Why do desires rationalize actions?
Why do desires rationalize actions?
I begin the paper by outlining one classic argument for the guise of the good: that we must think that desires represent their objects favourably in order to explain why they can make actions rational (Quinn 1995; Stampe 1987). But what exactly is the conclusion of this argument? Many have recently formulated the guise of the good as the view that desires are akin to perceptual appearances of the good (Oddie 2005; Stampe 1987; Tenenbaum 2007). But I argue that this view fails to capitalize on the above argument, and that the argument is better understood as favouring a view on which desires are belief-like states. I finish by addressing some countervailing claims made by Avery Archer (2016).
1061-1081
Gregory, Alexander
4f392d61-1825-4ee5-bc21-18922c89d80f
2 January 2019
Gregory, Alexander
4f392d61-1825-4ee5-bc21-18922c89d80f
Abstract
I begin the paper by outlining one classic argument for the guise of the good: that we must think that desires represent their objects favourably in order to explain why they can make actions rational (Quinn 1995; Stampe 1987). But what exactly is the conclusion of this argument? Many have recently formulated the guise of the good as the view that desires are akin to perceptual appearances of the good (Oddie 2005; Stampe 1987; Tenenbaum 2007). But I argue that this view fails to capitalize on the above argument, and that the argument is better understood as favouring a view on which desires are belief-like states. I finish by addressing some countervailing claims made by Avery Archer (2016).
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Accepted/In Press date: 13 October 2017
e-pub ahead of print date: 2 January 2019
Published date: 2 January 2019
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 425504
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/425504
ISSN: 2330-4014
PURE UUID: 6cf45f9c-ab20-4d11-abee-ca0f0212e06c
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Date deposited: 22 Oct 2018 16:30
Last modified: 16 Mar 2024 04:16
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