of English currency for the first time since 1351 and last for another fifty years.⁷ Both gold and silver specie were reduced in weight relative to its face value with the pound in future representing 215.8g silver.⁸ This 17% reduction alleviated the loss of metal, but not with any great permanence – and by 1423 it was again complained in a petition from the mayor and merchants of the Calais staple that gold and silver were being shipped in large quantities 'to Bordeaux and Flanders, and elsewhere'.⁹

By a decade or so into the fifteenth century the crown had implicitly accepted that English coinage, particularly gold nobles, would, to some extent, find their way to Bordeaux. This was openly discussed in 1414 with Gascony's elites.¹⁰ Around 11% of the value of a loan garnered in 1420–1 from the wealthiest of Bordeaux came in the form of these nobles, and at the same time they were hoarded by the *confrérie* of Saint-Michel.¹¹ Bullionism nevertheless remained a driving ethos in Westminster and the continued Anglo-Gascon preference for English gold caused much

¹ *GSR*, C 61/118: 16–18, 36, 39, 40–44, 46–47, 49, 51–53, 60; C 61/120: 8, 10–12, 27–29, 32; C 61/121: 2, 4–5, 10, 17, 18–19, 22–27, 31–33, 35–36, 38–39, 41–43, 45–46, 48; C 61/122: 1, 6, 12–13, 18–19, 22; C 61/123: 1.

² 'Henry VI: February 1426', item 37, *PROME, BHO*.

³ 'Henry IV: January 1401', item 53, *ibid*.

⁴ *GSR*, C 61/107: 171.

⁵ 'Henry IV: September 1402', item 103, *PROME, BHO; SR*, 2, p. 142 (4 Hen. IV, c.16).

⁶ 'Henry IV: September 1402', item 109, *PROME, BHO; SR*, 2, p. 142 (4 Hen. IV, c.21).

⁷ Munro, *Wool, Cloth and Gold*, pp. 34–35, 60–62.

⁸ Clark, *English Prices and Wages*.

⁹ 'Henry VI: October 1423, Part 1', item 42, *PROME, BHO*.

¹⁰ *RJ*, II, pp. 28–32, 72–76, 270–2.

¹¹ *RJ*, II, pp. 624–631; *ADG*, G 2302, fos 77v, 81r, 83v, 87v, 88r, 91v, 94v, 97r, 101r, 103r, 105v, 107v, 110r, 113r.

antagonism in the kingdom. At the parliament of 1429 foreigners were collectively blamed for loan and currency manipulation by demanding only gold nobles as payment for debts. In response further complex currency rules were imposed, forcing foreign traders to accept all coin for payment, and preventing them from selling on credit.¹ There should be little doubt that the interruption of credit chains would have been especially problematic for trade. Furthermore in July 1433 when English merchants tried unsuccessfully to prevent foreign merchants acting as brokers, it was suggested that their collusion would ‘increase the prices of their merchandise, that is to say, spices, wine, and other things, and lower the prices of our merchandise, both wool and cloth’.²

Food returned under an export licensing regime in 1430 as the war began to turn against the Lancastrian cause, and the scale of shipments becomes once again visible. Indeed 1432, a year which saw catastrophic flooding all across Western Europe, saw the highest volume of grain licensed for export of the whole period, covering some 17,972 quarters (143,776 bushels) of wheat and 520 quarters (4,160 bushels) of peas or beans.³ The grain alone, using the prevailing estimates of the per capita consumption of other comparable cities, would have supported around an estimated 14,000 people for a year, probably around half the population of Bordeaux.⁴ Such considerable demands, only possible because wheat prices in England were comparatively low, soon subsided and returned to only very small quantities. Slowly licensing grew across the 1430s and early 1440s even as prices rose to a peak in 1438–40, and so would have represented exports to Gascony of great value. These cease to be issued entirely during 1443–50, mostly years of truce with France during which time licence free export was permitted provided wheat prices did not rise beyond 6s 8d sterling per quarter.⁵ Yet once the final stages of war arrived, a final burst of supplies were required for Plantagenet Gascony during its last two years 1450–1.

The extent to which the licensing regime inhibited the wine trade is unclear. Certainly the extra expense and hassle for merchants to obtain permits for outward journeys to Gascony, not least organising the required sureties, added costs that deterred exchange. Consequently we can surmise that in periods where licensing was lifted exports were naturally higher than they were during periods of regulation. By extension exports of cloth, which remained largely unlicensed after 1364, were encouraged over all other commodities. The effectiveness of exchange and capital controls could be questioned, certainly the successive redrafting of regulations with persistent reports of circumventions would suggest they were not watertight. But a possible side-effect would have been to force merchants to become ever more dependent on credit relationships where cash payment was

¹ ‘Henry VI: September 1429’, items 29, 66, *PROME, BHO*.

² ‘Henry VI: July 1433’, item 51, *ibid*; TNA, SC 8/26/1284.

³ See Appendix 2 for licence details; for the reports of flooding, see McCormick et al., ‘Draft 3: Western European Climate from Written Sources, ca. 1300 to ca. 1500,’ Report IDs 6405–67.

⁴ Estimates put consumption in London c.1300 at 465 litres of grain per capita per year, Milan 320 litres, and Florence 302 litres. These 17,972 quarters of wheat, represent 5,066,306.8 litres, sufficient for 13982.5 people at 362.3 litres per capita per year, see D. Keene, ‘Medieval London and its supply hinterlands’, *Regional Environmental Change*, 12:2 (2012), pp. 263–81, at p. 266; B.M.S. Campbell, J.A. Galloway, D. Keene, M. Murphy, *A Medieval Capital and its Grain Supply: agrarian production and distribution in the London Region c. 1300*, *Historical Geography Research Series 30* (London, 1993), pp. 30–6.

⁵ ‘Henry VI: February 1445’, item 33 (32), *PROME, BHO*.

not possible. This would leave the trade more vulnerable to more acute downturns if a wave of debt defaults occurred, and such chains of credit would take some years to rebuild.

Overall it might appear the crown displayed a generous and flexible attitude towards the export of goods to its Gascon subjects overseas. Yet with the application of bullionist ideas came an increasing tendency to treat Aquitaine as economically foreign, on the same footing as other trading partners, such as Flanders or the Hanse. It was policy to push high value exports and stop flows of specie, which was of course largely to the English benefit over the long term as they were able to take hold of a key export market and improve their own balance of trade. For the duchy of Aquitaine, the economic policy of which was also under the control of the Plantagenets, this was to cause serious long-term difficulties.

2.4.2 The Bordeaux mint and exchange rates

The dukes of Aquitaine held customary rights over the minting of coin, and control of its value in exchange. Mints periodically operated in Bayonne, Dax, Saint-Sever, Agen, Mézin and Bergerac, but it was that at Bordeaux, situated in the *Château de l'Ombrière*, which was by far the most important.¹ Gascony and England retained separate coinage and monies of account, the *livre bordelaise* in the duchy and the pound sterling in the kingdom with different and changing values. With the close economic relationship between the two polities it is unsurprising that the relative value of money should be of paramount importance in the wine trade, since barrels were priced in sterling in England and *livres* in Bordeaux. Likewise trade links with territory loyal to the Valois persisted to some degree, particularly into the *Haut-Pays* where some wine and grain continued to be sourced – there the *livre tournois* was predominant – so French monetary policy was also relevant.

Spufford has described the various ways currency could naturally leave circulation, for example, how the circulating coins succumbed to progressive loss of silver through wear, and therefore became underweight relative to face value, and would require reminting.² As such the mints had a vital role in sustaining the money supply, recently described as ‘off-balance-sheet banks’.³ These relied on adequate supplies of gold and silver being available and brought to the mint by merchants in the form of old coins or bullion. If plentiful, and cheap, the authorities were encouraged to strengthen the money of account by minting heavier or finer coins at the same face value, in order that this might reflect the exchange value of the metal. However, if the price offered to merchants by the mint was insufficient, because, for example, a shortage of precious metals in

¹ R. Rogers, *Annals of the Coinage of Great Britain and its Dependencies: from the earliest period of authentic history to the reign of Victoria* (London, 1840), pp. 248–60; Rechenbach, ‘The Gascon Money of Edward III’, p. 263.

² Spufford, *Money and its Use*, p. 354.

³ A. Hotson, ‘Currency stabilisation and asset-price anchors: An examination of medieval monetary practices with some implications for modern policy’, *Vox: The CEPR's (Centre for Economic Policy Research) Policy Portal* (2013) <<http://voxeu.org/article/medieval-monetary-practices>>.

the territory had pushed up market prices for silver and gold above that threshold, mint activity would decline or cease, and money even leave the economy, as was illustrated in detail by Munro.¹ In such an event the authority controlling the mint needed to physically debase coinage, reduce its weight, or increase its face value, thereby devaluing the money of account. By doing so the price offered to merchants in nominal terms could be increased. Unlike in England, where tradition and parliament defended sound money, on the continent this manipulation was more often accepted, despite the protestations of contemporary thinkers such as Nicolas Oresme (1320–82) and Thomas De Vio (1469–1534).² People, then as now, generally preferred more bad money to less good money as weaker coin could be used equally in any transaction denominated in money of account, even though it was evident that the lower intrinsic value, and their greater number, could lead quickly to price inflation.³ The same method could be used by a ruler to increase their own revenues, though the drawbacks were considerable.⁴ As in all periods of inflation, the value of any goods, services or obligations set in fixed nominal terms were eroded.

Such matters were important because Anglo-Gascon Aquitaine did not include any gold or silver mines of any consequence even at its height during the Black Prince's principality. So, like England, the territory was normally dependent on windfall capital transfers (such as ransoms) or on regularly positive trade balances in order that precious metals appear in the economy. Deliberate arrivals of bullion were unpredictable, and could just as easily occur in reverse, and consequently in most years Gascony required a strong wine trade to generate adequate export earnings that could at least equal that spent on vital imports. This was a necessity well understood by Girard in around 1465 and featured in his analysis of the Gascon economy.⁵ The onward export of English cloth could certainly also generate inflows but this too was dependent on the wine trade in order that this commodity arrive in sufficient quantities. In short, for Gascony, strong mint production was usually indicative of a current account surplus albeit with a uncertain time lag as incoming metals accumulated and lowered in price.

¹ Munro, *Wool, Cloth and Gold*, pp. 25–8.

² *The De moneta of N. Oresme, and English Mint documents*, (trns.) C. Johnson, (London, 1956), pp. 29–35; Thomas De Vio, *On Exchanging Money (1499)*, (trns.) P.T. Brannan, *Journal of Markets & Morality*, 10:1 (2007), pp. 193–252, at p. 236.

³ Miskimin, *Money, Prices and Foreign Exchange*, pp. 43–4, 53–73. The key monetarist interpretation of the dynamics of price levels is the Quantity Theory of Money. This is simplified into the equation of exchange $MV = PT$ whereby the money supply (M) multiplied by the velocity at which the money circulates (V) is equal to the price level (P) times the number of transactions (T). The implications of the equation to the medieval economy is discussed in detail by Bolton, *Money in the Medieval English Economy*, pp. 3–17.

⁴ Miskimin himself pointed out, even if a ruler could pay his own obligations by devaluation, 'he would reduce the value of his own fixed revenue', and prices would rise against him, see Miskimin, *Money, Prices and Foreign Exchange*, pp. 42–6; also see Munro, *Wool, Cloth and Gold*, pp. 25–8. Miskimin's view is challenged by N. Sussman, 'Debasements, Royal Revenues, and Inflation in France During the Hundred Years' War, 1415–1422', *The Journal of Economic History*, 53:1 (1993), pp. 44–70.

⁵ *AHG*, LVI, pp. 34–42, at p. 35. Girard stated that, 'leurdicte marchandise se départira par les royaumes et païs dessusditz qui à celle occasion apporteront foison or et argent, le tout demourra en la seigneurie du Roy' ('the said merchandise [wine] will be distributed through said kingdoms and lands which will then bring in an abundance of gold and silver, all of which will remain in the lordship of the king').

As Rechenbach demonstrated, the reign of Edward III was a period of boundless activity in Gascon mints.¹ The 1320s and 1330s saw strong exports of wine to England, so we can surmise a trade surplus with the kingdom made the necessary silver available to the mint. Coin production ceased from 1339 to 1342, with the opening of the Hundred Years' War, as wine exports fell and necessary imports increased, draining specie and making it impossible to attract bullion. This period also precisely coincided with a pronounced devaluation of the *livre tournois* and so some Gascon specie may have disappeared into enemy territory through arbitrage.² By late 1342 the situation had much ameliorated and the mints at Bordeaux and Dax were able to re-open albeit having increased the face value of the silver coinage by one third.³ Despite the onset of the Black Death in 1348 mint activity remained strong without any further devaluation.⁴ The decline in population not only resulted in a greater average share of the money supply per capita, but as Miskimin suggested, high mortality and conspicuous consumption caused specie to be dishoarded lowering metal prices.⁵ It was not quite the same in England because sterling was more stable, with old denominations accepted for longer, so people spent old coin instead of selling it to the mint. London mint prices had to increase and the silver weight of one pound sterling fell from 292.1g to 259g.⁶

Along with numerous silver denominations, large volumes of gold coins were also being minted in Gascony in this period, and this accelerated into the 1350s, an indication of the then strong flow of gold nobles from England as part of the wine trade.⁷ There was a certain moderation of activity at the end of the decade probably as a result of the Valois devaluation of the *livre tournois* in order to pay the ransom of John II (1319–64), captured at the battle of Poitiers (1356). This may have again briefly drawn some precious metals away from Gascony.⁸ But around 1361–2, with the foundation of the principality of Aquitaine imminent, a whole new monetary programme was initiated.⁹ This was expanded from 1363 as new mints were brought within the Anglo-Gascon

¹ This work unfortunately remains unpublished, Rechenbach, 'The Gascon Money of Edward III'. Many millions of coins were struck in the 1320s and 1330s, particularly good silver white *obols* worth 10*d bord.* and billon black doubles worth 2*d*, *ibid.* pp. 251–9.

² N. Sussman, J. Zeira, 'Commodity money inflation: theory and evidence from France in 1350–1436', *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 50 (2003), pp. 1769–93, at p. 1773.

³ The money of account value of the white *obol* was changed to 15*d bord.* and the black double to 2½*d bord.*, Rechenbach, 'The Gascon Money', p. 261.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 262–7.

⁵ Miskimin, *Money, Prices and Foreign Exchange*, pp. 110–1.

⁶ Clark, *English Prices and Wages*.

⁷ Gold *léopards* (from 1344), imitations of the French *écus* (minted 1348–51), and imitation Florentine florins (minted 1353–5), were produced, see M. Bompaire, 'Les monnayages d'or d'Aquitaine anglo-gasconne, le témoignage des livres de changeur', *Revue numismatique*, 6:155 (2000), pp. 261–79; P. Capra, 'Le Léopard et le Guyennois d'or, monnaies d'Aquitaine: Essai sur la chronologie de leurs émissions', *Annales du Midi*, 72:52 (1960), pp. 393–409; Rechenbach, 'The Gascon Money', pp. 269–75, 279–81.

⁸ Sussman, Zeira, 'Commodity money inflation', pp. 1769–93, at p. 1773; see Appendix 6.1 for Bordeaux's mint profit figures.

⁹ Whilst black *deniers* (1*d bord.*), *gros* (2*d bord.*), doubles (worth 2½*d bord.*) and gold *léopards* (16*s* 8*d bord.*) continued to be minted, new coins were introduced: the silver sterling *guyennois* worth 5*d bord.* based on the English penny sterling and the almost-pure gold *guyennois* then worth 16*s* 8*d bord.* or 40 sterling. Later silver *blancs* worth 10*d bord.* and gold *nobles guyennois* (also known as *pavillon d'or*) were also produced, see Rechenbach, 'The Gascon Money', pp. 171, 283; also see G. Des Aubineaux, 'Vins, prix et monnaies du Moyen âge en pays bordelais', *Revue Historique de Bordeaux et du Département de la Gironde*,

economy, at Poitiers, La Rochelle and Limoges, even in Figeac in Quercy.¹ The power ‘to make money in gold and silver’ was a right passed to the Black Prince, from his father, by the instruments of his sovereign entity’s creation.²

Such persistently active mint production was only possible because of very low precious metal prices, and at that time these were evidently flooding into Gascony. There was a strong recovery in the wine trade after the Black Death, exports doubled in scale over the 1350s whilst export prices remained stubbornly above pre-war levels.³ Thanks to the generous policy on precious metal exports from the kingdom this allowed a considerable trade surplus in favour of the Anglo-Gascon economy, and profits were easily re-patriated partially in cash. Even after the exchange and capital controls were implemented by the crown in 1364 to prevent these flows of coin, they continued for a time, at first under licence and then probably illegally.⁴ It has also been estimated that over 1348–61 some £86,227 sterling had been assigned to the constables of Bordeaux from the English exchequer.⁵ These fiscal transfers of capital also continued to bolster the Prince’s new regime, such as the £17,811 2s 7d sterling in 1363–4 (89,055l 13s bord.).⁶ All such inflows, once monetised, contributed considerable upward pressure on aggregate prices in the duchy in the 1350s and particularly in the principality throughout the Brétigny period.

The great mid-fourteenth century shift in wine prices, complained about and legislated for in 1353, 1363 and 1368, thus became a largely monetary phenomenon.⁷ For, most significantly, the current account surplus impacted the value of the *livre bordelaise*, the money of account in which the face values of coinage and the book value of assets were expressed. The weight of pure gold each unit represented increased 39.2% between the twenty year period 1341–60 and the 1361–80.⁸ In foreign exchange the *livre* appreciated significantly in value against the English pound sterling, and so goods priced in the local Anglo-Gascon currency, as they were in the vast majority of exchanges, became more expensive for exporters.⁹ Strong demand in post-Black Death England

7 (1958), pp. 171–5; Bompaire, ‘Les monnayages d’or’, pp. 261–79; Lodge, ‘The Estates of the Archbishop’, p. 187.

¹ Rechenbach, ‘The Gascon Money’, p. 285; Rogers, *Annals of the Coinage*, pp. 248–60.

² TNA, E 30/1105; GSR, C 61/75: 54.

³ Exports grew from 13,427 tuns in 1349–50 to 27,838 in 1357–8, prices in the 1350s averaged c.14l 5s bord. per tun compared with 5l 15s bord. before the war, see Appendices 3.1 and 8.1.

⁴ CPR, 1364–1367, pp. 13, 15–7. See chapter 2.4.1 for English exchange and capital controls.

⁵ G.L. Harriss, *King, Parliament and Public Finance in Medieval England to 1369* (Oxford, 1975), p. 329.

⁶ CGD, 1, pp. 134–7 (no. CCXXIII).

⁷ SR, 1, pp. 331, (27 Edw. III, st.1, c.5–7), 379 (37 Edw. III, c.5), 389 (42 Edw. III, c.8).

⁸ See Appendix 6.5.

⁹ *Ceteris paribus*, the exchange rate in between two economies was: the relative value of precious metals expressed in their respective monies of account; or, the ratio between the quantity of pure metals each money of account represented, the ‘par value’ (see Spufford, *Handbook of Medieval Exchange*, xlix). This assumes the long-run functioning of purchasing power parity (PPP) between medieval economies, for which the evidence is considerable (see A.R. Bell, C. Brooks, T.K. Moore, ‘Did Purchasing Power Parity Hold in Medieval Europe?’ *The Manchester School*, 85:6 (2007), pp. 682–709). In the short-run imbalances could leave a currency over-valued or under-valued (see P. Bernholz, ‘Flexible Exchange Rates in Historical Perspective’, *Princeton Studies in International Finance*, 49 (1982), p. 2). In practice, if the domestic price of gold and silver fell the value of the money of account rose in relative terms over the short-term, the latter would buy more foreign goods and services of an economy where the price of metals is higher. Its effective exchange rate would therefore have appreciated until prices were corrected by merchant arbitrage or monetary action was taken.

allowed wine to continue to be exported, albeit reluctantly, but other Gascon exports suffered considerably. In 1364, a royal ordinance announced that ‘it has now been shown to the king [Edward III] and council that there is no merchandise in Gascony for the profit of the realm of England other than wines’.¹ Salt produced in the duchy was undercut by growing competition in the Bay of Bourgneuf, from whence between two thirds and three-quarters of England’s salt was shipped after the mid-fourteenth century, with the remainder coming from Brittany and Spain.² Re-exports of iron were always outshone by shipments directly from the Basque country, and these declined also, English imports were then supplemented by supplies from Sweden.³ Kowaleski noted a profound decline in the import of dyes into Exeter, including 94% less blue woad.⁴ This trade from Toulouse via Gascon ports would not really grow again more generally until the 1470s.⁵ Only Gascon honey remained a major feature of cargoes leaving Bordeaux, but fluctuated greatly in volume inversely in proportion to wine, the preferred commodity.⁶ English goods, by contrast, became comparatively cheaper for Anglo-Gascon importers, and as we have seen, demand grew.⁷ All these things suggest that Gascony may have been suffering from a problem familiar to modern economies, so-called ‘Dutch disease’. This posits that a resource export boom can diminish other sectors in an economy because strong exports of a single commodity lead to an inflow of capital, an appreciating currency, and therefore cheaper imports relative to domestic production in other sectors, which are thus rendered uncompetitive.⁸

Unfortunately there is insufficient surviving evidence for the exchange rates for those dealing in physical coin used day-to-day, however there was an official rate, that used by the ducal government and English exchequer in their financial accounts.⁹ The archbishops of Bordeaux, chapter of Saint-André and the *confrérie* of Saint-Michel all used it for valuations on their own books, and there were periodic efforts to enforce its use in all foreign exchange transactions.¹⁰ This was only possible by very strong regulation. In England the Crown had instituted a monopoly over foreign exchange in 1351, and in Bordeaux an official exchange was certainly in operation by the time of the Black Prince’s tenure of Aquitaine.¹¹ The money-changers who operated in and around the *Château de l’Ombrière*, in the vicinity of the mint, were strictly controlled. These were men such as Pey de la Gardela, who rented a house beneath one of the castle’s turrets in the late 1370s.¹² There were rules that, for example, governed the maximum commission they were able to charge

¹ *CPR*, 1364–1367, pp. 6–7.

² Bridbury, *Salt Trade*, pp. 53–5, 114–9.

³ Childs, *Anglo-Castilian Trade*, pp. 112–9.

⁴ Kowaleski, *Local Markets and Regional Trade*, pp. 235–9. According to one set of accounts, in the early fourteenth century 7,404 quarters of woad were imported, this at fallen to just 435 quarters in an equivalent set of accounts from the 1380s.

⁵ Childs, *Anglo-Castilian Trade*, p. 108.

⁶ See Appendix 3.6 for honey exports shown against wine exports.

⁷ See Chapter 2.4.1.

⁸ For a full explanation of Dutch disease see W.M. Corden, ‘Boom Sector and Dutch Disease Economics: Survey and Consolidation’, *Oxford Economic Papers*, 36 (1984), pp. 359–80.

⁹ See Appendix 6.3 for the official exchange rate data.

¹⁰ *AHG*, XXI, p. 390; *ADG*, G 2302, fol. 94v; *AHG*, XIII, p. 19; *RJ*, II, pp. 28–32, 270–2.

¹¹ Allen, *Mints and Money*, pp. 214–30; *CGD*, 1, pp. 134–5 (no. CCXXIII).

¹² *TNA*, E 101/180/9, fol. 21r.

on transactions, this was set at 1.25% in 1414.¹ Their records were scrutinised by the authorities, and would be summoned before ducal and city officials if indiscretions were suspected.²

The official fixed rate was changed very rarely (Figure 8). The mechanism by which it was done is unclear but it can be safely assumed that the responsibility for decisions on such important matters went as high as the royal council in England, as it related to the king's very right to mint and control money. Under such direction the *livre* appreciated considerably against the pound sterling in the late 1340s and into the 1350s, thereafter the fixed rate settled at 5 *livres* to the pound for most of the next twenty years (5*d bord.* = 1*d* sterling). Rough calculations based on weight values would give the pure silver value of 42.93g per *livre*, compared with 259g per pound after 1350, a 'par' rate based on metal of 6:1 – meaning Anglo-Gascon money was then slightly over-valued but not overly so if we take into account local demand for silver. Although England was never truly bimetallic, we can make some similar crude assessments for relative value nonetheless, the gold noble (worth 6*s* 8*d* sterling) weighed 7.8g of nearly pure gold in 1351, giving 23.4g as the crude gold worth of a pound sterling, which compared with 2.63g on average for the *livre* during 1341–1360, gives a par *livre*/pound exchange rate of 8.9:1 based on gold. This indicated that in the 1350s gold specie was extremely highly sought after in Gascony. This was reflected in the very large gold/silver ratio of 1:16.32, far greater than that in England that probably stood at around 1:11.07.³ Even if we accept Miskimin's scepticism regarding the opportunities merchants had for bullion arbitrage,⁴ nobles exchanged at the official rate gave far more local currency than they should at par. Thus, wine in Gascony was in effect 40% cheaper if bought with English gold nobles than with silver. All of which explains why the flow of gold to the duchy in this period was so strong – and why the crown worked so hard from the early 1360s to prevent the flight of gold using capital and exchange controls.

¹ *RJ*, II, p. 8, 270–2. In 1414 the commission for changing a English gold noble into 160 *sterlings guyennois* was set at maximum 2 *sterlings guyennois*, or 1.25%.

² *RJ*, II, p. 362, 364–5, 473, 477, 481–2.

³ See Appendix 6.5 for the gold and silver values of the *livre bordelaise*; and bimetallic ratios.

⁴ Miskimin, *Money, Prices and Foreign Exchange*, pp. 41, 117–9.




Figure 8 Value of the *livre bordelaise* in pounds sterling at official exchange rates, shown against overall wine exports from Gascony (tuns), 1340–1460. **Source:** Exchange rate data from Appendix 6.3; export data from Appendix 3.1.

The economic tide would soon turn. The *livre*'s relative strength and quantity stimulated a great spending spree on foreign imports into the principality, particularly from England. The debts of £2,520 owed to English merchants in 1365 by a wide spectrum of Anglo-Gascon lords, gentry and burgesses give vivid testimony to this.¹ In addition, the much-testified profligacy of the Prince's court and the spiralling costs of his campaigns over the Pyrenees in Castile caused a great deal of his principality's money supply to drain abroad.²

Revenues from the Bordeaux exchange steadily declined between 1363–4 and 1366, then dropped suddenly 88.4% the following year, and from then on ceased to produce a profit entirely (Table 3 - overleaf).³ This is a clear indication that the inflow of foreign currency into Gascony was diminishing, then replaced by an outflow of gold and silver. It is worth noting that the start of the decline at the exchange coincided with the 1363 law which insisted Gascon merchants in England repatriate their profits only in trade goods, and the imposition of the 1364 exchange controls.⁴

¹ TNA, E 101/128/11. The exchange rate based on wheat prices in Gascony and England (Appendix 6.4) also suggests that the *livre* was becoming significantly over-valued at its official exchange rate with sterling. For the wider use of wheat to measure purchasing power, see Bell et al, 'Did Purchasing Power Parity Hold?', pp. 682–709, especially pp. 702–3.

² Barber, *Edward, Prince of Wales and Aquitaine*, pp. 184, 190, 209.

³ *CGD*, 1, pp. 134–5 (no. CCXXIII).

⁴ See Chapter 2.4.1.

Table 3 Revenues from the Bordeaux exchange, 1363–70.

Year	£ sterling	<i>l bord.</i>
1363–4	£522 5s 2d	2,611l 5s 10d
1365	£432 16s 2d	2,240l 16s 8d
1366	£333 4s	1,666l
1367	£38 14s	193l 10s
1368	<i>Nothing</i>	<i>Nothing</i>
1369	<i>Nothing</i>	<i>Nothing</i>
1370	<i>Nothing</i>	<i>Nothing</i>

Source: *CGD*, 1, pp. 134–5 (no. CCXXIII).

A gradual shift in the current account toward deficit is also evident in the records of the principality's mints, which show an equally clear decline in activity, as gradually precious metals became too scarce and expensive to attract to the *Château*. The combined seigniorage from gold and silver mint-runs had been 19,907l 15s *bord.* in 1364, this fell to 12,778l 15s *bord.* in 1365 and just 8,348l 15s in 1366.¹ Since such mint profits were generally extracted at rates fixed rates per *marc* of pure metal these are very strong indicators of the declining real replenishment of the money supply.²

Though exports during the Brétigny peace were considerable, foreign earnings from the wine trade became insufficient to balance such outflows since commerce was now encountering tougher economic headwinds. Not only was the *livre* becoming seriously over-valued but the principality's bimetallic ratio had shifted dramatically from 1:16.32 to 1:9.49 as silver appreciated in value against gold, the impact of two decades of gold nobles arriving from England. This increased merchants' and producers' costs in the former metal which were usually used for wages or other smaller payments, and diminishing their revenues in the latter which were only used for larger commercial transactions. The tipping point came in May 1368 when, at the request of the Three Estates of Aquitaine, the Prince revalued his gold and silver coinage in order to reflect this shift. The silver *blanc* was reduced in face value from 10d *bord.* to 6d, much to the chagrin of the archbishop of Bordeaux's clerks, who observed a substantial book loss on those revenues in silver coin.³ By contrast the various gold denominations, proudly introduced at the beginning of the decade needed to be reduced in weight or increased in face value.⁴ The revaluations of 1368 brought a surge of activity in Bordeaux's mint - profits from silver coinage alone increased more than five-fold from 2,286l 5s *bord.* in 1366 to 14,081l 17s 6d *bord.* in 1367–8, even whilst those

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 169–76 (no. CCXXIV).

² For examples of fixed seigniorage rates per silver *marc* see: TNA, E 101/189/12, fos 14r; 34v; 57r; 79v; 79v; E 101/191/11, fol. 7v, 32v; E 101/192/8, fol. 32v.

³ *AHG*, XXII, p. 197. Boutruche considered this a 40% increase in the value of the *livre bordelaise* (Boutruche, *La crise*, p. 267). If true it would further explain the decline in wine exports in 1368–9, as Gascon goods would have become suddenly more expensive, but there is no evidence this immediately impacted the exchange rate (see the Black Prince's accounts held under TNA, E 36/80). It is better seen as an internal adjustment in the bimetallic ratio between the metals the *livre* represented.

⁴ Bompaire, 'Les monnayages d'or d'Aquitaine', pp. 263–72.

from gold coinage fell a further 80%.¹ Yet the following year – as war resumed with the French crown – the mint ceased operating entirely.

The mint was to stay closed for the subsequent twelve tempestuous years, as Gascony suffered from numerous French invasions, outbreaks of plague, famines, and the political collapse of the principality. There is some suggestion that by mid-way through the decade some limited minting was done under licence by members of the Bordeaux *jurade*, though this was probably only small denomination billon and unlikely to have had a great economic impact.² Whether it was political instability which made the normal functioning of official mints unfeasible is unclear, certainly they had continued to function in other similarly difficult times. The accounts of the constable Richard Rotour stated that in certain years ‘no money was made because of the war’.³ In reality the prices of gold and silver in the newly reconstituted duchy were simply far too high thanks to their constant flow abroad with weak wine exports and strong imports demanded by the duchy. The vast scale of the latter in this period are revealed by the records of a municipal sales tax in Bordeaux levied at 2.5% on the sale of goods by all foreign (including English) merchants. In just over one hundred days from January to May 1376, merchandise to the value of 216,344*l* 10*s* *bord.* (£28,846 sterling) were sold in the city.⁴ If sustained at that rate throughout the year annual imports would surpass 750,000*l* *bord.* (£100,000 sterling) in value.

That burden of foreign imports was all the greater for around 1372 the *livre* was devalued 33.3% relative to sterling according to the official exchange rate, resetting it to 7*l* 10*s* *bord.* to the pound (7½*d* *bord.* = 1*d* sterling).⁵ This decision may have belatedly contributed towards the short but impressive export boom during the truce of Bruges (1375–7), when the real price of wine in Gascony fell disproportionately for English buyers, and wine in England, the chronicler Walsingham noted, became abundant.⁶ The value of the 23,920 tuns exported in 1376–7, probably around 500,000*l* *bord.* (£66,666 6*s* 8*d* sterling), was considerable, though was almost certainly still insufficient to entirely balance imports.⁷ Moreover this growth in exports was brief because supply constraints with the invasions of Gascony in 1377–8 again raised prices.

¹ *CGD*, 1, pp. 169–76 (no. CCXXIV).

² TNA, E 101/180/9, fol. 8r.

³ For example see TNA, E 101/180/9, fol. 27r.

⁴ TNA, E 101/180/9, fol. 8v. The tax of 6*d* in every *livre* was raised from 19 January 1376 to 1 May 1376, a one-third share of the revenues was delivered to the ducal treasury, some 1,802.87 *livres*, giving a gross value of foreigners’ sales at 216,344.5 *livres*.

⁵ TNA, E 101/179/9, fol. 9v; E 101/179/14, fol. 12r; E 101/179/15, fol. 23r; TNA, E 101/179/14, fol. 27v; E 101/180/1, no. 12; E 101/180/9, fol. 29v.

⁶ Exports rose from 8,656 tuns in 1375–76 to 23,920 tuns in 1376–77 (see Appendix 3.1). Thomas Walsingham noted that in 1377 ‘tanta advecta est in Angliam vinorum abundantia, quanta multa transacta tempora non viderunt’, *Historia anglicana*, (ed.) H.T. Riley (London, 1863), p. 323.

⁷ Estimate based on the mean of 1376 and 1377 Bordeaux prices, 20.86 *livres* per tun.




Figure 9 Profits of the Bordeaux mint, in annualised *livres bordelaise*, 1350–1453. **Source:** Appendix 6.1.

External devaluation had to some extent corrected monetary imbalances on the trade route with England. By the period 1381–1400, the *livre* had the silver weight of 31.06g, or 2.90g of gold. How these weights compare with sterling (still 259g of silver per pound) suggests a par exchange rate of 8.3:1 based on relative weight in silver, 8.1:1 based on gold.¹ The Bordeaux mint re-opened in 1381 when the military situation had improved, yet the amounts of coin produced were extremely small relative to before the crisis years (Figure 9). Despite a certain recovery in wine exports over the following decades, imports from England, widely promoted by the crown during Richard II's reign, ensured the economy was still unable to run trade surpluses remotely near those of the 1350s and 1360s.² Moreover, the narrower gold/silver ratio of 1:10.71, now less than the ratio of 1:11.07 in England ensured that these mint-runs included no gold coinage, as the flow of gold nobles from England to Gascony dried up.³

The duchy's economy was also experiencing the first wave of the growing Europe-wide bullion famine. Already low, the activity of Bordeaux's mint appears to have almost halved over the course of the 1380s as the market price of silver increased over 30%.⁴ Stronger exports during peace with France in the late 1390s helped to draw in a little more metal but by the early 1400s the monetary imbalances in Anglo-Gascon trade had returned. The *livre* had a gradually diminishing metal value, even though the official fixed exchange rate remained at 7.5:1. Sterling was still set at 259g of silver, yet the *livre* was worth 20.23g, giving a more correct exchange rate in terms of silver of 12.8:1. The equivalent in terms of gold was 8.42:1. The consequence was that wine bought in Gascony was artificially expensive for English buyers when priced in the money of account. Also shortages of silver had pushed the bimetallic ratio to as low as 1:7.28, particularly bad for exporting merchants with expenses in dearer silver but profits in cheaper gold. This exacerbated a downturn in the wine trade already desperately trying to recover from the damage done by the invasions of 1405–8, which had also again increased the demand for English goods.

To make matters worse, in 1411 Henry IV devalued sterling to prevent specie loss to Flanders.⁵ This reduced the silver weight of the pound sterling to 215.8g and the gold equivalent (in three lighter 7g gold nobles) to 21g, which despite slightly narrowing the Anglo-Gascon fixed exchange rate imbalance, caused Gascon wine to become even more expensive for English merchants. Imports into England fell sharply from over 15,000 tuns in 1409–10 to around 9,500 in 1411–2.⁶ Then finally around 1413 the *livre* in Gascony was devalued 25% against sterling at the official exchange rate, which was set at 10:1 (*10d bord.* = *1d* sterling).⁷ This largely corrected the fixed exchange rate problem since the par exchange rate based on silver between the *livre* and the post-1411 pound was 10.67:1. That gold nobles should be used in exchange was evidently by

¹ See Appendix 6.5.

² 'Richard II: October 1377', item 36 *PROME, BHO; GSR, C 61/91: 34.*

³ See Appendix 6.5.

⁴ For mint activity see Appendix 6.1. The price of a *marc* of pure silver at market rose from *6l 10s bord.* in 1377 to *8l 5s* in 1388, see TNA, E 101/179/14, fol. 27v; *AHG, XXII, p. 404.*

⁵ Munro, *Wool, Cloth and Gold*, pp. 34–5, 60–2.

⁶ Appendix 3.4.

⁷ TNA, E 364/51; E 364/55.

now also accepted, since rules on currency transactions laid down by the duke of Clarence, while he was in the duchy in 1413, expressly stated that one English noble (‘noble’) should be worth 160 sterlings *guyennois* (each *5d bord.*). Since the gold coin was worth 6s 8s sterling and the Anglo-Gascon silver worth *3l 6s 8d bord.* the proclamation enforced the rate of exchange at the official rate.¹

The external devaluation of the money of account ran in parallel with intervention in the coinage. In 1414–5 the Three Estates of the Bordelais expressly requested that actions be taken over reports of a ‘total failure’ of the circulating silver, a problem that was implicit in the unparalleled low bimetallic ratio, the cumulative result of the first bullion famine and recent balance of trade deficits with England. It was reported that consequently the people ‘could neither be paid for their labours, nor sell their wines’.² The market price of silver in the duchy had now reached a critical point, up from *8l 5s bord.* per pure *marc* in 1407 to over *10l 6s.*³ In response the weight of the silver sterling *guyennois* was reduced 11.1% in the hope that coins would remain in circulation and the money supply be improved.⁴

These devaluations were to have a visibly transformative effect on trade for a number of years. For this reason alone we can speculate that Lewis John, as senior official in the London mint and financier for the Lancastrian regime, had some influence on behalf of his colleagues of the *mistry of the Vintry*.⁵ Wine became cheaper in sterling for the merchants buying in Gascony, passed on albeit to a lesser degree to English consumers. This greatly ameliorated demand and Gascon wine poured into England, rising from around 10,000 to 18,000 tuns per year (Figure 10).

The extent of the stimulative effect of currency devaluations itself serves as evidence for both the degree of price elasticity in demand for exports and how the fixed exchange rate policy constrained trade levels.⁶ The stimulative effect lasted only until around 1416, by which time Bordeaux sellers had raised their nominal prices to reflect the fall in the *livre*’s value, and the scale of trade returned to close to previous levels.

¹ *RJ*, II, pp. 28–32, 270–2.

² *RJ*, II, p. 75.

³ *RJ*, I, p. 256; II, p. 272.

⁴ *RJ*, II, p. 30, 72–6.

⁵ L.S. Woodger, ‘JOHN, Lewis (d. 1442), of London and West Horndon, Essex’, in *The History of Parliament*, (eds.) J.S. Roskell et al.

⁶ The Marshall–Lerner condition states that a devaluation will only improve the balance of trade if the export and import demand elasticities are sufficiently high, see S. Tokarick, ‘A Method for Calculating Export Supply and Import Demand Elasticities’, *IMF Working Paper* (2010), p. 26.




Figure 10 English wine imports (tuns), and English mean wine prices (pounds sterling per tun), shown against changes in the foreign exchange (FX) rate between the pound sterling and *livre bordelaise*, 1400–59. **Source:** Appendix 3.4 [English imports]; Clark, *English Prices and Wages, 1209–1914* (2003) [English prices], provided in Appendix 9.1; Appendix 6.3 [foreign exchange].




Figure 11 Profits of the Bordeaux mint, in annualised *livres bordelaise*, 1381–1453. **Source:** Appendix 6.1.

Opinions in Gascony regarding the ongoing abandonment of ‘sound’ money at this time were mixed. The diminution of the *livre* was done with the support of the Three Estates yet the changes caused much anxiety for some Bordeaux burgesses who voiced their grievances to one English official.¹ They would see the costs of their imports, that had been artificially cheap, again rise in real terms.² But by raising mint prices, deterring Gascon imports, and encouraging wine exports, the *Château* appears to have ameliorated the duchy’s current account until well into the 1420s. Indeed between 1418–9 and 1423–4 profits from the Bordeaux mint increased 268.4%.³ In 1427–8 over half a metric ton of pure silver was minted, a greater quantity than was processed by the London mint over the same period.⁴ Only from 1428–9 did mint activity start to dwindle as overall wine exports fell to around half the level they had been at the beginning of the decade.⁵ A resurgence in exports in 1429–31 allowed a brief improvement in silver available, but this was short-lived. The problems with the duchy’s money supply returned with a vengeance. It is probable Dauphinist French monetary policy also played some part here. Substantial devaluations of the *livre tournois* took place during 1417 to 1422, and 1427 to 1431, and with local truces in the *Haut-Pays* common in this period, merchant arbitrage may have carried the new Anglo-Gascon money into enemy territory.⁶ Reports that reached Humphrey, duke of Gloucester, in late 1431, stated that so little circulated in the southern city of Bayonne that coinage from Iberia was used.⁷ Despite royal instructions to re-open a mint at Bayonne, all attempts to do so failed, as they had done in the 1420s.⁸

By the mid-1430s the constables of Bordeaux had again resorted to the practice of producing increasingly debased coinage. The key circulating coin, the silver *blanc*, which had been minted with one third pure silver, was reduced to only 25% silver. The *noirs* or ‘billon’ *deniers* were reduced to just 5.56% silver.⁹ Even with debasements silver was increasingly scarce; a sure sign of the mid-fifteenth century bullion famine that was disrupting economies across Europe. Moreover relentless internal devaluation resurrected the problem of the *livre bordelaise*’s incorrect valuation in foreign exchange. In the late 1430s, though the exchange rate remained pegged at the duke of Clarence’s 1413 level of 10 *livres* to the pound, the par exchange rate based on metals had

¹ Vale, *English Gascony*, p. 9.

² For example, see Appendix 8.3 for wheat prices in Gascony in sterling terms.

³ TNA, E 101/187/12, fol. 7v, 18v; E 101/189/6, m. 7.

⁴ TNA, E 101/189/12, fol. 34v; for the London mint figures see Munro, *Wool, Cloth and Gold*, p. 191.

⁵ Overall wine exports had been 16,258 tuns in 1422–3, but were only 9,074 tuns in 1427–8 (see Appendix 3.1).

⁶ Sussman, ‘Debasements, Royal Revenues, and Inflation’, pp. 44–70; Sussman, Zeira, ‘Commodity money inflation’, pp. 1769–1793, at p. 1774. For analysis of local truces see Vale, *English Gascony*, pp. 179–80, 191.

⁷ It was reported that, ‘there is a great lack of money, since because of the war, no silver can be brought to the king’s mint of Bordeaux, so that coins of the kingdoms of Castile, Portugal, Aragon and Navarre and other kingdoms are current in the city of Bayonne’, *GSR*, C 61/124: 60.

⁸ *GSR*, C 61/120: 1.

⁹ TNA, E 101/189/12, fos 34v, 57r, 79v; E 101/191/11, fos 7v, 32v; for the value of the *blanc*, see E 101/189/12, fol. 81v.

drifted to close to 13.8:1 for silver, 13.5:1 for gold.¹ This imbalance had once again inhibited wine exports, encouraged imports, and had contributed to an increasing current account deficit over the course of the 1430s long before the invasions of Villandrando and other enemies could have had a significant impact.² By the end of the decade wine exports had fallen to their lowest on record during the entire history of the wine trade.

Shortly after the arrival the new constable Sir Robert Clifton in Gascony in 1439, the *livre* was finally devalued 21.6% against sterling, and the official exchange rate was then set at 12.75 *livres* to the pound (12¾*d bord.* = 1*d* sterling), very close to par.³ The correction of the fixed exchange rate again lowered of the relative price of wine in sterling and prompted a similar, albeit smaller rise in exports from Gascony and imports into England to the one two decades earlier (see Figures 8 and 10).⁴ Yet market silver prices in Bordeaux in 1442 stood at 15*l bord.* per pure *marc*, up 81.8% since the beginning of the century.⁵ Only two years after external devaluation the *livre* was already chronically over-valued at the official rate when compared with the price of silver in England.⁶ Evidently neither monetary intervention nor greater exports after 1445, brought in sufficient precious metals since mint activity in Bordeaux remained negligible (Figure 11).

The pronounced decline of the wholesale market in Bordeaux, as shown by the falling proportion of exports paying the *issac*, can be therefore be partially ascribed to a crisis of financial liquidity.⁷ The quantity of available money in the city had become sufficiently diminished to inhibit exchange. In the last years of Plantagenet rule this continued to deteriorate. The money supply shrank and aggregate prices fell with it even as the currency itself declined in intrinsic value.⁸ All were features of an economy in the grip of a severe depression. Monetary matters would surface as a major political issue in 1451 during the negotiations to bring the city under the rule of the French king, the improvement of currency being one of the key Anglo-Gascon demands.⁹

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¹ The gold/silver bimetallic ratio of 1:9.89 in Gascony, now very close to that of England, evidently did not favour one precious metal over the other be shipped.

² Overall exports had fallen from 12,603 tuns in 1435–6 to 4,761 in 1437–8 and just 4,052 in 1438–9, see TNA, E 101/192/8, fol. 31.

³ TNA, E 364/75; E 364/84; R.W. Dunning, 'Beckington, Thomas (1390?–1465)', *ODNB* <<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-1908>>.

⁴ See Chapter 2.3.2.

⁵ 'Compte du trésorier de la ville de Bordeaux pour 1442', pp. 179–215, at p. 194; *RJ*, I, pp. 171–2, 175–6, 233, 256

⁶ If the Bordeaux market price in 1442 was 15*l bord.* per pure silver *marc*, but 18*s 4d* sterling at the London mint (Clark, *English Prices and Wages*) for the same weight of metal, a real 'par' exchange rate could be estimated at 1:16.4. This was already far greater than the official rate of 1:12.75.

⁷ See Appendix 3.3.

⁸ For wine prices see Appendix 8.1; for wheat prices see Appendix 8.4.

⁹ *Livre des bouillons*, pp. 539–40, also see Chapter 4.3.

This chapter has shown the various methods by which the English crown intervened, directly or indirectly, in the wine trade, and the political framework that underpinned them. These included new insights into how the king regulated the structure of the wine market in order to control the participation of merchants; and how the crown provided trade privileges and valuable endowments to allies, increasingly so in periods of political crisis. The export of goods and money were controlled. Currencies and foreign exchange were manipulated.

Intervention primarily resulted from pressure applied by the various interested parties, the petition and parliamentary influence being the most important tools at their disposal. Episodes of regulatory and statutory control, be it the key 1353 statute, which so-benefited the Bordeaux merchants, or that of 1445 which abolished it in the interests of their English buyers, were highly-political acts. Likewise, the acquiescence of rent-seeking across the trade, the pursuance of advantage in order to gain unproductive revenues, as well as price, exchange and capital controls in England were all encouraged by those who would most benefit. English influence appeared in the ascendant across the period but this was far from uniform. Some politically important groups of Anglo-Gascons: the Bordeaux church and burgesses, and various specific nobles; all won a number of commercial concessions, not least the extremely valuable burgess-status itself.

Such policy-making was far more reactive than it was proactive. Decisions taken were largely as the result of the crown's response to events, and these were both causes and consequences of market volatility. Though that intervention might have a long lasting impact, very little fondness for future planning can be demonstrated. The few policies pursued repeatedly with any conviction over the long term in Gascony, rather than committed to *ad hoc*, were often contradictory. For example, the wish to repair and expand trade with the *Haut-Pays* appears incompatible with the economic protection of Bordeaux, as shall be made clear in the subsequent chapter.¹

Though the duchy retained some commercial links with its greater hinterland, as well as Iberia, Brittany and Flanders, England was, to a very considerable degree, its dominant trading partner. As a consequence Gascony's economy functioned as an annex of that of its political metropole, and thus Anglo-Gascon trade was impacted considerably by the English adherents of bullionist ideas and their influence on wider economic policy. That the rise and fall in the *livre bordelaise* mirrored that of the wine trade is the case in point. It reflected the swing in policy that emanated from Westminster from a more free flow of money to a stricter policy after 1364. Before this point the value of English gold, and the dramatic rise in English wine prices, brought on the wine trade boom in the two decades after the Black Death. This was for Gascony, as Postan observed for Northern European towns, 'a short, intoxicating period of prosperity under the stimulus of the relative superabundance of capital'.²

After 1364 these monetary trends began to reverse. Liquid capital left the Anglo-Gascon economy. The *livre* weakened, albeit in bursts where the crown was forced to react to repeated

¹ See Chapter 3.4 in particular.

² Postan, *Essays*, p. 21.

currency crises, on account of being over-valued in exchange with England. The extent to which these problems were responsible for the long-term decline in Gascon exports can only be guessed at, but certainly these episodes contributed upward pressure on nominal wine prices in the duchy, despite the regular shortages of precious metals, until the final decade of Plantagenet rule.

At the same time English protectionism and licensing encouraged the import of English goods into the duchy, which exacerbated the duchy's specialisation in wine and made it vulnerable to any subsequent downturns in trade. Such was the degree of overspecialisation, in the Bordelais in particular, that by the final decades of the fifteenth century its inhabitants would complain of the great divergence between their economy and that in the *Haut-Pays*, where diversification of production had left it 'fat and opulent' by comparison.¹

How vested interests in the trade fared whilst these changes took place and how they responded to them to protect their own advantages – varied enormously. This is the subject of the following chapter.

¹ Harris, *Valois Guyenne*, p. 47.

3. Vested interests

In keeping with the highly stratified nature of medieval societies, the advantages of trade were spread widely but not evenly. Some would benefit materially or financially more than others. This chapter investigates the relative impact of the policies, as previously clarified (chapter 2), concentrating on the fortunes of those English and Anglo-Gascon elites with vested interests in the market.

3.1 English Crown, nobility, and the Anglo-Gascon administration

3.1.1 Kings of England

The kings of England were beneficiaries of the wine trade, both fiscally, as it provided an important avenue for taxation at both ends of the route, and materially, as it provided the royal court with huge quantities of wine. Yet from the beginning of the period under discussion their policies were not necessarily helpful to their own interests. One motive for the establishment of an effective staple in 1353 was an improvement of crown's revenues. In fact it achieved nothing of the sort. Customs revenues at Bordeaux actually fell from 7,192*l* 16*s* 8*d* *bord.* (£1,438 11*s* 4*d* sterling) in 1352–3 to 6,301*l* 13*s* 4*d* *bord.* (£1,260 6*s* 8*d* sterling) the following year.¹ This was because the new regulations constrained the activities of English merchants and ship-owners and so would deter investment, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 3.2; and also because it increased the share of exports with tax-exemptions and reductions, discussed in Chapter 3.3–4.²

The first effect was unavoidable because real returns on customs were inextricably linked to the prevailing scale of the export trade. For instance, they provided the Black Prince an average of £5,848 13*s* 4*d* sterling per year during 1363–7, but these fell 48.8% to £2,996 12*s* 2*d* sterling per year in 1369–70, as trade levels collapsed.³ Despite the disintegration of the principality some recovery of income levels was achieved during the 1370s, and these peaked again at over £1,250 sterling per annum during the tenure of Sir John de Stratton during 1381–6. Yet thereafter the trend was largely downward, and after the reign of Henry IV (1399–1413) they never again increased beyond an average of £1,000 per annum at any stage, though there was a visible boost to income after the 1445 reforms of the Gascon wine market.⁴

The second effect, the crown's own policy of exempting a large portion of Gascon producers from export duty, also contributed to continued diminishing returns.⁵ Privileged wine had crucial competitive advantages in the export market, especially in difficult years for the trade

¹ TNA, E 101/170/17, m. 4; E 101/171/2, mm. 4–5.

² Also see Appendix 3.2 for overall exports by tax category.

³ Calculated from *CGD*, 1, pp. 134–7 (no. CCXXIII).

⁴ See Appendix 10.1 for annualised ducal revenues 1372–1453.

⁵ See Chapter 2.2.1.

where it would make up a greater proportion of overall exports. For example some 43.6% of stock exported was tax-free in 1436–7, but after the invasions of the Bordelais by Rodrigo de Villandrando and Charles [II], lord of Albret, the share was 65.1% in 1438–9. In the latter year 86.6% of stock exported held some sort of discount on duty.¹

The rates at which all these customs were charged were developed by the early 1350s and then remained remarkably unchanged throughout most of the last century of Plantagenet rule. This was in stark contrast to efforts by the crown to exact large fiscal revenues from the wool trade with Flanders, through the main ancient custom charged per sack as well as the imposition of *maltolts*, or large surcharges.² Wool exports were simply less price elastic in demand, the Flemish buyers had few alternatives so would, in the short-term, absorb the tax burden. The same was not true of the wine trade. The *grande coutume* at Bordeaux had been raised briefly to 20*s bord.* (then 4*s* sterling) per tun in the 1360s by Edward, the Black Prince, in an effort to ameliorate his principality's fiscal troubles, but was abruptly returned to the earlier rate in 1368–9.³ The only equivalent to a *maltolt* occurred only once in the early fifteenth century. For twelve months from April 1413 an extra tranche of taxes were levied on trade in Gascony in order to pay for the duke of Clarence's military endeavours there. A surcharge of 20*s bord.* per tun was charged each time wine was traded, with half paid each by the buyer and the seller, 10*s* charged on every tun exported regardless.⁴ This was nonetheless exceptional. The motivation to keep Anglo-Gascon export duty rates the same, instead of raising them to exploit the crown's rights, is unclear. Whilst the need to keep wine prices down, and so to keep trade levels up, would have been well-understood, it was probably largely a politically motivated position, as such alterations continued to prove contentious. The aforementioned 1413 levy required the approval of the Three Estates of the Bordelais. Yet the stability of duty levels was in truth somewhat of an illusion since they were fixed at nominal rates in the local money of account. Thus, another great consequence of the depreciation of the *livre bordelaise*, both in relation to weight of gold and silver and in foreign exchange, was that the tax burden duly fell in such terms across the period (see Table 4).

Table 4 Effective rates of customs duty on wine leaving Bordeaux and Bayonne, expressed in pounds sterling per tun, across the main tax bands charged.

Period	<i>Grande coutume</i>	<i>Grande coutume & issac b</i>	<i>Grande coutume & issac non-b</i>
1356–1370	2 <i>s</i> 8 <i>d</i>	4 <i>s</i>	6 <i>s</i>
1371–1413	1 <i>s</i> 9 <i>d</i>	2 <i>s</i> 8 <i>d</i>	4 <i>s</i>
1414–1439	1 <i>s</i> 4 <i>d</i>	2 <i>s</i>	3 <i>s</i>
1440–1453	1 <i>s</i> ½ <i>d</i>	1 <i>s</i> 7 <i>d</i>	2 <i>s</i> 4 <i>d</i>

Source: Calculated based on standard 13*s* 4*d*/20*s*/30*s bord.* tax bands and prevailing exchange rates in Appendix 6.3.

¹ Calculated by the author from Appendix 3.1.

² E. Power, *The Wool Trade in English Medieval History: Being the Ford Lectures 1939* (Oxford, 1941), pp. 37–41; also see T.H. Lloyd, *The English Wool Trade in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 1977).

³ *Livre des bouillons*, pp. 147–8.

⁴ *GSR*, C 61/114: 35.




Figure 12 Annualised revenues of wine customs duties in Gascony, 1372–1453, in pounds sterling.

Source: Appendix 10.1.




Figure 13 Proportion of overall revenues from wine customs duties in Gascony, 1372–1453, in annualised %, excluding fiscal transfers from the English exchequer.

Source: Appendix 10.1.

The monetary policy of the Anglo-Gascon authorities in effect led to dramatic tax cuts for exporters, falling some 60.8% overall between the 1350s and later 1440s when expressed in pounds sterling, a great benefit as those merchants obliged to pay duty. Thus, as Vale observed, the falling value of the *livre* also had a tangible negative effect on the revenues of the duchy in sterling terms (Figure 12).¹ For example, the annual revenues from duties recorded during the tenure of Robert de Wykford, constable of Bordeaux during 1373–5, were 5,277*l* 12*s* 4*d* *bord.* or £1,055 10*s* 6*d* sterling, but the same receipts during the period 1446–51, while Sir Edward Hull was constable, were nominally higher at 7,385*l* 8*s* 9*d* *bord.* per year but were far lower in sterling terms, at just £579 15*s*.²

Despite all these problems, to claim, as Vale has, that the later duchy was worth little to the Plantagenets financially, would be incongruous.³ It is true that revenues were sometimes unreliable and were squandered on pensions and wages, such as in 1372–3, when fixed annuities amounted to as much as half of all ducal expenditure.⁴ Yet in reality the importance of customs revenues to ducal finances far outweighed their overall size, especially if we exclude financial contributions from England (Figure 13). From the late fourteenth and into the fifteenth centuries the latter were markedly reduced. Though more than £70,000 sterling was transferred to the duchy between 1363 and 1379, which was then necessary to equalise the current account deficit and drain of specie, never again would transfers be made on this scale, instead there was a more concerted effort for the duchy to pay for itself.⁵ The *Château* received only meagre revenues from other taxation, the ducal demesne lands, or revenues of justice, all of which were very small and increasingly alienated by patronage for the use of prominent Gascons.⁶ Whereas in the fourteenth century there were a multitude of financial opportunities leased to tax-farmers to provide regular income streams, after the Lancastrian succession almost all except the wine customs had been given away.⁷ Thus the proportion and significance of revenues from the trade increased even as their value fell in real terms. Over the final eighty years of Plantagenet rule, during the four decades, 1372–1413, the average share of wine revenues' contribution to the annual ducal budget was 71.3%, and in the final forty years, 1413–1453, this averaged 80.6%.⁸

The only form of income from the duchy itself which could challenge customs in scale was the confiscation and sale of the goods and lands of rebels. This is behind the relatively reduced proportion the former constituted during mid to late 1370s and in the first account of Sir Edward Hull's tenure as constable in 1442–6, both of which periods saw numerous defections to the French

¹ Vale, *English Gascony*, pp. 8–9.

² Calculated by the author from data in Runyan, 'The Constabulary of Bordeaux', pp. 215–58, at p. 229; Vale, *English Gascony*, p. 237.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 8–9.

⁴ Runyan, 'The Constabulary of Bordeaux', pp. 215–58, at p. 228.

⁵ *CGD*, 1, pp. 134–137 (no. CCXXIII); TNA, E 101/180/9, fol. 73r.

⁶ Vale, *English Gascony*, pp. 8, 204–6; F. Bériac, 'Les officiers et l'administration dans le duché d'Aquitaine (c. 1430–1451)', pp. 337–48, at p. 344–7.

⁷ For example, compare the accounts of the 1372–3 [TNA, E 101/179/9, fos 3v–5r] with those of 1418–9 [E 101/187/12, fos 3r–6v, 13v–16v] or later.

⁸ Calculated by the author from mean annualised percentages, excluding fiscal transfers from the English exchequer, based on figures in Appendix 10.1.

crown and the habitual use of punitive financial measures.¹ In most other periods the *grande coutume* in particular formed the mainstay of the duchy's finances and was used as a source of income to provide backing for loans. For example, in the first years of the fifteenth century, the seneschal, Gaillard de Durfort, lord of Duras, used the customs duty to secure a debt of 700 gold francs (875*l bord.* or £116 13*s* 4*d* sterling) from one John Bederenden, a London cloth merchant, in order to cover a fiscal deficit.²

Indeed, through the period of Lancastrian rule, the *Château de l'Ombrière* borrowed heavily, and with increasing regularity, especially from the Bordeaux commune, which in turn would loan money from merchants and financiers among the city's burgesses and clergy in order to finance its role as the king's banker.³ Such investors were the only remaining source of liquid capital in the duchy itself, and this triangular arrangement of public debt finance effectively constituted the reinvestment of Anglo-Gascon profits from the wine trade into the Plantagenet regime.⁴ During crises repayment of these debts could be suspended, as they were in 1406 in the aftermath of Armagnac's attack on the Bordelais and by 1409 the commune had built up debts of 40,000 francs (50,000*l bord.*/£6,666 13*s* 4*d* sterling) in support of this and the war against Orléans. The series of sales taxes was granted by the crown on goods sold by foreign merchants in the city, in order to help repay it.⁵ These were repealed under pressure from English merchants in 1429 just as declining customs revenues precipitated a severe fiscal crisis for the ducal authorities.⁶ The *Château's* own debts outstanding then began to mount up. The treasurer of England, Ralph Cromwell, reported to parliament in October 1433 that these had reached £5,357 12*s* 4½*d* sterling, well over eight times the duchy's annual revenues at that time.⁷ By the end of the decade, local sources of capital had been exhausted by trade deficits and bullion famine so the *Château* had to turn more often to international creditors. In 1437–8, loans totalling some 1,410 francs (1,762½*l bord.*) were raised from a consortium of English merchants in order to pay for war expenses during the destructive campaigns of Rodrigo de Villandrando.⁸

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¹ Runyan, 'The Constabulary of Bordeaux', pp. 215–58, at pp. 229; 114, TNA, E 101/180/9, fol. 59v, 60r, 62r, 71v, 72; Vale, *English Gascony*, pp. 119, 206–10, 218.

² GSR, C 61/110: 42. In that particular case the ducal authorities, hard pressed by the financial demands of defending the duchy against the campaigns of the duke of Orléans, eschewed repayment, and instead the merchant needed to gain restitution from the king in England, see CPR, 1408–1413, p. 91.

³ RJ, I, p. 271; II, pp. 396, 466, 471, 486, 500, 506, 624–631; for the commune's debts see RJ, I, 3, 5, 12–13, 22, 24, 26, 79, 86, 111, 140, 150–2, 155, 157, 165, 173, 175, 209, 213, 221, 224, 229, 233, 250, 301, 304, 321, 326, 341, 350, 352, 378, 381, 383, 415–6, 420, 427; II, pp. 7–8, 115, 294, 303, 306, 330, 394–5, 422, 463, 500, 525. Vale briefly discusses the role of Bordeaux as a centre of finance, see Vale, *English Gascony*, pp. 22–3.

⁴ See Chapter 3.3.1 and 3.4.1.

⁵ GSR, C 61/112:88; RJ, I, pp. 86, 153.

⁶ 'Henry VI: September 1429', item 29, PROME, BHO.

⁷ 'Henry VI: July 1433', item 24, *ibid.*

⁸ TNA, E 101/192/8, fol. 45r.

At the other end of the trade route, the crown had a further array of income streams from wine customs in England. These formed part of the taxes on overseas trade Ormrod termed ‘the most valuable single source of royal revenue’.¹ The import duty on wine raised as part of the ancient (or great) custom, established officially under Edward I, would not continue to the period of concern in this study.² Instead the key duty was part of the subsidies of *tunnage and poundage*, the first of which applied to imported wine. Originally this was intended as an occasional charge of 2s sterling per tun, later raised to 3s from the 1360s, to pay for protecting shipping and coastal defence. This had gradually evolved into a continuous royal revenue stream, ostensibly as a result of the increased importance of the war at sea. It began to be granted permanently by parliament from 1371.³ This was just over a year before the disastrous battle of La Rochelle on 22–3 June 1372, when the earl of Pembroke’s small fleet was destroyed by Castilian galleys.⁴ While Sherborne explained how any decline in English naval power was minimal, around this time there are strong indications that most wine ships joined large well-guarded convoys.⁵ It was unclear how often the money raised actually ended up subsidising ships and soldiers to protect such convoys. Certainly this failing triggered protest enough for the grant at the 1373 parliament to be conditional on it doing so.⁶ Nevertheless, by the Wonderful Parliament of 1386 this covenant had been broken and it was accepted that *tunnage and poundage* would become an ordinary income for the crown.⁷

A further import duty on Gascon wine payable in England was the new custom (or *butlerage*). This added a 2s sterling charge which yielded an additional £200 sterling per annum on average.⁸ Those obliged to pay this tax were usually those foreign, non-English, importers, trading under the terms of the *Carta Mercatoria* of 1303.⁹ English merchants were also sometimes required to pay, such as occurred in 1371–2, though this was very rare.¹⁰

¹ Ormrod, ‘The West European Monarchies’, pp. 123–60, at p. 136.

² For the collection of the ancient custom, see *Calendar of Fine Rolls* [hereafter *CFR*]: *Edward I, Volume 1, 1272–1307* (London, 1911), pp. 248, 250, 254, 255, 267, 275, 282, 300, 333.

³ Sargeant, ‘The Wine Trade with Gascony’, pp. 257–311, at pp. 284–5. Some very limited records of *tunnage and poundage* in this period do survive in the enrolled customs accounts, see: *The Enrolled Customs Accounts (E 356, E 364, E 372) Part II*, LIS, 306, (ed.) S. Jenks (2005), pp. 489–93, 495–8, 499–502, 503–8; *ibid.*, IV, LIS, 313, (ed.) S. Jenks (2006), p. 1069; *ibid.*, V, LIS, 314, (ed.) S. Jenks (2006). The subsidy was put under the authority of the butler or other more local jurisdictions from 1371 (*CFR*, 1368–1377, p. 143) until 1383–4.

⁴ Jean Froissart, *Chronicles*, MS Besançon 864, fos 343v–347v: *TOF* <<http://www.hrionline.ac.uk/onlinefroissart>>, (eds.) P. Ainsworth, G. Croenen, (Sheffield, 2013); Walsingham, *Historia Anglicana*, p. 314.

⁵ J.W. Sherborne, ‘The Battle of La Rochelle and the War at Sea, 1372–5’, *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 42:105 (1969), pp. 17–29, 25–8; James, *Studies*, pp. 124–33.

⁶ ‘Edward III: November 1373’, item 12, *PROME, BHO*. The same year (1373) the admirals of England were commissioned to use *tunnage* to fund both English and Gascon ships ‘arrayed for war’ to protect the year’s wine convoy: *CFR*, 1369–1377, p. 208. Yet such commissions are actually quite rare.

⁷ C. Liddy, *War, Politics and Finance in Late Medieval English Towns: Bristol, York and the Crown, 1350–1400* (Woodbridge, 2005), p. 110; W.M. Ormrod, ‘Finance and Trade under Richard II’, in *Richard II: The Art of Kingship*, (eds.) A. Goodman, J.L. Gillespie (Oxford, 1999), pp. 155–86, at 173.

⁸ See Appendix 10.2 for the new custom revenues.

⁹ *Munimenta Gildhallae Londoniensis: Liber Custumarum*, Rolls Series, 12:2, (ed.) H.T. Riley (1860), pp. 205–11; *CFR*, 1272–1307, pp. 476, 509.

¹⁰ TNA, E 101/80/22.

In common with the wine export duties from Gascony, duty in England was usually charged at unchanging fixed sums per tun shipped, so the potential revenues attainable by the king varied considerably according to the volume of trade. For example, in the twelve months from December 1406, during invasions of Gascony, just 3,199 tuns of wine were imported into England.¹ Revenues from wine duty that year were very low, totalling just £668 9s sterling.² By contrast from Michaelmas 1413 to Michaelmas 1414, when wine prices were falling in Gascony as the *livre bordelaise* was devalued, some 16,720 tuns were imported into the kingdom.³ This yielded some £2,805 8s 6d sterling for the crown.⁴ Thus intervention that boosted trade could make a dramatic difference to the king's annual revenues.

What is very clear that overall tax revenues from the wine trade with Gascony could be a great deal larger at the English, rather than Gascon, end of the route. This became even more the case as the currency in which Anglo-Gascon export duty was charged was progressively devalued, and real revenues into the *Château de l'Ombrière* treasury fell in comparison with those to the exchequer.

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The advantages that the English crown and political elites gained from wine trade were not merely fiscal. The relationship with Gascony gave the wealthiest in England, those largely unconcerned by price fluctuations, access to a reliable supply of wine for their palaces, castles and town-houses. As Margery James observed, the royal household was the largest consumer of Gascon wine in England.⁵ The historic mechanism of procurement was the *prise*, a levy of one tun per ship under 20 tuns cargo, or two tuns over that volume, taken from each wine ship arriving in the kingdom, for which only a nominal payment was made.⁶ Yet from the fourteenth century a proportion of importers into England were exempt. As of 1302, apart from the period 1309–22, Gascons were freed from this exaction in return for the payment of the new custom.⁷ In addition numerous ports were exempt, such as those in: Cornwall; Wales; at Chester; and the cinque ports in south-east England; and from 1327 the most important port of entry of all at London.⁸ Thus in total an average of just 82 ships per year were obliged to provide wine during the years 1327–79, providing an average yield of between 82 and 164 tuns of wine.⁹ This quantity was to prove not nearly sufficient

¹ For the wine import figures see Appendix 3.4.

² In 1406–7, the new custom (2s sterling per tun) yielded just £188 12s sterling [TNA, E 101/81/5], the yield from the *tunnage* (3s per tun) would have been £479 17s, based on 3,199 tuns of wine imported.

³ See Chapter 2.3.3 for the effects of currency devaluation and events in Gascony on wine prices.

⁴ In 1413–4, the new custom annualised yield was £297 8s 6d sterling [TNA, E 101/81/8], the yield from the *tunnage* (3s per tun) would have been £2,508, based on 16,720 tuns of wine imported.

⁵ James, *Studies*, p. 6.

⁶ McCusker, 'The Wine Prise', pp. 279–96, at p. 279. The crown would theoretically still have to pay for wine taken by the *prise*, but would be a nominal amount and certainly result in a loss for the merchant.

⁷ 'De Libertatibus Concessis Mercatoribus vinetariis de Ducatu Aquitaniae,' pp. 1060–4; *Munimenta Gildhallae Londoniensis: Liber Custumarum*, Rolls Series, 12:2, (ed.) Riley, pp. 205–11.

⁸ James, *Studies*, p. 4.

⁹ Calculated by the author from the fourteenth-century *prise* figures provided by James, *Studies*, p. 35.

to meet the levels of consumption at the royal court, not to mention victualling royal castles and other requirements, and so the *prise* always needed to be supplemented by a yearly programme of bulk wine purchases by the royal butler and his agents.¹ Usually this was done at English ports, bought in a variety of qualities at wholesale prices. Almost all of this wine was Gascon by origin, and the quantities were very large, for example wine delivered by royal buyers totalled some 891 tuns during the twelve months from September 1347.² For 1362–3, some £6,700 sterling was specified for the butler's purchase of 800 tuns of Gascon wine, along with just 22 tuns from other sources.³

Sometimes, however, procurement occurred in Gascony itself, led by agents or merchants charged with the task.⁴ One feature common to all of the king's shipments from Bordeaux was that they were marked by officials as part of the franchise in the customs books and so therefore could be processed without any export duty being owed. The demands of the crown's cellar could also be the responsibility of local Anglo-Gascon government. The registers of the Bordeaux *jurade* record the large quantities of wine shipped by Bordeaux burgesses to the king in Normandy in 1420.⁵ Exports in the king or king's butler's name only occasionally appear in the constables' customs books, yet when they do they are for very large quantities, and since the king's own demesne in Gascony was insignificant, would involve huge sums of money changing hands. For example, on 28 April 1373, 227½ tuns were shipped from the port at Bordeaux in two ships, one of London and one of Sandwich, exported in the name of 'Dominus Rex' ('the Lord King') and intended for the use of Edward III.⁶ This one day's shipment was then worth about 5,000*l bord.* or £660 sterling in Gascony, but this would have cost probably about £2,000 sterling in England, and so would have represented a considerable saving even with shipping costs totalling some £250.⁷ Such shipments continued to be intermittently recorded under Edward's successors, such as the 40 tuns shipped in the name of 'Le Roy' Richard II on 14 December 1378, and 117½ tuns exported in the name of 'nostre sengeur le Roy' Henry IV on 7 February 1410.⁸

Queens and dowager queens were at times also known to source wine directly from Gascony, as is evident in fifteenth century customs books. For example, on 10 April 1429 it was recorded that 'La deyma de nostro Senhor lo Roy', Catherine de Valois (1401–37), widow to Henry V, shipped 12 tuns of wine tax-free from the city for her use in England.⁹ Such records from the 1420s are fragmentary so it is quite possible such consignments were regularly being sent to the

¹ See James, *Studies*, pp. 6–7, 10, 177, 179–83.

² TNA, E 101/79/22, m. 5.

³ T.F. Tout, D.M. Broome, 'A National Balance Sheet for 1362–3', *The English Historical Review*, 39:155 (1924), pp. 404–19, at p. 414. Along with 800 tuns of Gascon wine, the appropriation of 10 pipes of 'vyn douce' (sweet wine), and 12 pipes of 'vyn de Ryne' (Rhenish wine) was noted.

⁴ For examples, see *GSR*, C 61/113: 83; C 61/113: 15; *CCR*, 1402–1405, pp. 78–9.

⁵ *RJ*, II, pp. 416–9.

⁶ TNA, E 101/602/3, fol. 46v.

⁷ For Gascon prices see Appendix 8.1, for English prices Clark, *English Prices and Wages*, provided in Appendix 9.1; freightage for a tun of wine from Bordeaux to London in the 1372–3 season was 22s sterling, James, *Studies*, p. 152.

⁸ TNA, E 101/182/6, fol. 45r; E 101/184/19, fos 59r, 60r.

⁹ TNA, E 101/190/6, fos 5v–6v.

French princess, who still lived as part of her son Henry VI's household until at least 1433.¹ Similarly, between December 1448 and March 1449, Margaret of Anjou (1430–82), who had become Henry VI's queen in 1444/5, was named as an exporter of 20½ tuns of duty-free Gascon wine on ships from Kent.²

3.1.2 English nobility

In addition to the kings' shipments, English royal princes also engaged in direct exports in order to supply their own households and retainers in England. For example, Edward of Woodstock, the Black Prince, exported 110 tuns on 1 April 1357, as he returned to England with John II (1319–64), king of France, his prisoner since his victory at the battle of Poitiers the previous September.³ In the 1370s John of Gaunt would instruct his own butler to regularly source wine directly for Gascony itself, to be stored in the Savoy palace or wherever the duke was in residence, often surplus or old wine was donated to charity.⁴ Following his son's usurpation to the throne in 1399, the wider royal family became particularly frequent direct exporters. The customs books show that 'Le Tresnoble et Trespuissant Seigneur le Prince' Henry of Monmouth (later king Henry V), shipped 48½ tuns on 6 January 1403 and 76½ tuns between 2 January and 7 February 1410.⁵ Thomas of Lancaster, duke of Clarence, another son of Henry IV, then in Gascony as king's lieutenant, shipped 30 tuns of wine between February and April 1413, in his and his butler's name.⁶ This was sent to England ahead of the duke to supply his household there when he himself returned to England the following July.⁷

The Lancastrian royal duke most disposed to ship wine was Humphrey, duke of Gloucester. He first appears in the Bordeaux customs books among the ships leaving on 29 October 1431 when he had exported just 15½ tuns of wine, however later the shipments increased greatly in scale, between 10 November 1435 and 14 February 1436 some 73 tuns, then between 21 October 1443 and 17 January 1444 some 67 tuns were sent to England for the duke.⁸ By contrast, his other elder brother John, duke of Bedford, does not appear after having ordered for 13 tuns to be sent to his father on February 1410.⁹ Gloucester had far stronger links with Gascony than his next eldest brother, particularly from 1430 through his being assigned the inheritances of Pons [VIII], lord of

¹ M. Jones, 'Catherine (1401–1437)', *ODNB* <<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-4890>>.

² D.E.S. Dunn, 'Margaret (1430–1482)', *ODNB* <<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-1013044>>; TNA, E 101/195/19, fos 67v, 69v, 72r.

³ TNA, E 101/173/4, fol. 88r; Barber, *Edward, Prince of Wales and Aquitaine*, p. 152.

⁴ *John of Gaunt's Register*, II, (ed.) S. Armitage-Smith, Camden 3rd Series, XXI (London, 1911), pp. 54–55, 96, 103, 144, 172–3, 182, 270–80.

⁵ TNA, E 101/185/11, fol. 16v; E 101/184/19, fos 54r, 56v, 57v, 59r, 60r.

⁶ TNA, E 101/185/9, fos 9r, 10v.

⁷ Vale, *English Gascony*, p. 67.

⁸ TNA, E 101/191/3, fos 2v, 3v; E 101/192/1, fos 12r, 16r, 28r, 29v, 32r, 43r; E 101/194/3, fos 1r, 3v, 7v, 9v, 10r, 12v, 37r, 39v.

⁹ TNA, E 101/184/19, fol. 75r.

Castillon, and Bernat de Lesparre, lord of Labarde, by Henry VI.¹ These legacies included a vast portfolio of lands across the Bordelais, and the increased number of tuns exported by Gloucester constituted the wine surplus of these estates.² Were the totals of 1435–6 and 1443–4 to constitute normal annual consignments from 1433 until Gloucester's death in February 1447, then the duke extracted wine for his use in England worth an estimated 33,661l 18s 9d *bord.* (£3,131 4s 7d sterling) in Gascony.³ All the while he never visited his estates in Gascony and so became a noteworthy example of an English absentee landlord during the later Plantagenet period.

Many of the most senior among the English aristocracy were also involved in making wine shipments directly. In April 1357, as the Black Prince returned to England after his successful campaigns in France of the previous two years, all the senior English noblemen in his army also shipped large quantities of wine with them back to England. Among them were Robert d'Ufford (1298–1369), earl of Suffolk, William de Montagu (1328–97), earl of Salisbury, and Thomas de Beauchamp (1313–69), earl of Warwick, as well as such distinguished knights as Sir Reginald de Cobham (1295–1361) and Sir Richard Stafford (1331–94).⁴ A letter from the prince to the exchequer still survives, sewn into the relevant section of the Bordeaux customs book, in which he requested his entourage's shipments pass unmolested and untaxed.⁵

High-ranking nobles who served as king's lieutenants in the duchy habitually engaged in shipping wine home to England. Sir John Neville (1337–88), Baron Raby, arrived in Gascony to serve in this role in September 1378,⁶ and by 2 November that year a shipment of wine in his name was leaving the port of Bordeaux. Between then and the following February Neville sent a total of 66 tuns back home, worth an estimated 1,200l *bord.* or £160 sterling in Gascony, and which would have cost £532 4s 6d sterling in England.⁷ Edward of Norwich, earl of Rutland and later duke of York, was appointed king's lieutenant in 1401, and held the office until May 1403.⁸ Between 5 November 1402 and 8 February 1403, 42½ tuns of wine were shipped from Bordeaux either in Edward's name or his agents.⁹ During his time in Gascony he had formed strong bonds with the local mercantile community, particularly one Richard Makanam, a wine merchant and financier of

¹ GSR, C 61/124: 7; TNA, E 30/405A.

² Most of these lands acquired by Humphrey, duke of Gloucester, were in the parishes of Castillon, Lamarque, Monton, Saussac, Castlenau-en-Médoc, Cussac, Listrac and Montignac. For more details of his acquisition of lands and seigniorial rights in the duchy see Vale, *English Gascony*, pp. 99–103.

³ This estimate is based on mean exports of 70 tuns per year for 14 trading seasons from 1433–4 to 1446–7 at prevailing prices and exchange rates.

⁴ TNA, E 101/173/4, fos 88r–90r.

⁵ TNA, E 101/173/4, fol. 68r.

⁶ Sumption, *Divided Houses*, pp. 330–3.

⁷ TNA, E 101/182/6, fos 3r, 23v, 53v, 65v; for Gascon prices see Appendix 8.1, for English prices see Clark, *English Prices and Wages*, provided in Appendix 9.1.

⁸ GSR, C 61/108: 92; R. Horrox, 'Edward, second duke of York (c.1373–1415)', *ODNB* <<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/22356>>.

⁹ TNA, E 101/185/11, fos 5v, 9v, 11v, 25r, 27v.

considerable means.¹ These links would far outlive his tenure there, and was last in evidence in June 1415, only months before the duke of York's death at the battle of Agincourt.²

Similar links to the wine trade existed among the senior clergy. Henry Bowet, who was constable of Bordeaux from 1396 to April 1399 on behalf of Richard II, then October 1399 to 1401 for Henry IV, established deep roots in Gascony before returning to England to become first bishop of Bath and Wells, then archbishop of York.³ As has been discussed, among his many rewards for his support during the Lancastrian succession, he received tax exemptions on wine shipping in 1401, which he put to good use.⁴ In early 1403 shipments totalling 10 tuns of wine bound for Bowet's household appear in the Bordeaux customs books. By the end of the decade Bowet had increased his consignments. Some 27 tuns were sent from Bordeaux between 4 November 1409 and 7 February 1410, and then 18 tuns between December 1412 and February 1413.⁵ All were exported tax-free with the note 'per patentem' in the margins linking them to Bowet's special privilege from the crown. The archbishop's nephews and heirs John and Sir Nicholas Bowet, whom also served as royal officers in Gascony, would also send considerable quantities of wine back to England, such as the 28 tuns John shipped on 7 February 1410, though they were themselves obliged to pay tax.⁶ The ease by which the Bowets formed strong links with wine suppliers and English shippers was partly the result of their financial roles within the Anglo-Gascon administration, partly because Henry had an acquired extensive property in the parish of Saint-Michel in Bordeaux. It was in that fashionable quarter that the city's wealthiest merchants resided, many of whom involved in overseas trade with England.⁷ The family would have been prominent in the community. Their house on the *Rue de Mirail* was so large a structure that it was used to describe the position of all others.⁸

3.1.3 Royal officers

Commercial connections were conventional among the wider group of English appointees to royal offices in Gascony. A list drawn up by the English chancery as the principality of Aquitaine was being dismantled in 1373 named nineteen royal offices in the city of Bordeaux, most of which were based in the *Château de l'Ombrière*, and usually filled with Englishmen.⁹ These included not only the senior positions of seneschal, constable and controllers, but also the provost of the castle, mayor, some judges and court officials, and many others. Each office had a support staff of

¹ See M. Meaudre de Lapouyade, *Les Makanam; les Ayqvem de Montaigne, recherches historiques* (Bordeaux, 1943).

² *RJ*, II, p. 189.

³ Tout, 'Bowet, Henry (d. 1423)', *ODNB*.

⁴ *GSR*, C 61/109: 68.

⁵ TNA, E 101/185/11, fos 17v, 20v, 25r, 38r; E 101/184/19, fos 4v, 16v, 17r, 57v, 59v; E 101/185/7, fos 49r, 50v, 62r.

⁶ TNA, E 101/184/19, fos. 4v, 56r; E 101/195/19, fol. 52r [exports of John Bowet]; E 101/191/3, fol. 71 [exports of Nicholas].

⁷ Meaudre de Lapouyade, *Les Makanam*, pp. 20–1; Vale, 'The Last Years', pp. 119–38, at p. 130.

⁸ ADG, H 544, nos 10–1, 14–5

⁹ TNA, C 47/24/7/10.

lieutenants and clerks. Most of these individuals, who constituted the ducal government, were at some stage involved in shipping wine from the port at Bordeaux, either to supply households in England or for simple financial gain. There are many notable examples, a selection of which is worth highlighting to demonstrate their sheer scale and the great value the shipments represented in monetary terms. Despite the fact that details of only a handful of years' survive should they prove even slightly representative of annual levels the value of wine shipped over an individual's tenure could be substantial.

John de Chiverston, who was seneschal of Gascony from March 1354, is recorded as having exported 7 tuns of wine between 27 November 1357 and 26 March 1358, then worth 74*l bord.* (£14 16*s* sterling).¹ Sir John Harpsden, who was seneschal 1385–9, shipped out 7½ tuns in the winter of 1386, then worth 112*l* 10*s bord.* (£15 sterling) in Gascony.² Volumes greatly increased in the fifteenth century. Sir John Radcliffe, who was constable from 1419 to 1423, and seneschal from 1423 to 1436, exported an extraordinary 189½ tuns from 2 November to 6 December 1431.³ This shipment alone was worth a considerable fortune, at an estimated 5,211*l* 5*s bord.* (£521 2*s* 6*d* sterling) in Gascony, but £1,533 sterling at prevailing prices in England.⁴ All three seneschals paid duty on these shipments, which indicates that they were not sent by royal instruction, but rather their own efforts. Indeed, Radcliffe especially had strong links with mercantile interests. As he travelled out to the duchy in 1419 to become constable and captain of Fronsac castle on the Dordogne his retinue included a wide variety of merchants, among them a number of prominent vintners such as John Cole the elder of London.⁵

Exporting wine was especially common among those officers with an explicitly financial brief. Richard Rotour, the constable of Bordeaux from 1375–9, exported some 17 tuns from 6 November to 15 December 1378 worth 340*l bord.* (£45 6*s* 8*d* sterling). His successor Sir John de Stratton, the lord of Landiras by marriage, and constable of Bordeaux 1381–6, shipped 18 tuns of wine from January to April 1386 worth an estimated 270*l bord.* (£36 sterling).⁶ As with the seneschals, the numbers often increase greatly in the fifteenth century, for example Simon Sprotley, the long serving controller of customs in Bordeaux shipped 65½ tuns of wine out of Bordeaux on his own account from the 4 November 1409 to 7 February 1410, and then this increased to 113 tuns

¹ TNA, E 101/173/4, fos 105r, 119v, 124v.

² TNA, E 101/183/11, fos 30r, 52r, 67r.

³ TNA, E 101/191/3, fos 31v, 32v, 34v, 47r, 47v, 56v, 66r, 67v. The crown was far in arrears in paying Radcliffe's considerable wages and expenses as seneschal (not least for the permanent force of 200 mounted archers he was contracted to provide), see L.S. Woodger, 'RADCLIFFE, Sir John (d.1441), of Attleborough, Norf.', in *The History of Parliament*, (eds.) J.S. Roskell et al; also see A.C. Reeves, 'Sir John Radcliffe, K.G. (d. 1441): Miles Famossissimus', *Journal of Medieval Military History*, 11 (2013), pp. 183–213. Radcliffe nevertheless still commanded considerable resources in the duchy, including the revenues of the valuable Béguey estates (see Chapters 3.4.1 and 4.1). These huge wine shipments may have been Radcliffe's method of recouping his costs via the profits of trade.

⁴ For Gascon prices see Appendix 8.1, for English prices see Clark, *English Prices and Wages*, provided in Appendix 9.1.

⁵ GSR, C 61/118: 5–13.

⁶ TNA, E 101/183/11, fos 23v, 47v, 60v, 61r, 63r, 68v, 70v, 75r, 76v.

during a trading season between 11 December 1412 and 6 April 1413.¹ These are very large quantities, with significant price tags, the latter season's shipments alone worth an estimated 2,870*l bord.* or £382 14*s* sterling in Gascony, and £855 sterling in England.²

From the mid-fourteenth century onward the mayors of Bordeaux were almost always Englishmen.³ These were essentially royal appointees though endorsed by the *jurade*.⁴ A good many also engaged in shipping wine, some in very large quantities. For example, Sir Thomas Swinburne, mayor of Bordeaux from 1405 to 1412, was recorded as exporting 59½ tuns on eight different ships between 4 November 1409 and 7 February 1410, worth 1,871*l 5s 6d bord.* (£249 10*s* sterling), on which he paid the highest rate of duty.⁵ The mayor's subordinates, the city clerks, also often appear as exporters, in the same accounting year 1409–10, 'Lo cleric de la ville' shipped 12½ tuns of wine himself.⁶ All the customs books in the fifteenth century record exports in the name of judges, also royal appointees though usually Gascons. They themselves were rarely named in person, rather shipments were marked 'Lo Iuge', 'Iudex Vasconie' or 'Monsieur le Juge de Gascoigne'.⁷ During February and March 1410, this ducal judge was named as exporter of 137½ tuns of wine from Bordeaux, then worth an estimated 4,324*l 7s 6d bord.* (£576 11*s 8d* sterling) in Gascony.⁸

Royal officials in Bordeaux were well paid. In the late fourteenth and early fifteenth century constables commonly earned wages of 4*s* sterling a day, the same as a baron would be paid on campaign. The two controllers were paid 2*s* sterling a day, the same as a knight, and the constables' lieutenants were paid 1*s* a day.⁹ Significantly their pay was fixed at rates in sterling but paid in local coinage, and so would inflate as the *livre* lost value. These were also increasingly supplemented by payments drawn from tax revenues on wine, which could also be extremely lucrative.¹⁰ Tuns of wine were a propitious form in which to repatriate capital from surplus wages, or other revenues from patronage, back home to England, and perhaps make some profit on the side from an position apt for insider trading. For such officials, as well as having close relationships with Gascon and English merchants, would have likely had foreknowledge of any coming intervention, or indeed any other events, ahead of the market.

It is therefore conspicuous that Henry IV sought to address corruption among financial officials in Gascony at a time that coincided with a surge in exports by the likes of Sprotley or

¹ TNA, E 101/184/19, fos 2r, 2v, 3r, 4v, 11r, 15r, 42v, 57v, 59v, 60r, 75r; E 101/185/7, fos 56r, 57v, 59v, 66v, 67v, 71r, 74r, 77r, 80r, 81v; E 101/185/9, fos 10r, 11v.

² For Gascon prices see Appendix 8.1, for English prices see Clark, *English Prices and Wages*, provided in Appendix 9.1.

³ The exception would be Guilhem-Amanieu [III] de Madaillan (1375–1413/4), lord of Lesparre, Rauzan, Pujols, Carcans, Breuil, Verteuil, Blazimont and elsewhere. He was acting mayor in 1404–5, although he never went through the proper selection process. See Campagne, *Histoire de la Maison de Madaillan*, pp. 61–3.

⁴ *Bordeaux sous les rois d'Angleterre*, pp. 443–4, 566–70.

⁵ TNA, E 101/184/19, fos 4v, 43v, 49v, 52v, 54r, 55v, 59v, 59v

⁶ TNA, E 101/184/19, fol. 68r.

⁷ TNA, E 101/184/19, fos 57v, 68r, 73r, 74r, 75r; E 101/192/1, fos 34r, 54r.

⁸ TNA, E 101/184/19, fos 57v, 68r, 73r, 74r, 75r, 68r, 73r, 74r, 75r.

⁹ TNA, E 101/180/9, fos 29v–30r; E 101/187/12, fos 8v–9r.

¹⁰ See Chapter 2.2.2.

Swinburne. Such men were increasingly the main beneficiaries of commerce from the perspective of the Plantagenet administration, and the risks they took on an overseas posting evidently paid considerable dividends. In August 1409, William Faringdon, a former constable of Bordeaux, was ordered 'to cease every excuse', and appear in the exchequer 'to render his account of the office of constable of Bordeaux, bringing the books, evidences and warrants which concern the same'.¹ He was to have his 'disposal of the revenues of the duchy of Aquitaine' thoroughly vetted, and appeared to be vindicated. In 1411, at the request of the same Faringdon, the former controllers John Mitford and Simon Sproteley were also investigated for financial improprieties. They were to be arrested by an English sergeant-at-arms and forced to 'render account before the treasurer and barons of the exchequer' – though unfortunately it is unclear what their findings were.²

*

The Bordeaux customs books reveal the depth of direct involvement in the wine trade by the greatest and wealthiest of England, as well as their most senior political subordinates in the duchy. For some of these individuals such activities were a product of their own links to Gascony, through service or property. For others, it was simply a matter of them filling their own wine cellars in England from a convenient and historically reliable source. In either case such buyers constituted that tranche of wine demand in England that was usually price inelastic, the kings, magnates, or ecclesiastics. They are therefore best thought of as engaging in active 'cutting out' of the middleman by direct exports from the duchy. Evidently the political union with Gascony was advantageous in this regard, as it was for those agents of the crown who gleaned commercial profit from their positions, though for both, a working relationship with mercantile communities in England was also still essential.

¹ *CCR*, 1405–1409, p. 455.

² *TNA*, SC 8/290/14488.

3.2 English merchants and ship-owners

All individuals and groups with vested interests would profit or not, change their economic behaviour, or otherwise react to English government policy in some respect, but none was so critical to overall commercial prosperity than those who invested most of the capital in the international trade, namely English merchants and ship-owners. It has been discussed earlier in this study how by the mid-fourteenth century these handled most of the trade and contributed most of the shipping along the main route from Bordeaux to England. This was a heterogeneous group and difficult to define, least of all by size. The sequence of restrictions in the 1360s on merchant participation clouds the issue further.¹ Certainly it was clear from such legislation that there existed some merchant vintners who specialised largely in wine-trading and others with different specialisms, such as the ironmonger Gilbert Maghfield, also dealt a few barrels.² The chancery licences granted to export trade goods or money allows some rough insights into those of the mercantile community with direct interests. The records for the year 1364 are particularly interesting because technically then only vintners were supposed to engage in the trade, though this ordinance had already begun to be rejected. That year some 135 merchants from across England were granted licences to export gold or silver coin, cloth and victuals to Gascony to buy wine. The largest proportion of these, 62 individuals, or 45.9% of the total came from London and the South East, whilst only 20% were from the North East, 19.3% from the South West and 14.8% from East Anglia.³

Members of the *mistry* of the Vintry formed a large part of the South East's vintners active overseas, and the patent rolls list twenty-nine names of merchants who would probably have been the participating members of the guild that year.⁴ This was half the estimate Anne Crawford made for their overall numbers at the beginning of the century, but some members may not have been active in overseas enterprises that year.⁵ Included are the names of many notable figures of the *mistry*, such as John (de) Stodeye (d.1376), who served as alderman for the vintry for over twenty-four years and rose to become mayor of London in 1357. He was later knighted by Edward III, probably for, as Crawford speculated, his regular role as a royal financier. There is also Walter

¹ These had occurred in 1363, 'Edward III: October 1363', item 23, *PROME, BHO*; *CCR*, 1364–1368, pp. 75–6; *SR*, 1, pp. 379 (37 Edw. III, c.5) p. 384, (38 Edw. III, st.1, c.11); and again in 1368, 'Edward III: May 1368', item 17, *PROME, BHO*; *SR*, 1, p. 389, (42 Edw. III, c.8). See Chapter 2.1.1.

² Gilbert Maghfield (whose ledgers are stored under TNA, E 101/509/19) primarily imported Spanish iron via Bayonne, but also imported wines to the value of £132 9s 3½d over the years 1390–5, see James, *Studies*, pp. 200, 202, 214. In addition the Cely family specialised in wool, but also made voyages to Bordeaux to buy wine, see *The Cely papers: selections from the correspondence and memoranda of the Cely family, merchants of the staple*, (ed.) H.E. Malden (London, 1900), pp. 185–8.

³ *CPR*, 1361–1364, pp. 492, 496–7, 510–11, 521–22; *CPR*, 1364–1367, pp. 13, 15, 16–7, 25, 32, 50, 59.

⁴ These were Thomas Berkele, Richard Blake, Henry Boseworth, John Brynnynggham, John Cavendissh, William Chirchegate, John Clyvele, Thomas Cornwallays, Geoffrey Cremelford, William de Cressynggham, William de Fletestret, John de Hatfeld, Robert de La More, William de Strete, John de York, Walter Doget, Thomas Gysors, Roger Long, John Michel, Geoffrey Neuton, William Norton, John Ponder, John Rothyng, William Sharpyng, Richard Sprot, William Sterre, John Stodeye, William Stodeye and William Stokesby. A thirtieth London merchant named Clement Lavender also appears but who was known to be a Fishmonger [*CPR*, 1364–1367, p. 34].

⁵ Crawford, *Vintners*, p. 42.

Doget (d.1388), member of a family of wealthy wine merchants, at one time sheriff of London and master of the *mystery*.¹ Even closer to the crown was William de Strete, king's butler from around 1361 to at least 1373.²

Notables from other regions also stand out in the greater list of licensees from 1364. Henry de Selby from Kingston-Upon-Hull was mayor of that town in 1363, 1373 and 1386, and his brother Robert was mayor in 1365 and 1371, both were great investors in Anglo-Gascon trade.³ Likewise their namesake Roger de Selby was mayor of York in 1370 and was also directly involved.⁴ Farther south three members of the influential de Welbourne family of Norwich were also large investors. John the elder was bailiff of that Norfolk town in 1359, 1361, 1365, and 1368; also William in 1367 and John the younger in 1375.⁵

The licences also hint at the relative trading habits of the merchants. Of the £5,388 6s 8d sterling in cash, mainly gold coin, permitted by the crown to be exported to Gascony in 1364, £3,173 6s 8d, or a 58.9% share, was assigned to merchants of London and the South East. This included an allowance of £2,000 to divide up among 25 members of the *mystery* of the Vintry at the discretion of the guild. Some 24.5% of the specie licences went to merchants of the North East, and 16.6% to East Anglia.⁶ The generous allowances given perhaps reflect a greater influence in chancery by politically active members of the *mystery*, and investors from towns of the east coast. By contrast none at all was given to those of the West Country, rather their merchants were licensed for actual export goods, including 5,480 woollen cloths, more than half of which was high-value coloured textiles, and 352 tuns of fish.⁷ This difference may not of course have been political rather it could reflect the great growth in the weaving industry of this region over the previous generation.⁸ As such these licences may be simply what had been requested. For by contrast, apart from Boston (Lincolnshire) which was granted a valuable licence to export unlimited cloth, just 220 cloths were licensed for export in the North East, 91 in the South East and 30 in East Anglia. Some further cloth was allowed to leave in the hands of the merchants of these regions, but this was licensed by value, not by quantity: £1,586 13s 8d to London and the South East; £310 to East Anglia; and £126 13s 8d to the North East.⁹ The snapshot of the 1364 licencing regime strongly indicates that though merchant interests in the wine trade with Gascony were spread from the Tyne to the Bristol Channel, they were largely concentrated in London and the South East, both in number and the scale of the capital they invested. This is reflected in the relative importance of the ports of entry. Over the twelve months following Michaelmas 1371, 40.7% of wine imported by

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 46–7.

² TNA, E 101/80/15, E 101/80/16, E 101/80/17, E 101/80/18, E 101/80/19, E 101/80/20, E 101/80/22; E 213/333.

³ C. Frost, *Notices Relative to the Early History of the Town and Port of Hull* (London, 1827), pp. 147–8.

⁴ *The History and Antiquities of the City of York*, 3 (York, 1785), p. 30.

⁵ F. Blomefield, *An Essay Towards a Topographical History of the County of Norfolk*, 3 (London, 1806), pp. 99–100.

⁶ *CPR*, 1364–1367, pp. 13, 15–7.

⁷ *CPR*, 1361–1364, pp. 492, 496, 500, 510, 521; *CPR*, 1364–1367, pp. 32, 50.

⁸ Kowaleski, *Local Markets and Regional Trade*, p. 27.

⁹ *CPR*, 1361–1364, pp. 496–7, 500, 511, 521–2; *CPR*, 1364–1367, pp. 13, 15–7, 25, 50, 59.

English merchants was still landed in London and the South East, 40.6% in the South West. Though because 90% of foreign merchants' imports arrived in the former, in fact 54.3% of overall imports arrived in or near the largest city.¹ Of course the port of arrival does not necessarily reflect the origins of the capital invested. It seems reasonable to suppose that the mercantile wealth that had concentrated in London since the highest level of commerce in the early 1300s remained significant even in a period of overall decline. As James stated, 'London wine dealers, whose importance increased so greatly in the fourteenth century, were active everywhere'.²

Some of these key English merchant vintners appear in Bordeaux's customs books in the later 1350s. The aforementioned John (de) Stodeye, the prominent London vintner and politician exported 39½ tuns from the port of Bordeaux between 30 October 1355 and 28 February 1356 paying custom duty in his own name.³ His brother or possibly his son William (de) Stodeye also appears in the manifests for 26 March 1358 exporting precisely the same quantity.⁴ Robert Selby, later mayor of Hull, appears as an exporter as early as the plague year, shipping 3 tuns on 19 November 1348, then subsequently increasing his direct involvement to 17 tuns by December–January 1355–6.⁵ More can be understood with regard those England merchants who had settled in Gascony on a more permanent basis. This was an obvious workaround for those who wished to avoid the extreme restrictions that the 1353 wine trade act imposed on their businesses, namely on their ability to buy throughout the year and throughout the duchy. This was not simply a tax-dodge rubber stamped by the authorities. As for any prospective Gascon burgess an applicant would still need to demonstrate the serious intention to reside in the city, prove sufficient financially, and have sufficient influence with the Bordeaux patrician class in order to gain the approval of the *jurade*.⁶ A good example of such a merchant was one William Wakefield, a grain and wine-trader of considerable scale.⁷ He shipped 61 tuns of wine in 1355–6, expanded his business dramatically to 160 tuns the following year and 133 tuns the year after that.⁸ He had certainly gained burgess status by 1356 as this was when he first exported an admittedly very small proportion of his stock under the Bordeaux franchise, which suggests he had acquired some small local wine-producing property. The motivation for Wakefield to acquire this status is clear enough from the customs books. Around 85% of all his wine paid only the *grande coutume*. This meant that this proportion of his business involved purchasing wine outside of the boundaries of Bordeaux, and then only bringing to the city to use its port.

¹ James, *Studies*, pp. 93–118, particularly p. 98.

² *Ibid.*, p. 167.

³ TNA, E 101/173/4, fos 8r, 18r, 20r, 30r.

⁴ TNA, E 101/173/4, fol. 124r; 'Wills: 50 Edward III (1376–7)', in *Calendar of Wills Proved and Enrolled in the Court of Husting, London: Part 2, 1358–1688*, (ed.) R.R. Sharpe (London, 1890), pp. 186–93, *BHO*.

⁵ TNA, E 101/167/16, no. 21; E 101/173/4, fos 23r, 27v.

⁶ *Livre des bouillons*, pp. 381–2.

⁷ By 1352–3, William Wakefield was already a resident of Bordeaux and a considerable supplier of grain to the *Château de l'Ombrière*, selling 37½ tuns of wheat to the administration that year, TNA, E 101/170/17, m. 5.

⁸ TNA, E 101/173/4, fos 8r, 8v, 27r, 34v, 35v, 36v, 40v, 42v, 43v, 52v, 62r, 69r, 72r, 73r, 74v, 78r, 84r, 86v, 87v, 89r, 103r, 104v, 105v, 107r, 108v, 112r, 113r, 115r, 119r, 121v, 122v, 125v, 126v.

Another well documented example was John Scot, who settled in Bordeaux probably in the early 1360s. He was already exporting 71 tuns per annum by the early 1370s, though his business was badly hit by the crises mid-way through the decade and his shipments shrank severely to 6½ tuns in 1374–5. Scot was highly adaptable, and by the autumn and winter of 1378 he had expanded to ship 135 tuns during this period of very high prices, cleverly using his burgess status to source two-thirds of his stock from beyond the limits of Bordeaux, we can safely assume at a considerable discount. Scot continued to prosper during the 1380s, once the price volatility was reduced, instead buying over half of his stock from other burgesses before transporting it to overseas markets on ships from ports right around the coast of England.¹ With a total of 158 tuns handled in 1385–6, he had become one of the greatest merchants in the trade. The profits he accrued must have been considerable for he expended great sums acquiring Gascon real estate. The purchase of his two houses held allodially in the parish of Saint-Pierre, beside the port, would not have been cheap. He also invested in productive holdings. Sandrine Lavaud counted twelve separate parcels of land in the parish of Talence to the south of Bordeaux, most of which were planted with vines.² This he then leased out to local vine workers, who would manage the actual viticulture, such as shown by a contract made by Scot with Pey Guilhem, a burgess from the parish of Saint-Eloi.³ From the late 1370s small quantities from the one-quarter share of the wine this generated, were also exported.⁴ Living until at least the mid-1390s Scot married locally and he and his wife were later buried in the church of Saint-Pierre in Bordeaux.⁵

Careers like that of Wakefield or Scot demonstrate the adaptability of English merchants in the face of shifting regulations. Yet some changes in the trading environment could not be mitigated by wily businessmen, who instead responded by altering their level of involvement. No commercial enterprise will be entered into or continued for long unless known to be sufficiently financially worthwhile for the protagonists. This being the case, the key metric for understanding merchant behaviour and its impact on the market is potential profitability.

Some rudimentary calculations using basic prices and costs can allow us to estimate net profit margins for some years. London merchants, members of the *mistry* of the Vintry, who sold into taverns at the assize price, and were exempt from the *prise*, could evidently usually enjoy very healthy profits of c.50–c.60% on their ventures (Table 5). Even if reduced by further unknown extraneous costs, such as wages and storage fees, these were still very great returns. They reflect the reward necessary to take on the very considerable risks involved in a Gascon wine trade venture.

¹ TNA, E 101/602/3, fos 5r, 8v, 9v, 13v, 16r, 18r, 21r, 47r; E 101/180/2, fos 13r, 38r, 41r; E 101/182/6, fos 14v, 15r, 17v, 19r, 19v, 21r, 21v, 31v, 32r, 37r, 43v, 45r, 81r, 82r, 82v E 101/183/11, fos 6v, 7r, 7v, 8r, 18r, 24v, 27v, 37r, 40r, 49r, 57r, 59r, 65r, 67r, 68r.

² Lavaud, 'Une communauté enracinée', pp. 35–48, at p. 41.

³ ADG, G 2640.

⁴ TNA, E 101/182/6, fol. 19v.

⁵ The tombstone of John Scot and his wife is now on display in the medieval section of the Aquitaine museum in Bordeaux [Musée d'Aquitaine, Inv. 12 595].

Table 5 Some estimated profit margins per tun of wine for London merchant vintners trading Bordeaux to London, in decimalised pounds sterling.

Year	Key expenditures			Taxes		Total costs	London assize price	Profit margins	
	Wine	Freight	Loaders & gaugers	Gascony	England			Unit margin	% margin
1373	£2.90	£1.10	£0.02	£0.20	£0.35	£4.37	£10.50	£6.13	58.38
1381	£2.67	£1.15	£0.02	£0.20	£0.35	£4.18	£10.50	£6.32	60.19
1395	£3.08	£0.45	£0.02	£0.20	£0.35	£3.90	£8.40	£4.50	53.57
1415	£2.13	£0.40	£0.02	£0.15	£0.35	£2.84	£6.30	£3.46	54.92
1416	£2.50	£0.44	£0.02	£0.15	£0.35	£3.26	£6.30	£3.04	48.25

Source: Prices from Appendix 8.1 and James, *Studies*, pp. 50–2, 60–3; freightage rates calculated from *ibid.*, pp. 151–3.

It should be emphasised that the London vintners, with exclusive access to tavern sales and exempt from the *prise* and new custom, were almost certainly the participants with the highest returns, albeit squeezed by the lowering of assize prices from the late fourteenth and into the fifteenth century, which appear in step with their falling costs. Those left selling only at lower wholesale prices or paying further taxes would be left competing with far thinner margins. It is noteworthy that in 1381, when wholesale price controls were imposed at a maximum of £5 sterling per tun (for top quality), costs were such that a profit margin of only 16.4% was possible in that market during the two years they were in force.¹

A key expense for a merchant was freightage. The mean cost of shipping a tun of wine from Bordeaux to London across the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was 15s 5d sterling, and this could rise as high as £1 3s per tun in some years, as it did in the early 1380s.² Margery James suggested that freightage rose when ships had to join large well-guarded convoys because at such times shipmasters would need to expend extra on armed men on-board and on escort vessels.³ In reality, prices determine the costs merchants are able to pay not the other way round. So in this case the mean rate per tun fluctuated with shifts in demand for and supply of cargo space.⁴ Freightage would rise in times of greater risk at sea, such as when that hostile ships were particularly active in the channel, because the shipmasters and owners themselves were unwilling to risk their vessels or pay for protection, reducing supply. This was all the greater when the demand from merchants was high at the same time. James probably also overstated freightage as a significant hindrance to trade. In most periods the variation of rates was generally small and such costs were predictable. This

¹ See Chapter 2.3.1.

² James, *Studies*, pp. 151–3.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 15–9, 124–33.

⁴ Freightage costs tended to be low in periods when a greater supply of shipping capacity was available, such as pre-1337, 1350–4, or 1395–6 and higher when the fleet size was constrained, such as in 1372–3 or 1381, see James, *Studies*, pp. 151–3.

suggests that because of its significant size the market was reasonably efficient.¹ It can be estimated that, *ceteris paribus*, it would require an increase in freightage of around five times to make the wine trade unprofitable for the London merchant vintners illustrated in Table 5. Even though margins for all other traders would have been tighter, such spikes in the price of cargo space do not occur anywhere in the available data, so freightage alone was never a threat to profitability.

Instead the market risk of critical concern for merchants was simply the volatility of Gascon wine prices.² A trader arriving in Bordeaux in spring 1425 might pay between 12*l* 10*s* and 17*l* 10*s* *bord.* (£1 5*s*–£1 15*s* sterling) for a tun of claret, but returning a year later would have to pay 31*l* 16*s* 2*d* *bord.* (£3 3*s* 9*d* sterling) for the same stock.³ The statute of 1353 directly contributed to this uncertainty as it prohibited English merchants from travelling to Bordeaux, or *Haut-Pays*, before the proper buying season to negotiate with suppliers.⁴ This prevented any smoothing of prices that might have been achieved by advance agreement. Instead an English trader was left with less room to manoeuvre on price. Such inflexibility was explicitly blamed in the 1444–5 petition to parliament for depressing overall trade.⁵ In really bad years it was high wine prices in Bordeaux which destroyed trade via the merchants' bottom line, such as occurred in 1406. Were, in that year, the level of freightage estimated as the mean of 1395–1416, London vintners selling their wine at retail would have, on average, endured a net margin of just under 1%, which translated into a unit margin of only 14½*d* sterling on every tun transported. Again all other traders would have been even worse affected that year – hardly surprisingly then that as a result imports of wine into England fell to just 3,199 tuns, their lowest level of the entire Hundred Years' War period. This remaining stock being that destined for only the wealthiest consumers: the king, and magnates, purchasing wholesale.

Information was everything. There were long-established populations of English merchants in Bordeaux and Gascon merchants in London, and communication between the two ports was strong, therefore market news would reach English merchants before ships embarked south around September.⁶ Such were the risks and costs involved it is probable that rumours of good or poor vintages, comparative peace or French military activity, things which could have been known up to months beforehand, prompted an anticipatory increase or decline in merchant ventures. Moreover even once arriving in Bordeaux a merchant or their agent could scale up, relying on local credit if this was available, or alternatively scale back the venture depending on possible profitability and risks.

¹ For example, the C_v of freightage rates from Bordeaux to London in pounds sterling per tun was just 4.8% during February to December 1414. Calculated by the author from figures provided by James, *Studies*, pp.151–3.

² Prices on the Gascon wine market had a C_v of 33.6% by silver value in 1335–84, dropping only slightly to 31.4% over 1385–1449, see Chapter 2.3.2, and Appendix 8.1.

³ TNA, E 101/189/8, m. 8; E 364/67, m. 4.

⁴ SR, 1, p. 331 (27 Edw. III, st.1, c. 5–7); *ibid*, 2, p. 343 (23 Hen. VI, c. 17).

⁵ 'Henry VI: February 1445', item 45, *PROME, BHO*.

⁶ For these communities, see James, *Studies*, pp. 70–88; also Lavaud, 'Une communauté enracinée', pp. 35–48.

Ideally, in order to illustrate the impact of positive news or latter-day profit warnings, profitability estimates would be presented as a full time series. Unfortunately the available freightage data is too limited, as is our knowledge of the vast assortment of extraneous costs: charges for the use of cranes and harbour barges; warehouse fees and factors' salaries; all might vary enormously over time and by location. Also, taxes, as have been discussed, were applied in a profusion of forms and levels. As such the inclusion of such variables would not necessarily increase our understanding, and would probably obscure any useful trends. Instead a simple metric of a gross margin, based on the difference between Gascon and English prices, is illustrative because it is probable this was the principal information available to merchants at the time (see Figure 14).




Figure 14 Trends in gross profit margins for wine traded from Gascony to England, 10-year moving averages, 1340–1470. **Source:** For Gascon prices see Appendix 8.1.1; for English prices see Clark, *English Prices and Wages*, provided in Appendix 9.1; and James, *Studies*, pp. 50–2, 60–3. **Note:** Margins do not include freightage, taxes or and other costs.

The trend in margins using countrywide English prices follows that using the London assize prices closely, indicative of the influence the capital's prices had on profitability throughout the kingdom. The former were routinely slightly higher in keeping with higher prices farther from the main market, and the pricing in of transport costs to the provinces. The measures diverge in a handful of important phases, London margins were reduced in the early 1350s with tighter price controls after the Black Death. This was soon ameliorated by the *mistery's* increasing influence, though that didn't help in the early 1370s when a raising of retail prices was delayed. A long period of stable profits for London's vintners between the 1380s and around 1404 was sustained despite

declines in those for the rest of the country during the periods of tentative truce of Leulinghem in the 1390s.

As has been discussed, the fifteenth century saw greater stability in English prices than in the fourteenth.¹ The London assize price remained stubbornly fixed at 6*d* per gallon, and the prices in the rest of the country remained slightly above that – as a result profits for wine merchants were influenced to a far greater degree by shifts in the Bordeaux price and market intervention in the duchy; particularly the monetary policy and market reforms. Profits for merchants in London and elsewhere both collapsed during another great crisis period brought about by the campaigns of Armagnac and Orléans, only to be rectified by the monetary interventions of 1413–15 in Gascony which produced another period of high returns that lasted just over a decade. By the late 1420s a long slow decline in profits set in, reaching its lowest ebb in 1437–40 thanks to further invasions in the Bordelais, before finally further intervention, a fragile truce and market reforms permitted greater profits that encouraged greater quantities to be shipped in the final years of Plantagenet Gascony. Economic policy can be thus seen to have had a stimulating effect on merchant profits.

It was this profit motive that drove the scale of English investment and this went well beyond the simple purchase of merchandise. The installation of warehouses, wharfs and cranes all required considerable accumulation of capital. Yet the biggest outlay in any maritime trade was on the ship itself. Because the wine fleet was dominated by English ships most of the investment required would have originated within the kingdom. This stimulated the local economy with gainful employment and spent profits, but such prosperity was not shared equally. In the first decades of the fifteenth century 70 different ports had ships engaged in the trade, but over half came from just six locations, Dartmouth, London, Plymouth, Bristol, Fowey, and Guernsey.²

Roughly one in six vessels came from Dartmouth in 1401–13. Its special status is corroborated by Chaucer, who had visited the Devon port in November 1373 and chose it as the hometown for the shipman in his *Canterbury Tales*, in which the wine trade receives a direct citation, ‘Ful many a draughte of wyn had he ydrawe / Fro Burdeux-ward, whil that the chapman sleep’ (‘He had drawn very many a draft of wine/ While coming from Bordeaux, while the merchant slept’).³ Kowaleski commented on the growing significance of Devon’s ships more broadly in the Bordeaux trade. She calculated that one county alone contributed 8% of ships before the Hundred Years’ War, 18% into the second half of the fourteenth century, and then 22% in the first half of the fifteenth.⁴ Cloth and fish – as per the crown’s economic policy – were funnelled into Dartmouth and Plymouth for export south to the duchy. In return she determined that, by 1381–4, 82% of nearby Exeter’s traders imported wine, compared with 62% elsewhere, and remarked that ‘the value of the wine trade quite literally dwarfed all other imports’. Yet as in London interests were concentrated in the hands of a few wealthy merchants. Just nine individuals

¹ See Chapter 2.3.1.

² See Appendix 5.3 for the home ports of English ships visiting Gascony, by percentage of the wine fleet.

³ D.A. Pearsall, *Life of Geoffrey Chaucer: A Critical Biography* (Oxford, 1992), p. 105; Geoffrey Chaucer, *Canterbury Tales*, General Prologue, 388–410, in *The Riverside Chaucer*, (ed.) L.D. Benson (Oxford, 2008).

⁴ Kowaleski, *Local Markets and Regional Trade*, pp. 242–3.

handled 46% of all wine in 1381–91 and these were those figures that dominated the town's government.¹

Devon's importance made sense as one of the logical crossing points for trade going first to Brittany and then on to Gascony. In fact in September 1384 John de Gedeneye, lieutenant of the constable of Bordeaux, suggested Dartmouth as the place that merchant vessels bound for the duchy should wait in for their escort ships.² The wider harbour towns of the region (Dorset, Somerset, Devon and Cornwall) contributed 52.7% of the English wine fleet during 1401–13. In this we can surmise that the relative proximity of Gascony was important because the specialised knowledge of mariners at navigating the southern route would have been advantageous, knowing like Chaucer's shipman 'every cryke in Britaigne'.³ Whilst the significance of West Country shipping is clear, some of the largest contributors to the fleet were still the larger population centres in the east of the kingdom. London was the second largest provider of shipping at just less than 9% of the fleet, excluding royal ships.

Levels of maritime participation were not static, and by 1431–44, the English wine fleet came from just 56 ports, 20% fewer than at the beginning of the century, though over half still came from just seven ports. Dartmouth remained the largest contributor, though to a somewhat lesser degree, followed closely by Hull which had doubled its share of the wine fleet in the intervening years, and London, which remained important. The West Country harbour towns still constituted 56.3% of the fleet, and with the relative decline of Dartmouth and Plymouth, other towns such as Poole and Saltash were able to take a more prominent role. The extent to which home ports reflected ship-ownership is unclear. If they did such statistics would reflect the relative contribution of pooled capital by region. But ship-owners are an even more difficult group to define than international merchants, as they and their interests also overlapped. James correctly observed that sometimes merchants might possess their own vessels.⁴ For example, business partners Richard Bye and William Duket, the owners of *Le Goost*, sold their entire enterprise in 1440 to John Bouchier a merchant of Bishop's Lynn. This constituted the 'ship with all the gear thereof, two boats and all instruments, stock and other things needful thereto belonging; also of all their merchandise and wares in Bordeaux', altogether valued by the bond pending their transfer at £200 sterling. Such wealthy merchants, just like the aforementioned Bye and Duket, would not themselves travel to foreign markets, rather relying on 'their servants and factors there'.⁵ It is probable most vintners contributed only capital and their skills in organising or facilitating commerce whilst chartering ships to transport of their goods to Gascony and return with wine. This process, described in detail by Margery James, centred on non-standardised charter party agreements which set out cargos, destinations, costs and charges.⁶ One good surviving example

¹ Ibid., pp. 19, 27, 34, 107–8, 252–5.

² CCR, 1381–1385, pp. 480–1.

³ Chaucer, *Canterbury Tales*, General Prologue, 388–410.

⁴ James, *Studies*, p. 169.

⁵ CCR, 1435–1441, pp. 470–1.

⁶ James, *Studies*, pp. 133–7.

was that drawn up for *Le Michael* of Dartmouth in October 1381. This contract bound together seven merchants' wine for the voyage from Bordeaux to London, via Southampton and Sandwich, and also covered wine that the master and crew traded on their own account.¹

How widely ship-ownership was spread is currently also uncertain. Shipmasters themselves might be owners or simply their representatives as in the case of Robert Bangor of the *Michael*. Matters are complicated because ships might be part-owned by a myriad of investors, from a variety of walks of life, either because the outlay required was too large for a single investor or simply investors split their capital among many ships to mitigate the risk of the loss of any one vessel. Nonetheless we can be fairly certain that wealthy burgesses of English coastal towns and cities were the major investors and constituted a powerful interest group as 'Possessours de niefs'.² These would regularly petition the king, directly and through parliament regarding issues which would impact their profits. The most common complaint regarded the crown's regular habit of requisitioning shipping for military purposes and appeals for compensation for their use. It was this very function of merchant shipping which gave owners increasing influence in the fourteenth century as the war at sea intensified.³ In 1348, the 'men of Ipswich' requested a re-assessment of their tax burden because of the costs they had incurred providing their ships for Edward III's wars.⁴ Similar protests on this subject from the wider ship-owner community occurred from 1372.⁵ This was not the only issue. In 1390 they collectively lobbied with great success against their own mariners to curtail their collective bargaining over wages; and in 1406, and again in 1416, the lobby's demands had widened to include both the crown's proper use of the *tunnage* and *poundage* revenues and their security.⁶

It has often been difficult to understand the influence ship-owners held other than through such appearances in English political discourse. Yet advances can be made towards quantifying fluctuations in their economic activity, and the influence it had over time, albeit circuitously. A critically important dataset from amongst Bordeaux's customs records, previously unexploited by historians, is that indicating the charge of *killage* (*keelage*).⁷ In many ports this tax was simply levied on every ship for the use of the harbour (literally 'per keel'), but in Bordeaux the approach was subtly different. Here it was a one-off charge paid by ships arriving in the harbour for the first time, and those vessels newly built or exchanged.⁸ This caveat may have put off previous scholars looking to gauge either the size of fleets or activity of the harbour. In fact it is all the more useful,

¹ TNA, C 47/24/9/1.

² They are described as such in parliamentary records for 1390, 1393 and 1439: 'Richard II: November 1390', item 37, *PROME, BHO*; 'Richard II: January 1393', item 24, *ibid.*; 'Henry VI: November 1439', item 44, *ibid.*

³ C. Lambert, 'Henry V and the crossing to France: reconstructing naval operations for the Agincourt campaign, 1415', *Journal of Medieval History*, 43:1 (2017), pp. 24–39, at p. 29–30.

⁴ TNA, SC 8/13/636; 'Edward III: January 1348', item 59, *PROME, BHO*.

⁵ 'Edward III: November 1372', item 20, *PROME, BHO*.

⁶ 'Richard II: November 1390', item 37, *PROME, BHO*; 'Henry IV: March 1406, Part 1', items 20–6, *PROME, BHO*; 'Henry V: March 1416', item 31, *PROME, BHO*.

⁷ For the Bordeaux and Libourne *killage* figures, see Appendix 5.2.

⁸ This peculiarity is always noted in the constables' accounts along with the *killage* figures and revenues, e.g. TNA, E 101/179/9, 6r.

for it represents a metric for changing capital investment in shipping in Anglo-Gascon trade across the period. Such investment required the collaboration of merchant and ship-owner, predominately English, raising capital in the kingdom. These were either one and the same or were effectively so though their use of the charter party and the market for freightage capacity. Therefore the level was vulnerable to commercial forces, the propensity to trade based on anticipated profitability, and also prevailing economic conditions.

By this measure, levels of investment fell extremely low during the first wave of the Black Death in 1348–9, but recovered very quickly, and within a few years overall annual wine exports returned to around 20,000 tuns. Potentially dishoarding and a high spending culture during this period aided the availability of capital. The introduction of the 1353 statute can be seen to have a profound, albeit brief, adverse effect on capital investment. The imposition of new restrictive rules on English mercantile activities was accompanied by a collapse of 58.6% in the level of new ships or ship-owners entering the wine trade. Such sudden divestment partly explains why exports would fall to 16,328 tuns that year and 14,411 in 1355–6. Confidence would recover from such shocks however, and investment was soon rising dramatically with the military successes of the Black Prince and foundation of his principality. A spike in the *killage* figures in 1357–8 probably represents the departure of the fleet relaying the Prince's army and the French king as hostage back to England, nevertheless it is clear these were boom years for the investor which peaked probably around 1366, exactly in line with profitability trends. The negative impact of the combination of the banning of English merchant ventures to Gascony and the return of open conflict with the French crown is clear to see. Between 1368 and 1369, capital investment declined 73.7%. The wine fleet shrank dramatically in size. Where it had brought 363 ships of all sizes in 1360–1, by 1372–3 there were just 164.¹

As soon as such restrictions were lifted, capital would again flow into the trade during the crisis years of the 1370s in spite of increasing price volatility.² It reduced a great deal as profits were squeezed into mid-way through the decade, surged with the truce of Bruges, then eased off again with the high wine prices of the later years of the decade. These fluctuations are all visible in the available shipping capacity, as ships were periodically moved onto other routes, to Brittany only, towards Flanders, or simply into coastal trade around England. Then the beginning of the 1380s saw a dramatic shift in the overall trend. It is tempting to suggest that the 58.1% decline in new ships between 1379–80 and 1380–1 could be in some way attributable to the 1381 Peasant's Revolt. However vivid the image of wealthy London merchants' or ship-owners' houses and their goods despoiled by a mob probably cannot be invoked, simply because the chronology does not match precisely with the relevant trading periods. Similarly it is too early to propose that the statute of 1381 fixing wholesale wine prices deterred business investment as this would not come into effect until early the following year.³ That being said prices in England were at a turning point at

¹ See fleet sizes in Appendix 5.1.

² See decadal wine price volatility in Appendix 8.1.2.

³ *SR*, 2, pp. 18–9 (5 Rich. II, c.4).

precisely this time, and the phase of high prices, which had been so influential in the trade since the start of the Hundred Years' War and the Black Death, was beginning to come to an end.¹ The response of English mercantile interests may well have been a reaction to declining demand on the English market. Bullion famine may have played its part here as falling investment was exacerbated by declines in the availability of mercantile credit in line with the monetary base, in such a way as has been convincingly argued by Nightingale.² Merchants may have found it harder to raise capital for trading ventures and wine purchases, this would cause a decline the demand for wine, and thus prices. What works in favour of this argument is that the trends in both Gascon prices and in capital investment continued to hold the same trajectory for most of the next sixty years, barring some dramatic upward movements in prices due to war entering the Bordelais, such as in 1405–8. The *killage* records do suggest there was some effort to re-invest in the wine fleet in the 1430s, particularly after a brief devaluation of the *livre* at the official exchange rate in 1434–5, but this was cut short by invasion of Rodrigo de Villandrando in 1437 which was accompanied by historically high volatility and then inflated nominal prices in Bordeaux.³ It was not until the truce with France and market reforms around the mid-1440s that mercantile capital investment saw another boom period, with the mean annual numbers of ships entering the fleet recovering substantially albeit only to the levels of the bad years of the 1370s. Even with this caveat, the repeal of the 1353 statute had such an impressive positive effect on business confidence that we must fully believe the claims of the petitioners of 1444–5 that the law had been the critical factor inhibiting the scale of trade.⁴

The smaller wine fleet leaving Bordeaux had remained nevertheless dominated by English owners despite decades of poor investment. In 1435–6, 123 of 146 ships were English (84.25%), and in 1443–4, 70 of 85 ships (82.35%) remained so.⁵ The English share of the import trade was still overwhelming, at around three-quarters of all wine shipped, despite set-backs in trading conditions such as existed from the mid-1430s to mid-1440s.⁶ Therefore over the last century of Plantagenet rule, it is assuredly the case that English mercantile interests were generally well served by the crown, regulatory and monetary policy would increasingly work in their favour to secure their profits culminating in the reforms of 1445. As their ships provided the physical link between the kingdom and duchy, as well as the navy for war against the Valois it was certainly necessary. The impact in Gascony itself was more varied.

¹ See Chapter 2.3.1.

² P. Nightingale, 'Monetary Contraction and Mercantile Credit in Later Medieval England', *The Economic History Review*, 2nd series, 43:4 (1990), pp. 560–75.

³ The exchange rate this year briefly changed from 10 to 11.25 *livres* to the pound [TNA, E 101/191/11, fos 9r, 9v, 10v], this may explain the rise in *killage* from 18 ships in 1434–5 to 28 in 1436–7. The rate thereafter returned to its former level for the remainder of the decade. For volatility by decade, see Appendix 8.1.2.

⁴ 'Henry VI: February 1445', items 44–5 (45–6), 50 (51), *PROME, BHO*; TNA, SC 8/190/9467; SC 8/199/9901; C 49/26/8.

⁵ TNA, E 101/192/1, fol. 62v; E 101/194/3, fol. 77r.

⁶ See Appendix 3.5.

3.3 The seigneurial landholders of Aquitaine

3.3.1 The church

The church loomed large in Anglo-Gascon politics, society and the economy, as it did across all of medieval Europe. Its participation in the wine trade is among the best documented, along with its great wealth. The total taxable revenues of the archdiocese of Bordeaux in 1362 came to 24,299*l* 5*s* *bord.* (then £4,859 17*s* sterling).¹ The median annual income of the 336 individuals or institutions assessed was just 25*l* *bord.* (£5 sterling), mostly minor clerics, but the relative wealth of the regions within the archdiocese principally depended on the presence of larger earners, and these were not situated equally. The ecclesiastics of the city of Bordeaux took the largest share at 46.4%, almost all of which was generated by four seigneurial landholders: the archbishop himself, perhaps the largest single holder of property in the duchy of Aquitaine, who earned 4,000*l* *bord.* (£800 sterling), 16.5% of the total of the archdiocese; the chapter and dignitaries of the cathedral of Saint-André earned 3,586*l* 10*s* *bord.* (£717 6*s* sterling), 14.8% of the total; and those of the collegiate church of Saint-Seurin 1,620*l* *bord.* (£324 sterling), some 6.67%. In addition the abbey of Sainte-Croix was assessed for an income of 1,867*l* *bord.* (£373 8*s* sterling), a share of 7.68%.² The archpresbytery of the *Entre-Deux-Mers*, situated between the Dordogne River and the Garonne, had the second largest share by region, at 10.7%, mainly because of the presence of the Benedictine abbey of Sauve-Majeure with assessed revenues of 1,175*l* *bord.* (£235 sterling).³

The archbishop of Bordeaux, as Lodge observed, held his vast estates as an *allod*, free from any requirement of homage. From this he acquired considerable quantities of wine by direct cultivation, through rents in kind, or by tithes in kind.⁴ Unfree serfs known locally as *questals*, and the labour dues they provided, were increasingly rare in the Bordelais.⁵ Instead the vineyards managed directly ‘de mensa archiepiscopali’, part of his *réserve domaniale* or *demesne*, were generally tended and harvested by paid labourers employed at great expense by his estate managers. Sandrine Lavaud’s studies of the church of Saint-Seurin’s seigneurial role in the Bordelais showed how of all agricultural workers surveyed working their lands, 81.5% was described as ‘laboradors de vinhas’ or vine-workers, the majority of whom were inhabitants of the city.⁶

¹ These totals are calculated from the records of the 1362 papal subsidy preserved within the archbishop of Bordeaux’s accounts: *AHG*, XXII, pp. 2–22. For the total revenues by region of the archdiocese, see Appendix 4.1.2.

² These four accounted for 98.2% all ecclesiastical revenues in Bordeaux.

³ *AHG*, XXII, pp. 13–4.

⁴ Lodge, ‘The Estates of the Archbishop’, p. 56. There were two principal types of property ownership that came down from the High Middle-Ages: the *allod* and the *fief*. The holder of an *allod* owned property completely free from dues or responsibilities to a higher lord. The more common *fief* was the opposite; it involved countless feudal dues and encumbrances to secure the property from a lord to whom an oath of fealty had been sworn.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 82–107, particularly pp. 100–7; also Boutruche, ‘La crise d’une société: seigneurs et paysans’, pp. 336–48, at 340–1.

⁶ Lavaud, *Bordeaux et le vin*, p. 75.

In the third week in August 1361, the archbishop's vineyard in Pessac, to the south-west of Bordeaux, was harvested by 32 women hired for 5 *gros* (10*d bord./ 2d* sterling), and 28 men at 10 *gros* (20*d bord./4d* sterling) per day, with meat, fish, wine and fuel provided.¹ The men especially, were better paid even than skilled artisans in England, where, for example, thatchers were usually paid only 3½*d* sterling (17½*d bord.*) per day that year.²

The largely accepted dynamic post-mid-fourteenth century was that unit labour costs rose in this period as demographic decline through plague, famines and war made labour scarcer, and workers were able to command better pay.³ This is indeed generally what can be seen in Gascon wine production. Between 1355 and 1368 wages for vine-maintenance workers increased two and a half times, only just less than the equivalent rise in wine prices, and wages at harvest-time appear to grow at a similar rate.⁴ This suggests that they were easily able to bargain for at least a consistent share of the rising value of each wine barrel produced during the boom years. Hit by declining demand, and an ailing economy in the duchy, their pay would return back to previous levels along with the price of wine after the crises of the 1370s. Wages did gradually rise again towards the end of the century, yet between 1395 and 1402 wine prices fell by a third during the truce of Leulinghem and vineyard wages remained static, meaning that labour took a larger share of income overall. The impact of the duchy's monetary policy was also felt, especially into the fifteenth century. Between April 1427 and September 1430 about 4½ metric tonnes of *blancs* with only one third silver were put into circulation.⁵ The reduction of intrinsic value and quantity of money effects fed into price and wage inflation, and helped push up a vine worker's pay 92% between 1430 and 1432. Wages ended up five and a half times the level of mid-fourteenth century in nominal terms, and over two and half times in terms of sterling. The persistently large labour inputs of wine production and rising wages meant that there was a high level of circulating capital required. Boutruche calculated that up to 37.5% of the cost of wine at export was expended on labour.⁶ With demographic decline it is likely this would grow ever higher and was a burden only the richest producers could bear. It is hardly surprising that replanting in the Bordelais, which occurred intermittently after periods of high prices, was principally led by the church.⁷

Though the establishment or maintenance of vines and the grape-harvest were very labour-intensive, the finishing of production and beginnings of commerce became progressively more capital-intensive. This meant that supply in the wine trade was sensitive to fluctuations in capital investment. The archbishop's account books are replete with investments in fixed capital. Large numbers of baskets which needed to be purchased for use in the harvest, also the building of wine

¹ *AHG*, XXI, pp. 685–7. For a full description of the management of the archiepiscopal *réserve* see Lodge, 'The Estates of the Archbishop', pp. 156–75.

² Dyer, *Standards of Living*, p. 206.

³ G. Duby, *Rural Economy and Country Life in the Medieval West*, (trns.) C. Postan, (1962, repr. 1990), pp. 304–5; Hatcher, 'England in the Aftermath of the Black Death', pp. 3–35.

⁴ See Appendix 7 for Gascon wage against wine price indices.

⁵ TNA, E 101/189/12, fos 14r, 34v, 57r, 79v; E 364/67, m. 2.

⁶ Boutruche, *La crise*, p. 151.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 179–91, 201–9, 215–31, 402–5.

presses and vats for vinification.¹ Barrels were a very great expense, for their manufacture, purchase, repair and cleaning.² Once filled these were transported at great cost to Bordeaux, by carts, or in the case of his archbishop's vineyards in Lormont in the *Entre-Deux-Mers*, across the Gironde by barges, loaded by cranes.³ All these needed to be hired or purchased. In order to have sufficient storage capacity for all the wine produced, a vast number of undercroft cellars had to be constructed and maintained across the Bordelais. In the case of the archbishop, as with most other producers, the organisation of wine storage was complex. Stock was accumulated centrally in the cellars of the archiepiscopal palace in Bordeaux, but once these were overflowing, surplus wine was housed in other cellars in the city, for a fee, until instructions were given to take it to the palace or elsewhere.⁴ It was then either consumed by the household, or sold on to the city's burgesses or foreign merchants.⁵ The capital requirements to sustain this value chain from grapes on the vine to finished wine in barrels on the dockside were significant. They could not be met by all producers and those without significant resources would have to sell to middlemen.⁶

For both ecclesiastic and secular lords directly managed vineyards only constituted a small proportion of seigneurial estates, and generated only a limited quantity of wine. Grapes or barrels of finished wine were also collected from their tenants and tithes. As Lodge perceived, although some feudal elements remained in legal nomenclature, allodial property, and fiefs held by homage, were in decline everywhere in the Bordelais, to be largely replaced by the period concerned in this study by the holding of *censives*.⁷ Such tenancies could be for houses or shops with gardens attached, often combined with larger parcels of agricultural property or just the land itself. In either case grape-vines were the crop most often cultivated. Most tenants held the vineyards they worked freely, and could be passed on by inheritance or alienated by the holder, paying a fee in cash to the lord known as the *esporle* in the event of a change of tenant or lord. In return for their holdings the tenant had to pay the lord the eponymous *cens*, a rent usually in cash fixed in local money of account, having sold their wine themselves, or more rarely in kind. In the latter case wine could pass to the lord from the tenant in a fixed quantity per year. For example, one tenant of the archbishop, a certain Johannes de Porta, a resident of Bordeaux, owed at harvest time 'unum modium vini', around 258 modern litres of wine, as part of his rent for the vines he held in 1367.⁸ When the *cens* was small it was because the majority of the rent was paid in kind through a system known locally as the *agrières*. Similar to *métayage* or share-cropping, this required a proportion of the produce of the property would be given to the lord annually after the harvest. In the case of viticulture this was usually a third or a quarter of the fruit or wine produced on the property.⁹ The

¹ *AHG*, XXII, p. 325

² *AHG*, XXI, pp. 416, 487, 509–10, 684–5, 691; XXII, pp. 356, 379.

³ *AHG*, XXI, p. 686.

⁴ *AHG*, XXI, pp. 353–9, 688.

⁵ *AHG*, XXI, pp. 8–9, 390, 651; XXII, pp. 100–1, 372–3, 378.

⁶ See Chapters 2.3.2 and 3.4.1.

⁷ For analysis of types of holdings, see Lodge, 'The Estates of the Archbishop', pp. 49–81, 131–55.

⁸ *AHG*, XXII, p. 36

⁹ For examples, see *AHG*, XXI, pp. 216–7; XXII, pp. 36, 46.

form of *censive* tenancies was heterogeneous, and could include mixtures of rent types, but in general over time the spread between tenancies requiring rents in a share of produce, the fixed wine-rents or *agrières*, and the large *cens* in money, had shifted towards the latter since the thirteenth-century commercial revolution. *Agrières* rents meant the lord shared the risk in the production and sale of the harvest, in the event of a poor crop or low prices he too would lose out. In addition close supervision was required to ensure that a correct share was paid as rent. By the commutation to fixed cash payments the burden of risk was passed entirely onto the tenant and the lord was guaranteed a regular income.¹ Boutruche argued, like Postan did, that lords tended towards favouring such stable incomes even if they were substantially lower.²

This makes sense if we also consider share-cropping to be an inefficient form of agriculture, which it has long been criticised as being. Alfred Marshall famously suggested, in the late nineteenth century, that it inevitably discouraged the tenant to invest labour in developing his parcel of land, as he would only keep a small share of the marginal product, the productivity, gained by such efforts.³ This would be particularly troublesome in wine production because it was so labour intensive, therefore directly-managed vineyards with paid labour or a cash tenant should be far more productive. Despite this, even in the fifteenth century *agrières* rents still made up a large proportion of those seigneurial rents for vineyard tenancies. In some, such as the chapter of Saint-Seurin they constituted the majority.⁴

The reasons for the resilience of this type of share-cropping are worthy of some consideration. For one, it is not entirely clear how inefficient it was relative to other forms of wine production. Marshall's argument has been challenged, including very recently by Samuel Garrido with regards share-cropping in much later European viticulture.⁵ He suggests that it could indeed be efficient provided that the landlord (in the medieval, the lord) were to work closely in partnership with the tenant, and that the latter were compensated for improvements. This was true to a degree in the medieval Bordelais, as Lodge realised, since whereas those tenants paying fixed cash rent were left largely unmanaged by their lord's agents, those paying *agrières* were. Such leases would include a detailed set of assurances of how the tenant would keep the vineyard in good condition on pain of forfeiture and supervisory officials were employed to oversee the harvest. Moreover there are indications some tenants were compensated for investment in the land, such as by manuring the soil, with reductions in the rent burden.⁶ Though Lodge was sceptical, were these practices in fact widespread they would fulfil Garrido's requirements for share-cropping to become efficient.⁷ It is also far from certain that share-cropping was financially unfavourable for

¹ Spufford, *Money and its Use*, pp. 242–3.

² Boutruche, *La crise*, pp. 53–4; Postan, *Essays*, p. 38.

³ A. Marshall, *Principles of Economics* (London, repr. 1890 repr 1895), pp. 728–31; also see J.D. Reid, Jr., 'Sharecropping in History and Theory', *Agricultural History*, 49:2 (1975), pp. 426–40.

⁴ Calculated based on data provided by Boutruche, *La crise*, p. 318.

⁵ S. Garrido, 'Sharecropping was sometimes efficient: sharecropping with compensation for improvements in European viticulture', *Economic History Review*, 2nd series, 70:3 (2017), pp. 977–1003.

⁶ Lodge, 'The Estates of the Archbishop', pp. 49–81.

⁷ Garrido 'Sharecropping was sometimes efficient', pp. 977–1003, at pp. 997–8.

the lord. In another recent study Debapriya Sen has shown its superiority over fixed rental contracts in markets with imperfect competition and a strong seasonal variation of price.¹ These were certainly also key features of the Anglo-Gascon wine market. If applied to the trade this newer model, employing modern contract theory, suggests that most tenants were more commonly obliged to sell their share of the crop at the time of the year when the market was over-supplied and prices were low in Bordeaux in December.² By comparison the lord's share could be stored until later in the year to take advantage of the higher prices as wine became scarcer. Indeed, we see that around half of all secular seigneurial export transactions occurred from January onwards, compared with Bordeaux's burgesses whose proportion of overseas wine shipments in this later part of the year fell from 46.8% in 1348–86 to 26.8% over 1402–49.³

Boutruche observed the period after the outbreak of war and the arrival of the Black Death as one in which the relative fortunes of tenants were in the ascendant on account of their relative scarcity and a desire by landlords to repopulate abandoned land.⁴ He had calculated that over the course of the war all rents of vineyards in the suburbs of Bordeaux halved.⁵ Yet in addition, cash rents were also denominated and fixed in *livres*, the value and relative burden of which was further diminished in waves of devaluations after 1368. On this second matter Boutruche remained sceptical, believing monetary effects to be largely irrelevant compared with the destructiveness of the war. He suggested instead that the paucity of precious metals in the economy might have increased the purchasing power of that remaining, which in turn propped up the value of money rents.⁶ Whilst this was potentially one overall deflationary effect of bullion famine across Europe, and might have occurred in the 1380s and 1440s in Gascony, it was not broadly true across the period as a whole. Nominal wages, as well as prices of wheat and wine, for example, all eventually rose in line with devaluations.⁷ This was largely because of how integrated Gascony's economy was with those of its trading partners and so the declining exchange rate is indicative of a substantial reduction in the purchasing power of each *livre* from the decline of the principality through to the end of Plantagenet rule.⁸ Tenant producers on fixed cash rents, who would sell most

¹ D. Sen, 'A theory of sharecropping: the role of price behavior and imperfect competition', *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 80:1 (2011), pp. 181–99.

² See Chapter 2.3.2.

³ See Appendices 4.4.2 and 4.3.2.

⁴ Boutruche, *La crise*, pp. 301–12, also see pp. 247–342, 351.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 'La crise d'une société: seigneurs et paysans', pp. 336–48, at 345.

⁶ Boutruche, *La crise*, pp. 267–9.

⁷ See Chapter 2.3.2 and 2.4.2. Also see Gascon prices for wheat in Appendix 8.4, which rose sharply with devaluations of the *livre bordelaise*. They, for example, rose from 8*l* 10*s* *bord.* in 1414 to 12*l* per quarter in 1416.

⁸ Purchasing power parity (PPP) held sufficiently in Anglo-Gascon trade to prevent the value of precious metal in England and Gascony diverging too far without a devaluation or revaluation and an exchange rate correction between the *livre* and sterling (Chapter 2.4.2). Indeed, the official exchange rate also largely follows the crude of measure of the relative purchasing based on wheat, see Appendix 6.4. The changes in this ratio after devaluations is so dramatic as to suggest the loss of *livre*'s purchasing power was considerably greater in terms of victuals than the official rate suggests. For more on PPP in medieval trade, see A.R. Bell, C. Brooks, T.K. Moore, 'Did Purchasing Power Parity Hold in Medieval Europe?' *The Manchester School*, 85:6 (2007), pp. 682–709, especially pp. 702–3 for conclusions regarding the wider use of wheat to measure purchasing power.

they would produce themselves, were in a position to exploit price rises, and so to at least maintain their incomes, as their real liabilities declined.

Rather inconsistently Boutruche did simultaneously accept that lords, particularly the ecclesiastics, might also benefit by the nominal inflation in the value of their rents in kind.¹ Here he was correct. Lords then had the greater motive to keep their *agrières* tenancies in order to accrue more wine that could be then sold at great profit both domestically or to international merchants and they were evidently sometimes willing to take on the greater risk. The figures Boutruche harvested from fifteenth century tenancy contracts relating to the chapter of Saint-Seurin illustrate the struggle between landlord and tenant over the form of their rents.² Yet these are ambiguous. Of one the set of tenancies that covered the years 1414–24, 65% of rents were still paid in *agrières* compared with 35% with a cash *cens*. By contrast with those that encompassed 1425–59 the proportion of *agrières* was 70.5%. Yet another source he used that covered the years 1424–78 show that share falling to 56.2%. Preference for payment in shares of harvest may reflect a period during which there was a shortage of good silver. Boutruche himself noted that the return to *cens* payments over *agrières* largely occurred after the end of the Hundred Years' War. Even within this there are moments that lords managed to take a larger share when they could. Over 1414–24, 8.6% of Saint-Seurin tenants paid just one fifth or less of the harvest, by those covered 1425–78 this had fallen to 1.7%. Most by this time would pay one quarter of their wine as rent.

Lordship was certainly economically adaptable to the changing market. For another increasingly important method by which wine would be amassed in bulk was through tithes, the customary payments of a tenth share of the fruits of agriculture and labour for the upkeep of the clergy.³ Many had long been enfeoffed to lay individuals, particularly lords, knights and their heirs over the preceding centuries, though the archbishop and several Bordeaux chapters still held the right to tithes over a number of parishes across the Bordelais. By the mid-fourteenth century many tithes were also commuted to cash payments, but as with seigneurial rents a good proportion were also still also paid in kind, in agricultural produce, sometimes grain, but often wine.⁴ Of these some were harvested and vinified by the tenants, then collected directly by the agents of the archbishop, yet much of the responsibility for collection of tithes, as well as of *agrières* rents, was farmed out to an 'assensator'.⁵

Farm-holders were individuals, or occasionally partnerships, who were contracted to pay the original land or tithe-holder a fixed cash amount and in return the farmer held the right to collect the relevant income, in cash or kind.⁶ Such leases were sold for set periods, sometimes just

¹ Boutruche, *La crise*, pp. 268–9.

² *Ibid.*, p. 318.

³ Wine was assessed as part of the major tithe, that which applied to staple food crops, commodities such as grains, see E. le Roy Ladurie; J. Goy, *Tithe and Agrarian History from the Fourteenth to the Nineteenth Century: An Essay in Comparative History* (Cambridge, 1982), p. 14.

⁴ For examples, see *AHG*, XXII, pp. 36, 439–440.

⁵ *AHG*, XXI, pp. 216–7.

⁶ For examples, see *AHG*, XXII, pp. 146, 160, 287–9, 370. Occasionally tithe-farmers were also leased the responsibility to collect the seigneurial rents in kind also as part of their farm. This was common elsewhere in Europe, see le Roy Ladurie, Goy, *Tithe and Agrarian History*, p. 16.

for one year, or as many as nine years. The holder would profit speculatively from the margin between the price he paid, and the value of that which he collected, less costs. Such investors, as Joseph Goy suggested of their type more generally, could 'be seen as genuine capitalist entrepreneurs'.¹ Many were prosperous members of that or some nearby parish, lesser clerics, or merchants whom would invest their surplus capital.² In 1395, the prominent Bordeaux wine merchant Richard Makanam purchased the tithe-farm for Saint-Germain-du-Puch, a parish on the *Graves* de Vayres just to the south of Libourne, for 24 gold *guyennois* (30*l bord.* or £4 sterling).³ Many squires and knights would similarly acquire farms, such as Sir Pey de Laroque, Sir Gerald de Podio, or Sir Bernard Moncet did in the 1370s.⁴ The latter invested the substantial sum of 34 gold *guyennois* (42*l 10s bord.* or £8 10s sterling) in the tithe-farm of the parish of Saint-Sulpice in 1375. Even the Anglo-Gascon nobility were involved. In 1395, the recently widowed Isabeau de Saint-Symphorien, formerly wife of John de Stratton, lord of Landiras, invested 6 gold *guyennois* (7*l 10s bord.* or £1 sterling) in the farm of tithes and also the *agrières* of some church lands, to provide income in her widowhood.⁵ Gaillard [III] de Durfort, lord of Duras, heavily invested in the tithes of the vineyards of Bègles to the south of Bordeaux, an area of strong wine production.⁶

The value of tithe (and *agrières*) farms should, with informed bidding, have reflected the sum of anticipated returns, based on previous years' yields, and the bidders' expectations of the conditions of the market, particularly prices for the production purchased. Since this was essentially a credit and risk transaction between the lessor and lessee, the profit would represent the time value of money of the latter's capital and the risk premium. If one looks at a sample of parishes from across the Bordelais for which the archbishop of Bordeaux sold tithe-farms, it is clear their prices followed the price of wine closely.⁷ For example, between 1361 and 1367, as wine prices increased dramatically, the aggregate prices of 11 tithe-farms rose 79%.⁸ At the end of the 1380s these tithes collapsed in value as wine prices fell. The prices paid for tithe-farms for 7 equivalent parishes fell 59% between 1367 and 1389.⁹

Therefore as with *agrières* tenancies, the great attraction of holding tithes that paid in kind was that it gave the holder access to saleable commodities or farm-leases, the nominal prices of which would grow with the devaluation of the *livre*. There are again clear indications also that into the fifteenth century, as the inflationary pressures of the duchy's monetary policy took hold, the church adapted by expanding its holdings of such assets. For the chapter of Saint-André, this

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

² *AHG*, XXII, p. 288.

³ *AHG*, XXII, p. 470. 'Graves' were banks of glacial gravel that drained well and so excellent for viticulture.

⁴ *AHG*, XXII, pp. 288–9.

⁵ *AHG*, XXII, p. 472. For details on Stratton and Isabeau de Saint-Symphorien see D.A. Bailey, 'Les Châteaux de Landiras et de Montferrand and Their Seigneurial Families — Part One: Setting, Medieval History, and Genealogy', *Advances in Historical Studies*, 2:2 (2013), pp. 81–93, at pp. 82, 89.

⁶ For example, see ADG, G 310, fol. 54r; *AHG*, VII, pp. 444–6, 457.

⁷ See Appendix 8.6.

⁸ Based on the farm price of the parishes of Bassens (incl. *agrières*), Blaye, Bruges, Calamiac, Guitignan (incl. *agrières*), Loupes, Nérigean, Saint-Quintin, Saint-Sulpice, Soulac and Tabanac.

⁹ Bassens (incl. *agrières*) fell 63.2%, Blaye 86.8%, Guitignan (incl. *agrières*) 23%, Loupes 71%, Nérigean 55%, Saint-Sulpice 28.1%, Saint-Quintin 84%.

programme was begun by future archbishop Pey Berland (c.1380–1458) whom in 1426 had re-acquired the tithes from the productive vineyards of Bègles for 895*l* 16*s* 8*d* *bord.*, then in 1429 the chapter bought those for Paludate for 440 francs (550*l* *bord.*).¹ This practice continued through to at least 1435 when the chapter bought from Jean de Pereriis, a Bordeaux notary, one quarter share of the tithes in the parish of Artigues, just across the river from Bordeaux, and one quarter share of the tithes in the same from Guillotin de Lansac, a nobleman and knight, each share costing 120 *livres* apiece.² Over the same period the chapter was supporting their wine business through investments in its fixed capital. For example in 1431 the canons sold a house that their chapter held in Bordeaux to one of their own. The 36 francs raised were then re-invested in repairs to Saint-André's wine press and vinification facilities.³




Figure 15 Aggregated wine exports of the Anglo-Gascon church, 1348–1449. **Source:** Appendix 4.1.1.

With the physical returns of such investments the church was increasingly involved in direct exports (Figure 15).⁴ If we exclude the year of the Black Death (1348–9), the growth in average exports from the first three shipping seasons' customs records, 1355–6, 1356–7 and 1357–8, to the last three 1435–6, 1443–4 and 1448–9, was 41.7%. This is profoundly against the trend of overall exports. The data is punctuated by exports spikes that appear anomalous in the otherwise steady upward trajectory. Noticeably 1356–7 and 1378–9 are particular boom years where a concerted effort was evidently made to raise money from overseas wine sales. Longer-term growth

¹ *AHG*, VII, pp. 444, 457

² *AHG*, XIII, p. 13.

³ *AHG*, XIII, pp. 5–6.

⁴ See Appendix 4.1.1.

was dominated by a number of key institutions. In the 1350s the mean exports for the cathedral of Saint-André were just over 50 tuns per year but in the fifteenth century they were around 140 tuns. Over the same time period the church of Saint-Seurin increased theirs from around 20 tuns to 80 tuns on average. The portfolio of lands or tithes held by the chapters' themselves constituted a considerable portion of these exports, over half in the case of the cathedral, the remainder were from the benefices of dignitaries and canons. Among the lay clergy the deans of Saint-Seurin were particularly prolific exporters. It was not unusual for them to ship upwards of 20 tuns themselves in a good year. Exports of wine from the abbey of Sainte-Croix were almost entirely the purview of the abbot himself, with just over three-quarters of all shipments in his name across the period, usually over 50 tuns per annum.¹

The seasonality of ecclesiastics' interactions with the market also changed across the period. Church exports progressively made more use of their bourgeois privileges by exporting an increasing proportion of their wine stock earlier in the sales season – so capturing better prices. Whereas in 1348–86, 34.4% of their wine was shipped before December, in 1402–49 this had risen to 55.5%. If considered in terms of the proportion of commercial transactions, this had increased from 28.45% to 52.4%.² Thus the clergy were not just supported, but became extremely rich, living, as Vale has described, 'in greater luxury than many of the wealthiest merchants in the city'.³

That wealth did not spread far across Plantagenet Aquitaine. The 1350s saw a collapse in shipments sourced from anywhere other than Bordeaux, particularly those from outside of the archdiocese (Figure 16 - overleaf). Some periodic recoveries were made in the later fourteenth and fifteenth centuries but their share never rose again beyond 15% of church exports. It is right to suspect this again was partly the result of English commercial policy. The great Benedictine abbey of Sauve-Majeure had little involvement in international trade. The abbot only appeared once, shipping 13¾ tuns of wine in 1442–3. It might be claimed that the ravages of war were a decisive factor but more likely it was because he lacked the export privileges of the Bordeaux church.⁴ For, by contrast, the nearby Cistercian abbey of Bonlieu ('Bonloc') did enjoy privileges and, probably as a consequence, its abbot was a more regular moderate exporter.⁵ Bonlieu's most active period in the surviving records was between January and February 1386, when 22½ tuns were exported by the abbot.⁶ Yet their exports tail off after the first decade of the fifteenth century, their last appearance in the customs books being the 5 tuns shipped by the abbot on 25 November 1435.⁷ The smaller abbeys and priories that peppered Gascony and Guyenne rarely appear to exported more than a tun or two, and never consistently. The Sainte-Croix dependent priories such as those at Loupiac, near Benauges, or in the Isle-Saint-George in the Gironde estuary, are good examples of

¹ See Appendix 4.1.3.

² This is based on 1,236 consignments of wine shipped over these two periods, see Appendix 4.1.5.

³ Vale, *English Gascony*, p. 24.

⁴ TNA, E 101/194/3, fol. 22v, 36r, 39r, 73v.

⁵ TNA, E 101/602/3, fol. 34v; E 101/180/2, fol. 22r; E 101/182/6, fol. 3v; E 101/183/11, fos 31r, 32v, 56r, 68v; E 101/184/19, fos 16v, 20v, 42v, 90v; E 101/192/1, fol. 22r.

⁶ TNA, E 101/183/11, fos 31r, 32v, 56r, 68v.

⁷ TNA, E 101/192/1, fol. 22r.

these.¹ They also were unable to use the privileges of the Bordeaux church usually available to their mother abbey. For the constables appear to have followed the rules strictly and most ecclesiastical exports from outside Bordeaux, be they secular, monastic, or mendicant, lacking any special dispensation, were taxed on export.²




Figure 16 Share of the Anglo-Gascon church wine exports by region, 1348–1449. **Source:** Appendix 4.1.1.

It was, in short, the result of expanding production and export by the Bordeaux church alone which resulted in the increasing proportion ecclesiastical wine constituted of overall annual exports. This share rose from around 2% in the 1350s to approaching 3.5% in the first half of the fifteenth century.³ Considering the scale of ecclesiastical landholdings, especially in the Bordelais, it is surprising how low this still was. It is indicative of the farming-out of assets and the strong position of burgesses as middle-men in the trade. This means that it is impossible to be precise about quite what proportion of ecclesiastical revenues derived from wine exports. We can make a rough estimate based on their direct exports, wine prices at that time, and the total income revealed

¹ TNA, E 101/173/4, fol. 22r [Loupjac]; TNA, E 101/184/19, fol. 2r; E 101/188/14, fol. 3r; E 101/195/19, fol. 61v [Isle-Saint-George].

² TNA, E 101/167/16, nos 18, 32, 36; E 101/173/4, fos 13v, 22r, 25v, 27r, 31r, 65v; E 101/602/3, fol. 34r; E 101/184/19, fol 2r; E 101/188/14, fol 3r, 4r; E 101/191/3, fos 50v, 69v; E 101/192/1, fol. 39r; E 101/194/3, fol. 3v; E 101/195/19, fos 40r, 40v, 51v, 56v, 61r, 61v, 67r, 68v.

³ See Appendix 4.1.4.

by the 1362 papal subsidy.¹ It is probable that about 24% of ecclesiastical income around the late 1350s and early 1360s derived from their direct involvement alone.² As cash rents declined in value, wine prices inflated, and the church expanded its commercial involvement, the percentage derived from the wine trade would only have increased over time.

3.3.2 The nobility

In Gascony, as in France proper, the *seigneurie* was the basic unit of secular aristocratic landholding which ‘was the vehicle of the wealth, prestige, and power of the lords’ as Gareth Prosser succinctly put it.³ As such it is often supposed that, as a rule, the secular nobility of the Late Middle-Ages were not regularly engaged in trade. In principle their *noblesse* rested upon being able to ‘live nobly’ off of their seigneurial incomes, either in the form of rents from the inhabitants of their estates or from the direct cultivation of their *réserve domaniale*, their *demesne*.⁴ This ideal was certainly unrealistic. All large landholders, as we have seen for senior ecclesiastics, might accumulate more physical product of their estates than they and their household could consume. They would therefore have to dispose of any surplus and increasingly this would mean engaging in markets. It has been long understood how in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the lordly *réserve* would often be increasingly intensively farmed with commerce in mind, in order to generate cash necessary in an increasingly monetised economy.⁵ It has been observed how by the mid-fourteenth century this process was reversed and direct cultivation had declined across Europe with the reserved land instead leased out.⁶ But with the financial pressures of post-Black Death Europe, of falling rents and rising wages, as well as costs of war, those reliant only on their ancient lordships risked penury. The profits of the wine trade were therefore an attractive option, though the degree to which this was possible would vary greatly.

In his c.1465 analysis of Valois Aquitaine, Régnauld Girard certainly considered the lands of the greatest secular lords of the region, the counts of Armagnac and Foix, and the lords of Albret, to be customarily integrated with the export economy of Bordeaux.⁷ Their earlier separation from the Anglo-Gascon wine market was therefore noteworthy and this appeared to have had causes both political and geographical. The segmentation of the *Haut-Pays* from the Bordelais after the outbreak of war in 1337 removed the key link between the lands of John [I] (1311/9–73), count of Armagnac and the wine trade – at least in the direct or legitimate market. Lands under the count’s jurisdiction along the Gers river to the north of Auch, the southern Agenais along the

¹ *AHG*, XXII, pp. 2–22.

² This is based on exports of 680.15 tuns, estimated to be worth 5,9231 *bord.* which is 24.37% of the total income of the church at 24,2991 10s *bord.*

³ G. Prosser, ‘The later medieval French noblesse’, in *France in the later Middle-Ages 1200–1500*, (ed.) D. Potter (Oxford, 2003), pp. 182–209, at p. 189.

⁴ This view is summarised by G. Small, *Late Medieval France* (Basingstoke, 2009), p. 76.

⁵ Duby, *Rural Economy*, pp. 260–73.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 317–27.

⁷ *AHG*, LVI, pp. 34–42, at p. 35.

Garonne river, and the Caussade along the Tarn and Aveyron north of Toulouse, would have been broadly impacted by conflict.¹ His great rival Gaston [III] Fébus (1331–91), count of Foix, ruled Béarn, Bigorre, and also parts of Marsan and Gavardan.² Though much of this was within the basin of the Adour River, which led to Bayonne rather than Bordeaux, they would have suffered similarly from political and military upheavals. Matters were complicated in 1398 by the Foix-Grailly inheritance, when Archambaud de Grailly, *capit* de Buch became the count by right of marriage to Isabelle de Foix-Castelbon (1361–1428), the cousin, and only surviving heir of Gaston.³ The role of the Albret is most pertinent. At one time the lords of that house were closely involved in the trade, drawing on the viticultural lands they held in the Bazadais, to the east of Bordeaux along the Garonne, notably the lordships of Castelnau de Cernès, Sore, Cazeneuve, Aillas, Casteljaloux and Sainte-Bazeille.⁴ Bernard Ezi [IV] (d.1358) exported 729 tuns of wine during 1349, the year after the arrival of the Black Death, 12.3% of all the wine to leave Gascony that year.⁵ This involvement gradually declined over subsequent years and the Albret too had largely abandoned the trade by the end of the 1350s, apart from their cadet branch in the Bordelais, who continued to export until the late 1370s.⁶ The wine of these major lords was amongst the most prejudiced against by Plantagenet policy, and this may have been a factor in their decline. They usually lacked export privileges and, being largely based far from Bordeaux, were most vulnerable to the effects of punitive tariffs. In the end, distance from port and insecurity would have discouraged most merchants from buying their wine in any considerable quantity.

The evidence is far more extensive for the direct involvement in the wine trade among those of middling and lesser Gascon nobility established more usually under the suzerainty of the Plantagenets during the period of concern in this study. Late medieval Gascony was a checkerboard of small lordships, most of which made some appearance in the records of the wine trade, but as exporters their fortunes varied considerably. Some, such as the lords of Lalande, holders of the barony and castle of la Brède, strategically situated on the southern approach to Bordeaux, generated exports that fluctuated from around ten to over forty tuns per annum. They enjoyed certain degree of tax exemption on their exports. Over 85% of their wine shipped was indicated as coming under the Bordeaux franchise.⁷ Other lords had exports that were strong in the mid-fourteenth century, experienced a severe decline, but then greatly recovered in the fifteenth century, the *capitals* de Buch for example. The house of Grailly, later Foix-Grailly, held their principal barony in the sand dunes and pine trees of the north-western Landes, a region that was never a substantial producer of wines, yet even so the quantities of wine the *capitals* were capable of accumulating was evidently substantial. This was because the Graillys were also viscounts of

¹ See Chapter 3.4.3 for the impact of war in the *Haut-Pays*.

² See R. Vernier, *Lord of the Pyrenees: Gaston Fébus, Count of Foix (1331–1391)* (Woodbridge, 2008).

³ *Ibid.*, p. 198; Pépin, 'The French Offensives of 1404–1407', pp. 1–40, at pp. 1–2.

⁴ For the lands of the Albret, see Savy, *Bertrucat d'Albret*, p. 316.

⁵ TNA, E 101/167/16, nos 32, 35–7.

⁶ See Appendix 4.2.1 for Anglo-Gascon noble export figures.

⁷ Of 282½ tuns of the lords of Lalande-la Brède recorded as shipped in the surviving constables' books during the period, 240½ were marked 'Fr', or 85.13%.

Benauges and Castillon, barons of Castelnau-en-Médoc and lords of Puy-Paulin in Bordeaux, the latter of which gave them a claim to burgess status. They also held a plethora of other smaller estates or parcels of land.¹ From these the *captals* produced enough to export between 70 and 100 tuns in good years. Even once Archambaud swore homage to Charles VI in March 1401 his position was ambiguous enough to continue exporting. Likewise after his death in 1412, his lands and titles were split among his sons, Jean de Foix-Grailly became the count of Foix and Mathieu became count of Comminges, with implicit loyalty to the French king, but Gaston de Foix-Grailly inherited the Anglo-Gascon lands and wine export business. In September 1440, the latter owed an enormous debt of 15,000*l bord.* (£1,500 sterling) to John Holland (1395–1447), earl of Huntingdon, then king's lieutenant in Aquitaine, and since the *capital* lacked the necessary specie the debt was paid off by the *capital* with 500 tuns of wine.²

Where they exported significantly nobles had adapted their holdings to find new sources of wine. From the 1370s the *captals* de Buch held the parish of Latresne ('La Trena') from the archbishop.³ This was highly-productive viticultural land just across the river from the port at Bordeaux. A recognizance made in November 1411, for a piece of the *capital's* vineyard land nearby, made with a tenant who specialised in viticulture (a 'laborador de vinhas') confirmed the tenancy based on the payment of an *agrières* of one fifth of the fruits of the vines, given in wine.⁴

Likewise, the lords of Montferrand, holders of their eponymous barony in the western portion of the *Entre-Deux-Mers*, had a similar export trajectory to the *captals*, achieving upwards of 40 tuns per annum in the 1350s and 1430s. By the early fifteenth century Bertrand [III] (1380–1435/46) de Montferrand acquired the baronies of Langoiran and of Veyrines, as well as lordships of Agassac, Soussans, Podensac and Rions.⁵ These represented the inheritance of the house of Albret in the lower Garonne and Dordogne valleys, forfeit after Bérard (III) d'Albret, lord of Langoiran, submitted to Anjou at Saint-Macaire in October 1377.⁶ His estates had been highly adept at generating large wine surpluses for export with more than 70 tuns per year sent abroad by Bérard in the early 1370s.⁷

In an age of declining seigneurial fortunes, few lords were more perpetually short of funds than Florimont, lord of Lesparre, whose barony in the Médoc was not an area of concentrated viticulture, rather a mixture of marsh or thick forest, more appropriate for raising livestock.⁸ His

¹ TNA, SC 8/274/13667; SC 8/277/13849; SC 8/274/13659; ADG, H 1006, no. 16; G 2268, no. 16; *AHG*, XXII, pp. 240, 271–291; *AHG*, LVIII, p. 11. Lodge would claim that the barony of Castelnau-en-Médoc had little widespread viticulture (see Lodge, 'The Barony of Castelnau', pp. 93–101, at p. 96). This, we should agree, was true compared with elsewhere in the Bordelais, or the Médoc today, however there were in fact numerous large tenancies in Castelnau which involved vineyards, wine-rents or wine *agrières*. Some of these Lodge seemed to have missed, such as, for examples, ADG, 1 E 17, nos 4, 5, 7, 11, 21, 27.

² Malvezin, *Histoire du commerce de Bordeaux*, p. 255.

³ *AHG*, XXII, pp. 240, 271, 291.

⁴ ADG, H 1006, no. 16.

⁵ Bailey, 'Les Châteaux de Landiras et de Montferrand—Part One', pp. 81–93, at pp. 81, 83, 86.

⁶ *Les archives de Vayres*, pp. 784–5 (nos 631–2).

⁷ TNA, E 101/602/3, fos 7r, 9v, 17r, 24v, 25v, 40v, 41v, 42v, 46v; E 101/180/2, fos 8r, 10v, 11v, 14r, 19r, 22r, 24r, 27v, 32r.

⁸ Lodge, 'The Barony of Castelnau', pp. 93–101, at p. 96.

various debts for the payment of ransoms, and other war costs, mounted up, especially with the mercantile community in London, alongside those of other Gascon nobles such as Pons, lord of Castillon.¹ By the 1380s Florimont had embarked on greater involvement in the wine trade as the convenient solution to repaying these debts whilst simultaneously transferring the necessary capital from the duchy to the kingdom. In August 1383 Florimont received his licence to trade 10,000 tuns of wine from the *Pays-Rebelles*.² This huge quantity appears unachievable given that officially only just over 100 tuns per annum from French-held areas were exported via Bordeaux or Libourne during the 1380s, and the only quantitative evidence of Lesparre's exports are 20 tuns recorded in the 1385–6 customs book.³ The limitations of the sources for this period can be deceptive on this point. It is likely some wine from the *Haut-Pays* entered the Bordelais but were sold and then exported under a different tax category. Certainly the indications are that Florimont was exporting to London by the shipload since around this time a vessel arriving in London, filled with the lord of Lesparre's wine, was seized in lieu of his debts.⁴

A serious problem was that the loss of territory to French obedience could separate a lord from portions of his lands and therefore income. The lordship of Duras was consistently at the frontier of Plantagenet territory, or occupied by Valois forces, for most of the period concerned in this study. Indeed after Gaillard [II] de Durfort reneged on his submission to the French king, given after his capture at the nearby battle of Eymet in 1377, the castle and town were laid siege to and partly destroyed.⁵ Simultaneously the Durforts forfeited their castle and lordship of Blanquefort due to perceived disloyalty to the English crown, just as they had done at the beginning of the war.⁶ Although both times the lordship was regained, the lands around Blanquefort were dominated by the 'Palu' of Bordeaux, an area of marsh containing comparatively little suitable land for vines.⁷ Nevertheless, the Durforts succeeded in accumulating large wine surpluses for export, for example in late 1386, early 1387, the lord of Duras had a ship with 87 tuns of wine seized in London on the orders of Richard II, as a result of having previously neglected to pay the king his share of a third of the ransom from some Castilian prisoners.⁸ Whilst Gaillard (III) Durfort was seneschal of Gascony from 1399 to 1415 the scribe working on the constable's customs books noted in the margin where wine shipments originated with the seneschal. These indicate that in 1402–3, 108 tuns of the lord of Duras' wine were exported overseas, and 65½ tuns in 1409–10.⁹ Such large shipments came from a mixture of sources. That which paid only the custom (32% at the beginning

¹ TNA, E 30/306; SC 8/199/9909; GSR, C 61/104: 25; C 61/113: 12.

² GSR, C 61/97: 39, 94.

³ The associated figures for *Pays Rebelles* exports from this period are 107 tuns for 1379–80, 126 for 1380–1, 120 for 1387–8, 50 for 1388–9, and 130 tuns for 1389–90 (Appendix 3.1), for Florimont's 1380s shipment, see TNA, E 101/183/11, fol. 48v.

⁴ TNA, SC 8/166/8293.

⁵ Jean Froissart, *Chronicles*, MS Stonyhurst 1, fos 359v–361r, *TOF*.

⁶ Wright, 'The Accounts of John de Stratton and John Gedeney', p. 275.

⁷ Lavaud, *Bordeaux et le vin*, pp. 38–43.

⁸ TNA, C 54/227, m. 15. This close rolls entry is reproduced in full in *Documents sur la maison de Durfort*, pp. 766–7; it is also calendared in: *CCR*, 1385–1389, p. 212.

⁹ TNA, E 101/185/11, fos 10r, 11r, 13v, 16r, 16v, 20r, 20v, 23r, 24r, 29r, 33v, 44v, 53r; E 101/184/19, fos 17r, 33v, 36r, 37r, 49v, 55v, 62r, 62v, 74r.

of the decade) were probably from the tithes in Bègles, an extremely prolific wine producing area in which Gaillard (III) was heavily invested.¹ Some portion may have come from the estates at Duras and Blanquefort, as these had been re-occupied by the Durforts in this period and were being re-developed.² A substantial portion (47.2% in 1402–3) was bought from burgesses and is thus evidence for speculative trading in wine by a Gascon lord.

Another lordship closely linked with officers of the duchy was that of Landiras, based around the castle and parish of that name 22 miles (35 km) to the south-east of Bordeaux. From the late thirteenth century this was associated with the noble de Saint-Symphorien family, yet the Cheshire knight and retainer of the Black Prince, Sir John de Stratton, married the heiress to this lordship, Isabeau de Saint-Symphorien, to himself become lord of Landiras in the early 1360s.³ He established himself as an exporter of wine from these new estates, though evidently suffered considerably from the crises of the 1370s, as his shipments of 37½ tuns in 1372–3, fell precipitously to 20½ in 1374–5, and to just 8½ in 1378–9.⁴ This is almost certainly due to the advance of the French under the duke of Anjou – especially once the nearby towns of Saint-Macaire and Langon had been captured in 1377.⁵ Indeed it was reported by the *soudan* de la Trau in 1384 that much of the area had been deserted since that time for lack of security.⁶ Thereafter, as has been already discussed, Stratton established himself in Bordeaux itself and gained a great deal from the forfeiture of rebels during this tempestuous period.⁷ There he continued to export whilst constable, shipping 18 tuns in 1386, which given their tax status were probably either purchases from burgesses, or wine acquired in kind from his many revenues he received as patronage.⁸ After his death, Stratton's widow Isabeau, who had invested in the farm of both tithes and the *agrières* of some church lands in 1395, also from 1400 rented from the archbishop some large vineyards in Bègles and Cadaujac, just to the south of Bordeaux along the Garonne river, and also a cellar for the production and storage of their produce.⁹ Isabeau regularly exported surplus wine from these sources tax-free, such as the 13½ tuns shipped abroad in 1412–3, as did their daughter Marguerite de Stratton-Landiras (c.1370–1424/27), and grand-daughter Isabeau de Preissac-Landiras (1390–c.1437).¹⁰

The commercial behaviour of the secular lords was idiosyncratic, partly because their lands varied greatly in terms of aptitude for viticulture or security during periods of conflict, partly because seigneurial households were less stable and financially solvent institutions than say, a

¹ ADG, G 310, fol. 54r; *AHG*, VII, pp. 444–6, 457.

² Wright, 'The Accounts of John de Stratton and John Gedeney', p. 275.

³ Bailey, 'Les Châteaux de Landiras et de Montferrand—Part One', pp. 81–93, at pp. 81–3

⁴ TNA, E 101/602/3, fos 8v, 18r; E 101/180/2, fos 4v, 5r, 8r, 28v; E 101/182/6, fos 22r, 33v.

⁵ *Les grandes chroniques de France*, 12, pp. 188–92; Froissart, *Chronicles*, MS Stonyhurst 1, fos 358v–361r, *TOF*; Sumption, *Divided Houses*, pp. 301–4.

⁶ *GSR*, C 61/98: 23.

⁷ *AHG*, XVI, pp. 166–9; *GSR*, C 61/91: 105; C 61/107: 93.

⁸ TNA, E 101/183/11, fos 23v, 47v, 60v, 61r, 63r, 68v, 70v, 75r, 76v.

⁹ *AHG*, XXII, pp. 472, 596–7.

¹⁰ TNA, E 101/184/19, fol. 62v; E 101/185/7, fos 48r, 48v, 51r, 68r, 69v, 75r; E 101/188/14, fol. 2r; E 101/191/3, fos 29r, 44v, 67v; Bailey, 'Les Châteaux de Landiras et de Montferrand—Part One', pp. 81–93, at pp. 89.

church chapter. Furthermore the loyalty of these lords to the Plantagenet cause, discussed later in this study, no doubt impacted their export levels – joining the French would normally remove access to the wine staple at Bordeaux and thus most northern markets.




Figure 17 Aggregated wine exports of a sample of Gascon nobility (*capit de Buch*, lord of Albret, lord of Curton, lord of Duras, lord of Lalande/Brède, lord of Landiras, lord of Langoiran, lord of Lesparre, lord of Montferrand, lord of Mussidan, lord of Rauzan, *soudan de la Trau*), 1355–1449. **Source:** Appendix 4.2.1.

What is clear from the aggregated data for a sample of Anglo-Gascon lords (Figure 17), is their propensity to export greater quantities of wine around the earlier periods of adversity, particularly when military activity was prevalent in or near the duchy. This is seen clearest in 1355–6, 1372–3, 1374–5, 1402–3 and 1409–10, in stark contrast to the prevailing scale of overall exports. The explanation for this behaviour was probably a need to raise funds for warfare, and given the high prices on offer they may have been induced to sell rather than consume the surpluses of their estates, or indeed any others they managed to appropriate.

The trend of overall exports for this group is one of decline, with particularly low levels shipped in times of otherwise healthy exports, when they would be outcompeted by larger scale merchants. As Boutruche has emphasised, the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries saw a trend of impoverishment of the secular Gascon lords.¹ Their ever-diminishing stock of wealth would have contributed to a chronic lack of investment in the capital infrastructure required for large scale exports, especially since any surplus liquid capital would end up expended on matters military, or the support of their households. The only wine directly exported by these nobles in any quantity after the first decade of the fifteenth century was that also covered by the Bordeaux franchise, that produced by lords dependent on their status as *burgesses* for their very livelihoods.

¹ Boutruche, *La crise*, pp. 247–342, 351.

3.4 The burgesses of Aquitaine

3.4.1 Bordeaux

It is apparent that the city of Bordeaux had been favoured explicitly by crown policy over much of the last century of Plantagenet rule.¹ The consequences of 1353 statute in particular were profound, redirecting shipping to its port and strengthening the city's role as a centralised market for the exchange of goods. With these came a greater share of the duchy's capital investment in infrastructure: cranes; carts; barges and cellars; and also provided ancillary employment for local populace, not least for the coopers, whose manufacture and repair of barrels formed the most important secondary industry in the duchy.² Moreover, in forcing most of the deals struck in the wine trade to take place within the city's boundaries, it established a captured market for resident brokers who would commonly take a 2% cut on the value of transactions, and the notaries who might take anything up to a 5% fee to draw up a bill of sale.³

The chief beneficiaries were the political class. The commune was dominated by its burgesses, who, as we have seen, were an especially privileged urban elite numbering perhaps 7.5% of the taxable population. It is clear enough from the rising share of the overall exports under the 'Fr', (franchise) or 'Cust Iss b' (bought from burgess) tax categories that the wine from their property was increasingly dominant in overseas trade. The 1353 wine statute dramatically enhanced the former in particular during in the early 1350s, and then in certain difficult years in the later 1370s and 1430s their advantages allowed tax-free exports to comprise the majority of the export market.⁴ With their competitors diminished, these privileged producers and traders were left in a prime position to expand their activities more widely once prosperity returned.

The burgesses as a group could include as many as 250 families, yet Yves Renouard and his colleagues named a handful of patrician houses he viewed as being particularly politically influential, serving most often on the *jurade*, and councils of thirty or three-hundred. These he divided between 'old ancient great bourgeois families' and 'new managing bourgeoisie'. Among the old families, those he named were the houses of Soler, Colom, Béguey, Rostang, Toscanan, Lambert, Monadey and Caillau. These are those families that since the thirteenth century had risen to wealth and influence in the Bordelais and were by the mid-fourteenth century beginning to join, and to some extent, displace the lesser nobility. Not far behind were the new families, who rose to prominence in the fourteenth century, and would surpass them in the fifteenth century, the likes of the houses of Estebe, Constantin, deu Casse, Sans, Peytabin, and Gassies.⁵ Though on average across the period these fourteen key families represented only 3.2% of total exports, their political importance meant that their relative economic success or failure is of greater consequence and therefore worthy of closer scrutiny.

¹ See Chapter 2.1.2 and 2.2.1.

² Lavaud, *Bordeaux et le vin*, pp. 82–6.

³ *AHG*, XXII, pp. 336, 356, 416–7 [broker commissions]; ADG, G 2302, fos 77r, 92r [notary fees].

⁴ See Appendix 3.2 for overall exports by tax category.

⁵ *Bordeaux sous les rois d'Angleterre*, p. 436.

The merchant burgher families of Bordeaux were not necessarily family firms as we might understand it today. They were unlikely to have ever operated as unified companies. Without any surviving accounts books or other business records it is hard to reconstruct what kinship might have meant in business terms yet we can surmise that there was certainly some overlap in family members' businesses, either through formal partnerships in trading ventures or through the sharing of both fixed and circulating capital. On a merchant's death his reputation for good credit, trusted business contacts and commercial knowledge could not easily be passed on, but capital along with any accumulated property were inherited by the successive generations even if no formal commercial entity was passed on intact.¹

Among the oldest families of Bordeaux and those with the most conspicuous pasts were those of Soler and Colom. It was these two houses that had vied for power with such aggression in the later thirteenth century and early fourteenth centuries.² Lodge distinguished the two by stating that the former were more inclined towards accumulating property whereas the latter remained chiefly involved in the wine trade.³ This is not so clear by the mid-fourteenth century. They both exported around 30 tuns per year during the 1350s and the senior members of the Colom family had by then accrued considerable property, Sir Johan Colom, 'in the *Graves* of Bordeaux and the *Entre-Deux-Mers*' and his brother Sir Amaniu Colom 'in Bordeaux and the Bordelais'.⁴ These estates were held in variety of ways. Sir Johan for example was both a burgher of Bordeaux and a knight, and as such he held land within the suburbs of Bordeaux, and a lordship based around his castle, La Tour de Bessan, in Soussans, near Margaux in the southern Médoc. The latter he held as a direct fief from Edward III.⁵ Sir Johan was, in another capacity, a tenant of the archbishop, holding in 1370, along with his house in the city, some 40¾ *sados* of vineyards (8.42 modern acres or 3.4 hectares) of the archiepiscopal lands in the parishes of Port-Peyron and La Souys, on the right bank of the Garonne opposite Bordeaux, all for 18l 13s *bord.* (£3 15s sterling) cash rent per year.⁶ A little farther to the south-east along the river, Sir Johan held directly, through homage to the crown, the right to a fifteenth share of wine from a certain vineyard called 'Port de Mons' in the parish of Cenon, and a quarter and a fifteenth share of wine from certain vineyards called 'Seignerons' in the parish of Bouliac.⁷ All these holdings could yield wine for export, indeed there is evidence that this was increasing as the Colom shipped 47 tuns in 1374–5, despite all the problems of previous years.⁸

¹ For an example of such continuity of capital see the case of the Mekanams, see TNA, CP 40/800, rot. 182d.

² For details of this period see F.B. Marsh, *English Rule in Gascony, 1199–1295 - with special reference to the towns* (Ann Arbor, 1912), also see Lodge, *Gascony under English rule*, pp. 36–39, 43, 48, 51.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

⁴ TNA, E 101/167/16, no. 11; E 101/173/4, fos 17r, 29r, 30v, 56v, 60v, 77v [Soler]; E 101/167/16, nos 11, 28, 37; E 101/173/4, fos 13v, 22v, 28r, 35r, 37r, 37v, 57v, 59r, 74r, 84v [Colom]; *GSR*, C 61 94: 81. 'Graves' were banks of glacial gravel that drained well and so excellent for viticulture.

⁵ TNA, E 101/180/9, fos 60, 71v.

⁶ *AHG*, XXII, pp. 31–32, 39–40; *GSR*, C 61/110: 25. The *sado* was a measure of land of approximately 1000 square yards, see *Revised Medieval Latin Word-List: from British and Irish Sources*, (ed.) R.E. Latham (Oxford, 1965, repr. 2012), p. 420.

⁷ *GSR*, C 61 95: 107–8.

⁸ TNA, E 101/180/2, fos 6v, 7v, 8v, 12v, 13v, 15r, 17v, 18v, 28r, 38.

It is fortuitous that because Sir Johan was arrested in 1377 details of his wine business survive transcribed into the account book of the constable Richard Rotour.¹ The account for the twelve months from feast of St. Barnabas (11 June) 1378 states that the vineyards held within the suburbs of Bordeaux produced 12 tuns of claret wine which were sold at Michaelmas for 20 *livres* apiece to be shipped to 'English parts'. La Tour de Bessan also produced a surplus of 12 tuns of claret wine, sold for the same price, but with significant expenses listed which reveal the cost advantages of suburban holdings over rural fiefs. Along with the outlay of 4*l bord.* to purchase each empty tun barrel and 4*s bord.* each to transport these from Bordeaux via boats along the Gironde, once filled these were then carried by carriage overland back to Bordeaux for the cost of 12*s 6d bord.* per tun. Thus wine sales brought net revenues of 182*l 2s bord.* (£24 5*s 7d* sterling) after costs were deducted, 83.5% of total revenues that year.²

By contrast, the 1379 vintage at Bessan produced a surplus of just 6 tuns 1 pipe of wine. This almost 45.8% decline in yield on the previous year is but one qualitative example of how precarious medieval wine production could be, market forces acted to raise the price up to 37*l 10s bord.* per tun.³ The price of barrels precisely halved from 4*l* to 2*l* per tun, in line with the equivalent fall in the demand for them. The cost of transporting the empty barrels also fell, from 4*s* to 2*s 6d* each, as the demand for water transportation collapsed with the reduced harvest.⁴ The net revenues accrued from the sale of wine were in the end 224*l 5s bord.* (£29 18*s* sterling). This was more than in the previous year despite almost half the wine yield. The costs deducted amounted to just 8%, compared with 24.125% for the year before. This was an effective demonstration of how some could benefit from shifts in the market, though at the expense of others, noticeably in this case barrel makers and boatmen. Income from viticulture constituted 92% of the net revenues of Bessan for 1379–80, up from 83.5% the year before. Hence, in difficult years where the wine supply was squeezed and prices rose, the indications are that dependency on viticulture and the wine trade also increased, relative to staple food crops.

The ancient Bordelais family of Béguey experienced fluctuations of political and commercial fortunes that largely followed both those of the Colom. Their exports in the mid-fourteenth century were large and growing, from a still impressive 27 tuns in the year of the plague (1348–9) to 103½ tuns in 1355–6 and a huge 172½ tuns in 1356–7, the year encompassing the battle of Poitiers and its aftermath. The following season their shipments shrank a little but remained well above 100 tuns.⁵ By the early 1370s the exports of the family were dominated by Sir Galhart Béguey, the first knight to swear the oath to the Black Prince in the cathedral of Saint-

¹ TNA, E 101/180/9, fos 60, 71v.

² In addition, in 1378–9 the ducal authorities received 8 bushels of wheat, 13 bushels of rye and 9 bushel measures of firewood from the lands and serfs of La Tour de Bessan. This they sold wholesale for 30 *livres* [TNA, E 101/180/9, fol. 60r].

³ TNA, E 101/180/9, fol. 71v.

⁴ In contrast to the year before, the full barrels were then shipped back to Bordeaux by boat also at 2*s 6d* per tun; a fifth of the cost of overland transport one year previous.

⁵ TNA, E 101/167/16, nos 13, 15, 20, 22, 25, 28; E 101/173/4, fos 2v, 5r, 5v, 6v, 7r, 8v, 13v, 16r, 18r, 19r, 19v, 20r, 20v, 22r, 22v, 23v, 24v, 25r, 28v, 30r, 33r, 34v, 33v, 34r, 35r, 36v, 43v, 46r, 49v, 50r, 59v, 60v, 70v, 72v, 77r, 81r, 88v, 90v, 91r, 102r, 103r, 106r, 110r, 110v, 112r, 112v, 113r, 116r, 119r, 125v 126r.

André in 1363 who later fought with distinction in Spain.¹ In 1372–3, despite the evolving crises of the decade, Sir Galhart succeeded in exporting some 82 tuns from the port at Bordeaux, though by 1374–5 this had more than halved to just 30½ tuns.² Sir Galhart held a vineyard in the parish of Bègles to the south of the city, probably a *censive* associated with the large house in which he inhabited in Bordeaux, and a great swathe of vineyards just to the north of Bordeaux in Saint-Médard-en-Jalles and the surrounding areas of Corbiac and Hastignan. These he held directly of the English king for a rent of 8*l bord.* per annum. In addition, he possessed the right to levy the tithe on wines of the nearby lordship of Blanquefort.³ The most comprehensive breakdown of Sir Galhart's wine business is that which survives for the twelve months following July 1377. In total, of wines that were worth 1,050*l 10s bord.* after vinification, net profits from wine sales amounted to 702*l 2s bord.* (£93 12*s 3d* sterling) for that vintage.⁴ Costs amounted to 33.2% that year, mostly for transportation, just in order to bring wine to market from parishes less than 10 miles (15 km) from Bordeaux's boundaries. Further revenues were raised in 1377–8 from cash rents normally accrued by Sir Galhart Béguey, some 17*l 10s bord.* from the aforementioned properties in Saint-Médard-en-Jalles and 60*l* from lands and tenements he held in the city of Bordeaux itself. This meant that just over 93% of all revenues from Sir Galhart's holdings came from wine sales.

Though the remaining five 'old' families lack the equivalent surviving documentation regarding their estates, there is abundant evidence for their exports. Those of the houses of Rostang and Caillau broadly rose across the last one hundred years of Plantagenet rule. The Lambert started high at perhaps 50 tuns per annum, then declined during the crises of the 1370s except for a boom year in 1378–9, then gradually recovered in the fifteenth century.⁵ The fortunes of the House of Monadey were likewise good in the 1350s, particularly its then most senior member Sir Arnaut who exported altogether close to 100 tuns in 1356–7, and yet again their fortunes appeared diminished in the early to mid-1370s. Recovery in 1378–9 was strong and then a very substantial 125½ tuns were exported in 1385–6. Their exports collapsed with the Lancastrian succession and for the remainder of Plantagenet were minimal.

The houses of Constantin, Gassies (Gassias), Estebe, Sans, Peytabin, and deu Casse, were comparatively new among the patrician families ruling Bordeaux, mostly coming to the fore in the fourteenth century, and continuing to grow in wealth and prestige into the fifteenth.⁶ The Constantin were amongst the most consistently involved in the wine trade. They followed the trajectory of total exports closely and exported over one hundred tuns in 1357, but slumped in the difficult 1370s before consistently finding export growth until the end of Plantagenet rule. Their best year was the last season on record, 1448–9, when they shipped a colossal 193¾ tuns. Their

¹ *CGD*, 1, pp. 86–121, at p. 88 (no. CXCII); Jean Froissart, *The Chronicles of Froissart*, (ed.) G.C. Macaulay (London, 1904), p. 176.

² TNA, E 101/602/3, fos 2r, 7r, 9r, 19r, 22v, 22v, 24v, 27v, 33v, 38r, 42v; E 101/180/2, fos 17v, 18r, 18v, 24r, 25v, 31v, 41v.

³ TNA, E 101/180/9, fos 19v, 38r, 44v, 45r; 72v.

⁴ TNA, E 101/180/9, fos 44v–45r.

⁵ See Appendix 4.3.1.

⁶ *Ibid.*

business interests were well spread, around half their stock came from their own vineyards, the rest bought from other burgesses and in later years, all over Gascony. They also regularly appear across the period in custody of wine entering England, mostly carried by English ships. This occurred particularly during the stronger trading periods of the 1360s and 1390s, and continued in partnership with other Gascon merchants into the fifteenth century, peaking in May 1416 with the 75 tuns that Bernard Constantin and his company unloaded at the port of London.¹ Equally prosperous were the Gassies family, whose exports followed a similar path, though they were to particularly thrive around 1409–10 and 1412–3, with exports at around 200 tuns per annum, two-thirds of which was bought from other burgesses. A key shipper Johan Gassies later served as one of Bordeaux's *jurats*, the city's most senior magistrates.² The family struggled comparatively in the subsequent decade but, like the Constantin, experienced a resurgence in the final years of Plantagenet rule. Members of this house too sold directly into England themselves, particularly in the later period. The same (or perhaps a namesake) Johan Gassias led partnerships of Gascon merchants shipping significant quantities on English ships into London and Hull, such as he did in 1437 and 1438.³

The houses of Estebe and Sans did not really make any great impact in international trade until the 1370s but then steadily increased their exports. Expanding that produced under the franchise at a similar rate, suggesting they had been acquiring more wine-bearing property of their own. The House of Peytabin, whose name suggests were descendants of immigrants from Poitou, enjoyed a surge of exports in the end of the fourteenth century, especially through buying and selling other wine, and with the profit, investing in land. Though they too imported some wine into England, they differed from the above four new families because after the first decade of the fifteenth century their involvement gradually tailed off, and was reduced to nothing by the end of the English period.⁴

The overseas trade interests of the deu Casse family in the mid-fourteenth century were considerable though they fluctuated spectacularly. In the peak years of 1355–6, 256 tuns, and 1357–8, 344½ tuns of their stock left Bordeaux port per annum, most in the name of Reymund deu Casse. Yet in the intervening year, the period which covered the battle of Poitiers and the Black Prince's residence in Bordeaux, their shipments plummeted to fewer than 50 tuns, suggesting they probably supplied the Prince's household and army at high prices. This family were, all told, the largest direct importers into England among Bordeaux patricians of their time. The records of the new custom offer a certain view this business. Between April 1351 and November 1365, 1021½ tuns of wine, mostly belonging to Reymund, arrived in the kingdom.⁵ Over half were shipped into

¹ TNA, E 101/80/15, m. 3; E 101/80/25, mm. 1, 4; E 101/81/8, mm. 3, 8, 9.

² *RJ*, II, p. 503.

³ TNA, E 101/81/1, m. 1; E 101/81/15, m. 1.

⁴ See Appendix 4.3.1.

⁵ TNA, E 101/80/3, mm. 1–2; E 101/80/6, m. 1; E 101/80/9, mm. 1–3; E 101/80/11, mm. 1–3; E 101/80/12, mm. 1–2; E 101/80/15, mm. 1, 3; E 101/80/16, m. 2; E 101/80/17, m. 1; E 101/81/8, m. 8. 28.5% of the volume shipped by deu Casses were undertaken as partnerships, the remainder were handled as a sole trader. 568 tuns of the total (55.6%) arrived in London, in keeping with the habit most of alien wine merchants who

London, where they would benefit from the established Gascon expatriate community and more reliable protections given by the crown. By the 1370s almost all of their exports were from their own property, which suggests that they had shifted from what had been a trading business into primarily one defined by production from their own expanding lands. Perhaps as a result of this ascendancy into landholding, the family's international trade interests dropped to only a handful of tuns per annum after the 1380s.¹

The trends in wine export levels for the old and new families mirror the shifts in their respective political importance. The exports of the old families appear to drop away across the period whilst those of the new families rise (Figures 18(a) and 18(b)). It is tempting to equate volume of exports with political position. Given the role of the Bordeaux's political councils as quasi-guilds protective of the commercial self-interest of its members, as suggested by Lodge and Vale, we can speculate as to the link between seniority in trade and influence.² The aggregate totals for both sets' exports follow each other remarkably closely across the available customs books. The only major divergences in year-on-year export trajectory occurred in the 1350s. The new families had significantly lower exports in 1356–7, than the old, but then this increased dramatically the following year. The best explanation is that the new families of our sample were the very merchants whom supplied the army of the Black Prince during and after the battle of Poitiers (1356), and then enthusiastically loaded wine onto the large fleet returning to England in 1357. This commercial partnership contributed, to a large degree, to their wealth and lasting ties with England.



After Brétigny, fluctuations in both subsets follow each other, though new families made on average faster recoveries from downturns, such as in 1378–9 or 1409–10, perhaps because closer links to active commerce than propertied wealth left them with better access to liquid capital unaffected by the tribulations of invasions. As we would expect from their ancient pedigree, the old families began with a majority of the exports from their own lands, that covered by the franchise. The new families by contrast, only began with a small proportion franchised, instead they were much more closely involved in buying from outside Bordeaux or trading in the stock of other burgesses. But their franchised proportion increased over time, in keeping with Lavaud's assertion that it was long-term aim of most burgesses to acquire land and live off of its revenues.³

frequented the capital. Of the remainder 180½ tuns (17.7%) arrived into Sandwich, 121½ tuns (11.9%) in Hull, 110 tuns (10.8%) in Boston, and just 36½ (3.6%) were shipped to Bristol, in the west of the country. 60.2% of *deu Casse* stock was carried in English holds, while 37.5% of stock was carried in Gascon holds, just 2.3% using a Breton carrier. The home ports of the English ships were spread around the south and east coasts. The largest contributor in terms of number of ships and tonnage was unsurprisingly Dartmouth.

¹ See Appendix 4.3.1.


² Lodge, *Gascony under English Rule*, pp. 152–3; Vale, *English Gascony*, p. 25.

³ S. Lavaud, 'Les marchands et le vin à Bordeaux (XIIIe– début XVIe siècle): des destins liés', *Nouveau bulletin de la Société internationale des amis de Montaigne*, 4 (2008), pp. 209–27, at pp. 224–5.




Figures 18(a) and (b) Aggregated wine exports of (a) old and (b) new Bordeaux bourgeois families sample, 1348–1449. **Note:** Old families are Béguey, Caillau, Colom, Lambert, Monadey, Rostang, Soler, and Toscanan, new families are Constantin, deu Casse, Estebe, Gassies, Peytabin and Sans. **Source:** Appendix 4.3.1.

(a) Aggregated total



(b) Share of aggregated total by tax category



Figures 19 (a) Aggregated wine exports of the sample of old and new Bordeaux Burgess families, and (b) Share of aggregated total by tax category, 1348-1449. **Note:** families included are the Béguey, Caillau, Colom, Constantin, deu Casse, Estebe, Gassies, Lambert, Monadey, Peytabin, Rostang, Sans, Soler, and Toscanan. **Source:** Appendix 4.3.1.

The rise in the proportion of franchised wine exported in years with high export prices, in 1356–7, 1374–5, 1378–9, and 1409–10, for example, is highly indicative of the efficacy of commercial privileges. This is true both of the sample of families and franchised wine as a whole. Wine without tax exemptions, or sourced at higher cost from farther afield than the suburbs of Bordeaux, were naturally excluded from the market by the effect of high price elasticity of demand. In better times there was a greater propensity to buy in wine from elsewhere before the crises of the 1370s, but after were as likely to speculate in the stock of their fellow burgesses. Then in the final decades of Plantagenet rule this domestic market in Bordeaux was squeezed by a worsening liquidity crisis that further encouraged the dominance of burgesses' franchised property in exports. An exception was the last visible year, 1448–9, when lower prices allowed wine from farther afield to be exported in greater quantities. By the end of Plantagenet rule, the spread of tax status is indistinguishable between the exports of old and new families, which suggest that they had, to all intents and purposes, merged as a group. Taken as whole, these most important burgesses of Bordeaux held remarkably strong export levels across the period concerned in the face of an overall decline in trade, at least as far as the aggregated total of this sample can show. They are not as obviously augmented as those of the church, nor declining like those secular lords examined, though certainly would have constituted an increasing proportion of overall exports.

This growing share was likely also more profitable, for, much like the Bordeaux church, the seasonal interactions of these burgesses with the market also shifted to make better use of their economic privileges. Over the period 1348–86, 30.7% of the stock shipped by our sample of families left during the period of higher prices before December, in 1402–49 this had risen to 52%.¹ By contrast the remaining wine exports of the secular lords who were eligible to use the protected sales periods were being gradually excluded. 19.6% of their wine was exported before December over 1348–86, but only 14.7% over 1402–49.²

Surplus profits, where not re-invested in wine-trading were, as Vale pointed out, not allowed to sit idle.³ There were speculative investment opportunities in aforementioned farms of tithes and *agrières*.⁴ Some of those accumulated by the wealthiest burgesses were also invested in public debt. This is particularly visible for the 1420–1 loan advanced to the ducal government, as the 157 contributors are listed among the registers of the *jurade*.⁵ Of the 3,184l 14s *bord.* (£318 9s sterling) outstanding, individuals lent a median of 7l 10s (15s sterling) but a mean of 20l 5s 8d *bord.* (£2 6d sterling), revealing a definite skew towards the larger lenders. Indeed the top decile of lenders (10%) held 55.4% of debt and the top quartile of lenders (25%) held 78.6%. Wine exporters dominated. The top two lenders were both members of the extended Gassies family named Johan, one being the aforementioned *jurat*. They lent 200 francs (£25 sterling) and 180 francs (£22 10s sterling) respectively. The conditions of the loan are not known - though it does not appear to have

¹ This is based on 1,697 consignments of wine shipped over these two periods, see Appendix 4.3.2.

² See Appendix 4.2.2.

³ Vale, *English Gascony*, pp. 22–3.

⁴ See Chapter 3.3.1 and Appendix 8.6.

⁵ *RJ*, II, pp. 624–31.

been forced - so we can only speculate as to any usurious interest or other advantage which might have benefited the crown's creditors. Yet, these were Bordeaux's richest residents, who were usually repaid via indirect taxes on foreign goods, the greater burden of which fell on the broader populace.¹ The total effect was highly regressive, and this was well understood at the time. It was argued at parliament in 1429, that the 5% duty, charged since 1415 on all foreign goods sold in Bordeaux, was, 'only used for the profit of the mayor of the said city and of certain of its jurats, at their pleasure'.²

There was clearly also a tendency for burgesses to reinvest their profits from the wine trade in land. These acquisitions took the form of, in some cases, parcels of allodial property or fiefs, but most were *censives*, heritable and alienable tenancies, held from one of the major Anglo-Gascon lords.³ These would either be operated directly themselves or leased on to 'laboradors de vinhas' for cash or wine rents. Beyond the draws of property for social or political status were underlying economic motivations, which were enhanced because successful exporters were the few in Gascony with ready cash.⁴ Even the best vine-bearing land was getting cheaper thanks to a scarcity of tenants, a glut of available property, and at times, a shrinking money supply. The repeated sale of a single small *censive* in the *Graves* outside the walls of Bordeaux called 'Au Vivey' illustrates this well (Figure 20 - opposite).⁵

Those with capital to invest would have also enjoyed increasing nominal returns on their investments after the 1380s thanks to a Plantagenet monetary policy that inflated the nominal profits generated by wine sales. Vineyard land was particularly attractive in 1396 and 1410, whereas 1384 and 1413 were years when the purchase of this asset could be considered more risky due to higher property prices. In the period between the latter and 1436, the return increased dramatically to the point where an investor willing to risk capital could expect to recoup his investment after just one year. This was lucrative enough to more than make up for declining capital value of the tenancy. The periods of highest returns were those that Boutruche observed as the highest level of replanting of vines in the Bordelais.⁶

¹ See Chapter 3.1.1. When not repaid with the duty on foreign goods sold in Bordeaux, the commune's debts were repaid with other local sales taxes, such as that on the sale of grain. For example, see *RJ*, I, p. 86.

² 'Henry VI: September 1429', item 29, in *PROME, BHO*.

³ For analysis of types of holdings, see Lodge, 'The Estates of the Archbishop', pp. 49–81, 131–55.

⁴ Boutruche discussed this in *La crise*, pp. 312–3.

⁵ This plot of vines covering 47 *règes* (4,042 square metres, 0.4 hectares, 1 acre) was transferred seven times between burgess proprietors during the period (noted in Boutruche, *La crise*, pp. 319–20). Assuming estimated wine yields were as calculated by Porcher [K. Porcher, 'De la vigne au chai: viticulture et vinification en Bordelais après la guerre de Cent Ans (vers 1450 – vers 1480)', unpublished PhD thesis, Université de La Rochelle (2011), pp. 95, 291] and the prices in Appendix 8.1.1, together give the output. Production costs probably constituted around 65% of the unit sale price, as per Boutruche (*La crise*, p. 151). The rent paid to the lord remained stable as a large *agrières* of $\frac{1}{3}$ share of output. The remaining revenues as a percentage of the sum invested give the return on investment (ROI) of the tenant.

⁶ Boutruche, *La crise*, pp. 179–91, 201–9, 215–31, 402–5.




Figure 20 Price of a 1 acre (0.4 hectare) vineyard *censive* in the Graves of Bordeaux and return on investment (ROI) at point of sale, 1384–1452. **Source:** Appendix 8.5.

An increasingly profitable use of a narrowing stock of capital among the bourgeois wine-growers at least partly explains their incremental social and economic rise relative to their landlords, whom would gain only a diminishing cash *censive* or fractional *agrières* as a share of this productivity. Returns on capital in pre-industrial agricultural economies, as Picketty recently emphasised, usually averaged 4–5% per annum.¹ Indeed, Boutruche himself commented that seigneurial landholdings in the Bordelais tended to return 1 *sou* for every *livre* of capital.² Even with rising labour costs, returns on vineyard tenancies producing wine as a cash crop were many times greater than this. This further explains the aforementioned seigneurial preference for wine bearing *agrières* or tithes, as at least they would take a share of rising returns.

This is not to say that the problems faced by the lords meant that the trend was towards generalised equality. These dynamics of debt and property investment, along with the exports which antedated them, were actually indicative of, and themselves contributed to, rising wealth inequality among the Bordelais. The best vineyard land was concentrated into the hands of the few successful mercantile families with the capital to invest in periods of low property prices. They were in turn able to enjoy the ever higher returns even as the economy shrank, growing their wine exports relative to the total into the fifteenth century, and in doing so ever increasing their share of the Anglo-Gascon economy.

¹ T. Picketty, *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*, (trns.) A. Goldhammer (2014, repr. London, 2017), pp. 65–70.

² Boutruche, *La crise*, pp. 76–7

For just some of the city's burgesses, despite all the problems in the late medieval duchy, this was a time of opportunity. The Makanams are an excellent illustrative example. This family, of probable English origins, shipped more wine in 1402–3 than the entire sample of key old and new patrician families combined.¹ In 1409–10, Richard [I] Makanam (c.1365–c.1428) alone exported 405½ tuns, just over 3% of the market, a greater export share than the church as a whole.² The customs books record seven members of the family across three generations with interests in the trade over the first half of the fifteenth century.³ Each generation in succession invested increasingly in land and the proportion of their exports covered by the franchise increased exponentially.⁴ Then the family made the final leap from the ranks of wealthy bourgeois to landed nobility after the French conquest. Though some members of the house incurred suspicion for having fled into exile in England, of the younger grandsons of Richard [I], Gadifer became seigneur d'Angludet, and Estienne Makanam (1435–1502) was made seigneur de la Salle de Bruges en Médoc.⁵ Both founded dynasties that established political influence in Valois Aquitaine.⁶

¹ Between 5 November 1402 and 12 April 1403, Richard [I] and Arnaut [I] Makanam shipped 365½ tuns whereas the all the members of the main sample of families exported just 225½ tuns in total, TNA, E 101/185/11. Meaudre de Lapouyade declared confidently that: 'the Makanams are from English stock'. The evidence he provided for this claim was two-fold: firstly orthological, suggesting that their name, not being Gascon, was probably originally Scottish 'Mac Anam'; secondly that in 1456 it was stated in the court of the *Grand jours de Bordeaux* that the family originated from London, see Meaudre de Lapouyade, *Les Makanam*, pp. 9–10.

² Richard [I] Makanam was indispensable as a facilitator of seigneurial exports. In March 1403 he shipped 34 tuns of wine of the seneschal Gaillard [III] Durfort, lord of Duras, on an English ship, *La Maria de Bampton*, TNA, E 101/185/11, fol. 53r.

³ TNA, E 101/185/11, fos 1r–2v, 5v, 7r, 9r, 14r, 15r, 22v, 23v, 25r, 27v, 32v, 35r–36v, 37v, 41v, 45r, 46r, 48r, 49r, 50r, 50v, 51v, 52r, 53r, 53v, 54r, 55r, 57r, 61r, 62r–64r; E 101/184/19, fos 2v, 3v, 4r, 5v, 7r, 9v, 12v, 12r, 15v, 17v, 20r, 23r, 31v, 32r, 36r, 38r, 39r, 41v, 44v, 48r, 50r, 51v, 54r, 55r, 55v, 58v, 59r, 59v, 61r, 61v, 64v, 66r, 68v, 69v, 70r, 72v–73v, 74v, 75r; E 101/185/7, fos 5v, 8r, 8v, 14r, 14v, 16v, 20r, 21r, 22v, 25v, 26r, 26v, 31r, 35r, 45r, 46v, 52r, 55r–56r, 59r, 64v, 69v, 71v, 81v; E 101/185/9, fol. 11r; E 101/188/14, fol. 5r; E 101/191/3, fos 19r, 22v, 26v, 27r, 28r, 29r, 43r, 47v, 48r, 50r, 52v, 54r, 67r, 67v, 70v; E 101/192/1, fos 1r, 12v, 25r, 29r–30r, 34v, 36r, 38r, 48v, 53r, 54v, 57r, 57v; E 101/194/3, fos 13r, 16r, 16v, 26v, 53v; E 101/195/19, fos 1r, 1v, 2v, 4r, 5r, 15v, 43v, 44r, 49r, 53v, 58v, 59v, 74v, 76r.

⁴ Richard's [I] heirs were his sons Pey (1390–c.1446) and Arnaut [II] (c.1390–?); and grandsons Richard [III] (1425–?) and Baudinot (c.1430–?). Genealogical details are taken from Meaudre de Lapouyade, *Les Makanam*, pp. 19–39. For the years for which we have records, Richard [I] increasingly exported wine tax-free from the yields of his own holdings: 2.26% in 1402–3; 5.30% in 1409–10; 13.7% in 1412–3. 57% of the wine his son Pey shipped was covered by the Bordeaux franchise and by the later careers of Richard [III] and Baudinot almost all exports were produced from Makanam land.

⁵ *AHG*, IX, pp. 274, 286, 290, 294, 338, 500, 509; James, *Studies*, p. 85; Boutruche, *La Crise*, p. 135; Meaudre de Lapouyade, *Les Makanam*, pp. 11, 37–9.

⁶ *Documents inédits concernant la Guyenne*, (ed.) le Conte de Saint-Saud (Bordeaux, 1895), pp. 24–7; *Revue de Béarn Navarre et Lannes: partie historique de la revue des Basses-Pyrénées et des Landes*, 2 (Paris, 1888), pp. 132, fn. 2, 241, 244, fn. 1.

3.4.2 Other Bordelais towns

Though Bordeaux's paternal relationship within the confederation of the large communes in the Bordelais has been emphasized since the sixteenth century, in fact the so-called *filles* were also commercial competitors.¹ Libourne, Bourg and Blaye were a particular threat for they had harbours with easy access to the Gironde estuary, which nearby Saint-Émilion and Castillon could use. Cadillac, Rions and Saint-Macaire, by contrast, had their path to the sea along the Garonne blocked by Bordeaux itself and so had to re-export from there. The burgesses of all these towns constituted the elites who controlled municipal government albeit with less confidence than the capital, many had significant vested interests in the wine trade and with them the bonds with England. They held plots of vines in the suburbs and traded in wine, but this was increasingly at risk from the dominance of Bordeaux. Of particular concern was the requirement that English merchants and ships only trade in and transport wine from the capital between 1353 and 1445. The city's gains were these other towns' loss. The capital investment in infrastructure required for servicing, loading, or unloading large numbers of ships: wharfs, cranes, barges, amenities for wine storage, for example, were lost. This led to a general decline of their wider urban economies as the many jobs and business opportunities that went with such facilities were no longer required. Moreover, the absence of high numbers of transactions between wine merchants deprived a town's brokers and notaries their lucrative fees. Quite simply the loss from a region, specialised in viticulture, of the right of direct access to the wine trade could only erode its general prosperity. The elites of Bourg described this very process in their petition of the 1370s, citing how the impact was 'such that they can barely live or sustain their poor estate'.²

No town suffered more than Libourne. The town's exports had declined precipitously, from almost 10,000 tuns at the start of the fourteenth century to only 83½ tuns by mid-century (Table 6 - overleaf). It is true that war and plague struck the region in the intervening years – with this town's position north of the Dordogne, its vineyards were particularly exposed to despoilment by enemy forces after 1337 – but even so this doesn't entirely account for the fall from 10.6% of total Gascon exports to a mere 0.3% share. The imposition of disadvantageous trade rules contributed greatly to the loss of business by diverting the bulk of the wine trade from Dordogne region to the capital, such is clear from the aforementioned 1357–8 customs book.³ Despite such indignities, activity in the port achieved a spectacular recovery during the years of the treaty of Brétigny (1360–9), it reached over half its former levels. Statute law governing English merchants and ships still applied so this export growth was thanks to the arrival of non-English traders: Flemish, Breton, and for a brief period also Castilian.

¹ Gabriel de Lurbe, *Chronique bordelaise*, fol. 31v; this view was perpetuated by Lodge, *Gascony under English Rule*, pp. 110, 158–9, 161.

² TNA, SC 8/290/14462, GSR, C 61/90: 17; AHG, XVI, pp. 60–1.

³ TNA, E 101/173/4, fos 65v–91r, 93v, 94v–128v; totals on fos 128v–129r. Also see Chapter 2.1.1 for the implications of the 1353 statute for the Dordogne wine trade.

Table 6 Wine exports from the port at Libourne, 1306–1449.

Year	Exports (tuns)	Year	Exports (tuns)
1306–7	9,941	1375–6	313.5
1308–9	9,126	1376–7	175
1357–8	83.5	1379–80	183
1363–4	1,822	1380–1	263
1365	4,581	1400–1	450.25
1366	6,043	1409–10	56
1367	6,787	1412–3	264
1369	5,099	1418–9	81
1370	423	1422–3	105
1372–3	129.5	1435–6	14
1374–5	46.5	1448–9	124

Source: *CGD*, 1, pp. 134–7 (no. CCXXIII); TNA, E 36/80, fos. 403–4; E 101/173/4, fos 128v–129r; E 101/180/2, fol. 43r; E 101/180/9, fol. 7; E 101/180/9, fol. 26; E 101/182/9, fol. 14v; E 101/602/3, fol. 48r; E 101/691/3; James, *Studies*, pp. 32–3, 55–6.¹

The work of Wendy Childs has shown how in this period great numbers of Spanish ships visited Gascony, including some 69 vessels during 1360–61, and these carried the local wine on northwards, some of which arrived in England.² Although this only formed, at its peak, less than a third of all alien merchant imports into the kingdom, it was momentarily a solution to the 1353 rules for the port of Libourne. Alas civil war in Castile and then the victory of Henry of Trastámara, a partisan for the kings of France, soon diverted these Spanish ships from the town also. By the 1370s the only vessels known to visit were those from Bayonne or from Flanders, notably Sluys (L'Écluse).³ Export volumes shrank as even local wine needed to go to Bordeaux to be shipped.⁴ Libourne's port never again handled more than 500 tuns a year, even in periods of relative peace such as 1400–1. It is for this year that we know most about the remaining wine trade in Libourne as there survives a small booklet, previously unstudied, written up by the controllers of customs in the town to catalogue exports.⁵ This document confirms that the Libournais honoured the Bordeaux burgesses' monopoly, as their first exports left the port on 24 November 1400, thirteen days after Martinmas. Between then and until 17 May 1401, 450¼ tuns were shipped overseas, delivered to the quayside by 32 different exporters. Over 60% of this was brought by only seven individuals, which indicates that the trade was concentrated in the hands of a small commercial elite. Furthermore, 23.8% passed customs in the custody of 'factors' or other agents on behalf of their real owners, which at least suggests that the wine still came from farther afield than the town's environs. This can be known shown for sure in a couple of cases. On 7 January 1401, 15

¹ It should be noted that Elspeth Veale, in editing Margery James's work after her death, optimistically believed that Libourne's exports in the fifteenth century were obscured on account of the town's customs revenues being granted out by the king, see note in James, *Studies*, p. 55. There is no evidence for this – rather the much reduced compounded Libourne custom represented the sum of fifteenth century exports.

² Childs, *Anglo-Castilian Trade*, pp. 130–1.

³ TNA, E 101/602/3, fol. 48r; E 101/180/2, fol. 43r.

⁴ TNA, E 101/183/11, fos 30v, 41r.

⁵ TNA, E 101/691/3.

tuns were exported on behalf of the bastide of Gensac, 28.3 km (17.6 miles) away to the east.¹ Also three separate shipments split between November, January and May totalling some 39½ tuns arrived in the hands of Arnaud Guilhem, a factor from the parish of Teuillac, 30 km (18.6 miles) to the north west, actually within the commune of Bourg.²

It is true that the pronounced decline in Libourne's fortunes might more commonly be attributed to the impact of war. The town's vineyards were less protected and suffered more from protracted military incursions by the French and routier activity than did those around Bordeaux, as occurred in 1377 with the devastating campaign of Louis, duke of Anjou. In that year the French advanced through the Libournais, *Entre-Deux-Mers*, and parts of the Bordelais itself.³ Many parishes held by the archbishop of Bordeaux, most of which were to the north of the Dordogne, returned no rents for that year, with the explanation 'deserta est et non computatur' inscribed in the margins of his estate accounts.⁴ The town itself was considered at risk of siege, since the frontier was often close. This is well expressed in a letter to the Bordeaux *jurade*, the municipal council, in July 1406, which shows apprehension of another forthcoming French invasion.⁵ It was to prove prescient for the vulnerability of Libourne's wine trade was re-affirmed later that year with the great offensive of Louis, duke of Orléans, a campaign which culminated in a large hostile army laying siege to nearby Bourg.⁶ The duke's campaign was ultimately unsuccessful, nevertheless by 1409–10 the exports from the port at Libourne had shrunk again 86% to just 56 tuns.

Commercial activity would fluctuate in much this fashion for the remainder of Plantagenet rule. Periods of relative peace brought a few more barrels to be carried by non-English ships, but in general even wine from nearby was drawn towards Bordeaux.⁷ At times the producers of smaller towns appeared to actively avoid Libourne. In 1409, high-ranking residents of the town of Saint-Émilion, just 7.5 km (4.7 miles) to the east, instead appear in the Bordeaux customs books using their right of the franchise to export wine tax-free from the capital.⁸ Likewise, in the autumn of 1412 even the mayor of Bourg was required to export his meagre shipments of 1½ tuns via Bordeaux, on which he had to pay the maximum 30s *bord.* per tun duty.⁹

The problems facing Saint-Macaire, 40 km (24.5 miles) to the south-east of Bordeaux, were in some ways similar to those to the north. The town marked the border of the Bordelais with the Bazadais and as such was often on the front line in the war. Yet, set as it was on the north bank of the Gironde River, any prospect of the considerable quantities of wine produced nearby entering international markets would inevitably involve passing by the capital. Therefore political wrangling

¹ TNA, E 101/691/3, fol. 1.

² TNA, E 101/691/3, fos 1r, 1v, 2v; *AHG*, XXI, pp. 573, 644; XXII, 20, 129, 171, 243.

³ 'Petite chronique de Guyenne', pp. 53–79, at p. 63; *Chronique et coutumes de Bazas*, p. 48; *Les Grandes chroniques de France*, 12, pp. 187–9.

⁴ *AHG*, XXII, pp. 300–2. The parishes concerned were Saint-Georges-de-Guestas, Saint Médard-de-Guizières, Puynormand, Saint-Pierre-d'Absac, Saint-Pierre-de-Gours de Saint-Seurin, Chacusac et de Chamadelle, Tizac, Saint-Pierre-de-Stella, Porchceres, Coutras, La Gorse, Saint-Vivien-d'Orfossa.

⁵ *RJ*, I, p. 92.

⁶ Pépin, 'The French Offensives of 1404–1407', pp. 1–40, at pp. 17–27.

⁷ TNA, E 101/191/3, fol. 66r.

⁸ TNA, E 101/184/19, fos 34v, 49v.

⁹ TNA, E 101/185/7, fol. 18v.

over embarkation was of perhaps less consequence. Instead the burgesses of the town gained the right in 1348 to export tax-exempt all wine grown within one league, as if they were burgesses of Bordeaux. They quickly made good use of their privileges. The majority of the over 150 tuns exported during the plague year were tax-exempt.¹ Yet, even though exports from Saint-Macaire increased progressively over the 1350s, their franchised wine decreased in volume overall, to be increasingly replaced by wine bought from them by burgesses of Bordeaux, and then exported or sold on to English merchants for their own profit (Figure 21).²



Figure 21 Wine exports of the castellan and burgesses of Saint-Macaire, 1348–75.
Source: Appendix 4.4.1.

With the town's overseas trade largely taken over by their rivals downstream, its economic fortunes survived the resumption of warfare in 1369 remarkably intact. Even after the lord of Albret captured Bazas in 1370, just 15 km (9 miles) to the south, by 1372–3 Saint-Macaire's exports remained very close to what they had been 16 years earlier.³ It was only with the advance to the gates of the town by the duke of Anjou during mid-to-late September 1374 that the wine trade in this region collapsed to a fraction of its previous size.⁴

Throughout this period the close connection between the most senior political figures in the town and the overseas wine trade are the clearest to see anywhere outside of Bordeaux. A considerable number of burgesses from Saint-Macaire whom featured as major exporters in the

¹ TNA, E 101/167/16, nos 10–15, 17–19, 21, 23, 28.

² TNA, E 101/173/4, fos 12v, 13r, 15r, 20r, 20v, 23r, 29v, 31v, 33v, 34v, 36v, 42r, 62v, 66r, 69v, 71r, 74v, 75r, 78r, 89r, 90r, 93v, 94r, 95v, 96v, 97r, 97v, 98r, 99v, 100r, 100v, 101r, 112v, 113v, 116v, 118v, 119r, 122v, 124r, 126r, 126v.

³ 'Petite chronique de Guyenne', pp. 53–79, at p. 63; also see Sumption, *Divided Houses*, pp. 51–2; TNA, E 101/602/3, fos 12r, 16r, 17r, 23r, 27r, 39r, 39v, 42r, 43r.

⁴ Sumption, *Divided Houses*, pp. 205–6; TNA, E 101/180/2, fos 5v, 7r, 14r, 24r, 26v, 29r, 31v, 36v, 41v.

customs books also served as its elected officials, procurators and *jurats*, and moreover swore the oath of fealty to the Black Prince in the cathedral of Saint-André in 1363.¹ The *jurat* Bonafos de Cahors exported large quantities throughout the 1350s and into the 1370s, including a noteworthy 56½ tuns in November 1355, all entirely tax-free under the franchise.² His three other fellow *jurats* Guiraud Aiquem, Guiraud Vigoros and Guillem de Lator also exported over the same period, albeit in slightly smaller quantities.³ The procurators Vidal Pinel, Bertran Duport and Guillem Seguin, also feature in the Bordeaux customs books across these years shipping tax-free wine overseas, and took the oath.⁴

Exports from Saint-Macaire disappeared from the constable's books after October 1377 when the town was captured in another great offensive by the duke of Anjou.⁵ It was then in French loyalty under the lordship of the Albret until it was re-captured by the combined forces of the constable Sir John Radcliffe and the communal militia of Bordeaux in 1420.⁶ The involvement of Saint-Macaire in the wine trade during this period as frontier town is unclear from the surviving commercial sources. When under French control its burgesses' trade privileges were forfeit, and so barrels of its wine do not appear in customs books with a special tax code or anything to differentiate them. Even though such privileges were restored once back in Plantagenet rule their exports are not indicated separately from those of the burgesses of Bordeaux.

The absence of evidence is not, however, cause for total pessimism regarding Saint-Macaire's links with Bordeaux, and by extension, England. In the 1430s and 1440s there are again signs of overseas exports by a handful of the town's residents.⁷ As Vale has rightly pointed out, territories under separate allegiances had mutual interests in continuing local trade, especially since Langon, just a mile away across the river remained under Plantagenet while Saint-Macaire was Valois. All had an interest in trading links along the river between the *Haut-Pays* and the Bordelais remaining open.⁸ Local truces and unofficial agreements meant that wine produced nearby could find its way to where demand was high, namely the quayside in Bordeaux. Though in theory this should show up as wine from the *Pays-Rebelles*, once it had passed nearby Cadillac, there is every reason to suspect that the border tithe could, for locals at least, be evaded by land, and the wines of Saint-Macaire could enter the market and be exported, probably only paying the *grande coutume*.

¹ *CGD*, 1, p. 91 (no. CXCII).

² TNA, E 101/173/4, fos 12v, 13r, 15r, 74v, 96v; E 101/602/3, fol. 17r.

³ TNA, E 101/173/4, fol. 118v; E 101/602/3, fos 16r, 23r, 27r, 43r; E 101/180/2, fos 5v, 7r.

⁴ TNA, E 101/167/16, no. 11; E 101/173/4, fol. 126v; E 101/602/3, fos 16r, 17r; E 101/180/2, fos 29r, 41v.

⁵ Jean Froissart, *Chronicles*, ch. CCCLVIII, Stonyhurst 1, fos 358v–361r, *TOF*, (eds.) Ainsworth; Croenen; *Les Grandes chroniques de France*, 12, (ed.) Delachenal, pp. 188–92.

⁶ Vale, *English Gascony*, p. 86.

⁷ TNA, E 101/191/3, fos 68v, 70r; E 101/194/3, fos 9v, 31v, 53r; these are only known of fortuitously because the scribe coincidentally chose to show the merchant's origins.

⁸ Vale, *English Gascony*, pp. 179–80, 191.

3.4.3 The *Haut-Pays*

La Réole, situated in the northern Bazadais just 15 km (9.3 miles) to the east of Saint-Macaire along the Garonne, was likewise a frontier town for much of the period. With its strong thirteenth-century castle, prominent position overlooking the river, and productive hinterland, it was a valuable prize. From its capture in 1345 until its fall in 1374 to the duke of Anjou the town was in English hands and operated under the set of commercial privileges negotiated by Henry of Lancaster. All ‘burgesses, inhabitants and merchants’ trading wine from within ‘the honour and district’ of the town were to allowed to export tax free.¹ This effectively brought the residents of La Réole, along with those of Saint-Macaire, within the Bordeaux franchise.

Perhaps unsurprisingly this benefaction for a regional rival was strongly opposed by the municipal government of the capital, whose burgesses saw their own privileges again diluted by their extension to farther urban areas. The mayor and *jurats* stood accused of: preventing the storage or sale of La Réole wine anywhere in the city; imposing extortionate tolls on their merchants; and insisting that the *Château de l’Ombrière* charge duty on their exports. The crown had to intervene repeatedly to guarantee the town’s rights, culminating in the letters patent of May 1354.² Capra rightly pointed out however that, by 1358, the king had expanded the privilege to allow the circumvention of the restriction on pre-Martinmas sales to include the town of Bazas and the Bazadais in general, thus negating much of La Réole’s advantage.³

The effects of this dispute are visible in the town’s exports (Figure 22). During 1348–9, 569 tuns were exported by its residents, of which 87% were incorrectly required to pay the *grande coutume*.⁴ By 1355–6, after the king’s letters patent had taken effect, almost all the wine shipped was tax-free, though the overall quantity had fallen, probably because of the presence of the Black Prince and his army in the town in December 1355 after his chevauchée into the Languedoc.⁵ Thereafter their privileges remained in place as the exports of La Réole increased exponentially across the decade, with 1,087½ tuns sent abroad in 1357–8.⁶

¹ TNA, SC 8/243/12134; GSR, C 61/59: 29–30, 32, 36–37, 42, 45, 53, 61.

² GSR, C 61/117: 44.

³ Capra, ‘Un conflit sur les droits commerciaux’, pp. 213–20, at p. 218.

⁴ TNA, E 101/167/16, nos 15–25, 27–28.

⁵ TNA, E 101/173/4, fos 12r, 12v, 16v, 18v, 20v, 23v, 24r, 25r, 29v, 30r, 30v, 31r, 31v, 32r, 37r; for details of the Black Prince’s chevauchée into the Languedoc, see J. Sumption, *Trial by Fire: The Hundred Years’ War II* (London, 1999, repr. 2001), pp. 175–87, 190.

⁶ TNA, E 101/173/4, fos 40r, 40v, 49r, 51r, 57r, 58r, 61v, 62r, 62v, 70r, 72r, 72v, 74v, 75r, 77v, 78r, 78v, 79r, 81v, 82v, 85r, 88v, 89r, 93v, 94r, 94v, 95r, 96v, 98r, 98v, 99v, 101r, 102v, 103r, 103v, 104v, 105v–111v, 114r, 114v, 115r, 116r, 116v, 118r, 121r, 124r, 125v.



Figure 22 Wine exports of La Réole, 1348–73. **Source:** Appendix 4.4.2.

After the boom years of the 1350s and 1360s evidently the re-emergence of open conflict had impacted the town's economic fortunes as by 1372–3 exports had more than halved and after its capture by the French the following year its privileges were forfeited and its merchants disappeared from the customs books.¹ From then until the recapture of the town by Sir John Tiptoft in 1416 it is unclear what part it played in the wine trade.² Likewise surviving records for the 1420s and 1430s are scarce, but there are tentative hints of small quantities of La Réole wine occasionally reaching Bordeaux for export during this period and these barrels retained their prized tax exemptions.³ Any full recovery was however cut short in 1442 with its re-capture by Charles VII.⁴

The town of Bergerac, on the Dordogne in the Périgord, was in a similar position, albeit on the more vulnerable northern frontier. Captured by Henry of Lancaster in 1345, it was then in Plantagenet loyalty until 1374, but was retaken in 1435, briefly fell to Charles VII in 1442, and was finally captured by the French under Jean Bureau in 1450.⁵ The records of the town's *jurade* indicate that its environs continued to produce considerably throughout though it lacked the export privileges that might make its production discernible in the customs books.⁶ Moreover its location meant that overseas shipping via Libourne was more appropriate, so the re-direction of most of the Dordogne trade to Bordeaux after 1353 would have rendered Bergerac wine relatively uncompetitive. This was compounded by the addition, from the 1370s, of the 10% tariff on wine descending from outside English territory. Even with such constraints commerce continued to some

¹ TNA, E 101/602/3, fos 9v, 21r, 21v, 23r, 24r, 26v, 27v, 29v.

² J. Sumption, *Cursed Kings: The Hundred Years' War IV* (London, 2015), p. 620.

³ TNA, E 101/192/1, fos 22v, 48r, 54r.

⁴ Vale, *English Gascony*, pp. 206–7.

⁵ For a history of late medieval Bergerac, see E. Labroue, *Bergerac sous les Anglais: essai historique sur la commune 1322–1450* (Cressé, 2004).

⁶ *Les Jurades de la ville de Bergerac*, I, pp. 13, 170, 240

small degree. Wine arrived in Bordeaux in early 1409 from French-held Bergerac, as well as nearby La Force and Lalinde, and this was forcibly stored in the commune's own cellars.¹ Probably as a result, that September the town's inhabitants were re-granted letters of protection for four years by the English crown both to safely work their vineyards but also conduct 'business and trade on land and at sea and on all the jurisdictions of the duchy of Aquitaine or elsewhere'.² This can be viewed as part the push for greater *Haut-Pays* trade for which there were economic grounds for optimism with regards the upper Dordogne. In the early 1380s prices in Bergerac were as high as 12 francs per tun but by a decade into the fifteenth-century these prices had stabilised at around 7–8 francs per tun (c.£1 sterling).³ This should have, in theory, made it sufficiently profitable to ship wine west, but instead on average only about 100 tuns per year passed down from the whole Dordogne region on average between March 1427 and June 1431.⁴ The reasons for which will become clear in the following chapter on conflict and loyalty.⁵

*

The *Haut-Pays* proper, that is to say the Agenais, higher on the Garonne, Tarn and Lot rivers, was the main area of pre-war production and the basis of the wine trade at its height. As was demonstrated by Margery James, wine transported by barge down to Bordeaux from these areas made up the majority of exports, and these were cut short by the outbreak of war (Table 7).⁶

Table 7 Wine exports of the privileged towns in the *Haut-Pays* 1305–37.

Year	Exports from Gascony (tuns)		Share (%)
	<i>Haut-Pays</i>	Total	
1305–6	57,934	97,848	59.2
1306–7	53,591	93,452	57.3
1308–9	38,812	102,724	37.8
1335–6	46,901	74,053	63.3
1336–7	4,645	16,577	28.0

Source: James, *Studies*, p. 32.

There can be little doubt as to the validity of this narrative, a 90.1% fall in exports from this region between 1335–6 and 1336–7 is hard to refute. As their share of totals shipped fell dramatically from close to two-thirds to almost a quarter, it was clearly not simply a decline across the whole trade. Much of the Agenais had fallen into French hands during and after the War of Saint-Sardos in 1324, but many of the towns, dependent as they were on export markets via

¹ *RJ*, I, p. 399.

² *GSR*, C 61/112: 139; these letters had been granted the previous year, see *GSR*, C 61/112: 55.

³ *Les Jurades de la ville de Bergerac*, I, pp. 20, 69, 79, 77, 120, 102, 174, 185, 202, 226, 275.

⁴ TNA, E 364/67, m. 2.

⁵ See Chapter 4.

⁶ James, *Studies*, p. 15.

Bordeaux, remained sympathetic to English interests. Then, in early 1337, French forces bypassed the remainder of Plantagenet-held Agenais, captured La Réole and soon held the whole stretch of the Garonne in the northern Bazadais as far as Saint-Macaire. This cut off the main supply route along the river linking the *Haut-Pays* towns with Bordeaux during the second sales season for the 1336 vintage, preventing more than a trickle of wine reaching port. Yet this blockade was only temporary, the following year most French troops withdrew north and those who remained became largely besieged in the handful of strongholds they had taken. Local uprisings among those Gascons loyal to the English king unblocked passage along the river in 1340.¹ Therefore it is impossible to characterise the often defined destruction of the trade, at the war's outbreak, as anything other than a momentary supply shock. In 1342, the English took further strongholds around the confluence of the Lot and Garonne, the Truce of Malestroit from 1343–5 allowed open trade to resume, and in 1345–6 the victories of Henry of Lancaster re-took La Réole, Aiguillon and parts of the western Agenais.²

Thus, the trading routes through to Bordeaux could periodically re-open, though any assessment as to the level of trade for most of the 1340s would be truly speculative, which is what led many, among them Margery James, to assume that trade had entirely stopped.³ Yet even with the disruptions the Black Death wrought on trade during 1348–9, exports from Agen remained at a third of the level it had been in 1306–7, while those from Aiguillon were at 91.8% of those historic highs, despite having endured a dramatic siege in 1346.⁴ This would appear to contradict the claim made by James that the resurgent Anglo-Gascon campaigns of the mid-1340s caused damage to viticulture that 'more than outweighed the territorial gains of victory'.⁵ Admittedly other towns had fared less well, nearby Castelmoron on the Lot, and Nérac, for instance, were down to less than 10% of their export potential.⁶ The rules under which these towns traded varied considerably. Aiguillon, Castelmoron and Nérac were back in English hands, and so were entitled to their large discounts on export duty at Bordeaux – unlike Agen itself which remained garrisoned by the French, and had to pay the maximum rate.⁷

In general the prospects for commercial activity in the *Haut-Pays* after the beginning of the war should be thought more varied than destroyed. The issue was not really one of destruction of vines or infrastructure, or even dispersal of population, but of investment. Merchants were unlikely to put up capital for ventures in which goods could be seized by passing hostile forces. According to Froissart, Arnaud-Amanieu, lord of Albret would later boast how he would prey on passing merchants in this very region, habits we can safely assert were largely representative of this

¹ Sumption, *Trial by Battle*, pp. 204, 214, 223, 335–8.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 403; Fowler, *The King's Lieutenant*, pp. 53–66.

³ James, *Studies*, p. 15.

⁴ TNA, E 101/167/16, nos 8–13, 16, 18–19, 21–39 [Agen]; TNA, E 101/167/16, nos 29–36 [Aiguillon]. For export figures of the *Haut-Pays* towns see Appendix 4.4.3. For the siege of Aiguillon, see Sumption, *Trial by Battle*, pp. 485–8, 496–7, 503, 512, 519–20.

⁵ James, *Studies*, pp. 19–20.

⁶ TNA, E 101/167/16, nos 37–9 [Castelmoron]; 26, 34, 37, 39 [Nérac].

⁷ Sumption, *Trial by Battle*, pp. 121, 352.

period.¹ Moreover after war began the valuable discounts on export duty which each municipality held were forfeited as they passed from English to French allegiance. The loss of commercial advantages made it even less worth the risk if they could not guarantee to be competitive at export. Equally important was the erosion of the credit arrangements which were the very lifeblood of the wine trade. Seeing as though so much of the length of the trade depended on deferred payments, an Agenais producer would have to trust that, even during war, money from English or Bordeaux merchants would make its way back to their distant *Haut-Pays* town as the sale credit chain was redeemed. In short, war destroys trust, the very basis of credit and, by extension, trade.

With this in mind it is worth noting that the overseas exports of these towns tended to be shipped in the names of an extremely small number of merchants, sometimes even a single merchant. In 1348–9 all 252½ tuns from Aiguillon left in the name of Raymund de Malmusson and the same year exports from Castelmoron were all by Raymund de Cantirano or his agent Bernard del Genk. Even into the 1350s these same figures remain clear leaders in international trade for their respective towns. One Johan de Labatut from Gontaut exported 95% of the wine of his hometown, as well as buying wine in Caumont and Port-Sainte-Marie.² It is probable that their dominant positions reflect either special connections with political authorities in and en route to Bordeaux, such that business relations could remain strong. Some towns' exports were visibly managed by prominent individuals from Bordeaux itself. In 1348–9, most of Nérac's wine shipments were traded by the lawyer and cleric Gerald de Podio, a senior member of the chapter of Saint-André, king's councillor, judge and diplomat.³ De Podio also remained a major exporter of Nérac wines through to at least the end of the 1350s.⁴

The level at which other towns in the *Haut-Pays* remained capable of overseas trade became visible only after the winter campaigns by Thomas de Beauchamp, earl of Warwick, Sir John Chandos and Sir James Audley from December 1355 to February 1356.⁵ These offensives, falling in between the Black Prince's more famous chevauchée across the Languedoc and Poitiers campaigns, captured Noillac, Le Mas-d'Agenais, Tonneins, Buzet, Clairac, Port-Sainte-Marie and Castelsagrat in quick succession. The following spring (1357) commercial links between Port-Sainte-Marie, Bordeaux and beyond had already been re-established. 105 tuns from that key town passed through the capital's port.⁶ This town succeeded ahead of its neighbours, its wine exported a full ten days before a truce was signed with the French dauphin on 18 March 1357, probably

¹ Jean Froissart, *Chronicles*, MS Besançon 865, fol. 252r, *TOF*. Froissart has Arnaud-Amanieu declare: "Dieu merci, je me porte asséz bien, mais j'avoie plus d'argent, aussi avoient mes gens, quant je faisoie guerre pour le roy d'Angleterre, que je n'aie maintenant, car quant nous chevauchions a l'aventure, ilz nous sailloient en la main aucuns riches marchans de Thoulouse, de Condon, de La Rirole ou de Bregerath", ("I am, thank God, in reasonably good health, but I had more money and men when I was waging war for the king of England than I have now, because whenever we rode out in search of adventure, rich merchants from Toulouse, Condom, La Réole and Bergerac would fall into our hands").

² TNA, E 101/173/4, fos 108v, 109v, 110r, 111r, 111v, 118v, 120r, 122r, 122v, 124r.

³ For biographical details of Gerald de Podio, see *FEG*, XIII, pp. 304–5.

⁴ TNA, E 101/167/16, nos 34, 37, 39; E 101/173/4, fos 40v, 124r.

⁵ Sumption, *Trial by Fire*, pp. 174–249, particularly pp. 190–1.

⁶ TNA, E 101/173/4, fos 79v, 85r, 85v, 86r, 86v, 88r, 89r.

because of the presence of a large permanent English garrison, which ensured some security for its growers and merchants.¹

By the following autumn all the other major wine-growing towns of the *Haut-Pays* also reappeared in the Bordeaux customs books.² Although overall exports were 1,464 tuns, 5.8% of the level of 1306–7 where figures for specific towns are comparable, again fortunes varied considerably. The towns farther west in Plantagenet hands such as Caumont was at 17.4%, Gontaud 18.5%, and Castelmoron at 11.9% of their potential. One of the most successful was Nérac, whose links with Bordeaux's rich and powerful allowed the achievement of almost 35% of the highs of the beginning of the century.³ The producers from Port-Sainte-Marie more than doubled their exports of the previous year.⁴ Despite being still in Valois hands the town of Moissac in Quercy nevertheless exported 13% of 1306–7 levels, though nearby Montauban was only at 1.5% likewise Castelsarrasin just 2%. Agen, also still in French loyalty, had lost almost all of its residual presence in overseas trade, perhaps because of the particularly savage destruction of infrastructure in its environs in January 1356.⁵ Like the towns farther west, the wine trade was dominated by just a handful of powerful local merchants. In Moissac, during the trading period 1357–8, over half of all exports via Bordeaux were handled in the name of just two individuals: Bertrand Anger and Arnaut Guillem de Barda.⁶

Though evidence for local negotiations does not survive it is apparent from the constable's customs book that under the truce of 1357 all towns previously granted privileges, even towns still officially loyal to the French king, were allowed to benefit again from their discounts on duty. This concession well may have encouraged the producers and merchants of the region to export some of their remaining wine surplus via Bordeaux, rather than supply Toulouse as they likely had done previously. Remarkably enough, even some 146½ tuns from the environs of that very French capital of the Languedoc made its way west for export, mostly in the hands of the enterprising Gerald Oliver whom shipped over three-quarters of this amount, all wine which was also given privileged status.⁷ As with the towns nearer Bordeaux, there were some indications of a political dimension to commercial links with the English market. Key figures involved in trade in the 1350s were also the oath-takers in 1364, at the establishment of the principality. Four of the six oath-takers on behalf of Port-Sainte-Marie: Galhard Servat, John Destrannet, Jordan de Labarda, and

¹ For discussion of the garrisoning of Port-Sainte-Marie, see Sumption, *Trial by Fire*, pp. 191, 282.

² See Appendix 4.4.3.

³ TNA, E 101/173/4, fos 111v, 113r, 117v, 118r, 119v, 121v, 123r, 123v, 124r, 125r, 125v, 126r, 127r, 128r [Castelmoron]; E 101/173/4, fos 123v, 124r, 125v, 126r, 127r, 127v, 128r.

⁴ TNA, E 101/173/4, fos 100v, 102r, 104r, 105v, 107v, 108r, 108v, 109r, 109v, 111r, 111v, 113r, 114r, 114v, 115r, 115v, 116r, 116v, 117r, 117v, 118v, 120r, 120v, 121r, 121v, 123v, 124r, 125r, 126r, 127r, 127v.

⁵ TNA, E 101/173/4, fos 102v, 103r, 105v, 108v, 108v, 108v, 109v, 111r, 111v, 113r, 114r, 114v, 115r, 115v, 116r, 117r, 118v, 119r, 120r, 120v, 121v, 124v, 126r, 127v [Moissac]; E 101/173/4, fos 103r, 108v [Agen]; for the military events of January 1356 see Sumption, *Trial by Fire*, p. 191.

⁶ TNA, E 101/173/4, fos 102v, 103r, 105v, 108v, 109v, 111r, 115r, 124v [Bertrand Anger]; E 101/173/4, fos 113r, 114r, 114v, 115r, 116v, 118v, 119r, 120r, 121v, 126r [Arnaut Guillem de Barda].

⁷ TNA, E 101/173/4, fos 120v, 121r, 121v, 124r, 124v, 125r, 125v, 126r, 126v, 127v, 128r.

Johan Despiasse, involved themselves in overseas wine exports from the town.¹ Yet this is less clear for the region as a whole.

For the remainder of the fourteenth century the specifics of wine export activity from the *Haut-Pays* are unclear. We must assume that with the treaty of Brétigny these towns played a considerable role in the export boom of the 1360s but that this was eroded by the re-opening of hostilities, re-conquests by the French, and imposition of further trade barriers. Only 715 tuns passed through Langon in 1369–70.² The number of tuns from the Agenais as a whole, officially paying the new tithe at the border with Anglo-Gascon territory, hovered around the 100 tun mark from most of the 1370s and 1380s, though reaching a high of 625 tuns during the truce of Bruges (1375–7), less than half the level of the 1350s.³ It would be obtuse to suggest that such fluctuations were not related directly to the war with France. Almost all the before mentioned wine-producing towns were in enemy hands and links with Bordeaux via the Garonne were fractured. Few merchants were likely to risk their capital or offer credit in overseas trade. Commercial politics would have had their part to play also, for by 1388 the privileges of Agen, and its merchants, were officially rescinded by order of the crown and at the request of Bordeaux's *jurade*.⁴ This further depleted any motive to trade.

Yet, at times, it must have appeared that the official policy of encouraging trade with the *Haut-Pays* might enjoy some success. During the short peace in the 1390s and early 1400s there are indications of healthier trade links, not observed by Margery James. Between November 1402 and April 1403, 1,117½ tuns of wine passed the frontier from the Agenais.⁵ Of the wine that was exported only 108½ tuns still came from the burgesses of Port-Sainte-Marie, but the nearby town of Clairac still produced about the same for export as it had 45 years earlier, and Tonneins a little further west shipped 92½ tuns, three times that which it had exported in 1357–8.⁶ These were the 'lieux anglais en le haut pais', a handful of locations in French territory that had remained garrisoned by Anglo-Gascon forces, and that evidently benefitted from continued commercial links with England.⁷

After the return of serious military activity in 1405, Port-Sainte-Marie, Aiguillon, Tonneins and Caumont were all captured by the count of Armagnac.⁸ With their loss and the imposition of the 1406 French counter-tariffs legitimate trade with the *Haut-Pays* returned to very low levels for around forty years.⁹ There are hints of a somewhat healthier black market. In 1414 for example, the Bordeaux *jurade* was informed of 200 *Haut-Pays* tuns that had arrived untaxed in the city in the

¹ CGD, 1, p. 95; TNA, E 101/173/4, fos 100v, 102r, 104r, 105v, 107v, 113r, 114r, 116r, 118v, 121r, 123v, 124r, 125r.

² TNA, E 36/80, fol. 398.

³ James, *Studies*, pp. 32–3.

⁴ *Livre des bouillons*, pp. 255–6 (no. 81).

⁵ TNA, E 101/185/11, fol. 61r.

⁶ TNA, E 101/185/11, fos 26r, 26v, 28v, 32v, 39r, 41r, 42v, 45v, 46v, 47r, 48r, 50v, 51r, 54r, 55r, 57r, 57v, 60v; E 101/184/12, fos 1r–2r.

⁷ TNA, E 101/184/12, fol. 1r; for the military narrative see Sumption, *Cursed Kings*, pp. 185–7.

⁸ Pépin, 'The French Offensives of 1404–1407', pp. 1–40, at pp. 13–5.

⁹ See Chapter 2.1.2.

possession of ‘French’ merchants from Marmande.¹ Yet such details are obscure and in any case this would hardly have helped the duchy’s fiscal problems, despite the express wishes of crown policy. Legally transported barrels probably never surpassed the 228 tuns that arrived in Bordeaux in 1428–9.² No towns with export privileges remained beyond the frontier and the concurrent policy of Bordelais protectionism provided no encouragement to risk capital. It was not until the truce of Tours in 1444 and market reforms of 1445 that trade links began to recover. Indeed, one of the very petitions from English merchants that demanded change at parliament, did so in order to allow greater trade in the viticultural production of the *Haut-Pays*, that, unlike the produce of the Bordelais, ‘was and still is the best wine and the most pleasant and wholesome for man’.³

In 1435–9 fewer than ten tuns per year crossed the frontier, but over 1442–6 an average of 427 tuns per year arrived.⁴ Yet an even greater level of growth was curtailed by negative economic headwinds experienced throughout Europe, particularly falling prices for wine in Bordeaux. There was not sufficient time for the *Haut-Pays* towns to rebuild their interests in international trade before the end of Plantagenet rule.

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This chapter has assessed how the major vested interests in the wine trade fared as a consequence of English crown policy from the mid-fourteenth century onwards. It has provided new statistical evidence, particularly from the Bordeaux customs books, to demonstrate this. Put simply, alterations to the trade’s regulatory framework, distribution of commercial privileges and monetary policy favoured specific groups. Furthermore, it is apparent that economic advantages conferred by government were undoubtedly effective, and, such was the wine trade’s significance, in Gascony and in certain regions of England, that a noticeable consequence was to concentrate wealth in their hands.

In terms of English commercial interests, the most prosperous were a small number of English investors concentrated around the *mystery* of the Vintry in London and particular provincial towns such as Dartmouth. They repeatedly benefited from crown policies, both regulatory and monetary, and operated in the international trade with the highest profit margins. Thus they could easily outcompete any rivals. It was their investment habits which drove the scale of trade. Meanwhile, English officers in the duchy could use their prominent position, and close relations with merchants, for considerable personal profit. This habit was clearly well-established in the fourteenth century but reached its zenith in the fifteenth century under the Lancastrians. Meanwhile, the English kings and nobility benefited considerably from the continued Plantagenet

¹ *RJ*, II, p. 129.

² See Appendix 3.1.

³ *Haut-Pays* wine was said to be ‘the which weren, and yet be the best wyne, most plesaunt and holsom for man’, ‘Henry VI: February 1445’, item 45, *PROME, BHO*; TNA, SC 8/190/9467.

⁴ TNA, E 364/75, m. 5, 5 dorso; E 364/84, m. 20.

tenure of the duchy, and established long supply chains in order to source relatively cheap wine for their households in England. Such material advantages are not to be underestimated.

Those greatest beneficiaries of crown policy in Gascony itself were a narrow section of the richest burgesses in Bordeaux along with those ecclesiastics or nobles that shared their status. The erosion of the real value of fixed export duties across the period suggests it was increasingly the geographical and seasonal restrictions on the market, in their favour, which were decisive. Using these advantages they were able to outcompete rivals in production and in their lucrative position as middle-men, to acquire an increasingly large proportion of the wealth still available in the duchy. For whilst the wine market in Bordeaux had become highly speculative, those with the correct status, whether a certain commercially-privileged class of seigneurial landholder, burgess tenant-vintner, revenue-farmer or middle-man merchant; these could still make large profits if they had some capital to risk. Their surplus accumulated profits were then solidified in economically-protected land or in other productive investments.

Such gains were not necessarily made at the expense of the commons, of the Bordelais at least, some would themselves see periodically higher wages and lower rents. Rather it was those vested interests with weaker or no commercial privileges who lost their relative economic position. This could mean those other residents of Bordeaux without sufficient capital or status. But significantly this also meant most other towns, both in the Bordelais and *Haut-Pays*, along with much of the Gascon nobility, and also the wider church.

It is noteworthy that another loser in Gascony, in financial terms, was the English king in his role as duke. Monetary intervention and patronage eroded the returns from its increasingly important wine revenues – though in reality these policies should be seen more as an exchange of financial for political capital. The value of such an exchange, and that of the wine trade as a whole in this regard, is the subject of the next chapter.

4. Loyalty and conflict

The following chapter will examine whether the commercial and economic policies expounded in Chapter 2, and their consequences in Chapter 3, could have affected the loyalty of Gascons to the English crown or provoked incidences of conflict, armed or otherwise. While over-specialisation and relative privilege may help to explain the vulnerability of some in Plantagenet Gascony to fluctuations in wine prices, it does not directly explain periodic crises of loyalty.

Our image of the Gascons as treacherous and rebellious was in a large part thanks to the assessment of Froissart. The regularity at which they were noted to have changed sides back and forth for financial advantage makes for a very unfavourable impression.¹ Yet it is entirely true that the control of the duchy depended upon the shifting loyalties of local elites, described by Vale as the ‘anarchic arena of politics’. He himself followed the chronicler by distinguishing between the loyalty of the nobility to the English crown, which rested on tradition, and that of the urban elites, which relied on economic pragmatism.² The second position was linked directly by contemporaries to the wine trade with England. Froissart himself has representatives of Bordeaux, Bayonne and Dax state in 1399, “we have more merchandise, wool and cloth, from wines to the English than to the French, and such we are inclined better to them by nature”.³ Moreover, the *jurade* of Bordeaux, the most senior council of the city’s communal government, went further on 9 January 1416, by declaring, in existential terms, that:

The wine produced from our vines is what we are made of, and they constitute our entire revenues from which we live, and if the wine is not abundant, it is feared we will come to poverty, and we will not be able to defend ourselves against our enemies, by which cause, the king, our lord, fears losing the city and all the land.⁴

Yet Bordeaux’s political order was not the *jurade* alone. It was, in Patrick Lantschner’s terms, polycentric.⁵ The English mayors, the ducal authorities in *Château de l’Ombrière*, the archbishop and other potent lords of the Bordelais such as the *capit* de Buch, were all strong

¹ For examples, see Jean Froissart, *Chronicles*, MS Berlin Rehdiger 3, fos 80v–81v, *TOF*; *ibid.*, MS Besançon 865, fol. 252r, *ibid.*

² Vale, *English Gascony*, p. 155.

³ Jean Froissart, *Oeuvres*, xvi, 1397–1400, (ed.) K. de Lettenhove (Brussels, 1872), pp. 213–4, 216–7.

⁴ *RJ*, II, p. 306. In the original Gascon, the *jurade* stated that ‘lo bin qui creys en nostras binhas es nostra substancia, et sian totas nostras reuenuas de que biuem, et, si lo bin no sse ben, es dopte de benir a paubretat, et no poiren deffendre nos aus enemics per laquau causa, lo Rey, nostre senhor, sere en dopte de perdre la ciutat et tot lo pais.’

⁵ See P. Lantschner, *The Logic of Political Conflict in Medieval Cities: Italy and the Southern Low Countries, 1370–1440* (Oxford, 2015).

competing political units. These were the ‘nodal points’ about which very different opinions could interact and political conflict could breed.¹

With regards the wider duchy, Vale argued for understanding the ‘problem of allegiance’, almost entirely in terms of the feudal politics of noble families. He considered issues such as the propensity to make intricate alliances beyond the control of the crown, and the engagement in multi-generational feuds, such as that between the counts of Armagnac and Foix, to be most important.² As discussed, unlike Boutruche, he doubted the relevance of most of the financial rewards the Plantagenets were able to provide in keeping these lords loyal, in this he argued that the French king was always able to outbid the English.³ Yet Vale placed too much emphasis on drawing distinctions between the nobility and urban elites. This study has shown not only how lords had become burgesses, and burgesses became lords, but how their financial interests might overlap. Moreover the church, populated by members of the same seigneurial and burgess families, were together united in the very same commerce which bound them to the English crown.

In order to understand better the dynamics of commercial and political interests, in Bordeaux as in the wider duchy, it is necessary to hypothesise certain associations between the wine trade and loyalties. At its most simple this would be that political agents acted rationally in their own financial self-interest, that gains from the wine trade, particularly with England, was a motive for loyalty to the Plantagenet crown and a deterrent against rebellion or joining the Valois cause. Such advantages could include the profits from exports, economic rents on trade, or shares of the ducal administration’s rents on trade. By implication, a lack of these should mean the reversal of motives. Such economic rationality is of course to not be expected in all cases, as people could act against their self-interest, and instead base their loyalty on other factors. Self-interest can also work both ways, the prospect of capturing such profits may also serve as an inducement towards conflict. In this sense, political stability, or lack thereof, can also be attributed to the wine trade as a function of the ‘resource curse’. The dependence of an economy on the export of a single commodity is a risk factor with regards political violence and internal conflict. There are two leading theories as to how this can occur.

One, is the ‘honey pot’ argument developed by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler.⁴ Their research centred on the motive-opportunity dichotomy: whether rebellion is caused by grievance, perceived past injuries; or greed, the wish to pursue some future ‘profitable opportunities’. Out of all the possible factors Collier and Hoeffler examined, they calculated, based on 79 modern conflicts, that a polity with an economy in which primary commodity exports constituted 33% of GDP, the risk of civil war was 22%, while in a polity with no exports the risk was just 1%, concluding that alone ‘the effect of primary commodity exports on conflict risk is both highly significant and considerable’. Their reasoning was that rebellion is embarked on when a resource is

¹ Ibid., p. 8.

² Vale, *English Gascony*, pp. 154–79.

³ Ibid., pp. 202–4, particularly p. 203; Boutruche, *La Crise*, pp. 350–1.

⁴ P. Collier, A. Hoeffler, ‘On Economic Causes of Civil War’, *Oxford Economic Papers*, 50:4 (1998), pp. 563–73; *ibid.*, ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil War’, *Oxford Economic Papers*, 56:4 (2004), pp. 563–95.

large enough relative to the rest of the economy to represent a sufficiently profitable opportunity to extort revenue. Simultaneously they suggest that ‘primary commodity dependence worsens governance, and so generates stronger grievances’.¹ This latter point follows the second relevant model, that of the ‘rentier state’.² This describes a polity where the government’s income is dominated by the exaction of economic rents in the form of levies on resource exports, which are then re-directed to ensure support for that administration. Without direct taxation it will become less necessary to govern in the interests of the wider population, and will instead become authoritarian and isolated. Both this style of government and the inequity it provokes through its patronage could too become cause of sufficient grievance to provoke rebellion.

Although it would be anachronistic to apply these models in their entirety to the pre-modern, they do mirror certain aspects of medieval Gascony sufficiently to be taken seriously. We see elements of the rentier state in the increasing proportion of ducal income coming from duties on wine exports (rising above c.80%) and the tendency of the *Château de l’Ombrière* to funnel these to key supporters.³ The calculation of a percentage of GDP that the wine trade contributed, necessary for the ‘honeypot’ theory, is far harder to calculate. It was stated in the English parliament of June 1369 that the Gascons ‘for the most part live off this trade’, but unsurprisingly statistical evidence would not have been offered.⁴ The conventional view would put the proportional value of exports in any medieval economy very low. Epstein noted that in England, a ‘major exporting nation’ in his opinion, it was less than 8%, while in Sicily ‘one of the most open economies in pre-modern Europe’ it was only around 15%.⁵ Yet we can be fairly certain that around the late 1350s and early 1360s the percentage of ecclesiastical income derived from direct exports was around 24%, and that this was likely to increase with the erosion of the value of money rents and increasing value of *agrières*.⁶ This could be seen as representative to some degree since the church was perhaps the greatest secular landowner in the Bordelais. In addition, we have seen with the estates of wealthy patricians, such as Sir Johan Colom and Sir Galhart Béguey, how wine sales constituted well over 80% of their income.⁷

¹ Ibid., pp. 563–95, at pp. 564, 580.

² For the modern development of the ‘rentier state’ model, see H. Mahdavy, ‘The Pattern and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran’, in *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East*, (ed.) M.A. Cook (Oxford 1970), pp. 428–64. For a more recent definition, see H. El Beblawi, ‘The Concept of “Rentier States” Revisited’, in *The Middle East Economies in Times of Transition*, (eds.) I. Diwan, A. Galal (London, 2016), pp. 199–212.

³ See Chapter 2.2.2.

⁴ ‘Edward III: June 1369’, item 23, in *PROME, BHO*.

⁵ Epstein, *Freedom and Growth*, p. 71.

⁶ See Chapter 3.3.1.

⁷ See Chapter 3.4.1.

Neither of these of course indicates the value as a proportion of the economy, but it is certainly not impossible that the wine trade's share of Plantagenet Aquitaine's GDP could reach at least one third, especially as the duchy reduced in size after the 1370s, and often consisted of little more than the Bordelais itself and the regions around Bayonne, Dax and Saint-Sever. Given the often discussed historic tendency of Gascons towards engaging in private wars, even by the standards of the time, it is certainly appropriate their possible economic causes be discussed.¹ For as Froissart had a knight of Brittany joke 'they readily steal at another's expense'.²

4.1 The Prince, the principality, and their ruin, 1355–89

The arrival of Edward, the Black Prince, in Gascony in 1355 coincided with a resurgence in wine exports, with strong profits and wages for all involved thanks to an appreciating local currency. The attractiveness of the Plantagenet cause at this time cannot be expressed quantitatively, but the success of the duchy's export economy in generating wealth is evident in the abundant gold and silver flowing to the Bordeaux mint in the first half of the decade.³ As capital investment in trade was increased, as the *killage* numbers indicate it was, there must have been a growing confidence in commercial links between Gascony and England. Access to this abundance had already bred conflict in the form of the commercial rivalry between Bordeaux and La Réole. The use of the capital's natural monopoly over exports descending the Garonne, to attack the interests of another commune, had to be put a stop to by Edward III in 1354.⁴

Most of the major Gascon lords who enthusiastically joined the prince for his chevauchée into the Languedoc in autumn 1355: the lord of Albret; Bérard d'Albret; and *capit* de Buch among them, were enjoying the profitable export of wine of their estates. By contrast their opponent and their military target, John [I], count of Armagnac, and also the ambiguous bystander in the form of Gaston [III] Fébus, count of Foix, held no such investment.⁵ The division between wine-exporting and non-wine exporting noblemen is clear in this regard, though whether it is right to assume loyalty determined admission to trade or vice versa is less so. Geography was certainly a factor in this – noblemen with lands close to, or, in the case of the *capit*, in Bordeaux – would have a greater chance of sensing and experiencing a greater profit through links with England. This was not a fixed line, nor did it necessarily follow a frontier as the experience of the *Haut-Pays* towns demonstrates.⁶ Instead, the wine market expanded and contracted largely with the loyalty of the local nobles and towns.

¹ Vale, *English Gascony*, pp. 170–9; Ibid., *The Angevin Legacy*, pp. 112–31; Ibid., 'The War in Aquitaine', in A. Curry, M. Hughes (eds.), *Arms, Armies and Fortifications in the Hundred Years War* (Woodbridge, 1994, repr. 1999), pp. 69–82, at p. 73.

² Jean Froissart, *Chronicles*, MS Besançon 865, fol. 252r, *TOF*.

³ See Chapter 2.4.2.

⁴ *GSR*, C 61/117: 44, also Chapter 3.4.3 and Capra, 'Un conflit sur les droits commerciaux', pp. 213–220.

⁵ For details of the 1356 chevauchée, see Sumption, *Trial by Fire*, pp. 175–87; see also Chapter 3.3.2 and Appendix 4.2.1 for noble exports.

⁶ See Chapter 3.4.3.

The establishment of the principality of Aquitaine in 1362 wiped away such distinctions by absorbing wine lords and non-wine lords alike into a single polity. Fully re-opening trade with the *Haut-Pays* in theory could have brought the wider region within the export economy centred on Bordeaux. The more distant magnates, such as Armagnac, might have enjoyed the same commercial bonds with England enjoyed by the lords of the Bordelais. This did not take place, moreover the failure to return long-term production to the scale of 1306–7 had a knock on effect on the secondary gains to be had through economic rents on trade, mainly in the form of taxes and tolls on the Garonne and Dordogne rivers which linked Bordeaux with strong areas of production around towns in the Agenais, Quercy and the Périgord. Higounet's list covering around 1324–6 lists the huge number of greater and lesser lords who exacted revenues on wine barrels passing down the Garonne for export.¹ The very dominance of the Bordelais as a centre of production, cemented since 1337, now limited the scope for wider seigneurial advantage from the trade.

There is no evidence that Armagnac ever engaged himself in the wine trade with England whilst he was under the authority of the Black Prince, moreover the new lord of Albret, Arnaud-Amanieu (1338–1401), had evidently abandoned the commercial interests of his father.² These were the key rebels in 1368–9 who accepted offers of legal, military and of course financial assistance from Charles V (r.1364–80). Those nobles who joined them in rebellion were largely their vassals from eastern regions distant from the Bordelais, or less-viticulturally specialised regions, such as the Albret lands in the Landes, all whose interests were largely aligned with their liege lords. Conventionally the crisis is viewed essentially as a tax rebellion against the *fouage*, the hearth tax, of 1368, since it was legal appeals to the *parlement* of Paris about oppressive exactions which triggered the uprising.³ Yet were this really the primary cause we would expect a more even spread of rebels across the region as the principality would have been burdened equally by the tax. A more nuanced explanation suggests Albret and Armagnac had become impoverished ever since their defeat and capture at the battle of Launac (1362) by their great rival the count of Foix. Their ruinously costly ransoms at 300,000 gold florins for Armagnac and 100,000 florins for Albret put them in a state of perpetual insolvency and made them far more sensitive to any military or financial demands of the prince. Such demands would have been doubly antagonistic since they were in no position to benefit from the export boom of the 1360s, whilst were still vulnerable to the negative effects of the economic downturn once it arrived towards the end of the decade.

By contrast, Arnaud-Amanieu's kinsmen, the heirs of Bérard d'Albret, remained true to the prince. These were all exporters and holders of strongly wine-producing lands or had tolls in the lower Garonne and Dordogne valleys.⁴ Likewise there was no sudden rebellion amongst other lords farther west towards Bordeaux. The *capal* de Buch, *soudan* de la Trau, lords of Montferrand,

¹ Higounet, 'Géographie des péages de la Garonne', pp. 421–44, at 443–4.

² See Chapter 3.3.2 and Appendix 4.2.1.

³ Barber, *Edward, Prince of Wales and Aquitaine*, pp. 207–21; Sumption, *Trial by Fire*, pp. 484, 568–72; Green, 'Lordship and Principality', pp. 3–29, at pp. 10, 21.

⁴ For the exports of the lords of Langoiran see, TNA, E 101/602/3, fos 7r, 8v, 17r, 23v, 24v, 39v, 40v, 41v, 45v; E 101/180/2, fos 8r, 9v, 10v, 14r, 19r, 22r, 24r, 26v, 32r; also see Chapter 2.2.2.

Duras, and Mussidan all remained loyal. As Guilhem Pépin has demonstrated, it took a number of years before the principality was truly undone by multiple French invasions.¹ It was only as the war came closer to the Bordelais that gradually the loyalties at the core of Plantagenet Gascony began to be tested. This coincided with period of high wine price volatility. A nominal C_v that had been 31% in the 1350s, and 33% in the 1360s, reached 47% in the 1370s.² The invasions of the duke of Anjou, successive famine and bouts of plague over the first half of the decade, but then the truce during 1375–7 brought an economic boom, before an even more devastating French campaign in 1377–8. Such vast contrasts between successive desperation and success revealed stark political divisions among Anglo-Gascon elites, both seigneurial and within the bourgeoisie. By 1372 a certain portion of these evidently decided that their fortunes would be ameliorated were they to transfer their loyalty from the ailing Edward III to the ascendant Charles V. Seizures of property and prosecutions, begin from this time, first Bordeaux burgesses in particular, then non-burgesses too. Their numbers peak first in 1374, again decline toward 1377, and then rise again increased particularly sharply in 1379 and 1381 (Figure 23).




Figure 23 Rebels and other accused individuals recorded in Bordeaux constables' accounts 1370–1385, shown against total wine exports (tuns). **Source:** TNA, E 101/179/9, fol. 5v; E 101/179/14, fos 5v, 19, 12r, 27v, 44v–45v, 59v–60v, 71r, 72v; E 101/182/10, fos 7v–8r, 24r; for total exports, see Appendix 3.1.

There appears to be a striking inverse correlation between the frequency of rebels recorded in the Bordelais and total wine exports from the port at Bordeaux. Periods of particularly low exports coincided with the highest instances of rebellion, and vice versa. The effect is particularly marked for burgesses, whose status no rebel held in 1376, the year of greatest commercial success.

¹ Pépin, 'Towards a New Assessment', pp. 59–114.

² See Appendix 8.1.2 for price volatility by decade.

The idea that mercantile prosperity might have proved a strong incentive to remain loyal, and decline a motive to rebel is compelling, however we must be cautious. There were a myriad of other motives for rebellion, and since the peaks in their numbers also coincide with the arrival of French forces, which offered an opportunity to act on any other grievances whilst coincidentally disrupting trade. Thus correlation might not mean causation.

These years are best understood through the appearance of factionalism in Bordeaux. Though its politics are largely obscured for lack of evidence some parties with their motivations can be discerned. That led by Sir Johan Colom appeared in the open in 1375 with submission of his petition to Edward III to reduce the size of the *jurade* from twelve to six members and bar the nobility from election.¹ This should be seen as nothing less than a political coup to cement the authority of the older burgess families over the city. The rule he proposed that forbade aristocrats or gentlemen holding burgess status should likewise be understood as the equivalent attempt to keep control of economically valuable opportunities in the wine trade. The house of Colom had actually done surprisingly well during the crisis years of the 1370s, they managed to achieve export growth with high prices.² The ‘honey-pot’ effect of export wealth was therefore plausibly the motive to take action. The subsequent rebuke of Colom’s petition by the *capit* de Buch revealed the opposing faction.³ This was largely composed of exporting members of the Anglo-Gascon nobility and probably some of the newer burgess families that the reduction in the number of *jurats* aimed to exclude.

Tensions between the two factions finally broke into conflict in 1377. The arrest of Guilhem-Sans [IV] de Pommiers (d.1377), viscount of Fronsac, on charges of planning to defect to the French was the spur to action.⁴ We might even speculate that this lord’s rebellion was also remotely linked to trade, since his lordships lay largely to the north of the Dordogne, with Libourne as the principal point of export. The deterioration of that region’s prosperity since the imposition of the 1353 statute would have had a palpable effect on the lord of Pommiers’ economic fortunes, and it was offers of considerable financial support that had led him to conspire with the lord of Albret. Colom was arrested in April 1377 around the same time as Pommiers. The crimes the former were accused of are unknown – though it is clear he was tortured and then publically beheaded with the viscount the following month, and property confiscated. Indeed, many noblemen with interests in the wine trade were likely closely involved in his trial, as they were in that of Pommiers, namely the *capit* de Buch, Florimont, lord of Lesparre, Bérard d’Albret, lord of Langoiran, and others.⁵ Over subsequent weeks and months, Sir Galhart Béguey, Sir Pey de Landiras and other heads of wealthy old Bordeaux families, all with substantial wine businesses, were also arrested, were

¹ *GSR*, C 61/88: 82; *TNA*, SC 8/205/10238; SC 8/210/10483; also see P. Chaplais, ‘À propos de l’ordonnance de 1375 sur la bourgeoisie et la Jurade de Bordeaux’, *Annales du Midi*, 65:21 (1953), pp. 113–8.

² Chapter 3.4.1 and Appendix 4.3.1.

³ *GSR*, C 61/91: 50; *TNA* SC 8/222/11067; SC 8/223/11143.

⁴ Jean Froissart, *Chronicles*, MS Paris fr. 2644, fol. 2v, *TOF*; *GSR*, C 61/91: 1; C 61/111: 12; *AHG*, XXVI, pp. 149–63.

⁵ *AHG*, XXVI, pp. 149–63; *TNA*, EXT 7/18 (Formerly E 101/181/6).

detained, and had their property and commercial enterprises seized.¹ The best way to interpret these actions is not simply as a government response to conspiracy per se. Froissart himself thought Béguey's betrayal unlikely even though we can see his exports had fallen considerably.² Instead we might consider that his great wealth made him an obvious target for the duchy authorities.³ This was in effect a counter-coup against the 'over-mighty' old burgess families by a coalition of Anglo-Gascon lords with the complicity of the ducal administration in the *Château de l'Ombrière*. Gaillard (II) Durfort, lord of Duras, and a number other unspecified nobles, all forcibly occupied the Bégueys' estates. At Hastignan it was noted in the constable's accounts that the men-at-arms stole and drank 6 tuns of wine.⁴ Durfort in particular might have coveted the return of valuable tithes Sir Galhart held from the seigneurie at Blanquefort. Sir Johan Colom's Tour de Bessan was seized also, as were his vineyards in the suburbs of Bordeaux, all to be managed by loyal burgesses from newer families. For many years their sizable revenues from wine sales were conveyed into the treasury in the *Château* and used to pay military costs, as well as the wages, pensions and annuities of the very same loyal nobles.⁵ Wine stocks and other property from across the city of Bordeaux were confiscated and sold.⁶

The disastrous defeat at the battle of Eymet at the beginning of September 1377 only briefly interrupted this process as many of the lords involved were captured along with the instigator of the purge, the seneschal Sir Thomas Felton (d.1381). Bérard (III) d'Albret, lord of Langoiran was prised from his vineyards on the Garonne with the offer of an extremely large pension of 2,000 gold francs per year (2500*l bord.*) by the French king.⁷ Despite submitting to French loyalty, the lords of Duras and Guilhem-Ramon de Madaillan, lord of Rauzan, almost immediately re-defected back to the Plantagenet cause in return for a cash bribe of 600*l bord.*⁸ Raymond de Montaut, lord of Mussidan and Blaye, was also back in English loyalty within a handful of years.⁹ Meanwhile appropriations continued. Over the course of the 1380s the bulk of the large Colom estates were redistributed to loyalists such as the *soudan* de La Trau, John de Stratton, lord of Landiras, and the lawyer Guilhem Boneu.¹⁰ Sir Galhart Béguey's imprisonment continued, and the crown began the apportioning the profits of his lands and business, again to the *soudan* and also to Bertrucat d'Albret, and to one William Forster of Lancashire as reward for service.¹¹

¹ TNA, E 101/180/9, fos 44v–45r; E 101/180/9, fos 54v, 68v; E 101/182/9, fol. 15v; E 101/180/1, no. 56.

² See Appendix 4.3.1.

³ Jean Froissart, *Chronicles*, MS Paris fr. 2644, fol. 2, *TOF*.

⁴ TNA, E 101/180/9, fos 44v–45r.

⁵ *Ibid.*, fos 54v, 60–61, 68v, 72; E 101/182/9, fol. 15v; E 101/180/1, no. 56.

⁶ For example, TNA, E 101/180/9, fol. 72v.

⁷ *Les archives de Vayres*, pp. 784–5 (nos 631–2).

⁸ *Les grandes chroniques de France*, 12, pp. 186–8; Jean Froissart, *Chronicles*, MS Stonyhurst 1, fos 357r–v, 358r, *TOF*, (eds) Ainsworth, Croenen; Sumption, *Divided Houses*, pp. 299–302.

⁹ TNA, SC 8/216/10753.

¹⁰ *GSR*, C 61 94: 81; C 61 95: 107–8.

¹¹ Details are lacking, but Sir Galhart did eventually go to trial accused of 'lèse majesté and other betrayals', sometime after 1382, and by 1387 had been fully restored to his property and presumably exonerated (*GSR*, C 61/94: 19, 82; C 61/95: 14; C 61/96: 6, 17; C 61/100: 34, 52). After the death of his successor Sir Amanieu

From this time it became common for constables to maximize the kings' revenues by a more aggressive enforcement of commercial taxation. Their eyes inevitably fell upon the wealthy Anglo-Gascon church. In 1383 the abbot of Sainte-Croix in Bordeaux complained in a petition to the king that Stratton, then constable, had 'maliciously troubled them' and 'compelled them to pay the custom on their wine produced from their vineyards, and those annual rent payers to similarly pay'.¹ By way of securing forced payment Stratton had smashed the locks and doors to the abbey's cellars and seized 10 tuns of wine. Once appeals had been made to the crown it was ordered swiftly that their historic liberties and privileges be restored and restitution be made.² Yet by such means Stratton achieved the highest annual wine revenues of the post-principality period.³ In the future even the economic rights of the archbishop were not above being threatened by zealous royal officials, as they were in the 1420s, when 'whereas his predecessors had the privilege of selling the wine from their properties and tithes without paying customs nor any tax, he has been lately compelled to do so by the king's officers'.⁴

If the re-established Plantagenet ducal administration had learnt any lesson from the demise of the principality it was an aversion towards raising funds from their Gascon subjects via direct taxation. Never in the remaining eighty years of Plantagenet rule in Bordeaux would they attempt another *fouage*, and indeed increasingly revenues from then on came in the form of their economic rents on the wine trade.

4.2 The consolidation of Lancastrian Gascony, 1390–1434

Richard II's plans for peace with France largely rested on a compromise over the sovereignty of Aquitaine. If the duchy could be transferred to another, namely his uncle John of Gaunt, the troubles of the past whereby the Plantagenets had so intolerably been both kings, and vassals to the French crown, could be avoided.⁵ Gaunt knew Gascony, in his youth he had been in Bordeaux with his older brother, had fought with the Anglo-Gascon army at Nájera, and had returned in the 1370s at the head of his chevauchée.⁶ Despite these connections the plan thrust him into a headlong confrontation with the Bordeaux elites, first when the duchy was transferred in 1390, and again more vehemently in 1394 when the estates of the Bordelais refused to recognise the duke's authority. Though, as Vale explained, the explanation most often given was that the new duke was

Béguey, the revenues of the estate returned under the control of the crown and were assigned to the constable and seneschal Sir John Radcliffe in the 1420s and 1430s (*CCR*, 1435–1441, pp. 90–1).

¹ *GSR*, C 61/97: 45.

² *Ibid.*

³ See Chapter 3.1.1 and Appendix 10.1.

⁴ *GSR*, C 61/119: 79.

⁵ See J.J.N. Palmer, 'The Anglo-French Peace Negotiations, 1390–1396', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 16 (1966), pp. 81–94, at p. 85.

⁶ S. Walker, 'John [John of Gaunt], duke of Aquitaine and duke of Lancaster, styled king of Castile and León (1340–1399), prince and steward of England,' *ODNB* <<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-1010377>>.

not of sufficient seniority or that he had ‘abused his powers’.¹ At its core the issue was that, if Gaunt were duke, the Gascons might lose their direct link with the English crown, and with it the right to petition the king directly and have resident royal officials. This threatened the Gascons’ economic as much as their political position. The prospect of a return to a governmental structure akin to the principality of the 1360s with all its fiscal demands was hardly alluring, moreover the idea threatened the precious direct relationship with the English crown that underwrote all their commercial privileges. What makes this explanation plausible is that disputes were only resolved with, in 1390, sufficient guarantees of their continued rights as well as assurances the duchy would not be fully alienated, and in 1394, a whole new charter of liberties and similar guarantees that Richard II would remain sovereign.² The Bordeaux burgesses gained a whole raft of new advantages, for example their further monopoly over wine sales from Pentecost to Michaelmas dates from this time.³ Such was the wider significance of the failure of Richard’s scheme that Palmer credited it with derailing the entire long term prospect of peace.⁴

The dispute was resurrected with Henry IV’s usurpation in 1399 when much of the duchy revolted. This, Vale argued, should be viewed as a continuation of previous opposition to Lancastrian interference in Gascony.⁵ For a time there was a risk of a wholesale change of loyalty to Charles VI, even Archambaud de Grailly, the *capitain* de Buch, defected, though he had the greatest inducement of all in the form of the county of Foix.⁶ The rising was particularly prolonged in Bayonne, a reaction perhaps to Henry’s immediate revocation of the city’s right to charge duty on the merchandise of English merchants.⁷ Most of the duchy was soon brought back under the control of the crown, again by assurance and negotiation, this time by the archbishop Francesco Ugucione (d.1412), Henry Bowet and Sir Hugh Despenser as royal proctors, with the aid of the lord of Duras, who was to become seneschal as a result.⁸ Whilst, as explained by Vale, the successful management of subtle political relationships was important, it might be argued that the strength of the Lancastrian position now lay in the Plantagenet control of trade. It was fortunate that the 1390s had seen a strong recovery in the scale of wine exports to England, as such economic inducements were still powerful. Those, like Bordeaux’s burgesses, for whom the very continuation of commercial links was necessary for their survival, were most easily convinced. The flood of patronage given in the duchy by Henry IV in the first decade of the fifteenth century, much of it based on revenues or advantages in the wine trade, was the main incentive for others.⁹

Thus, under the Lancastrians Gascony had become fully a ‘rentier’ state. Yet in promoting support for the government this policy would inexorably create wider tensions between those who

¹ Vale, *English Gascony*, pp. 27–8.

² Palmer, ‘The Anglo-French Peace Negotiations’, pp. 81–94, at pp. 92–4.

³ *Livre des bouillons*, pp. 195–196, 268.

⁴ Palmer, ‘The Anglo-French Peace Negotiations’, pp. 81–94, at p. 94.

⁵ Vale, *English Gascony*, pp. 29–35.

⁶ Pépin, ‘The French Offensives of 1404–1407’, pp. 1–40, at pp. 1–2.

⁷ Vale, *English Gascony*, pp. 35–6.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 39–48.

⁹ See Chapter 2.2.2.

saw the benefits and those who did not. In such circumstances, the towns of the *Haut-Pays*, isolated from the capital, were bound to be excluded. In the past they had needed to be bribed with special tax privileges to engage with the far-off English market, but that was a policy which only ever produced fragile results. Now, with an ever more economically protected Bordelais, such bonds of loyalty farther away became ever weaker the longer such areas of production remained disconnected from the export market. For the towns of the Agenais the English export market held none of the draw in the fifteenth century that it had in the fourteenth. Indeed there are indications, expounded by Pépin, that those that had remained in Plantagenet hands thus far had willingly submitted to the count of Armagnac in 1405.¹ Likewise a key noble of the *Haut-Pays*, Guilhem-Ramon (d.1418), lord of Caumont, submitted to the count by treaty, despite his predecessor Nopar having negotiated in 1399 to receive the customs revenues for any wine exported from seven Agenais towns he had captured.² Evidently such revenues were insufficient to warrant continued loyalty to Henry IV.

Division was also in evidence in Bordeaux itself where one dispute between two burgesses in particular serves as a revealing example.³ During the first year of Henry IV's reign (1399/1400), at the height of opposition to Lancastrian rule, one Bertran Ozanne stopped Johan Boulomer in the street and declared that:

The English are bad people causing great offence, and lately they were in Margaux and Macau where they have cut down the trees laden with fruit, taking them into their ships; and know you that we have to leave their lordship.

Boulomer, a tailor who rented a shop from the crown near the *Château de l'Ombrière*,⁴ insisted that they must remain loyal for otherwise:

How might the poor ploughmen live, and the subjects of the king of England, our lord, were they not able to sell their wines nor have goods from England as it is customary?

Such contrasting opinions are demonstrative of the Anglo-Gascon dilemma. Boulomer, who was a direct tenant of the king, worked in a trade which benefitted directly from imports of cloth from England – that used to buy wine. Ozanne, a more general merchant, with no known links to the wine trade, would have seen his wider imports become more expensive as the *livre* declined in value. Moreover, the subtext to Ozanne's account is that not only was produce being

¹ Pépin, 'The French Offensives of 1404–1407', pp. 1–40, at p. 13.

² TNA, SC 8/252/12597. The towns for which the customs payments were given were Caumont, Castelmoran, Castel Senheur, Dubort Saint Pierre, Coveux, Fauillet and Gontaud.

³ GSR, C 61/112: 25; 'Rymer's Foedera with Syllabus: June 1408', in *Rymer's Foedera*, 8, (ed.) T. Rymer (London, 1739–45), pp. 530–40, *BHO*.

⁴ TNA, E 101/180/9, fol. 21r.

exported (“the fruit”), but the very means of production was also being expropriated (“the trees”), a hint of recognition that there was a flow of capital from Gascony to England.¹

Even the political discourse among the wine-exporting burgesses at the top of ducal politics was very tense, a consequence of the political uncertainty and economic reverses of the time. The wine market was volatile, indeed, the C_v for nominal wine prices rose to 46% in this decade, close to what it had been in the 1370s.² In February 1405, the deputy mayor of Bordeaux, Ramon Monadey, was banished by the city’s *jurade*.³ A substantial trader of an old patrician family and long standing importer into England, Ramon evidently had previously held some influence in the court of Richard II, for in 1378 he had received a royal pardon from for having killed one Arnaut Dusselyn, another Bordeaux resident.⁴ However Monadey’s commercial and political prosperity did not last long into the Lancastrian succession. His business by 1402–3 had been much diminished, he only exported 16 tuns that year compared with 117½ tuns in the mid-1380s, a decline of over 85%.⁵ All that is known of the dispute was that he, by his own testimony, ‘did not agree to an evil letter sent by some jurats to the king’.⁶ An appeal to Henry IV went against the deputy mayor and a vineyard seized from Ramon at this time remained in the crown’s possession for many years.⁷

Despite such obvious divisions Bordeaux’s burgesses would emerge, through the Lancastrian ascendancy, in an especially prominent role within the Anglo-Gascon union. It has long been suggested, by Lodge among others, that an important shift took place by the early fifteenth century that left the Bordeaux commune largely autonomous, and with a large degree of control over the remainder of the duchy.⁸ The *jurade*, council of thirty, and of three hundred, along with the body of burgesses that they led, took on a greater role in defence and diplomacy than they ever had done in previous centuries. Their response to the French military offensives by the count of Armagnac then duke of Orléans in 1405–8 is demonstrative of this. The city’s officials financed, organised and directed both troops and a fleet action against the enemy. Such efforts would be repeated in 1420, 1438, 1442 and 1450.⁹ By comparison the ducal authority’s involvement in

¹ Boulomer and Ozanne’s feud culminated in August 1407 with a long duel in Nottingham castle, before being stopped by the king in a dramatic fashion, see *GSR*, C 61/112: 25.

² See Appendix 8.1.2 for wine price volatility by decade.

³ *GSR*, C 61/110: 9.

⁴ TNA, E 101/80/23, m. 4; *GSR*, C 61/91: 69. Ramon was also given letters of protection to travel freely, and was later in the presence of the king in chancery in July 1387 to stand surety for that shipload of grain owned by the cathedral in Bayonne would reliably return to Gascony, *GSR*, C 61/91: 70; C 61/100: 1.

⁵ TNA, E 101/185/11, fos 16r, 27r; E 101/183/11, fos 2r, 3r, 7r, 14v, 17v, 19r, 29r, 29v, 38v, 40r, 46r, 46v, 48v, 66v, 68r, 71v, 75r, 75v.

⁶ *GSR*, C 61/110: 9.

⁷ TNA, E 101/187/12, fol. 18v. This was leased out for a rent of 1 or 2 tuns of wine per annum, which was then sold, and the profits sent to the *Château de l’Ombrière*’s treasury.

⁸ Lodge, *Gascony under English rule*, p. 158.

⁹ *RJ*, II, pp. 549, 565, 57–4, 586; ‘Compte du trésorier de la ville de Bordeaux pour 1442’, pp. 179–215, particularly at pp. 190–2; ‘Petite chronique de Guyenne’, pp. 53–79, at p. 65; *The Chronicles of Enguerrand de Monstrelet*, (trns.) T. Johnes, 2 (London, 1840), pp. 74, 190–1. Also see Pépin, ‘The French Offensives of 1404–1407’, pp. 1–40, at pp. 14, 27. For more on the military capability of Bordeaux, see V. Haure, ‘Bordeaux à la fin du Moyen Age, une puissance militaire: composition et organisation de ses forces armées’, *Annales du Midi*, 126 (2014), pp. 139–59. For work on Bordeaux’s naval exploits in particular, see S. Lavaud,

military matters was largely reduced to maintaining important garrisons, such in the large castle of Fronsac, on the Dordogne, which became a secondary seat of royal power. This change is not to be overestimated however, even Lodge conceded that true authority still resided with the king and his officers, all decisions could be countermanded by the seneschal.¹

The increasing prominence of Bordeaux's elites was largely down to money. Little by way of fiscal transfers now arrived in the *Château de l'Ombrière* from Westminster. The administration had its resources gradually stripped away as revenues on the wine trade fell in real terms with the decline in the *livre*, and by the redirection of so much of what remained into the pockets of nobles and technocrats.² The aristocracy, as Boutruche's work corroborated, was largely bankrupt without it.³ The top burgesses of Bordeaux, by contrast, protected by their privileges and buoyant commercial profits, remained, along with the church, remarkably solvent. Their bourgeois funds underwrote all government action in Lancastrian Gascony, whether it was money taxed or lent to the commune, or that loaned to the ducal authorities to cover their increasing budget deficits.⁴

Exports improved from c.1415, thanks to monetary reforms and the relative military security of local truces. This in turn revived the Anglo-Gascon economy.⁵ Rebelliousness appears to have subsided, along with price wine volatility which fell to its lowest level in this period.⁶ Returns on vineyard land increased dramatically, stimulating investment.⁷

The secular lords saw little of the benefit, seigneurial money rents were in headlong decline because of scarce tenants and the ongoing depreciation of the *livre*.⁸ Most lacked the necessary liquid capital to make use of the boom in trade, indeed almost all exports from secular seigneurial sources were in a slump at this time.⁹ Instead they would have to resort to forced expropriation of goods in order to benefit. Nowhere was this felt more than in the *Haut-Pays*, particularly those closer frontier towns of the Bazadais and Périgord, whose economic interests in the wine trade might have been more resilient. This is clearest in and around Bergerac, where the records of their *jurade* kept details of such exactions. As early as 1375, one year after the town fell to French forces, *patis* or *sufferte*, protection payments in cash or kind, began to be demanded, much of which was transferred in the form of the town's wine surplus.¹⁰ In autumn 1381, agents of Sir Bertucat d'Albret, who held the nearby castle of Montcuq, demanded certain quantities of wine

'La flotte communale au service de l'effort de guerre; le cas de Bordeaux pendant la guerre de Cent ans', in *Gens de Mer: Ports et cités aux époques ancienne, médiévale et moderne*, (eds.) É. Guerber, G. Le Bouëdec (Rennes, 2013), pp. 55–71.

¹ Lodge, *Gascony under English rule*, p. 158.

² See Chapters 2.2.2 and 2.4.2.

³ Boutruche, *La Crise*, pp. 247–342, 350–1.

⁴ See Chapters 3.1.1 and 3.4.1.

⁵ See Chapters 2.4.2 and 3.4.2–3.

⁶ See Appendix 8.1.2 for wine price volatility by decade.

⁷ See Chapter 3.4.1.

⁸ See Chapter 3.3.1–2.

⁹ See Chapter 3.3.2.

¹⁰ *Les Jurades de la ville de Bergerac*, pp. 32–5. For analysis of the *patis* and *sufferte* taken in the Bordelais and Bazadais, particularly the town of Saint-Émilion, see G. Pépin, 'Patis et souffertes en Bordelais et Bazadais (1391–1439): le prix de la paix pendant la guerre de Cent Ans', *Revue Historique de Bordeaux et du département de la Gironde*, 20 (2014), pp. 13–39.

for him to send on to England. The following year, the lord of Mussidan extorted 25 pipes of wine as payment of *patis*, even though the town's security had apparently already been guaranteed by the lord of Duras for a disbursement that included 3 tuns, also of wine. By 1386, the lord of Labarde was also involved, receiving 6 tuns that December.¹ So many examples of *patis* appear on the *jurade*'s books and such arrangements may have been commonplace even routine.

By the fifteenth century such behaviour had grown evidently so traumatic for commerce as to become unsustainable. For example, in 1405 it was reported how Ramonet de Sort, the lord of Montcuq and sometime English partisan, had seized 25 pipes of wine, en route along the Dordogne to be sold to Libourne merchants, and demanded two francs per tun in order to allow the shipment to continue.² Such actions compelled Bergerac to entreat Henry IV for letters of protection in 1409, even though it remained in French loyalty.³ This did little good. Not only did de Sort continue to receive free wine, by 1416, the *captal* de Buch, the lord of Duras and the constable of Bordeaux were all also making extortionate demands in wine from the town, so much so that a *taille*, property tax, of more than 420 francs was required by the commune to pay for the king's claims alone.⁴ The following year, the lord of Montferrand received 12 tuns along with sum of cash for the administration.⁵ In 1418 John Beauchamp, acting on behalf the Bordeaux constable, then in residence at Fronsac castle, arranged an ongoing annual payment of 30 pipes.⁶ Altogether these exactions represented a constant flow of wealth out of the hands of Bergerac's merchants. By May 1416, the *consuls* and *jurats* of Bergerac specifically blamed all these demands of the English king and his council for the terrible state of the town.⁷ It is unclear how the relationship between towns such as Bergerac and the ducal administration altered once back in England hands, as it was in 1435, but seeing as though the French had no qualms about previously extorting wine themselves, as had the counts of Périgord and *captals* de Puch Agut, it is possible little changed.⁸

Broadly similar behaviour likely took place all across contended regions. Whether the aim was greed, the 'honeypot' effect of trade, or was a military strategy to impoverish towns in enemy hands, both certainly succeeded, but by further sapping capital and business confidence it was neither likely to increase the level of commerce with *Haut-Pays*, nor was it likely to mean its population would feel any compulsion towards espousing the Plantagenet cause long-term.

¹ *Les Jurades de la ville de Bergerac.*, pp. 60, 64, 69–71, 113.

² *Ibid.*, p. 146.

³ *GSR*, C 61/112: 139.

⁴ *Les Jurades de la ville de Bergerac.*, pp. 158, 179, 201–2, 204.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 214–5

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 216.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 205–7.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 105, 120, 188–94, 202.

4.3 The end of Plantagenet Aquitaine, 1435–53

With the repudiation of the Anglo-Burgundian alliance after the congress of Arras in 1435, the war entered a new phase which saw a Valois king ascendant in Charles VII (r.1422–61). Conflict in and near Gascony began to intensify after having remained at a low level for some fifteen years thanks to truces and apathy on both sides. The initiator of the pro-French campaigns in the 1430s was undoubtedly Rodrigo de Villandrando (d.1457), the Castilian mercenary captain and routier, known as ‘emperor of pillagers’.¹ Once persuaded by Charles to take the fight to the English, in 1437 Rodrigo began to harass the western Agenais, capturing a number of towns, including Tonneins on the Gironde, one of the few that still had growth in wine exports.² The *Petite chronique* states Rodrigo was joined the following year, 1438, at Clairac on the Lot River by Charles [II] lord of Albret (1407–71), his bastard son Gilles (d.1479) and the Gascon Jean Poton de Xaintrailles (1390–1461), before together invading the heart of the remaining Plantagenet duchy.³ Over August and September they ravaged the Bordelais along the Médoc peninsula as far Soulac, stormed the castle at Castelnau-en-Médoc, property of the *capit* de Buch and attacked the lordship of Blanquefort, property of the lord of Duras, and finally occupied the wealthy collegiate church and suburb of Saint Seurin, situated just to the north ‘a bow’s shot distance outside Bordeaux’s walls’. Monstrelet described a vicious though inconclusive battle between French and Anglo-Gascon forces that had sallied out from the city, only to be ambushed by Rodrigo amongst the high-trellised vines of the productive gravel bank on the outskirts of the city. Unable to take Bordeaux, it is said the French, ‘destroyed, without opposition, that part of the country, which was abundant in all things - for until then, it had been a long time without suffering the miseries of war’.⁴

Though it is true that no hostile army had come near Bordeaux since the beginning of the century, the duchy had already been experiencing a severe economic slowdown for some years. Gone were the years of wine export growth of the 1420s, and with it the expanding money supply and burgeoning commercial activity. Exports had declined, whilst the level of food imports from England in 1432 reached such an unprecedented level that much of the accumulated metal stocks of the previous decade had drained abroad. Market prices of silver reached such a level that the *Châteaux de l’Ombrière* engaged in wholesale debasement of the coinage simply in order to replenish the money supply, the result was rampant inflation.⁵ Thus the arrival of Villandrando caused a serious crisis in an already ailing export sector. Wine prices that decade were again very volatile.⁶ The *Petite Chronique* states that by 1437 the price of a tun in Bordeaux was around 40 francs (£5 sterling), which was already double the average for the fifteenth century, and in 1438 prices rose further to between 40 and 50 francs per tun. This spike in prices announced itself in

¹ J. Quicherat, *Rodrigue de Villandrando* (Paris, 1879), pp. 122–3.

² See Chapter 3.4.3.

³ ‘Petite chronique de Guyenne’, pp. 53–79, at p. 65.

⁴ *The Chronicles of Enguerrand de Monstrelet*, p. 74.

⁵ See Chapter 2.4.

⁶ The nominal price C_v in the 1430s reached over 39%, compared with 31% the decade previous, see Appendix 8.1.2 for price volatility by decade.

England as a serious profit warning. Rapid divestment from the trade by English merchants and ship-owners was the result. The wine fleet, which had numbered 126 ships during the year from Michaelmas 1436, fell to 84 the following year and just 49 the year after that. The quantity of wine shipped shrank 68% between 1436 and 1438.¹ Such was the evaporation of export demand that by 1440 the price of wine had sunk to just 12 francs per tun, from its peak a decline in nominal value of 76%, and in terms of sterling over 80% because of concurrent devaluations.² For the first time in probably centuries English imports of wine were greater than Gascon exports, confirming that the duchy's most reliable buyers were decidedly going elsewhere.³

These military events themselves were brief. Monstrelet himself remarked that, 'in the course of a year, the English reconquered the greater part of these places', and apart from a brief assault on Bazas in 1439, their direct consequences would have soon subsided.⁴ Nevertheless, the trauma wrought on the wine market was such that Plantagenet Gascony was plunged into a deep economic recession of such severity that it would not be anachronistic to term it a depression. Poignant evidence for this lies in reports of deteriorating wine quality first 1432 and then in 1445 as Gascon producers struggled with rising nominal costs but low real export prices.⁵ Despite falling prices export recovery was extremely slow, while all the time imports were rising, apart from a brief fall in 1438 when shipping was in itself insufficient because of the divestment of English merchants.⁶ All remaining gold and silver left the economy and coin production at the Bordeaux mint slowed to a trickle.⁷ Low returns from wine customs meant that the ducal government too suffered increasingly from financial insolvency.⁸ The constables had to resort to writing out debentures for their creditors, letters addressed to the exchequer in Westminster requesting they themselves honour the debts of the holder.⁹ It is unclear how often these could be successfully redeemed given the crown's ever increasing insolvency during the reign of Henry VI.¹⁰ Such was the backdrop to the closing years of Plantagenet rule, brought about by a crisis in trade.

¹ TNA, E 101/192/8, fol. 31.

² See price data in Appendix 8.1.1.

³ In 1437–8 Gascony exported 4,761 tuns, but 5,383 were imported into England. This was also the case in 1438–9 (4,052 exported, 5,069 imported) and 1443–4 (8,827 exported, 9,828 imported). See Appendices 3.1 and 3.4.

⁴ *The Chronicles of Enguerrand de Monstrelet*, p. 74.

⁵ 'Henry VI: May 1432', item 43, *PROME, BHO*; TNA, C 49/26/8.

⁶ See Chapter 2.4.1 and Appendix 3.1 for Gascon exports; see Chapter 3.2 and Appendix 5.2 for English mercantile divestment.

⁷ See mint data in Appendix 6.1.

⁸ See Chapter 3.1 and Appendix 10.1 for declining ducal wine revenues.

⁹ For example, Walter Colles had to resort to this method from 1437, see TNA, E 101/192/9, no. 22.

¹⁰ For the crown's wider fiscal difficulties, see Griffiths, *The Reign of King Henry VI*, pp. 109, 114, 119, 377, 394, 406.




Figure 24 Number of forfeitures of fiefs in Gascony against total wine exports (tuns), 1430–1452. **Source:** Forfeitures from Vale, *English Gascony*, pp. 242–3 (originally from *GSR*, C 61/107–140); export data from TNA, E 101/192/8, fol. 31; E 364/84, m. 20; E 364/91, m. 13; James, *Studies*, pp. 55–6.

A dispute between the *captal* de Buch and lord of Montferrand over the Castillon inheritance broke out into violent conflict in 1436.¹ Even as they did so rebellion amongst important Gascons began again in step with the military and economic crises. Forfeitures of fiefs in the duchy began to appear in the Gascon rolls. For the following fifteen years incidences of rebellion coincide with years of below average exports (Figure 24). Again, these were not necessarily only connected to the immediate downturn in trade – the presence of a hostile army also allowed those with grievances the opportunity to act on them. This appears the case for those first involved, men such as Ivo du Puch, Ramon de Viella or Guitart de Bézaudu, who themselves lacked any direct investment in commerce or its benefits.² There was potentially a geographical element to this – all held their fiefs remotely from Bordeaux and near those leading the renewed hostility to the English duchy. Ivo du Puch was in Sauveterre-en-Guyenne in the *Entre-Deux-Mers*, one of the targets of Rodrigo in 1437. De Viella held the lordship of Doazit in the far south of the Landes near Saint-Sever, and de Bézaudu, captain of Tartas, held property in the nearby lordship of Brassens. Both were near the centre of power of the lords of Albret. Neither of the rebels in the Landes, like Charles [II] d’Albret himself, would have gained financially by commercial links with England. Though Sauveterre-en-Guyenne might have once have been a producer of wine for export its status as a frontier town may have precluded any strong loyalty through financial inducements.

The economic crisis did however inflict long term damage to loyalty at the heart of power. By 1442, when Thomas Beckington and Sir Robert Roos arrived in the duchy to negotiate the

¹ Vale, *English Gascony*, p. 105

² *GSR*, C 61/128: 6; C 61/128: 8; C 61/129: 53.

marriage of Henry VI to a daughter of the count of Armagnac, the mood in Bordeaux was one of malaise.¹ This view is evident in letters they sent back to England and in the journal of Beckington's secretary. The pair were well placed to make this assessment, having disembarked in July and spent the following months in the Bordelais in constant dialogue with all key figures in the duchy, attending regular meetings with the king's council and members of the ducal government. They had separate lunches or dinners with the archbishop Pey Berland, the bishop of Bazas Henri François de Cavier (d.1446), deans of Saint-André, Saint-Seurin and Saint-James, as well as the English mayor, Gadifer Shorthose, Bernard Angevin, and the *capit* de Buch. The image given was a duchy at war with itself, torn apart by 'selfe misgovernance', while 'al is against the king and to his grete hurt', and that there was 'no council remaining that cared for the interests or advantage of the king'. There was an outstanding law suit against the constable Robert Clifton, excommunicated over local unpaid debts. It required the insistent intervention of Roos himself, made regent on account of the recent capture of the seneschal, to organise the sending of troops to the aid of La Réole, then under siege. The dean of Saint-André declared openly that they would submit to whichever side, Plantagenet or Valois, was strongest.²

This was all the worse for the year 1442 brought yet another campaign against the remains of the duchy, this time by Charles VII himself. Bayonne had been attacked and the king had marched up the Garonne valley with great success, capturing: Clairac; Tonneins; Gontaut; Caumont; Marmande; and critically Langon; before finally the said castle at La Réole.³ Charles' invasion coincided with further increases in the forfeitures of rebels' fiefs, which continued over the following 18 months (Figure 24). Again, as with the previous crisis, the nobility of the Landes to the south formed a large proportion of the defectors, men such as the lords of Estaing, Caupenne, Sarain, and others that had all been traditionally staunch supporters of the English crown.⁴ It could never be claimed that such seigneuries, given their location in the sandy, forested Landes, were ever tied closely to England through the wine trade, though their loyalty was vulnerable to the diminished financial viability of the ducal administration. For, as Vale observed, it was the lack of rewards from the crown which 'had forfeited the support of those families whose loyalty had been most constant'.⁵ Such is the fate of 'rentier-states' when the economic rents on which the regime is based are no longer generating sufficient value to sustain them.

There were also defections in which commercial matters may have been more at the directly pertinent, particularly those three more northerly lords: Bérard de Lamothe, the lord of Roquetaillade to the south of Langon; the lords of Biron in the southern Périgord; and Francès, lord of Gramont and Mussidan. The first two seigneuries were particularly vulnerable to French predations: Biron, deep in French-held *Haut-Pays* would long have suffered from the economic

¹ *Journal of Beckington*, p. 14. They reported to the king of 'as sorrowful a town and as gretly dismayed and discouraged as any might be in th'erth as poeuple desolat and cast out of al comfort of any socour to be had from your said mageste ageinst your enemies that ben in this cuntry in gret puissance'.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 20–1, 38.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

⁴ Vale, *English Gascony*, pp. 211–4.

⁵ *Ibid.*

protection of the Bordelais; while Roquetaillade, based around the eponymous castle on the border with the Bazadais, had produced 25 tuns of wine per year for export at the beginning of the century, it no longer exported any.¹ Likewise a 1.66% cut of the wine passing Langon, which the Lamothe family had held since the 1370s, would have become worthless as the trade passing by shrank into the 1430s.² Such penury left Bérard de Lamothe open to the temptingly generous pension offered by Charles VII in 1442, as was his brother Jean, lord of Castelnaud and Noaillan the following year.³ Francès, lord of Gramont was by far the greatest landholder to be tempted to the French cause. Though the Mussidan inheritance he held on the northern frontier was of long-diminished viticultural and commercial potential, among his other possessions were a wide array of parishes across the Bordelais which would have remained wine exporting until recent years.⁴ Francès was keen to join the French after only gaining his inheritance from his predecessor in 1441. A decline in revenues probably left the 600 *écu* annuity he was paid from the wine customs insufficient to counterbalance the offer of a 10,000 *écu* lump sum from Charles VII as well as a pension of 1,000*l* *tour.* per year.⁵

The connection between the collapse in loyalty and the wine trade was clear enough to contemporary observers. Beckington and Roos reported in a letter to Henry VI that in their opinion, had English merchants still been arriving to buy wine in as greater numbers as they had in the past, ‘doubtles your enemies wold not have abiden to do this grete harme that have doon and dayly doth’.⁶ The ambassadors well understood the economic conditions, Beckington himself observed the harvest and vinification at Saint-Seurin, the institution that had borne the brunt of the incursion by Rodrigo four years earlier. Like the church as a whole, Saint-Seurin’s exports remained well below what they’d been in the mid-1430s. If we take the depreciation of the *livre* into account their returns from wine sales must have been considerably beneath expected levels.⁷ The lack of security in the internal Gascon trade would have contributed to deterring English investment, and this was experienced first-hand by the visitors on the night of 1–2 August 1442 the French raided Bordeaux harbour and were able to seize two ships carrying wine and grain - though later these were retaken.⁸

With the truce of Tours in May 1444, the issue of reforms to the wine trade soon came to the fore as a matter of urgency. Though these were presented by English merchant interests at the parliament in February 1445, Thomas Beckington attended, by then in his capacity as the bishop of Bath and Wells, and may have been persuasive as to their wider importance.⁹ The wine market was decisively deregulated, and this brought growth in wine exports, but it did not correct the deep-seated economic problems under which the duchy then suffered.¹⁰ The economy was more

¹ TNA, E 101/184/19, fos 41v, 52r.

² GSR, C 61/87: 57.

³ Vale, *English Gascony*, pp. 206–8.

⁴ GSR, C 61/131: 18; C 61/132: 12.

⁵ Vale, *English Gascony*, pp. 208–9.

⁶ *Journal of Beckington*, p. 51.

⁷ See Chapters 2.4.2 and 3.3.1; also see Appendix 4.1.1.

⁸ *Journal of Beckington*, pp. 25–6.

⁹ ‘Henry VI: February 1445’, items 45–6, *PROME, BHO*.

¹⁰ See Chapter 2.1.2.

specialised than ever, and totally dependent on goods, particularly food, from England.¹ The money supply was still greatly diminished by bullion famine and trade deficits, only a trickle of coinage ever emerged from the *Château de l'Ombrière's* mint, and even though the coinage now had little intrinsic worth in precious metal, inflation was again turning to deflation.² These all inhibited the swift re-building of Anglo-Gascon capital after the invasions of 1438 and 1442.

Another problem with the reforms of 1445 was that their benefits were unequally distributed. Wine bought away from Bordeaux then exported increased by 68.3% in total volume, and as a share of exports from 23.4% to 33.9%.³ Given sufficient time, such a shift should have rebuilt economic links with towns and seigneuries on the frontiers and potentially attracted a return of wider loyalty to the Plantagenet cause. By comparison, though the exports of the church in Bordeaux rose substantially, in general exports of wine from burgess-held vineyards around the city did not increase at all, and fell as an overall proportion of the market. Between September 1442 and September 1446, 67% of exports were produced under the Bordeaux franchise, but between September 1446 and June 1451 this had fallen to 57%. Though the city's very richest burgesses continued to handle much of Gascony's increased internal trade, the diminution of Bordeaux as a marketplace greatly undermined wider interests in commercial links with England. That in 1435–9 stock bought and sold in the city constituted 34.2% of exports, but only 20.5% in 1446–51 eroded the wealth of the city's notaries, agents and brokers.⁴

What must have been obvious at the time was how the profit margins of English merchants had increased dramatically as they accessed cheaper wine stocks in larger quantities.⁵ Yet because of falling prices and the diminished intrinsic and exchange value of the *livre*, the returns for producers and exporters were falling in real terms. Those that had sufficient reserves of capital to do so exported more. The archbishop Pey Berland, major Bordeaux religious chapters, certain lords like the *capit* de Buch, and greater burgess families, did this, though in so doing would only have maintained their incomes.⁶ All those who could not boost their production or export level would see a reduction in their real incomes even as they observed overall exports of wine booming. Such considerations may explain why commercial reforms did not resolve Gascony's political issues after 1445, only widened them. Pro-English and pro-French factions were solidified. The great and growing antagonism was immediately palpable in a letter dated September 1446 from the mayor and aldermen of London to their counterparts in Bordeaux. This made accusations of active violations of English commercial freedoms to trade in the duchy, and threatened the seizure of Gascon ships in retaliation.⁷ It was effectively a test case for the reforms, listing the various

¹ See Chapter 2.4.1–2.

² See Chapter 2.4.2.

³ This compares the export data from September 1442–September 1446 and that from September 1446–June 1451: TNA, E 364/84, m. 20; E 364/91, m. 13.

⁴ TNA, E 364/75, m. 5, 5 dorso; E 364/84, m. 20; E 364/91, m. 13.

⁵ See Chapters 2.3.1 and 3.2.

⁶ See Appendices 4.1.1, 4.2.1 and 4.3.1.

⁷ *AHG*, I, pp. 147–50.

impositions placed upon two aldermen: William Abraham, a vintner, later a sheriff;¹ and Alan Johnson, a grocer; including their arrest and detention.

Forfeitures of fiefs began again from 1448 and increased with the resumption of hostilities with the French crown the following year (see Figure 24). The year 1450 would be critical, marked by invasions in the north of the duchy: Jean [IV] (d.1452), count of Périgord took Bergerac back into French hands for the final time; Arnaud-Amanieu (c.1424–63), lord of Orval, third son of the lord of Albret, advanced from Bazas along the southern bank of the Garonne with a large force, with the intention of repeating Villandrando's chevauchée through the Bordelais and the Médoc. His way was blocked 6.5km (4 miles) from Bordeaux by a larger army, hastily assembled and led by Gadifer Shorthose, the mayor. Despite being outnumbered and lightly-equipped Orval achieved a stunning victory, blamed by Monstrelet on the cowardice of Shorthose. We are told 1,800 English and Anglo-Gascon troops were killed, 1,200 taken prisoner – and the French returned to Bazas in triumph.² This day was known ever after as the 'Mal Journade' (quite literally the 'Bad Day') by the pro-English Gascons, and is viewed as the critical defeat of that faction in Bordeaux in the final days.³ For the collapse of loyalty during the 1451 French conquest of the duchy of Aquitaine appears so sudden as to suggest that the military superiority of French forces, advancing from the north and east, was such that all concerned knew that the writing was on the wall. This is certainly the impression given by Monstrelet, the principal chronicle source.⁴ We should, however, be extremely wary of such a simple explanation for Charles VII's success. Overwhelming force had failed in the past, such as in 1405–8. In fact the conquest relied on a careful use of economic inducements, in this the French king was evidently aware that his route to Bordeaux had to be through the Gascon purse, as much as by martial prowess.

All towns taken were given clear commercial privileges at least equivalent to what they held under the English king. Monstrelet recounts the dramatic siege of Blaye by Jean (1402–68), count of Dunois, in May 1451 in which the town was cut off from supply by sea and stormed. But suspiciously, despite the town's supposed strong resistance, it received an extremely generous charter only the following year suggesting it had actually come to terms.⁵ The supposition, cited by Lodge, that the reluctance to fight was because the campaign coincided with the grape harvest, cannot be true.⁶ This was still months away. Instead the tradition of supplication over concerns about viticulture may however reveal a broader truth – the areas through which Dunois' army first advanced had long been damaged by the Plantagenet management of the wine trade and preference in favour of Bordeaux.⁷ For Bourg likewise surrendered after the no more than six days, despite being heavily garrisoned, and gained privileges within a month which included tax-free sales for

¹ For William Abraham's election as sheriff, see 'Folio 238b: Sept 1447', in *Calendar of Letter-Books of the City of London: K, Henry VI*, (ed.) R.R Sharpe (London, 1911), pp. 314–25, *BHO*.

² *The Chronicles of Enguerrand de Monstrelet*, pp. 190–1.

³ Lodge, *Gascony under English rule*, pp. 125–6.

⁴ *The Chronicles of Enguerrand de Monstrelet*, pp. 191–8.

⁵ *AHG*, XII, pp. 21–3.

⁶ Lodge, *Gascony under English rule*, p. 127.

⁷ See Chapters 2.1.3, 2.2.1, and 3.4.2.

the wines of the town's burgesses.¹ The formidable castle at Fronsac was also strongly defended, but immediately asked for terms as the French drew near. Libourne and Saint-Émilion, close by, did not offer any defence whatsoever, and gladly submitted to French rule in return for guarantees of privileges. The latter gained the right to raise taxes on local wine sales for six years in order to repair its walls or spend on 'other communal matters'.² The same occurred with the offensive from the east under the command of Jean [V] (1420–73), count of Armagnac. Towns on that frontier that had also suffered from crown policy for decades gladly treated with the French, Sauveterre-en-Guyenne in the *Entre-Deux-Mers*, and Saint-Macaire on the river Gironde, both received similarly generous privileges as soon as they capitulated to the count in June.³

The disloyalty of the Anglo-Gascon nobility in the face of Charles VII's generosity should be emphasised also. The surrender of Pierre [II] de Montferrand (1410–54), *soudan* de la Trau, along with the Bertrand [IV] de Montferrand (d.1474), lord of Montferrand and mayor Gadifer Shorthose, in the castle at Blaye was blamed in his pardon two years later on overwhelming odds. Yet it was also admitted by the *soudan* himself he had, 'to save his lands and lordships, just like many other nobles, made an agreement with the king's [Henry VI's] adversary [Charles VII]'.⁴ This needs to be understood in the context of Beckington's assessment of the fractured political situation in 1442. Such ambiguous loyalty of the lords, visible then, had come to define 1451, during which a cascade of fief confiscations were entered in the Gascon rolls (Figure 24). That the Anglo-Gascon leaders at Blaye were almost immediately freed by Dunois, and included in the main negotiations with representatives of the French crown less than a month later, suggests that they had already planned to submit to the Valois king.

The agreement by which Bordeaux was yielded to the French crown was signed on 12 June 1451, ratified by Charles VII on 20 June, and the city was occupied on 30 June.⁵ The minutes recording the meeting of the chapter of Saint-André cathedral that day noted simply that 'the city of Bordeaux is of the kingdom of France'.⁶ The terms of the treaty itself, and the negotiations by which it came about, have been discussed only to a limited extent in the historiography. This is probably because just over fourteen months later, in October 1452, Bordeaux was already back in Plantagenet hands thanks to a conspiracy to allow John Talbot (1387–1453), earl of Shrewsbury, to enter the city.⁷ The French re-conquest in September 1453, after the decisive battle of Castillon that July, effectively made most of the terms of the deal redundant.⁸ Nevertheless the 1451 treaty itself provides clear confirmations as to the political relevance of the wine trade in the final years of Plantagenet Aquitaine and the impact crown policy had had.

¹ *AHG*, XXXI, pp. 255–65.

² *The Chronicles of Enguerrand de Monstrelet*, pp. 191–4; *AHG*, XXVIII, pp. 487–9.

³ *AHG*, X, pp. 79, 184–5.

⁴ *GSR*, C 61/139: 69.

⁵ *Livre des bouillons*, pp. 533–41; Lodge, *Gascony under English rule*, p. 128.

⁶ ADG, G 311, fol. 84v. 'Civitas Burdegale est Regni Francie' is written at the top of the day's proceedings.

⁷ Vale, 'The Last Years', pp. 119–38, at 128–31.

⁸ This was the point made by E.M. Carus-Wilson, 'The Effects of the Acquisition and of the loss of Gascony on the English wine trade', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 21:63 (1947), pp. 145–54, at p. 149–54.

The representatives of the Three Estates sent to negotiate with Jean de Dunois comprised the core of Anglo-Gascon power, almost all of whom had strong links to the mercantile community in Bordeaux. Pey Berland, the archbishop of Bordeaux, led the delegation, and was joined by the lord of Montferrand, lord of Duras, the lord of Lalande and la Brède, the lord of Lansac, Bernard Angevin, now lord of Rauzan and Gadifer Shorthose.¹ The only significant missing nobleman was the *capital* de Buch who was instead entreating with his kinsman, the count of Foix.² No current officer of the ducal administration, neither the seneschal nor constable attended, indeed it appears the mayor was the only Englishmen present at what was in effect a treasonous conference. There is little doubt that the terms agreed in June 1451 were extremely generous to the Gascons. There was to be no retribution for a populace that had remain so staunchly opposed to the French king for generations. With a couple of exceptions the deal was designed instead to retain the status quo but simply replace a Plantagenet overlord for a Valois.³ Of the twenty-six clauses, ten dealt with issues directly or indirectly affected the wine trade, covering a variety of commercial or economic issues.

Clauses 10 through 13 of the treaty affected all but were clearly aimed at clarifying the rights of the city's merchants.⁴ Those who did not want to enter into French allegiance would have six months to leave with all their moveable goods intact, and their immoveable goods could pass to their heirs. For this they would only have to pay one gold *écu* each to guarantee safe-conduct. Merchants who were absent abroad on business had a whole year to make up their mind about their prospective allegiances and could return without penalty. Moreover those Gascons who chose to leave but still had some goods in the duchy could have access to them at a later date.

Clauses 16 and 17 protected the rights of the key wine producers in the Bordelais: ecclesiastics would retain the product of their benefices and prebends; all concessions of land, castles and lordships made by the king of England were to be reconfirmed.⁵ Clause 18 guaranteed that no new taxes would be imposed by the new regime, which also protected the tax-free export privileges of the Bordeaux franchise. These were again re-enforced by clause 25 that guaranteed the French royal officers would respect the ancient customs of the land. This would include such rights of the Bordeaux burgesses as well as the other market rules what protected their commercial interests.⁶ Moreover, clause 19 granted that there would be no new duty imposed on any goods imported into the Bordelais that might be traded for wine.⁷

The inclusion of clause 23 was especially revealing as to the position of the Anglo-Gascon delegates. This set out the plan to establish a French royal mint in Bordeaux with the condition that the current circulating coinage would remain accepted for the next year or two. The French

¹ See Chapter 3.1.3 and 3.3; also Appendix 4.

² Lodge, *Gascony under English rule*, p. 128.

³ *Livre des bouillons*, pp. 537–8.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 538–9.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 539–40.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 539.

delegation conceded that Charles VII would forgo his right of seigniorage, and that the circulating coinage would be improved ‘for the profit of the people of said land’.¹

Put simply, the conditions set out by the 1451 treaty would, if enacted, serve to protect the long-term commercial interests of the Bordelais, and would allow Bordeaux to retain much of the regional dominance in the wine trade that had been accumulated over the previous century. That such an overwhelmingly aristocratic delegation would negotiate a deal so conducive to business continuity in Bordeaux demonstrates the great importance of the wine trade to the prosperity of the Anglo-Gascons even as they arranged to sever historic ties with the English crown. No doubt this had much to do with Pey Berland’s own propensity to push the archbishopric towards international trade and also the long-standing interests retained by many of the Anglo-Gascon lords, however reduced they had become of late.² Furthermore by guaranteeing the reversal of the previous decades of English monetary policy the lords evidently saw an opportunity to revive their seigniorial incomes, along with any profits from the export of surpluses.

Details as to the precise application of the treaty are unclear, as are the subsequent events after June 1451 that lead to the re-capture of much of the duchy by the English in October 1452. We cannot be sure how many Gascons left for England. Certainly there were not many among the nobility. They received generous pensions from Charles for their complicity in the transition of power.³ The exception to this was the Gaston de Foix, the *capitai* de Buch and his son John de Foix (c.1410–85), earl of Kendal, who fled across the Pyrenees the following year rather than pledge allegiance to the French king. A delegation from the Three Estates of the Bordelais, among them Pey du Tasta, the dean of St Seurin and the burgess Johan Gassias, whom had been in England for a number of years, took the option to stay and transfer their moveable property abroad as permitted by clause 13 of the treaty.⁴

Despite some more dogged resistance of Anglo-Gascon loyalists in Bayonne, and in the lordship of Lesparre in the northern Médoc, the transfer of power in 1451 appeared to have been broadly accepted.⁵ As Vale has suggested, evidence shows ‘little depth to the attachment of the Gascons to the English, at least at Bordeaux’.⁶ Yet within a year a pro-English conspiracy had formed within Bordeaux for which there is no simple or easy explanation. Commerce had continued apace out of Bordeaux’s port, the English wine fleet arrived in spring 1452, and only the customary duties were paid. Carus-Wilson showed in fact the scale of trade probably grew guaranteed by safe conducts from Charles VII.⁷ There is little evidence that the promise of amnesty

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 539–40. This was later considered important enough to be mentioned by Gabriel de Lurbe, *Chronique bourdeloise*, fol. 36.

² The wine exports of Pey Berland, archbishop of Bordeaux had steadily increased across his tenure, reaching 70 tuns in 1448–9, see TNA, E 101/192/1, fos 5v, 7v, 12r, 15v, 27v, 35r, 55v; E 101/194/3, fos 10v, 20r, 29r, 37v, 48v, 54r, 62r, 63r, 69v, 75r; E 101/195/19, fos 5v, 9v, 17v, 20r, 22r, 43v, 45v, 47r, 55v, 67r, 69r. Also see Chapter 3.3.1–2 for church and noble exports.

³ Vale, ‘The Last Years’, pp. 119–38, at 131.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 119–38, at 127.

⁵ Lodge, *Gascony under English rule*, p. 130.

⁶ Vale, ‘The Last Years’, pp. 119–38, at 123.

⁷ *AHG*, 38, p. 223; Carus-Wilson, ‘The Effects of the Acquisition and of the loss’, pp. 145–54, at p. 150–1.

and respect for property was reneged on by the French authorities, with the exception of the confiscation of the lucrative wine-producing lordship of Langoiran, once part of the Albret, then Lesparre-Montferrand inheritances.¹ Although none of the promised minting of new currency had begun in Bordeaux or Bayonne, nor would be until 1459, they could hardly be expected to begin so soon; besides which the Gascon delegates had requested the local money remain briefly in circulation.² The point of contention was supposedly clause 18, the agreement not to raise further taxes. A *taille*, a direct land tax, appeared to have been raised to pay for the garrisoning of Bordeaux.³ This was the opinion of Monstrelet, who stated that the Bordelais ‘had imposed on them heavier taxes, and that his officers had treated them with more harshness than they had been accustomed to when under the government of the English’.⁴

It has been suggested by some later French sources that this precipitated the sending of a ‘secret embassy’ of Gascon nobles to England to request the return of their former overlord, however this has been strongly disputed as apocryphal by Vale.⁵ Instead he suggested Talbot’s expedition was initiated by Gascon exiles in England, particularly Pey du Tasta, and orchestrated in Bordeaux by Pierre de Montferrand, the *soudan* de la Trau and a small network in the city centred on the parish of Saint-Michel, home to many wealthy merchants with interests in overseas trade. Vale correctly observed that many of the conspirators, named later by one of their number under torture, belonged to the *confrérie* of Saint-Michel – and posited that this could have been the focus for rebellion.⁶ It is certainly plausible that the composition of the organisation may have formed the network by which pro-English conspirators associated. Members of the key families with political influence in Plantagenet Bordeaux had also been long involved in the *confrérie*, notably the Monadey, Constantin, Peytavin, Lambert, and deu Casse.⁷ Such men would have still carried significant authority and could have raised the support necessary to instigate a revolt. Wider support from within the Bordeaux church should not be underestimated either. Labarge has suggested their discontent may have been stirred by the application of the Pragmatic Sanction of 1438, which gave Charles VII authority over ecclesiastical appointments and thus the revenues of benefices.⁸ As has been shown, it was not unusual for the English king to interfere in this manner, though Charles’ behaviour would have to have been far more heavy-handed to have contravened clause 16 of the 1451 treaty. The *Chronique bourdeloise* tells that in 1452 archbishop Berland and Elie [IV] de Bourdeille, bishop of Périgueux, sent deputies to directly oppose the sanction and ‘maintain the authority of the pope against the liberties of the Gallican church’.⁹ Moreover that July

¹ AHG, XXVI, p. 366.

² Miskimin, *Money and Power*, pp. 145–6, 191–2.

³ Lodge, *Gascony under English rule*, p. 130; Labarge, *Gascony, England’s First Colony*, p. 222.

⁴ *The Chronicles of Enguerrand de Monstrelet*, p. 222.

⁵ For example, see Gabriel de Lurbe, *Chronique bourdeloise*, fol. 37r; also see Vale, ‘The Last Years’, pp. 119–38, at 126–7.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 119–38, at 130.

⁷ ADG, G 2302, fol. 108r.

⁸ Labarge, *Gascony*, p. 222.

⁹ Gabriel de Lurbe, *Chronique bourdeloise*, fol. 37r.

Berland swore an oath in his cathedral that he would die archbishop, which can be seen as a promise to protect church assets.¹

Still, no satisfactory explanation has yet been made for what, of all these muddled grievances, precisely motivated the conspiracy of 1452 that led, on 23 October, to the breaking open of the Beyssac gate in Saint-Michel by some three hundred people. The reason for the *soudan*'s sudden reversal of opinion was likely bitterness at his loss of valuable portions of the Lesparre-Montferrand inheritance to Charles VII's royal *demesne*, including the lordship of La Tour de Bessan, that great wine-producing estate held by Sir Johan Colom in the previous century.² The majority of Plantagenet loyalists were those who had gained the most from economic ties with England, the top ecclesiastics and burgesses of Bordeaux most profitably involved in the wine trade. As the implications of French rule became clearer, particularly taxes on their prized investments in property, such vested interests desired a Plantagenet return out of simple financial self-interest. It is certainly clear that wine merchants such as Thomas (then sub-mayor of Bordeaux) and Thomelin Gassies, whom had previously accepted positions within the new regime, were then implicated in the plot.³ Both were kinsmen of the exile Johan Gassies and were members of that influential new patrician house of Gassies which as a whole had enjoyed particularly great commercial success in the final years. Their exports more than doubled between 1443–4 and 1448–9.⁴ Thomalin had increased his own exports from 4 to 10 tuns per annum, Thomas alone had exported some 50 tuns in 1448, of which 35 had been bought outside of Bordeaux.⁵ Such men were among the few who had continued to thrive even after the market reforms of 1445. Given how unequally the profits of trade were distributed and how divided the city politics were, it is certain that the conspirators represented only a small fraction of the population. The loyalties of the former Anglo-Gascon lords at that moment were similarly mixed. The south of the duchy remained French, which largely reflects the estrangement of much of that region from the English crown under the influence of the Albret a decade earlier. The key nobility of the north: Gaillard [IV] de Durfort, lord of Duras along with the *capit* de Buch, his son the earl of Kendal, and the lords of Montferrand, Rauzan, Anglade all re-joined the Plantagenet cause.⁶ Unfortunately we do not know what terms they were offered by the English crown.

During the brief return of the English, lasting just less than one year, Talbot and Sir Edward Hull, the constable, attempted to re-establish the commercial status quo. Some 9,919 tuns of wine were exported from the Bordeaux's port on board 97 ships, a greater level of economic activity than had taken place ten years previously.⁷ The proportion that was exported which came from franchised vineyards had risen back to 68.4%, above the level before the 1445 reforms,

¹ Labarge, *Gascony*, p. 222.

² Bailey, 'Les Châteaux de Landiras et de Montferrand and Their Seigneurial Families—Part Two)', pp. 156–66, at pp. 156–7.

³ Vale, 'The Last Years', pp. 119–38, at 130.

⁴ See Appendix 4.3.1.

⁵ TNA, E 101/192/1, fol. 36r; E 101/195/19, fos 38r, 51r, 61r.

⁶ Labarge, *Gascony*, p. 228.

⁷ TNA, E 364/92, m. 11; E 101/194/3, fol. 77r.

though the internal Bordeaux market still only constituted an all-time historical low of just 18.9% of exports.¹

The re-establishment of Plantagenet Gascony was cut short by the battle of Castillon on 17 July 1453, fought on the banks of the Dordogne. A few short hours of fighting saw the death of Lord Talbot, and his son Lord Lisle. This is rather clumsily set as the close of the Hundred Years' War, though that assessment is perhaps premature. It would require the sieges of Cadillac and the Durfort castle at Blanquefort before Bordeaux would finally fall again into French hands on 19 October.² The new agreement with Charles VII stripped away all the advantageous concessions of two years previous and amounted to almost an unconditional surrender with military occupation.³ Yet in return for large indemnity of 100,000 gold écus most of the population of Bordeaux were pardoned for rebellion, which may perhaps reflect how only a certain minority had actually ever welcomed the English return. Moreover many burgesses from old families such as Johan de Rostang, whom Vale suggested were largely beneficiaries of the conspiracy, were also forgiven.

Some loyal burgesses did then flee to England. The scale of this migration may have been overstated, but at the very least it constituted the core of the English-descended or pro-Plantagenet mercantile community in Bordeaux.⁴ Johan Constantin, for example, went into exile in order, it was reported, 'to preserve his loyalty to the king', this strongly suggests that Johan had himself been directly involved in the Saint-Michel conspiracy, and then attempted to avoid retribution.⁵ The key nobles who had repudiated the treaty of 1451 were banished – and would too head into exile in England.⁶ Pey de Tasta, the dean of Saint-Seurin, would remain in exile, but Pey de Bearn, younger son of the *capit* de Buch and abbot *in commendam* of Sainte-Croix, was tried for crimes of *lèse-majesté* for having conspired with Talbot after having sworn allegiance to Charles VII. In retribution royal troops ransacked all the property of the abbey in 1453. The following year all its goods were confiscated and its great wine-producing lands put under royal administration.⁷

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Despite the harshness of the second French occupation the wine trade with England continued to some degree. For English merchants and Gascon exiles the trade fell under a licensing regime managed in chancery, Carus-Wilson counted some 58 licences issued in 1454 and 32 in 1455 allowing merchants to return and trade.⁸ This was an increased transaction cost though evidently not insurmountable. In Gascony things were more uncertain. With the final capture of

¹ See Appendix 3.1–3.

² Vale, *English Gascony*, p. 153

³ Labarge, *Gascony*, p. 228.

⁴ James, *Studies*, pp. 85–8

⁵ *GSR*, C 61/141: 23.

⁶ Labarge, *Gascony*, p. 228.

⁷ A. Chauliac, *Histoire de l'abbaye Sainte-Croix de Bordeaux*, Archives de la France monastique, IX (Paris, 1910), pp. 188–90.

⁸ Carus-Wilson, 'The Effects of the Acquisition and of the loss', pp. 145–54, at p. 152.

Bordeaux in 1453, the responsibility for the wine trade and all that it entailed for Gascon prosperity passed to the Valois. There was to be a traumatic change in policy. Charles VII immediately placed an increased duty of 25 *sous* per tun on all exports, even on those wines from the estates of the Bordeaux burgesses, and removed their protected sales periods. This undid the very political-commercial status quo that cemented the city's pre-eminence in the region. Numerous restrictions were placed on visiting English merchants whom had been the dominant buyers for a century. This unsurprisingly included the need for safe-conducts, but also ships had to stop at Soulac at the mouth of the Gironde estuary then at Blaye, to obtain permits, give up weapons and pay fees. Even once in Bordeaux the English were only allowed permission to stay for one month, quartered with known hosts under curfew, and could do business beyond the city gates only under supervision and with another licence.¹

Even this remaining trade was at risk of further political or military confrontation. In July 1454, the *soudan* de la Trau returned from exile in London and landed with a small force in the Médoc near Lesparre.² He was almost immediately captured and then condemned, decapitated and quartered in Poitiers, but as a consequence Valois attitudes to commerce remained hostile. In 1455 Charles VII briefly attempted to block the granting of safe-conducts to 'enemy' merchants. This was quickly reversed after mass protest erupted.³ Such an atmosphere was hardly conducive to mercantile investment. The suppression of the export trade coincided with the worsening bullion famine and the Gascon economy re-entered a deep depression.⁴ Weak demand and deflation kept prices for wine very low. By autumn 1457 they had fallen to 20 *livres* per tun (about £1 10s sterling). The following year the same quantity was being sold for just 9 old écus worth around 12l 13s 1d (just under £1 sterling).⁵ An indicator of the terrible economic woes under which post-conquest Bordeaux in particular suffered, was that no coinage was produced in the city until 1459 and even then beginning in very small quantities.⁶

Political antagonism during the first phase of Edward IV's (r.1461–70, 1470–83) reign, confrontations between the English crown and the new French king Louis XI (r.1461–83) spilt over into matters commercial.⁷ Periodically French safe-conducts for English merchants would cease being issued, or were withdrawn. In 1462, Edward himself embargoed the import of wine from French territory which caused the trade to grind to a halt, such that by 1464 the Bordeaux mint experienced a dramatic decline in mint production, down 97.3% on the previous year in terms of total value of the coinage with noticeably no gold available to mint. As a response export duty was lowered to 18 *sous* per tun by Louis XI, while Bordeaux's burgesses regained their exemptions and

¹ Gabriel de Lurbe, *Chronique bourdeloise*, fol. 37.

² Bailey, 'Les Châteaux de Landiras et de Montferrand and Their Seigneurial Families—Part Two)', pp. 156–66, at p. 157.

³ Carus-Wilson, 'The Effects of the Acquisition and of the loss', pp. 145–54, at p. 152.

⁴ For a comprehensive description of the great mid-fifteenth century bullion famine, see Spufford, *Money and its Use*, pp. 356–62.

⁵ ADG, H 736, fol. 89v; H 1187, fol. 8.

⁶ See Appendix 6.2.

⁷ See James, *Studies*, pp. 45–6.

protections.¹ Despite such concessions, with an acute economic crisis, concerns over the loyalty of Gascons re-surfaced. In his c.1465 report to the French king, Régnault Girard assessed that in the absence of the great wealth that English traders had brought to Bordeaux, in his opinion once worth 100,000 nobles per year in goods and gold, the general impoverishment of the city itself posed a grave threat to the region's security.² He argued that economic links with England, if denied through retaliatory actions on the part of the Valois, would be counter-productive, and would drive the Gascons back into the arms of the Plantagenets.

Girard's assessment was astute, for it was not until the treaty of Picquigny in 1475 that solutions were found for all such matters. Renouard, James, Harris and others all correctly identified this as the turning point.³ For the first time since the conquest English merchants were able to travel to French territory without safe-conducts, extra punitive customs dues were then abolished. Wine exports and English imports began to grow once again, the latter topping 10,000 tuns by 1488–9.⁴ By 1495 the Bordeaux mint was finally able to produce large quantities of coinage. Only once freer trade in wine was fully re-established was the Valois conquest of Gascony truly complete.

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This chapter has explored new perspectives on how the wine trade impacted the political relationship between England and Gascony, with a focus on loyalty and conflict in the duchy. It would be impossible to state categorically that the link between export dependence and political violence proposed by Collier and Hoeffler held true in medieval Gascony without the equivalent quantitative evidence to that which they used for the modern day.⁵ This simply is not available. That being said, informative parallels can be drawn given the centrality of the wine trade in the duchy's political discourse, and its evident dominance of the economy. Episodes of conflict and rebellion did undoubtedly begin with the periods of raised market volatility, in the 1370s, first decade of the 1400s, and the 1430s, and this is significant even though the function of cause and effect is unclear.⁶ Possible initial causes for unrest were many, yet economic motives could be argued to be behind most of them. There are numerous examples of Gascons leaving English lordship because it appeared no longer financially beneficial. When specific cases do surface in the source material with sufficient details, be it the Colom affair of 1375–7 or the Boulomer-Ozanne feud of 1399–1407, it is clear enough that perceived past injuries on account of Plantagenet trade policies were central to disputes. Likewise we should have little reason to doubt the testimony of

¹ Gabriel de Lurbe, *Chronique bourdeloise*, fol. 38v; also see Harris, *Valois Guyenne*, pp. 48–9

² *AHG*, LVI, pp. 34–42

³ Renouard, 'Les conséquences de la conquête de la Guienne', p. 27; James, *Studies*, pp. 47–50; Harris, *Valois Guyenne*, p. 48.

⁴ James, *Studies*, pp. 58–9.

⁵ Collier, Hoeffler, 'On Economic Causes of Civil War', pp. 563–73; *ibid.*, 'Greed and Grievance in Civil War', pp. 563–95.

⁶ See Appendix 8.1.2 for price volatility by decade.

Roos and Beckington in the 1440s that a decline in trade had threatened to allow Charles VII to prise the duchy from Henry VI.

The strongest conclusion that may be drawn from modern developmental theory regards the assessment of Plantagenet Aquitaine as a 'rentier state'. Vale identified that 'the Lancastrian cause was as good as lost by 1442', largely because they lacked the 'material or moral' resources to retain loyalty in the face of the Valois ascendancy. Critically, in his opinion, this meant that of the key nobility.¹ If true this was because the material resources previously used were dependent on an export trade which the English crown's own policies had eroded ever since the statute of 1353. Moreover the 'selfe misgovernaunce' detailed by Beckington and Roos assuredly describes their destructive effects on the quality of government. The wine trade generated both greed and grievance.

Reform instituted after the 1445 parliament aimed to improve trade, but it was clumsily done and there was insufficient time for commercial prosperity to be restored, and with it broader Gascon loyalty. There were evidently some who remained sure, or were quickly reminded after the fall of Bordeaux in 1451, that there were serious economic advantages of a political link with England. Yet the wealth disparities that had built up over the preceding century were overwhelming, and are a major explanation for the wish of most Gascons to come to terms with Charles VII.

¹ Vale, *English Gascony*, pp. 218–9.

5. Conclusion

In the introduction to this thesis, Chapter 1, it was stated that the study of a ‘political economy’ should demonstrate how politics interacted with the economy to influence the distribution of wealth and power. To this end, Chapter 2, on politics and policy, set out the form and focus of English crown policy toward the wine trade. This was generally reactive, and increasingly under English mercantile influence, as well as that of an ever-narrowing group of lords, churchmen and burgesses, based in and around Bordeaux. Chapter 3 has shown the consequences this had for the fortunes of those across English and Anglo-Gascon society with vested interests in the trade. It has been revealed how commercial and economic benefit largely followed the pattern of political influence. In Gascony in particular, wealth generated by the wine trade appeared to concentrate in one place: Bordeaux. In turn Chapter 4 has discussed the consequences this had in the duchy, how English policy had generated: marked inequality of benefit from the wine trade among the elites; the impoverishment of the other Bordelais towns; the failure to re-integrate the *Haut-Pays* with the export market; all of which fed back into political uncertainty, conflict and rebellion in the duchy.

The three substantive chapters introduced new evidence which either furthered past scholarship or brought forward arguments not previously presented in scholarly discourse. The early work of Frank Sargeant on the regulation of trade has been greatly expanded and enhanced. A new regulatory narrative, with reference to quantitative evidence, exposed the full significance of both the 1353 wine trade statute, and the legislation which removed it in 1445. The exhaustive use of the Gascon rolls presented a fresh interpretation of patronage and privilege in Gascony as tightly linked to the trade, and integral to the political management of the duchy. This has reinforced the assertions of Robert Boutruche and countered those of Malcolm Vale. Likewise, the focus on the rolls permitted an important new assessment of the role of export licensing in England, and how these evolved over time. A more focussed use of the constables’ accounts provided new insights into the economic state of the duchy and its difficult trade relationship with England. The extensive use of new wine export data drawn from the underused Bordeaux customs books has shown, for the first time, the divisive consequences of policy for vested interests. Finally, the application of theory derived from modern developmental studies has integrated the discussion of matters commercial with events of political violence within the historical narrative. This too, had been previously untried.

This work matters because it contributes to our understanding of the bond between Gascony and England, based on commerce; the importance of which was assumed, occasionally mentioned, but almost never studied. The wine trade has been demonstrated to be a key facet of this relationship, and vital to our understanding its history. In the 1350s and 1360s, the rise and fall of the Black Prince in Aquitaine reflected the boom and bust cycle of trade. Indeed, the mishandling of the vital commercial partnership with England between can be considered as much

a significant causal factor in the demise of his principality, as can the more direct political mistakes of the Plantagenets. Similarly, even through the economy's subsequent material decline, commercial politics, and the success or failure of trade, were central to Anglo-Gascon relations. This was particularly true through the tempestuous 1370s, the opening years of the Lancastrian succession, and also the final years of the Plantagenet duchy. Whether Gascons were enemies or allies of the English crown was largely decided on the quayside at Bordeaux.

As such, for the English kings, the custodianship of the wine trade remained their single most valuable inheritance from their Angevin forebears in Gascony. Yet, at the same time, the image of the role of government in late medieval trade, presented here in this thesis, can appear thoroughly pessimistic. This was largely unavoidable, though not a contradiction. Today the reactive decisions of politicians, based on limited information, are often viewed in hindsight as having no effect at best, or a negative impact at worst. This does not make them unimportant. Likewise, disasters such as the Hundred Years' War, Black Death and famines, of food or bullion, may have shaped many of the challenges of the age, but their effects were not predetermined. It was to a great extent governmental responses to these events that decided their long-term impact.

In terms of their most basic motivations, we find that, as Epstein stated, those with political influence in this period principally stimulated trade and influenced markets for the purpose of ameliorating their own economic rents, these being mainly in the form of tax revenues or the capture of increased profits. This, he said, was the 'fundamental aspect of their social and political powers', integral to the 'feudal economy', but were nonetheless responsible for causing a slowdown within it.¹ There should be little doubt this was the case with regards the wine trade. Rent-seeking was rampant, probably even by the standards of the day. This assessment could benefit from the similar analysis of other trade routes but this is unfortunately not a comparative study. Instead we are left to speculate. The wool trade with Flanders, for example, suffered from much of the same lobbying and regulatory intervention. Monopolies and over-taxation may have contributed to its slow decline.² It can be argued that the very political origins of the wine trade made this much worse. Commercial relations between England and Gascony emerged and evolved with a political union. As a consequence the development of this market's structure over the final century of Plantagenet rule was almost entirely dictated by the requirements of contemporary politics.

In principle there was a balance to be found between the interests of the kings' Gascon or English subjects, in practice decisions came down increasingly in favour of the latter. It was, for example, critically important that the ascendancy of English over Gascon capital in the international trade be constrained - instead it was encouraged – and this was probably due to the disproportionate influence of the kingdom's merchants and ship-owners in parliament. Such investors were vital partners for the crown to raise money and provide ships for war with France, and so had the king's ear in matters commercial. The decline in Gascon shipping, and the Hundred

¹ Epstein, *Freedom and Growth*, pp. 50–1, 53

² Power, *The Wool Trade in English Medieval History*, p. 57.

Years' War, both meant that the economy of Aquitaine was increasingly isolated and dependent on England's for most goods. Thus it was the concentrated capital held within the wine trade: ships; port facilities; and distributive infrastructure; that provided the crucial conduit. The reinvestment of accumulated profits by English merchants dictated the scale and robustness of this connection. Again, this gave England's mercantile elites increased political leverage.

Regardless of the wine trade's importance to the duchy, and England's part in it, in the end it proved singularly unreliable. T.H. Lloyd thought that for Gascony 'the salvation of the region was wine', but in reality it became much less a blessing than a curse.¹ Natural drawbacks of wine as a commodity, crop yield variation, and perishability were compounded by Plantagenet regulation. The staple in Gascony exaggerated volatility and price controls in England further increased price elasticity. The combination of economic policy during the export boom after the Black Death, and English domestic export policy thereafter, precluded any further diversification in the economy, so in the end there was no alternative to wine. At its root it was this over-specialisation, and dependence on foreign imports, which made Anglo-Gascon Aquitaine unstable. For in turn wages and prices in the duchy rose fast and fell hard. War or natural disasters could trigger crises but were then exacerbated by declines in the wine trade, and these led to long periods of economic depression in the duchy in 1372–5, 1378–82, 1408–15 and finally 1435–45, when the centuries-old trading relationship with England practically collapsed. After the fall of the principality, the duchy more often than not ran current account deficits, and this drained the economy of gold and silver. The wine trade constituted an increasingly large proportion of the declining Anglo-Gascon economy, but its benefits were concentrated into fewer and fewer hands, so associated greed or grievance became key drivers of political instability.

It can certainly be argued that events as ephemeral as battles rarely decide wars. Rather it is those less tangible forces within politics and economics, the very same which begin conflicts, which bring them to an end. The apparent decisiveness of the battle of Castillon in 1453 is overshadowed by a long century of economic and commercial maladministration that should be seen as a significant contributory factor in the loss of the last major Plantagenet territory on the continent, at the end of the Hundred Years' War.

¹ Lloyd, *Alien Merchants in England*, p. 84.

6. Map



Figure 25 Map of the Gironde-Garonne-Dordogne basin with important cities and towns [indicated with circular marks], and castles [indicated in italics with square marks] indicated. **Source:** Created by the author.

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**THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
ANGLO-GASCON WINE TRADE
c.1348–c.1453**

Volume 2 (of 2): Appendices

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Abbreviations

ADG	Archives départementales de la Gironde
AHG	<i>Archives Historiques du Département de la Gironde</i>
BHO	<i>British History Online</i>
<i>Cal. Letter Books</i>	<i>Calendar of Letter-Books of the City of London</i>
CCR	<i>Calendar of Close Rolls</i>
CFR	<i>Calendar of Fine Rolls</i>
CGD	<i>Collection générale des documents français qui se trouvent en Angleterre</i>
<i>C. Inq. Misc</i>	<i>Calendar of Inquisitions miscellaneous</i>
CPR	<i>Calendar of the Patent Rolls</i>
C _v	Coefficient of variation
FEG	<i>Fasti Ecclesiae Gallicanae</i>
fr.	francs
GSR	<i>Calendar of Gascon Rolls</i>
<i>lsd bord.</i>	<i>livre, sous or denier bordelaise</i>
<i>lsd tour.</i>	<i>livre, sous or denier tournois</i>
LIS	List and Index Society
ODNB	<i>Oxford Dictionary of National Biography</i>
PROME	<i>Parliament Rolls of Medieval England</i>
PPC	<i>Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council of England</i>
RJ	<i>Registres de la jurade</i>
SR	<i>Statutes of the Realm</i>
TNA	The National Archives
TOF	<i>The Online Froissart</i>

Note: Dates are based on the modern calendar years (new year begins 1 January), and years of account are Michaelmas (29 September) to Michaelmas, unless otherwise stated.

1. Trade privileges

1.1 Burgess status

Date	Recipient	Type	Reference
27 March 1357	Dean, chapter and canons of Saint-André of Bordeaux	Ecclesiastic	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/115: 14; C 61/120: 18; C 61/119: 86; <i>AHG</i> , IV, pp. 116–8
26 March 1378	Archambaud de Grailly, <i>capitain</i> de Buch	Noble	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/91: 50; TNA SC 8/222/11067; SC 8/223/11143
1 September 1383	Pey de Saint-Symphorien/Landiras	Noble	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/97: 66
18 January 1384	Abbot and convent of Sainte-Croix of Bordeaux	Ecclesiastic	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/97: 58; C 61/108: 132, 134; C 61/115: 16; <i>GSR</i> , C 61/119: 8
1389?	Sir John de Stratton, lord of Landiras	Noble	<i>AHG</i> , XVI, pp. 166–169, 172–173
22 April 1405	Johan de Béarn, lord of Hontanx	Noble	TNA, E 28/20, no. 53; E 28/20, no. 5252; C 61/110, m. 3
13 June 1407	Guilhem-Ays de Fronsac		<i>GSR</i> , C 61/111: 109
19 January 1412	Francesco Uguccione, archbishop of Bordeaux	Ecclesiastic	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/113: 92
15 July 1413	Galhart de Jonquière		<i>GSR</i> , C 61/114: 16, 21
16 July 1414	Prior of Bardanac	Ecclesiastic	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/115: 23
25 June 1416	Prior and brothers, hospital Saint-Julien of Bordeaux	Ecclesiastic	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/117: 6; C 61/117: 32; C 61/119: 87
11 July 1417	Menauton de Castéra		<i>GSR</i> , C 61/117: 66
11 July 1417	Bernat de Lesparre, lord of Labarde	Noble	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/117: 74; TNA, SC 8/182/9073, item 3
18 July 1423	David de Montferrand, archbishop of Bordeaux	Ecclesiastic	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/119: 79
4 July 1432	Galhart d’Arsac	Esquire	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/124: 123
21 May 1437	Joan de Gournay, widow of Aymeric de Duras, knight	Noble	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/127: 83
10 February 1439	Guilhem de Boisset	Esquire	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/129: 41
24 June 1441	Gaillard de La Tour	Esquire	<i>AHG</i> , XVI, pp. 266–7
25 November	Johan de Boisset	Esquire	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/131: 26–7
25 November	Amaniu de Piis	Esquire	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/131: 31–2
5 October 1449	Bidau de Bielle	Esquire	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/137: 2
21 March 1451	Galhart [IV] de Durfort, lord of Duras and Blanquefort	Noble	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/138: 63; <i>Documents Sur La Maison de Durfort</i> , II, pp. 919–20

1.2 Other trading rights

Date	Recipient	Type	Privilege	Reference
22 July 1356	Mint officials and their families	Officials	Tax exempt exports	<i>AHG</i> , XVI, pp. 22–6
24 February 1365	Clerks and sons of the burgesses of Bordeaux		Tax exempt exports	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/78: 24
4 September 1383	The friars minor of Saint-Émilion	Ecclesiastic	Tax exempt exports	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/97: 38
17 March 1387	Mayor, <i>jurats</i> and inhabitants of Libourne	Town	Right to load at Libourne	<i>AHG</i> , XVI, pp. 61–3
16 March 1397	Mayor, <i>jurats</i> and inhabitants of Libourne	Town	Right to load at Libourne	<i>AHG</i> , XVI, pp. 61–3
26 March 1400	Burgesses and inhabitants of Libourne	Town	Gauger charge exemption	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/107: 162
20 July 1401	Abbot and convent of Sainte-Croix de Bordeaux	Ecclesiastic	Tax exempt exports	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/108: 132; C 61/119: 84
2 May 1407	Blaye	Town	Right to sell at retail in Bordeaux	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/111: 93
26 August 1408	Mayor, <i>jurats</i> and burgesses of Saint-Émilion	Town	Tax exempt exports	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/112: 46
21 August 1409	Nobles, commons and inhabitants of the <i>prévôté</i> of Saint-Émilion	Town	Right to sell in taverns or wholesale	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/112: 135
10 May 1414	Mayor, <i>jurats</i> et habitants de Libourne	Town	Right to load at Libourne	<i>AHG</i> , XVI, pp. 61–3
24 December 1416	Prior and brothers of the hospital Saint-Julien of Bordeaux	Ecclesiastic	Tax exempt exports	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/117: 32; C 61/119: 87
1425?	Consuls and inhabitants of Saint-Macaire	Town	Tax exempt exports	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/120: 43; <i>AHG</i> , XVI, p. 123
18 January 1427	Bazas, La Réole and towns, castles of the Bazadais	Region	To export before Martinmas	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/122: 15
24 February 1433	Burgesses, citizens and inhabitants of Saint-Sever	Town	Tax exempt exports	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/125: 26
26 June 1441	Burgesses, merchants and inhabitants of la Réole	Town	Tax exempt exports	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/130: 77

1.3 Incomes and annuities

Date	Recipient	Type	Income from	Value (given)	Reference
15 April 1337	Arnaud (II) de Durfort, lord of Frespech	Noble	Custom at Saint-Macaire	500 marks sterling per annum	<i>Archives de Durfort</i> , I, p. 444 (749)
1 June 1340	Berard d'Albret	Noble	Customs at Vayres, Rions	£130 sterling per annum	<i>AHG</i> , XXIII, pp. 438–442
20 November 1345	Arnaud (II) de Durfort, lord of Frespech	Noble	Custom at Saint-Macaire	500 marks sterling	<i>Archives de Durfort</i> , I, p. 554 (916); <i>GSR</i> , C 61/57: 83
10 April 1356	Auger de Montaut, lord of Mussidan	Noble	<i>Grande coutume</i>	600 tuns worth of tax per annum	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/117: 27; TNA, SC 8/161/8029
18 August 1360	Sir John Brocas	Official	<i>Issac</i>	£40 sterling per annum	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/73: 7
10 February 1368	Jean de Grailly, <i>Capit</i> de Buch	Noble	Custom at Cadillac	15 <i>d bord.</i> per tun for life (2.5 <i>d</i> for heirs)	<i>AHG</i> , VI, pp. 371–2
14 November 1369	Pey de Landiras	Noble	<i>Issac</i> or <i>royan</i>	200 <i>l bord.</i> per annum	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/95: 53
8 December 1374	Pey de Lamothe, lord of Roquetaillade	Noble	Custom at Langon	4 <i>d</i> per <i>livre</i> (1.66%)	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/87: 57
15 Sept 1377	Richard de Fillongley	Official	<i>Royan</i>	2 <i>d bord.</i> per tun (up to 200 <i>l bord.</i>)	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/91: 6–7
4 June 1378	John de Stratton, lord of Landiras	Noble	Market of Bordeaux		<i>AHG</i> , XVI, pp. 166–9; <i>GSR</i> , C 61/91: 105
15 March 1379	Pey Merle, burgess of Montauban		<i>Issac</i>	100 <i>l bord.</i> per annum for life	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/92: 43–4
12 January 1384	Walter Ralph		<i>Issac</i>	100 <i>l bord.</i> per annum for life	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/97: 48–9
12 January 1384	John Rose		<i>Issac</i>	100 <i>l bord.</i> per annum for life	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/97: 48–9
26 March 1384	Radegonde Béchet, lady of Morthemmer	Noble	Market of Bordeaux		<i>GSR</i> , C 61/97: 92–3
8 October 1388	Arnaut-Guilhem de Gaston		<i>Haut-Pays</i> taxes	12 <i>d</i> sterling per day	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/101: 12
22 July 1392	Radegonde Béchet, lady of Morthemmer	Noble	<i>Issac</i>		<i>GSR</i> , C 61/103: 10; C 61/107: 4
c.1399	Nopar, lord of Caumont	Noble	Custom at Caumont	3 <i>d</i> sterling per tun	TNA, SC 8/252/12597
c.1399	Nopar, lord of Caumont	Noble	<i>Grande coutume</i>	Customs of captured Agenais	TNA, SC 8/252/12597
6 November 1399	Guiraut Provost, burgess of Libourne		<i>Pays-Rebelles</i> taxes	120 gold fr. per annum	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/107: 39
12 November 1399	William Langbrook	Official	<i>Royan</i>	2.5 <i>d bord.</i> per tun & 200 <i>l</i> per ann.	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/107: 44; C 61/128: 25–6
9 December 1399	Guilhem des Camps, burgess of Bordeaux		<i>Grande coutume</i>	300 fr. per annum	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/107: 45; C 61/109: 74
18 February 1400	Henry Bowet	Official	Market of Bordeaux		<i>GSR</i> , C 61/107: 93
18 February 1400	Henry Bowet	Official	Custom at Langon	4 <i>d</i> per <i>livre</i> (1.66%)	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/107: 93
8 April 1400	Bertrand [II], lord of Montferrand	Noble	<i>Pays-Rebelles</i> taxes	6 <i>d</i> per <i>livre</i> (2.5%)	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/107: 140; C 61/116: 16; TNA, C 81/662/434
14 April 1400	Bertrand [II], lord of Montferrand	Noble	<i>Grande coutume</i>	£40 sterling per annum	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/107: 130; C 61/108: 138–9; C 61/116: 16, TNA, C 81/662/434
7 August 1400	Pey de Prieret	Official	<i>Grande coutume</i>	250 gold fr. per annum for life	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/107: 174; C 61/108: 3
18 May 1401	Guilhem de Thouil	Official	<i>Issac</i>		<i>GSR</i> , C 61/108: 52–3; C 61/108: 56–7
13 July 1401	Pey d'Arzet	Esquire	<i>Haut-Pays</i> taxes	£20 sterling per annum	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/108: 119
11 January 1402	Guilhem des Camps, burgess of Bordeaux		<i>Haut-Pays</i> taxes	300 fr. per annum for life	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/109: 72–4; C 61/111: 28; C

28 August 1402	Bernat de Lesparre, lord of Labarde	Noble	Custom at Libourne	120 gold écus per annum	61/112: 48
14 December 1403	Bernat de Lesparre, lord of Labarde	Noble	Custom at Aiguillon	£100 sterling per annum	GSR, C 61/116: 16; C 61/109: 137
28 February 1406	John Grosvenor	Official	<i>Haut-Pays</i> taxes	500 fr. per annum for life	GSR, C 61/109: 136
30 June 1406	Hugues Brouard		<i>Pays-Rebelles</i> taxes (Libourne)	£20 sterling per annum for life	GSR, C 61/111: 13; C 61/113: 111–112; C 61/118: 33
14 July 1406	Johan de Montlau, lord of Montlau	Noble	<i>Issac</i>	140 gold écus per annum	GSR, C 61/111: 50
10 June 1407	Carlos de Beaumont, alférez of Navarre	Noble	<i>Issac</i>		GSR, C 61/111: 43
26 August 1408	Mayor, jurats & burg. of Saint-Émilion	Town	Retail	Levy on tavern sales for 12 years	GSR, C 61/111: 106–7; C 61/112: 107; C 61/116: 38; C 61/114: 42; C 61/117: 55; C 61/119: 4, 88.
28 August 1408	John Carnell	Esquire	<i>Haut-Pays</i> taxes	Customs and the tithes of 60 tuns	GSR, C 61/112: 47
24 October 1408	Sir John Tiptoft	Official	<i>Issac</i>		GSR, C 61/112: 41
24 October 1408	Sir John Tiptoft	Official	Market of Bordeaux		GSR, C 61/119: 69; AHG, XVI, pp. 110–1
8 August 1409	Hermit of Notre-Dame de Cordoua	Eccles.	<i>Haut-Pays</i> taxes	8 <i>d</i> sterling per ship	GSR, C 61/119: 69; AHG, XVI, pp. 110–1
22 August 1409	Carlos de Beaumont, alférez of Navarre	Noble	Toll levied on the Adour	25 <i>d bord.</i> per tun	GSR, C 61/112: 104
8 November 1409	Bernat de Lesparre, lord of Labarde	Noble	<i>Grande coutume</i>	£100 sterling per annum	GSR, C 61/112: 133; C 61/114: 42
11 December 1409	Mayor, jurats and community of Libourne	Town	<i>Pays-Rebelles</i> taxes (Libourne)	500 marks sterling	GSR, C 61/113: 16
5 June 1410	Maria de Montaut; Johan, lord of Gramont	Noble	<i>Grande coutume</i>	600 écus per annum	GSR, C 61/113: 23; SC 8/187/9342
23 July 1410	Bertrand [III], lord of Montferrand	Noble	Custom in his lands	500 écus per annum for 3 years	GSR, C 61/113: 55; C 61/117: 27, 38; C 61/131: 18.
5 August 1412	Bérart de Montferrand	Esquire	<i>Grande coutume</i>	Cust. of 60 tuns/8 <i>l bord.</i> per ann.	GSR, C 61/113: 52
29 May 1415	Bénédeyt Espine, merchant of Bordeaux		<i>Pays-Rebelles</i> taxes	£260 sterling owed to him	GSR, C 61/116: 1
14 January 1416	Edmund de la Pole	Esquire	Fronds of cypress		GSR, C 61/116: 22; C 61/122: 20
5 May 1423	Menaut de Habas	Knight	Langon wine tithe	10 tuns of wine per annum	GSR, C 61/116: 23
15 July 1424	Mayor, jurats & burg. of Saint-Émilion	Town	Retail	Levy on tavern sales for 5 years	GSR, C 61/119: 57
20–1 February 1433	Bernat Angevin	Official	<i>Grande coutume</i>	15 marks sterling per annum	GSR, C 61/120: 9
20 October 1438	Pey Durand		<i>Grande coutume</i>	£50 sterling per annum	GSR, C 61/125: 6–7
20 October 1440	Gaston de Foix, <i>Capit</i> de Buch	Noble	Custom at Cadillac	4 <i>ardits</i> * per tun	GSR, C 61/129: 78
31 July 1440	Gaston de Foix, <i>Capit</i> de Buch	Noble	Custom at Castillon	4 <i>ardits</i> and 3 <i>d bord.</i> per tun	GSR, C 61/130: 10
10 June 1440	John Chippenham	Official	<i>Royan</i>	2.5 <i>d bord.</i> per tun	GSR, C 61/131: 85
20 October 1441	Francès de Gramont, lord of Gramont and Mussidan	Noble	<i>Grande coutume</i> (Bordeaux)	600 écus per annum	GSR, C 61/130: 21–2
23 May 1442	John Pykborne	Official	<i>Issac</i>		GSR, C 61/131: 18
24 July 1443	John Pykborne	Official	Market of Bordeaux		GSR, C 61/131: 98, 100; C 61/132: 36

8 August 1444	John Say; Thomas Chamberlain	Official	<i>Issac</i>	20 marks sterling	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/132: 115
12 August 1444	Guilhem de Lunes		<i>Grande coutume</i>	£20 sterling per annum	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/132: 118
4 September 1444	George Swillington; John Trevelian		<i>Grande coutume</i>	30 <i>d bord.</i> per tun	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/133: 1–2
19 March 1449	Thomas Routh	Official	Fronds of cypress		<i>GSR</i> , C 61/136: 9
2 December 1452	Jehan Clemens		<i>Royan</i>	2.5 <i>d bord.</i> per tun	<i>AHG</i> , XVI, pp. 365–6
20 May 1467	Robert Jones		<i>Issac</i>		<i>GSR</i> , C 61/144: 7

* An *ardit* (*liard*) was a coin worth 2*d tournois*.

1.4 Offices

Date	Recipient	Type	Office	Income	Reference
10 April 1356	Auger de Montaut, lord of Mussidan		Gauger of wine at Bordeaux	5 <i>d bord.</i> per tun	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/117: 27; TNA, SC 8/161/8029
4 June 1378	John de Stratton, lord of Landiras		Gauger of wine at Bordeaux	5 <i>d bord.</i> per tun	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/91: 105–6; <i>AHG</i> , XVI, 166–9.
28 February 1397	Robert Martin	Official	Collector & receiver <i>Pays-Rebelles</i> tithes	50 gold fr. per annum	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/107: 87
6 December 1399	Guiraut Provost, burgess of Libourne		Collector & receiver <i>Pays-Rebelles</i> tithes	120 gold fr. per annum	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/113: 153–4
18 February 1400	Henry Bowet	Official	Gauger of wine at Bordeaux	5 <i>d bord.</i> per tun	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/107: 93; <i>AHG</i> , XVI, pp. 144–6
16 June 1402	Pey de Taller		Gauger of wine at Bayonne		<i>GSR</i> , C 61/109: 89
26 September 1404	Johan Ayral	Esquire	Controller of <i>Pays-Rebelles</i> tithes (Libourne)	£10 sterling per annum	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/109: 178–9; C 61/113: 153–4
13 August 1406	Pey de Contis	Esquire	Gauger of wine at Bordeaux	5 <i>d bord.</i> per tun	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/111: 71
22 September 1408	John Hull; John Esmond	Official	Controller of <i>Pays-Rebelles</i> tithes (Libourne)		<i>GSR</i> , C 61/112: 70, 75
6 February 1426	Nicholas Bowet	Knight	Gauger of wine at Bordeaux	5 <i>d bord.</i> per tun	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/121: 13, 29; <i>AHG</i> , XVI, p.139
19 March 1449	Thomas Routh	Official	Searcher at Bordeaux	Fronds of cypress	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/136: 9

1.5 Licences

Date	Recipient	Rank/Title	Tuns	Provenance	Frequency	Reference
1 January 1372	Bernard Couraud	Esquire	200		Annually for life	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/108: 18–9
10 January 1382	Mondon Ébrard	Esquire	100	<i>Haut-Pays</i>	Annually for life	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/95: 76, 125
11 September 1382	Robert Cholmondeley	Esquire	60	<i>Haut-Pays</i>	Once	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/96: 33–4
12 May 1383	Arnaut-Bernat [IV] de Preissac, s. de la Trau	Noble	3,000	<i>Haut-Pays</i>	Over 3 years	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/96: 110–1
18 July 1383	Ramon Vigerous	Ecclesiastic	300	<i>Haut-Pays</i>	Annually for 6 years	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/97: 11
18 July 1383	Guilhem-Ramon de Madaillan, ld. of Rauzan	Noble	2,000	<i>Pays-Rebelles</i>	Annually for 6 years	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/97: 22
30 August 1383	Florimont, lord of Lesparre	Noble	10,000	<i>Pays-Rebelles</i>	Annually for 10 years	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/97: 39, 94
15 October 1395	Johan Guibon	Ecclesiastic	20			<i>GSR</i> , C 61/107: 130
23 February 1399	Guilhem lo Touilh, burgess of Bordeaux		120	<i>Pays-Rebelles</i>	Single	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/105: 83
9 December 1399	Guilhem des Camps, burgess of Bordeaux		20	<i>Haut-Pays</i>		<i>GSR</i> , C 61/107: 45; C 61/109: 74
c.1399	Nopar, lord of Caumont	Noble	All	<i>Haut-Pays</i>		TNA, SC 8/252/12597
7 February 1400	Hélias de Mortiers		80	Garonne	Annually for life	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/107: 83
11 April 1400	Johan Guibon	Ecclesiastic	40			<i>GSR</i> , C 61/107: 130
18 May 1401	Guilhem de Thouil	Official	120	<i>Pays-Rebelles</i>	Annually for life	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/108: 52–3, 56–7
28 August 1401	Arnaut Buade		100		Annually for life	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/108: 107–8
23 September 1401	Edward of Langley, earl of Rutland	Noble	300	<i>Haut-Pays</i>	Single	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/108: 123–4
2 November 1401	Henry Bowet	Official	All		Annually for life	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/109: 68
10 June 1407	Carlos de Beaumont, <i>alférez</i> of Navarre	Noble	120	<i>Pays-Rebelles</i>	Annually for life	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/111: 106; C 61/114: 42
28 June 1407	John Sterling of Ipswich		500	<i>Haut-Pays</i>	Single	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/111: 112
3 May 1409	Ramon Bernatet	Official	100	<i>Haut-Pays</i>	Annually for life	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/112: 92
11 November 1409	Reynaut de Roquefort		100	<i>Pays-Rebelles</i>	Single	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/113: 7–8
12 November 1409	Jean [V], duke of Brittany	Noble	100	<i>Pays-Rebelles</i>	Single	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/113: 5
26 November 1409	Gassion de Meyrac, lord of Théobon	Noble	100	<i>Pays-Rebelles</i>	Single	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/113: 14–15
8 December 1409	Carlos de Beaumont, <i>alférez</i> of Navarre	Noble	120	<i>Pays-Rebelles</i>	Annually for 20 years	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/112: 107; C 61/114: 42; C 61/116: 38
10 June 1410	Jean [V], duke of Brittany	Noble	100	<i>Pays-Rebelles</i>	Single	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/113: 40
8 September 1411	Thomas of Lancaster	Royal	80	<i>Pays-Rebelles</i>	Single	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/113: 74
6 October 1411	Robert Ruddington	Official	600	<i>Pays-Rebelles</i>	Single	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/113: 82
1 June 1416	Johan Guibon	Ecclesiastic	40		Annually	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/117: 5
11 October 1417	Thomas Bolthorp		All	Anywhere		<i>GSR</i> , C 61/117: 81
7 May 1439	The Augustinians of Bordeaux	Ecclesiastic	12		Annually	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/129: 24–5
6 July 1440	The Dominicans of Bordeaux	Ecclesiastic	12		Annually	<i>GSR</i> , C 61/129: 135

2. Licensed exports of staple foods from England to Gascony

Year	Food exports licensed (quarters)				Year	Food exports licensed (quarters)				Year	Food exports licensed (quarters)			
	Wheat and barley	Beans/peas	Oats	Total		Wheat and barley	Beans/peas	Oats	Total		Wheat and barley	Beans/peas	Oats	Total
1360	744	800		1,544	1389	4,300	500		4,800	1421	6,288	300	300	6,888
1361	7,970	40	1,150	9,160	1390	3,672	620	40	4,332	1423	43.75			43.75
1362	1,500			1,500	1391	6,040	20		6,060	1424	502			502
1363	80			80	1392	9,420	200		9,620	1425	1,540	100		1,640
1364	580	400	200	1,180	1393	6,652	240		6,892	1426	10,760	700		11,460
1365	800	1,860	1,000	3,660	1394	2,380			2,380	1427	1,600			1,600
1366	160	140	300	600	1395	1,800			1,800	1430	300			300
1367	1,180	1,950	750	3,880	1397		2		2	1431	3,800			3,800
1368		350		350	1402	120	60		180	1432	17,972	520		18,492
1371	600	640		1,240	1403	7,268.5	14		7,282.5	1433	560			560
1373	5,800	1,296		7,096	1404	8,320			8,320	1434	600			600
1374	6,860	1,380	1,100	9,340	1405	940	300		1,240	1435	1,030			1,030
1375	7,490	4,736	140	12,366	1408	200			200	1436	1,160	30	10	1,200
1376	540	990		1,530	1409	1,400			1,400	1437	2,132			2,132
1377	2,600	1,700		4,300	1410	1,200			1,200	1438	600		100	700
1378	7,060	420	500	7,980	1412	600			600	1439	1,600			1,600
1379	100			100	1413	700	300	100	1,100	1440	1,840	1,120	140	3,100
1381	100	400		500	1414	260			260	1441	2,600	100		2,700
1382	1,200	100	100	1,400	1415	1,012			1,012	1442	4,000			4,000
1385	2,280			2,280	1416	2,220	20		2,240	1450	7,620			7,620
1386	651			651	1417	1,600			1,600	1451	200			200
1387	4,762	200		4,962	1419	1,600			1,600	1453	400			400
1388	2,240			2,240	1420	6,400	500	300	7,200					

Source: GSR, C 61/73–8; C 61/80; C 61/84–92; C 61/95–6; C 61/98–105; C 61/108–14; C 61/116–32; C 61/134; C 61/137–9; CCR, 1360–1364, p. 27; CCR, 1385–1389, pp. 183; CCR, 1389–1392, pp. 227, 390; CCR, 1392–1396, pp. 64, 72, 139–140, 169; CCR, 1396–1399, p. 185; CCR, 1401–1405, pp. 13, 197, 461; CCR, 1405–1409, p. 434; CCR, 1409–1413, p. 114; CCR, 1419–1422, p. 159; CCR, 1422–1429, pp. 161–162; CCR, 1435–1441, p. 94; CPR, 1364–1367, p. 32; CPR, 1367–1370, p. 33; CPR, 1364–1367, pp. 50, 59, 61, 86, 101, 211, 324, 378; CPR, 1367–1370, p. 109; CPR, 1370–1374, p. 86; CPR, 1385–1389, p. 281; CPR, 1401–1405, p. 325; CPR, 1416–1422, pp. 59, 299.

3. Gascon exports and English imports


3.1 Total Gascon wine exports, 1305–1453

Accounting and shipping year	Tax category/origin of wine exported (tuns)					Privileged <i>Haut- Pays/Pays-Rebelles</i> towns	Shipped from ports below Bordeaux	Compounded Custom (1-2 <i>écus</i>)	Libourne	Total (gauged tuns)
	Fr	Cust Iss (incl. Cust in 14th century)	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust					
1305–1306	13,958	17,956				57,934	8,000			97,848
1306–1307	13,886	16,034				53,591	9,941			93,452
1308–1309	12,260	30,947				38,812	11,597		9,126	102,724
1335–1336	7,958	14,136				46,901	5,058			74,053
1336–1337	5,447	2,979				4,645	3,506			16,577
1348–1349	867	4,586				470				5,923
1349–1350										13,427
1350–1351	7,282									
1352–1353	10,927	8,702				0				19,629
1353–1354	8,627	7,659				42				16,328
1355–1356	6,698	7,713				0				14,411
1356–1357	8,900	11,159				141				20,200
1357–1358	10,506	15,559				1,773				27,838
1363–1364										18,280
1364–1365										43,869
1365–1366										36,207
1366–1367										37,103
1368–1369										28,264
1369–1370										8,945
1372–1373	5,535	8,720		20		98				14,373
1373–1374		7,099		605		76				
1374–1375	3,080	4,527		323		0				7,930
1375–1376	2,437	3,522		1,769		625			313	8,656
1376–1377	9,636	10,761		3,138		110			175	23,920
1377–1378	6,679	5,109		668		0				12,456
1378–1379	7,597	5,500		525		0				13,622
1379–1380	2,973	2,805		356		126			183	6,643

1380–1381	4,584	3,474	614	107			9,041
1387–1388		6,988	397	120			
1388–1389		9,205	648	50			
1389–1390		5,082	605	130			
1394–1395							c.12000*
1402–1403							10,067
1409–1410	4,840	3,618	1,223	3,533	0	56	13,270
1412–1413	5,171	4,246	557	2,810	0	264	13,158
1418–1419		1,195	102	1,086	151	81	
1422–1423	6,107	5,822	1,338	2,886	0	105	16,258
1427–1428	3,796	2,410	705	2,225	28	0	9,074
1428–1429	3,747	2,769	1,004	2,817	228	0	10,765
1429–1430	5,333	3,527	1,197	3,055	10	0	13,222
1430–1431	5,528	3,934	1,244	2,882	46	0	13,634
1431–1432	2,929	2,307	782	2,608	0	0	8,626
1433–1434		2,994	604	2,663	0	0	
1435–1436	5,586	3,466	911	2,616	0	14	12,603
1436–1437	4,748	3,170	669	2,316	0	0	10,903
1437–1438	2,333	1,430	268	712	18	0	4,761
1438–1439	2,638	871	286	257	0	0	4,052
1443–1444	4,502	1,549	735	2,141	0	0	8,827
1448–1449		2,339	905	5,638	0	124	
1452–1453	5,337	1,448	422	2,712	0	0	9,919

Source: M.K. James, *Studies in the Medieval Wine Trade*, (ed.) E.M. Veale, (Oxford, 1971), pp. 32–3, 55–6; * exports from 1394–5 are an estimate based on the $\frac{1}{2}$ *bd*. per tun claimed by the archbishop of Bordeaux recorded in *Archives Historiques du Département de la Gironde*, XXII (1882), p. 473.

3.2 Share of wine exports by tax category, 1305–1453



Source: Calculated by the author from data in M.K. James, *Studies in the Medieval Wine Trade*, (ed.) E. M. Veale, (Oxford, 1971), pp. 32–3, 55–6. **Note:** Most of the wine contained in the ‘other’ category is that from the *Haut-Pays*.

3.3 Wine exports paying *issac*, 1348–1453

Accounting and shipping year	Tuns charged <i>issac</i>	% of export market	Accounting and shipping year	Tuns charged <i>issac</i>	% of export market
1348–1349	1,149	19.40	1409–1410	4,841	36.48
1352–1353	4,792.5	24.42	1412–1413	4,803	36.50
1353–1354	3,587	21.97	1422–1423	7,160	44.04
1355–1356	4,183.5	29.03	1427–1428	3,115	34.33
1357–1358	9,970	35.81	1428–1429	3,773	35.05
1372–1373	8,818	61.35	1429–1430	4,724	35.73
1373–1374	2,383	14.80	1430–1431	5,178	37.98
1374–1375	1,857.5	23.42	1431–1432	3,089	35.81
1375–1376	3,954.5	45.69	1435–1436	4,377	34.73
1376–1377	9,040	37.79	1436–1437	3,839	35.21
1377–1378	4,072	32.69	1437–1438	1,698	35.66
1378–1379	3,837	28.17	1438–1439	1,157	28.55
1379–1380	1,824	27.46	1443–1444	2,284	25.88
1380–1381	2,460.5	27.21	1452–1453	1,870	18.85
1402–1403	2,492	24.75			

Source: TNA, E 101/167/16, no. 40; E 101/170/17, m. 4; E 101/171/2, m. 4–5; E 101/173/4, fos 38v, 128v–129r; E 101/179/9, fol. 6r; E 101/179/14, fol. 4v; E 101/179/15, fol. 16v; E 101/180/9, fols. 7r–8v, 26r–27v, 44r–25r, fol. 61r; E 101/182/10, fos 6v–7r, 22v, 31v; E 101/182/9, fol. 14r; E 101/185/11, fol. 61r; E 101/167/16, no. 40; E 101/170/17, m. 4; E 101/171/2, m. 4–5; E 101/173/4, fos 38v, 128v–129r; E 101/179/9, 6r; E 101/179/14, fol. 4v; E 101/179/15, fol. 16v; E 101/180/9, fos 7r–8v; E 101/180/9, fos 26r–27v; E 101/180/9, fos 44r–45r; E 101/180/9, fol. 61r; E 101/182/10, fos 6v–7r; E 101/182/10, fol. 31v; E 101/182/9, fol. 14r; E 101/182/10, fol. 22v; E 101/192/8, fos 29v–30r; also some calculated by the author from data in M.K. James, *Studies in the Medieval Wine Trade*, (ed.) E. M. Veale, (Oxford, 1971), pp. 32–3, 55–6.

3.4 Total English wine imports, 1402–1500

Accounting and shipping year	Tuns imported								
1403–1404	11,722	1425–1426	7,046	1446–1447	9,270	1465–1466	3,776	1484–1485	6,247
1404–1405	6,394	1426–1427	11,514	1447–1448	11,093	1466–1467	4,352	1485–1486	5,075
1405–1406	7,451	1428–1429	7,729	1448–1449	11,188	1467–1468	7,084	1486–1487	5,963
1406–1407	3,199	1429–1430	7,621	1449–1450	4,968	1468–1469	6,313	1487–1488	6,338
1407–1408	9,350	1430–1431	10,323	1450–1451	5,123	1469–1470	3,820	1488–1489	10,186
1408–1409	13,753	1431–1432	8,097	1451–1452	6,000	1470–1471	2,315	1489–1490	6,293
1409–1410	15,365	1432–1433	8,286	1452–1453	8,948	1471–1472	5,483	1490–1491	9,028
1410–1411	11,362	1433–1434	10,592	1453–1454	5,699	1472–1473	4,486	1491–1492	7,194
1411–1412	9,593	1434–1435	10,141	1454–1455	9,158	1473–1474	3,964	1492–1493	9,996
1412–1413	10,540	1435–1436	10,104	1455–1456	4,071	1474–1475	3,768	1493–1494	7,041
1413–1414	16,720	1437–1438	5,383	1456–1457	2,427	1475–1476	4,636	1494–1495	8,557
1414–1415	17,939	1438–1439	5,069	1457–1458	3,701	1476–1477	5,759	1495–1496	7,353
1415–1416	17,280	1439–1440	9,162	1458–1459	3,446	1477–1478	6,442	1496–1497	8,821
1416–1417	15,454	1440–1441	14,757	1459–1460	4,337	1478–1479	7,159	1497–1498	8,506
1417–1418	14,392	1441–1442	12,365	1460–1461	2,763	1479–1480	6,845	1498–1499	10,708
1418–1419	8,192	1442–1443	10,352	1461–1462	3,525	1480–1481	8,327	1499–1500	10,389
1419–1420	10,216	1443–1444	9,828	1462–1463	4,373	1481–1482	5,538		
1420–1421	10,370	1444–1445	12,189	1463–1464	8,240	1482–1483	5,443		
1421–1422	6,905	1445–1446	10,684	1464–1465	6,699	1483–1484	6,277		

Source: M.K. James, *Studies in the Medieval Wine Trade*, (ed.) E. M. Veale, (Oxford, 1971), pp. 57–9.

3.5 English share of wine imports, 1406–44

Annualised imports of wine into England, with English and alien imports separated.

Accounting and shipping period		Annualised imports (tuns)			English share %
Start date	End date	Alien merchants	English merchants	Total	
8 Dec 1406	7 Dec 1407	1,486.0	1,713.0	3,199.0	53.5
23 Mar 1413	16 Mar 1415	2,974.3	14,355.3	17,329.5	82.8
30 Oct 1415	21 Mar 1418	2,617.0	13,091.7	15,708.7	83.3
31 Aug 1425	31 Sept 1427	1,380.6	7,533.0	8,913.7	84.5
30 Sept 1436	29 Sept 1438	1,280.9	2,165.6	3,446.5	62.8
30 Sept 1438	29 Sept 1440	1,597.4	5,518.1	7,115.5	77.6
30 Sept 1442	29 Sept 1444	2,399.5	7,690.5	10,090.0	76.2
30 Sept 1444	29 Sept 1446	2,954.3	8,482.3	11,436.5	74.2

Source: TNA, E 101/81/5; E 101/81/8; E 101/81/12; E 101/81/15; E 101/81/16; E 101/81/18; E 101/81/19; totals are from James, *Studies*, pp. 57–8.

3.6 Gascon honey exports, 1363–1444

Date	Tuns exported			Date	Tuns exported		
	Honey	Wine	Ratio		Honey	Wine	Ratio
1363–4	195	20,122	103.4	1409–10	135.5	13,270	97.9
1365	256	48,450	189.0	1418–9	145		
1366	596	31,450	52.8	1423–4	30		
1367	210	43,890	208.6	1424–5	78		
1369	554	33,363	60.2	1425–6	10		
1370	350	9,368	26.8	1427–8	50.5	9,074	179.7
1372–3	0			1428–9	57	10,765	188.9
1373–4	65			1429–30	53	13,222	249.5
1374–5	360	7,930	22.0	1430–1	97	13,634	140.6
1375–6	122.5	8,656	70.7	1434–5	20.5		
1376–7	0	23,920		1435–6	135	12,603	93.4
1377–8	17.5	12,456	711.8	1436–7	37	10,903	294.7
1378–9	79	13,622	172.4	1437–8	181.5	4,761	26.2
1379–80	277	6,643	24.0	1438–9	165.5	4,052	24.5
1380–1	196	9,041	46.1	1443–4	2	8,827	4,413.5
1402–3	387	10,067	26.0				

Source: *CGD*, pp. 134–7 (no. CCXXIII); *TNA*, E 101/179/9, 6r; E 101/179/14, fol. 5r; E 101/179/15, fol. 16v; E 101/180/9, fos 7r–8v, 26r–27v, 44r–45r, 61r, 74r; E 101/182/10, fos 6v–7r; E 101/182/9, fol. 14v; E 101/184/19, fol. 76r; E 101/185/11, fol. 61r; E 101/187/12, fol. 18v; E 101/189/6, m. 5; E 101/189/8, m. 8; E 101/189/9, m. 6; E 101/189/12, fos 34v, 56v, 79r, 101r

4 Particular Gascon exporters

4.1 Church

4.1.1 Church exporters (tuns by tax category), 1348–1449

Reference: TNA, E 101/167/16 Accounting year: 1348–1349 Start date: 17 October 1348 End date: 15 July 1349

Institution	Type	Sub-region	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
Archbishopric of Bordeaux	Secular	Bordeaux	4					4
Cathedral of Saint-André	Secular	Bordeaux	3					3
Hospital of Saint-André	Secular	Bordeaux						
Collegiate Church of Saint-Seurin	Secular	Bordeaux		5				5
Abbey of Sainte-Croix	Monastic	Bordeaux	25					25
Abbey of Soulac	Monastic	Lesparre						
Abbey of Bonlieu	Monastic	<i>Entre-Deux-Mers</i>						
Abbey of Bounet	Monastic	Other						
Abbey of Sauve-Majeure	Monastic	<i>Entre-Deux-Mers</i>						
Priory of Bardanac	Monastic	Cernes						
Priory of Saint-James	Monastic	Bordeaux	4					4
Priory of Saint-Julian	Monastic	Bordeaux						
Brothers' Minor of Bordeaux	Mendicant	Bordeaux						
Sisters' Minor of Bordeaux	Mendicant	Bordeaux						
Order of Saint John	Military	Miscellaneous						
Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous		14			42	56
Totals			36	19			42	97

Reference: TNA, E 101/173/4 Accounting year: 1355–1356 Start date: 20 April 1355 End date: 24 March 1356

Institution	Type	Sub-region	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
Archbishopric of Bordeaux	Secular	Bordeaux	25	11.5				36.5
Cathedral of Saint-André	Secular	Bordeaux	38.5	11				49.5
Hospital of Saint-André	Secular	Bordeaux						
Collegiate Church of Saint-Seurin	Secular	Bordeaux	11	1				12
Abbey of Sainte-Croix	Monastic	Bordeaux	37	1				38
Abbey of Soulac	Monastic	Lesparre						
Abbey of Bonlieu	Monastic	<i>Entre-Deux-Mers</i>						
Abbey of Bounet	Monastic	Other						
Abbey of Sauve-Majeure	Monastic	<i>Entre-Deux-Mers</i>						
Priory of Bardanac	Monastic	Cernes						
Priory of Saint-James	Monastic	Bordeaux	82					82
Priory of Saint-Julian	Monastic	Bordeaux						
Brothers' Minor of Bordeaux	Mendicant	Bordeaux						
Sisters' Minor of Bordeaux	Mendicant	Bordeaux						
Order of Saint John	Military	Miscellaneous	7					7
Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous	1	72.5				73.5
Totals			201.5	97				298.5

Reference: TNA, E 101/173/4 Accounting year: 1356–1357 Start date: 9 April 1356 End date: 3 April 1357

Institution	Type	Sub-region	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
Archbishopric of Bordeaux	Secular	Bordeaux	58	8			20	86
Cathedral of Saint-André	Secular	Bordeaux	61	11			7	79
Hospital of Saint-André	Secular	Bordeaux						
Collegiate Church of Saint-Seurin	Secular	Bordeaux	42	7				49
Abbey of Sainte-Croix	Monastic	Bordeaux	162	2				164
Abbey of Soulac	Monastic	Lesparre						
Abbey of Bonlieu	Monastic	<i>Entre-Deux-Mers</i>						
Abbey of Bounet	Monastic	Other						
Abbey of Sauve-Majeure	Monastic	<i>Entre-Deux-Mers</i>						
Priory of Bardanac	Monastic	Cernes						
Priory of Saint-James	Monastic	Bordeaux	122					122
Priory of Saint-Julian	Monastic	Bordeaux	6					6
Brothers' Minor of Bordeaux	Mendicant	Bordeaux						
Sisters' Minor of Bordeaux	Mendicant	Bordeaux	4					4
Order of Saint John	Military	Miscellaneous	16				7	23
Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous			10			10
Totals			471	38			34	543

Reference: TNA, E 101/173/4 Accounting year: 1357–1358 Start date: 4 November 1357 End date: 2 April 1358

Institution	Type	Sub-region	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
Archbishopric of Bordeaux	Secular	Bordeaux	3.5					3.5
Cathedral of Saint-André	Secular	Bordeaux	26.5					26.5
Hospital of Saint-André	Secular	Bordeaux						
Collegiate Church of Saint-Seurin	Secular	Bordeaux	9					9
Abbey of Sainte-Croix	Monastic	Bordeaux	46					46
Abbey of Soulac	Monastic	Lesparre						
Abbey of Bonlieu	Monastic	<i>Entre-Deux-Mers</i>						
Abbey of Bounet	Monastic	Other						
Abbey of Sauve-Majeure	Monastic	<i>Entre-Deux-Mers</i>						
Priory of Bardanac	Monastic	Cernes						
Priory of Saint-James	Monastic	Bordeaux	59					59
Priory of Saint-Julian	Monastic	Bordeaux						
Brothers' Minor of Bordeaux	Mendicant	Bordeaux						
Sisters' Minor of Bordeaux	Mendicant	Bordeaux						
Order of Saint John	Military	Miscellaneous	19.5	4				23.5
Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous	25					25
Totals			188.5	4			0	192.5

Reference: TNA, E 101/602/3 Accounting year: 1372–1373 Start date: 5 October 1372 End date: 29 April 1373

Institution	Type	Sub-region	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
Archbishopric of Bordeaux	Secular	Bordeaux						
Cathedral of Saint-André	Secular	Bordeaux	112	6.5				118.5
Hospital of Saint-André	Secular	Bordeaux						
Collegiate Church of Saint-Seurin	Secular	Bordeaux	45	1				46
Abbey of Sainte-Croix	Monastic	Bordeaux	59					59
Abbey of Soulac	Monastic	Lesparre						
Abbey of Bonlieu	Monastic	<i>Entre-Deux-Mers</i>	1					1
Abbey of Bounet	Monastic	Other						
Abbey of Sauve-Majeure	Monastic	<i>Entre-Deux-Mers</i>						
Priory of Bardanac	Monastic	Cernes						
Priory of Saint-James	Monastic	Bordeaux	30					30
Priory of Saint-Julian	Monastic	Bordeaux						
Brothers' Minor of Bordeaux	Mendicant	Bordeaux						
Sisters' Minor of Bordeaux	Mendicant	Bordeaux						
Order of Saint John	Military	Miscellaneous	7					7
Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous	6	8				14
Totals			260	15.5				275.5

Reference: TNA, E 101/180/2 Accounting year: 1374–1375 Start date: 28 October 1374 End date: 27 June 1375

Institution	Type	Sub-region	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
Archbishopric of Bordeaux	Secular	Bordeaux						
Cathedral of Saint-André	Secular	Bordeaux	78.5	1			0.5	79.5
Hospital of Saint-André	Secular	Bordeaux						
Collegiate Church of Saint-Seurin	Secular	Bordeaux	98	0.5				98.5
Abbey of Sainte-Croix	Monastic	Bordeaux	42	0.5				42.5
Abbey of Soulac	Monastic	Lesparre						
Abbey of Bonlieu	Monastic	<i>Entre-Deux-Mers</i>	1.5					1.5
Abbey of Bounet	Monastic	Other						
Abbey of Sauve-Majeure	Monastic	<i>Entre-Deux-Mers</i>						
Priory of Bardanac	Monastic	Cernes						
Priory of Saint-James	Monastic	Bordeaux						
Priory of Saint-Julian	Monastic	Bordeaux						
Brothers' Minor of Bordeaux	Mendicant	Bordeaux						
Sisters' Minor of Bordeaux	Mendicant	Bordeaux						
Order of Saint John	Military	Miscellaneous	2					2
Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous						
Totals			222	2			0.5	224

Reference: TNA, E 101/182/6 Accounting year: 1378–1379 Start date: 22 October 1378 End date: 10 March 1379

Institution	Type	Sub-region	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
Archbishopric of Bordeaux	Secular	Bordeaux	13					13
Cathedral of Saint-André	Secular	Bordeaux	293			15		308
Hospital of Saint-André	Secular	Bordeaux						
Collegiate Church of Saint-Seurin	Secular	Bordeaux	170		2	4.5		176.5
Abbey of Sainte-Croix	Monastic	Bordeaux	202	3.5				205.5
Abbey of Soulac	Monastic	Lesparre						
Abbey of Bonlieu	Monastic	<i>Entre-Deux-Mers</i>	5			2		7
Abbey of Bounet	Monastic	Other		14				14
Abbey of Sauve-Majeure	Monastic	<i>Entre-Deux-Mers</i>						
Priory of Bardanac	Monastic	Cernes						
Priory of Saint-James	Monastic	Bordeaux	94.5					94.5
Priory of Saint-Julian	Monastic	Bordeaux	10			1		11
Brothers' Minor of Bordeaux	Mendicant	Bordeaux						
Sisters' Minor of Bordeaux	Mendicant	Bordeaux						
Order of Saint John	Military	Miscellaneous	1					1
Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous	30	2	8			40
Totals			818.5	19.5	10	22.5		870.5

Reference: TNA, E 101/182/6 Accounting year: 1379–1380 Start date: 6 October 1379 End date: 12 November 1379

Institution	Type	Sub-region	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
Archbishopric of Bordeaux	Secular	Bordeaux						
Cathedral of Saint-André	Secular	Bordeaux						
Hospital of Saint-André	Secular	Bordeaux						
Collegiate Church of Saint-Seurin	Secular	Bordeaux	5.5	1		0.5		7
Abbey of Sainte-Croix	Monastic	Bordeaux						
Abbey of Soulac	Monastic	Lesparre						
Abbey of Bonlieu	Monastic	<i>Entre-Deux-Mers</i>						
Abbey of Bounet	Monastic	Other						
Abbey of Sauve-Majeure	Monastic	<i>Entre-Deux-Mers</i>						
Priory of Bardanac	Monastic	Cernes						
Priory of Saint-James	Monastic	Bordeaux						
Priory of Saint-Julian	Monastic	Bordeaux						
Brothers' Minor of Bordeaux	Mendicant	Bordeaux						
Sisters' Minor of Bordeaux	Mendicant	Bordeaux						
Order of Saint John	Military	Miscellaneous						
Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous	0.5					0.5
Totals			6	1		0.5		7.5

Reference: TNA, E 101/183/11 Accounting year: 1385–1386 Start date: 5 October 1385 End date: 15 April 1386

Institution	Type	Sub-region	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
Archbishopric of Bordeaux	Secular	Bordeaux	40		0.5			40.5
Cathedral of Saint-André	Secular	Bordeaux	176					176
Hospital of Saint-André	Secular	Bordeaux						
Collegiate Church of Saint-Seurin	Secular	Bordeaux	35					35
Abbey of Sainte-Croix	Monastic	Bordeaux	28.5					28.5
Abbey of Soulac	Monastic	Lesparre				1		1
Abbey of Bonlieu	Monastic	<i>Entre-Deux-Mers</i>	22.5					22.5
Abbey of Bounet	Monastic	Other						
Abbey of Sauve-Majeure	Monastic	<i>Entre-Deux-Mers</i>						
Priory of Bardanac	Monastic	Cernes						
Priory of Saint-James	Monastic	Bordeaux	28					28
Priory of Saint-Julian	Monastic	Bordeaux						
Brothers' Minor of Bordeaux	Mendicant	Bordeaux						
Sisters' Minor of Bordeaux	Mendicant	Bordeaux	4					4
Order of Saint John	Military	Miscellaneous						
Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous						
Totals			334		0.5	1		335.5

Reference: TNA, E 101/185/11 Accounting year: 1402–1403 Start date: 5 November 1402 End date: 12 April 1403

Institution	Type	Sub-region	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
Archbishopric of Bordeaux	Secular	Bordeaux	51			2		53
Cathedral of Saint-André	Secular	Bordeaux	112					112
Hospital of Saint-André	Secular	Bordeaux						
Collegiate Church of Saint-Seurin	Secular	Bordeaux	91		1			92
Abbey of Sainte-Croix	Monastic	Bordeaux						
Abbey of Soulac	Monastic	Lesparre						
Abbey of Bonlieu	Monastic	<i>Entre-Deux-Mers</i>						
Abbey of Bounet	Monastic	Other						
Abbey of Sauve-Majeure	Monastic	<i>Entre-Deux-Mers</i>						
Priory of Bardanac	Monastic	Cernes						
Priory of Saint-James	Monastic	Bordeaux	19				4.5	23.5
Priory of Saint-Julian	Monastic	Bordeaux						
Brothers' Minor of Bordeaux	Mendicant	Bordeaux						
Sisters' Minor of Bordeaux	Mendicant	Bordeaux						
Order of Saint John	Military	Miscellaneous						
Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous						
Totals			273		1	2	4.5	280.5

Reference: TNA, E 101/184/19 Accounting year: 1409–1410 Start date: 4 November 1409 End date: 7 March 1410

Institution	Type	Sub-region	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
Archbishopric of Bordeaux	Secular	Bordeaux	73.5					73.5
Cathedral of Saint-André	Secular	Bordeaux	73					73
Hospital of Saint-André	Secular	Bordeaux	16					16
Collegiate Church of Saint-Seurin	Secular	Bordeaux	22					22
Abbey of Sainte-Croix	Monastic	Bordeaux	48.5					48.5
Abbey of Soulac	Monastic	Lesparre	12.5			4.5		17
Abbey of Bonlieu	Monastic	<i>Entre-Deux-Mers</i>	13.5					13.5
Abbey of Bounet	Monastic	Other				1		1
Abbey of Sauve-Majeure	Monastic	<i>Entre-Deux-Mers</i>				13		13
Priory of Bardanac	Monastic	Cernes						
Priory of Saint-James	Monastic	Bordeaux	17					17
Priory of Saint-Julian	Monastic	Bordeaux						
Brothers' Minor of Bordeaux	Mendicant	Bordeaux	5					5
Sisters' Minor of Bordeaux	Mendicant	Bordeaux	6.5					6.5
Order of Saint John	Military	Miscellaneous						
Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous	1					1
Totals			288.5			18.5		307

Reference: TNA, E 101/185/9 Accounting year: 1412–1413 Start date: 5 October 1412 End date: 6 April 1413

Institution	Type	Sub-region	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
Archbishopric of Bordeaux	Secular	Bordeaux	5					5
Cathedral of Saint-André	Secular	Bordeaux	228.5		1	5	1	235.5
Hospital of Saint-André	Secular	Bordeaux	11					11
Collegiate Church of Saint-Seurin	Secular	Bordeaux	120			11		131
Abbey of Sainte-Croix	Monastic	Bordeaux	86.5		1.5	0.5	1.5	90
Abbey of Soulac	Monastic	Lesparre	3.5					3.5
Abbey of Bonlieu	Monastic	<i>Entre-Deux-Mers</i>						
Abbey of Bounet	Monastic	Other	5					5
Abbey of Sauve-Majeure	Monastic	<i>Entre-Deux-Mers</i>				18		18
Priory of Bardanac	Monastic	Cernes						
Priory of Saint-James	Monastic	Bordeaux	17					17
Priory of Saint-Julian	Monastic	Bordeaux						
Brothers' Minor of Bordeaux	Mendicant	Bordeaux						
Sisters' Minor of Bordeaux	Mendicant	Bordeaux						
Order of Saint John	Military	Miscellaneous	9					9
Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous	1.5			0.5		2
Totals			487		2.5	35	2.5	527

Reference: TNA, E 101/188/14 Accounting year: 1422–1423 Start date: 29 March 1423 End date: 5 June 1423

Institution	Type	Sub-region	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
Archbishopric of Bordeaux	Secular	Bordeaux						
Cathedral of Saint-André	Secular	Bordeaux	2					2
Hospital of Saint-André	Secular	Bordeaux						
Collegiate Church of Saint-Seurin	Secular	Bordeaux	9					9
Abbey of Sainte-Croix	Monastic	Bordeaux	23					23
Abbey of Soulac	Monastic	Lesparre						
Abbey of Bonlieu	Monastic	<i>Entre-Deux-Mers</i>						
Abbey of Bounet	Monastic	Other						
Abbey of Sauve-Majeure	Monastic	<i>Entre-Deux-Mers</i>						
Priory of Bardanac	Monastic	Cernes						
Priory of Saint-James	Monastic	Bordeaux	1.5					1.5
Priory of Saint-Julian	Monastic	Bordeaux						
Brothers' Minor of Bordeaux	Mendicant	Bordeaux						
Sisters' Minor of Bordeaux	Mendicant	Bordeaux						
Order of Saint John	Military	Miscellaneous	3					3
Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous	2.5					2.5
Totals			41					41

Reference: TNA, E 101/190/6 Accounting year: 1429–1430 Start date: 10 April 1429 End date: 10 April 1429

Institution	Type	Sub-region	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
Archbishopric of Bordeaux	Secular	Bordeaux						
Cathedral of Saint-André	Secular	Bordeaux						
Hospital of Saint-André	Secular	Bordeaux						
Collegiate Church of Saint-Seurin	Secular	Bordeaux	1.5					1.5
Abbey of Sainte-Croix	Monastic	Bordeaux						
Abbey of Soulac	Monastic	Lesparre						
Abbey of Bonlieu	Monastic	<i>Entre-Deux-Mers</i>						
Abbey of Bounet	Monastic	Other						
Abbey of Sauve-Majeure	Monastic	<i>Entre-Deux-Mers</i>						
Priory of Bardanac	Monastic	Cernes						
Priory of Saint-James	Monastic	Bordeaux						
Priory of Saint-Julian	Monastic	Bordeaux						
Brothers' Minor of Bordeaux	Mendicant	Bordeaux						
Sisters' Minor of Bordeaux	Mendicant	Bordeaux						
Order of Saint John	Military	Miscellaneous						
Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous						
Totals			1.5					1.5

Reference: TNA, E 101/191/3 Accounting year: 1431–1432 Start date: 29 October 1431 End date: 10 December 1431

Institution	Type	Sub-region	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
Archbishopric of Bordeaux	Secular	Bordeaux	16					16
Cathedral of Saint-André	Secular	Bordeaux	112					112
Hospital of Saint-André	Secular	Bordeaux	18					18
Collegiate Church of Saint-Seurin	Secular	Bordeaux	50.5					50.5
Abbey of Sainte-Croix	Monastic	Bordeaux	60.5			3		63.5
Abbey of Soulac	Monastic	Lesparre	4.5					4.5
Abbey of Bonlieu	Monastic	<i>Entre-Deux-Mers</i>						
Abbey of Bounet	Monastic	Other						
Abbey of Sauve-Majeure	Monastic	<i>Entre-Deux-Mers</i>	10					10
Priory of Bardanac	Monastic	Cernes						
Priory of Saint-James	Monastic	Bordeaux	7.5					7.5
Priory of Saint-Julian	Monastic	Bordeaux	1					1
Brothers' Minor of Bordeaux	Mendicant	Bordeaux	3					3
Sisters' Minor of Bordeaux	Mendicant	Bordeaux	3					3
Order of Saint John	Military	Miscellaneous	8					8
Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous	2.5			3		5.5
Totals			296.5			6		302.5

Reference: TNA, E 101/192/1 Accounting year: 1435–1436 Start date: 10 November 1435 End date: 14 February 1436

Institution	Type	Sub-region	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
Archbishopric of Bordeaux	Secular	Bordeaux	38.5					38.5
Cathedral of Saint-André	Secular	Bordeaux	139.5					139.5
Hospital of Saint-André	Secular	Bordeaux	10					10
Collegiate Church of Saint-Seurin	Secular	Bordeaux	78.5					78.5
Abbey of Sainte-Croix	Monastic	Bordeaux	125			1		126
Abbey of Soulac	Monastic	Lesparre						
Abbey of Bonlieu	Monastic	<i>Entre-Deux-Mers</i>	5					5
Abbey of Bounet	Monastic	Other				9.5		9.5
Abbey of Sauve-Majeure	Monastic	<i>Entre-Deux-Mers</i>						
Priory of Bardanac	Monastic	Cernes	7.5					7.5
Priory of Saint-James	Monastic	Bordeaux	22			2.5		24.5
Priory of Saint-Julian	Monastic	Bordeaux						
Brothers' Minor of Bordeaux	Mendicant	Bordeaux						
Sisters' Minor of Bordeaux	Mendicant	Bordeaux	4.5					4.5
Order of Saint John	Military	Miscellaneous	15.5					15.5
Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous	12.5			11		23.5
Totals			458.5			24		482.5

Reference: TNA, E 101/194/3 Accounting year: 1443–1444 Start date: 1 October 1443 End date: 17 January 1444

Institution	Type	Sub-region	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
Archbishopric of Bordeaux	Secular	Bordeaux	32.25			0.5		32.75
Cathedral of Saint-André	Secular	Bordeaux	83					83
Hospital of Saint-André	Secular	Bordeaux	3					3
Collegiate Church of Saint-Seurin	Secular	Bordeaux	51.25					51.25
Abbey of Sainte-Croix	Monastic	Bordeaux	48.25		3	1		52.25
Abbey of Soulac	Monastic	Lesparre	10					10
Abbey of Bonlieu	Monastic	<i>Entre-Deux-Mers</i>						
Abbey of Bounet	Monastic	Other				8.75		8.75
Abbey of Sauve-Majeure	Monastic	<i>Entre-Deux-Mers</i>				13.75		13.75
Priory of Bardanac	Monastic	Cernes	6					6
Priory of Saint-James	Monastic	Bordeaux	16					16
Priory of Saint-Julian	Monastic	Bordeaux						
Brothers' Minor of Bordeaux	Mendicant	Bordeaux						
Sisters' Minor of Bordeaux	Mendicant	Bordeaux						
Order of Saint John	Military	Miscellaneous	21.5					21.5
Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous				6		6
Totals			271.3		3	30		304.3

Reference: TNA, E 101/195/19 Accounting year: 1448–1449 Start date: 5 October 1448 End date: 1 May 1449

Institution	Type	Sub-region	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
Archbishopric of Bordeaux	Secular	Bordeaux	70					70
Cathedral of Saint-André	Secular	Bordeaux	236				0.25	236.3
Hospital of Saint-André	Secular	Bordeaux	30					30
Collegiate Church of Saint-Seurin	Secular	Bordeaux	127.3					127.3
Abbey of Sainte-Croix	Monastic	Bordeaux	67.5					67.5
Abbey of Soulac	Monastic	Lesparre						
Abbey of Bonlieu	Monastic	<i>Entre-Deux-Mers</i>						
Abbey of Bounet	Monastic	Other				17		17
Abbey of Sauve-Majeure	Monastic	<i>Entre-Deux-Mers</i>						
Priory of Bardanac	Monastic	Cernes	7.75			7.5		15.25
Priory of Saint-James	Monastic	Bordeaux	35.75					35.8
Priory of Saint-Julian	Monastic	Bordeaux	11.25					11.25
Brothers' Minor of Bordeaux	Mendicant	Bordeaux				12		12
Sisters' Minor of Bordeaux	Mendicant	Bordeaux						
Order of Saint John	Military	Miscellaneous	23			1		24
Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous	7.75			24.5		32.25
Totals			616.3			62	0.25	678.6

4.1.2 Revenues by sub-region, 1362

These are the annual ecclesiastical revenues, from benefices, of the sub-regions within the archdiocese of Bordeaux, 1362.

Sub-region	Ecclesiastical Revenues		% Share
	<i>l. bord.</i>	£ sterling	
Bordeaux	11,275.50	2,255.10	46.4
Archpresbytery of <i>Entre-Deux-Mers</i>	2,589.00	517.80	10.7
Archpresbytery of Bourg	1,829.50	365.90	7.5
Archpresbytery of Benauges	1,678.00	335.60	6.9
Archpresbytery of Blaye	1,344.00	268.80	5.5
Fronsac	1,289.00	257.80	5.3
Archpresbytery of Entre-Dordogne	1,163.25	232.65	4.8
Archpresbytery of Lesparre	1,043.00	208.60	4.3
Archpresbytery of Moulis	931.00	186.20	3.8
Archpresbytery of Buch and Born	820.00	164.00	3.4
Archpresbytery of Cernes	337.00	67.40	1.4
Total	24,299.25	4,859.85	100.0

Source: Calculated from *AHG*, XXII, pp. 2–22. **Note:** Currency figures are decimalised.

4.1.3 Share of institutions' exports by named exporters, 1348–1449

<i>Cathedral of Saint-André</i>	
	% Exports
Chapter	52.8
Canons, priests and lay tenants	24.5
Cantor	13.2
Archdeacons	3.9
Dean	3.6
Sacristan	0.9
Prebendary	0.7
Operarius	0.2
Bellringer	0.2
Other	0.1
Total	100

Source: TNA, E 101/167/16; E 101/170/17; E 101/173/4; E 101/602/3; E 101/180/2; E 101/182/6; E 101/182/6; E 101/183/11; E 101/184/19; E 101/185/9; E 101/188/14; E 101/190/6; E 101/191/3; E 101/192/1; E 101/194/3; E 101/195/19.

Collegiate Church of Saint-Seurin

	% Exports
Canons, priests and lay tenants	42.0
Chapter	31.9
Dean	16.1
Operarius	2.8
Sacristan	2.5
Treasurer	2.4
Sub-Dean	1.0
Primicerius	0.5
Provost	0.5
Prior	0.03
Other	0.15
Total	100.0

Source: TNA, E 101/167/16; E 101/170/17; E 101/173/4; E 101/602/3; E 101/180/2; E 101/182/6; E 101/182/6; E 101/183/11; E 101/184/19; E 101/185/9; E 101/188/14; E 101/190/6; E 101/191/3; E 101/192/1; E 101/194/3; E 101/195/19.

Abbey of Sainte-Croix

	% Exports
Abbot	75.24
Brothers, priests and tenants	4.63
Piscarius	4.45
Infirmarian	3.15
Chamberlain	2.41
Sacristan	2.22
Clergy	1.76
Abbey and its agents	1.55
Prior	1.14
Cantor	0.93
Almoner	0.72
Unknown	0.60
Hospitaller	0.51
Clerk	0.32
Hosteller	0.14
Rector	0.14
Ostiary	0.09
Total	100

Source: TNA, E 101/167/16; E 101/170/17; E 101/173/4; E 101/602/3; E 101/180/2; E 101/182/6; E 101/182/6; E 101/183/11; E 101/184/19; E 101/185/9; E 101/188/14; E 101/190/6; E 101/191/3; E 101/192/1; E 101/194/3; E 101/195/19.

4.1.4 Share of church direct exports of overall Gascony exports, 1348–1444

Shipping year	Export share (%)
1348–1349	1.64
1355–1356	2.07
1356–1357	2.69
1357–1358	0.69
1372–1373	1.92
1374–1375	2.83
1378–1379	6.39
1402–1403	2.79
1409–1410	2.31
1412–1413	4.01
1431–1432	3.51
1435–1436	3.83
1443–1444	3.45

Source: Calculated using totals from Appendix 4.1.1 above as a share of total exports in Appendix 3.1.

4.1.5 Monthly church wine consignments and volume exported, 1348–86 and 1402–49

	1348–86				1402–49			
	Cons.	%	Tuns	%	Cons.	%	Tuns	%
October	16	3.40	149.00	5.24	149	19.48	621.75	20.98
November	118	25.05	830.00	29.18	252	32.94	1,022.75	34.51
December	122	25.90	818.50	28.78	179	23.40	708.00	23.89
January	99	21.02	522.50	18.37	39	5.10	112.25	3.79
February	47	9.98	242.00	8.51	94	12.29	312.50	10.55
March	37	7.86	153.50	5.40	40	5.23	152.00	5.13
April	17	3.61	64.50	2.27	11	1.44	26.50	0.89
May	11	2.34	28.00	0.98	0	0.00	0.00	0.00
June	4	0.85	36.00	1.27	1	0.13	7.50	0.25
July	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0	0.00	0.00	0.00
August	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0	0.00	0.00	0.00
September	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0	0.00	0.00	0.00
Totals	471	100.00	2,844.00	100.00	765	100.00	2,963.25	100.00

Source: TNA, E 101/167/16; E 101/170/17; E 101/173/4; E 101/602/3; E 101/180/2; E 101/182/6; E 101/182/6; E 101/183/11; E 101/184/19; E 101/185/9; E 101/188/14; E 101/190/6; E 101/191/3; E 101/192/1; E 101/194/3; E 101/195/19.

4.2 Nobility

4.2.1 Noble exporters (tuns by tax category), 1348–1449

Reference: TNA, E 101/167/16 Accounting year: 1348–1349 Start date: 17 October 1348 End date: 15 July 1349

Lordship	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
<i>Capital</i> de Buch						
Lord of Albret		729				729
Lord of Curton						
Lord of Duras		31				31
Lord of Lalande/La Brède						
Lord of Landiras						
Lord of Langoiran		21				21
Lord of Lesparre						
Lord of Montferrand	2	43				45
Lord of Mussidan						
Lord of Rauzan						
<i>Soudan</i> de la Trau						
Totals	2	824				826

Reference: TNA, E 101/173/4 Accounting year: 1355–1356 Start date: 20 April 1355 End date: 24 March 1356

Lordship	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
<i>Capit</i> de Buch	25					25
Lord of Albret		199				199
Lord of Curton						
Lord of Duras						
Lord of Lalande/La Brède	12					12
Lord of Landiras						
Lord of Langoiran	7	7				14
Lord of Lesparre						
Lord of Montferrand	8					8
Lord of Mussidan		15				15
Lord of Rauzan						
<i>Soudan</i> de la Trau						
Totals	52	221				273

Reference: TNA, E 101/173/4 Accounting year: 1356–1357 Start date: 9 April 1356 End date: 3 April 1357

Lordship	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
<i>Capital</i> de Buch	79	27				106
Lord of Albret		11				11
Lord of Curton						
Lord of Duras		9				9
Lord of Lalande/La Brède	22	0.5				22
Lord of Landiras						
Lord of Langoiran						
Lord of Lesparre						
Lord of Montferrand						
Lord of Mussidan						
Lord of Rauzan						
<i>Soudan</i> de la Trau						
Totals	101	47.5				148

Reference: TNA, E 101/173/4 Accounting year: 1357–1358 Start date: 4 November 1357 End date: 2 April 1358

Lordship	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
<i>Capital</i> de Buch	25				46	71
Lord of Albret						
Lord of Curton						
Lord of Duras						
Lord of Lalande/La Brède	4					4
Lord of Landiras						
Lord of Langoiran						
Lord of Lesparre						
Lord of Montferrand		20.5				20.5
Lord of Mussidan						
Lord of Rauzan						
<i>Soudan</i> de la Trau						
Totals	29	20.5			46	95.5

Reference: TNA, E 101/602/3 Accounting year: 1372–1373 Start date: 5 October 1372 End date: 29 April 1373

Lordship	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
<i>Capit</i> de Buch	30	5				35
Lord of Albret						
Lord of Curton						
Lord of Duras						
Lord of Lalande/La Brède	16	16				31.5
Lord of Landiras		37.5				37.5
Lord of Langoiran	73					72.5
Lord of Lesparre		3				3
Lord of Montferrand						
Lord of Mussidan						
Lord of Rauzan						
<i>Soudan</i> de la Trau						
Totals	118	61.5				179.5

Reference: TNA, E 101/180/2 Accounting year: 1374–1375 Start date: 28 October 1374 End date: 27 June 1375

Lordship	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
<i>Capit</i> de Buch	49				1	50
Lord of Albret						
Lord of Curton				10		10
Lord of Duras						
Lord of Lalande/La Brède	13					12.5
Lord of Landiras		20.5				20.5
Lord of Langoiran	74					73.5
Lord of Lesparre						
Lord of Montferrand						
Lord of Mussidan						
Lord of Rauzan						
<i>Soudan</i> de la Trau						
Totals	135	20.5		10	1	166.5

Reference: TNA, E 101/182/6 Accounting year: 1378–1379 Start date: 22 October 1378 End date: 10 March 1379

Lordship	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
<i>Capital</i> de Buch	20					20
Lord of Albret						
Lord of Curton		18				18
Lord of Duras		1.5				1.5
Lord of Lalande/La Brède	10					10
Lord of Landiras		8.5				8.5
Lord of Langoiran						
Lord of Lesparre	6	5				11
Lord of Montferrand						
Lord of Mussidan						
Lord of Rauzan						
<i>Soudan</i> de la Trau	1					1
Totals	37	33				70

Reference: TNA, E 101/182/6 Accounting year: 1379–1380 Start date: 6 October 1379 End date: 12 November 1379

Lordship	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
<i>Capital</i> de Buch						
Lord of Albret						
Lord of Curton						
Lord of Duras						
Lord of Lalande/La Brède	1					1
Lord of Landiras						
Lord of Langoiran						
Lord of Lesparre						
Lord of Montferrand						
Lord of Mussidan						
Lord of Rauzan						
<i>Soudan</i> de la Trau						
Totals	1					1

Reference: TNA, E 101/183/11 Accounting year: 1385–1386 Start date: 5 October 1385 End date: 15 April 1386

Lordship	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
<i>Capital</i> de Buch	15					15
Lord of Albret						
Lord of Curton						
Lord of Duras						
Lord of Lalande/La Brède	30					30
Lord of Landiras			0.5	17.5		18
Lord of Langoiran						
Lord of Lesparre				20		20
Lord of Montferrand						
Lord of Mussidan				6.5		6.5
Lord of Rauzan						
<i>Soudan</i> de la Trau	3					3
Totals	48		0.5	44		92.5

Reference: TNA, E 101/185/11 Accounting year: 1402–1403 Start date: 5 November 1402 End date: 12 April 1403

Lordship	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
<i>Capit</i> de Buch	23					23
Lord of Albret						
Lord of Curton						
Lord of Duras	1.5		51	20.5	34.5	108
Lord of Lalande/La Brède	16					16
Lord of Landiras						
Lord of Langoiran						
Lord of Lesparre						
Lord of Montferrand				14		14
Lord of Mussidan						
Lord of Rauzan						
<i>Soudan</i> de la Trau	5.5			4	0.5	10
Totals	46		51	38.5	35	171

Reference: TNA, E 101/184/19 Accounting year: 1409–1410 Start date: 4 November 1409 End date: 7 March 1410

Lordship	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
<i>Capital</i> de Buch	76					75.5
Lord of Albret						
Lord of Curton						
Lord of Duras				65.5		65.5
Lord of Lalande/La Brède	16		0	0.5	0	16.5
Lord of Landiras	6					6
Lord of Langoiran						
Lord of Lesparre						
Lord of Montferrand	4			12.5		16.5
Lord of Mussidan				24.5		24.5
Lord of Rauzan						
<i>Soudan</i> de la Trau	22					22
Totals	124		0	103	0	226.5

Reference: TNA, E 101/185/9 Accounting year: 1412–1413 Start date: 5 October 1412 End date: 6 April 1413

Lordship	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
<i>Captal</i> de Buch						
Lord of Albret						
Lord of Curton						
Lord of Duras						
Lord of Lalande/La Brède	27					27
Lord of Landiras	14					13.5
Lord of Langoiran						
Lord of Lesparre						
Lord of Montferrand						
Lord of Mussidan						
Lord of Rauzan						
<i>Soudan</i> de la Trau				1.5		1.5
Totals	41			1.5		42

Reference: TNA, E 101/188/14 Accounting year: 1422–1423 Start date: 29 March 1423 End date: 5 June 1423

Lordship	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
<i>Capital</i> de Buch	2					2
Lord of Albret						
Lord of Curton						
Lord of Duras						
Lord of Lalande/La Brède						
Lord of Landiras	0.5					0.5
Lord of Langoiran						
Lord of Lesparre						
Lord of Montferrand						
Lord of Mussidan						
Lord of Rauzan						
<i>Soudan</i> de la Trau						
Totals	2.5					2.5

Reference: TNA, E 101/190/6 Accounting year: 1429–1430 Start date: 10 April 1429 End date: 10 April 1429

Lordship	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
<i>Capital</i> de Buch	1					1
Lord of Albret						
Lord of Curton						
Lord of Duras						
Lord of Lalande/La Brède						
Lord of Landiras						
Lord of Langoiran						
Lord of Lesparre						
Lord of Montferrand						
Lord of Mussidan						
Lord of Rauzan						
<i>Soudan</i> de la Trau						
Totals	1					1

Reference: TNA, E 101/191/3 Accounting year: 1431–1432 Start date: 29 October 1431 End date: 10 December 1431

Lordship	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
<i>Capital</i> de Buch	10					10
Lord of Albret						
Lord of Curton						
Lord of Duras						
Lord of Lalande/La Brède	8					8
Lord of Landiras	6					6
Lord of Langoiran						
Lord of Lesparre						
Lord of Montferrand	4.5					4.5
Lord of Mussidan						
Lord of Rauzan						
<i>Soudan</i> de la Trau						
Totals	29					28.5

Reference: TNA, E 101/192/1 Accounting year: 1435–1436 Start date: 10 November 1435 End date: 14 February 1436

Lordship	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
<i>Capital</i> de Buch	36					35.5
Lord of Albret						
Lord of Curton						
Lord of Duras				3.5		3.5
Lord of Lalande/La Brède	22					22
Lord of Landiras						
Lord of Langoiran						
Lord of Lesparre						
Lord of Montferrand	46					45.5
Lord of Mussidan						
Lord of Rauzan						
<i>Soudan</i> de la Trau						
Totals	103			3.5		106.5

Reference: TNA, E 101/194/3 Accounting year: 1443–1444 Start date: 1 October 1443 End date: 17 January 1444

Lordship	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
<i>Capital</i> de Buch	14					13.75
Lord of Albret						
Lord of Curton						
Lord of Duras	0.25			0.5		0.75
Lord of Lalande/La Brède	30				9	38.5
Lord of Landiras						
Lord of Langoiran						
Lord of Lesparre						
Lord of Montferrand	30					29.5
Lord of Mussidan						
Lord of Rauzan	3.5					3.5
<i>Soudan</i> de la Trau						
Totals	77			0.5	9	86

Reference: TNA, E 101/195/19 Accounting year: 1448–1449 Start date: 5 October 1448 End date: 1 May 1449

Lordship	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
<i>Capital</i> de Buch	89					88.75
Lord of Albret						
Lord of Curton						
Lord of Duras				10		10
Lord of Lalande/La Brède	11		13			23.5
Lord of Landiras						
Lord of Langoiran						
Lord of Lesparre						
Lord of Montferrand	2					2
Lord of Mussidan						
Lord of Rauzan	8.1					8.125
<i>Soudan</i> de la Trau						
Totals	109		13	10		132.375

4.2.2 Monthly noble wine consignments and volume exported, 1348–86 and 1402–49

	1348–86				1402–49			
	Cons.	%	Tuns	%	Cons.	%	Tuns	%
October	9	6.16	61.00	3.82	4	2.96	10.00	1.57
November	33	22.60	252.50	15.83	26	19.26	84.00	13.17
December	31	21.23	208.50	13.07	49	36.30	254.00	39.81
January	26	17.81	191.50	12.01	6	4.44	15.50	2.43
February	12	8.22	107.00	6.71	20	14.81	97.50	15.28
March	25	17.12	184.00	11.54	28	20.74	160.00	25.08
April	3	2.05	82.50	5.17	2	1.48	17.00	2.66
May	6	4.11	373.00	23.39	0	0.00	0.00	0.00
June	1	0.68	135.00	8.46	0	0.00	0.00	0.00
July	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0	0.00	0.00	0.00
August	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0	0.00	0.00	0.00
September	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0	0.00	0.00	0.00
Totals	146	100.00	1,595.00	100.00	135	100.00	638.00	100.00

Source: TNA, E 101/167/16; E 101/170/17; E 101/173/4; E 101/602/3; E 101/180/2; E 101/182/6; E 101/182/6; E 101/183/11; E 101/184/19; E 101/185/9; E 101/188/14; E 101/190/6; E 101/191/3; E 101/192/1; E 101/194/3; E 101/195/19.

4.3 Burgesses (Bordeaux)

4.3.1 Burgess exporters (tuns by tax category), 1348–1449

Reference: TNA, E 101/167/16 Accounting year: 1348–1349 Start date: 17 October 1348 End date: 15 July 1349

Family	Type	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
Béguey	Old	22				5	27
Caillau	Old						
Colom	Old	3				8	11
Constantin	New					12	12
Deu Casse	New	3	1.5			9.5	14
Estebe	New						
Gassies	New	3					3
Lambert	Old						
Monadey	Old	0.5	2			2.5	5
Peytebin	New						
Rostang	Old						
Sans	New						
Soler	Old		5				5
Toscanan	Old						
Totals		31.5	8.5			37	77

Reference: TNA, E 101/173/4 Accounting year: 1355–1356 Start date: 20 April 1355 End date: 24 March 1356

Family	Type	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
Béguey	Old	88	7.5			8	103.5
Caillau	Old	11					11
Colom	Old	22.5	2.5			1	26
Constantin	New	9.5				13	22.5
Deu Casse	New	106	61			109.5	276
Estebe	New						
Gassies	New	5	8				13
Lambert	Old	47	2				49
Monadey	Old	42				2	44
Peytebin	New	7	1				8
Rostang	Old	13	6			5.5	24.5
Sans	New						
Soler	Old		33.5				33.5
Toscanan	Old	6					6
Totals		357	121.5			139	617

Reference: TNA, E 101/173/4 Accounting year: 1356–1357 Start date: 9 April 1356 End date: 3 April 1357

Family	Type	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
Béguey	Old	147	18			7.5	172.5
Caillau	Old	26				16	42
Colom	Old	26	2				28
Constantin	New	36.5	18.5			53	108
Deu Casse	New	19	8			8	35
Estebe	New						
Gassies	New	43.5	4				47.5
Lambert	Old	14	2				16
Monadey	Old	84	10				94
Peytebin	New		4				4
Rostang	Old	40.5				3	43.5
Sans	New	7	2			2	11
Soler	Old	2.5	28				30.5
Toscanan	Old	37					37
Totals		483	96.5			89.5	669

Reference: TNA, E 101/173/4 Accounting year: 1357–1358 Start date: 4 November 1357 End date: 2 April 1358

Family	Type	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
Béguey	Old	108	7			2	117
Caillau	Old	3				2	5
Colom	Old	29					29
Constantin	New	1	1			40.5	42.5
Deu Casse	New	120	36			189	344.5
Estebe	New						
Gassies	New	68	61.5			2	131.5
Lambert	Old	26	10				36
Monadey	Old	42					42
Peytebin	New						
Rostang	Old	3				6	9
Sans	New						
Soler	Old	4					4
Toscanan	Old	36.5					36.5
Totals		440	115.5			241.5	797

Reference: TNA, E 101/602/3 Accounting year: 1372–1373 Start date: 5 October 1372 End date: 29 April 1373

Family	Type	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
Béguey	Old	82					82
Caillau	Old	41.5					41.5
Colom	Old	16.5	1				17.5
Constantin	New	17	2			3	22
Deu Casse	New	58.5	8.5			39.5	106.5
Estebe	New	1.5	5			16	22.5
Gassies	New	17	5.5			1	23.5
Lambert	Old	14.5	3.5			3	21
Monadey	Old	32					32
Peytebin	New						
Rostang	Old	10					10
Sans	New						
Soler	Old						
Toscanan	Old						
Totals		291	25.5			62.5	378.5

Reference: TNA, E 101/180/2 Accounting year: 1374–1375 Start date: 28 October 1374 End date: 27 June 1375

Family	Type	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
Béguey	Old	30.5					30.5
Caillau	Old	7					7
Colom	Old	46.5	0.5				47
Constantin	New	8				1.5	9.5
Deu Casse	New	28.5	2				30.5
Estebe	New	3					3
Gassies	New	19					19
Lambert	Old	4	2.5				6.5
Monadey	Old	28	1				29
Peytebin	New	4.5	5.5				10
Rostang	Old	9					9
Sans	New	2	1.5				3.5
Soler	Old						
Toscanan	Old						
Totals		190	13			1.5	204.5

Reference: TNA, E 101/182/6 Accounting year: 1378–1379 Start date: 22 October 1378 End date: 10 March 1379

Family	Type	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
Béguey	Old	7.5					7.5
Caillau	Old	10.5		0.5			11
Colom	Old	42					42
Constantin	New	21.5	5.5			6	33
Deu Casse	New	160		4		3.5	167.5
Estebe	New	15.5		3.5			19
Gassies	New	35		1			36
Lambert	Old	52				15	67
Monadey	Old	58					58
Peytebin	New	11.5		10			21.5
Rostang	Old	23.5		2			25.5
Sans	New	4					4
Soler	Old						
Toscanan	Old						
Totals		441	5.5	21		24.5	492

Reference: TNA, E 101/182/6 Accounting year: 1379–1380 Start date: 6 October 1379 End date: 12 November 1379

Family	Type	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
Béguey	Old						
Caillau	Old						
Colom	Old						
Constantin	New	5		3		0.5	8.5
Deu Casse	New						
Estebe	New						
Gassies	New						
Lambert	Old						
Monadey	Old	0.5					0.5
Peytebin	New						
Rostang	Old	1					1
Sans	New						
Soler	Old						
Toscanan	Old						
Totals		6.5		3		0.5	10

Reference: TNA, E 101/183/11 Accounting year: 1385–1386 Start date: 5 October 1385 End date: 15 April 1386

Family	Type	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
Béguey	Old	53		2.5			55.5
Caillau	Old	12		1			13
Colom	Old	68			2.5	1	71.5
Constantin	New	31		14		17.5	62.5
Deu Casse	New	88.5		8.5		39	136
Estebe	New						
Gassies	New	62.5		15		24.5	102
Lambert	Old	13					13
Monadey	Old	70.5		4.5		50.5	125.5
Peytebin	New	21		26.5		1	48.5
Rostang	Old	17.5					17.5
Sans	New	10		16.5		1	27.5
Soler	Old						
Toscanan	Old						
Totals		447		88.5	2.5	134.5	672.5

Reference: TNA, E 101/185/11 Accounting year: 1402–1403 Start date: 5 November 1402 End date: 12 April 1403

Family	Type	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
Béguey	Old	5					5
Caillau	Old						
Colom	Old	1.5		3.5	3	2	10
Constantin	New	20.5		4		7	31.5
Deu Casse	New	12			5.5	1	18.5
Estebe	New	1.5		1			2.5
Gassies	New	26		36	7.5	6	75.5
Lambert	Old						
Monadey	Old	9		6		4	19
Peytebin	New	2				9	11
Rostang	Old	5		2			7
Sans	New	7.5				3	10.5
Soler	Old	1.5		11.5		22	35
Toscanan	Old						
Totals		91.5		64	16	54	225.5

Reference: TNA, E 101/184/19 Accounting year: 1409–1410 Start date: 4 November 1409 End date: 7 March 1410

Family	Type	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
Béguey	Old	53.5		4	0.5	6.5	64.5
Caillau	Old	5.5			1.5		7
Colom	Old	24		2	4		30
Constantin	New	42	1	22	2		67
Deu Casse	New	15.5					15.5
Estebe	New	6.5		3		18.5	28
Gassies	New	57.5		134.5		14	206
Lambert	Old	8		4.5		2.5	15
Monadey	Old	9.5					9.5
Peytebin	New	26.5		5.5		5	37
Rostang	Old	27.5					27.5
Sans	New	13.5				21	34.5
Soler	Old			1.5			1.5
Toscanan	Old						
Totals		290	1	177	8	67.5	543

Reference: TNA, E 101/185/9 Accounting year: 1412–1413 Start date: 5 October 1412 End date: 6 April 1413

Family	Type	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
Béguey	Old	7		4.5		4.5	16
Caillau	Old	11		4		0.5	15.5
Colom	Old	13					13
Constantin	New	34.5		13	2.5	5	55
Deu Casse	New	26.5		6			32.5
Estebe	New	6.5		17			23.5
Gassies	New	67		94.5		27	188.5
Lambert	Old	12.5		5		4.5	22
Monadey	Old	12					12
Peytebin	New	6		11.5		10	27.5
Rostang	Old	28				1	29
Sans	New	18		24		2	44
Soler	Old	22		27		45	94
Toscanan	Old						
Totals		264		206.5	2.5	99.5	572.5

Reference: TNA, E 101/188/14 Accounting year: 1422–1423 Start date: 29 March 1423 End date: 5 June 1423

Family	Type	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
Béguey	Old			1		3.5	4.5
Caillau	Old						
Colom	Old	3					3
Constantin	New	3.5		3			6.5
Deu Casse	New	2					2
Estebe	New	0.5		3		0.5	4
Gassies	New	2		1			3
Lambert	Old	4			0.5		4.5
Monadey	Old						
Peytebin	New	1		1			2
Rostang	Old						
Sans	New						
Soler	Old						
Toscanan	Old						
Totals		16		9	0.5	4	29.5

Reference: TNA, E 101/190/6 Accounting year: 1429–1430 Start date: 10 April 1429 End date: 10 April 1429

Family	Type	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
Béguey	Old					4	4
Caillau	Old						
Colom	Old	10.5					10.5
Constantin	New	3			1		4
Deu Casse	New						
Estebe	New			2			2
Gassies	New	0.5					0.5
Lambert	Old	3		4.5			7.5
Monadey	Old						
Peytebin	New						
Rostang	Old						
Sans	New						
Soler	Old						
Toscanan	Old						
Totals		17		6.5	1	4	28.5

Reference: TNA, E 101/191/3 Accounting year: 1431–1432 Start date: 29 October 1431 End date: 10 December 1431

Family	Type	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
Béguey	Old	1		6.5		37	44.5
Caillau	Old	9.5		9.5		5.5	24.5
Colom	Old						
Constantin	New	24		31	1	18.5	74.5
Deu Casse	New	3.5		2.5			6
Estebe	New	16.5		17.5		25	59
Gassies	New	9		5		8	22
Lambert	Old	11		8		2.5	21.5
Monadey	Old						
Peytebin	New	11.5		0.5			12
Rostang	Old	18.5					18.5
Sans	New			2.5		2.5	5
Soler	Old	1		0.5		2	3.5
Toscanan	Old						
Totals		106		83.5	1	101	291

Reference: TNA, E 101/192/1 Accounting year: 1435–1436 Start date: 10 November 1435 End date: 14 February 1436

Family	Type	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
Béguey	Old	12.5		7		19.5	39
Caillau	Old	15		2		14.5	31.5
Colom	Old	10.5					10.5
Constantin	New	44		36		17.5	97.5
Deu Casse	New	6		3		0.5	9.5
Estebe	New	10.5		11	1.5	0.5	23.5
Gassies	New	48		5	1	2.5	56.5
Lambert	Old	25		12		13	50
Monadey	Old	2.5					2.5
Peytebin	New	5					5
Rostang	Old	12.5			3		15.5
Sans	New	1.5		6.5		6	14
Soler	Old	3.5		0.5			4
Toscanan	Old						
Totals		197		83	5.5	74	359

Reference: TNA, E 101/194/3 Accounting year: 1443–1444 Start date: 1 October 1443 End date: 17 January 1444

Family	Type	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
Béguey	Old	11.3		11	1	31.5	54.75
Caillau	Old	8.25		2.5			10.75
Colom	Old	8					8
Constantin	New	44.8		20		21.25	86
Deu Casse	New	6.75					6.75
Estebe	New	15.5		5	4.5	1	26
Gassies	New	62.3		7.625	1.25		71.125
Lambert	Old	16.5		7.25	2.25	2	28
Monadey	Old	13			0.5		13.5
Peytebin	New	2					2
Rostang	Old	17.3			1.5		18.75
Sans	New	3			1.5	1	5.5
Soler	Old	1.5				16	17.5
Toscanan	Old						
Totals		210		53.375	12.5	72.75	348.625

Reference: TNA, E 101/195/19 Accounting year: 1448–1449 Start date: 5 October 1448 End date: 1 May 1449

Family	Type	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b	Cust Iss non-b	Cust	Total
Béguey	Old	36		6.5	12	77.5	132
Caillau	Old	36		5		44.25	85.25
Colom	Old	8.5					8.5
Constantin	New	79		5		109.75	193.75
Deu Casse	New	2.75		0.5			3.25
Estebe	New	13.5		10	4	6.75	34.25
Gassies	New	142		9.5		35.5	187
Lambert	Old	20		7		2.5	29.5
Monadey	Old	11.8			1		12.75
Peytebin	New	0.25					0.25
Rostang	Old	55.5		0.5			56
Sans	New	8.5		1		5	14.5
Soler	Old	11		1.5		21.5	34
Toscanan	Old						
Totals		425		46.5	17	302.75	791

4.3.2 Monthly burgess wine consignments and volume exported, 1348–86 and 1402–49

	1348–86				1402–49			
	Cons.	%	Tuns	%	Cons.	%	Tuns	%
October	59	8.37	434.00	11.06	139	14.01	581.25	17.99
November	154	21.84	772.00	19.68	343	34.58	1,098.38	33.99
December	162	22.98	1,044.50	26.62	244	24.60	809.13	25.04
January	146	20.71	668.50	17.04	53	5.34	142.00	4.39
February	47	6.67	188.50	4.80	116	11.69	359.00	11.11
March	89	12.62	613.00	15.62	76	7.66	199.00	6.16
April	33	4.68	141.50	3.61	20	2.02	42.50	1.32
May	6	0.85	28.00	0.71	0	0.00	0.00	0.00
June	5	0.71	16.00	0.41	1	0.10	0.50	0.02
July	2	0.28	9.50	0.24	0	0.00	0.00	0.00
August	2	0.28	8.00	0.20	0	0.00	0.00	0.00
September	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0	0.00	0.00	0.00
Totals	705	100.00	3,923.50	100.00	992	100.00	3,231.75	100.00

Source: TNA, E 101/167/16; E 101/170/17; E 101/173/4; E 101/602/3; E 101/180/2; E 101/182/6; E 101/182/6; E 101/183/11; E 101/184/19; E 101/185/9; E 101/188/14; E 101/190/6; E 101/191/3; E 101/192/1; E 101/194/3; E 101/195/19.

4.4 Burgesses (others)

4.4.1 Wine exports from Saint-Macaire, 1348–75

Accounting Year	Tuns by tax category			Cust	Total	Reference
	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b			
1348–1349	90.5	58		5.5	154	TNA, E 101/167/16
1355–1356	74.5	42.5		1	118	TNA, E 101/173/4
1356–1357	61.5	69.5			131	TNA, E 101/173/4
1357–1358	55	137.5		3	195.5	TNA, E 101/173/4
1372–1373	63	93.5			156.5	TNA, E 101/602/3
1374–1375	21				21	TNA, E 101/180/2

4.4.2 Wine exports from La Réole, 1348–73

Accounting Year	Tuns by tax category			Cust	Total	Reference
	Fr	Cust Iss	Cust Iss b			
1348–1349	73.5			495.5	569	TNA, E 101/167/16
1355–1356	251.5	1			252.5	TNA, E 101/173/4
1356–1357	695.5				695.5	TNA, E 101/173/4
1357–1358	1,060	14.5		13	1,087.5	TNA, E 101/173/4
1372–1373	507				507	TNA, E 101/602/3

4.4.3 Wine exports from *Haut-Pays* towns, 1306–1403.

Tuns by accounting and shipping year						
	1306–1307	1348–1349	1355–1356	1356–1357	1357–1358	1402–1403
Agen	3,140	1,004.5			16.5	
Aiguillon	275	252.5				
Buzet	45				7.5	
Castelmoron	894	77.5			106.5	
Castelsagrat	224				22.5	
Castelsarrasin	678				13.5	
Caumont	367				64	
Clairac	539				69	70
Gontaud	381				70.5	
Le Mas d'Agenais	1,123				104	
Moissac	2,270				296.5	
Montaubin	4,941				72.5	
Nérac	281	14	33.5		97.5	
Port-Sainte-Marie	4,083			105	218.5	108.5
Rabastens	3,128				122.5	
Tonneins					36	92.5
Toulouse					146.5	

Source: James, *Studies*, p.3 [for 1306–7]; TNA, E 101/161/3; E 101/167/16; E 101/173/4; E 101/173/4; E 101/173/4; E 101/184/12; E 101/185/11.

5 Shipping

5.1 Total size of annual wine fleet, 1307–1483

Shipping year	Number of ships	Shipping year	Number of ships
1307–8	624	1402–3	223
1308–9	736	1409–10	213
1310–11	503	1412–3	180
1348–9	74	1416–7	218
1355–6	153	1431–2	129
1356–7	254	1435–6	166
1357–8	220	1436–7	126
1359–60	146	1437–8	84
1360–1	363	1438–9	49
1372–3	164	1443–4	85
1374–5	95	1445–6	136
1377–8	138	1448–9	162
1378–9	184	1482–3	310
1385–6	194		

Source: W.R. Childs, 'The Commercial Shipping of Southwestern England in the Later Fifteenth Century', *The Mariner's Mirror*, 83:3(1997), pp. 272–92, at p. 278; TNA, E 101/167/16; E 101/192/8, fos 29v–30r.

5.2 Number of ships paying *killage* at Bordeaux and Libourne, annualised, 1348–1451

Shipping Period	Killage (<i>ann.</i>)	Shipping Period	Killage (<i>ann.</i>)
1348–9	3	1402–3	2
1352–3	29	1409–10	12
1353–4	12	1412–13	8
1355–6	24	1418–9	4
1356–7	32	1423–4	14
1357–8	89	1424–5	4
1363–4	65	1425–6	4
1365	69	1427–8	11
1366	76	1428–9	10
1367	47	1429–30	9
1368–9	38	1430–1	20
1369–70	10	1434–5	18
1372–3	41	1435–6	19
1373–4	33	1436–7	28
1374–5	23	1437–8	19
1375–6	22	1438–9	11
1376–7	54	1442–6	31.5
1377–8	50	1446–51	24.5
1378–9	37		
1379–80	31		
1380–1	13		

Source: TNA, E 36/80, fos. 403–4; E 101/167/16; E 101/170/17, m. 4; E 101/171/2, m. 4–5; E 101/173/4, fos 38v, 128v–129r; E 101/179/9, 6r; E 101/179/14, fol. 5r; E 101/179/15, fol. 16v; E 101/180/9, fos 7r–8v, 26r–27v, 44r–25r, 61r, 74r.; E 101/182/9, fol. 14v; E 101/182/10, fos 6v–7r; E 101/184/19, fol. 76r; E 101/185/11, fol. 61r; E 101/185/7; E 101/187/12, fol. 18v; E 101/189/6, m. 5; E 101/189/8, m. 8; E 101/189/9, m. 6; E 101/189/12, fos 34v, 56v, 79r, 101v; E 101/191/11, fol. 7r; E 101/192/8, fos 29v–30r; E 101/194/3, fol. 77r; E 364/63, mm 6–8, dorso; E 364/67, m.2; E 364/70, m. 9; E 364/75, m. 5 dorso; E 364/84, m. 20; E 364/91, m. 13; E 364/92, m. 11; *CGD*, 1, pp. 134–137 (no. CCXXIII).

5.3 Home ports of English ships as a percentage of wine fleet

1401–1413	%	1431–1444	%
Dartmouth	15.76	Dartmouth	10.93
London	8.95	Hull	9.65
Plymouth	7.39	London	7.40
Bristol	6.23	Bristol	6.75
Fowey	6.03	Fowey	6.11
Guernsey	6.03	Poole	5.14
Hull	5.45	Plymouth	4.50
Milford Haven	2.72	Saltash	4.18
King's Lynn	2.53	Guernsey	3.54
Newcastle	2.14	King's Lynn	3.22
Bridgwater	1.95	Southampton	2.57
Great Yarmouth	1.75	Weymouth	2.57
Tenby	1.75	Winchelsea	2.25
Exmouth	1.56	Teignmouth	1.93
Sandwich	1.56	Exeter	1.61
Teignmouth	1.56	Landulph	1.61
Winchelsea	1.56	Newcastle	1.61
Ipswich	1.36	Bridgwater	1.29
Poole	1.36	Jersey	1.29
Jersey	1.17	Mount's Bay	1.29
Weymouth	1.17	Orwell	1.29
Barnstaple	0.97	Penzance	1.29
Carmarthen	0.97	Sandwich	1.29
Others ¹	18.09	Others ²	16.72

Source: Calculated by the author with the aid of *The Merchant Fleet of Late Medieval and Tudor England, 1400–1580* (2017), medievalandtudorships.org, accessed on 22/11/17.

¹ Other ports during 1401–1413 that contributed less than 1% of shipping for the wine trade were Falmouth, Southampton, Bursledon, Hook Fareham, Kingswear, Seaton, Brixham, Caerleon, Gosford, Ottermouth, Penzance, Portsmouth, Saltash, Carlyon Bay, Chepstow, Chester, Colchester, Fareham, Hamble-le-Rice, Kirkley, Orwell, Yealmpton, York, Arundel, Barry, Basildon, Bawdsey, Boston, Bridlington, Brightlingsea, Cardigan, Combwich, Cornwall, Grimsby, Isle of Wight, Kingsbridge, Lancaster, Liverpool, Looe, Lymington, Maldon, Mount's Bay, Northam, Reading Street, Sarisbury, Totnes.

² Other ports during 1431–1444 that contributed less than 1% of shipping for the wine trade were Bursledon, Looe, Tenby, Topsham, Bideford, Brixham, Colchester, Falmouth, Gloucester, Ipswich, Milford Haven, Portsmouth, Rye, Barnstaple, Berkeley, Boston, Chichester, Dover, East Portlemouth, Exmouth, Kingswear, Lowestoft, Lymington, Millbrook (Cornwall), Paignton, Reading Street, Redcliffe Bay, Seaton, Shoreham-by-Sea, Small Hythe, Wells-next-the-Sea, Yealmpton.

6 Monetary data

6.1 Bordeaux mint figures, 1350–1453

Note: Values are decimalised.

Period	Constable	Length of accounts	Mint profits (<i>l bord.</i>)			Ann.	Reference
			Gold	Silver	Total		
1350–1	John de Charnels	26 Dec 1350– 4 Nov 1351	4,711.50	3,791.52	8,503.02	8,503.02	M.C. Rechenbach, 'The Gascon Money of Edward III: A Study in Monetary History', Ph.D. Thesis, University of Maryland (1955), pp. 268–9 [based on TNA, E 372/198/40]
1351–2	William de la Pommeraye	7 Nov 1351– 16 Jul 1352	5,888.33	3,537.83	9,426.17	9,426.17	Rechenbach, 'The Gascon Money', pp. 270–1 [based on TNA, E 372/207/46d]
1352–4	John de Charnels	17 Jul 1352– 4 Apr 1354	13,636.19	2,558.00	16,194.19	10,041.30	Rechenbach, 'The Gascon Money', pp. 272–3, 278–9 [based on TNA, E 372/199/37]
1354–61	John de Stretle	4 Apr 1354– 20 Sept 1361	19,612.88	11,357.05	30,969.93	4,055.51	Rechenbach, 'The Gascon Money', p. 281 [based on TNA, E 101/207/17]
1361–2	William de Farle	20 Sept 1361– 19 Jul 1362	243.33	680.13	923.46	923.46	Rechenbach, 'The Gascon Money', pp. 282–3, 285 [based on TNA, E 101/210/15; E 101/176/6]
1363	Principality		14,437.62	56.65	14,494.27	14,494.27	<i>Collection générale des documents français qui se trouvent en Angleterre</i> , 1, (ed.) J. Delpit (Paris, 1847), pp. 169–176 (no. CCXXIV).
1364	"		11,016.12	8,891.63	19,907.75	19,907.75	<i>CGD</i> , 1, pp. 169–76 (no. CCXXIV).
1365	"		7,269.16	5,509.60	12,778.75	12,778.75	<i>CGD</i> , 1, pp. 169–76 (no. CCXXIV).
1366	"		6,062.50	2,286.25	8,348.75	8,348.75	<i>CGD</i> , 1, pp. 169–76 (no. CCXXIV).
1367–8	"		1,204.26	14,081.88	15,286.14	15,286.14	<i>CGD</i> , 1, pp. 169–76 (no. CCXXIV).
1381–86	John de Stratton	26 Aug 1381– 26 Dec 1386		2,436.75	2,436.75	456.89	J.R. Wright, 'The Accounts of John Stratton and John Gedeney, Constables of Bordeaux, 1381–1390', <i>Mediaeval Studies</i> , 42 (1980), p. 247
1386–90	John Gedeney	26 Dec 1386– Sept 1390		937.69	937.69	250.05	Wright, 'The Accounts of John Stratton and John Gedeney', p. 292
1401–13	William de Farringdon	1 May 1401– 16 Nov 1413		7,452.67	7,452.67	615.92	TNA, E 364/51, m. 16
1413–18	William Clifford	23 Mar 1413– 27 Mar 1418		1,212.42	1,212.42	303.10	TNA, E 364/55, m. 37

1418–19	Robert Holme	27 Mar 1418– 16 May 1419	380.00	380.00	368.60	TNA, E 364/55, m. 35
1419–23	John Radcliffe	16 May 1419– 18 May 1423	1,987.71	1,987.71	480.57	TNA, E 364/59, m. 21
1423–27	Thomas Barnaby	Oct 1423–Mar 1427	4,513.15	4,513.15	1,293.91	TNA, E 364/63, mm 6–8, dorso
1427–31	Bernard Angevin	28 Mar 1427– 28 Jun 1431	2,603.72	2,603.72	612.64	TNA, E 364/67, m. 2
1431–35	Walter Colles	Oct 1431–Sept 1435	430.25	430.25	107.56	TNA, E 364/70, m. 9 dorso
1435–39	Walter Colles	Sept 1435–Aug 1439	48.80	48.80	12.58	TNA, E 101/191/11, fol. 32v; TNA, E 364/75, m. 5
1442–46	Edward Hull	Sept 1442–Sept 1446	12.97	12.97	3.24	TNA, E 364/84, m. 20
1446–51	Edward Hull	Sept 1446–24 Jun 1451	13.05	13.05	2.75	TNA, E 364/91, m. 13
1452–53	Edward Hull	Oct 1452 – Jul 1453	139.27	139.27	187.44	TNA, E 364/92, m. 11

6.2 Bordeaux mint figures, 1459–1495

Note: Values are decimalised.

Year	Pure gold		Pure silver		Total in <i>livres</i>
	<i>Marc</i> s	Kg	<i>Marc</i> s	Kg	
1459	54.3	13.3	202.7	47.6	7,443.50
1460	94.6	23.2	200.4	47	11,530.90
1461	206.8	50.6	143.6	33.7	22,265.40
1462	57	14	79.4	18.6	6,526.70
1463	135.7	33.2	70.1	16.4	14,438.00
1464	0	0	36.9	8.7	390.90
1495	294.5	72.1	298.8	70.1	42,358.30

Source: Calculated by the author from H.A. Miskimin, *Money and Power in Fifteenth-century France* (New Haven, 1984), pp. 145–6.

6.3 Exchange rates: *livre bordelaise* against sterling, 1318–1453

Note: Values are decimalised

	Year/period (modern)	Price of <i>l bord.</i> (£sterling)	Price of £sterling (<i>l bord.</i>)	Reference
1	1318	0.16667	6.00	W.H. Prior, 'Notes on the weights and measures of medieval England', <i>Bulletin du Cange</i> 1 (1924), pp. 79–97 and 141–70
2	1327–31	0.12500	8.00	P.J. Capra, 'Les espèces, les ateliers, les frappes et les émissions monétaires en Guyenne anglo-gasconne aux XIVe et XVe siècles', <i>Numismatic Chronicle</i> 7 Ser. 19 (1979), pp. 139–53
3	1336–7	0.16667	6.00	M.C. Rechenbach, 'The Gascon Money of Edward III: A Study in Monetary History', unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Maryland (1955), pp. 171, 263–284
4	1338	0.12500	8.00	Rechenbach, 'The Gascon Money', pp. 171, 263–284
5	1338–40	0.08333	12.00	Rechenbach, 'The Gascon Money', pp. 171, 263–284
6	1340–1	0.06667	15.00	Rechenbach, 'The Gascon Money', pp. 171, 263–284
7	1341–3	0.05000	20.00	Rechenbach, 'The Gascon Money', pp. 171, 263–284
8	1348	0.20000	5.00	Rechenbach, 'The Gascon Money', pp. 171, 263–284
9	1349	0.20000	5.00	TNA, E 101/167/16, no. 40
10	1353	0.20000	5.00	Rechenbach, 'The Gascon Money', pp. 171, 263–284
11	1354–5	0.20000	5.00	P.J. Capra, 'Le Léopard et le Guyennois d'or, monnaie d'Aquitaine', <i>Annales du Midi</i> , 72 (1960), p. 398
12	1355	0.20000	5.00	P.J. Capra, 'L'histoire monétaire de l'Aquitaine anglo-gasconne aux temps du Prince Noir 1354–1372', <i>Bulletin et Mémoires de la Société d'Archéologie de Bordeaux</i> 64 (1968)
13	1356	0.29555	3.38	Rechenbach, 'The Gascon Money', pp. 171, 263–284
14	1357	0.20000	5.00	Rechenbach, 'The Gascon Money', pp. 171, 263–284
15	1361	0.20000	5.00	P.J. Capra, 'Les espèces, les ateliers', pp. 139–53
16	1368	0.20000	5.00	P.J. Capra, 'Recherches sur la valeur des monnaies dans le Bordelais au temps de la lieutenance du Prince Noir 1354–7', <i>Bulletin philologique et historique</i> (1957), pp. 417–563
17	1367–71	0.20000	5.00	TNA, E 36/80
18	1373–3	0.13333	7.50	TNA, E 101/179/9, fol. 9v
19	1374	0.13333	7.50	TNA, E 101/179/14, fol. 12r

20	1375–6	0.13333	7.50	TNA, E 101/180/1, no. 12
21	1375–80	0.13333	7.50	TNA, E 101/180/9, fol. 29v
22	1379	0.13333	7.50	TNA, E 101/182/9, fol. 1r–v
23	1381–90	0.13333	7.50	J.R. Wright, ‘The Accounts of John Stratton and John Gedeney, Constables of Bordeaux, 1381–1390’, <i>Mediaeval Studies</i> , 42 (1980), p. 259
24	1401–13	0.13333	7.50	TNA, E 364/51
25	1413–8	0.10000	10.00	TNA, E 364/55
26	1419–23	0.10000	10.00	TNA, E 364/59
27	1423–7	0.10000	10.00	TNA, E 364/63
28	1427–31	0.10000	10.00	TNA, E 364/67
29	1427–8	0.10000	10.00	TNA, E 101/189/12, fol. 15r
30	1430–1	0.10000	10.00	TNA, E 101/189/12, fol. 102v
31	1431–5	0.10000	10.00	TNA, E 364/70
32	1434–5	0.08889	11.25	TNA, E 101/191/11, fol. 10v
33	1435–9	0.10000	10.00	TNA, E 364/75; E 101/192/8, fol. 40v
34	1442–6	0.07843	12.75	TNA, E 364/84
35	1446–51	0.07843	12.75	TNA, E 364/91
36	1452–3	0.07843	12.75	TNA, E 364/92

6.4 Exchange rates: based on purchasing power (wheat), 1332–1459

Note: Values are decimalised

Price of wheat (quarter)					Price of wheat (quarter)				
Year	England		Exchange rates		Year	England		Exchange rates	
	£ sterling	Gascony <i>l bord.</i>	PP	Official £:1 <i>bord.</i>		£ sterling	Gascony <i>l bord.</i>	PP	Official £:1 <i>bord.</i>
1332	0.36	2.50	6.94	8.00	1398	0.26	5.10	19.62	7.50
1339	0.15	4.38	29.20	12.00	1407	0.20	3.60	18.00	7.50
1340	0.27	5.40	20.00	12.00	1414	0.20	8.50	42.50	10.00
1341–2	0.18	5.83	32.39	15.00	1416	0.30	12.00	40.00	10.00
1342–3	0.21	7.40	35.24	20.00	1420	0.22	10.00	45.45	10.00
1343–4	0.19	23.00	121.05	20.00	1421	0.30	10.00	33.33	10.00
1354	0.21	2.50	11.90	5.00	1422	0.24	8.40	35.00	10.00
1355	0.28	2.17	7.75	5.00	1437	0.25	25.00	100.00	10.00
1356	0.29	2.74	9.45	5.00	1438	0.46	40.00	86.96	10.00
1357	0.31	4.17	13.45	5.00	1440	0.35	10.00	28.57	12.75
1360	0.31	7.13	23.00	5.00	1442	0.19	8.75	46.05	12.75
1367	0.26	5.35	20.58	5.00	1459	0.29	5.36	18.48	12.75
1382	0.25	7.20	28.80	7.50					

Source: E.C. Lodge, 'The Estates of the Archbishop and Chapter of Saint-André of Bordeaux under Plantagenet rule', in *Oxford Studies in Social and Legal History*, III, (ed.) P. Vinogradoff (Oxford, 1912), p. 152; 'Petite chronique de Guyenne', pp.53–79, at p.65; ADG, G 2302, fol. 76r; *RJ*, I, pp. 157, 160; II, pp. 309, 467, 575, 593, 598; 'Compte du trésorier de la ville de Bordeaux pour 1442 (février – août)', pp. 179–215, at p.194 (for Gascon wheat prices); G. Clark, *English prices and wages, 1209–1914* (2003) (for English wheat prices); Appendix 6.3 (for the official exchange rate).

6.5 Precious metal value of *livre bordelaise* and estimated bimetallic ratios

Period	Value of the <i>livre bordelaise</i>				Estimated gold : silver ratio (1:x)
	Gold 1803 francs	Gold (grams.)	Silver 1803 francs	Silver (grams)	
1341–1360	9.08	2.63	9.55	42.93	16.32
1361–1380	12.61	3.66	7.73	34.75	9.49
1381–1400	10	2.90	6.91	31.06	10.71
1401–1420	9.59	2.78	4.50	20.23	7.28
1421–1440	6.41	1.86	4.09	18.39	9.89
1441–1460	5.38	1.56	3.47	15.60	10.00

Source: Author's calculations of the weights of gold and silver are based on those in *Germinal* francs of April 1803 provided by J-A. Brutails, *Recherches sur l'équivalence des Anciennes Mesures de la Gironde* (Bordeaux, 1912), p. 154.

Note: 1 *Germinal* franc = 0.290034g pure gold = 4.495527g pure silver; a 1:15.5 gold/silver ratio.

7 Gascon wages

Note: Indices of male Gascon day wages and wine prices, 1355=100.

	Viticultural work				Non-viticultural work				Wine prices	
	Maintenance		Harvest		Grain harvest		Carpenter		<i>l bord.</i>	£sterling
	<i>l bord.</i>	£sterling	<i>l bord.</i>	£sterling	<i>l bord.</i>	£sterling	<i>l bord.</i>	£sterling		
1354	114.3	114.3								
1355	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1356	114.3	114.3	137.1	137.1	120.0	177.3			167.2	247.0
1357	142.9	142.9	167.1	167.1	138.0	138.0	315.0	315.0	117.6	117.6
1362	104.3	104.3	200.0	200.0	120.0	120.0			96.8	96.8
1368	271.4	271.4			213.3	213.3	20.8	20.8	273.6	273.6
1383	171.4	114.3	157.1	104.8	160.0	106.7	166.7	111.1	194.4	129.6
1387	171.4	114.3	171.4	114.3			160.0	106.7	166.7	111.1
1390	157.1	104.8	157.1	104.8			210.0	140.0		
1395	185.7	123.8			213.3	142.2	175.0	116.7	257.0	171.4
1402	185.7	123.8			176.0	117.3			170.4	113.6
1410	208.6	139.0	200.0	133.3						
1412	242.9	161.9			240.0	160.0	280.0	186.7	282.2	188.1
1430	285.7	142.9					300.0	150.0	361.1	180.6
1432	548.6	274.3			160.0	80.0				
1459	171.4	67.2	154.3	60.5						

Source: Wage indices calculated by the author from E.C. Lodge, 'The Estates of the Archbishop and Chapter of Saint-André of Bordeaux under Plantagenet rule', in *Oxford Studies in Social and Legal History*, III, (ed.) P. Vinogradoff (Oxford, 1912), pp. 187–9; prices from Appendix 8.1.1.

8 Gascon prices

8.1 Wine prices in the Bordelais

8.1.1 Bordelais price dataset

*This uses the modern calendar; and if sale date is unknown within accounting period the calendar year it most covers is entered; or if in doubt the later calendar year is given.

NB As with G Clark but in contrast to William Beveridge and Thorold Rogers.

** Unknown can be usually assumed to be 'claret' as this was the most commonly traded wine. It appears in most cases the colour is mentioned only if it were not.

	Calendar year*	Date	Price per tun		Silver (grams)	Gold (grams)	Wine type**	Port of exit	Price unit	Reference
			<i>l bord.</i>	£sterling						
1	1337		5.75	0.96	246.85	15.12	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	AHG, XXI (1881), p. 8
2	1340		10.40	0.69	446.47	27.35	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	AHG, XXI, pp. 100–1
3	1341		12.80	0.85	549.50	33.66	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	AHG, XXI, pp. 100–1
4	1341		19.20	1.28	824.26	50.50	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	AHG, XXI, pp. 100–1
5	1341		22.50	1.50	965.93	59.18	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	AHG, XXI, pp. 100–1
6	1341		17.30	1.15	742.69	45.50	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	AHG, XXI, pp. 100–1
7	1351		18.00	3.60	772.74	47.34	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	TNA, E 101/168/8, m. 1
8	1351	29 November 1351	22.25	4.45	955.19	58.52	Unknown	Bordeaux	Gold	TNA, E 101/170/12, fol. 63r
9	1353		8.00	1.60	343.44	21.04	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	TNA, E 101/170/17, m. 4
10	1353		12.50	2.50	536.63	32.88	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>) (sterling)	TNA, E 101/170/19, m. 7
11	1353		20.00	2.00	858.60	52.60	Unknown	Bordeaux	Gold	TNA, E 101/170/19, m. 7
12	1355		9.00	1.80	386.37	23.67	Claret	Bordeaux	Gold	AHG, XXI, p. 217
13	1356		18.47	5.46	793.00	48.58	Unknown	Bordeaux	Gold and Silver (Eng.)	AHG, XXI, p. 390
14	1356		18.33	5.42	787.04	48.22	Unknown	Bordeaux	Gold	AHG, XXI, p. 390
15	1356		10.54	3.12	452.57	27.73	Unknown	Bordeaux	Gold	AHG, XXI, p. 391
16	1356		12.83	3.79	550.92	33.75	Unknown	Bordeaux	Gold	AHG, XXI, p. 391
17	1357		12.00	2.40	515.16	31.56	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	AHG, XXI, p. 447
18	1357		9.17	1.83	393.54	24.11	Unknown	Bordeaux	Gold	AHG, XXI, p. 461
19	1361		11.88	2.38	412.66	43.46	Unknown	Bordeaux	Gold	AHG, XXI, p. 651
20	1361		8.71	1.74	302.60	31.87	Claret	Bordeaux	Gold	AHG, XXI, p. 651
21	1362		8.71	1.74	302.60	31.87	Claret	Bordeaux	Gold	AHG, XXI, p. 651

22	1362		2.38	0.48	82.53	8.69	Red	Bordeaux	Gold	AHG, XXI, p. 651
23	1362		1.98	0.40	68.77	7.24	Red	Bordeaux	Gold	AHG, XXI, p. 651
24	1367	23 Mar 1367	20.00	4.00	695.00	73.20	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	AHG, XXII (1882), p. 146
25	1367	21 July 1367	28.00	5.60	973.00	102.48	Claret	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	AHG, XXII, p. 160
26	1367		25.00	5.00	868.75	91.50	Claret	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	AHG, XXII, p. 160
27	1367		25.00	5.00	868.75	91.50	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	AHG, XXII, p. 160
28	1367		25.00	5.00	868.75	91.50	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	AHG, XXII, p. 160
29	1367		25.00	5.00	868.75	91.50	Claret	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	AHG, XXII, p. 161
30	1367	March 1367	25.00	5.00	868.75	91.50	Claret	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	AHG, XXII, p. 161
31	1367		24.00	4.80	834.00	87.84	Claret	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	AHG, XXII, p. 161
32	1367		10.00	2.00	347.50	36.60	Red	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	AHG, XXII, p. 162
33	1367		18.00	3.60	625.50	65.88	Unknown	Bordeaux	Gold	TNA, E 36/80, fol. 347
34	1368		14.00	2.80	486.50	51.24	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	TNA, E 36/80, fol. 380
35	1369		23.00	4.60	799.25	84.18	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	TNA, E 36/80, fol. 382
36	1371		30.00	6.00	1,042.50	109.80	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	TNA, E 36/80, fol. 411
37	1373		32.50	4.33	1,129.38	118.95	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	TNA, E 101/179/9, fol. 6v
38	1373		11.00	1.47	382.25	40.26	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	AHG, XXII, p. 287
39	1375		11.25	1.50	390.94	41.18	White	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	TNA, E 101/179/14, fol. 24r
40	1376		42.50	5.67	1,476.88	155.55	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	TNA, E 101/180/9, fol. 8r
41	1376		30.00	4.00	1,042.50	109.80	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	TNA, E 101/180/9, fol. 8r
42	1376		25.00	3.33	868.75	91.50	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	TNA, E 101/180/9, fol. 8r
43	1376		12.50	1.67	434.38	45.75	Unknown	Libourne	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	TNA, E 101/180/9, fol. 8r
44	1376		45.00	6.00	1,563.75	164.70	Claret	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	TNA, E 101/180/9, fol. 8v
45	1376		25.30	3.37	879.18	92.60	Unknown	Bordeaux	Silver	TNA, E 101/180/9, fol. 27r
46	1376		18.00	2.40	625.50	65.88	Unknown	Libourne	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	TNA, E 101/180/9, fol. 27r
47	1376		14.50	1.93	503.88	53.07	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	TNA, E 101/180/9, fol. 27v
48	1377		15.00	2.00	521.25	54.90	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	TNA, E 101/180/9, fol. 44v–45r
49	1377		15.00	2.00	521.25	54.90	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	TNA, E 101/180/9, fol. 44v–45r
50	1377		16.00	2.13	556.00	58.56	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	TNA, E 101/180/9, fol. 44v–45r
51	1377		14.50	1.93	503.88	53.07	Claret	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	TNA, E 101/180/9, fol. 44v–45r
52	1378		20.00	2.67	695.00	73.20	Claret	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	TNA, E 101/180/9, fol. 60r
53	1379		12.00	1.60	417.00	43.92	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	TNA, E 101/180/9, fol. 59r
54	1379		37.50	5.00	1,303.13	137.25	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	TNA, E 101/180/9, fol. 71v; E 101/182/10, fol. 7r
55	1380		37.50	5.00	1,303.13	137.25	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	TNA, E 101/182/10, fos 7r; E 101/182/10, fol. 32r
56	1380		27.27	3.64	947.74	99.82	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>) (sterling)	TNA, E 101/182/10, fol. 8r
57	1381		25.00	3.33	776.50	72.50	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	TNA, E 101/182/9, fol. 14v; E 101/182/10, fol. 23r
58	1381		20.00	2.67	621.20	58.00	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	TNA, E 101/182/10, fol. 23v.

59	1381		20.00	2.67	621.20	58.00	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	TNA, E 101/182/10, fol. 23v.
60	1381	Autumn	15.00	2.00	465.90	43.50	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	TNA, E 101/182/9, fol. 35v; E 364/21.
61	1382		15.00	2.00	465.90	43.50	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	AHG, XXII, p. 336
62	1383	Autumn	17.50	2.33	543.55	50.75	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	AHG, XXII, p. 356
63	1384		25.00	3.33	776.50	72.50	White	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	AHG, XXII, p. 372
64	1384		29.69	3.96	922.11	86.10	Claret	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	AHG, XXII, p. 372
65	1384		23.75	3.17	737.68	68.88	Claret	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	AHG, XXII, p. 372
66	1384		22.50	3.00	698.85	65.25	Claret	Bordeaux	Gold	AHG, XXII, p. 372
67	1385		18.75	2.50	582.38	54.38	Claret	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	AHG, XXII, p. 378
68	1385		25.00	3.33	776.50	72.50	White	Bordeaux	Gold	AHG, XXII, p. 378
69	1386	Late in year	15.00	2.00	465.90	43.50	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	TNA, E 364/21, m. 2; TNA, E 364/27, m. 1
70	1387		15.00	2.00	465.90	43.50	Unknown	Libourne	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	AHG, XXII, p. 420
71	1395		23.13	3.08	718.51	67.09	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	AHG, XXII, p. 473
72	1401		12.50	1.67	252.88	34.75	Unknown	Libourne	Account (fr.)	TNA, E 101/691/3, fol. 2r
73	1401		11.25	1.50	227.59	31.28	Unknown	Libourne	Account (fr.)	TNA, E 101/691/3, fol. 2r
74	1401		12.50	1.67	252.88	34.75	Unknown	Libourne	Account (fr.)	TNA, E 101/691/3, fol. 2v
75	1401		11.25	1.50	227.59	31.28	Unknown	Libourne	Account (fr.)	TNA, E 101/691/3, fol. 2v
76	1403		20.95	2.79	423.82	58.24	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	TNA, E 101/185/11, fol. 61r
77	1403		16.66	2.22	337.03	46.31	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	TNA, E 101/185/11, fol. 61v
78	1405	8 Feb 1405	17.50	2.33	354.03	48.65	Unknown	Bordeaux	Gold	ADG, G 2280, no. 7
79	1405		50.00	6.67	1,011.50	139.00	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	<i>Livre des Bouillons</i> , I, p. 558 (no. CLXXIII)
80	1405		56.25	7.50	1,137.94	156.38	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	<i>Livre des Bouillons</i> , I, p. 558 (no. CLXXIII)
81	1406		37.50	5.00	758.63	104.25	Unknown	Libourne	Account (fr.)	'Petite chronique de Guyenne jusqu'à l'an 1442', <i>Bibliothèque de l'école des chartes</i> , tome 47 (1886), pp. 53–79, at p. 65
82	1406		50.00	6.67	1,011.50	139.00	Unknown	Libourne	Account (fr.)	'Petite chronique de Guyenne jusqu'à l'an 1442', pp. 53–79, at p. 65
83	1406		35.00	4.67	708.05	97.30	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	<i>Registres de la jurade: Délibérations de 1406 à 1409</i> , (ed.) H. Barckhausen, <i>Archives municipales de Bordeaux</i> (Bordeaux, 1873), p. 21.
84	1406		35.00	4.67	708.05	97.30	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	<i>RJ</i> , I, p. 21
85	1406		42.50	5.67	859.78	118.15	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	<i>RJ</i> , I, p. 165
86	1407		37.50	5.00	758.63	104.25	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	<i>RJ</i> , I, p. 271
87	1407		25.50	3.40	515.87	70.89	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	<i>RJ</i> , I, p. 275
88	1407		37.50	5.00	758.63	104.25	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	<i>RJ</i> , I, p. 165
89	1407		31.25	4.17	632.19	86.88	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	<i>RJ</i> , I, p. 281
90	1407		31.25	4.17	632.19	86.88	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	<i>RJ</i> , I, p. 285
91	1408	Sept 1408	37.50	5.00	758.63	104.25	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	<i>RJ</i> , I, p. 354

92	1412	Sept 1412	25.40	3.39	513.84	70.61	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	ADG, G 2302, fol. 71r
93	1415		17.50	1.75	354.03	48.65	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	ADG, G 2302, fol. 81v
94	1415		22.50	2.25	455.18	62.55	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	<i>Registres de la jurade: Délibérations de 1414 à 1416 et de 1420 à 1422</i> , (ed.) H. Barckhausen, <i>Archives municipales de Bordeaux</i> (Bordeaux, 1883), p. 137
95	1415		23.75	2.38	480.46	66.03	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	<i>RJ</i> , II, p. 276
96	1416		25.00	2.50	505.75	69.50	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	<i>RJ</i> , II, p. 340
97	1416		25.00	2.50	505.75	69.50	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	<i>RJ</i> , II, p. 339
98	1417		20.00	2.00	404.60	55.60	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	ADG, G 2302, fol. 87v
99	1417		15.00	1.50	303.45	41.70	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	ADG, G 2302, fol. 88r
100	1417		19.38	1.94	391.96	53.86	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	ADG, G 2302, fol. 88v
101	1418		30.00	3.00	606.90	83.40	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	TNA, E 101/187/12, fol. 18r
102	1418		20.00	2.00	404.60	55.60	Unknown	Libourne	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	TNA, E 101/187/12, fol. 18r
103	1418		30.00	3.00	606.90	83.40	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	TNA, E 101/187/12, fol. 18v
104	1418		29.50	2.95	596.79	82.01	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	ADG, G 2302, fol. 90v
105	1419		15.00	1.50	303.45	41.70	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	ADG, G 2302, fol. 95v
106	1419		25.00	2.50	505.75	69.50	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	ADG, G 2302, fol. 96v
107	1420		12.50	1.25	252.88	34.75	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	ADG, G 2302, fol. 98r
108	1420		22.50	2.25	455.18	62.55	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	ADG, G 2302, fol. 100r
109	1420		17.50	1.75	354.03	48.65	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	<i>RJ</i> , II, pp. 415–6.
110	1421	22 Nov 1421	37.50	3.75	689.63	69.75	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	<i>RJ</i> , II, p. 579.
111	1423		14.00	1.40	257.46	26.04	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	ADG, G 2302, fol. 103v
112	1423		21.25	2.13	390.79	39.53	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	ADG, G 2302, fol. 105r
113	1424		11.61	1.16	213.51	21.59	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	TNA, E 101/189/6, m.7.
114	1424		12.50	1.25	229.88	23.25	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	TNA, E 101/189/6, m.7.
115	1424		23.90	2.39	439.52	44.45	Claret	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	ADG, G 2302, fol. 106r
116	1424	22 Dec 1424	25.00	2.50	459.75	46.50	Unknown	Bordeaux	Gold	ADG, H 733, fol. 2v
117	1425		25.80	2.58	474.46	47.99	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	ADG, G 2302, fol. 107v
118	1425		17.50	1.75	321.83	32.55	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	TNA, E 101/189/8, m. 8
119	1425		12.50	1.25	229.88	23.25	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	TNA, E 101/189/8, m. 8
120	1426	7 Nov 1426	30.00	3.00	551.70	55.80	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	ADG, G 310, fol. 25v
121	1427	29 Sept 1427	31.86	3.19	585.91	59.26	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	TNA, E 364/67, m. 4.
122	1427		30.00	3.00	551.70	55.80	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	TNA, E 101/189/12, fol. 14r
123	1427		20.00	2.00	367.80	37.20	Unknown	Libourne	Account (fr.)	TNA, E 101/189/12, fol. 14r
124	1427		30.00	3.00	551.70	55.80	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	TNA, E 101/189/12, fol. 14r
125	1427		27.93	2.79	513.63	51.95	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	TNA, E 101/189/12, fol. 14r
126	1427	26 Sept 1427	30.00	3.00	551.70	55.80	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	TNA, E 101/189/12, fol. 18r
127	1427		24.00	2.40	441.36	44.64	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	TNA, E 101/189/12, fol. 14v

128	1428		35.00	3.50	643.65	65.10	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	ADG, G 2302, fol. 111v
129	1428		24.00	2.40	441.36	44.64	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	TNA, E 101/189/12, fol. 57v
130	1428		30.00	3.00	551.70	55.80	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	TNA, E 101/189/12, fol. 34v
131	1429		33.75	3.38	620.66	62.78	Claret	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	ADG, G 503, fol. 21
132	1429		31.25	3.13	574.69	58.13	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	TNA, E 101/189/12, fol. 57r
133	1429		35.00	3.50	643.65	65.10	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	TNA, E 101/189/12, fol. 57r
134	1429		33.06	3.31	608.03	61.50	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	TNA, E 101/189/12, fol. 57r
135	1430		23.75	2.38	436.76	44.18	Pimpin	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	ADG, G 503
136	1430		32.50	3.25	597.68	60.45	Claret	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	ADG, G 503
137	1430		32.50	3.25	597.68	60.45	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	TNA, E 101/189/12, fol. 79v
138	1430	29 Sept 1430	24.00	2.40	441.36	44.64	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	TNA, E 101/189/12, fol. 102v
139	1431		25.00	2.50	459.75	46.50	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	TNA, E 101/189/12, fol. 102r
140	1431		30.00	3.00	551.70	55.80	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	TNA, E 101/189/12, fol. 102r
141	NA		31.86	3.19	585.85	59.25	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	TNA, E 364/67, m. 2
142	1437		50.00	5.00	919.50	93.00	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	'Petite chronique de Guyenne jusqu'à l'an 1442', pp. 53–79, at p. 65
143	1438		50.00	5.00	919.50	93.00	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	'Petite chronique de Guyenne jusqu'à l'an 1442', pp. 53–79, at p. 65
144	1438		62.50	6.25	1,149.38	116.25	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	'Petite chronique de Guyenne jusqu'à l'an 1442', pp. 53–79, at p. 65
145	1438	12 Feb 1438	10.00	1.00	183.90	18.60	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	TNA, E 101/192/8, fol. 32r
146	1438	26 May 1438	45.00	4.50	827.55	83.70	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	TNA, E 101/192/8, fol. 32r
147	1438	28 May 1438	43.75	4.38	804.56	81.38	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	TNA, E 101/192/8, fol. 32r
148	1440		15.00	1.50	275.85	27.90	Unknown	Libourne	Account (fr.)	'Petite chronique de Guyenne jusqu'à l'an 1442', pp. 53–79, at p. 66
149	1440	Sept 1440	30.00	3.00	551.70	55.80	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	T. Malvezin, <i>Histoire Du Commerce de Bordeaux Depuis Les Origines Jusqu'a Nos Jours</i> , tome. I (Bordeaux, 1892), p. 255.
150	1442		17.50	1.37	273.00	27.30	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	J. Bernard; F. Giteau, 'Compte du trésorier de la ville de Bordeaux pour 1442 (février – août)', <i>Bulletin philologique et historique (jusqu'en 1610) du comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques</i> , année 1961 (1963), pp. 179–215, at p.192
151	1442		31.25	2.45	487.50	48.75	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	Bernard; Giteau, 'Compte du trésorier de la ville de Bordeaux pour 1442 (février – août)', pp. 179–215, at p. 194
152	1445	12 July 1445	36.25	2.84	565.50	56.55	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	ADG, 3 E 4807, fol. 9
153	1453	17 Oct 1453	25.00	1.96	390.00	39.00	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	ADG, H 735, fol. 17v

154	1457	13 Sept 1457	20.00	1.57	312.00	31.20	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	ADG, H 736, fol. 89v
155	1458	11 Oct 1458	12.66	0.99	197.43	19.74	Claret	Bordeaux	Gold	ADG, H 1187, fol. 8
156	1460	2 Aug 1460	17.50	1.37	273.00	27.30	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (<i>lsd</i>)	ADG, H 1187, fol. 3v
157	1466		18.75	1.47	292.50	29.25	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	ADG, H 1187, fol. 21
158	1466	29 April 1466	13.75	1.08	214.50	21.45	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	ADG, H 1187, fol. 22
159	1466	25 May 1466	15.41	1.21	240.44	24.04	Unknown	Bordeaux	Account (fr.)	ADG, H 1187, fol. 21v

8.1.2 Bordelais claret prices and volatility by decade

Note: Values are decimalised

Decades	Obs.	Nominal price			Sterling price			Silver price (grams)			Gold price (grams)		
		Mean	Median	C _v (%)	Mean	Median	C _v (%)	Mean	Median	C _v (%)	Mean	Median	C _v (%)
1340–9	5	16.44	17.30	29.62	1.10	1.15	29.09	705.77	742.69	29.61	43.24	45.50	29.60
1350–9	7	12.91	12.00	30.98	3.40	3.12	45.88	554.09	515.16	31.01	33.94	31.56	31.00
1360–9	14	20.09	23.50	33.10	4.02	4.70	33.10	698.20	816.63	33.10	73.54	86.01	33.10
1370–9	18	23.13	19.00	46.93	3.20	2.53	49.80	803.69	660.25	46.93	84.65	69.54	46.93
1380–9	14	21.57	20.00	30.74	2.88	2.67	30.56	686.99	621.20	34.95	66.07	58.00	40.26
1390–9	1	23.13	23.13		3.08	3.08		718.51	718.51		67.09	67.09	
1400–9	20	30.47	33.13	45.62	4.06	4.42	45.57	616.37	670.12	45.62	84.70	92.09	45.62
1410–9	15	22.87	23.75	21.82	2.34	2.38	24.36	462.63	480.46	21.80	63.57	66.03	21.80
1420–9	28	25.00	25.40	31.24	2.50	2.54	31.20	463.14	467.11	30.45	48.22	50.30	28.95
1430–9	12	36.43	32.50	39.28	3.64	3.25	39.29	669.87	597.68	39.28	67.75	60.45	39.28
1440–9	5	26.00	30.00	35.54	2.23	2.45	34.08	430.71	487.50	33.82	43.26	48.75	33.80
1450–9	3	19.22	20.00	32.31	1.51	1.57	32.45	299.81	312.00	32.31	29.98	31.20	32.32
1460–9	4	16.35	16.46	13.58	1.28	1.29	13.28	255.11	256.72	13.55	25.51	25.67	13.56

Source: Appendix 8.1.1.

Note: The coefficient of variation (C_v) is the ratio of the standard deviation (σ) relative to the mean (μ) of a dataset, expressed here as a percentage (%):

$$C_v = \frac{\sigma}{\mu} \times 100$$


8.2 Wine prices in the *Haut-Pays*

Note: Values are decimalised.

	Calendar year*	Town	Price per tun		Reference
			livres	£sterling	
1	1345	Agen	8.33	1.67	<i>Jurades de la ville d'Agen (1345–1355)</i> , (ed.) A. Magen (Auch, 1894), p. 3
2	1346	Agen	5.18	1.04	<i>Jurades de la ville d'Agen</i> , p. 50
3	1350	Agen	13.13	2.63	<i>Jurades de la ville d'Agen</i> , p. 193
4	1350	Agen	15.00	3.00	<i>Jurades de la ville d'Agen</i> , p. 194
5	1350	Agen	9.38	1.88	<i>Jurades de la ville d'Agen</i> , pp. 203–4
6	1350	Agen	5.00	1.00	<i>Jurades de la ville d'Agen</i> , pp. 203–4
7	1350	Agen	12.50	2.50	<i>Jurades de la ville d'Agen</i> , p. 210
8	1350	Agen	19.00	3.80	<i>Jurades de la ville d'Agen</i> , p. 215
9	1351	Agen	10.00	2.00	<i>Jurades de la ville d'Agen</i> , p. 224
10	1351	Agen	10.00	2.00	<i>Jurades de la ville d'Agen</i> , p. 227
11	1352	Bergerac	9.00	1.80	<i>Les Jurades de la ville de Bergerac</i> , t. I, 1352–1485, (ed.) G. Charrier (Bergerac,
12	1353	Agen	19.00	3.80	<i>Jurades de la ville d'Agen</i> , p. 301
13	1353	Agen	19.00	3.80	<i>Jurades de la ville d'Agen</i> , p. 302
14	1382	Bergerac	15.00	2.00	<i>Les Jurades de la ville de Bergerac</i> , I, p. 69
15	1382	Bergerac	20.00	2.67	<i>Les Jurades de la ville de Bergerac</i> , I, p. 79
16	1382	Bergerac	15.00	2.00	<i>Les Jurades de la ville de Bergerac</i> , I, p. 77
17	1386	Bergerac	7.50	1.00	<i>Les Jurades de la ville de Bergerac</i> , I, p. 120
18	1386	Bergerac	10.00	1.33	<i>Les Jurades de la ville de Bergerac</i> , I, p. 102
19	1411	Montréal-du-Gers	12.00	1.32	<i>AHG</i> , XXIX (1894), p. 296
20	1411	Montréal-du-Gers	12.00	1.32	<i>AHG</i> , XXIX, p. 299
21	1411	Montréal-du-Gers	12.00	1.32	<i>AHG</i> , XXIX, p. 302
22	1412	Montréal-du-Gers	2.53	0.28	<i>AHG</i> , XXIX, p. 307
23	1412	Montréal-du-Gers	16.00	1.76	<i>AHG</i> , XXIX, pp. 311–2
24	1412	Montréal-du-Gers	9.50	1.04	<i>AHG</i> , XXIX, p. 324
25	1412	Montréal-du-Gers	11.00	1.21	<i>AHG</i> , XXIX, p. 324
26	1413	Montréal-du-Gers	7.00	0.58	<i>AHG</i> , XXIX, p. 330
27	1413	Montréal-du-Gers	14.00	1.15	<i>AHG</i> , XXIX, p. 336
28	1413	Montréal-du-Gers	9.00	0.74	<i>AHG</i> , XXIX, p. 339.
29	1414	Bergerac	10.00	1.33	<i>Les Jurades de la ville de Bergerac</i> , I, p. 174
30	1414	Bergerac	8.75	0.88	<i>Les Jurades de la ville de Bergerac</i> , I, p. 185
31	1416	Bergerac	8.75	0.88	<i>Les Jurades de la ville de Bergerac</i> , I, p. 202

32	1424	Bergerac	8.00	0.80	<i>Les Jurades de la ville de Bergerac</i> , I, p. 226
33	1429	Montréal-du-Gers		1.00	<i>AHG</i> , XXXI (1896), p. 79
34	1431	Montréal-du-Gers		0.67	<i>AHG</i> , XXXI, p. 96
35	1434	Montréal-du-Gers		1.01	<i>AHG</i> , XXXI, p. 109
36	1438	Montréal-du-Gers		1.25	<i>AHG</i> , XXXI, p. 123
37	1441	Riscle		1.00	<i>Comptes consulaires de la ville de Riscle de 1441 à 1507</i> , (eds.) P. Parfouru; J. de
38	1442	Montréal-du-Gers		0.92	<i>AHG</i> , XXXII (1897), p. 19
39	1442	Montréal-du-Gers		0.98	<i>AHG</i> , XXXII, p. 19
40	1442	Riscle		1.24	<i>Comptes consulaires de la ville de Riscle</i> , p. 10
41	1445	Riscle		1.05	<i>Comptes consulaires de la ville de Riscle</i> , p. 22
42	1448	Montréal-du-Gers		0.87	<i>AHG</i> , XXXII, p. 69
43	1451	Riscle		1.31	<i>Comptes consulaires de la ville de Riscle</i> , p. 49
44	1466	Bergerac	10.00	0.78	<i>Les Jurades de la ville de Bergerac</i> , I, p. 275

8.3 Bordelais prices against total wine exports



Source: Prices from Appendix 8.1.1, and the export figures from Appendix 3.1.

8.4 Gascon against English wheat prices, 1332–1459

Note: Mean decimalised price per quarter

Year	England £sterling	Gascony <i>l bord.</i>	£sterling	% Gross margin
1332	0.36	2.50	0.31	-15.20
1339	0.15	4.38	0.36	57.76
1340	0.27	5.40	0.36	24.56
1341–2	0.18	5.83	0.29	37.60
1342–3	0.21	7.40	0.37	43.68
1343–4	0.19	23.00	1.15	83.17
1354	0.21	2.50	0.50	57.28
1355	0.28	2.17	0.43	36.31
1356	0.29	2.74	0.55	46.23
1357	0.31	4.17	0.83	62.90
1360	0.31	7.13	1.43	78.47
1367	0.26	5.35	1.07	75.92
1382	0.25	7.20	0.96	74.13
1398	0.26	5.10	0.68	62.25
1407	0.20	3.60	0.48	59.17
1414	0.20	8.50	0.85	76.00
1416	0.30	12.00	1.20	75.33
1420	0.22	10.00	1.00	78.20
1421	0.30	10.00	1.00	70.04
1422	0.24	8.40	0.84	71.97
1437	0.25	25.00	2.50	90.10
1438	0.46	40.00	4.00	88.60
1440	0.35	10.00	0.78	55.13
1442	0.19	8.75	0.69	72.87
1459	0.29	5.36	0.42	30.77

Source: E.C. Lodge, 'The Estates of the Archbishop and Chapter of Saint-André of Bordeaux under Plantagenet rule', in *Oxford Studies in Social and Legal History*, III, (ed.) P. Vinogradoff (Oxford, 1912), p. 152; 'Petite chronique de Guyenne', pp.53–79, at p.65; ADG, G 2302, fol. 76r; *RJ*, I, pp. 157, 160; II, pp. 309, 467, 575, 593, 598; 'Compte du trésorier de la ville de Bordeaux pour 1442 (février – août)', pp. 179–215, at p.194 [Gascon prices]; G. Clark, *English prices and wages, 1209–1914* (2003), provided in Appendix 9.2 [English prices].

8.5 Gascon vineyard prices, 1384–1452

Note: Values are decimalised.

Price, estimated revenues and profits for 1 acre (0.4 hectare) vineyard *censive* ‘Au Vivey’ in the Graves of Bordeaux and return on investment (ROI) at point of sale.

Date	Price (<i>l bord.</i>)	Estimated revenues (<i>l bord.</i>)	Estimated revenues (<i>l bord.</i>) less <i>agrières</i>	Estimated profit (<i>l bord.</i>)	Tenant return (%)
1384	20.00	22.74	15.16	5.30	26.52
1396	6.25	20.77	13.85	4.85	77.55
1405	14.50	37.04	24.70	8.64	59.61
1410	7.50	22.81	15.21	5.32	70.96
1413	13.75	22.81	15.21	5.32	38.71
1436	10.00	44.90	29.93	10.48	104.77
1452	4.25	22.45	14.97	5.24	123.26

Source: Calculated by the author from prices noted in R. Boutruche, *La Crise d’une société: seigneurs et paysans du Bordelais pendant la Guerre de Cent Ans* (Paris, 1947, repr. 1963), p. 319–20; for estimated yields see K. Porcher, ‘De la vigne au chai: viticulture et vinification en Bordelais après la guerre de Cent Ans (vers 1450 – vers 1480)’, unpublished PhD thesis, Université de La Rochelle (2011), pp. 95, 291.

Notes: The *censive* ‘Au Vivey’ contained 47 *règes* of vines, each *rège* was 86 square metres (102.855 square yards) so this amounted to 4042 square metres, 0.9988 acres or 0.4 hectare. Kévin Porcher estimated an average yield of 20 hectolitres per hectare, or 808.4 litres per acre. The rent paid to the lord remained stable as a large *agrières* of 1/3 share of output giving 539 litres (or 0.6 of a tun) left for sale by the tenant at the prevailing prices in Appendix 8.1.1. Costs are deducted at 6.5 livres for an 8–10 livre tun estimated by Boutruche (*La crise*, p. 151), taken as 65%, leaving the estimated profit from the property. Return on investment is the annual profit as a proportion of the original purchase price of the tenancy.

8.6 Sample of prices for tithes and *agrières* farms in the Bordelais, 1333–98

Note: Values are decimalised.

Year	Price of tithes (D) and <i>agrières</i> (A) by parish (<i>l bord.</i> per year)													
	Ambarès D	Bassens D & A	Blaye*	Bruges	Calamiac D & P**	Guitignan D & A	Loupes D	Loupes and Bonnetan D	Montussan and Saint- Loubès D	Nérigean D	Soulac	Saint- Quintin D	Saint- Sulpice	Tabanac
1333				3.00										
1338	33.00	6.00		10.00		28.00								0.75
1339					40.00									
1341	45.00	14.50	50.00		51.00	55.00		4.00	31.50					1.00
1342				16.00	55.00	67.00			34.00					1.50
1346														1.00
1353		8.00	5.00											
1354	15.00		20.00	3.00	35.00	31.00		5.00			24.00	16.00		1.00
1355	20.00	10.00	35.00	8.00	70.00	48.00		10.00			48.00		4.00	1.50
1356	25.67	7.10		15.00	25.00			10.08	15.00		20.00			
1357		16.00	30.00		27.50	16.67			15.00					
1360		3.00					8.00							
1361		22.00	40.00	18.00	31.50	77.00	7.00			33.00	40.00	30.00	20.00	2.00
1362													17.75	
1367	65.00	34.00	60.00	16.00	70.25	100.00	7.00		30.00	22.00	210.00	32.00	20.00	2.50
1372												16.00		
1375													43.75	
1377				3.00								10.00		2.50
1378														
1389		12.50	52.50			77.50	2.00			10.00		5.00	14.38	
1395	17.50		46.25	11.25	12.50	58.75			15.00	10.00		7.00	10.63	
1398	20.00	7.50	57.50	8.75	15.00	82.50			17.50	10.00	58.75	8.00		

*Includes the farm of the ‘costume, censuum, feudorum et aliorum proventuum’.

**Includes the farm of ‘proventuum’.

Source: *Archives Historiques du Département de la Gironde*, XXI, pp. 10, 19, 27, 45–6, 48, 90–4, 113–5, 143, 158, 201–2, 214–5, 304–5, 309–10, 374, 377–8, 383–4, 455–6, 462–3, 522, 645–7; XXII, pp. 146–9, 287–90, 288–90, 297, 437, 470–1, 541–2.

9 English Prices

9.1 English wine prices, 1250–1499

Note: Prices are decimalised.

Year	Price per tun										
	£ sterling	silver (grams)									
1250	1.69	542.15	1288	3.05	974.83	1319	5.44	1740.19	1351	11.14	2884.85
1251	2.12	679.70	1289	3.28	1047.34	1320	4.69	1498.50	1352	11.93	3090.44
1252	1.65	530.01	1290	3.91	1248.75	1322	5.17	1651.57	1353	9.19	2379.02
1253	2.19	703.98	1291	3.33	1063.45	1323	4.89	1562.95	1354	8.76	2268.06
1260	2.89	926.50	1292	4.32	1381.68	1324	2.77	886.21	1355	7.62	1974.36
1262	5.71	1832.77	1293	2.84	906.35	1325	5.52	1764.36	1357	8.96	2320.28
1263	1.20	384.36	1294	5.04	1611.29	1326	3.72	1188.32	1360	13.86	3589.74
1264	5.09	1634.53	1295	2.89	922.46	1327	5.75	1836.87	1361	9.80	2538.93
1266	5.01	1610.25	1297	5.68	1816.73	1328	6.16	1969.80	1362	8.09	2095.10
1268	4.32	1387.73	1298	4.32	1381.68	1329	5.08	1623.37	1363	11.20	2901.16
1269	2.77	890.09	1299	3.65	1168.18	1330	5.05	1615.32	1364	8.90	2303.96
1270	5.41	1735.67	1300	6.88	2199.41	1331	4.50	1438.07	1365	9.66	2503.03
1271	5.51	1768.04	1301	4.45	1421.96	1332	4.46	1425.99	1366	9.19	2379.02
1273	4.06	1302.77	1302	4.26	1361.54	1333	3.86	1232.64	1367	8.64	2238.69
1274	5.95	1909.65	1303	4.83	1542.81	1334	5.22	1667.68	1368	9.58	2480.18
1275	4.06	1302.77	1304	4.93	1575.03	1335	5.57	1717.54	1369	6.80	1762.24
1276	2.41	772.76	1305	3.06	978.86	1336	5.63	1736.97	1370	11.84	3067.60
1277	3.00	962.91	1306	4.11	1313.20	1338	7.43	2292.65	1371	11.77	3048.02
1278	2.41	772.76	1307	3.26	1043.31	1339	12.65	3901.38	1372	10.72	2777.15
1279	4.36	1393.76	1309	5.04	1611.29	1340	9.82	3027.07	1374	7.59	1964.57
1280	4.71	1506.55	1311	6.77	2163.15	1341	8.28	2553.00	1377	8.57	2219.11
1281	2.19	700.91	1312	4.83	1542.81	1343	5.76	1775.83	1378	8.06	2088.58
1282	3.19	1019.14	1313	3.12	999.00	1344	3.14	916.43	1383	6.68	1729.60
1283	3.82	1220.55	1314	5.25	1679.77	1345	7.09	2072.10	1384	6.44	1667.60
1284	3.28	1047.34	1315	5.77	1844.92	1348	7.41	2164.11	1385	8.76	2268.06
1286	4.11	1313.20	1316	5.04	1611.29	1349	12.74	3720.95	1386	8.00	2072.26
1287	2.24	717.02	1317	5.62	1796.59	1350	9.84	2874.44	1387	7.22	1869.93

Year	Price per tun		Year	Price per tun		Year	Price per tun		Year	Price per tun	
	£ sterling	silver(grams)		£ sterling	silver (grams)		£ sterling	silver (grams)		£ sterling	silver (grams)
1388	8.57	2219.11	1418	8.74	1887.04	1445	10.46	2256.84	1472	7.76	1339.65
1389	7.88	2039.63	1419	9.03	1949.58	1446	8.91	1922.39	1473	8.64	1491.89
1390	7.93	2052.68	1420	8.24	1778.28	1447	7.64	1647.76	1474	9.70	1674.57
1391	6.01	1556.64	1421	5.81	1253.50	1448	8.28	1786.44	1475	9.12	1574.53
1393	7.75	2006.99	1422	10.70	2308.50	1449	8.29	1789.15	1476	9.29	1602.80
1394	6.92	1791.61	1423	6.79	1465.58	1450	9.27	2001.24	1477	8.92	1539.73
1395	5.30	1373.89	1424	7.64	1647.76	1451	9.37	2023.00	1478	8.00	1380.97
1396	7.61	1971.09	1425	7.14	1541.72	1452	8.09	1745.65	1479	8.24	1422.29
1397	6.69	1732.87	1426	9.44	2036.59	1453	7.82	1688.55	1480	8.04	1387.50
1398	6.90	1788.34	1427	7.28	1571.63	1454	8.77	1892.48	1481	8.45	1459.26
1399	8.19	2121.21	1428	11.00	2373.76	1455	8.08	1742.93	1482	9.32	1609.32
1400	7.35	1902.56	1429	5.76	1242.62	1456	9.69	2090.97	1483	13.28	2292.20
1401	5.95	1540.32	1430	7.02	1514.53	1457	9.68	2088.25	1485	13.28	2292.20
1402	7.40	1915.62	1431	8.09	1745.65	1458	8.69	1876.17	1486	9.44	1628.90
1404	8.05	2085.31	1432	7.98	1721.18	1459	9.56	2063.78	1487	10.32	1781.13
1406	6.50	1683.91	1433	7.64	1647.76	1460	8.09	1745.65	1488	9.53	1644.12
1407	11.18	2894.64	1434	7.75	1672.23	1461	10.36	2235.08	1489	10.40	1794.18
1408	8.73	2261.54	1435	7.50	1617.85	1462	8.76	1889.76	1490	10.99	1896.39
1409	6.34	1641.49	1436	8.24	1778.28	1463	12.23	2640.23	1491	11.24	1939.89
1410	7.76	2010.25	1437	7.80	1683.11	1464	7.69	1658.64	1492	11.01	1900.74
1411	7.14	1850.35	1438	8.86	1911.51	1465	8.18	1411.42	1493	10.60	1828.97
1412	8.16	1761.96	1439	8.77	1892.48	1466	8.44	1457.09	1494	11.45	1976.86
1413	6.97	1503.65	1440	9.35	2017.56	1467	8.05	1389.67	1495	11.48	1981.21
1414	6.60	1424.80	1441	7.12	1536.28	1468	8.86	1528.86	1496	13.15	2270.45
1415	6.55	1413.92	1442	7.75	1672.23	1469	7.71	1330.95	1497	9.95	1718.06
1416	8.76	1889.76	1443	8.19	1767.40	1470	15.03	2594.49	1498	9.58	1652.82
1417	9.92	2139.92	1444	9.05	1952.30	1471	3.77	650.25	1499	9.10	1570.18

Source: Calculated by the author from G. Clark, *English Prices and Wages, 1209–1914* (2003).

9.2 English wheat prices, 1251–1499

Note: Prices are in decimalised shillings sterling.

Year	Shillings per bushel								
1251	0.350	1278	0.567	1303	0.528	1328	0.544	1353	0.635
1252	0.355	1279	0.521	1304	0.461	1329	0.726	1354	0.534
1253	0.543	1280	0.635	1305	0.643	1330	0.735	1355	0.690
1254	0.345	1281	0.609	1306	0.601	1331	0.813	1356	0.737
1255	0.314	1282	0.767	1307	0.522	1332	0.900	1357	0.773
1257	0.745	1283	0.770	1308	0.653	1333	0.611	1358	0.837
1258	0.847	1284	0.763	1309	0.824	1334	0.499	1359	0.712
1260	0.451	1285	0.523	1310	0.878	1335	0.514	1360	0.767
1261	0.471	1286	0.652	1311	0.930	1336	0.570	1361	0.736
1262	0.508	1287	0.511	1312	0.580	1337	0.507	1362	0.590
1263	0.439	1288	0.323	1313	0.569	1338	0.434	1363	0.864
1264	0.422	1289	0.363	1314	0.635	1339	0.385	1364	1.080
1265	0.475	1290	0.557	1315	0.785	1340	0.679	1365	0.849
1266	0.456	1291	0.743	1316	1.747	1341	0.455	1366	0.645
1267	0.519	1292	0.655	1317	1.723	1342	0.521	1367	0.642
1268	0.402	1293	0.690	1318	0.901	1343	0.484	1368	0.887
1269	0.544	1294	0.960	1319	0.476	1344	0.679	1369	0.834
1270	0.606	1295	1.010	1320	0.587	1345	0.436	1370	1.820
1271	0.848	1296	0.981	1321	0.708	1346	0.488	1371	0.863
1272	0.848	1297	0.606	1322	1.473	1347	0.823	1372	0.736
1273	0.609	1298	0.747	1323	1.040	1348	0.773	1373	0.932
1274	0.773	1299	0.623	1324	0.784	1349	0.494	1374	0.671
1275	0.800	1300	0.625	1325	0.862	1350	0.707	1375	1.058
1276	0.633	1301	0.594	1326	0.588	1351	0.973	1376	0.981
1277	0.808	1302	0.576	1327	0.452	1352	1.297	1377	0.527

Year	Shillings per bushel								
1378	0.466	1403	0.724	1428	0.465	1453	0.620	1478	0.824
1379	0.460	1404	0.542	1429	0.839	1454	0.523	1479	0.873
1380	0.715	1405	0.507	1430	0.829	1455	0.485	1480	0.653
1381	0.743	1406	0.429	1431	0.685	1456	0.597	1481	0.686
1382	0.621	1407	0.490	1432	0.482	1457	0.615	1482	0.930
1383	0.603	1408	0.686	1433	0.775	1458	0.760	1483	1.189
1384	0.594	1409	0.803	1434	0.583	1459	0.733	1484	0.844
1385	0.510	1410	0.950	1435	0.538	1460	0.620	1485	0.631
1386	0.642	1411	0.675	1436	0.662	1461	0.880	1486	0.583
1387	0.531	1412	0.580	1437	0.619	1462	0.899	1487	0.720
1388	0.425	1413	0.553	1438	1.140	1463	0.498	1488	0.713
1389	0.406	1414	0.510	1439	1.353	1464	0.421	1489	0.707
1390	0.707	1415	0.515	1440	0.867	1465	0.509	1490	0.697
1391	1.053	1416	0.740	1441	0.431	1466	0.517	1491	0.735
1392	0.612	1417	0.973	1442	0.468	1467	0.659	1492	0.745
1393	0.388	1418	0.664	1443	0.480	1468	0.698	1493	0.622
1394	0.446	1419	0.816	1444	0.472	1469	0.719	1494	0.587
1395	0.459	1420	0.545	1445	0.427	1470	0.730	1495	0.563
1396	0.530	1421	0.749	1446	0.657	1471	0.781	1496	0.502
1397	0.747	1422	0.590	1447	0.694	1472	0.685	1497	0.761
1398	0.646	1423	0.474	1448	0.598	1473	0.518	1498	0.667
1399	0.602	1424	0.505	1449	0.579	1474	0.500	1499	0.672
1400	0.670	1425	0.567	1450	0.625	1475	0.538		
1401	0.836	1426	0.508	1451	0.709	1476	0.663		
1402	1.059	1427	0.464	1452	0.726	1477	0.641		

Source: G. Clark, *English Prices and Wages, 1209–1914* (2003).

10 Fiscal data

10.1 Ducal revenues, 1372–1453

Years of Account	Constable	Revenues (annualised decimalised £sterling)			% share	Reference
		Wine revenues	Other	Total		
1372–3	John Ludham	793.94	155.54	949.49	83.6	T. Runyan, 'The Constabulary of Bordeaux: the Accounts of John Ludham (1372–73) and Robert de Wykford (1373–75). Part I', <i>Mediaeval Studies</i> , 36 (1974), pp.215–58, at p.228
1373–5	Robert de Wykford	1,114.66	1,397.40	2,512.06	44.4	Ibid., pp.215–58, at p. 229
1375–9	Richard Rotour	1,187.02	595.17	1,782.19	66.6	TNA, E 101/180/9, fos 7r–8v, 26r–27v, 44r–45r, 61r, 74r
1381–6	John de Stratton	1,255.53	416.58	1,672.11	75.1	J.R. Wright, 'The Accounts of John de Stratton and John Gedeney, Constables of Bordeaux 1381–90', <i>Mediaeval Studies</i> , 42 (1980), p. 246
1386–90	John Gedeney	775.97	293.70	1,069.68	72.5	Ibid.
1401–13	William Faryngdon	1,050.15	176.55	1,226.70	85.6	M. Vale, <i>English Gascony 1399–1453: A Study of War, Government and Politics during the later stages of the Hundred Years' War</i> (Oxford, 1970), p. 237 (from TNA, E 364/51)
1413–18	William Clifford	923.75	74.90	998.65	92.5	Vale, <i>Gascony</i> , p. 237 (from TNA, E 364/55)
1418–19	Robert Holme	182.75	97.20	279.95	65.3	Vale, <i>Gascony</i> , p. 237 (from TNA, E 364/55)
1419–23	John Radcliffe	694.55	73.85	768.40	90.4	Vale, <i>Gascony</i> , p. 237 (from TNA, E 364/59)
1423–27	Thomas Barneby	915.10	167.00	1,082.10	84.6	Vale, <i>Gascony</i> , p. 237 (from TNA, E 364/63)
1427–31	Bernard Angevin	716.70	151.80	868.50	82.5	Vale, <i>Gascony</i> , p. 237 (from TNA, E 364/67)
1431–35	Walter Colles	590.95	59.00	649.95	90.9	Vale, <i>Gascony</i> , p. 237 (from TNA, E 364/70)
1435–39	Walter Colles	420.75	68.10	488.85	86.1	Vale, <i>Gascony</i> , p. 237 (from TNA, E 364/75)
1442–46	Edward Hull	190.20	420.40	610.60	31.1	Vale, <i>Gascony</i> , p. 237 (from TNA, E 364/84)
1446–51	Edward Hull	579.25	74.20	653.45	88.6	Vale, <i>Gascony</i> , p. 237 (from TNA, E 364/91)
1452–53	Edward Hull	410.10	27.25	437.35	93.8	Vale, <i>Gascony</i> , p. 237 (from TNA, E 364/92)

10.2 English new custom (*butlerage*) revenues, 1350–1451

Note: Values are decimalised.

Date	Account		Tuns imported	New custom duty (£sterling)		Reference
	Start	End		Total	Annualized	
1350–1352	30 Sept 1350	30 Sept 1351	1,713.50	171.35	171.35	TNA, E 101/80/3
1351–1353	29 Sept 1351	28 Sept 1352	898.50	99.42	99.42	TNA, E 101/80/4
1353–1355	29 Sept 1353	28 Sept 1354	2,389.50	238.95	238.95	TNA, E 101/80/6
1355–1357	29 Sept 1355	28 Sept 1356	1,799.50	179.95	179.95	TNA, E 101/80/9
1357–1359	29 Sept 1357	28 Sept 1358	2,052.00	250.20	250.20	TNA, E 101/80/11
1358–1360	29 Sept 1358	28 Sept 1359	1,640.00	164.00	164.00	TNA, E 101/80/12
1361–1363	29 Sept 1361	28 Sept 1362	2,856.00	285.60	285.60	TNA, E 101/80/15
1363–1364	29 Sept 1363	28 Sept 1364	1,493.00	149.30	149.30	TNA, E 101/80/16
1364–1366	29 Sept 1364	28 Sept 1365	1,454.00	145.40	145.40	TNA, E 101/80/17
1366–1368	29 Sept 1366	28 Sept 1367	1,150.50	115.05	115.05	TNA, E 101/80/18
1367–1369	29 Sept 1367	28 Sept 1368	1,178.00	117.80	117.80	TNA, E 101/80/19
1370–1372	29 Sept 1371	29 Sept 1372	817.50	82.15	82.15	TNA, E 101/80/20
1371–1373	29 Sept 1372	28 Sept 1373	5,998.00	600.15	600.15	TNA, E 101/80/22
1378–1383	29 Sept 1378	28 Sept 1379	1,891.50	191.50	191.50	TNA, E 101/80/23
1378–1383	29 Sept 1379	28 Sept 1380	992.50	99.25	99.25	TNA, E 101/80/23
1378–1383	29 Sept 1380	28 Sept 1381	1,044.50	104.45	104.45	TNA, E 101/80/23
1378–1383	29 Sept 1381	28 Sept 1382	1,262.00	126.40	126.40	TNA, E 101/80/23
1392–1396	29 Sept 1392	28 Sept 1393	1,611.00	161.10	161.10	TNA, E 101/80/25
1392–1396	29 Sept 1393	28 Sept 1394	4,719.00	471.90	471.90	TNA, E 101/80/25
1392–1396	29 Sept 1394	28 Sept 1395	3,352.00	335.20	335.20	TNA, E 101/80/25
1402–1405	7 November 1402	7 January 1405	3,156.00	315.60	157.80	TNA, E 101/81/1
1406–1409	8 December 1406	7 December 1407	1,486.00	188.60	188.60	TNA, E 101/81/5
1413–1419	23 March 1413	16 March 1415	5,948.50	594.85	297.43	TNA, E 101/81/8
1413–1419	30 October 1415	21 March 1418	7,851.00	785.10	261.70	TNA, E 101/81/8
1424–1428	31 August 1425	31 Sept 1427	2,874.75	287.48	143.74	TNA, E 101/81/12
1436–1439	30 Sept 1436	29 Sept 1438	2,561.88	256.18	128.09	TNA, E 101/81/15
1438–1441	30 Sept 1438	29 Sept 1440	3,194.75	319.48	159.74	TNA, E 101/81/16
1442–1445	30 Sept 1442	29 Sept 1444	4,798.92	479.89	239.95	TNA, E 101/81/18
1444–1451	30 Sept 1444	29 Sept 1446	5,908.50	590.85	295.43	TNA, E 101/81/19

