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Nietzsche on Falsification, Perspectivism and Artistry

By

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ABSTRACT

FACULTY OF HUMANITIES
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This thesis attempts to argue that Nietzsche's falsification remarks should be understood in the context of a dynamic between falsification, perspectivism, artistry and honesty. Against the account of Clark (1990), I argue that, from the early essay *On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense* (1873) onwards, Nietzsche does not affirm an all-pervasive falsification thesis; i.e., the thesis that all human beliefs are necessarily false. I also argue that Clark misreads Nietzsche when she interprets him as, up until 1887, associating truth with a 'true world' and asserting that falsification is a result of our lacking empirical access to such a world.

Instead, I argue that from *Truth and Lie* onwards Nietzsche identifies three strands of falsification which commonly pollute our epistemic dealings with the world – but which are mere contingent aspects of our cognition. These three strands are: our tendency to overestimate the status of our truths and to reify our concepts, along with structural aspects of our thought, into reality; the erroneous conception of knowledge – a particular type of belief in 'objectivity' – which has attained dominance; the obscuring nature of the conventional conceptual schema through which we (typically) encounter the world.

These strands of falsification are things which inhibit our ability to honestly confront the truths of Nietzsche's naturalism. However, Nietzsche's perspectivism works as a corrective against the first two of these strands by deflating the status of our knowledge claims and exposing the absurdity of the

notion of 'objectivity' which has taken hold. The perspectivist call to develop a many-sided view of any given subject matter also helps prevent our enclosure within a conceptual schema.

Artistry, and in particular our adoption of the 'techniques of artists', also helps us to correct the falsifying aspects of the dominant conceptual schema. This is because Nietzsche associates artistry with selection and valuation and thinks that the techniques of artists are integral to developing new interpretations, i.e. alternatives to the dominant conceptual schema.

Perspectivism and artistry thus help to lift us out of falsification and lead to the individual developing their own understanding of the world – to rival the understanding embodied in the conceptual schemata of dominant perspectives. In doing this, they help us to develop our intellectual conscience and increase our ability to honestly confront the truths of Nietzsche's naturalism; which the dominant perspectives obscure or directly falsify.

In addition to arguing that this dynamic between falsification, perspectivism, artistry and honesty is the key to understanding Nietzsche's falsification remarks, I will argue that it is a theme which is consistently present in his work from *Truth and Lie* of 1873, through to 1888; again contra Clark (1990) and her developmental thesis.

By approaching the issue of falsification with the key Nietzschean themes of honesty, perspectivism and artistry in mind, I show that there is no need to attribute to Nietzsche a wildly implausible view about the necessary falsity of all human beliefs. Clark's focus on Nietzsche's alleged concern with truth and the 'true world' has led to a widespread mis-contextualizing of Nietzsche's remarks on falsification. Reversing Clark's influence on this point helps us to better understand Nietzsche on falsification. In addition to this, it also helps us understand artistry and perspectivism as correctives against falsification, and to see that honesty is Nietzsche's key epistemic concern.

Nietzsche on Falsification, Perspectivism and Artistry

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UNIVERSITY OF Southampton

Academic Thesis: Declaration Of Authorship

I, Jeremy Page

declare that this thesis and the work presented in it are my own and has been generated by me as the result of my own original research.

'Nietzsche on Falsification, Perspectivism and Artistry'

I confirm that:

1. This work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research degree at this University;

2. Where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or any other qualification at this University or any other institution, this has been clearly stated;

3. Where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly attributed;

4. Where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given. With the exception of such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work;

5. I have acknowledged all main sources of help;

6. Where the thesis is based on work done by myself jointly with others, I have made clear exactly what was done by others and what I have contributed myself;

7. Either none of this work has been published before submission, or parts of this work have been published as: [please list references below]:

Signed: ....

Date: ....

Abbreviations of Nietzsche's Works

A

The Anti- Christ, translated by Norman, J., in Ridley, A. & Norman, J. (eds), *The Anti- Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

AR

'Lectures on Ancient Rhetoric', translated by Gilman, S.L., Blair, C., & Parent, D.J., in Gilman, S.L., Blair, C., & Parent, D.J. (ed.) *Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

BGE

Beyond Good and Evil, translated by Hollingdale, R. J. (London: Penguin, 2003).

BT

The Birth of Tragedy, translated by Kaufmann, W. in *The Birth of Tragedy and The Case of Wagner*, (New York: Vintage, 1967).

D

Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality, translated by Hollingdale, R. J. in Clark, M. & Leiter, B. (eds), *Daybreak* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

EH

Ecce Homo, translated by Norman, J. in Ridley, A. & Norman, J. (eds), *The Anti- Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

GM

On the Genealogy of Morality, translated by Clark, M. & Swensen, A. J. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998).

GS

The Gay Science, translated by Nauckhoff, J. in Williams, B. (ed.), *The Gay Science,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

HH

Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, translated by Hollingdale, R. J. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

OS

'On Schopenhauer', translated by Janaway, C. in Janaway, C. (ed.), *Willing and Nothingness: Schopenhauer as Nietzsche's Educator*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).

[I cite section numbers from the translated text located at: Appendix 1: 258-265].

P

'The Philosopher: Reflections on the Struggle Between Art and Knowledge', translated by Breazeale, D. in Breazeale, D. (ed.), *Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche's Early Notebooks*, (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1979).

[I cite section numbers from the translated text located at: p1-58].

TI

Twilight of the Idols, translated by Norman, J. in Ridley, A. and Norman, J. (eds), *The Anti- Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

TL

"On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense," trans: Breazeale, D. in Breazeale, D. (ed.), *Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche's Early Notebooks* (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1979).

[I cite page numbers from Breazeale (1979)].

UM

Untimely Meditations, translated by Hollingdale, R. J. in Breazeale, D. (ed.), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

WEN

Writings from the Early Notebooks, translated by Löb, L. in Geuss, R. & Nehamas, A. (eds), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

WLN

Writings from the Late Notebooks, translated by Sturge, K. in Bittner, R. (ed.), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

WP

The Will to Power, translated by Kaufmann, W. & Hollingdale, R. J. (New York: Random House, 1967).

Z

Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, translated by del Caro, A. in del Caro, A. & Pippin, R. B. (eds), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

Introduction

In his account of *Nietzsche's Philosophy of Art* (1992), Julian Young interprets Nietzsche as failing to be able to respond to Schopenhauerian pessimism and resignation by affirming life. This is because Young believes the affirmation shown to be possible by Nietzsche is inauthentic, it does not 'face the world "honestly"' (Young: p138), and this means that 'to the extent […] that its main aim is to be the "antipode" to Schopenhauerianism, to "affirm life," Nietzsche's philosophy ends in failure' (*ibid.*, p148). Young explains how art is the main culprit in this failure. Art and artistry are the predominant means through which the picture of life and existence we face up to is made into something we can affirm. That is, on Young's interpretation, art and artistry only enable us to affirm life and existence by casting the question of affirmation in terms which should not satisfy our, or Nietzsche's, intellectual conscience.

Young sets out two main ways in which art dishonestly renders the character of life and existence in order to allow us to adopt an affirmative stance toward it. These are referred to as the "Apollonian" and "Dionysian" solutions to the problem of existence – that is, to the problem announced by Silenus in *The Birth of Tragedy,* that 'best of all is not to be born, not to *be*. To be nothing. But the second best for you is – is to die soon' (BT 3). The Dionysian solution fails to be honest as the affirmative stance it offers is only available from a trans-individual point of view. In order to be affirmative, the individual has to retreat from his first person perspective, that is, to retreat from the details of his own life and life as viewed from the point of view of the individual. Young describes the situation as one where the individual 'identifies himself with the whole eternal process of becoming and, as such, achieves immunity to the penalties of being *part* of that flux' (*ibid.*, p139). In Nietzsche's words, one becomes: 'the

will to life rejoicing in its own inexhaustability' (TI *What I Owe The Ancients* 5). Young takes Nietzsche to return to a position of this kind in 1888 after having first adopted it in *The Birth of Tragedy* in 1872[1]. On the Apollonian solution, which Young ties mainly to *The Gay Science,* responsibility for affirming life is not avoided by a retreat from one's own individual perspective to a trans-individual vantage point, but artistry is employed in order to significantly sweeten one's picture of life and existence in order to make affirmation possible. Thus, this solution also contravenes the intellectual conscience: 'We write out, in particular, the demands of our honesty […] We transform ourselves from weighty thinkers into intellectual and spiritual lightweights' (Young, p99). Though I disagree with Young's characterisation of art as something principally bound up with truth-evasion in *The Gay Science*, there do exist passages which can be read in this way. For example, Nietzsche tells us that 'our honesty has a counterforce […] art, as the good will to appearance. […] As an aesthetic phenomenon existence is still bearable to us' (GS 107). We are also encouraged to '*learn from artists'* the skill of making things 'beautiful, attractive, desirable' when they are not, '[a]nd in themselves they never are' (GS 299).

It is not my purpose in this dissertation to examine the finer details of what the affirmation of life might require of the individual. Having said this, it does seem that Young must be right in thinking that any life which Nietzsche could, on his own terms, find praiseworthy must display an intellectual conscience, or, what I take to be the same thing, the virtue of honesty: 'honesty – granted that this is our virtue, from which we cannot get free' (BGE 227). Nor is it my purpose to argue directly against the account which Young gives – though I believe it to be essentially misguided in characterising art as

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[1] Whether we should accept Young's characterisation of Nietzsche as championing a retreat to a trans-individual perspective in this passage of 1888 is another question. The title of the relevant section, '*What I Owe the Ancients'*, hints that its tone should be understood as retrospective rather than necessarily expressive of a current position. It also seems that Nietzsche might be engaging in hyperbole here in his eagerness to stress the affirmative character of both his early and late philosophy.

predominantly "dishonest". It *is* my intention, however, to attempt to bring out a sense in which art and artistry are positively related to the intellectual conscience. This will be done by demonstrating that art and artistry are suited to help one develop one's intellectual conscience by enabling the individual to transcend the falsification which Nietzsche believes, in ways to be considered below, to be prevalent.

When I come to investigate Nietzsche's later remarks on knowledge, which contain what is often referred to as his "doctrine" of perspectivism, my aim is similarly to suggest that these should be understood primarily against the background of our tendency to fall into falsification. I will argue that both Nietzsche's praise of artistry and his perspectivism are fruitfully interpreted as correctives against falsification. Before saying more about the characterisation of the relationship which I argue for between falsification, perspectivism and artistry, it will be necessary to position my account against that of Maudemarie Clark (*Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy* (1990)[2]) in chapter one. Though Clark does not focus on artistry, she gives a seminal account of Nietzsche's remarks on falsification and perspectivism against which I argue throughout this dissertation. Setting out her account in chapter one will enable me to sketch the structure of this thesis and the content of its chapters, as these have been determined in large part by the fact that I take Clark as a direct or indirect interlocutor throughout.

Clark understands Nietzsche's remarks on both falsification and perspectivism as being intimately bound up with the question of whether 'true being' is related to a 'true world' from which human knowing is cut off (Clark, p110). In taking this approach, Clark presupposes that Nietzsche holds a theoretical interest in the nature of truth and this leads her to read various "falsification" passages from works before 1887 as claiming that human

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[2] All references in the text to Clark are to Clark 1990, unless a different year is specified.

knowledge is necessarily false. I deny that Nietzsche was preoccupied with theoretical issues relating to truth or knowledge. I also deny that the falsification passages in question, several of which will be examined in detail in later chapters, should be read as claiming that *all* human beliefs are *necessarily* false. Instead, I argue that Nietzsche's preoccupation in these passages is to highlight contingent factors which lead to our understanding of the world containing falsity or being impoverished in a related sense.

Whereas Clark's interpretation of the falsification passages and perspectivism is developed on the assumption that Nietzsche held a theoretical interest in issues relating to truth, my interpretation argues that such an assumption is not supported by the texts and leads Clark to obscure the character of the passages in question. Further, I argue that the falsification and perspectivism passages are best understood in the context of Nietzsche's practical goal of enabling his readers to develop their intellectual conscience.

Chapter one gives a detailed account of the aspects of Clark's account which will be argued against in later chapters. This enables me to set out the content of later chapters. Chapter two then sketches the context within which I believe Nietzsche's falsification passages should be understood by analysing the notion of intellectual conscience. In doing this, it summarises, and begins to provide textual evidence for, my interpretation of the relationship between falsification, artistry and perspectivism. In addition to this, it begins to explore the ideas underpinning Nietzsche's dissatisfaction with our cognitive dealings as this is expressed in some central falsification passages. The interpretation that I give of these passages will contradict Clark's attribution of an all-pervasive falsification thesis to Nietzsche.

Chapter three demonstrates the striking similarities between the mechanics of cognition underwriting Nietzsche's remarks on falsification in the early unpublished essay *On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense* (1873) and the

philosophy of the 1880s. This provides me with a basis upon which to mount an interpretation of the role of falsification, perspectivism and artistry in the early and later philosophy which emphasises the continuity of Nietzsche's thought. Doing this with regard to *Truth and Lie* (chapter four) and the later philosophy (chapter five), will allow me to argue powerfully against the developmental nature of Clark's account. Following this, I will conclude by summarising the continuity in Nietzsche's remarks on falsification and on the role which perspectivism and artistry play in enabling us to overcome falsifying aspects of our understanding of the world which impoverish our intellectual conscience.

Chapter One | Clark on Falsification and Perspectivism

Section one of this chapter provides a detailed account of the aspects of Clark's interpretation against which later chapters will argue. This enables me, in section two, to clearly state my research aims and give more detail about the structure of this thesis.

Introduction

The differences between Clark's interpretation and my own on the topics of Nietzsche's remarks on falsification and perspectivsm are significant. On the issue of falsification, whereas I see Nietzsche as making a claim that many human beliefs falsify reality, but see this as consistent with the thought that it is possible for us to move beyond falsification, Clark interprets Nietzsche's (early) remarks on falsification as amounting to a falsification thesis which precludes the possibility that any human belief could be true. On Nietzsche's perspectivism, Clark understands Nietzsche's remarks, particularly GM III 12, as constituting a fully-fledged doctrine which signals his full abandonment of the falsification thesis and 'invites us to recognize as incoherent the very idea of things-in-themselves' (Clark, p132). In contrast, I attempt to play down the significance of Nietzsche's remarks as an epistemological thesis, whilst also rejecting the thought that they represent a major development in Nietzsche's thinking. In this section, I will begin by introducing Clark's account of Nietzsche's falsification thesis (1.1) before turning to her interpretation of perspectivism (1.2). Following this, I will consider Clark's assessment of the implications for the falsification thesis of Nietzsche's perspectivism. This section will then be brought to a close with a summary of the basic insight grounding perspectivism.

Section One | Clark on Falsification and Perspectivism

1.1 Clark and the Falsification Thesis

Clark's *Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy* (1990) offers a formidable study of Nietzsche's position on truth and ultimately argues that Nietzsche's mature philosophy should be understood as 'perfectly compatible with the minimal correspondence account of truth and therefore with granting that many human beliefs are true' (Clark, p135). Nietzsche's maturation on the themes in focus is characterised by Clark as a messy and staggered development away from the position of the early unpublished essay *On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense*; an essay in which, according to Clark, he first gives expression to the thesis that all human beliefs are false – the falsification thesis. I will say more about the specifics of Nietzsche's maturation on Clark's account later. For now, briefly giving Clark's interpretation of the argument which can be extracted from *Truth and Lie* for the falsification thesis will be helpful.

Clark (1990) primarily focuses her interpretation of *Truth and Lie* on the conception of truth she takes to be underwriting Nietzsche's provocative remarks in the essay. Clark notes some confusion on this issue on Nietzsche's part[3], but ultimately takes Nietzsche to be committed to the metaphysical correspondence theory of truth: '[f]ar from rejecting the conception of truth as correspondence, Nietzsche's denial of truth evidently presupposes the metaphysical correspondence theory' (*ibid.*, p83). This theory holds a standard of truth such that for a belief to be true it is required to adequately describe metaphysical reality or, in Kant's terms, the thing in itself. This theory of truth represents one of two key premises in the essay. The second premise Clark

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[3] Clark (1998: p47) goes into detail about the metaphysical confusion which surrounds the central argument for the falsification thesis in *Truth and Lie*. I ignore this confusion and Clark's account of it here, but will come back to it in chapter four.

associates with Nietzsche's acceptance of a representational theory of perception which he inherits from Schopenhauer (*ibid.*, p77-85). The finer details of this theory need not detain us, what is crucial is that Clark feels that it is this theory which leads Nietzsche to conceive of there being a complete separation between our representations and a metaphysically independent reality: our representations 'correspond in no way to the original entities' which we claim knowledge of (TL 83).

This leaves us in a situation where we strive for truth and conceive of truth as correspondence to metaphysical reality, yet lack any access to such a reality. Thus it is that Clark interprets the central refrain of the essay – 'truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions' (TL 84) – as: 'the claim that what we refer to as "truths", our canon of beliefs in science and common sense, do not attain the standard of truth, as correspondence to metaphysical reality, which they pretend to' (Clark, p89). Our lack of perceptual access to metaphysical reality precludes the possibility that our beliefs could attain the status of correspondence to such a reality[4]. Not only are they thus false, but they are also illusions in that we hold them to attain a standard which it would be impossible for them to. Further, Clark notes that we can understand here why Nietzsche refers to "truths" as "lies", in the specific "extra-moral" sense of the title of the essay; they deceive us as to their status, but do not intend to so deceive us, as lies commonly do. "Truths" are thus: 'lies told unconsciously or without [one] realizing they are lies' (*ibid.*, p89) – they innocently masquerade as corresponding to the thing in itself whilst unwittingly failing to do this.

This is how, in brief, Clark sees Nietzsche's as arguing for the falsification thesis in *Truth and Lie*. From this point in 1873 up until the canonical expression of perspectivism in 1887, Clark interprets Nietzsche's remarks on falsification

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[4] Clark (1998: p47) also questions the consistency of Nietzsche's position here. Along the lines that it seems that if there can be no true beliefs about metaphysical reality, then we should question how Nietzsche could know that our beliefs fail to correspond to it.

as a further assertion of the fact that human beliefs *necessarily* fail to be true and fail to be true because the realm to which they pretend to correspond is one from which they are (or would be) cut off. However, as Clark claims that part of Nietzsche's philosophical development in the years between *The Gay Science* (1882) and *Beyond Good and Evil* (1886) is to question the conceivability of the Kantian thing in itself (along with any notion of an essence which stands behind our appearances or representations (see, e.g., GS 54)), she needs to explain how Nietzsche remains attached to the falsification thesis in this period. If Nietzsche really does do away with the notion that there is some 'thing in itself', or 'true world', to which we aspire to correspond – but from which we are cut off – then it would seem that his reasons for claiming that all of our beliefs are necessarily false would disappear. If there is no 'true world' – meaning a world standing behind our representations, to which "true being" is ascribed (Clark, p110) – then we would expect Nietzsche to drop the metaphysical correspondence theory of truth and adopt something, perhaps, like a minimal correspondence theory which takes correspondence to empirical reality as a standard of truth.

Clark's account here becomes complicated. However, her basic move is to understand Nietzsche as replacing the criterion of truth as correspondence to the thing in itself, with the criterion of truth as correspondence to the 'chaos of sensations'; the latter turning out, on Clark's reading, to be another version of a 'true world' (WP 569; Clark: p124). Clark explains the genesis of Nietzsche's equation of the chaos of sensations with reality in terms of the influence of his representationalism on his thinking following his jettisoning of the notion of the thing in itself. Whereas in *Truth and Lie* Nietzsche conceived of our representations as having something, i.e. things in themselves, standing behind them, when the thing in itself is removed from the picture only our representations remain. This being the case, Nietzsche sought to characterise reality as the parts of our representations which are given: 'If only

representations exist, it could seem plausible to identify reality with whatever part of the representations we do not "make up" (*ibid.*, p122). Nietzsche believes himself entitled to make a distinction between what is "given" in our representations and what we "make up", Clark explains, as he 'agrees with Kant's denial that the form or structural features of our representations derive from experience' and gives a naturalized account of how 'the human brain structures the data of sensation' (*ibid.*, p121).

In theory then, Nietzsche posits a distinction between the chaos of sensations and the form or structure through which we experience it in our representations. However, Clark interprets this distinction as consigned to the realm of theory. In the crucial Nachlass passage from which Clark takes the notion of the 'chaos of sensation', we are told that this realm is 'a kind "unknowable" for us' (WP 569). The chaos of sensation is unknowable for us, Clark thinks, because the emergence of sense impressions into human consciousness necessarily involves their being structured by us in 'communicable, or "logicized" (universal) and therefore falsified, form' (Clark, p121; cf. GS 354). Thus, we are cut off from any first person experience of the chaos of sensation, as all the perceptual data we receive is the structured and falsified representation which is delivered to consciousness. What this means is that though in theory we can distinguish between the chaotic data of sensation and the structural and formal elements that we contribute to our representations, in our actual experience it is impossible to make any such distinction. That is to say, that whatever we can experience is already rendered in a communicable or logicized manner. Indeed, even the presence of "things" in our representations is an instance of this: 'falsification [is] involved in the assumption of an enduring thing and bearer of properties' (*ibid.*, p121).

From here it is possible to see how the chaos of sensations occupies the same space as that which the thing in itself had previously. The chaos of sensation is categorised as a 'true world', along with the thing in itself, because

we have no perceptual or empirical access to it. It is hidden behind our representations and we have no way of comparing our representations with what we believe, in theory, stands behind them. We are trapped once again, by Nietzsche's representationalism, within our representations[5]. Thus the falsification thesis which Clark identifies always takes the form of a dissatisfaction with perception as the bedrock of human 'knowledge'. This is the case in the works where Clark's Nietzsche has done away with the notion of the thing in itself and instead takes the chaos of sensation as constituting reality, just as it was in *Truth and Lie*. Through perception we only receive and thus develop beliefs about representations; not things in themselves. This dissatisfaction, combined with a belief in the conceivability of things in themselves (or a similar 'true world', i.e. the chaos of sensations) and a

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[5] Clark goes into greater detail here as she has to account for the fact that Nietzsche associates another 'true world' with reality, even after he has seen through the idea that a thing's essence might exist in separation from all of its possible appearances in GS 54. Clark argues that Nietzsche is not aware that in associating reality with the chaos of sensation he is again falling into this trap. This is because he initially believes himself to have an empirical theory which leads to his association of reality with the chaos of sensation, as well as to the further claims that human perception is necessarily cut off from reality and that human beliefs are necessarily false. Up until an insight expressed in BGE 15 Nietzsche thinks, according to Clark, that he could empirically ground his theory that consciousness is a corrupter and falsifier of the chaos of sensations (which Clark sees him giving in GS 354; Clark, p121). It is on this account that the association of reality with 'whatever part of the representations we do not "make up"' (*ibid.*, p122) – i.e. with the chaos of sensations – gets going. Clark (p122) notes that Nietzsche refers to 'physiology and the history of animals' (GS 354) when making his case here and if it were the case that Nietzsche could construct an account of reality as a chaos of sensation via empirical means, then he could take himself to be able to assert the falsification thesis without resorting to a non-empirical account. However, as BGE 15 expresses, the flaw in this plan is that 'to study physiology with a clear conscience, one must insist that the sense organs are *not* phenomena in the sense of idealistic philosophy' (BGE 15; quoted in Clark, p123). That is, in order for Nietzsche to base an empirical theory concerning the corruption and falsification which our sense organs necessitate, he has to refer to 'real, independently existing things' in the form of sense organs. However, it is precisely the reality of such things that the argument for the association of reality with the chaos of sensation is trying to disprove. This undermines any hope of basing the association of reality with a chaos of sensations hidden by our representations on an empirical theory. Thus Clark thinks that the insight of BGE 15 is a crucial step in Nietzsche recognising that the claim that "all human beliefs falsify"' cannot be justified by an empirical theory and that the chaos of sensations is tantamount to a 'true world' as it has a nature which is in principle separate from any of its appearances. All this explains the key point for us, which is how (or, rather, how Clark can explain how) Nietzsche finds himself officially rejecting the idea that we should associate reality with a 'true world' from which we are cut off (GS 54) whilst inadvertently continuing to associate reality with such a realm. This positing of such a realm in the form of the 'chaos of sensation' is what guarantees the persistence of the falsification thesis up until BGE 15, on Clark's account.

Clark attributes Nietzsche's failure to recognise the shortcomings of his account immediately to his representationalism. It is primarily his representationalism which leads him into the position once again of thinking that it is precisely our representations – and their communicable and logicized character – which conceal reality (*ibid.*, p124).

conception of truth which demands correspondence to things in themselves (or another 'true world'), leads to the conclusion that human beliefs are necessarily false.

1.2 Clark on Perspectivism

Clark's account of perspectivism pinpoints GM III 12 as the point at which Nietzsche abandons the falsification thesis; the works from *The Genealogy* onward 'provide no evidence of his commitment to the falsification thesis, no reason to deny his commitment to the possibility of truth in science, nor to the truth of his own theories' (Clark, p108-109). Part of Clark's motivation for accepting that *Truth and Lie* contains the falsification thesis, yet arguing that Nietzsche matures away from this position, is to argue against 'radical or non-traditional interpreters who take Nietzsche's claim that truths are illusions to state his ultimate position on truth' (*ibid.*, p12). According to Clark, such interpreters typically 'deny that he accepted the traditional understanding of truth as correspondence, or regarded his own doctrines as true in this sense' (*ibid.*, p12). *Truth and Lie* is a crucial piece of evidence for radical interpretations, so Clark's categorization of it as belonging to Nietzsche's juvenilia is part of her well-intentioned project of arguing that the mature Nietzsche should not be read as radical readings argue he should.

Nietzsche draws a metaphor between sight and knowledge in GM III 12: 'there is *only* a perspectival seeing, *only* a perspectival "knowing"'. Clark unpacks this metaphor as an invitation to consider the nonsensicality of the thought that there could be non-perspectival sight (a seeing which occurs from an eye in no particular location relative to its object), as revealing something about the idea of non-perspectival knowledge. If non-perspectival seeing is a non-sense because it posits an eye with no spatial location, then, in order to unpack the

metaphor, Clark needs to posit an analogue to the notion of spatial location for knowledge. 'An obvious candidate for this role' she asserts, is 'what we believe at a particular time' (*ibid.*, p130). Just as spatial location affects the literal look of the object, the belief content of our cognitive perspective is 'something on the side of the knower which affects the intellectual "look" of the object' (*ibid.*). On this reading of the metaphor, the anti-foundationalist point now becomes salient. The demand that we should achieve a seeing which is not polluted by any particularities about the seer is absurd and the perspectivist metaphor invites us to conclude the same thing about the demand for a cognitive perspective which is not polluted by any particularities on the side of the knower. The opposite view, the view that we can have non-perspectival knowledge and a way of knowing which involves no particularities on the side of the knower, is foundationalism: 'To consider knowledge nonperspectival would be to insist that it must be grounded in a set of foundational beliefs, beliefs all rational beings must accept no matter what else they believe, beliefs that could therefore constitute a neutral corner…' (*ibid.*). Thus far Clark refrains from discussing perspectivism as having something to do with truth. What emerges from this discussion is, rather, a point about justification: 'Perspectivism amounts to the claim that we cannot and need not justify our beliefs by paring them down to a set of unquestionable beliefs all rational beings must share. This means that all justification is contextual, dependent on other beliefs held unchallengeable for the moment' (*ibid.*).

Clark goes further than this point about justification, however, when she suggests that Nietzsche's claim that the thought of non-perspectival knowledge is an 'absurdity' 'invites us to recognize as incoherent the very idea of things-in-themselves' (*ibid.*, p132). This seems to be a necessary development in his outlook as otherwise the metaphor of perspective would be compatible with the position Clark interprets Nietzsche as adopting in *Truth and Lie*; 'that there is a thing in itself that we cannot know' (*ibid.*, p132). Clark associates non-

perspectival knowledge with the 'knowledge in itself' which Nietzsche labels an 'absurdity' in GM III 12. She further understands 'knowledge in itself' as 'knowledge of things-in-themselves' (*ibid.*). The claim that the idea of such knowledge is an absurdity, means that Nietzsche's point here is more than merely a lamentation about our cognitive situation – i.e. it moves beyond the conclusion Nietzsche reaches in *Truth and Lie* that we cannot know things in themselves. Perspectivism entails, on Clark's reading, not only that we are unable to receive the kind of justification which would be necessary for us to be confident that we have knowledge of things in themselves, but also that the idea of a thing in itself is contradictory – the conceivability of the thing in itself is thus rejected.

The basis for this claim about conceivability comes from the fact that the perspectivist metaphor invites us to 'think of what things are in themselves as the cognitive equivalent of what they look like "in themselves," what they would look like from nowhere' (*ibid.*, p132). It only makes sense to think about how an object looks by conceiving of how it can be seen from various perspectives. Similarly, 'there is nothing to know of it [an object] except how it is interpreted from various cognitive perspectives' (*ibid.*, p133). This point is merely an instance of Nietzsche expressing again the conclusion of GS 54; we cannot think of a thing as having an essence which differs from how it can possibly appear. The aspects of a thing's 'intelligible character' are 'aspects of how it would be interpreted from one or more cognitive perspectives on it' (*ibid.*, p132). This being the case, Nietzsche no longer conceives of the perspectival nature of our knowledge as representing an epistemological deficiency or limitation on our part. The idea of there being a thing in itself which stands behind all of a things possible appearances, behind all the ways it could possibly be known, is inconceivable. Being precluded from having a type of knowledge which is recognised as absurd, because it would be knowledge of something which is itself inconceivable, is no limitation. What this means is that Clark sees

Nietzsche as making a point about truth in GM III 12: 'Because it rejects the conceivability of things-in-themselves, [perspectivism] rules out the metaphysical understanding of truth as correspondence to things as they are in themselves. A perspectivist denies that there is any truth in this metaphysical sense' (*ibid.*, p133-134).

This brief run through of Clark's interpretation of perspectivism allows us to see the importance she assigns to it. For Clark, it signals a change in his theoretical position regarding the nature of truth. In addition to this, it plays an important role in her developmental story and explains the reasons motivating Nietzsche's move away from the falsification thesis (along with the representationalism which was the reason for his attachment to this thesis post-GS 54). It will be helpful here to summarise Clark's remarks on perspectivism, the falsification thesis and representationalism and how they ultimately interrelate.

1.3 Perspectivism, the Falsification Thesis and Representationalism

The simplest way to understand the implications for the falsification thesis of perspectivism is to recognise it as wiping out a major premise in the argument which Clark identifies in *Truth and Lie*. In *Truth and Lie* Nietzsche's position is taken to be that our truths pretend to display correspondence to metaphysical reality yet fail to do this, thus they are "illusions". However, as Clark understands GM III 12 as the place where Nietzsche effectively and fully incorporates into his philosophy a rejection of the conception of truth as correspondence to metaphysical reality, he at this point removes any reason for thinking that our beliefs are necessarily false – they are only necessarily false when judged by the standards of this absurd conception of truth. Though Nietzsche jettisons the notion of metaphysical correspondence, Clark sees no

reason why he need throw out the idea of truth as correspondence *per se* – perspectivism 'is perfectly compatible with the minimal correspondence theory' (*ibid.*, p135). There is no need for current purposes to go into what this theory amounts to, other than that it allows that our beliefs may be true in lieu of access to the thing in itself. It allows that our beliefs may be true, that is, as long as we believe that we have access to what now counts as "real" – extramental objects. This brings us on to the topic of Nietzsche's representationalism.

Clark refers to the representationalism which Nietzsche inherited from Schopenhauer as the model of perception and knowledge 'according to which the object of perception and knowledge is only our own representation, and not something that does or could exist independently of us' (*ibid.*, p137). The metaphor of perspective is precisely what Nietzsche needs to escape the thought that what we perceive, and develop knowledge of, is mere representation. The object of knowledge within the perspectivist metaphor is set up as an independently existing thing, i.e., as possessing 'extramental existence' (*ibid.*, p136). To say that it is an independently existing thing is not to claim for it an essence which could, in principle, be distinct from its possible appearances. This would put us back into the position of positing a thing in itself. Instead, Clark understands the extramental thing as having an existence independent of particular representations, that is: 'its own foothold in reality' (*ibid.*, p136). Thus, Nietzsche can claim the extramental existence of things without violating the insight of GS 54 that there is no essence of a thing which remains hidden by its appearances: 'what could I say about any essence except name the predicates of its appearance!'. This allows Nietzsche, when he jettisons the notion of the thing in itself standing behind appearance, to stop short of reducing the object of knowledge to our representations.

Clark takes the mature Nietzsche's confidence that our representations get us into contact with independently existing objects, to work against his earlier remarks relating to the fact that everyday human consciousness and

conceptualisation falsify the chaos of sensation. To recap, Clark claims that, for Nietzsche pre-1887, falsification is pervasive and tied up even in the most common sense of beliefs: 'falsification [is] involved in the assumption of an enduring thing and bearer of properties' (*ibid.*, p121). The mature Nietzsche can and does accept that facts about the subject, e.g. our cognitive constitution and our practical interests, colour and structure how an object appears. However, as Nietzsche's position is now that an object can have 'no nature that is independent of how it can appear' (*ibid.*, p138), he does not associate the fact that perspectives involve 'subjective or *a priori* elements' with their necessarily effecting falsification or distortion (*ibid.*, p138). This is why, Clark (1990) dubiously claims that references to the falsifying influence of our consciousness (e.g. GS 354) are absent from Nietzsche's mature work.[6] All of this means that Clark's mature Nietzsche is able to accept what I will call the 'basic perspectivist insight'.

1.4 The Basic Perspectivist Insight

I take the basic insight grounding perspectivism to be that aspects on the side of the subject which determine how we interpret experience and form beliefs, do not necessarily lead to falsification and are, conversely, enabling features of cognition[7]. Nietzsche intends this point to cut against, for example, concepts such as "knowledge in itself" or objectivity as "disinterested contemplation"

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[6] NB. Clark has now changed her view on GS 354 and the whole of book V of *The Gay Science*, so that it is now classed as a "mature" work: '[My] current view [is that] the falsification thesis is present in the first four parts of GS, which was published in 1882, but not in the fifth part and preface, published in 1887' (Clark and Dudrick, 2004:384, n.3). Note also that Clark has been challenged on her claim that consciousness is only strongly linked with falsification in those works before his "mature" period (whether this is taken to start in 1886 or 1887). See, for example, Riccardi (2013: p222-223), Hussain (2004: p330) and Lanier Anderson (2002). I will discuss the implausibility of her account on this point in chapter five and argue that even in the works of 1888 Nietzsche is committed to the prevalence of falsification (though such falsification shouldn't be understood as all-pervasive or necessary).
[7] Anderson (1996) makes a similar point at p321. The account of Janaway (2007: p205-213) has also been influential in how I think about these matters.

(GM III 12), which conceive of the influence of subjectivity and interpretation as obstacles to knowing.

In order to make sense of this point it will be helpful to recall our earlier discussion concerning how perspectivism amounted to an anti-foundationalist position. There we noted how Clark saw perspectivism as entailing that beliefs cannot be justified by being reduced to a set of 'unquestionable beliefs that all rational beings must share' (*ibid.*, p130). We can imagine such a demand for foundational justification requiring that we abstract away from everything non-foundationally justified in our cognitive perspective when constructing or justifying beliefs. Such an attempt was referred to earlier as an attempt to get to a neutral or non-perspectival perspective. When discussing foundationalism directly, Clark parsed the necessarily perspectival character of our cognitive perspectives as having to do with the fact that they are constituted by non-foundationally justified beliefs. Clark later goes further in explaining other non-foundationally justified aspects of subjects which structure and give content to our cognitive perspectives: 'we can understand cognitive perspectives as constituted not only by beliefs, but also by those factors on the side of the subject responsible for beliefs, such as cognitive capacities and practical interests […] in particular, the interest in control and survival' (*ibid.*, p133).

The basic perspectivist insight captures these aspects as well. Contra foundationalism, it is the claim that non-foundationally justified beliefs, along with our particular cognitive capacities and our arbitrary practical interests, are necessary in order to construct perspectives, interpret experience and develop knowledge. This chimes with what Nietzsche says when he implores us to make use of the will, and in particular our affects, in order to develop our "objectivity": '*the more* affects we allow to speak about a matter, *the more* eyes, different eyes, we know how to bring to bear on one and the same matter, that much more complete will our "concept" of this matter, our "objectivity" be' (GM III 12). In this way, the inclusion of different affects is held to facilitate

our attaining different vantage points from which to interpret the subject matter in question. Thus, from the perspectivist's point of view, any theory of truth or conception of knowledge which aims at the wholesale extirpation of subjective factors not only aims at the impossible, but also frustrates inquiry by closing off the 'active and interpretation forces' of the individual (GM III 12).

On Clark's developmental interpretation, the early Nietzsche does not accept the basic perspectivist insight. This is why he views the cognitive perspectives that we can achieve as impure and falsifying; they involve non-foundationally justified aspects on the side of the knowing subject. However, with the perspectivist metaphor in hand, Nietzsche is able to break free from the conception of truth as correspondence to a 'true world'; a world completely independent of that disclosed by our representations and their subjective structuring and interpretation. As Clark puts it, for the mature Nietzsche following the perspectivist insight: 'we must abandon the presumption that subjective factors have a distorting influence' (*ibid.*, p133). Linking this with the previous section, we can say that Nietzsche no longer thinks that because our representations are *our* representations and are influenced by factors concerning us, that they fail to deliver perceptual input or to enable us develop knowledge about extramentally existing things.

None of this, of course, precludes the possibility that factors on the side of the subject – like, for example, the influence of faulty perceptual apparatus, or of an overbearing drive, on how we interpret experience – can lead to falsification. Clark does not spend much time discussing these types of issues, and offers no serious discussion of the often deceptive nature of drives and affects. Instead she summarises the influence of our interests on inquiry in the following terms: 'We should […] expect people with different interests to discover different truths (as well as many common ones). Our interests determine where we look, and therefore what we see' (Clark, p135). Whether this satisfactorily captures Nietzsche's position and his imploration to 'have

one's pro and contra *in one's power*, and to shift them in and out: so that one knows how to make precisely the *difference* in perspectives and affective interpretations useful for knowledge' (GM III 12) will be questioned in chapter two.

Section Two | Areas of Research and Thesis Structure

2. 1 Introduction

With the preceding discussion of Clark's interpretation in hand, it will be possible in this section to provide detail about the character of my disagreements with Clark on the issues of falsification and perspectivism. After I have done this, I will be able to set out the structure of this thesis and the content of its chapters. Maintaining focus on what Clark takes to be three crucial stages in the development of Nietzsche's thought will be helpful to this end.

2.2 Three Stages in Nietzsche's Development

Clark's developmental account of Nietzsche's position on truth, knowledge and the falsification thesis can be broken down as follows. In the first stage of Nietzsche's thought which Clark reports on[8] – that articulated in *Truth and Lie* – truth was associated with the thing in itself and Nietzsche adopted a form of

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[8] Clark (1990), like myself, does not discuss Nietzsche's position in *The Birth of Tragedy* in significant detail. This is why *Truth and Lie* is included in my summary of Clark's view as the first stage – though *The Birth* obviously precedes it and is philosophically distinct from it. In Clark (1998) there is an attempt made to bring *The Birth* into the picture. For my part, I leave *The Birth* out of my account in this thesis. I take Nietzsche's position in *The Birth* and in *Truth and Lie* to be philosophically distinct and take *Truth and Lie* to contain, in nascent form, the strands of his thought on falsification, perspectivism and artistry which continue into his later philosophy – hence my focus on it. *The Birth* simply doesn't take these themes as its subject matter in the way that *Truth and Lie* and, e.g., the short unpublished essay *On Schopenhauer*, clearly do.

representationalism which caused him to think of our representations as being cut off from the thing in itself. This in turn led him to affirm the falsification thesis – the thesis that all human beliefs are false. From this early point all the way through to the development of his mature perspectivism, Clark believes Nietzsche's thoughts on the falsity of our beliefs remain entangled with the idea of the existence of a 'true world' – be it the 'thing in itself' or, as is the case in the second stage of his development, the 'chaos of sensation'. This second stage is instantiated in *The Gay Science* in GS 54 where Nietzsche communicates the insight that it does not make sense to think of a thing's essence in separation from all of its possible appearances. Instead of fully heeding this insight, Nietzsche remains trapped in his representationalism and comes to see humans as cut off from the chaos of sensations – the new 'true world' – because the subjective structuring aspects of human perception and consciousness falsify and conceal the 'true world'. Becoming conscious of things is held, for example, to involve 'a vast and thorough corruption, falsification, superficialization, and generalization' (GS 354). This means that Nietzsche clings to the falsification thesis until 1887, along with his representationalism and the notion that truth is correspondence to a 'true world' hidden from us by our representations. However, in the third and final stage of his development, instantiated in GM III 12, Nietzsche frees himself from these commitments through the metaphor of perspective. Here the maturation of his philosophy is complete when he expounds an anti-foundationalist conception of knowledge and rejects the conceivability of the thing in itself, ushering out the conception of truth as metaphysical correspondence and ushering in a position which Clark describes as a minimal correspondence theory. This all amounts to Nietzsche accepting that there is nothing barring our beliefs from being true, i.e., he abandons the falsification thesis as his remarks on falsification were, according to Clark, bound up with his representationalism and association of truth with correspondence to a 'true world'. We encounter independently existing objects

in perception, which is to say that the 'senses do not lie' (TI *Reason* 2), and this leaves us with no reason to doubt the general veracity of our cognition – built, as it is for Clark's Nietzsche, largely on the basis of their testimony.

Two aims of Clark's study are to demonstrate the contribution Nietzsche's perspectivism makes to the current intellectual scene (Clark, p127) and to strike a blow against radical interpretations of Nietzsche's philosophy which construe his mature works as "denying truth", i.e., as containing the falsification thesis which Nietzsche allegedly argues for in *Truth and Lie*. The first of these aims would seem to suppose that Nietzsche had something like a fully worked out position called "perspectivism" which was primarily bound up with theoretical issues surrounding truth and knowledge. The second rests on an interpretation of *Truth and Lie* as containing the falsification thesis. It also, when added to the presumption that Nietzsche held a sustained interest in epistemological issues, motivates the developmental nature of Clark's account. In this vein, Clark attempts to show that Nietzsche's most strident "denial of truth" is attributable to the heady juvenilia of *Truth and Lie* and that a sustained inquiry into the conceivability of the thing in itself eventually allows him to abandon the falsification thesis.

2.3 Areas of Disagreement with Clark

The account I will go on to argue for challenges the accuracy of Clark's division of Nietzsche's thought on these issues into three stages. It also questions the pillars of Clark's account summarised in the previous paragraph. That is, that Nietzsche held a strong theoretical interest in issues surrounding truth and knowledge, that *Truth and Lie* contains a falsification thesis and that Nietzsche's thought significantly changed and developed with regard to the themes in question from 1873 to 1887. I disagree with Clark's account in that I do not

think that perspectivism is a fully fledged epistemological doctrine or that it amounts to a substantive position on the nature of truth. Nor do I think that there are significant fluctuations in Nietzsche's position on truth, knowledge and falsification in the years between *Truth and Lie* and the canonical statement of perspectivism in *The Genealogy*. Finally, I do not agree that Nietzsche is committed to Clark's falsification thesis in *Truth and Lie* of 1873, or at any time thereafter.

2.3.1 Falsification in *Truth and Lie*

Taking the last of these points first, it will be the case that in chapter two I will argue that the predominant reason that Nietzsche takes falsification to be prevalent in *Truth and Lie* is linked to our folk understanding of the status of our "truths". I understand Nietzsche to be attacking our faith that our truths correspond to some distinct metaphysical level of reality in this essay; rather than their failure to attain the standard of metaphysical correspondence *per se*. The crucial point here is that, on my account, Nietzsche does not subscribe, contra Clark, to the metaphysical correspondence theory of truth in *Truth and Lie*. Instead, his preoccupation in the essay is to attack a folk understanding of truth and knowledge which resembles the very metaphysical correspondence theory of truth which Clark takes him to adopt[9]. He aims to bring out the absurdity of taking such a theory as a standard by which to assess our beliefs. As the adoption of such a folk understanding of truth is contingent and may be jettisoned, I deny that Nietzsche ever held the view that human beliefs are necessarily falsify.

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[9] Anderson (1996: p324) makes a broadly similar point with regard to the later works (but not *Truth and Lie* itself): 'When Nietzsche articulates the falsification thesis, I submit, he is making [a] point about the failings of a traditional conception of truth'.

That I am able to defend such a reading of *Truth and Lie* will take away the foundations of Clark's account, as it is from her identification of the falsification thesis in this essay that her developmental story gets going.

2.3.2 The Development of Nietzsche's Position post-*Truth and Lie*

On the back of my interpretation of Nietzsche's remarks on falsification in *Truth and Lie* as being primarily related to a folk epistemology rather than our failure to correspond to the thing in itself, I question Clark's understanding of the character of Nietzsche's remarks on falsification in the works following this essay. Clark believes that Nietzsche continues to associate truth with a 'true world' – a world to which we lack access – in the years following the writing of *Truth and Lie,* right up until the development of the perspectivist metaphor in GM III 12. This means that Nietzsche's position in these years is still, effectively, that falsification is necessarily pervasive. However, when one removes the link between the falsification remarks and the association of truth with a 'true world' in *Truth and Lie*, Clark's attempt to argue that falsification is a result of Nietzsche's (albeit unwittingly) failing to move beyond the notion of a 'true world' in the works pre-1887 becomes significantly less convincing. At the beginning of chapter four, I will argue that whatever Nietzsche's position is on the conceivability of the thing in itself in *Human, all too Human*, there is little reason for thinking that it is what informs his remarks on falsification.

Similarly, I will argue in chapter five that the reason Nietzsche takes falsification to be prevalent in *The Gay Science* and *Beyond Good and Evil* is not related to his association of reality with the 'true world' of the chaos of sensations. Instead, it is, again, primarily bound up with the status we claim for our beliefs because of a conception of truth that we subscribe to.

This means that I will argue for the continuity of Nietzsche's remarks on falsification from *Truth and Lie* through to what Clark refers to as the mature philosophy. Clark sees Nietzsche as adopting the metaphysical correspondence theory in *Truth and Lie*, which he clings to in *Human, all too Human*, before ridding himself of the notion of the thing in itself in GS 54. Even after GS 54, she interprets Nietzsche as holding on to the notion that our beliefs fail to correspond to the 'true world' by speculating that Nietzsche associates the chaos of sensations with reality. In contrast, I believe that Nietzsche never associates reality with a 'true world' and thus does not understand falsification in terms of the failure of our beliefs to correspond to such a world. This is one reason why I think that Clark is misguided in understanding Nietzsche's remarks on falsification in relation to the developmental story which she constructs out of Nietzsche's texts concerning his supposed commitment, or belief in the conceivability of, a layer of reality hidden behind our representations; a layer which is the location of 'true being' and to which Nietzsche holds our beliefs must correspond (Clark, p110). There is scant evidence that Nietzsche's remarks on falsification require or suggest that we are necessarily cut off from reality or that reality takes the form of a 'true world'. Indeed, in GS 354 when discussing falsification Nietzsche specifically denies that his concern is with a distinction between a thing in itself and a realm of appearance: 'Even less am I concerned with the opposition between 'thing in itself' and appearance' (GS 354).

2.3.3 The Significance of GM III 12

Clark takes the perspectivist metaphor of GM III 12 to provide Nietzsche with a way of thinking about the objects we access in perception as having an extramental existence independent of our representations. The significance of the passage is taken by her to be the fact that it is an expression of Nietzsche's belief in the inconceivability of the thing in itself. Clark takes this point to be

emblematic of the beginning of Nietzsche's mature philosophy. From this point forward Nietzsche is no longer in any way caught, intentionally or unintentionally, in associating 'true being' with some 'true world'. Thus, he moves beyond the falsification thesis and its negative assessment of the status of human knowledge.

As I play down the significance of Nietzsche's musings on the existence or conceivability of any 'true world' and don't take his remarks on falsification to be determined by any such thoughts, I deny that GM III 12 plays this pivotal role. Instead, I see the passage as setting out and attacking the priestly conception of knowledge as 'knowledge in itself'[10]. This being a conception of knowledge which falsely represents the mechanics of our cognition, as it conceives of the will as separable from the knowing process, and embellishes the status of human knowledge by associating it with "disinterested contemplation". On this last point, GM III 12 thus links to Nietzsche's attack on the folk understanding of knowledge which I will argue is associated with falsification in *Truth and Lie*. In the section following the discussion of perspectivism and falsification in GS 354, Nietzsche also discusses an erroneous popular and philosophical conception of knowledge. This provides initial encouragement for the interpretative strategy of understanding perspectivism as being setup primarily in order to work against inflated and ultimately falsifying conceptions of knowledge. Getting clear about the relation between perspectivism, the shortcomings of dominant conceptions of knowledge and the character of falsification will be crucial to my interpretation.

As mentioned above, I believe Clark's account to be misguided because it attempts to track Nietzsche's conception of truth and to understand

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[10] This passage also refers explicitly to Schopenhauer (in its mockery of the idea of a 'pure, will-less, painless, timeless subject of knowledge"), as well as Kant and Hegel (in its reference to "pure reason" and "absolute spirituality"). However, it is the priest's 'incarnate will to contradiction and anti-nature' which is "philosophizing" in this passage and the implication is that Schopenhauer, Hegel and Kant are merely expressions of this will.

Nietzsche's falsification remarks in light of this conception. I will argue, with Gemes (1992), that Nietzsche is not interested in 'the notion of truth *per se*' (Gemes, p64) or concerned with giving a theory of truth. This ultimately leads me to deny Clark's particular story about Nietzsche's development and to deny that falsification and perspectivism are best understood in the context within which Clark deals with them. More will be said on this issue at the beginning of chapter two. At this stage it is possible to sketch the structure of this thesis.

2.4 Thesis Structure

Chapter two sketches the context within which Nietzsche's remarks on falsification and perspectivism should be understood. It does this in three main ways: firstly, by examining the nature and importance of Nietzsche's commitment to the intellectual conscience, along with the virtue of honesty, and suggesting that this commitment is more obviously related to his remarks on falsification and perspectivism than a purported theoretical interest in issues surrounding truth and knowledge on his part. Secondly, by highlighting the significant role which Nietzsche assigns to the will in human knowing. Thirdly, by separating the distinct ways in which the will leads us into falsification. This chapter will refine our understanding of the contingent factors which lead to falsification. It also introduces the ways that perspectivism and artistry are suited to work against falsification.

Following chapter two, each chapter focuses on one or more of the falsification passages within which Clark claims a fully-fleged falsification thesis is affirmed by Nietzsche. Chapter three discusses both GS 354 and *Truth and Lie.* The chapter begins by outlining a picture of the mechanics of cognition which underpin Nietzsche's understanding of the character of falsification. In doing this, it highlights the fact that the same basic picture persists from *Truth*

and Lie through to the philosophy of the 1880s. This strengthens my case for the continuity of Nietzsche's thinking on the themes in question. On the back of this analysis, I am able to launch interpretations of the dynamics between falsification, perspectivism and artistry in *Truth and Lie* (to which I also dedicate a further chapter of its own, in chapter four), and the later philosophy – in particular GS 107-111 and TI *Reason* – in chapter five. I focus on these specific falsification passages in order to lay out an interpretative battleground upon which my attack on Clark can take place and upon which I can subsequently argue instead for the plausibility of my reading of the passages. Paying close attention to these passages, which fall in different stages of Clark's developmental picture, also allows me to demonstrate the striking continuity in Nietzsche's thinking.

The interpretation which I develop of *Truth and Lie* in chapter four demonstrates that Nietzsche's rhetorical attack in this essay is most plausibly read as an attack on the conception of truth as metaphysical correspondence, rather than an attack on human knowledge made from the point of view of a metaphysical correspondence theory of truth. I show that Nietzsche already accepts the basic perspectivist point in *Truth and Lie* and that he uses this point to undermine a prevalent folk epistemology which overestimates the status of human knowledge and leads to falsification. Chapter four also highlights the role which artistry and metaphor play in counteracting falsification.

Chapter five argues against the claims of Clark concerning Nietzsche's development between the years of 1882 and 1888. Its goal is to drive home the continuity present in Nietzsche's remarks on falsification and to show how perspectivism and artistry are intended as methods of working against falsification. Clark's developmental account is summarised in her interpretation of Nietzsche's discussion of 'How the "True World" finally became a fable' (TI *HTTWBAF*). I provide a rival interpretation of this passage. In order to make my claim about the continuity of Nietzsche's remarks on falsification plausible,

I also demonstrate how the seemingly incompatible claims that 'delusion and error are conditions of cognitive and sensate existence' (GS 107 - 1882) and that the 'senses do not lie' (TI *Reason* 2 - 1888) are in fact compatible. This will be the final stage in my argument against Clark.

Following this, I will conclude chapter five by revisiting the interplay between falsification, perspectivism and artistry. This will demonstrate the strength of my account by highlighting the links which emerge between crucial passages when these themes are considered together.

This thesis endeavours to establish the following points:

1. That Nietzsche never adopts an all-pervasive "falsification thesis". Instead, in both *Truth and Lie* and the later philosophy, the cause of falsification is contingent.
2. That Nietzsche's understanding of falsification is not closely related to any explicit or latent conception of a 'true world'.
3. That the predominant cause which Nietzsche sees as responsible for the existence of falsification is an overestimation we make of the status of our knowledge.
4. That Nietzsche's understanding of falsification stays relatively constant from *Truth and Lie* through to the later philosophy.
5. That perspectivism is best understood against the background of falsification.
6. That artistry is positively related to the development of our intellectual conscience, as it serves to work against the causes of falsification.

Clark's account will be directly engaged with at various points. However, the main strand of my disagreement with it is her choice to interpret Nietzsche's remarks on falsification and perspectivism in the context of an alleged interest on Nietzsche's part in truth and the 'true world'. As I play down the extent of Nietzsche's theoretical interests in these themes, a large part of my strategy

against Clark is simply to show that understanding falsification and perspectivism in an alternative context is fruitful and more in tune with the text and its spirit. This will mean that, in addition to detailed textual argumentation with Clark, much of the thesis below focuses on establishing the correct context within which to understand Nietzsche's remarks on falsification and perspectivism. As stated above, chapter two is in part an attempt to demonstrate the general character of what I take this context to be.

Chapter Two | The Intellectual Conscience and Falsification

This chapter sets out the context within which Nietzsche's remarks on falsification, and the relation between perspectivism, artistry and falsification, should be understood. Whilst I hope also to provide reasons for accepting the aptness of my interpretation here, I will give further arguments for it in later chapters. In this sense, this chapter somewhat foreshadows the arguments which are to come. These later chapters will focus more specifically on arguing against Clark's account and especially its developmental nature.

Whereas Clark's narrative focuses on situating Nietzsche's remarks on falsification and perspectivism within the context of his (purported) theorizing on the nature of truth and the existence of a 'true world', I make salient what one might call the primarily 'practical' character of Nietzsche's remarks on falsification, perspectivism and artistry. I understand Nietzsche's falsification passages not as results of a primarily theoretical interest in what he describes as the 'purely theoretical problem of "thing in itself" and "appearance"' (HH 10), but rather as providing a diagnosis of the falsehood which commonly pervades our understanding of the world and our place within it. I describe this as being principally practical rather than theoretical, because Nietzsche's goal in highlighting such falsehood is to enable us to escape it and, in the process, to develop our intellectual conscience.[11]

Section one will cast doubt on the plausibility of Clark's reading of GM III 12 and her focus on the theoretical import of the passage. Section two will demonstrate an important shortcoming of Clark's account by showing that she seriously underplays the role which the will plays in shaping our understanding of the world. The analysis given in section two will then be built on in section

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[11] Here and below, I take myself to be justified in treating the intellectual conscience and the virtue of honesty to be interchangeable for our purposes - section one will highlight their interchangeability.

three where three strands of Nietzsche's dissatisfaction with our epistemological perspective (three strands of falsification) are distinguished – these being ultimately attributable to the influence of the will. Following this, I will consider how, firstly, perspectivism and then artistry enable us to develop our intellectual conscience and move beyond falsification – in sections four and five respectively.

Section One | Honesty and the Intellectual Conscience

In chapter one we saw how Clark assigns a pivotal role to GM III 12 as it signifies Nietzsche's abandonment of the falsification thesis and the culmination of the theorizing on truth that Clark takes Nietzsche to have been engaged in since at least 1873. Indeed, the importance of the passage for Clark is evidenced by the fact that she takes perspectivism to be Nietzsche's 'most obvious contribution to the current intellectual scene' (Clark, p127) and considers GM III 12 to be the only passage in Nietzsche's mature work which is expressive of the "doctrine" of perspectivism (*ibid.*, p128). I want to suggest that the emphasis Clark places on GM III 12 and on Nietzsche's theoretical interest in issues relating to truth are misplaced.

In questioning the emphasis Clark places on GM III 12 and Nietzsche's theoretical interest in truth, my account fits well with a recent trend among Anglo-American commentators to play down the significance of Nietzsche's views on truth and perspectivism, both within his philosophy and as a substantive philosophical doctrine which can be brought into contact with contemporary debates. This trend was in many ways foreshadowed by Gemes (1992), who argues powerfully that Nietzsche is not offering any theory of truth in GM III 12 or anywhere else in his philosophy. Further, many commentators point out that the focus of GM III 12 itself is, as one commentator puts it, 'not

truth per se' but 'the nature of knowing' (Leiter 2002: p270). Indeed, the excellent account of Berry (2011: ch.4) limits the scope of perspectivism to epistemology, but goes further and points out that it consists merely of a series of epistemologically themed remarks; rather than a theory of knowledge (Berry 2011: ch. 4; see also Janaway 2007: p211 & Ridley 2000 for accounts which play down the significance of GM III 12 as a substantive thesis).

Berry explains her dissatisfaction with many accounts of perspectivism as being due to the fact that they 'share one common interpretative feature': 'all of them ascribe to Nietzsche ambitious and complex metaphysical doctrines on which his perspectivism is founded or of which it is a consequence or expression' (Berry, p110). Clark's claim that GM III 12 is the culmination of a struggle on Nietzsche's part with the idea of truth as metaphysical correspondence is an example of the type of interpretation Berry describes. I take Berry's stance here, and the generally deflationary notes sounded by these commentators, to be well founded.

I take it to be a strength of my account that it places Nietzsche's remarks on perspectivism and falsification in the context of his remarks on honesty and the intellectual conscience – rather than in the context of a strong theoretical interest in truth which he might not have had. When I give my account of the GM III 12, I will also endeavour to satisfy a worry raised by Gemes (2013: p567) which applies to interpretations like Clark's that isolate GM III 12 from its context. Gemes stresses the need to understand GM III 12 within the context of the third essay of *The Genealogy* and the discussion of the psychology of the ascetic priest; the priest whose 'incarnate will to contradiction and anti-nature' is described as coming to philosophize in the development of the notion of knowledge as "disinterested contemplation".

What is crucial presently, is to get a handle on Nietzsche's understanding of the nature and importance of honesty, whilst also explaining its centrality in

his philosophy. In 1.1 I discuss the relation of honesty to the theme of the 'affirmation of life' in order to bring out its significance in Nietzsche's project. Following this, 1.2 considers Nietzsche's conception of the intellectual conscience in section two of *The Gay Science* and uses a case study of the intellectual conscience of the ascetic scientist mentioned in essay three of *The Genealogy* in order to make that conception concrete and intelligible. This link to essay three of *The Genealogy* brings Nietzsche's discussion of the ascetic priest into focus and affords a context-specific vantage point from which to consider the significance of GM III 12. The antithesis of Nietzsche's model of an honest and affirmative 'strong spirit' is then considered, in 1.3, through a discussion of his account of individuals who are enclosed within a single perspective. This discussion will provide us with a picture of the intellectually unconscientious individual and, in doing so, will further fill in the background against which Nietzsche's remarks in GM III 12 should be understood. It will also have a strong bearing on the picture of falsification and its relation to the will which I will give in sections two and three.

1.1 Honesty and Affirmation

In the introduction to this thesis, I cited Young's assessment of the failure of Nietzsche's attempt to respond affirmatively and honestly to life in the face of Schopenhauer's pessimism. The central Nietzschean theme of affirmation is a natural context within which to consider the importance of the virtue of honesty to Nietzsche. Though honesty is described by Nietzsche as 'our virtue, from which we cannot get free' (BGE 227), the seeming incompatibility of this virtue with the terrible character of the truth – which is fit to cause to 'perish' (WP 822) – and the need to affirm life, raise questions about his ultimate commitment to it. The extent to which Nietzsche can accommodate both the

virtue of honesty and the affirmation of life is a rich subject and one which I won't go into here.[12] What is important for our purposes is what can be understood about the virtue of honesty from its discussion in the context of affirmation. In this context, BGE 39 is often referred to by commentators. Nietzsche's description of what constitutes the 'strength of a spirit' in this passage offers a pithy expression of what honesty amounts to for him. The 'strength of a spirit' he tells us 'could be measured by how much "truth" it could take, more clearly, to what extent it *needed* it attenuated, veiled, sweetened, blunted, and falsified' (BGE 39). Understanding honesty as a kind of strength which frees one from the need to attenuate, veil, sweeten, blunt or falsify the truth will be helpful as our discussion proceeds. It will also be necessary to clarify the *kind* of truth which Nietzsche thinks we might be drawn to attenuate, veil, sweeten, blunt or falsify.

It must be the case that it is a particularly difficult and significant subset of truths that Nietzsche applauds strong spirits for honestly confronting – rather than propositions with a positive truth-value *per se*.[13] In order to get a grasp on what this subset of truths is, it is surely right to have in mind Nietzsche's goal of vanquishing the 'shadows of God' and attaining a 'de-deified' picture of the world (GS 109). Indeed, BGE 230 explicitly links 'wild honesty' [ausscheweifende Redlichkeit] to the project of translating 'man back into nature'. This link is picked up by Aaron Harper, who associates Nietzsche's virtue of honesty with the process 'through which individuals recognise themselves as part of the natural order' (2015: p380).

Here I wish to remain untangled in controversies over exactly what Nietzsche's naturalism amounts to, but that the virtue of honesty is closely related to it seems uncontroversial. When I, following Harper, conceive of

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[12] On this issue – and the relation between honesty, affirmation and art – see Came (2013), Janaway (2014), Reginster (2006: p248-249) and Ridley (2007). See also Ridley (2010) for a related discussion of the relation between art and truth in Nietzsche's philosophy more generally.
[13] This point is made by Ridley (see Ridley 2010: p430, n.11)

honesty in terms of the process 'through which individuals recognise themselves as part of the natural order', it is simply the 'broad sense' of naturalism, as described by Christopher Janaway, that I have in mind.

> He opposes transcendent metaphysics, whether that of Plato or Christianity or Schopenhauer. He rejects notions of the immaterial soul, the absolutely free controlling will, or the self-transparent pure intellect, instead emphasizing the body, talking of the animal nature of human beings, and attempting to explain numerous phenomena by invoking drives, instincts, and affects which he locates in our physical, bodily existence. Human beings are to be "translated back into nature," since otherwise we falsify their history, their psychology, and the nature of their values—concerning all of which we must know truths, as a means to the all important revaluation of values
>
> (Janaway 2007: p34).

This 'broad sense' of naturalism – which '[m]ost commentators on Nietzsche would agree' that he adopts in his later philosophy (*ibid.*) – also encompasses a rejection of the '*metaphysical*' valuation of truth we have inherited from Plato and Christianity (GM III 24; GS 344).

Given that a link between honesty and the project of translating man 'back into nature' undoubtedly holds, we can see that Young must be correct in characterising the "Dionysian" mode of affirmation, which he identifies in both the early and late philosophy, as dishonest. In aligning ourselves with the 'will to life rejoicing in its own inexhaustibility' (TI *What I Owe to the Ancients* 5) we clearly fail to honesty face up to our place in the nature order.

Two other features of the nature of honesty in BGE 39 are worth considering. Firstly, in presenting the truth which is to be faced up to as

something which can be 'attenuated, veiled, sweetened, blunted, and falsified' (BGE 39), Nietzsche discloses something about its content. Later in this chapter, we will consider the ascetic scientists who, though described (positively) as 'pale atheists, anti-Christians, immoralists', are still mocked by Nietzsche because of their preoccupation with '*petits faits*' (GM III 24). Such mundane 'petits' facts would not, one assumes, admit of veiling, sweetening, blunting and the like. They are, rather, small and relatively insignificant facts which can be fully comprehended and either accepted as true or rejected as false with relative ease. The "smallness" of such truths suggests something about their significance. The set of truths Nietzsche is interested in, conversely, are such that there is an inherent difficulty involved in facing them without culpably obscuring their content. As we will now move on to discuss when analysing Nietzsche's description of the 'intellectual conscience' in *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche also conceives of this subset of truth as taking work and care to properly confront and incorporate into one's worldview and the expression of one's agency. These reasons provide further motivation for following Harper and agreeing that the virtue of honesty, which is needed in order to have the strength to face these truths, is best thought of as a type of 'confrontation' with them – i.e. not something as simple as an acceptance or denial of a proposition (Harper, p377-380).

This point links with the final feature of honesty that I want to highlight here, that standing in an honest relationship to reality is by no means envisaged to be the default position for individuals; especially those living in the "shadows" of God with ascetic aspects such as the unconditional valuation of truth still present in their worldview. Indeed, Nietzsche goes so far as to claim that the project of de-deifying nature is met with resistance even in the grammar of our language: 'I am afraid that we have not got rid of God because we still have faith in grammar' (TI *Reason* 5). In this vein, he describes the process of translating 'man back into nature' as a process of working against 'fanciful

interpretations and secondary meanings which have been hitherto scribbled and daubed over that eternal basic text *homo natura'* (BGE 230). As we move on to discuss falsification and the intellectual conscience, I will suggest that we should understand our situation with regard to falsification being similar in that Nietzsche believes that the "default" relation we find ourselves in, with regard to the truths he is concerned with, is one polluted by falsity.

I will now move on to consider Nietzsche's canonical expression of the notion of intellectual conscience in *The Gay Science* and to the case study of the shortcomings of the ascetic scientist's intellectual conscience in the third essay of *The Genealogy*. My discussion here will develop and reinforce the initial sketch of Nietzschean honesty given above. In doing this it will further articulate the context within which Nietzsche's remarks on falsification, perspectivism and artistry should be understood.

1.2 The Intellectual Conscience and the Ascetic Scientist

In the aphorism at the beginning of *The Gay Science* entitled 'Intellectual Conscience' Nietzsche sets out the character of the intellectual conscience in a way consonant with our above discussion of honesty. The intellectual conscience is something which the 'great majority' lacks rather than a default or easily achievable virtue: '*to the great majority* it is not contemptible to believe this or that and to live accordingly *without* first becoming aware of the final and most certain reasons pro and con' (GS 2). The most obvious point to take from this aphorism is that the great majority passively accepts various beliefs without troubling themselves about the reasons for or against their adoption. However, it is not merely proper consideration of the reasons for believing certain propositions which Nietzsche is pushing here. In the quotation above he also emphasises that the great majority live according to these unreasoned beliefs.

Thus poverty of intellectual conscience is lamented by Nietzsche not merely because it leads one to hold false or unjustified beliefs, but also for its effect on how one enacts one's agency.

The scope of the intellectual conscience, and of the passivity and unconscientiousness of the great majority, similarly extends to engagement in valuing. Nietzsche laments, for example, that the great majority are impervious to criticism concerning their valuations: 'nobody as much as blushes when you notice that their weights are underweight', they instead go on 'handling their scales, calling this good and that evil' regardless (GS 2). Analysing the case study of the ascetic scientist's intellectual conscience will help us to make concrete these elements of the intellectual conscience; relating as they do, not just to whether we reflect on the reasons for and against the beliefs we consciously affirm (or merely passively accept), but also to how one translates these beliefs into action and how one values.

Nietzsche introduces the 'pale atheists, anti-Christians, immoralists' – which I shall refer to throughout as ascetic scientists – in GM III 24[14] and characterises their fanatical pursuit of truth (as mentioned above) as a pursuit of small facts: a '*wanting* to halt before the factual, the *factum brutum*; that fatalism of "*petits faits*" […] that renunciation of all interpretation'. This fanatical pursuit of truth is what leads the ascetic scientists to conceive of themselves as being opposed to the ascetic ideal. Nietzsche, however, is clear that they are mistaken on this point:

> [T]hey believe themselves to be as detached as possible
> from the ascetic ideal, these "free, *very* free spirits": and
> yet, to divulge to them what they themselves cannot see

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[14] I highlight the shortcomings which Nietzsche identifies in the ascetic scientists. That Nietzsche describes the ascetic scientists as those 'in whom alone the intellectual conscience today dwells' (GM III 24) should not confuse us here. Though they display a basic form of the intellectual conscience in their pursuit of facts, Nietzsche still sees them as deficient compared with a future embodiment of the intellectual conscience which breaks free from the ascetic ideal and is able to question the value of truth itself. That is to say, to call 'the value of truth… for once' experimentally 'into question' (GM III 24).

[…] this ideal is precisely *their* ideal as well […] they themselves are its most spiritualized outgrowth

(GM III 24).

The significance of the ascetic scientist unwittingly labouring under the ascetic ideal is that his will to truth stands on the same foundation as that of the priest, a foundation which should not be accepted by 'pale atheists, anti-Christians, immoralists'.

What *compels* one to this, however, this unconditional will to truth, is the *belief in the ascetic ideal itself*, even if as its unconscious imperative – do not deceive yourself about this, - it is the belief in a *metaphysical* value, a value *in itself of truth* as it is established and guaranteed by that ideal alone (it stands or falls with that ideal)

(GM III 24; Cf. GS 344).

The failure of intellectual conscience here consists in the ascetic scientist's (unconscious) belief in the metaphysical value, or value in itself, of truth. The failure is thus most obviously a failure of the intellectual conscience as the ascetic scientist believes something without due consideration or justification, i.e. that truth is of supreme value – it is valuable in itself, metaphysically valuable, unconditionally worth pursuing. Such a belief, it is implied, is not available to one who honestly confronts the world in its de-deified form with such shadows of God as 'metaphysical value' or 'value in itself' expunged from it. To fail to remove such shadows is to culpably fall into veiling, attenuating, sweetening, blunting or falsifying certain aspects of the truth which the strong spirit is able to more fully confront. That is to say, here we see how the will to truth – as manifested in the ascetic scientist – and honesty come apart.

However, in addition to the ascetic scientist failing to be intellectually conscientious by lacking justification for his beliefs, this passage also links with the other two features of the intellectual conscience mentioned above. It is clear that the belief in question concerns value and thus that it effects what, and how, the ascetic scientist values. Whilst also, as will be discussed below, having a significant influence on how the ascetic scientist enacts his agency – by causing him to dedicate his life to a pursuit of 'petits' facts.

There are two things it is important to add here. The first is that the failure of the ascetic scientist's intellectual conscience is something which occurs below the level of consciousness – the ascetic ideal backs up the metaphysical value of truth 'even if as its *unconscious* imperative' (GM III 24 – my emphasis). That such a central, and pernicious, element of the ascetic scientist's understanding of the world is present below the level of consciousness hints at the depth at which false beliefs and conceptions are embedded. As with our discussion of honesty earlier, cleanliness of intellectual conscience is not presented as something given or default, but as something one has to work for against dominant influences and unconsciously adopted or inherited beliefs which incline toward dishonesty, falsity and ignorance.

The second point to add is that the conception of truth and the nature of knowing which the ascetic scientist works with was inherited from the ascetic priest. This leads the ascetic scientist to conceive of truth in a way that Nietzsche attacks in GM III 12. A link between the ascetic priest and the ascetic scientist is present because of the ascetic scientist's enclosure within the ascetic ideal. It was, after all, the priest who instantiated the ascetic ideal; the priest whose '*right* to existence stands and falls with that ideal' (GM III 11). This ideal also 'established', and now 'guarantee[s]', the metaphysical valuation of truth which the ascetic scientist clings to: 'it [the metaphysical value] stands or falls

with that ideal' (GM III 24) [15]. However, in addition to this connection concerning the valuation of truth, the ascetic priest, whose 'incarnate will to contradiction and anti-nature' is described as 'philosophizing' in the conception of knowledge as "disinterested contemplation" and "objectivity" which Nietzsche attacks in GM III 12, also exerts influence over the ascetic scientist's conception of truth and knowledge.

The conception of truth and knowledge which the ascetic scientist inherits from the ascetic priest can perhaps most effectively be brought out through considering Nietzsche's opposing conception. Nietzsche defines his understanding of the nature of knowing in GM III 12 when he highlights the central role played by the affects, the will and interpretation. We are implored by Nietzsche to 'make precisely the *difference* in perspectives and affective interpretations useful for knowledge' and told that

> *the more* affects we allow to speak about a matter, *the more*
> eyes, different eyes, we know how to bring to bear on one
> and the same matter, that much more complete will our
> "concept" of this matter, our "objectivity" be. But to
> eliminate the will altogether, to disconnect the affects one
> and all, supposing that we were capable of this: what?
> Would that not be to castrate the intellect? …
>
> (GM III 12).

The priest in contrast affirms a notion of objectivity – understood as "disinterested contemplation" – which shuns the involvement of the will along with all interpretation. The implication of Nietzsche's words in the above quotation is that shunning the involvement of the will and renouncing

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[15] The exact similarity of language in the phrase - 'stands or falls with that ideal' – used to describe both the priest's relation to the ascetic ideal and the ideal's justification of the metaphysical valuation of truth, is evident also in the original German. Suggesting that Nietzsche is trying to direct our attention to the connection I'm making salient here.

interpretation in favour of "disinterested contemplation", amount to the same thing as it is the will, with particular stress on our 'affects', which interpret the world.

The thought that investigation would be improved by renouncing interpretation and prohibiting the will from being engaged in inquiry is, firstly, met with scepticism by Nietzsche: 'to eliminate the will altogether […] supposing that we were capable of this'. It is also, secondly, rubbished as it is precisely the interpretations formed by our affects which constitute inquiry: '[w]ould that not be to castrate the intellect?'. In GM III 24 we see the ascetic scientists associated with precisely the conception of knowledge under attack here when Nietzsche discusses their 'commendable philosophers' abstinence […] that *wanting* to halt before the factual, the *factum brutum*; that fatalism of "*petits faits*" […] that renunciation of all interpretation'. The ascetic scientist's renunciation of interpretation 'expresses asceticism of virtue as forcefully as does any negation of sensuality' (GM III 24). In withdrawing their will from inquiry and not attempting to engage in interpretation, they instead rest content with collecting the 'petits' facts which, as we saw in our discussion of honesty and the intellectual conscience, Nietzsche sets little stock in *per se*.

In summary, this case study of the ascetic scientist has made concrete certain elements of the virtue of honesty and the intellectual conscience which we explored Nietzsche's commitment to above. When discussing the virtue of honesty we noted that Nietzsche takes the kind of honesty exemplified by his strong spirit to require that truths related to his naturalism and the project of de-deifying nature are properly confronted. The ascetic scientist, however, acquiesces in a valuation of truth which is not consistent with this project. Further, the ascetic scientist sacrifices his agency to the pursuit of truth on the basis of the metaphysical value he implicitly believes it to have. In doing so, the ascetic scientists – though 'pale atheists, anti-Christians, immoralists' and thus assenting to beliefs which Nietzsche himself affirms – are guilty of attenuating,

veiling, sweetening, blunting and/or falsifying important truths. A belief in God's death, and a clear-sighted view of the de-deified world we inhabit, is not consistent with a belief in metaphysical value nor with one dedicating one's agency to an unconditional pursuit of truth – particularly when such a pursuit is conceived of as requiring the extirpation of one's affects through the renunciation of interpretation.

Nietzsche's criticism of the ascetic scientists with whom he shares a keen atheism does not merely pertain to their beliefs or the reasons for these. It is importantly directed toward the ways in which these beliefs are integrated with their values and activity. In continuing to accept the metaphysical value of truth, the ascetic scientist demonstrates that he still values things in a way inconsistent with a belief in the death of God. Similarly, sacrificing one's life in this world to an ascetic pursuit of truth does not make sense from the point of view of a de-deified picture of existence – a picture of existence from which divine commandments are absent, as is the possibility of one being rewarded for their conduct in this life in another realm or an afterlife.

Another natural way of explaining the ascetic scientist's failure of intellectual conscience here is to say that, though they have assented to certain truths, those which result in their identifying as 'pale atheists, anti-Christians, immoralists', these beliefs have been dealt with as isolated facts and have not been correctly interpreted and incorporated into their worldview. This means that the significance of these truths still remains largely hidden from them.

The understanding of honesty and the intellectual conscience developed here will be employed and developed in the remaining sections in this chapter and throughout this thesis. The fact that the ascetic scientist inherits from the priest not merely an ascetic valuation of truth, but also a conception of knowledge and objectivity which shuns interpretation and the involvement of the will, will become significant when we discuss different strands of

falsification in section three and also when we move on to discuss the role of the will in cognition shortly. Suffice it to say, that Nietzsche also considers the priestly conception of knowledge itself to be an error and to be further evidence of the impoverishment of the ascetic scientist's outlook.

1.3 The Antithesis of Strong Spirits

In the preceding discussion the ascetic scientist was presented as labouring under the ascetic ideal instantiated by the priest. This ideal is described by Nietzsche as a 'closed system of will, goal, and interpretation':

> It relentlessly interprets ages, peoples, human beings according to this one goal, it refuses to tolerate any other interpretation, any other goal, it rejects, negates, affirms, confirms solely in accordance with *its* interpretation
>
> (GM III 23).

Though the ascetic scientist has managed to throw out various elements of dogma associated with the ascetic ideal in its Christian manifestation, Nietzsche's claim is that he still acquiesces in what is fundamentally its interpretation, and helps pursue its goal. In acquiescing in the interpretation of the ascetic ideal, as we have seen, the ascetic scientist is, in various ways, guilty of failing to honestly confront the truths with which Nietzsche is primarily concerned. Nietzsche also considers the ascetic scientist's failure to be a strong spirit to be born from his need to shield himself from elements of the truth. The scholar of GM III 23, like the ascetic scientist who preoccupies himself with the collection of petits faits, displays 'mindless diligence' and determination in the name of the ascetic ideal, and in doing this conceals much from himself: 'how often all this has its true sense in preventing something from

becoming visible to oneself!' (GM III 23). These elements of the third essay of *The Genealogy*, and much of our discussion in this chapter heretofore, link with important passages from *The AntiChrist* and *The Gay Science* which will be discussed in relation to Nietzsche's perspectivism in section five. They also complement our account of honesty by bringing out its opposite in demonstrating what it is to be the 'antithesis of strong spirits' (A 54; cf. BGE 39) [16].

Both GS 347 and A 54 speak of the weakness which leads individuals to have unflinching faith in the correctness of a single perspective on, or interpretation of, life and existence. When a weakness in the form of a '*need to believe*' (GS 347) is present, Nietzsche explains that individuals are prone to subordinate themselves to some authority, adopt its perspective completely and in doing this blind themselves to other ways of understanding life and existence. A list of such authorities includes: 'a god, prince, the social order, doctor, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience' (GS 347). When under such a perspective, the individual experiences 'a type of hypnosis of the entire sensual-intellectual system to the benefit of an excessive nourishment (hypertrophy) of a single point of view and feeling which is now dominant' (GS 347). This kind of 'strict and necessary optic' leads one '*[n]ot* to see many things, *not* to be free on a single point, to be partisan through and through' (A 54).

It seems reasonable to suggest that the ascetic scientist is caught in something at least very much like this position under the ascetic ideal. In spite of moving beyond the dogma of the ascetic ideal's manifestation in Christianity, the ascetic scientist still accepts that truth is valuable in itself and also accepts the priest's conception of truth - and how it should be pursued - to the extent that he is prepared to extirpate his affects in its pursuit. The ascetic scientist also experiences the epistemic deficiencies which Nietzsche associates with

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[16] In the German: 'den Gegensatz-Typus des starken […] Geistes'.

subservience to a single perspective as he fails to properly integrate his beliefs and to properly understand the implications of those beliefs for his values and actions.

In this section, I have been attempting to bring out the character of Nietzsche's notions of honesty and the intellectual conscience, partly through a character study of the ascetic scientist. That Nietzsche calls those who are caught under a dominant perspective and locked into a single point of view – as the ascetic scientist is – the 'antithesis of strong spirits' (A 54) nicely rounds off our discussion. In this light we can think of honesty and the intellectual conscience as having the features we have discussed heretofore, but also note that the honesty of the strong spirit partly consists in his being, unlike his antithesis, strong enough not to sacrifice himself to a single perspective by expressing certainty and faith in it. He is instead able to move between different perspectives or 'affective interpretations' and in this way leave himself open to 'see many things' and confront many truths which would otherwise be hidden or obscured if he were to remain loyal to a single perspective. In this connection, we can also see a link which exists between the strength indicative of honesty and Nietzsche's perspectivism.

Section Two | The Role of the Will in Cognition

As mentioned at the end of the previous section, Nietzsche talks about 'believers and their need to believe' and how this need is related to their being enclosed within a single perspective. That Nietzsche mentions "needs" as heavily influential in the context of cognition is typical; similar needs and instincts are discussed in this context throughout his corpus. In TL 81, for example, he talks about the 'need to make peace' and 'exist socially with the herd' in a similar context. Further, in GS 355 he discusses an 'instinct of fear'

which is related to our concept of knowledge; GS 110-112 links the development of our cognitive faculties to our survival instincts; and in TI *The Four Great Errors[17]* 5, he asserts that 'the causal instinct is conditioned and excited by feelings of fear'. These passages, and others like them, will be discussed in what follows. However, what is clear even from this brief survey is that Nietzsche is adamant that these factors have had a huge influence on how we divide the world up and attempt to comprehend it.

In addition to discussing needs and instincts, Nietzsche uses many distinct terms to isolate particular kinds of influence the will has over our cognition: affect, drive, need, instinct, values, etc[18]. Nietzsche directly ties interpretations and perspectives with the affects and drives, most notably in GM III 12 and WP 481. The picture he paints is of drives and their associated 'one-sided views' fighting against each other below the level of consciousness (GS 333, cf. WP 481). Whilst it isn't necessary for our purposes to consider the definitions of, and relations between, these pieces of terminology in depth, the tie between affects and drives, and interpretations and perspectives is significant and will be discussed in 2.1 below, as well as in chapter three.

Another distinction which it is useful to make in order to paint a workable picture of the relation of drives and affects to perspectives is that between dominant and weak drives. Nietzsche talks of an 'order of rank' between the drives in an organism, all of which individually crave to be '*master* of all other drives' (BGE 6). This is what leads commentators to distinguish between drives which are well established and enjoy dominance over the organism and drives or affects which are weaker and don't enjoy such an influence[19]. The most natural way to understand the thought that the drives are

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[17] Henceforth, 'TI *Errors*'.

[18] See Janaway (2007: p205-216) for a good discussion of the differing technical terms used by Nietzsche and interpreters reporting on GM III 12.

[19] Constancio (2011: p17) talks of less significant drives forming 'elementary perspectives' on the world, but envisages dominant drives in some sense aggregating these. Whilst Harper (2015: p374-375) talks of values being 'unchanging concerns' or 'commitments or ends for which a person will act' and notes that Nietzsche's

engaged in a battle between each other is to conceive of each drive having its own perspective and attempting to 'compel all the other drives to accept [it] as a norm' (WP 481, cf. GS 333). The likely outcome here is that a dominant drive will achieve or sustain a position of dominance and that part of its doing this is bound up with it aggregating, or simply extirpating, the perspectives of the weaker drives over which it is dominant (cf. GS 333).

The specifics of this picture need not be rendered in any more detail for our purposes. What does seem clear here, however, is that it is a shortcoming of Clark's account that, though Nietzsche repeatedly associates the development and normal functioning of human cognition with the will, she fails to make any sustained attempt to explore a link between the will and falsification. She explains Nietzsche's insistence that one should make 'affective interpretations' useful for knowledge and have 'one's pro and contra in one's power' (GM III 12), simply as his noting that '[o]ur interests will determine where we look, and therefore what we see'; thus, we should 'expect people with different interests to discover different truths (as well as many common ones)' (Clark, p135). I take it that Clark's reference to the influence of our "interests" is prima facie unsatisfactory and fails to capture the connotations of rawness and unconsciousness Nietzsche intends through his use of the terms instinct, need, value, affect and drive. In 2.1 I will consider the relation between drives and perspectives. Following this, 2.2 will explore the tyranny which dominant drives exercise over our cognitive outlook.

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talk of values as standpoints or lenses demonstrates that 'values construct the individual's perspective of the world, they are orientations'. And Janaway (2007: p214) sees well-established drives as 'relatively stable' tendencies to action, and distinguishes these from affects which are merely 'what it feels like when a drive is active inside one'.

2.1 The Relation between the Will and Perspectives

In GM III 12 we are told that 'to eliminate the will altogether' would be 'to castrate the intellect'. This statement might, by itself, be seen to be something Clark can accommodate. The thought here would be that Clark can acknowledge the fact that the intellect is directed by our interests as it is these interests which motivate us to take any line of inquiry at all, or to select this particular line of inquiry, or this perspective, rather than another. On this line of thought, Nietzsche's talk of 'the capacity to have one's pro and contra *in one's power*, and to shift them in and out: so that one knows how to make precisely the *difference* in perspectives and affective interpretations useful for knowledge' would seem to reduce to a call for us to undertake multiple lines of inquiry. What is lacking in such an account however is a serious acknowledgment that the will is not merely active in directing inquiry, but is also active in the construction and development of the perspectives through which we understand the world.

That Nietzsche affords primacy to the operation of drives, affects and instincts below the level of consciousness is fairly uncontroversial. [20] As will be explored in chapter three, it is not the case that drives merely set a direction for inquiry, instead these perspectives are an expression of the drive as well as a means through which it fights for dominance over other drives: '[e]very drive is a kind of lust to rule; each one has its perspective that it would like to compel all the other drives to accept as a norm' (WP 481). What is at stake in such a battle is not merely control of the organism, but also, as the perspectives are ways of interpretting the world, the organisms orientation in, and stance toward, the external world. Thus Nietzsche tells us that '[i]t is our needs that interpret the world; our drives and their For and Against' (WP 481). The pro and con, or

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[20] I take this point to be evident from a survey of any of Nietzsche's works, but see e.g. BGE 3, GS 333, EH, Why I am so Clever, 9, for specific aphorisms.

for and against, of the drive doesn't merely set the direction for inquiry but is active in its interpretative activity.

At this point a major entry point for falsification can be seen to open up. As the drive is intimately related in the process of interpreting reality, it is likely that a tendency toward partiality in how things are represented will be evident. Constancio (2011) captures this point by describing how drives 'build interpretations in accordance with goals they affectively pursue' (Constancio, p17). Before moving on to consider the link with falsification directly, I will discuss a couple of concrete ways that the dominance of drives can have a falsifying influence.

2.2 The Tyranny of Dominant Drives

Our discussion of the ascetic scientist provides us with a prime example of the dominance a drive can exert over an individual's understanding of the world. The ascetic scientist is unwittingly caught under the influence of precisely the perspective which he takes himself, as an 'anti-Christian', to oppose. In GM III 11 Nietzsche describes how the priest 'treats life as a wrong path' and devalues "nature" and this "world" through a comparison with 'an entirely different kind of existence'. The outcome of this comparison is that this existence is merely 'held to be a bridge for that other existence' and the priest is described as '*hostile to life*' (GM III 11). That the ascetic scientist inherits his unconditional valuation of truth and will to renounce interpretation in pursuit of truth from the ascetic priest is unsurprising given that the priest has a drive to negate life animate within him and the essence of interpretation is seen by Nietzsche as being similar to the essence of life. Thus the priestly conception of knowledge and the goal of renunciation of interpretation described in GM III 12, and shown to be adopted by the ascetic scientists in GM III 24, is a natural expression of

the priest's hostility to life. Nietzsche describes 'the essence of life' in GM II 12 as a mixture of 'spontaneous, attacking, infringing, reinterpreting, reordering, and formative forces' and his characterisation of interpretation has a similar ring: 'doing violence, pressing into orderly form, abridging, omitting, padding, fabricating, falsifying and whatever else belongs to the *essence* of all interpreting' (GM III 24).

What this shows is that the drive to negate life, which the priest embodies, is capable of constructing a perspective which dominates the ascetic scientist's understanding of the world even after the specifically theistic trappings of the priest's perspective have been jettisoned. Constancio's description of drives as building perspectives on the world 'in accordance with the goals they affectively pursue' (Constancio, p17) helps us to understand the extent of the influence of the priestly drive in pushing the ascetic scientist to pursue the extirpation of their affects. As the world is interpreted as being made up of *petits faits* which are available to those who abstract away from their affects and refrain from interpretation, and as the collection of these *petits faits* is seen as ultimately valuable, the perspective here is set up in such a way as to encourage the pursuit of its goal. That is to say, as the ascetic scientist understands life in terms of pursuing truth – that is pursuing *petits faits* – and understands the extirpation of the affects as necessary for this, the ascetic scientist is seduced into working towards the goal of the priest – to devalue and negate worldly existence by extirpating their affects. This gives an idea of the tyranny which dominant drives are capable of.

The example of the priest is only one example of a drive which attains dominance however. As we have seen, Nietzsche also refers to needs and instincts relating to survival, the herd and the need to establish control over the environment as exerting significant influence on our understanding of the world. Indeed, just as part of the dominance of the priest's perspective consists in its successfully exporting a conception of knowledge to the ascetic scientist,

in GS 355 Nietzsche discusses how the '*instinct of fear* that bids us to know' is '[t]he origin of our concept of 'knowledge''. The connection between this instinct and knowledge is established because Nietzsche believes it to be the case that, for 'philosophers' and the 'common people' alike, knowledge means merely that 'something unfamiliar is to be traced back to something *familiar*' (GS 355). This affords us a 'regained sense of security' because in seeking the familiar we 'uncover among everything strange, unusual, and doubtful something which no longer unsettles us' (GS 355); thus it is often the case that 'the first idea that can familiarize the unfamiliar feels good enough to be considered true' (TI *Errors* 5; cf. WP 531, WP 608).

This dynamic which leads us to represent what is new or unfamiliar in the environment as something old, familiar and already known is very important to Nietzsche's remarks on human knowledge and falsification. Indeed, in WP 608 he describes how science 'desires […] and proceeds from the instinct to trace the unfamiliar back to the familiar'. One might summarise this tendency as the tendency to apply a pre-existing schema to the world; something which Nietzsche feels our cognitive dealings with the world routinely participate in.

In BGE 230, referring to conceptualisation, Nietzsche talks about a will of the spirit which seeks the 'arrangement of new things within old divisions'. The predisposition for our eyes '[g]iven some stimulus' to 'reproduce an image that they have often produced before' rather than 'register[ing] what is different and new about an impression' is discussed in BGE 192,[21] informing us that the creation of the perceptual image proceeds along similar lines to conceptualisation, science and, in fact, even the 'most secret processes of all "knowledge and cognition"' which BGE 192 also mentions.

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[21] See, for example, TL 87 for Nietzsche on the recalling of previously generated images in perception. Also, WLN 38[10] and P 148 for Nietzsche's understanding of perception as appropriation.

These sections will be discussed in greater detail throughout the course of this thesis, however, Nietzsche takes the attempt of the 'instinct of fear', or other related drives, to exert control over the environment, to be fundamental to all our cognitive dealings; and to largely determine our orientation in the world. Nietzsche thus considers most of our cognitive dealings with the world to take the form of the application of a pre-existing schema to reality. The intimate relation which has been highlighted in this section between the will and cognition will help us to now identify three main strands of falsification.

Section Three | Three Strands of Falsification

Clark's neglect of the role of the will in cognition and her focus on Nietzsche's purported theoretical interest in the conceivability of the 'true world' leads to her account of falsification possessing the virtue of simplicity. Falsification is, for her, always bound up with the necessary failure of our beliefs to correspond to a 'true world'. In my rival interpretation, I highlight errors in our cognitive perspective which are ultimately due to the overbearing influence of the will.

The interpretation I develop here is opposed to Clark in two other senses. Firstly, I understand Nietzsche's interest in highlighting the ways in which human cognition is pervaded by falsity to be practical. That is to say, that I believe his aim is to enable us to work against and move beyond falsification in the name of the intellectual conscience. Perspectivism and many of his remarks on artistry are geared toward helping us to make this escape. Secondly, I do not understand Nietzsche (early or late) to conceive of human cognition as necessarily falsifying. Though I still believe human cognition to characteristically be heavily burdened by error and falsity, I do not take this falsity to be all-pervasive or ineradicable. As I thus take falsification to have contingent and defeatable foundations, one might think that the term

'falsification' is inappropriate here. I continue to use this term because Nietzsche is still in the business of uncovering what he takes to be a falsifying cognitive orientation which is prevalent in philosophers and lay-people alike. It is the case however, as will be noted, that one of the strands of falsification identified below might, in certain of its manifestations, be thought of as a lack of sensitivity toward certain aspects of reality, and not necessarily as involving full-blown falsification. In his excellent article, Nehamas (2015) – who argues against Clark's claim that Nietzsche holds an all-pervasive falsification thesis – chooses to use the term 'falsehood' instead of falsification. As will be seen in chapter five, my position on the later philosophy is very close to that of Nehamas – though our terminology differs in this very minor way.

3.1 The Dominance of the Herd Schema

Nietzsche emphasises not only that human cognition proceeds through the application of a schema to reality, but also that the schema which we commonly work with is that which has grown up in the herd. The most direct and interesting passages which make this point are TL 84-87, BGE 268 and GS 354.

In BGE 268 Nietzsche notes that '[w]ords are sounds designating concepts' and that concepts are 'more or less definite images designating frequently recurring and associated sensations, groups of sensations'. In order to communicate with other members of the herd Nietzsche states that 'it is not sufficient to employ the same words; we have also to employ the same words to designate the same species of inner experiences, we must ultimately have our experience *in common*' (BGE 268). The first consequence to note from this is that in order to attain the goal of 'easy *communicability*' the individual begins to experience things in a way which robs them of their particularity as it is only what is 'average and *common*' that is communicable. However, Nietzsche also

makes the much stronger claim that using certain words to communicate what is common in our experiences also conditions us to experience things in a certain way. The implication of all of this is that we lose the ability to experience, let alone communicate, the particularity which Nietzsche implicitly posits as existing but which our herd schematizing obscures.[22]

Indeed, this is also precisely what is going on in GS 354 where Nietzsche links the 'development of language and the development of consciousness' and explains that we 'always bring to consciousness precisely that in ourselves which is 'non-individual' – that which is 'average''. This is because 'our thoughts themselves are continually as it were *outvoted* and translated back into the herd perspective'. In tying language to consciousness here, Nietzsche extends the claim that the herd perspective obscures as it generalises to all conscious thought. The need for communication with the herd, forces us to understand our experiences through a schema related to the goals of the herd, and this perspective fails to capture the particularity of our thoughts or experiences; it instead foregrounds what is common or general.

There are two main ways in which this strand of falsification impoverishes us cognitively. Firstly, our schematization of experience leads us to falsify a subject matter that we approach. We might, for example, in our eagerness to understand things as familiar – to understand things through our

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[22] One might well worry that - in GS 354 and BGE 268 - Nietzsche is committing himself to the kind of view which Wittgenstein's "private language argument" is intended to undermine: a point made by Alvarez and Ridley (2005: see especially p4-6). Though Nietzsche links the (co-)development of language and consciousness to our social existence – which might seem to be a move which is broadly consonant with the private language argument – his claims concerning falsification in these passages rely on an appeal to the particularity of our inner experiences, in order to substantiate the thought that the 'common' and 'generalised' way that our experiences are represented in language is epistemically impoverishing (see *ibid.*, p6). That our inner experiences are playing a crucial and potentially problematic role in Nietzsche's story here seems to be confirmed by his insistence that mutual understanding requires that we 'use the same words for the same category of inner experiences' (BGE 268; see also Alvarez and Ridley, p6-9) – which does seem to reveal a presupposition on his part that words somehow stand for the 'inner experiences' which, these passages suggest, are conceived of as being essentially private. As my primary concern in this discussion is to get clear about what Nietzsche is saying about concepts, I'm not primarily focused on issues to do with language and thus refrain from trying to defend him on this point. However, one thing to note is that it is not immediately clear what the link between language and concepts is for Nietzsche – which complicates matters further and might leave room for one to show how his discussion of concepts, at least, is immune to this charge.

generalised and limited schema – subsume objects (or events, etc.) under a concept incorrectly. In this case, it seems natural to understand what has gone on as an instance of falsification – the way we understand the object or event in question gets it wrong, falsifies it. In addition to this, the deficiency of our epistemological transactions here manifests itself in a lack of sensitivity to certain aspects of our experience. As the herd schema only picks out what is commonly experienced, and as we tend to focus on the familiar, we fail to properly accommodate rare and unfamiliar aspects of experience.

What is common to these ways of being cognitively impoverished is that they both – as is not always the case with the other two strands of falsification which I will move on to discuss – concern a first-order deficiency in our cognitive outlook. They are instances of a simple inaccuracy or inadequacy in how we represent the objects (or events, etc.) in our environment. That is to say, we get something wrong in a straightforward sense when we take a White Ash tree to be an Evergreen. Similarly, we straightforwardly fail to develop our sensitivity to the shape of one snowflake when we take it to be identical with another snowflake. The other two strands of falsification are, contrastingly, predominantly second-order, in that they primarily concern the erroneousness of our beliefs about the status of our knowledge and about how we understand human knowledge developing, respectively.

3.2 The Criterion of 'True Being'

In addition to falsification being prevalent because our cognition proceeds through the application of a schema (routinely, the schema of the herd), GS 355 hints at another strand of falsification by asserting a link between our schema and our concept of knowledge. We treat the application of our schema to the

world as if it delivers knowledge of a schema pre-embedded in the fabric of reality in a hard sense.

Nietzsche describes this process in TL 83 when he notes that our development of the concept "leaf" 'awakens the idea that, in addition to leaves, there exists in nature the "leaf": the original model according to which all the leaves were perhaps woven, sketched, measured, colored, curled, and painted'. Similarly, in 1887 Nietzsche discusses how we take a form which 'has merely been invented by us' and reify it into the world:

> What appears is always something new, and it is only we, who are always comparing, who include the new, to the extent that it is similar to the old, in the unity of the "form." As if a *type* should be attained and, as it were, was intended and inherent in the process of formation [...] One should not understand this compulsion to construct concepts, species, forms, purposes, laws ("a world of identical cases") as if they enabled us to fix the *real world* (WP 521).

I describe the tendency Nietzsche is attacking here as the reification of our schema into reality in a *hard* sense because he is not sceptical about the fact that our concept of species, for example, picks out some real and relevant similarity between different individuals. What he is attacking, rather, is the thought that, in addition to the similarities which are present between two individuals, our concept reveals that these two individuals are ultimately both manifestations of some metaphysically primary natural kind or "species essence" and thus that they are in fact identical. In discussing this passage Nehamas explains matters in a similar way and correctly notes that the only thing which Nietzsche is denying here is that two individuals are ever identical (Nehamas, p228 & p236).

Other passages make it clear that in addition to Nietzsche thinking that we reify our concepts of objects and species into reality – the content of our schema, as it were – we also reify the forms and structure associated with it. Briefly recounting his remarks on the '*Origin of Knowledge*' and '*The Origin of the Logical*' in GS 110 and 111 will demonstrate this, whilst also helping to explain the point about identity made in the previous paragraph.

Nietzsche notes in GS 110 that the inclination to quickly subsume things, and to take subsumption as an uncovering the identity of multiple things, was at one stage vital to our survival.

> [H]e who subsumes too slowly and was too cautious in subsumption – had a slighter probability of survival than he who in all cases of similarity immediately guessed that they were identical. The predominant disposition, however, to treat the similar as identical – an illogical disposition, for there is nothing identical as such – is what first supplied all the foundations for logic

(GS 110).[23]

The point in labelling the assumption of identity between individuals as the foundation for logic is to highlight the fact that logic – in Nietzsche's view – requires the notion that there are types or classes of things. Though there is nothing 'identical as such' Nietzsche thinks that our use of logic begins from, and reinforces our belief that, identity exists. As we rely on the system of logic to comprehend the world and make it calculable, we assume its presupposition and reify what was originally our hasty and mistaken positing of identity into reality.

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[23] Cf. TL 83, where Nietzsche similarly laments the fact that 'cases which are never equal and thus altogether unequal' are routinely treated as being the same.

In GS 111 Nietzsche similarly remarks that, because logic works with stable and discrete entities, the concept of substance develops to serve this end – and blinds us to changes in things.

> [I]n order for the concept of substance to originate, which is indispensable to logic though nothing real corresponds to it in the strictest sense, it was necessary that for a long time changes in things not be seen, not be perceived; the beings who did not see things exactly had a head start over those who saw everything "in a flux"
>
> (GS 111).

Here we again see tools which we develop for gaining control over things, and comprehending them, read into reality in a strong sense. In *Twilight* Nietzsche expands this point to cover other methods we use to stabilise reality in order to still it and make it appear to have become known; these he associates with 'the basic presuppositions of the metaphysics of language' and the 'presuppositions of *reason*' (TI *Reason* 5). '[T]he lie of unity, the lie of objectification, of substance, of permanence' (TI *Reason* 2) are such instances of our reading being into the world: 'Being is imagined into everything – *pushed under everything*' (TI *Reason* 5).

These passages will be discussed in greater depth in chapter five, however, I take the fact that Nietzsche believes we reify the form and content of our schema into reality to have been established. The crucial thing to note here is that, as is suggested by GS 355, Nietzsche thinks that in reifying our schema into reality we also warp our conception of what reality is. Thus, in discussing our reification of logic he asserts that our failure to recognise that logic is only a tool for comprehending the world leads to our positing a metaphysical world as the 'true world'.

> If we do not grasp this, but make of logic a criterion of
> true being, we are on the way to positing as realities all

those hypostases: substance, attribute, object, subject, actions, etc.: that is to conceiving a metaphysical world, that is, a "real world"

(WP 516).

Similarly, in WP 584 he remarks that

Instead of employing the forms as a tool for making the world manageable and calculable, the madness of philosophers divined that in these categories is present the concept of the world to which the one in which man lives does not correspond

(WP 584).

The strand of falsification I want to highlight here is precisely that the presuppositions of logic, reason, the metaphysics of language, and so on, become embedded in our thinking as criteria which we require things to correspond to. One consequence of this is that we assume that the concepts of our schema pick out things of this kind – i.e. things which display identity with a certain type and which are enduring, etc. This amounts, for Nietzsche, to a huge falsification of the world; the world is, for him, characterised by becoming and flux, not by being and stability.

Another, equally important, consequence of this is that we develop a conception of truth which requires objects to display the characteristics which we have reified into the world. This leaves us with a conception of reality which is in fact incompatible with the world we inhabit and have access to. The particular reifications which have grown up with "reason" and the metaphysics of our language mean that we conceive of reality as a 'true world' – as something which, for example, contains identity and "types" – as above understood. This is not the world we inhabit, but only a fiction added to it. That we approach

our reality as if it displayed these characteristics, and understand our truths to reveal them, means that we falsify the world which actually exists.

This second strand of falsification can be seen as entrenching the dominance of a particular schema over our thought. Not only is it the case that the drive primarily responsible for developing the schema dominates our cognitive outlook by providing the schema, it is also the case that we the believe this schema to latch on to and exactly mirror the structure of reality. We believe that our concepts pick out some natural kind or essence latent in reality and take the individual things we perceive as eternally enduring things or "types". Further, anything encountered which does not display the characteristics which we reify into reality is seen as mere appearance or illusion as it fails to satisfy our criteria of true being. This process can be seen as an instance of dominant drives attempting to force their perspective on to the organism and attempting to 'compel all other drives to accept as a norm' its schema (WP 481).

3.3 "Objectivity" and Knowledge

The final strand of falsification to be highlighted also stems from a misunderstanding of our cognitive processes – hence it is also primarily related to second-order falsification. This time the falsification comes in the form of a belief in the "objectivity" of the knowing processes which have delivered the "knowledge" aggregated in our current understanding of the world and schema of concepts. Along with this misunderstanding comes a demand that future knowing must be similarly "objective". This conception of how knowledge proceeds follows naturally from the tendency we have to be blind to the fact that we are active in developing the schema of concepts and, for example, the system of logic which we take to disclose 'true being'. As we forget that these things are our interpretation and reification of experience, we come to believe

that our knowledge develops through processes which are "objective" in a strong sense.

Two passages which we have already discussed bear this thought out. The first of these is GM III 12 which helps us fill out what is meant by "objective" here. Nietzsche associates the priest's understanding of objectivity with "disinterested contemplation" (GM III 12) and, as we have seen, this understanding seeks the extirpation of the affects and the 'renunciation of interpretation' (GM III 24). This conception of objectivity is one which denies the basic perspectivist point noted earlier, i.e., denies that subjectivity and interpretation are necessary and enabling features of knowledge. The ascetic scientist embodies this conception of objectivity when championing the renunciation of interpretation and the collection of *"petits faits"* – and when assuming that *"petits faits",* or 'factum brutum', can be amassed without interpretation. What the ascetic scientist is blind to, clearly, is the fact that this conception of knowledge and the belief that the world can be neatly divided into *"petits faits"* is itself an interpretation of the world which ultimately stems from the priest's perspective. Further, Nietzsche is clear, as we will see in the next chapter, that all representation of the world involves selection and interpretation – this is a point which Nietzsche gestures toward in GM III 24 itself by stating that '[t]here is, strictly speaking, absolutely no science "without presuppositions"'.

In GS 355 (and GS 110) knowledge seems to be portrayed, in a similar fashion to GM III 24, as a matter of noting brute facts. In conceiving of knowledge as a matter applying a schema to reality, the role of interpretation is significantly downplayed. No mention is made, in this aphorism describing what Nietzsche takes to be a widely held conception of knowledge, of our questioning the legitimacy of our concepts or reshaping these concepts to fit newly encounter objects or events. The development of novel affective interpretations, for example, seems foreign to this conception of knowledge.

The falsification involved with the bogus conceptions of knowledge glimpsed in GM III 12, 24 and GS 355 is bound up with our misrepresentation of the processes through which we come to know and a related inflation of the "objective" status of our knowledge. As we have become blind to the roles of subjectivity, reification and interpretation which establish the tenets of our perspective, we conceive of the "knowledge" embodied in our perspective as having been delivered through a purely objective process. Nietzsche's association of this conception of knowledge with "disinterested contemplation" in GM III 12 highlights its complete lack of fit with his own understanding of the perspectival and drive-augmented nature of knowing.

However, it is not merely in causing us to misunderstand our cognitive processes that this strand of falsification is pernicious. It also serves to entrench the dominant schema. As we conceive of all developments in knowledge having to proceed through processes which are 'objective', and as any challenges to the current schema can be shown to fail to be 'objective' in the relevant sense, the dominance of the current schema is maintained.

3.4 Summary

The foregoing discussion has introduced the three mutually reinforcing strands of falsification which I will argue are present in the falsification passages in the three remaining chapters of this thesis. I do not believe that at any point in the works from 1873 to 1888 Nietzsche ever associates truth with a 'true world', nor that he claims that all human beliefs are necessarily false. This puts me at odds with many scholars, and even many of those who are critical of Clark's developmental story. Many commentators who deny Clark's assertion that GM III 12 is emblematic of Nietzsche's rejection of the falsification thesis, interpret

Nietzsche as in fact clinging to some version of that thesis until the end of his productive life.[24]

These commentators often point to Nietzsche's analysis of falsification in later passages like GS 354 and to the fact that it seems to be essential elements of human cognition like consciousness (Anderson 1996) or conceptualisation (Hussain 2004) which are responsible for falsification. There are certainly some seemingly promising interpretative grounds for this position, Nietzsche writes, for instance, that

> everything which enters consciousness thereby becomes shallow, thin, relatively stupid, general, a sign, a herd-mark; that all becoming conscious involves a vast and thorough corruption, falsification, superficialization, and generalization
>
> (GS 354).

Thus, it will be necessary for me to analyse GS 354 more closely in chapter three in order to defend my view that Nietzsche never holds an all-pervasive falsification thesis. Chapter four and five will also include a defence of this position with regard to other falsification passages.

One significant and distinguishing feature of my account is that the three strands of falsification which I identify are all escapable. Indeed, the strand of falsification which is most substantive on my interpretation, that tied to the criteria of 'true being', is clearly compatible with the thought that it is possible for human cognition to be veridical. Nietzsche is explicitly condemnatory only about the way in which we reify our schema into reality, there is no need to think that he believes that all of our concepts, for example, necessary falsify. In WP 521, for example, Nietzsche is sceptical about the belief that there is a 'type'

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[24] For example, Anderson 1996; Green 2002; Hussain 2004; Meyer 2014; a notable exception is Nehamas (2015) who will be discussed in chapter five.

latent in reality which is in some way 'intended by' the process through which things are formed. However, he is not sceptical about, and himself uses, the concept of species. His scepticism regarding this concept is only aroused when it is associated with 'the false notion *that a goal has been attained* – and that evolution has a goal –'.

In the remaining two sections of this chapter I will work on the assumption that falsification can be transcended and introduce how perspectivism and artistry are instrumental in this process.

Section Four | Perspectivism as a Corrective against Falsification

In arguing that perspectivism should be seen primarily as a corrective against falsification, I focus predominantly on its expression in GM III 12. The structure of this section relates perspectivism to the three strands of falsification identified in the previous section; taking these in reverse order 4.1 addresses the notion of objectivity, 4.2 focuses on the epistemic modesty inherent in Nietzsche's position and thus cuts against the belief that our knowledge uncovers a level of 'true being' and 4.3 demonstrates how perspectivism helps us to work against the dominance of a schema over our cognition. My intention in this section is to sketch the role of perspectivism in the dynamic I seek to make salient – and which will be further examined in chapters four and five; this is also the intention of my discussion of how Nietzsche's remarks on artistry cut against falsification in the next section. In taking perspectivism to be primarily a corrective against falsification I align myself with the commentators mentioned in section one, most significantly Gemes (1992) and Berry (2011), who deny that GM III 12 amounts to a substantive theory of truth or metaphysical doctrine.

4.1 Nietzsche's 'Objectivity'

Our preceding discussion of the notion of "objectivity" which Nietzsche attacks in GM III 12 demonstrated that notions incompatibility with the basic perspectivist insight. Nietzsche's perspectivism combats this conception of objectivity by making salient the essential role which the will, and 'affective interpretations', play in the development of knowledge. In seeking to combat the notion of "objectivity" as "disinterested contemplation" he gives expression to an opposing objectivity which revalues subjectivity, interpretation and the will as enabling features of cognition.

> There is *only* a perspectival seeing, *only* a perspectival
> "knowing"; and *the more* affects we allow to speak about a
> matter, *the more* eyes, different eyes, we know how to bring
> to bear on one and the same matter, that much more
> complete will our "concept" of this matter, our
> "objectivity" be
>
> (GM III 12).

This rival conception of objectivity corrects the second-order errors present in the priestly notion of "objectivity". In addition to this, it liberates us to employ our affects in our cognitive dealings with the world and to form new interpretations of aspects of our environment with good conscience – thus opening up the possibility that we can work against first-order deficiencies in our understanding of the world by developing our sensitivity to aspects of our environment which were previously falsified or to which we failed to properly attend.

4.2 Perspectivism and Epistemic Modesty

The very nature of perspectivism forces on us the realisation that any mode of seeing or mode of knowing inescapably takes place from a perspective and involves structural aspects through which we make sense of reality. This works against the tendency mentioned in the previous section – another second-order error – for us to read the structuring aspects particular to a perspective into reality. Indeed, Nietzsche's insistence that 'active and interpretative forces' cannot be shut down and that we must 'guard ourselves' against concepts such as 'knowledge in itself', are designed to remind us that the appearance of knowledge which transcends the essentially perspectival nature of knowing is merely an appearance. This interacts with the second strand of falsification mentioned above as it works against the temptation to take one perspective's representation of the world to be adequate to the structure of a reality of 'true being' which lurks behind our representations.

Recognising the perspectival nature of knowledge and thus coming to understand that we do not have (e.g. perceptual) access to a world which is radically different from our own, also works against our tendency to take seriously any theory of truth which has a criterion of 'true being', i.e., any theory which associates truth with a realm which is in principle inaccessible (and which thus seems to be a rather speculative posit).

4.3 Perspectivism and Epistemic Enclosure

The first two ways in which perspectivism works against falsification are primarily geared toward undermining second-order errors, i.e. falsification which stems from conceptions of knowledge and truth which Nietzsche believes to be holding us captive. Nietzsche's aim in ridding us of these notions

is practical in that it makes possible the development of our intellectual conscience and our existing in a more honest relationship to reality. In making salient the ultimately perspectival and will-augmented nature of human knowing, he loosens the grip of falsifying conceptions of truth and knowledge over us. In doing this, our ability to break free from the dominance of perspectives and schemas of concepts within which we are epistemically enclosed is increased.

The final sense in which perspectivism works against falsification is in encouraging the development of new perspectives and 'affect interpretations', it therefore more directly enables us to work against (first-order) falsification, in that it helps us to attain a truer picture of the objects (and events, etc.) in our environment. This cuts directly against those instances of enclosure mentioned in GS 347 and A 54. In the former section, GS 347, we are warned that 'a single point of view and feeling which is now dominant' leads to a 'type of hypnosis of the entire sensual-intellectual system' (GS 347). In the latter, we are told that a 'strict and necessary optic' causes one '[n]ot to see many things, *not* to be free on a single point, to be partisan through and through' (A 54). Rather than seeing perspectivism as a doctrine which represents the culmination of a theoretical struggle with the nature of truth on Nietzsche's behalf, I understand it to be primarily intended as a corrective which encourages the development of multiple perspectives, in order that the epistemic enclosure of the individual by a single dominant perspective and schema can be worked against.

As this is the case, perspectivism is well designed to develop our intellectual conscience. This is because, as was seen in section one of this chapter, the shortcomings of intellectual conscience which Nietzsche associates with the 'great majority' and the ascetic scientist, are related to the perspectives which they find themselves trapped within – rather than to any active dishonesty on their part. In correcting the popularly held conceptions of knowledge and truth mentioned above, perspectivism attempts to work against

our tendency to fall into (second-order) falsification. Similarly, in encouraging the development of multiple perspectives, Nietzsche seeks to work against our tired application of a schema to experience (first-order falsification). A direct connection between perspectivism and the intellectual conscience is drawn along these lines in BGE 230 where Nietzsche associates the development of a 'many-sided and thorough view of things' with a 'kind of cruelty of the intellectual conscience'.

Section Five | Artistry, Selection and Falsification

Unlike perspectivism, the role Nietzsche assigns to artistry in combatting falsification does not (primarily) cut against the conceptions of truth and knowledge which we have seen to be associated with second-order falsification. Instead, artistry's efficacy against the types of falsification which we have identified is bound up with the fact that Nietzsche conceives of artistry as being associated with the imposition of form and the reworking of how a particular subject matter appears to us. In opposition to the passive application of schema which Nietzsche takes to characterise most of our attempts to make sense of the world, art and artistry are characterised by their association with the activity of shaping, selecting and bringing out certain aspects at the expense of others: 'what does art do? Doesn't it praise? Doesn't it glorify? Doesn't it select? Doesn't it highlight?' (TI *Skirmishes* 24). As Nietzsche takes our default understanding of the world, given the dominance of priestly and herd perspectives, to be mired in falsification, artistry is crucial in that it values and employs the skills and tendencies needed to creatively develop new interpretations of experience. These interpretations are means to capturing those aspects of reality which are falsified or obscured by the herd schema, thus artistry primarily enables us to work against first-order falsification. Before

proceeding to a more detailed explanation of how artistry interacts with falsification, I will outline Nietzsche's conception of artistry.

5.1 Artistry and the Imposition of Form

Artistry is, for Nietzsche, bound up with the imposition of form. This point is made by Aaron Ridley, who explains that both art and artistry are 'a matter of giving form; […] a matter of imposing form upon something that had been formless (or in some other way unsatisfactory […])' (Ridley 2010: p431). Ridley offers textual evidence for this interpretation of Nietzsche's conception of artistry from the second essay of the *On the Genealogy of Morals* where Nietzsche refers to state creators as 'the most involuntary, unconscious artists there are' (GM II 17). This naming of state creators as artists follows from their tendency toward 'instinctive creation and the imposition of forms' (GM II 17). The *imposition* of form in this case involves the state creators engaging in 'nothing but acts of violence' which allow the 'raw material of the people' to be '*formed*' into something comprehensible (GM II 17). The example of state creators brings out nicely how Nietzsche understands and employs the notions of art and artistry in a wider context than that of artworks proper (see e.g., HH II.174).

Another example of a context separate from art-proper where Nietzsche emphasises the importance of artistry as the imposition of form, is his discussion of self-creation in *The Gay Science*. In the introduction to this thesis, Young's assertion that the artistic techniques related to self-creation are essentially related to dishonesty and falsification was cited. Whilst there is no reason to think that art and artistry cannot be employed to dishonest ends in something like the way that Young describes (e.g. Young, p99-100), there are good reasons for denying that dishonesty and falsification are essential to the nature of art and artistry. Further, as I will show below, there is an important

sense in which artistry is seen by Nietzsche to be positively related to honesty and the intellectual conscience.

5.2 Self-Creation and the Development of New Perspectives

Self-creation involves a raw, perhaps contradictory and disparate self, having a form and style imposed upon it. Nietzsche describes this process as one where the individual studies 'all the strengths and weaknesses that their nature has to offer' and then shapes these into an 'artistic plan' (GS 290). Nietzsche sees artistry, that is, the techniques that he believes we should 'learn from artists' whilst being 'wiser than they' in applying them to life and not just to art, as essential to this process. He describes these techniques in the following passage:

> To remove oneself from things until there is much in them
> that one no longer sees and much that the eye must add *in*
> *order to see them at all*, or to see things around a corner and
> as if they were cut out and extracted from their context, or
> to place them so that each partially distorts the view one
> has of the others and allows only perspectival glimpses, or
> to look at them through coloured glass or in the light of
> the sunset, or to give them a surface and skin that is not
> fully transparent
>
> (GS 299).

That this process needn't be seen as essentially related to falsification is attested to by two factors. Firstly, Nietzsche is clear that the study begins with a survey of 'all the strengths and weaknesses' that one's nature has to offer – which there is no reason to think is not honest. Secondly, whilst the techniques mentioned here certainly seem to rework the way things initially appear to us, we have seen

that Nietzsche believes initial appearances are routinely falsifying. Further, the description of the techniques of artists here bears similarities to Nietzsche's characterisation of the features which make up the 'essence of all interpreting' in GM III 24. Indeed, the similarity between the techniques Nietzsche takes to be characteristic of artistry and those which he holds to be necessary in order to open out new perspectives is noted by Janaway (2014: p51-56).

Janaway draws our attention to an instance where artistry plays exactly this role of opening up a new perspective in GS 78. Here Nietzsche tells us that we should be grateful for artists because they

> have taught us to value the hero that is hidden in each of these everyday characters and taught the art of regarding oneself as a hero, from a distance and as it were simplified and transfigured—the art of 'putting oneself on stage' before oneself. Only thus can we get over certain lowly details in ourselves. Without this art we would be under the spell of that perspective which makes the nearest and most vulgar appear tremendously big and as reality itself
>
> (GS 78).

Artistry is not merely cast as something which glorifies here. It enables us to escape the "spell" of the perspective we commonly see the world through and thus to develop a sensitivity to something which that perspective obscures. Indeed, it is hard to read this section without being put in mind of Nietzsche's analysis in BGE 268 and his remark in GS 354 that because of the herd dominance of consciousness and language, our thoughts are continually 'outvoted and translated back into the herd perspective' (GS 354). What the artistic techniques seem capable of doing is counteracting our tendency to understand ourselves and the world through the schema of concepts developed in the herd. In enabling us to see the 'hero that is hidden' the techniques of

distancing, simplifying and transfiguring allow us to see past the 'vulgar' aspects which would otherwise be foregrounded.

5.3 Artistry, Selection and Interpretation

The importance of artistry as a corrective to falsification extends beyond the context of self-creation. Indeed, in *Twilight* Nietzsche returns to the tendency originally instilled in us by the priest, to renounce interpretation and 'halt before the factual [..] "*petits faits*"' (GM III 24), when he discusses the practice of 'lying in the dirt in front of *petits faits*' which he describes as 'unworthy of an artist' (TI *Skirmishes* 7). Nietzsche's point here is that when approaching some subject matter, a reluctance to interpret and a focus merely on "petits faits" is epistemologically impoverishing – '[t]his gives you a false optic' (TI *Skirmishes* 7). The result of such an approach is likely to be an interpretation of the subject which fails to be appropriately weighted and comprehensible: 'Artistically appraised, nature is no model. It exaggerates, it distorts, it leaves holes' (TI *Skirmishes* 7).

In addition to the potential incomprehensibility of such an approach, it seems we are justified in speculating that Nietzsche's point here is that 'lying in the dirt in front of *petits faits*' and attempting to refrain from interpretation does not deliver us reality neat, but rather has the effect of delivering an interpretation of the subject matter which follows from the schema and perspective which is currently dominant. Thus, like Nietzsche might have believed to be the case with the 'Parisian novelists' he takes aim at in this section, the resolution not to enforce one's own interpretation on a subject matter is tantamount to allowing oneself to be caught under 'the spell of that perspective which makes the nearest and most vulgar appear tremendously big and as reality itself' (GS 78). Indeed, as well as a disdain for Parisian novelists

on this account, in retrospective remarks on *Beyond Good and Evil* in *Ecce Homo,* Nietzsche castigates modernity (in general) for 'prostrating itself before *petits faits'*. On this theme he also makes it clear that he associates '[a]ll the things this age is proud of' including, crucially, 'the famous "objectivity"' we discussed earlier, with this tendency (EH, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 2) – i.e., the tendency to focus on small facts instead of forming an interpretation oneself, and thus to fall into conventional ways of understanding matters.

What art teaches us to do differently, through its tendency to praise, glorify, select and highlight (TI *Skirmishes* 24), is to '*force out* the main features' of a given subject matter (TI *Skirmishes* 8). Here the similarities between Nietzsche's characterisation of art and 'the *essence* of all interpreting' are striking: the latter being, remember, 'pressing into orderly form, abridging, omitting, padding, fabricating, falsifying' (GM III 24). These characteristics are the opposite of those Nietzsche associates with the priest's notion of objectivity and also with the "scientific attitude" (EH, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 2) – as will become significant when we consider the dichotomy which Nietzsche draws between art and (one understanding of) science in his early notebooks in chapter four.

It can now be seen how artistry is well suited to counter the falsifying perspectives which we find ourselves caught within. In being essentially related with reworking how things appear and driving out new interpretations, art and artistry hold open the possibility of developing our sensitivity to aspects of the world obscured by the dominant perspectives through which we encounter our environment. That the reworking of how things appear is characteristic of artists and that art and artistry shouldn't be understood as essentially dishonest is evident from a section in *Twilight* which Janaway discusses in a similar context to our own (Janaway 2014: p55). There Nietzsche notes that the tendency of artists to value and work with 'appearance' is not a sign of the decadence of

artists because '"appearance" here means reality *once again*, only selected, strengthened, corrected' (TI *Reason* 6).

That art is positively related to the virtue of honesty for Nietzsche is further attested by his remarks in TI *Skirmishes* 24 which associate art, and the tragic artist in particular, with difficult truths about existence: '[A]rt also presents a lot that is ugly, harsh, questionable in life, - doesn't this seem to spoil life for us. […] Doesn't he [the artist] show his fearlessness in the face of the fearful and questionable?'. This passage is naturally read as Nietzsche equating the tragic artist here with the strong spirit who seeks to honestly confront life and existence in their de-deified form.

5.4 Conclusion

Having sketched the dynamic I believe to exist between falsification, perspectivism and artistry, the next task will be to substantiate this dynamic in the course of arguing for its more perfect fit with Nietzsche's text than the interpretation of Clark. In the course of doing this, I will also establish the striking continuity which exists between Nietzsche's falsification remarks in *Truth and Lie* and the later works. This will justify the way I have drawn from works from every stage of Nietzsche's philosophy in this chapter in order to drive out the dynamic I take to be central. Chapter three will do this by highlighting the similarity between the mechanics of cognition which are present in *Truth and Lie* and the works of the early- to mid-1880s. It will also refine the account of falsification which I am arguing for by considering the character of falsification in GS 354 – a passage which is central to Clark's account. Following this, chapter four provides a detailed interpretation of *Truth and Lie* which highlights the existence of the dynamic between falsification, perspectivism and artistry set out in this chapter. It also demonstrates that,

contra Clark, Nietzsche did not view falsification as a necessary consequence of our epistemological situation. It does this by highlighting the framework underlying Nietzsche's call for us to attempt to develop our sensitivity to the 'vivid first impression' mentioned in that essay. Chapter five then offers an interpretation of Nietzsche's falsification remarks in GS 109-111 and in *Twilight* in order to argue against Clark's claim that these works are discontinuous. In addition to doing this, it traces features present in *Truth and Lie* through to the later works and seeks to resolve issues pertaining to the metaphysical status of the 'chaos of sensations' (WP 569) which interpretations like that of Riccardi (2013) take to be the loci of reality for the later Nietzsche.

Chapter Three | The Mechanics of Cognition

This chapter aims to give an account of the aspects of Nietzsche's understanding of the mechanics of cognition which are most relevant to his remarks on falsification. The relation between the conscious and the unconscious will be crucial here. Though this is a complex and controversial topic, the account of Constancio (2011) – in 'On Consciousness: Nietzsche's Departure from Schopenhauer' – pays close attention to Nietzsche's text and helpfully brings out his position against that of his great teacher. In the first of the two main sections of this chapter, I offer an account of Nietzsche's understanding of consciousness and the mechanics of cognition with reference to the work of Constancio on *Beyond Good and Evil* and the fifth book of *The Gay Science*. In the second, I demonstrate how a similar account is present in *Truth and Lie* and contemporaneous notebooks. These discussions link up with the overall research aims of this thesis by establishing a continuity between *Truth and Lie* and the later philosophy and by further refining our understanding of Nietzsche's falsification passages. Constancio's account shows how, contra Clark, Nietzsche's concern in GS 354 is not that we are trapped within our representations and unable to correspond to the 'true world' or the 'chaos of sensations' (WP 569), but is instead bound up with setting out the relation between consciousness and the unconscious. In establishing the continuity of Nietzsche's remarks on consciousness and the mechanics of cognition from *Truth and Lie* to BGE and GS V, I will provide reason for thinking that Nietzsche's concern with falsification is of a similar character in *Truth and Lie* as it is in these works. The main interpretative burden for this latter claim, however, will be borne in chapter four.

Section One | Consciousness as a 'Surface-and Sign-World'

Our discussion of the relation between the will and perspectives in chapter two suggested that Nietzsche rejects the thought that there is hard and fast distinction between a drive which founds a perspective and the structuring and development of that perspective. Drives don't merely stand behind the perspectives which they found, but are animate within them. This section aims to bring out Nietzsche's belief that something similar is true of the relation between unconscious and conscious thought. In this vein, Nietzsche writes that 'consciousness is the last link in a chain', that '[b]elow every thought lies an affect' (WLN I [61]) and that 'thoughts are *signs* of a play and a struggle of the affects: they are always connected to their hidden roots' (WLN I [75]). In the picture which will be developed here, consciousness is not in any real sense autonomous, it sits atop the unconscious - as a 'surface-and sign-world' (GS 354) – and points to what is "below". I begin with a brief discussion of some key features of consciousness in Nietzsche's philosophy which Constancio's account captures well. I give only a brief account of the first three of these features as they are important only to the extent that they provide a background within which to understand Nietzsche's claim that consciousness is a 'surface-and-sign-world'. To conclude this section, I will then consider how consciousness's character as a 'surface-and-sign-world' should be seen to impact on our understanding of Nietzsche's remarks on falsification.

1.1 First Aspect of Constancio's Account:
Consciousness and Concepts

Though Nietzsche presents consciousness as generally continuous with the unconscious, he does reserve for consciousness one main distinguishing

feature: it is essentially tied up with concepts. Consciousness just *is* thinking in concepts – that is what defines it. Constancio characterises the relation between consciousness and concepts by linking it with the relation between words and concepts. Nietzsche associates 'the development of language and the development of consciousness' – they go 'hand in hand' (GS 354). Similarly, words and concepts are tightly linked: 'Words are sounds designating concepts' (BGE 268) and 'concepts are possible only when there are words' (WP 506). Thus, there is a tight connection between consciousness and concepts; why this association of concepts with consciousness is taken by Nietzsche to be the key distinguishing feature of consciousness will be explained below.

1.2 Second Aspect of Constancio's Account: The Drives are Elementary Perspectives which "Perceive" their Relations to Each Other

Nietzsche frequently refers to consciousness as a surface which sits atop of unconscious processes. In this vein, Constancio notes that Nietzsche tells us that: 'every conscious mental state is "only a certain behaviour of the drives towards one another" (GS 333) and […] that "thinking is only a relation between these drives" (BGE 36)' (*ibid.*, p15). By taking this view of consciousness, Nietzsche pushes it into a fairly secondary role, as it is characterised as a conceptual commentary on the behaviour and relation of drives (as these things manifest themselves below the level of consciousness). It is in this sense that consciousness is not only a surface, but also a sign. It sits atop these unconscious processes, has its content determined by them and also *points toward* them.

Talk of drives behaving toward each other and being related in certain ways is obscure, but we can get enough of a grasp on the general picture in play here by reminding ourselves that different drives are individually in the process of building elementary perspectives in accordance with their goals – as we saw in our earlier discussion of WP 481. By noting that drives perceive their relations to each other, Constancio is pointing out that one thing the drives perceive is the likelihood of their goal being attained relative to other centres of force, i.e. other drives, in their environment. Similarly, we might think that conscious thought can be a sign to the state of the drives as it can reveal, for example, the dominance of a particular drive. Thus, when we note that the ascetic scientist's conception of the value of truth derives from the ascetic priest's perspective, we can understand this as a sign that the priest's drive to negate life is exerting a degree of dominance over the ascetic scientist.

At this point, we may well pause and note an apparent problem which could seem to arise from what has been said so far. If consciousness is conceived as a surface or sign of the world from which it springs – i.e. 'the life of the drives' (Constancio, p29) – and if this world of the drives consists merely of drives perceiving their relations to each other, then there seems to be no room for content from the external world in this picture. All we have, it may seem at this point, is the world of the drives within a human organism, relating to each other, and interpreting their relations, through their elementary perspectives – with these elementary perspectives of the organism then being expressed through concepts. However, this worry disappears when we consider a third aspect of Constancio's interpretation.

1.3 Third Aspect of Constancio's Account:

The Drives are Elementary Perspectives which "Perceive" the External World

Constancio explains that part of the "intelligence" of the drives – which is described in BGE 218 – consists in their being 'perceptual relations to the external world' (*ibid.*, p17). That Nietzsche conceives of drives as 'intelligent' and 'smart' (BGE 218) represents one way in which Nietzsche's account diverges from that of Schopenhauer. On Schopenhauer's account, instincts are blind forces which drive us 'as if they had learned to pursue such ends' yet with 'no conception of such ends' (*ibid.*, p17; cf. WWR II §27, §28). However, for Nietzsche drives are themselves elementary perspectives on the world which not only push us toward the goals they pursue, but which do this through their representation of the environment (cf. WP 481).[25]

This means that – as elementary perspectives – our drives form unconscious representations. Constancio describes the situation by noting that the 'material of the stimuli' – content from the external world – are organised into unconscious representations. Then, if these particular unconscious representations come into consciousness, the 'conscious mental states' which arise will be based on the unconscious representation (*ibid.*, p31). The inclusion

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[25] A problem for Nietzsche's account of consciousness (particularly as it is interpreted by Constancio) is that it seems vulnerable to the charge that it is ultimately uninformative. The bulk of the explanatory work regarding the emergence and character of consciousness is done for Nietzsche by his posit of "intelligent" sub-personal drives. However, these "intelligent" drives seem to display something very much like the characteristics which one might hope would be explained in a theory of consciousness - thus what was to be explained is merely relocated to the level of the drives. This issue - commonly referred to as the problem of the homunculi - was given one of its earliest expressions by Poellner (1995: p213-229); a good recent discussion is present in Janaway (2007: p216-222). Attempting to defend Nietzsche's account of consciousness against this charge, whilst retaining what is distinctive and interesting in it, would be an interesting project. My interest here, however, is merely to make salient certain features which Nietzsche believes consciousness to have.

of the external world in this process saves the picture under development here from being solipsistic.[26]

Two things might be noted at this point. Firstly, that Constancio does have convincing textual evidence for this claim, Nietzsche does after all state that consciousness is 'merely an *accidens* of the power of representation' (GS 357) and this suggests that this power to represent doesn't require consciousness. Indeed, Constancio notes that Nietzsche associating his understanding of the unconscious, in GS 354 and 357, with Leibniz and not Schopenhauer is significant. The former associates concepts with unconscious representation, whereas it isn't clear that the latter ultimately does (*ibid.*, p17: n.29).

Secondly, if we accept that representation is not something reserved for, or unique to, consciousness, then we can appreciate another aspect of continuity present between consciousness and the unconscious – they both represent. We can also see why consciousness is defined, not merely as representation, but rather as representation *through concepts*. Through its mode of representation in concepts, consciousness represents the relations between drives, but also the unconscious representations of the external world which have been formed as part of the elementary perspective of particular drives.[27]

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[26] Some commentators see Nietzsche as sliding into an idealist position and abandoning reference to the external world in *The Gay Science* and *Beyond Good and Evil*. However, when Nietzsche refers to the stimuli which meet our eye in BGE 192 (1886) or tells us that 'our needs interpret the world' in WP 481, there seems to be no reason to suppose that he is not conceiving of the individual having contact with the external world in a perfectly common-sense fashion. (WP 481 is dated by Kaufmann 1883-1888.)

[27] The idea that different kinds of representations, e.g., those which take the form of images, lie below the level of consciousness prior to our (potentially) becoming aware of them, might seem difficult to get a handle on. However, we do have a handle on the idea that other forms of unconscious representation exist prior to their becoming conceptualised and available to consciousness. The notion of unconscious images, it seems, can be understood as running parallel to these forms of unconscious representation. We can allow, for example, that the protective and suspicious father might, upon being pressed by his impatient daughter about his constant interrogation of his son-in-law, eventually admit: 'I suppose I have always believed he was being unfaithful'. We have no problem thinking of this statement as an accurate report on how the father represents the son-in-law, even if - until pressed - this (potentially) conceptually formulable representative content remained below the level of consciousness.

Though this offers only a swift run through of these issues and leaves many questions hanging, we do have enough of Nietzsche's understanding of consciousness in place to now move on to consider the sense in which it is a surface-and sign-world. What has been discussed in this chapter up to now provides a background within which to understand the following remarks, however it is the remarks to which we now turn which will be crucial to bear in mind as we turn to *Truth and Lie* and *The Philosopher* and demonstrate the continuity between the mechanics of cognition which inform both Nietzsche's early and late remarks on falsification.

1.4 Fourth Aspect of Constancio's Account:
The Character of Consciousness as a "Surface-and Sign-World"

Constancio points out that 'Nietzsche agrees with Schopenhauer in that concepts are "representations of representations", but he reinterprets this so as to mean that concepts are simplifications of pre-conceptual and pre-linguistic simplifications' (*ibid.*, p31). This quotation sharply summarises the role of consciousness and will be worth spending a little time unpacking. Constancio helps us here by going into further detail:

> The conscious representation of the world that is "relevant to us" (BGE 34) is a sign — i.e. a conceptual abbreviation — of an unconscious representation that already simplifies our experience and actually results from the activity of a drive for simplification. This is why this world is a "surface- and sign-world" (GS 354)
>
> (*ibid.*, p32).

To understand what is going on here we must get clear not only about how consciousness simplifies or abbreviates, but also about how to understand the new claim that the pre-conceptual, pre-linguistic world of the drives is itself also the result of 'the activity of a drive for simplification'.

Before doing this, it is interesting to note the double sense in which conscious representation involves simplification here; this double sense is present in Constancio's paper but not pushed into the foreground – it also applies to the process through which stimuli are formed into unconscious representations, as will be explored in the next paragraph. The first sense in which consciousness simplifies is due to its mode of representation being conceptualisation, the fact that the pre-conceptual representations are rendered in concepts generalises their content. This is part of what Nietzsche is gesturing toward when he notes that 'all becoming conscious involves a vast and thorough corruption, falsification, superficialization, and generalization' (GS 354). This is, as it were, merely a problem of the medium. We can understand what is going on here along the lines of the process Nietzsche outlines in BGE 268. Concepts are apt to pick out only common and general features of a subject matter. The second sense in which consciousness simplifies is tied to the drive-content or specific goals of the current perspective and with what they select to highlight. Thus, Nietzsche talks of a 'selecting drive' (WLN 34[131]). This might mean that, for example, a drive chooses to foreground the objects in the environment which it seeks to attain. However, as we have seen in the previous chapter, Nietzsche takes a key goal of individual drives and the organism as a whole to be the attainment of security – this goal being motivated by the 'instinct of fear' and other similar needs and drives (GS 355). Thus it is the case that the 'selecting drive' (WLN 34[131]) in the grip of the 'instinct of fear' often pushes into the foreground those aspects of the unconscious representation which are familiar, i.e. which can be rendered in terms of our schema of concepts. This is because, as discussed in chapter two, noting something

familiar in the unfamiliar and anxiety-provoking environment which surrounds us, leads to our feeling more secure (GS 355 and TI *Errors* 5). This process, however, also leads to our failing to properly attend to the unfamiliar aspects of the unconscious representation and thus the unfamiliar aspects of our environment.

Constancio brings out this second sense of the 'drive for simplification' by focusing primarily on one manifestation of it which Nietzsche details in TI *Errors* 4-5. Both the world of consciousness – "our world" – and the unconscious world of the drives, represent matters with a tendency to explain or make familiar through the notion of cause and effect. A drive will seek to understand its relation to other drives and to features of the external world through 'creat[ing] rough, pre-conceptual mental images of causes or effects' (*ibid.*, p30). Here the material of the stimuli is simplified by the pre-conceptual activity of the drives by having this form imposed upon them. Similarly, cause and effect are employed at the conscious level, where the rough images of cause and effect are formalised; '[c]onscious mental processes conceptualize in terms of causality (or, more generally, in terms of explanation)' (*ibid.*, p30). At the conscious level, the already simplified and selective method of explaining that which is strange or unfamiliar in the unconscious, is further simplified and has its familiar aspects foregrounded once more.

Understanding this process of simplification through the 'selecting drive' gives us an account of concept formation which will prove useful when we turn to *Truth and Lie*. What happens when the 'material of the stimuli' (the external content) present the drives with something unfamiliar is that 'perspectival processes […] exclude, chase away, make salient or irrelevant, select' (*ibid.*, p31). Similarly, with respect to consciousness – and thus concept formation on the basis of unconscious representations – Nietzsche tells us that 'in our conscious

mind there must be above all a drive to exclude, to chase away, a selecting drive — which allows only certain facts to be presented to it" (WLN 34[131]).

Considering Nietzsche's discussion of how this sort of a process works in the mundane case of 'our eye…react[ing] to a particular object' (BGE 192) will help us to get a better grasp of matters here. In this case, we are not drawn to 'retaining what is new and different in an impression', but instead to 'producing again an image […] often produced before'. Novel content is encountered, but in the process of giving form to this, we are prone to succumb to the temptation to fall back on familiar ways of representing the object, instead of attending to its particularity. Our preceding discussion of the selective drive highlights the motivation for doing this; familiarity is mentioned again in BGE 192.

In order to summarise the above exegesis we can conclude that consciousness is a 'surface- and sign-world' in four senses. Firstly, it is a surface in that it is largely continuous with its depths, i.e. with the unconscious representations which are similarly functions of the drives. Secondly, it is a sign in that, as a sign, it points toward the unconscious world of the drives with which it is continuous. The solidified and cumbersome notions of causation in play in consciousness, for example, gesture toward what is going on at a deeper level; e.g. at the level of "'the true world of causes'" which is, Nietzsche states, "unutterably more complicated" (*ibid.*, p22; WLN 34[46]). Thirdly, consciousness can serve as a sign pointing to the life of the drives. One may grasp something about the drives which are governing the development of one's perspectives through attending to the way things are being consciously represented. The foregrounding of familiar aspects in the immediate environment might, for example, suggest that the 'instinct of fear' is exerting its power. Finally – and again, as a sign – consciousness isn't a comprehensive representation of what it points toward, but is rather a generalised and 'selective'

representation geared toward making particular aspects of a subject matter salient. Here the particular aspects which consciousness choose to make salient are selected and foregrounded on the basis of an affective element of the drive in control.

1.5 Consciousness, Falsification and Simplification

It is on the basis of this final element of consciousness that Constancio labels consciousness as consisting of 'simplifications' but also, interestingly, of 'falsifications' (e.g., *ibid.*, p29). I will first consider the appropriateness of these labels with regard to the selective nature of consciousness before turning to the generalisation which attaches to representation in concepts.

That the 'selective drive' in the grip of the 'instinct of fear' might render its environment in a way that highlights familiar aspects, is an instance of the type of falsification which we identified in the previous chapter as linked to the dominance of a schema over our understanding of the world. 'Falsification' seems an appropriate label for what is going on here when this tendency obscures the nature of the things being represented. However, there is no reason for thinking that any type of falsification is present here which is all-pervasive or inescapable. Nothing precludes the possibility that we could become aware of and correct this tendency, nor that the 'instinct of fear' or drive for security could be replaced with a drive more concerned with accuracy.

However, the inherently generalising and simplifying nature of conceptual representation is fixed. Indeed, the kind of pessimism regarding our mode of representation which is present in Clark's analysis of Nietzsche's representationalism in *The Gay Science* might seem appropriate here and has, as mentioned in the previous chapter, convinced commentators generally hostile

to Clark's picture to accept that human consciousness and conceptualisation necessarily falsify. It is simply the case, one might think, that our mode of conscious representation cuts us off from the 'true world' – as thing in itself or chaos of sensations – and precludes the possibility of our having knowledge. Two things speak against this pessimism however.

The first is that there is nothing necessarily falsifying – nor obfuscatory, nor dissatisfying – about a medium that simplifies its subject matter.[28] So long as we understand that conceptual representation tends toward generalisation, there is no reason why it could not be capable of representing things accurately, truthfully and usefully. There is no reason, that is, unless one interprets Nietzsche as holding a criterion of truth as correspondence to the 'true world' of the 'chaos of sensations' which requires us to transcend the complete ambit of human cognition in order to transcend falsification. This is, of course, precisely the position Clark holds (with regard to *The Gay Science* and *Beyond Good and Evil*).

However, the second reason which speaks against pessimism about human knowledge here is the implausibility of Clark's interpretation of Nietzsche as treating the 'chaos of sensation' as a 'true world'. The implausibility of Clark's position will be thoroughly dealt with in chapter five. However, a couple of quick points can be made against it here. For one thing, Nietzsche's only use of this phrase is in an unpublished note from the fall of 1887 (WP 569).[29] This is puzzling as on Clark's chronology Nietzsche has completely done away with the notion of a 'true world' – thing in itself or 'chaos of sensation' – by this point. So, we would have to take Nietzsche to be retrospectively commenting in this aphorism on a passage he wrote a year before in order to maintain Clark's story. However, even if we were to do this, Clark's story still

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[28] Ridley (2013: p421) makes a similar point in a relevant context concerning the fact that (good) caricatures only falsify their subject matter if we misunderstand the conventions of the medium of caricature.

[29] As is also pointed out by Riccardi (2013: p223)

looks prima facie weak as Nietzsche specifically states in this passage that the 'chaos of sensation' 'is not "the true world"' (WP 569). I take it that these factors provide good reasons for trying to make sense of GS 354 without an assumption that he associates truth with the 'true world' of the 'chaos of sensations' in this aphorism.

When we do this, it seems eminently sensible to understand Nietzsche as seeing what consciousness simplifies as the unconscious representations which it renders in concepts. This links well with the story of the mechanics of cognition which has been set out in this chapter. In GS 354, as in BGE 268, Nietzsche's concern with the generalised and "common" nature of concepts is not that they fail to correspond to some transcendent realm. Indeed, on this point Nietzsche notes that it is not the hard and fast distinctions between 'subject and object' or "thing in itself' and appearance' which he is concerned with in this passage. His concern is rather that the particularity and uniqueness of our initial – and one must assume pre-conceptual – experience is lost when we are forced to communicate it and thus to translate it into the 'herd perspective' (GS 354). That it is simplification or falsification bound up with the contingent issue of the inadequacy of our conceptual schema seems to be confirmed by the fact that GS 354 runs straight into Nietzsche's lamentation, in GS 355, of our tendency to render the unfamiliar in terms of the familiar. Further, WP 608 (1886-1887) makes it clear that Nietzsche conceives of (good) science as developing in a way that captures precisely the kind of particularity and novelty which is obscured by the application of the herd schema: 'science resolves the "familiar" more and more into the "unfamiliar"'.

In this section I have leant on the work of Constancio in order to outline the mechanics of cognition which underpin Nietzsche's later work. Following this I have argued against Clark's characterisation of GS 354 as containing the 'falsification thesis'. I have instead suggested that the simplification and

falsification identified by Nietzsche here should be understood as stemming from factors which are contingent and which can be transcended. By doing this I have also argued against those commentators who reject Clark's chronology but still claim that human consciousness and/or conceptual representation is necessarily and inescapably bound up with falsification. I now move on, in section two, to demonstrate that a strikingly similar picture of the mechanics of cognition is present in the early essay *On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense.* The issue of the character of Nietzsche's falsification remarks in this short and difficult essay will largely be deferred until chapter four.

Section Two | *Truth and Lie*'s Two Metaphors

There are many difficult interpretative issues surrounding Nietzsche's unpublished essay *On Truth and Lie in an Extra Moral Sense.* The essay is a philosophical attack, couched in heady rhetoric, on the pomposity associated with human knowledge (TL 79). I defer the majority of the interpretative issues surrounding this essay until my chapter length discussion of *Truth and Lie* in chapter four. In chapter four, I will argue that the rhetorical tactics which Nietzsche uses in the essay contribute to his presenting his metaphysical position misleadingly. In this section, I simply want to bring out the similarities which are present between the picture of the mechanics of cognition which we have seen is present in the later philosophy and that which is in evidence in *Truth and Lie.* In order to do this, I will refer not only to *Truth and Lie* but also to contemporaneous notes Nietzsche made, particularly those which are collected under the heading *The Philosopher: Struggles Between Art and Knowledge* in Breazeale (1979). This is a useful tactic as these notes are free from the obfuscatory rhetorical extravagances of *Truth and Lie* and calmly set out crucial elements of the epistemological framework underpinning the essay.

In chapter four, I will bring out a genealogy of a moralised sense of truth and knowledge which is present in *Truth and Lie*, and through which Nietzsche explains how our pompous conception and evaluation of truth and knowledge develops. This moral sense of truth is an early version of both the strand of falsification related to the 'criterion of true being' and the strand related to the priestly notion of 'objectivity'. What is relevant to our discussion here is how this moral sense of truth is linked in the essay to something at least very similar to the 'instinct of fear' and drive for security present in the later work. That factors similar to the 'instinct of fear' and drive for security are active in the formation of the moral sense of truth is attested to by the fact that it is instantiated on the basis of a 'need to make peace' and to 'exist socially and with the herd'. Further, the will to avoid the 'hated consequences of certain sorts of deception' (TL 81) and the need for 'repose, security and consistency' (TL 86) lurk in the background here. These motivations lead to 'a moral impulse regarding truth' which formalises as a 'fixed convention' a 'schema' of concepts which presents the world to us as 'more solid, more universal, better known, and more human than the immediately perceived world' (TL 84). Following our discussion of the role of the will in the formation of perspectives in chapter two, and our analysis of the mechanics of cognition in section one of this chapter, the dynamic these snippets suggest is present in *Truth and Lie* should sound familiar. Considering the two metaphors which Nietzsche takes to characterise human cognition in *Truth and Lie* will allow us to more carefully examine the continuities which are present.

2.1 The Two Metaphors

> To begin with, a nerve stimulus is transferred into an image:
> first metaphor. The image, in turn, is imitated in a sound:
> second metaphor
>
> (TL 82).

In this section I will demonstrate that the interplay described in *Truth and Lie* between stimuli from the external world or 'nerve stimuli', the formation of unconscious representations or 'images' and the conceptual content of consciousness designated by 'sounds', resembles the dynamic which we have seen to be present in the later philosophy. Here Nietzsche talks of 'sound' as the result of the second 'metaphor' and not directly of a concept, however, it is clear that the sound refers to the utterance of a word and that words are intimately linked with concepts. Nietzsche states, for example, that '[e]very word instantly becomes a concept precisely insofar as it is not supposed to serve as a reminder of the unique and entirely individual original experience to which it owes its origin' (TL 83). Appreciating the technical sense in which Nietzsche uses the term 'metaphor' will be key to the exegesis I give below.

2.2 First Metaphor: The Formation of the Image

Nietzsche describes the process of the production of an image – the process referred to as the 'first metaphor' in the quotation above – in terms which highlight the fact that the subject acts creatively in the formation of images. It is from the 'primal faculty of human imagination' that 'a mass of images' issues and these images are formed by us as *artistically creating subjects* (TL 86). The

picture Nietzsche is ruling out here, is that of a subject passively receiving a fully formed and determinate image. Indeed, the fact that the 'relationship of a nerve stimulus to the generated image is not a necessary one' emphasises not only that the image is formed by creative processes on the side of the subject, but also that there is no proper schema or rule which guides this process (TL 87). What is doing the work is a creative power of the subject: an 'artistic power […] which produces images' (P 64[30]).

Nietzsche refers to the example of the 'dream world' in order to provide evidence for this picture (P 64). His point here seems to be that as we accept that a creative process of the imagination lies behind the production of the images present in our dreams, we should also accept that the creative processes of the imagination are operative in our waking life – as opposed to conceiving of matters here in terms of the passive reception of content from the external world. The implication is that the imagination is somewhat similarly "artistically" operative in its formation of images from nerve stimuli. The 'nerve stimuli' discussed here are raw data from the external world from which our perceptual powers form an image. This explains why Nietzsche talks of 'metaphor' here as a 'complete overleaping of one sphere, right into the middle of an entirely new and different one' (TL 82). Both TL 82 and P 64 refer to Chladni's sound figures. Considering the analogy Nietzsche draws between perception and Chladni's sound figures will be instructive.

These sound figures are the visual patterns created on a sand-covered surface by the vibrations produced by 'a string affixed below the plane' – a visual rendering of sound (Breazeale 1979: p24, fn.55). Nietzsche employs this process as a metaphor for how images are related to nerve stimuli: 'these images are the finest emanations of nervous activity as it is viewed on a surface' (P 64). Unlike the relatively free creation present in dreams, the creation of images in

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[30] Here and throughout this thesis references to *The Philosopher: Struggles Between Art and Knowledge* (1872) (in: Breazeale (1979)) are given in the format 'P 64' where the number designates the section number not the page.

waking life is "constrained" by the fact that it is a formation, or emanation, of the underlying nervous activity. Though the relationship between nerve stimuli and image is 'not a necessary one' (TL 86), Nietzsche is clear that 'there is no totally free artistic inventing' (P 64). Indeed, in addition to the artistic invention here being an imaginative rendering of particular nerve stimuli, the underlying state of the organism also plays a role: 'Considered physiologically, the artistic process is absolutely determined and necessary' (P 64). How we form the image then, is a function of the nerve stimuli which are being rendered and the physiological condition of our organism – though there is no necessary path or rule governing this process.

At this point similarities between this account and the mechanics governing the formation of unconscious representations discussed in the previous section suggest themselves. The formation of the image involves something which might be called a 'simplification' in that it is an expression of the raw data of the nerve stimuli through a foreign mode of representation. It is natural to think that this mode of representation must simplify the nerve stimuli in order to form a stable and comprehensible image. This explains why Nietzsche chooses to use the term 'Übertragung' for metaphor here. This term might also be translated as 'transference' and this captures the sense in which this 'first metaphor' involves a transference between the spheres of nerve stimuli and image. It seems that the first sense of simplification identified in the previous section is present in the mechanics of cognition which underwrite *Truth and Lie* then.

With regard to the second sense of simplification – the 'selecting drive' – the fact that the formation of the image is a function of both the nerve stimuli and the physiological state of our organism, suggests that part of what determines the formation of the image are the drives which are dominant in the organism – and thus that something similar to the 'selecting drive' is here

operative. More will be said on this second sense of simplification when we move on to consider the application of concepts and the 'second metaphor'.

Before doing this, it should be explained why we should think that the image under discussion here occupies a similar place to the unconscious representations present in Nietzsche's later philosophy. That is, why we should think of these images as unconscious? The fact that the process governing the production of the image is '[p]hysiologically determined' (P 64) makes clear that it occurs below the level of consciousness. However, it might still seem natural to think of the image which results from this process being transparently available to consciousness. This is not Nietzsche's position however. The latter stages of *Truth and Lie* state that our orientation in the world as 'a "*rational*" being' (TL 84) is an orientation which is pervaded by concepts which prevent our accessing the initial image. Nietzsche's terminology wavers a bit here, but he contrasts the world as understood through our conceptual 'schemata' to world of 'vivid first impressions' (TL 84), 'the powerful present intuition' (TL 90) and the 'immediately perceived world' (TL 84). Thus, the image – described here as a 'vivid first impression' – is obscured by our usual mode of cognising the world through a conceptual schema. In similar spirit, Nietzsche also contrasts the world as it appears through a conceptual schema – as 'more solid, more universal, better known, and more human' – to the 'immediately perceived world' (TL 84). Further, Nietzsche describes how it is necessary to speak in 'forbidden metaphors' and in 'unheard of combinations of concepts' so that 'by shattering and mocking the old conceptual barriers' we open up the possibility that we may 'at least correspond creatively to the impression of the powerful present intuition' (TL 90). All this points to the fact that the image does indeed occupy a similar space to the unconscious representations of the later philosophy – even if the terminology Nietzsche uses is a touch extravagant. We can now move on to consider the second metaphor and the relation between the pre-conceptual image and concepts.

2.3 Second Metaphor: Concepts and the Image

The 'second metaphor' involves another transference between spheres. The first metaphor, which Nietzsche also describes as the 'perceptual metaphor', results in an image which 'is individual and without equals' (TL 84). This definition makes it clear that the mode of representation associated with the first metaphor is distinct from the conceptual representation of the second metaphor. This is because conceptual representation is associated with simplification and generalisation in *Truth and Lie* just as we saw it to be in the later works. Nietzsche notes, for example, that concepts are made to simultaneously 'fit countless more or less similar cases' and in doing this they fail to capture the particularity of these individuals; this means 'purely and simply' that 'cases which are never equal and thus altogether unequal' are treated as being the same (TL 83).

Crucially, as was seen with our discussion of the perceptual metaphor, there is also another sense in which the second, or conceptual, metaphor is related with simplification in *Truth and Lie*. Though somewhat latent in *Truth and Lie* itself, something strikingly similar to the 'selective drive' is present in the essay; though it is often missed by commentators.[31] In addition to metaphor being bound up with transference, Nietzsche defines metaphor in his notebooks (1872-1873) in the following terms: '*Metaphor* means treating as *equal* something that one has recognised to be similar in one point' (WEN 19[249]).[32]

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[31] Murphy (2001: ch.2) is an exception and his account was helpful in helping me to organise my thoughts here.
[32] Murphy (2001: p22-23) notes that Nietzsche's use of 'Übertragung' (transference) tends to be an umbrella term covering particular tropes, e.g. metonymy, synecdoche and metaphor (metapher) – see *Ancient Rhetoric* (subsequently AR): 65. Note that AR is another directly contemporary source (1872-1872) which, as I will show in chapter four, lends support to my interpretation of *Truth and Lie* (contra Clark); For AR I use 'Lectures on Ancient Rhetoric', translated by Gilman, S.L., Blair, C., & Parent, D.J., in Gilman, S.L., Blair, C., & Parent, D.J. (ed.), *Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989)

In another contemporaneous work, Nietzsche notes that words are tropes and that 'language never expresses something completely but displays only a characteristic which appears to be prominent' (AR: 23-25). These quotations suggest that in directing our attention to the tropic or metaphorical nature of perception and conceptualisation, Nietzsche is attempting to highlight not merely that a transference between spheres is taking place, but also that these modes of representation involve a selection and a foregrounding of certain features at the expense of others.

At this point, it is natural to wonder about the basis upon which certain features are foregrounded and others ignored. The combination of two factors suggests that the process in play here is similar to that which we identified in the later philosophy. The first is that when discussing the formation of the image we noted that its construction is partly physiologically determined by the state of the organism (P 64). As the process of conceptualisation works with the pre-conceptual image, it is natural to think that features which are pushed into the foreground during the process of the construction of the image are also given prominence in the conceptual image. However, the question now arises of how we are to understand the character of the physiological state of the organism at this point in Nietzsche's philosophical development – i.e. before he has developed the arsenal of terminology relating to the drives.

For our purposes, it isn't necessary to go too far into the specifics here. What seems clear from the tenor of *Truth and Lie* and surrounding notebooks is that Nietzsche takes something very similar to the 'instinct of fear' and drive for security identified in the later works to be the most significant force determining our cognitive engagement with the world. As will be shown in the next chapter, it is our need to live peacefully and with the herd (TL 81) which inculcates the moral sense of truth which is referred to in the title of the essay. In addition to this, Nietzsche makes clear that the desire for 'repose, security, and consistency' (TL 86) is what motivates our decision to cling to conceptual

schemata and the 'more solid, more universal, better known' world it presents (TL 84). The link to Nietzsche's analysis in GS 354-355 here is strengthened by the fact that Nietzsche already at this stage associates the motivating factors behind cognition as routinely associated with an instinct to gain control of our environment by neutralising unfamiliar aspects of it; he talks, for example, of the 'appropriation of an unfamiliar impression by means of metaphor' (P 148).

This suggests then, that some early form of the 'instinct of fear' is operative in the construction of the pre-conceptual image and that it makes prominent aspects which are in some sense already familiar to it. Following on from this process, conceptual representation expresses the content of the pre-conceptual image in a simplified and generalised form.

Before summarising this section, one final piece of evidence which suggests a remarkable continuity between the early and later work should be noted. In P 55 Nietzsche describes the artistic power which is responsible for the production of the unconscious image in terms which evidence its link with the 'selecting drive' of the later philosophy. Nietzsche notes in the later notebooks that the tendency 'to exclude, to chase away' and to 'allow only certain facts to be presented' (WLN 34[131]) is characteristic of the 'selecting drive'. He similarly notes in his early notebooks, that the '*artistic power*' 'permits the *major* features of the mirror image to be perceived with greater intensity' and clearly associates it with selectivity: 'it is *creative*. Its chief means are *omitting*, *overlooking*, and *ignoring*. It is therefore an anti-scientific power, because it does not have the same degree of interest in everything that is perceived' (P 55). This all strongly suggests that an early version of the 'selective drive' present in the later philosophy is an important part of Nietzsche's picture of the mechanics of cognition in *Truth and Lie*.

2.4 Summary

In summary, the previous two sections have shown that, in both the early and later works, Nietzsche conceives of consciousness as linked to conceptual representation and deems this conceptual representation to be a simplified or "metaphorical" expression of the unconscious representation which lies below it – and with which it is in many ways continuous. The unconscious representation itself is a simplification, or "metaphorical" expression, of content which comes from the external world in the form of stimuli. Further, the representative moves from stimuli to unconscious representation and from unconscious representation to conceptual representation, involve transferences between spheres, or simplifications, as well as a selection of the material to be foregrounded. This foregrounding stems from the dominant forces (drives) in the organism (as well as from the character of the stimuli in play); finally, our cognitive dealings are usually animated by a drive related to fear or security.

In closing section one of this chapter, we noted that there was no reason to associate the simplifying and generalising notion of consciousness with the kind of all-pervasive falsification Clark (1990) interprets as being present in GS 354.[33] The interpretation of *Truth and Lie* which I give in chapter four, will argue in a similar vein against Clark's interpretation of Nietzsche's position on falsification in that essay.

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[33] Nb. That the amendments which Clark has made to her view mean that she now denies that the falsification thesis is present in GS 354 and in BGE, but still maintains that it is present in the first four books of GS (as discussed in my footnote 7: see also Clark and Dudrick 2004: 370-373 and 384, n.3). I still primarily attack her seminal work of 1990. Her understanding of Nietzsche's remarks on falsification in the works which she still feels express the falsification thesis remains essentially the same – and essentially tied to the notion of a 'true world' – and it is in opposition to this aspect of her account that I erect my interpretation. Though she has significantly changed the chronology of her interpretation, my arguments in chapters four and five demonstrate the implausibility of even her amended account of Nietzsche's philosophical development.

Chapter Four | Falsification in *Truth and Lie*

This chapter aims to construct an interpretation of *Truth and Lie* to rival the seminal account of Clark (1990). Whereas Clark takes the essay to argue for the conclusion that all of our beliefs necessarily falsify reality because they fail to satisfy the criteria of the metaphysical correspondence theory of truth, I will argue that the main thrust of *Truth and Lie* is to demonstrate the absurdity of something very much like this theory of truth, along with a concomitant conception of knowledge. By doing this, I aim to show that Nietzsche did not hold an all-pervasive falsification thesis in this essay. Instead, the strands of falsification present in *Truth and Lie* are best understood as instances of those we identified in chapter two. That is, they are related to our tendency to overestimate the objectivity of human knowledge, to conceive of our truths as disclosing a level of 'true being' and to fail to develop an adequate sensitivity to our environment because we experience it through the herd schema. The 'moral sense' of truth – which Nietzsche provides a genealogical account of in *Truth and Lie* – is the fundamental cause of the overestimation of truth and knowledge which leads to falsification; this will be discussed in section two. Section three then further clarifies Nietzsche's understanding of falsification in this essay. Following this, section four reveals Nietzsche's account of how falsification can be overcome and thus, contra Clark, shows that he does not hold the view that human beliefs are necessarily false. Section five then concludes this chapter by considering how my interpretation of *Truth and Lie* can accommodate passages which might be held up as objections to it.

In addition to arguing against Clark's interpretation of what she takes to be a major expression of the falsification thesis, this chapter strikes a blow against the developmental nature of her account. It removes the starting point from which she tracks the development of Nietzsche's thoughts on truth and

falsification. I begin in section one by setting out, and then challenging, Clark's interpretation of Nietzsche's metaphysical position in *Truth and Lie* and *Human, all too Human* and how she takes this to determine his position on falsification.

Section One | The Metaphysical Position

1.1 Clark on Nietzsche's "Denials of Truth"

The predominant argument for the all-pervasive falsification thesis, or denial of truth, which Clark identifies in *Truth and Lie,* reaches the conclusion that 'truths are illusions' on the basis of a metaphysical correspondence theory of truth and a representational theory of perception. Though it is correct to say that Clark takes such an argument to be that which best characterises Nietzsche's considered position in *Truth and Lie*, she notes some metaphysical confusion in the essay which complicates her interpretation of it (Clark, p90-93). In fact, she identifies two attempts to justify the claim that 'truths are illusions', but notes that neither of these successfully achieves Nietzsche's aim; this being, as she characterises it in a later work, 'to deflate modern culture's valuation of scientific and theoretical knowledge' (Clark 1998: p47).

The first of these attempts, Clark describes as being broadly 'Kantian' in character in that it involves the view that '[t]ranscendent truth is both conceivable and of overriding value', but that it is 'unattainable for human beings' (Clark, p92). An argument from this position is capable of establishing the conclusion that the truths of science and common sense are 'illusions', but is vulnerable to the charge of dogmatism. If we have no access to transcendent truth, then it is not clear how we can know that the truths of science do not correspond to things in themselves. Clark claims that in an attempt to save himself from the charge of dogmatism, Nietzsche momentarily adopts a position regarding transcendent truth that she describes as "agnostic" – on this

position one accepts that we cannot know whether our beliefs correspond to the thing in itself or not. Nietzsche does seem to adopt this position when he writes that, to claim our beliefs 'do not correspond to the essence of things: […] would of course be a dogmatic assertion and, as such, would be just as undemonstrable as its opposite' (TL 83). However, this momentary change of position is incompatible with the Kantian position which Clark feels to be Nietzsche's most settled metaphysical position in *Truth and Lie*. Further, it is incompatible with the claim that all our beliefs falsify, as truth remains unknown and thus we do not have the authority to assert their falsity. Thus, the argumentation intended to "deny truth" here is ultimately either incomplete or dogmatic.

The second argument for the denial of truth which Clark argues to be present in *Truth and Lie* is also beset by a fundamental problem. Clark refers to Nietzsche's metaphysical position here as 'neo-Kantian'. This position deems the idea of transcendent truth (or correspondence to thing in themselves) as inconceivable and a contradiction in terms (Clark, p92). This position is adopted by Nietzsche, Clark claims, when he states that the idea of '"the adequate expression of an object in the subject" – is a contradictory impossibility' (TL 86). Nietzsche can deny truth, that is, he can claim that our beliefs do not correspond to the thing in itself, on the basis of this position. However, what Clark takes to be his most fundamental aim in the essay, to debunk the status of the truths of science (and common sense), is frustrated. On this picture, claiming that science is incapable of corresponding to the thing in itself is now merely claiming that it is incapable of doing something impossible. Or, as Clark puts it, '[i]f the kind of truth science cannot have is a contradiction in terms, how in the world could the value of science be bound up with the claim to possess it?' (Clark 1998: p47).

The interpretation of *Truth and Lie* that I will give in this chapter demonstrates that Nietzsche's intention is not to debunk the truths of science

and common sense on the basis that they fail to attain the standard of correspondence to metaphysical reality, but rather to point out the absurdity of this standard and the conception of knowledge which Nietzsche takes to be allied with it. Though Clark is right that the neo-Kantian version of the "denial of truth" would only show science to fail to satisfy a contradictory standard of truth, she is mistaken in taking Nietzsche to be interested in debunking science *per se*. Nietzsche's attack is instead predominantly directed against the bogus conception of truth and knowledge which he takes to be prevalent. This conception, as will be explained in the next section, Nietzsche associates with the 'moral sense' of truth around which the essay revolves. 'Truths' are 'illusions' on my interpretation, not because they fail to correspond to the thing in itself, but rather because we unjustifiably claim that they do so and thus award them an illusory status.

With regard to questions about Nietzsche's metaphysical position in *Truth and Lie*, I will argue in sections four and five that much of the apparent confusion in the essay can be explained away when we come to understand the rhetorical strategies Nietzsche indulges in. I also think there are good reasons for doubting Clark's presumption that Nietzsche was particularly preoccupied with theoretical issues surrounding the conceivability of transcendent truth and that any such preoccupation on his part would feed into his remarks on falsification. For the remainder of this section, I will consider the position Nietzsche adopts regarding the possibility of a transcendent realm, or 'true world', in *Human, all too Human* (1878) and the early unpublished essay *On Schopenhauer* (1868)[34]. In doing this, I will provide reasons for doubting the relevance of the position he develops on these issues to his falsification remarks. I will suggest that the sceptical character of his agnosticism on these issues is

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[34] For 'On Schopenhauer' I use Janaway's translation (in Janaway, C. (ed.), (1998), *Willing and Nothingness: Schopenhauer as Nietzsche's Educator*, Oxford: Clarendon Press). Citations are given in the form of section numbers from the translated text located at: Appendix 1: 258-265.

good reason for doubting that he would himself subscribe to a conception of knowledge which required correspondence to a 'true world'.

1.2 Nietzsche on the Metaphysical World

In *Human, all too Human* (1878) Nietzsche refuses to take the dogmatic step of absolutely ruling out the possibility of the existence of a metaphysical world:

> It is true that there might be a metaphysical world; the
> absolute possibility of it can hardly be disputed. We view
> all things through the human head and cannot cut this
> head off; though the question remains, what of the world
> would still be there if it had been cut off
>
> (HH 9).

As Nietzsche fails to rule out the possibility of a metaphysical world, and the related possibility that transcendent truth could differ radically from anything we could in principle come to know, Clark takes him to be under the spell of the metaphysical correspondence theory of truth which, on her account, he first adopted in *Truth and Lie* (Clark, p95-100). This leads her to understand Nietzsche's position in *Human, all too Human* as being that human knowledge is 'limited' and 'devalued' because it fails to correspond to the thing in itself (Clark, p102).

Backing up Clark's account is a complex story about the type of metaphysical realism which Nietzsche commits himself to here. The plausibility of this story rests on two claims that I deny. The first is that Nietzsche adopts a position which is recognisable as a version of metaphysical realism in *Truth and Lie*; his position in *Human, all too Human* is presented as a logical development of this earlier position. The second is that Nietzsche is grappling

with theoretical issues surrounding the epistemic separation between human knowledge and a possible metaphysical world, and that this leads him to see human knowledge as devalued. The first of these claims will be considered in the remainder of this chapter. The second is something which I will now try to show we have strong textual reason for doubting. Far from suggesting a link between Nietzsche's thoughts on the possibility of the existence of a metaphysical world and his acceptance of a standard of truth which leads him to devalue human knowledge, the relevant passages in *Human, all too Human* speak strongly against his taking account of the possible existence of any such realm in his assessment of human knowledge.

In the section immediately following that quoted above, Nietzsche notes that the 'problem of the "thing in itself" and "appearance"' is 'purely theoretical' (HH 10) and claims that interest in it will soon cease. In addition to this, he notes the epistemological irrelevance of any possible 'metaphysical world': *if* such a realm were to exist, knowledge of it would be 'the most useless of all knowledge: more useless even than knowledge of the chemical components of water must be to the sailor in danger of shipwreck' (HH 9). When we add to these statements dismissing the importance of the possible existence of a metaphysical realm the fact that the reason Nietzsche gives for being unable to rule out the 'absolute possibility' of the existence of such a realm is because he cannot 'cut off his head' and see the nature of reality minus the contribution of our way of knowing, Clark's story starts to seem more doubtful.

Indeed, in this passage Nietzsche proclaims that 'the worst of all methods of acquiring knowledge' are those which 'have taught belief in' the metaphysical world. He again admits they cannot be ruled out – the 'possibility still remains over' – however, he is clear that 'one can do absolutely nothing with it, not to speak of letting happiness, salvation and life depend on the gossamer of such a possibility' (HH 9). Given that this is the case, it seems unlikely that Nietzsche would cling to the falsification thesis *on the basis of* such

a possibility either. That is, it seems unlikely that he would hold a criterion of truth as correspondence to metaphysical reality. A reality about which, if it *were* to exist, one could assert 'nothing at all', 'except that it was a being-other, an inaccessible, incomprehensible being-other' (HH 9).

It is true that Clark focuses on the conceivability of transcendent truth rather than directly on the possibility of a transcendent realm, however, given Nietzsche's insistence that the possible existence of any such realm is a matter of irrelevance, there seems to be little plausibility in taking Nietzsche to adopt a standard against which to assess human knowledge which relates to such a realm.[35]

In *On Schopenhauer* – written roughly five years before *Truth and Lie* – Nietzsche adopts a similar position with regard to the possibility of a metaphysical world. Whilst engaged in a critique of Schopenhauer's metaphysics, he notes that:

> There can be a thing in itself, yet only in the sense that
> in the region of transcendence everything is possible
> that ever was hatched in a philosopher's brain […] Any
> decent way of thinking would speak out against such a
> cluster of possibilities
>
> (OS 2).

As well as this deeply sceptical remark, Nietzsche is also clear that the thought that we could come to say anything meaningful, and *a fortiori* know anything, about the thing in itself is a non-starter. He describes attempts to do so in the following terms:

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[35] Meyer (2014) also argues against Clark's reading of Nietzsche's position on truth and falsification in *Human, all too Human*. Though there are few similarities between Meyer's account of falsification and my own, our accounts of *Human, all too Human* and, in particular, Clark's misreading of Nietzsche's position on the metaphysical world in it, do overlap. This will be discussed when I mount further arguments against Clark's reading of *Human, all too Human* in chapter five.

> a totally obscure, inconceivable X is being decked out, as
>
> if in brightly coloured clothes, with predicates drawn from
>
> a world alien to it, the world of appearance
>
> (OS 3).

The intent of these remarks is clearly to ridicule Schopenhauer's posit of the metaphysical world. Thus, both *On Schopenhauer* and *Human, all too Human*, provide reason for doubting that Nietzsche would adopt the metaphysical correspondence theory of truth.

That *On Schopenhauer* occurs before, and *Human, all too Human* after, *Truth and Lie,* suggests that the position Nietzsche adopts in *Truth and Lie* may be continuous with these works. When I move on to interpret *Truth and Lie* itself and show that Nietzsche does not commit himself to any kind of metaphysical realism in that essay, I will take myself to have gone a long way to undermining not only the plausibility of Clark's reading of that essay, but also the plausibility of her interpretation of Nietzsche's position on falsification in *Human, all too Human* – which stems from the thought that this work is a development of his position in that early essay.

The above discussion of Nietzsche's position in the works surrounding *Truth and Lie* lends some initial plausibility to my claim that Clark is mistaken in understanding Nietzsche's remarks on falsification along the lines of a distinction between the thing in itself and appearance in the essay. Whereas Clark sees Nietzsche as devaluing human epistemological endeavours on the basis that they do not correspond to the thing in itself right up until he formulates the perspectivist metaphor and understands the thing in itself to be inconceivable in 1887, I do not believe he needed to develop a position on the inconceivability of the thing in itself to motivate a dismissal of the idea that we should judge our truths relative to their correspondence to a transcendent realm. In chapter five, I will consider Nietzsche's history of 'How the "True

World" finally became a Fable' in order to further set out my position that it is the irrelevance of a transcendent realm, not its inconceivability, that motivates Nietzsche to abolish it. I will also give further reasons there for denying that Nietzsche held Clark's falsification thesis in that work.

I now turn to an exegesis of Nietzsche's analysis of the 'moral sense' of truth in *Truth and Lie*. This exegesis will demonstrate that it is our conceptions of truth and knowledge which are the predominant cause of falsification.

Section Two | *Truth and Lie*'s Genealogy and the Moral Sense of Truth

This section will walk through Nietzsche's genealogy of the 'truth drive' (TL 81) before pausing to characterise the moral sense of truth – and its allied conception of knowledge – which Nietzsche takes to be widely held. Following this, we will move on, in section three, to summarise Nietzsche's understanding of falsification in *Truth and Lie* in light of this discussion and the analysis of the mechanics of cognition given in chapter three. Sections four and five will then focus on how we can overcome falsification and on how we should think of Nietzsche's own position on truth in this essay, respectively.

2.1 The Pre-Moral Sense of Truth

'[T]he first step to acquiring that puzzling truth drive' (TL 81), Nietzsche explains, is the development within the herd of an agreement upon a set of binding designations for things.

> That is to say, a uniformly valid and binding designation is invented for things, and this legislation of language likewise establishes the first laws of truth
>
> (TL 81).

The motivation for the establishment of these designations is the need to avoid 'the most flagrant *bellum omni contra omnes'* and establish a means through which humans can survive as a group: through 'boredom and necessity, man wishes to exist socially and with the herd' (TL 81). Here 'the contrast between truth and lie arises for the first time' (TL 81) as he who deviates from a correct usage of the agreed set of designations is labelled a liar. At this "pre-moral" stage[36], obedience to the agreed upon schema of designations exists on the basis of a mutually prudential pact, rather than a moral imperative. Relatedly truth is valued instrumentally, not in isolation from a prudential assessment of its consequences. When it comes to the liar, for example, what the herd 'hate' is 'basically not deception itself, but rather the unpleasant, hated consequences of certain sorts of deception' (TL 81).

Nietzsche pauses at this point in the essay to ridicule the thought that these prudentially agreed upon designations exhibit direct linkage with reality as it is in itself:

> And besides, what about these linguistic conventions themselves? Are they perhaps products of knowledge, that is, of the sense of truth? Are designations congruent with things? Is language the adequate expression of all realities?

---

[36] Andresen (2010) also identifies a 'pre-moral' stage in the development of our conception of truth at this point in the essay. Though our positions differ significantly, his work on *Truth and Lie* was a useful tool in helping me organise my thoughts.

> It is only by means of forgetfulness that man can ever
>
> reach the point of fancying himself to possess a "truth" of
>
> the grade just indicated
>
> (TL 81).

Here Nietzsche's point is not only that there is no such link between language and reality, but also that the selection of the designations proceeds from prudential need and not with truth or adequate expression in mind[37]. Man must forget the prudentially motivated process in order to think these designations express "truth" *of the grade just indicated.* This "grade" of truth is one which Nietzsche is clearly distancing himself from and it is also foreign to the merely prudential pre-moral system of truth. Thoughts concerning a 'grade' of truth of this kind, develop at the same time that 'there arises a moral impulse regarding truth' (TL 84).

Before the moral sense of truth is established in Nietzshce's narrative, the situation is merely that there is a schema of designations which are dominant in the herd and which one has to use in order to ensure smooth societal relations and effective communication. The development of a moral sense of truth is born from a will to formalise and entrench this precarious prudential agreement. Though the developments which represent the change from pre-moral to moral here are developments in how we conceive of the epistemological status of our designations (as will be shown below), the impulse which arises is termed "moral" by Nietzsche. Presumably, this is because the motivation behind the development in how we conceive of truth and knowledge stems from the will to demand the obedience of all to a schema intended to benefit the herd.

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[37] Indeed, it is here that Nietzsche mentions the two metaphors discussed in chapter two of this thesis, further strengthening our interpretative analysis there.

When the moral sense of truth is in place, the herd are described not only as obediently sticking to the schema, but as having adherence to it embedded in their unconscious as 'fixed convention'. Thus this convention is followed 'with the herd […] in a manner binding upon everyone', and followed 'unconsciously and in accordance with habits which are centuries old' (TL 84). Indeed, it is the fact that the prudential nature of the schema – and the prudential reasons for dutifully obeying it – fall below the level of consciousness that leads to the moralised sense of truth coming into existence:

> precisely *by means of this unconsciousness* and forgetfulness he
> arrives at his sense of truth. From the sense that one is
> obliged to designate one thing as "red," another as "cold,"
> and a third as "mute," there arises a moral impulse
> regarding truth
>
> (TL 84).

One aspect of the entrenching of the schema at this stage then, involves the original prudential reasons behind its development being forgotten, whilst the obligation to adhere to it is made stronger and moralised.

2.2 The Moral Sense of Truth

In addition to this, the moral sense of truth involves a change in how the prudential designations developed at the pre-moral stage are conceived. They are now understood as concepts and this, Nietzsche explains, entails that our view of their relation to reality changes in a particular way. What is involved in treating our designations as concepts here is not merely that we now apply designations to countless 'more or less similar cases' and thus generalise the

content of the objects subsumed (TL 83). We also come to view concepts, e.g. "leaf", as a model and unity we have uncovered in the fabric of the world:

> This awakens the idea that, in addition to the leaves, there exists in nature the "leaf": the original model according to which all the leaves were perhaps woven, sketched, measured, colored, curled, and painted
>
> (TL 83).

This shows that the moral impulse doesn't merely tighten the grip of the schema of designations over our thought by asserting that it is a moral 'duty' to use 'fixed convention' 'with the herd and in a manner binding upon everyone' (TL 84). It also entrenches the dominant perspective and schema of concepts by treating these as latching on to some deeper level of reality. Indeed, Nietzsche makes something of a similar point in his discussion of the concept 'Schlange' (snake). We don't merely consider this to be a designation – or, in Nietzsche's terminology, a 'metaphor' – intended to help us group together several different things by noting one familiar aspect (i.e. the tendency to 'wind or twist' – from 'schlingen'[38]), we come to see it as expressing some latent essence, or type, in reality. We conceive of the concept 'Schlange' as capturing some enduring essence of "snakeness" from which its earthly tokens spring.[39] Our conception of the relation between our concepts and reality is thus fundamentally changed.

To briefly recall our analysis from the previous chapter, this aspect of the moral perspective on truth explains Nietzsche's lamentation of the fact that we forget the metaphorical nature of our cognitive processes. He defines metaphor in the following way: '*Metaphor* means treating as *equal* something that one has

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[38] I take this etymological information from Breazeale (1979: p82, fn. 11).
[39] Nietzsche's reference to the Platonic sounding 'original essence' of 'leafness' in TL 83, along with his light mockery of the idea that language is able to capture the essence of 'snakeness', evidences the fact that he has Plato (and particularly Plato's *Cratylus*) in mind in this passage.

recognised to be similar in one point' (WEN 19[249])[40]. In reminding us of this, he is working against the moral perspective's tendency to obscure the nature of our cognition and undermining the view that conceptualisation could completely capture some purported essence metaphysically underpinning the things we encounter.

A similar change of our understanding of perception accompanies the transition to the moral sense of truth. Perception, of course, also necessarily proceeds through "metaphor". However, Nietzsche describes how man 'forgets that the original perceptual metaphors are metaphors and takes them to be the things themselves' (TL 86). Nietzsche's claim in this regard is that under the moral perspective we conceive of perception not as involving transference and selection, but rather as simply giving us unmediated access to the layer of reality which we now understand our concepts to be picking out. We forget the process behind perception – forget that we are '*artistically creating* subject[s]' – and hold an 'invincible faith that *this* sun, *this* window, *this* table, is a truth in itself' (TL 86). In doing this, a similar form of correctness as that which we think of as applying to our concepts is associated with our perceptions. We conceive of there being a standard of 'correct perception', which Nietzsche takes to mean that we conceive of our perception as "'the adequate expression of the object in the subject'" (TL 86). Such a standard of correctness is, of course, a 'contradictory impossibility' (TL 86) given the fact that Nietzsche's understanding of the mechanics of cognition entail that a subject's perception must proceed through transference and selection, and thus can never be completely "adequate" or complete.

Nietzsche explains our confidence here as being strengthened by the longevity of the system of convention in dominance. He points out that '[e]ven the relationship of a nerve stimuli to the generated image is not a necessary one'

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[40] See also AR 23/25: 'language never expresses something completely but displays only a characteristic which appears to be prominent to it'.

but notes that 'when the same image has been generated millions of times and has been handed down for many generations' deception on this point can arise (TL 87). The point here being that the endurance of relation between nerve stimulus and produced image makes it seem as if the connection between them were not the result of a particular process of transference and selection but were, instead, simply necessary and correct.

What it means to say that an image is handed down through generations is a topic that will be touched on in our discussion of the 'remembered image' in section four. Section four will also consider the extra-moral perspective, the perspective from which Nietzsche writes and which opens up the possibility that we can transcend falsification. To close section two, we will now summarise the central tenets of the moral sense of knowledge which is allied to the moral sense of truth, in order to clarify the ways in which – from the point of view of the moral perspective – human cognition is necessarily trapped within falsification.

2.3 The Moral Conception of Knowledge

Along with the transformation of our understanding of the relation between perception, conceptualisation and reality under the moral sense of truth, comes a change in our conception of knowledge. The herd accept the truth of the conventional conceptual schema because they take the distinctions entrenched in it to result from unmediated access to things in themselves in perception and to line up with divisions present in some underlying reality. Anything which is to count as knowledge, thus has to exhibit similar characteristics.

This overestimation of the status of human truths entails that the moral perspective requires human knowledge to correspond to a deeper metaphysical level than that which we inhabit, i.e. that of the 'original model' – from which

tokens of the type 'leaf' are thought to be woven – where '*this* sun, *this* window, *this* table,' reside as a 'truth in itself'. As they fail to do this, human beliefs are necessarily false. Considering why human beliefs necessarily fail to correspond to such a metaphysical level and to such objects will to make salient the criteria for knowledge on the moral perspective.

Firstly, the faith we have that '*this* sun, *this* window, *this* table' are delivered in perception as truths in themselves leads to the moral perspective demanding such unmediated and completely adequate perceptual content as a necessarily foundation for any possible knowledge. As perception is, for Nietzsche, "metaphorical", any such perceptual foundation for knowledge is ruled out. What we get in perception is the result of a transference from nerve stimulus to image and is mediated and inadequate. It is also the case, of course, that the perceptual metaphor involves the selection and foregrounding of certain aspects, rather than the completely 'objective' and non-selective perception that can deliver things to us as 'truths in themselves'.

Secondly, a similar deficiency handicaps the process of conceptualisation. When the image is turned into a sound and a concept is formed – the process involved in the creation of the second metaphor as discussed in chapter three – Nietzsche highlights the transference involved: 'there is a complete overleaping of one sphere, right into the middle of an entirely new and different one' (TL 82). In addition to this transference meaning that concept formation violates the standards of the moral perspective, the necessary selectivity of the process also does so. This is made salient when Nietzsche ridicules the idea that our 'linguistic conventions' are 'products of knowledge' and thus that language could deliver 'adequate expression' (TL 81). When discussing the failure of the linguistic demarcation of the concept 'snake' to adequately express "snakeness" – on the criteria of the moral perspective – he makes clear that this failure is symptomatic of the 'one sided preferences' and 'arbitrary differentations' which characterise the development of language

and concept formation and necessarily preclude the possibility of it satisfying the criteria of the moral conception of knowledge.

The essentially metaphorical character of human cognition then, guarantees its inability to deliver truth of the grade the moral sense demands. As 'the drive toward the formation of metaphors is the fundamental human drive, which one cannot for a single instant dispense with in thought' we can assume that falsification is, on the moral sense, all-pervasive (TL 88-89).

The failure of human cognition to attain correspondence with what amounts to a 'true world' and to satisfy the criteria for knowledge on the moral perspective entails that human beliefs are, from that perspective, necessarily false. Following this analysis, the similarities between the understanding of falsification from the moral perspective and Clark's interpretation of Nietzsche's considered view on falsification coincide in all relevant respects. The metaphorical nature of our cognition means that we are trapped within our own representations and are thus unable to correspond to the 'true' realm which exists in metaphysical separation from human subjects and the realm they inhabit. As I further develop my interpretation, I will argue that it is only from the moral perspective that human cognition appears to be *necessarily* false. In section three, I will summarise the strands of falsification which are present in the essay and signal which of them are Nietzsche's own, i.e. which of them remain once we have moved beyond the moral sense of truth and taken up the extra-moral perspective mentioned in the title of the essay.

Section Three | An Alternative Understanding of Falsification

In this section, I will first consider the strand of falsification related to the dominance of the herd schema. In the process of doing this, we will see how Nietzsche believes that it is the 'vivid world of first impressions' (TL 84) which

the schema falsifies. This is significant as it is the development of our sensitivity to this unfalsified perceptual content which I will argue Nietzsche's extra-moral perspective attempts to encourage and facilitate. In addition to Nietzsche juxtaposing the herd schema with the 'vivid world of first impressions' he also discusses the 'immediatley perceived world' (TL 84) as standing behind the herd schema and champions our ability to escape this schema and 'correspond creatively' to the 'powerful present intuition' (TL 90). I understand the phrases 'vivid first impression', 'powerful present intuition' and 'immediately perceived world' to be gesturing toward the same thing and take this to be something similar to the unconscious representations which we discussed in chapter three. It is also clear that the main use the young (and extravagant) Nietzsche has for these terms is that they serve as placeholders for whatever is falsified or hidden behind the herd schema. I will further nuance and textually substantiate my understanding of the extra-moral perspective, and Nietzsche's notion of the vivid first impression, in section four. However, by introducing it at the beginning of section three I will be able to distinguish between the genuine worries Nietzsche has about falsification and worries about falsification which only arise from the moral perspective on truth. This will be done when I discuss the strands of falsification bound up with the moral perspective's overestimation of the status of our truths and its erroneous characterisation of human cognition.

3.1 Falsification and the Herd Schema

As we have seen, the herd schema of designations initially comes about because of the need of humans in our ancestral past to exist socially and to avoid unnecessary conflict (TL 81). Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that these designations, which later become concepts, are developed through a process of

transference and selection which is informed by these needs. In addition to concepts growing up in this way, the formation of the perceptual image is described as bearing the mark of the herd and previous generations. Nietzsche tells us, for example, that 'the relationship of a nerve stimulus to the generated image is not a necessary one', it is, rather, a matter of 'the same image', formed by distant ancestors, being 'handed down for many generations' (TL 87). Exactly what Nietzsche means by suggesting that we 'remember' an image in this way, rather than forming it ourselves, will be examined further in section four. However, we can get an initial grasp on matters here by thinking of a set of stimuli reactivating an antecedently formed and retained template image, in something like the way Papineau (2007) describes.

This perceptual process is, in fact, prior to the creation of concepts – which arises on the back of it: 'Everything which distinguishes man from the animals depends upon his ability to volatilize perceptual metaphors in a schema, and thus to dissolve an image into a concept' (TL 84). The motivation for dissolving perceptual metaphors into concepts – and 'unversaliz[ing]' them – is described by Nietzsche as being bound up with a need for stability and security. The '*rational*' man of the moral perspective 'will no longer tolerate being carried away by sudden impressions, by intuitions' because he wishes to mollify the world into 'less colourful, cooler concepts' so that he 'can entrust the guidance of his life and conduct to them' (TL 84). Here similarities are evident with the need for stability and control, and thus preference for being over becoming, which, in TI *Reason* 5, we saw motivating, through the 'presuppositions of *reason*', the schematization of the "becoming" given in sensation: 'Being is imagined into everything – *pushed under everything*'. Indeed, Nietzsche here similarly juxtaposes the stable world presented in our concepts with the more dynamic world available in sensation:

> a new world, one which now confronts that other vivid
>
> world of first impressions as more solid, more universal,

better known, and more human than the immediately perceived world

(TL 84).

That the development of this schema serves our need to live with 'repose, security, and consistency' (TL 86), should also put us in mind of the foregrounding of the familiar which the *'instinct of fear'* brings about in GS 355.[41]

One element of the falsification associated which the herd schema then, is this juxtaposition between the stable world presented in our concepts and the relatively unstable world available in sensation. This kind of juxtaposition is one which we also associated with the human tendency to reify our concepts into reality in chapter two, and it will be briefly discussed in that context in the next section.

Another element of falsification related to the herd schema is the way that it blinds us to the particularity present in the vivid first impression:

Every concept arises from the equation of unequal things
[…] the concept "leaf" is formed by arbitrarily discarding these individual differences and by forgetting the distinguishing aspects

(TL 83).

We obtain the concept, as we do the form, by overlooking what is individual and actual

(TL 83).

Whereas each perceptual metaphor is individual and without equals […] the great edifice of concepts displays the rigid regularity of Roman columbarium and exhales in

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[41] As was discussed in chapter two.

logic that strength and coolness which is characteristic of mathematics

(TL 85).

The falsification Nietzsche is concerned about here is most naturally read, not as stemming from a metaphysical separation from the world as it is in itself but, rather, as a lamentation of the generalising nature of concepts which blinds us to the particularity of individual things which are in some sense available to us in perception. As discussion proceeds, I will show that it is this particularity – gestured toward by the phrase 'vivid first impression' – which Nietzsche, through discussing the extra-moral perspective, requires our representational activity to be able to 'creatively correspond' to.

3.2 Falsification and the Extra-Moral Perspective

Several reasons speak against taking the moral perspective, and its conception of truth and knowledge, as Nietzsche's own. The first is that *Truth and Lie*'s purpose, as set out in its opening paragraph, is to prick the pomposity of the human race and its 'arrogant and mendacious' inflation of the importance of its 'knowledge' (TL 79). Nietzsche does this through demonstrating the absurdity of the moral perspective on knowledge. The genealogy of this conception of knowledge and truth – which traces the extravagances of the moral perspective back to survival needs, mindless conventionality and forgetfulness regarding the actual processes of human cognition – is a mechanism for making salient the absurdity of what Nietzsche takes to be a widely held understanding of our epistemological endeavours.

The fact that Nietzsche includes the genealogy of the moral sense of truth is indicative of his attempts to distance himself from it. He also distances

himself from its extravagances at various points through the essay. After listing a set of its criteria for truth which our designations fail to satisfy, for example, he fairly unambiguously signals that these are not his own criteria:

> It is only by means of forgetfulness that man can ever reach the point of fancying himself to possess a "truth" of the grade just indicated
>
> (TL 81).

The criteria here are of a 'grade just indicated', a phrase which suggests Nietzsche does not himself endorse them. They are, further, criteria only of a "truth" which needs to be demarcated with inverted commas.[42]

In addition to these points, the two most substantial reasons for thinking that Nietzsche distances himself from the moral perspective are, firstly, the fact that he clearly sees and highlights the absurdity of its criteria as criteria upon which to judge human knowledge. The absurdity here is due to these criteria completely clashing with the metaphorical character which Nietzsche believes human cognition has. Secondly – as he is clearly committed to the goal of encouraging and facilitating our sensitivity to the vivid first impression – he implicitly presents correspondence to the vivid first impression as a rival standard, to that of the moral perspective, from which to evaluate human cognitive endeavours. I will discuss both of these aspects of *Truth and Lie* in section four when giving an account of how Nietzsche believes we can escape falsification.

As Nietzsche takes correspondence to the vivid first impression as a goal of our cognitive endeavours, the falsification which is of his concern relates to our enclosure within a dominant schema of concepts, as discussed above, and thus to our failure to develop our sensitivity to what is hidden behind that

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[42] Nietzsche similarly distances himself from the moral perspective's criterion of correct perception, see TL 86.

schema – e.g. those real 'individual differences' which it blinds us to, i.e. to first-order falsification. However, this kind of falsification is accompanied by, and exists in a mutually entrenching relationship with, the falsifying conceptions of knowledge and truth of the moral perspective which hold us captive; that is, second-order falsification. This falsification is an instance of the strands we discussed in chapter two; those related with the positing of a realm of 'true being' and a belief in the 'objectivity' of our knowing processes. To bring this discussion of the falsification which Nietzsche is concerned with from the extra-moral perspective to a close, I will briefly summarise these strands as they are manifest in *Truth and Lie*.

3.2.1 Falsification and the Realm of 'True Being'

As we have seen, one constituent of the moral perspective is the reification of our concepts into reality. Thus, we believe our concepts latch on to some essence or type latent in a metaphysically separate layer of reality. From the extra-moral perspective, the falsification associated with the realm of 'true being' is not bound up with our failure to correspond to such a metaphysical layer. It resides, instead, in the overestimation we make of the status of our truths. Instead of conceiving of our concepts as usefully grouping together objects which are in some respects similar, we – held captive as we are by the moral perspective – understand them to be uncovering a layer of reality to which they could not possibly correspond; and which there is good reason for thinking Nietzsche is decidedly sceptical about the existence of. The falsity here attaches to the fact that, on the moral perspective, the claim that 'a is an instance of x' amounts to the claim that 'a' is an instance of a metaphysically entrenched and settled type: 'x'. Nietzsche also feels that when we subsume 'a', 'b' and 'c' under the concept 'x' we in some sense assert that 'a', 'b' and 'c' are identical.

The fact that the concept, as a metaphor, pushes forward similarities between 'a', 'b', and 'c' is (mis)understood as revealing the fact that these individuals share an identical essence. It is in this sense that concepts trade in 'the equation of unequal things', and that 'cases which are never equal and thus altogether unequal' are simply treated as manifestations of things of the type 'x' (TL 83).[43]

The key aspect of falsification here is bound up with the reification of our conceptual schema into reality and the fact that this means that our truth claims are, from the extra-moral perspective, exaggerated in a falsifying manner. It is along these lines that the central refrain of *Truth and Lie* should be understood. When Nietzsche states that '[t]ruths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions' (TL 84), he is making the point that our truths do not attain the illusory status which we, who subscribe to the moral perspective, take them to. They are not truths of the grade that the moral perspective would have us believe that they are.

Two other small points are worth making here. The first is that our attribution of truth to a realm other than this one means that we devalue the world of vivid first impressions to which we actually have access. The second is that, as was discussed in chapter two's section on the falsification associated with 'true being', the reification of our concepts into a realm of 'true being' also means that we understand reality to exhibit a stability and endurance which it does not. A similarly false picture of reality is presented by the herd schema, as is evidenced when, for example, Nietzsche remarks on the 'more solid, more universal, better known' nature of the world we take to be revealed in our schema – as compared with the 'world of vivid first impressions' (TL 84). This suggests a continuity between the kind of falsification associated with our

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[43] This point relates of course, to the metaphorical nature of concept formation and our tendency to forget this and assume that our concepts adequately express the objects they subsume. We forget, that is, that '*Metaphor* means treating as *equal* something that one has recognised to be similar in one point' and take the particular similarity posited between things to reveal their identity (WEN 19[249]).

schema in *Truth and Lie* and that which is present in the later philosophy, for example, in GS 110 and TI *Reason* 5.

3.2.2 Falsification and 'Objectivity'

Whereas from the moral perspective it is the metaphorical character of human cognition which necessitates our inability to reach truth, this is not a concern for Nietzsche. It is, rather, the way that knowledge is presented as requiring the transcendence of the processes of transference and selection essential to human cognition that Nietzsche is concerned with. This conception is falsifying simply because it presents a false picture of how our cognition works. As we'll see in the next section, the way that the subjective and creative aspects of our cognition are disregarded on the moral sense of truth resembles the ascetic priest's notion of 'objectivity' and his renunciation of interpretation, in the third book of *The Genealogy*.

Before moving on to section four it is worth noting how the two main strands of falsification given rise to by the moral perspective's conception of truth and knowledge, serve to entrench the dominance of the herd perspective. They do this because they discourage and inhibit our ability to see beyond the schema of concepts in two main ways. Firstly, because we take ourselves to be in contact with things in themselves in perception, and to latch on to distinctions which adequately express a reified realm of 'true being' in our development of language and concepts, a complacency arises which suppresses any felt need to examine matters further. Part of the reason for our complacency is the conception of how we got to the "knowledge" that we currently have. In thinking of perception as giving us unmediated access to reality, and thinking of our concepts as having been developed logically, we are content with the "knowledge" they have delivered to us. In thinking in this way,

however, we not only obscure the metaphorical processes inherent to our cognition but also disdain them as arbitrary and inadequate. This means that the processes through which Nietzsche thinks cognition proceeds, the processes through which we might challenge the herd schema, are prohibited and thus no longer available to us. As we have "forgotten", or were not aware of, the metaphorical processes which originally brought in the current schema of concepts, we don't take this prohibition on metaphor to be hypocritical or absurd. The fact that concepts are the mere '*residue of a metaphor*' and that 'the artistic transference of a nerve stimulus into images is, if not the mother, then the grandmother of every single concept' is something we fail to understand (TL 85). All of this serves to entrench the dominance of the herd schema.

The extent of the dominance of the herd schema, and of the pervasiveness of falsification, is therefore substantial. We have seen how, in perception, we routinely merely 'remember' ancestrally formed images when confronted with some stimulus. Our typical way of seeing is thus merely a matter of encountering forms shaped by our ancestors in the herd: we are content to 'receive stimuli' and have our 'eyes merely glide over the surface of things and see "forms"' (TL 80). On this picture, we do not even seem to have access to the content which is simplified, or pushed into the background, by the ancestral perceptual metaphor, as this process happens below the level of consciousness. Further, even when this image is delivered to us, we have only the herd schema of concepts to make sense of it – polluted as it is with the selection and foregrounding of the herd – because the moral sense of knowledge prohibits the development of new metaphors. Given the pervasiveness of falsification, it is now necessary to take on the challenge of showing how Nietzsche thinks it can be transcended.

Section Four |Overcoming Falsification in *Truth and Lie*

At the heart of *Truth and Lie* Nietzsche makes the following statement:

> 'Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions;
> they are metaphors that have become worn out and have
> been drained of sensuous force' (TL 84).

On my interpretation of the essay, Nietzsche's describes our 'truths' as 'illusions which we have forgotten are illusions' in order to draw our attention to the fact that, through the development of the moral perspective on truth, we afford an illusory status to our truths and believe them to latch on to, and adequately express, some underlying metaphysical level of reality. However, it is the second refrain in the above quotation which I will focus on in this section: '[truths are] metaphors that have become worn out and have been drained of sensuous force'. Nietzsche repeatedly returns to the theme of the metaphorical character of human cognition in *Truth and Lie* and his contemporaneous notebooks. I will here argue that Nietzsche attempts to move us beyond the moral perspective by highlighting the fact that it obscures the nature of our cognitive processes and prevents our epistemological flourishing. One major way in which he does this is by setting out his account of human cognition in a way that revalues its metaphorical character – against the moral perspective – and opens up the possibility that we can reinvigorate the metaphorical processes of human cognition and recapture its 'sensuous force'.

What this means, when we translate it out of the unhelpful terminology of *Truth and Lie*, is that we can reorient ourselves with regard to our cognitive processes in such a way that, instead of accepting the veracity of the 'worn out' metaphors which populate the herd schema, we are liberated to form new metaphors, i.e. attend to and represent aspects other than those foregrounded by the herd schema. When we see how Nietzsche seeks to reorient his readers with regard to their cognitive processes, it will also become possible to see how

we can respond to the question we posed at the end of chapter three concerning whether the simplifying nature of human cognition necessitates that it falsifies. When we, firstly, move beyond the demand that our representations must correspond to some underlying metaphysical level – and instead conceive of the goal of our representational activity as being to develop our sensitivity to what is available in perception. And, secondly, drop the requirement that cognition must deliver to us a complete and "adequate" expression of the subject matter it is concerned with, we will be able to see that there is no reason for thinking that human cognition necessarily falsifies. We will instead be able to employ the metaphorical character of our cognition to push forward prominent likenesses and to help us develop our sensitivity to the subject matter under consideration. Further analysis of the importance of Nietzsche's revaluation of the metaphorical character of our cognition, and his decision to use the term 'metaphor' in this regard, will be given below.

The two main parts of this section serve to demonstrate that falsification can be overcome, and thus that it is not all-pervasive as Clark asserts. The first part, 4.1, will provide an account of Nietzsche's revaluation of the subjective and creative aspects of our 'metaphorical' cognitive processes. This will be done by examining Nietzsche's reasons for thinking that the moral perspective's demand that we extirpate these aspects as absurd. In 4.1, we will also begin to bring out the role which perspectivism and artistry play in helping us to overcome falsification. The second part, 4.2, will give a textually grounded account which shows exactly how Nietzsche takes it to be possible to overcome falsification by coming to 'correspond creatively' with the world of vivid first impressions which the herd schema falsifies (TL 90). This will involve an in-depth examination of the delicate and technical terminology Nietzsche uses to discuss our cognitive mechanics in *Truth and Lie* and contemporary notebooks. The result of this will be that a distinction between the 'remembered' image and

the vivid first impression is made salient; a distinction which is vital to understanding how falsification can be overcome.

In demonstrating how the herd schema of concepts (first-order falsification) (4.2) and the falsifying elements of the moral perspective (second-order falsification) (4.1) can be overcome, we will have provided an account of the extra-moral perspective; this perspective being defined largely as a corrective against the excesses of its moral counterpart. Following this, section five will summarise chapter four. It will also consider how we should understand the notion of the "vivid first impression" and allay fears that it is a thinly disguised 'true world'. Before closing the chapter, I will also pause to consider a couple of passages from *Truth and Lie* which might be held out as objections to my interpretation.

4.1 Artistry and the Unselective Knowledge Drive

In section one of this chapter I mentioned that it was unlikely, given Nietzsche's scepticism about the existence, and philosophical relevance, of a 'true world' in *On Schopenhauer* and *Human, all too Human*, that he would adopt the standard of correspondence to any such realm as the standard via which we should judge human knowledge in *Truth and Lie*. We have seen how a standard of this kind is a feature of the moral sense of truth which Nietzsche gives a genealogical account of. Here I will show how Nietzsche introduces such a standard – not to signal his endorsement of it, but rather – to highlight its absurdity and to demonstrate how it can be overcome. In demonstrating how this standard can be overcome, and how its falsifying elements can be eradicated, I will bring to light the fact that an early version of Nietzsche's perspectivist insight is in evidence in *Truth and Lie* and foreground the role of artistry in this process.

On the moral perspective, it is the transference and selection inherent in our cognition which confines us to falsification. The existence of this conception in the essay explains Clark's insistence that Nietzsche affirms the falsification thesis, in part, because he is impressed by Schopenhauer's representationalism. It is certainly the case that Nietzsche believes that we are unable to completely escape our representations and that these representations bear the mark of the species, of our ancestral history and of the needs of the subject who produces them. We are thus, in a sense, trapped within our representations, and because of the nature of these representations, we never encounter the external world immediately or completely. Demonstrating that Nietzsche wants to encourage our sensitivity to the 'vivid world of first impressions', and not a 'true world' (as I will below), will enable us to see that the transference involved in cognition does not, however, entail the falsity of all human cognition. My focus at this point, though, is on the selective nature of cognition and how Nietzsche's move to the extra-moral perspective signals a revaluation of the selective and creative aspects of our cognition which casts them as enabling features of knowledge, rather than as falsifying.

To understand the source of the moral perspective's prohibition on selection and insistence on immediate and adequate expression in our representative activities, it is necessary to look at the dichotomy Nietzsche draws between science and art in *The Philosopher: Reflections on the Struggle Between Art and Knowledge* (1872). In these notes, Nietzsche associates science, and an attendant conception of knowledge, with an 'unselective knowledge drive' (P 20). Art, conversely, is associated precisely with creativity and selection. Thus, in P 55 Nietzsche labels the power present in perception as an '*artistic power*' 'because it is creative' and selective – its 'chief creative means are omitting, overlooking, and ignoring'. This is in opposition to science: 'It is therefore an anti-scientific power, because it does not have the same degree of interest in everything that is perceived' (P 55). Nietzsche is undoubtedly opposed to the

'unselective knowledge drive' (P25, P26). What is revealed by turning to *The Philosopher* then, is that there is a conception of science and knowledge which Nietzsche associates with the renunciation of selection and of the creative aspects of our cognition.

Such a renunciation of selection should put us in mind of the ascetic scientist's renunciation of interpretation in GM III 24. As we saw in chapter two and in our discussion of falsification above, the result of the extirpation of the selective and creative aspects of cognition is the further entrenchment of the dominant schema over our thought. When we extirpate our affects we effectively incapacitate our ability to effectively engage with the world cognitively and instead reduce ourselves to merely applying a schema in our epistemological dealings. In chapter two, I suggested that in order to combat the effects of this renunciation, Nietzsche revalues the selective and creative processes which are necessary to form interpretations on experience to rival that of the herd schema. This is precisely the method Nietzsche adopts for defeating this conception of knowledge and enabling the formation of new metaphors – new interpretations – to challenge the dominance of the herd schema in *Truth and Lie*.

In *Truth and Lie* Nietzsche employs the dichotomy he drew between artistry and the unselective knowledge drive in *The Philosopher*. He repeatedly highlights the selective and creative nature of fundamental elements of our cognition by associating them with artistry in order to demonstrate the absurdity of the moral conception of knowledge's prohibition of these elements. In this vein, he refers to the transition between nerve stimulus and image as an 'artistic transference' (TL 85). In addition to this we are told, for example, that we are active as '*artistically creating*' subjects when we form the perceptual image, and that between the different spheres of subject and object there is only an '*aesthetic* relation' (TL 86). However, the most striking instance of this tactic is the prominence of the term 'metaphor' in the essay. This term

is used to highlight the selective aspects of perception and the formation of concepts, and we are left in no doubt as to its importance: 'The drive toward the formation of metaphors is the fundamental human drive, which one cannot for a single instance dispense with in thought' (TL 88-89). It is also the case that when describing how we can develop our sensitivity to those aspects obscured or hidden by the herd schema, we are told that we must employ 'forbidden metaphors' in order to 'correspond creatively' to the 'powerful present intuition' (TL 90).

Thus we can see how Nietzsche revalues the selective and creative aspects of our cognition so they can be seen, contra the moral perspective, not as elements which necessarily lead us into falsity, but rather as features which enable us to overcome the straight-jacket of the herd schema and to develop our sensitivity to what it obscures. This revaluation is evidence of the fact that Nietzsche is not beholden to Schopenhauer's representationalism, as Clark asserts. Against Clark, it seems that in this early work, Nietzsche is already cognisant of the basic perspectivist insight that subjective factors which influence the individual's cognition needn't be presumed to have a distorting and falsifying influence on their representation of the world.

The above analysis demonstrates that Nietzsche is clear-sighted about the absurdity of the moral perspective's demand for "adequate expression". That this is the case makes it unlikely that he would adopt this demand in evaluating the products of human cognition. There is further evidence from notebooks contemporaneous with *Truth and Lie* that he was interested in challenging and deflating conceptions of knowledge which are inconsistent with the mechanics of human cognition:

> [K]nowing certainly does not want to admit of any
> transference […] But there is no "real" expression and *no*
> *real knowing apart from metaphor*

(P 149).

> We *know* what the world is: absolute and unconditional
>
> knowledge is wanting to know without knowing
>
> (WEN 19[146])

What Nietzsche does in *Truth and Lie* in order to enable us to see beyond the falsifiying conceptions of truth and knowledge which he feels to be dominant, is, firstly, to reorient us with regard to the 'metaphorical' nature of our cognitive processes. In doing this, he enables us to reinvigorate the metaphorical processes which he describes as having become 'worn out' and drained of 'sensuous force'. And, secondly, to refocus our attention on developing a sensitivity to what is obscured by the dominant herd schema. In doing this he removes the illusory status that the moral perspective pushed us to attach to our 'truths'.

4.2 Corresponding Creatively to the "Vivid First Impression"

In order to strengthen my argument for the claim that the falsification remarks Nietzsche makes in *Truth and Lie* do not commit him to an all-pervasive falsification thesis of the type Clark identifies, I will now further nuance my account of the cognitive mechanics which Nietzsche works out in the essay and contemporaneous notebooks. The process of doing this will also enable us to answer the question posed at the end of chapter three concerning whether the simplifying nature of our concepts entail that we are trapped in falsification for the early Nietzsche.

In setting out the mechanics of cognition in chapter three we followed Constancio's lead in taking the formation of the image to be something which

proceeds through the selecting drive of the individual subject. This drive, on Constancio's picture, foregrounds aspects which can be represented as familiar or which are particularly relevant to the individual's dominant drives. Constancio assumes that unconscious representations are formed by the individual on the basis of their underlying affective state. However, Nietzsche's talk in *Truth and Lie* of an image being selected – following the reception of nerve stimuli – from a pre-existing stock of images which are already formed and somehow handed down to us from previous generations, suggests that this is not always the case. This process is presented by Nietzsche as an almost automatic and default process: 'the same image has been generated millions of times and has been handed down for many generations' – even though its generation has no 'necessity or exclusive justification' (TL 87).

That something is missing from the account we gave in chapter three is further evidenced by the fact that Nietzsche distinguishes between two aspects of the 'artistic power' related to unconscious representation: 'There is a twofold artistic power here: the which produces images and that which chooses among them' (P 64). Indeed, in another note Nietzsche is clear that we do not always, upon the reception of some stimulus, produce an image ourselves: 'The appropriation of an unfamiliar impression by means of metaphors. Stimulus and recollected image bound together by means of metaphor' (P 148). Nor is this simply a quirk of the early work. In *Beyond Good and Evil* Nietzsche makes similar remarks concerning our tendency to recollect images:

> Given some stimulus, our eyes find it more convenient to reproduce an image that they have often produced before than to register what is different and new about an impression
>
> (BGE 192).

This reveals another aspect of our cognitive mechanics which contributes to its simplifying nature. Instead of producing an image which is adequate to the stimulus which is present, we often simply reactivate an image from a stock we have retained; in a way, as mentioned earlier, that might be understood along the lines of Papineau's talk of reactivating a 'sensory template' (2007: p114-115).[44]

It seems clear that any such recollection of an image must be unsatisfactory to Nietzsche, as his goal is to develop our sensitivity to the particularities which are obscured by the imposition of previously established schema. This is particularly the case in *Truth and Lie* where he associates the recollection of an image with a stock of images handed down from previous generations. In order to make sense of what the "vivid first impression" is in contrast to the recollected image, and to be able to explain how we might begin developing our sensitivity to it, it will be necessary to consider what we work with when we take on the burden of forming the image "ourselves" – where 'forming the image ourselves' means that the selective processes which proceed below the level of consciousness follow from the affective state of our individual organism – rather than simply being instances of our selecting a pre-formed image from a pre-existing (ancestral or personal) stock.

Nietzsche tells us that the 'primal procedure' – when it comes to sensory perception – is based upon tropes and seeks to identify 'some likeness between one thing and another, to identify like with like' (P 144). However, in order for Nietzsche to make sense of how this can happen he needs to posit the presence of something with some element of determinate form. If some likeness is to be discerned here, then it cannot be the case that we have a group of completely unformed nerve stimuli – we must be discerning likenesses on the basis of something. Thus Nietzsche tells us that the process here 'presupposes the

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[44] Riccardi (2013: p246) helpfully links BGE 192 with the work of Papineau (2007).

perception of shapes' (P 144). Though this is a single remark in a single note, it highlights (and resolves) an issue for Nietzsche's talk of our forming the images ourselves through means of metaphor. Some minimal form must be presupposed for Nietzsche's remarks about the production (or for that matter recollection) of an image to make sense. This is why Nietzsche posits this stage before further form and content is given to the image, where the image is present with minimal form. It is the image in this initial form which I suggest we might understand Nietzsche as referring to when he mentions the "vivid first impression" in *Truth and Lie*.

The precise workings of matters here do seem to be something Nietzsche spent some time thinking over. Though his discussion, and our own, has been dry and frustratingly abstract, he does seem keen to guarantee a space in his presentation of our cognitive mechanics to which we can attempt to develop our sensitivity when we transcend the conventional conceptual schema. One might question the legitimacy of taking this sketchy picture as Nietzsche's considered view. Indeed, it does seem to me to be helpful to think of the 'vivid first impression' simply as a placeholder for what is obscured and falsified by the herd schema, however, Nietzsche's remarks in P 144 suggest that our interpretation is on the right track. The picture we have in front of us now puts us in a position where the internal logic of the cognitive mechanics Nietzsche sets out is comprehensible. We can thus give an account of how Nietzsche thinks we may break free from dominant schema and develop our sensitivity to the "vivid first impression" – thus overcoming the first-order falsification which attaches to the herd schemas' generalised and falsified content.

What the mechanics in play here don't do is allow us to envisage some straightforward confrontation with the "vivid first impression". Our current relation to the "vivid first impression" is mediated, simplified and falsified. The question here is how can we work against this and develop our sensitivity to the "vivid first impression". The first step in this process is to counteract the way

we relate to the subject matter conceptually – on the moral sense – and falsify it by understanding our concept to be an "adequate expression" of some reified reality standing behind the thing. This conception must of course be abolished and Nietzsche's account, and revaluation, of the mechanics of cognition must be substituted in.

However, even after this first step, we are – at best – in a situation where we have a congealment of the image on the basis of one way of forming or remembering it. Assuming that it is the case that the formation of this image is caused by our organism, i.e., that we form this image, rather than relying on a recollected image from our ancestral stock, it is still the case that when this image is pushed into consciousness it will be represented in concepts. Further, the problem that we are trying to solve is that our current schema leads us into falsification, thus it might seem that even a freshly produced image will be pushed through the falsifying herd schema as it enters consciousness. A worry arises then, as it seems we can't escape the conceptual schema simply by moving beyond the moral sense of truth and the second-order falsification associated with it.

Near the end of *Truth and Lie* however, Nietzsche completes his picture of how we can come to increase our sensitivity to the vivid first impression. Though the young rhetorician provides us merely with a rhetorical flourish, what he says fits. In order to use the conceptual schema which we are in some sense "trapped" within to develop our sensitivity, we must manipulate it and apply it in novel ways. The "vivid first impression" and the way the secondary image is formed on the basis of this, lie below consciousness. It is through using the tools of consciousness, as it were, that we can attempt to recall those aspects of the "vivid first impression" pushed into the background by our selective formation of the image. Thus, Nietzsche calls for us to speak 'only in forbidden metaphors and in unheard of combinations of concepts' so that, in doing this, we may 'by shattering and mocking old conceptual barriers' 'correspond

creatively' to the "vivid first impression" (TL 90)[45]. We are again here dealing with the abstract and unhelpful terminology of *Truth and Lie*, however, Nietzsche is suggesting a way of moving beyond the partial and perhaps obscuring aspects of our representative faculties. The unorthodox use of metaphors and concepts is intended to open up to us what is obscured by the herd schema, by, for example, foregrounding novel aspects and unrecognised similarities.

Reference to the "vivid first impression" is crucial as it is a placeholder for what we are developing sensitivity to. Without this placeholder, Nietzsche would be in danger of either equating what he wants us to develop sensitivity to with nerve stimuli; which one assumes are relatively formless and thus theoretically compatible with almost any way of reading them out; this way lies the danger of relativism. Or, alternatively, of equating it with the image which has been formed, either by the herd or by the individual, which seems inappropriate. The "vivid first impression" provides something, though something sketchy and which should be understood as not much more than a placeholder, which is concrete and which it seems one could be judged to have successfully or unsuccessfully expressed something of in their representational activities. It is not completely relative nor completely drained of content. When one is successful in the task of expressing something about it, the metaphorical expressions really bring something to light about the "vivid first impression".

Note here that, even when this process is successful, there is no sense in which unmediated access is achieved or in which we transcend the modes of our cognition. By accepting that our mode of cognition involves a simplifying transference and accepting that each method of expressing something will selectively foreground some aspects instead of others, we can utilise our mode

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[45] Nietzsche's wavering of terminology means that he actually talks of corresponding to the 'impression of the powerful present intuition' (TL 90) but it is the same space as that demarcated by the phrase 'vivid first impression'.

of cognition effectively. This will involve developing multiple metaphors, multiple perspectives or ways of understanding, in order to see things from multiple points of view which can then be compared and aggregated. This process of shifting different points of view in and out, also serves as a check on dominant drives which might otherwise seduce us into accepting their perspective as a norm and as revealing reality completely adequately. Nietzsche's calls for the development of new points of view, new metaphors, to be formed in order to challenge a dominant schema should put us in mind of his remarks in GM III 12.

In summary, Nietzsche's account of how falsification can be overcome has the following features: It involves our breaking free from the claims about the status of our perception and conceptual schema associated with the moral sense of truth and calls on us to revalue the metaphorical nature of our cognitive processes. That is, it works against the second-order falsification which attaches to the moral perspective. In doing this, it encourages a different attitude toward our conceptual schema – which is revealed as partial and enclosing. Against the moral sense of knowledge, it encourages us to conceive of the subjective aspects of our mode of cognition, the selective aspects of metaphors, as things which can enable us to form a vantage point and mode of expression through which we can develop sensitivity to what is really there but is obscured by the conceptual schema, i.e. the "vivid first impression".

That the following points are present, if buried, in *Truth and Lie* and in the thinking mapped out by Nietzsche in his notebooks, demonstrates that Nietzsche is interested in pointing to a way out of the falsification he identifies. Against the position we found ourselves in at the end of chapter three – of questioning whether the mechanics of cognition left us in a situation where falsification was inevitable and inescapable – it is now possible to see that Nietzsche views falsification as contingent. It is only when we assume the moral sense of truth and knowledge that we end up in falsification. Transcending this

sense of truth and knowledge allows us to revalue the subjective aspects of our cognition and relate to them in a way which prevents our falling into falsification by considering ourselves to have an "adequate expression" (in the objectionable sense of this term) of reality in perception and in our conceptual schema. It also allows us to see beyond the herd schema which blinds us to certain aspects of the world, those aspects which Nietzsche reserves a place for when referring to the "vivid first impression".

In identifying the falsifying aspects of the moral sense of truth and overcoming them, Nietzsche gives expression to the extra-moral sense of truth which he refers to in the title of the essay.

Section Five | Knowledge and Truth in *Truth and Lie*

The foregoing discussion has made sense of the internal logic of Nietzsche's position in *Truth and Lie*. It has also brought out the plausibility of understanding the falsification present in the essay as being primarily bound up with the moral sense of truth and being something which is, though prevalent and stubborn, contingent and avoidable.

However, before closing this chapter it is necessary to consider a couple of points: firstly, how can my interpretation accommodate those elements of "metaphysical confusion" which appear in the essay and which Clark's account highlights. Secondly, how are we to understand Nietzsche's own position on knowledge and truth in the essay.

5.1 Nietzsche's Internal Critique of the Moral Sense of Truth

In order to demonstrate the explanatory power of my interpretation, even given the unhelpful and confused manner of Nietzsche's rhetorical posturing in *Truth and Lie*, I will consider two passages which might be used as counterexamples to it. In the first of these Nietzsche seems to assert a chasm between our representations and the 'original entities' which they purport to represent:

> [W]e believe we know something about the things themselves when we speak of trees, colour, snow, and flowers: and yet we possess nothing but metaphors for things – metaphors which correspond in no way to the original entities
>
> (TL 83).

This passage may seem troubling because it suggests an insurmountable barrier exists between our representations and what Nietzsche might be taken to believe our truths should correspond to. Thus, it might appear as if Nietzsche does after all hold the type of representational theory of perception which Clark understands him to. Further, one could conclude from this that Nietzsche believes truths should correspond to a metaphysical level of 'original entities' which are hidden behind our representations – which sounds a lot like his holding a metaphysical correspondence theory.

However, it is important to note that this passsage is embedded in Nietzsche's discussion of language. Indeed, on the same page he refers to the erroneous idea which arises on the basis of conceptualisation; that our concepts reveal some 'original model' lying in the fabric of reality. Thus, the most natural way to understand the 'original entities' which our metaphors fail in any way to correspond to is by taking them to be the 'original models' that we mistakenly posit – and which we mistakenly think objects are 'perhaps woven from' (TL

83). Indeed, when one reads the first line of the quotation above it seems that Nietzsche's critique is internal to the moral sense of truth, he is undermining our belief that we know about a distinct metaphysical level of 'things themselves' or 'original entities'. That is, rather than undermining the fact that we only have 'metaphors' to go on, or seeing these metaphors as deficient because they fail to correspond to the illusory layer of reality, he is mocking the positing of this layer of reality. Thus, my interpretation is capable of accommodating this seemingly awkward passage.

The second passage to discuss is the following:

> We obtain the concept, as we do the form, by overlooking what is individual and actual; whereas nature is acquainted with no forms and no concepts, and likewise with no species, but only with an X which remains inaccessible and undefineable for us. For even our contrast between individual and species is something anthropomorphic and does not originate in the essence of things; although we should not presume to claim that this contrast does not correspond to the essence of things: that would of course be a dogmatic assertion and, as such, just as indemonstrable as its opposite. (TL 83-84)

Though it is again perfectly possible to see how this quotation might suggest that Nietzsche holds a conception of truth as correspondence to the thing in itself, it seems to me that it needn't be understood that way. Indeed, the method used for explaining the previous quotation can do quite a lot of work here. Nietzsche is working against the thought that 'our contrast between individual and species' originates in the "essence of things" and given that this quotation is from the same paragraph as that in which it is noted that we have a tendency to read our concepts as disclosing "original models" in reality, it seems likely

that it is again this thought that he is attacking. Though Nietzsche's variations in terminology are ripe to cause confusion, it is clear that "nature", the "X" which remains 'inaccessible and undefineable' for us and the "essence of things", are all of the same metaphysical level. After all nature is said to be acquainted *only with* the "X" and is thus, despite its being referred to as "nature", nothing to do with the realm we have access to. Further, it is "nature" which it is implied we are trying to get to and the fact that we fail to do this is evidenced by the failure of our concepts to 'originate in the essence of things' – suggesting at least a very tight relationship between "nature" and the "essence of things". From this it would seem then, that Nietzsche is pointing out that confidence in the ability of our concepts to correspond to a deeper level of reality is misplaced.

Indeed, when we add the force of the final "agnostic" statement, it seems the standards of the moral sense of truth here are not merely misplaced but absurd. By pointing out that any knowledge or access to the realm of the 'X' is impossible, - even to the extent that we cannot non-dogmatically assert that our concepts (which originated from a world alien to it) fail to correspond it – Nietzsche is ridiculing the very notion of assessing our truths on the basis of their correspondence to this realm. He refers to the "essence of things" (and to an inaccessible "X") in order to disclose the implausibility of its posit and, more pressingly, to highlight the absurdity of taking it as a metaphysical level which we should expect our knowledge to display correspondence to – lest it be false or illusory. Nietzsche's position here is remarkably similar to that of *On Schopenhauer*. In that essay, he was involved in an internal critique of both Schopenhauer's posit of a thing in itself (OS 1-2) and his claim to be able to say anything meaningful about it (OS 3). In this essay, he is involved in an internal critique of the pompous valuation of knowledge which posits a realm of truth which is conceptualised in such a way that absurd criteria of knowledge arise.

The response I am able to give to these two quotations signals the interpretative power of my interpretation and how it can respond to passages which might initially seem to favour Clark's reading. My interpretation has the benefit, over Clark's, of situating *Truth and Lie* within the context of Nietzsche's contemporaneous notes and highlighting underlying positions and projects from *On Schopenhauer* and *The Philosopher* which inform its composition. Though one cannot hope to explain every waver in terminology or excuse the rhetorical posturing of the essay, my interpretation also has the benefit of demonstrating how Nietzsche holds a relatively stable position throughout the essay and is consistently focused on the aim of attacking the moral sense of truth.

5.2 The "Vivid First Impression", Knowledge and Truth

In closing this chapter, it will be helpful to consider what Nietzsche achieves in *Truth and Lie*. Is he replacing the idea of correspondence to the thing in itself with another theory of truth reliant on a 'true world' which the phrase "vivid first impression" represents? Is the outcome of the attack on the moral sense of truth best seen as culminating in a rival theory of truth and knowledge or are his concerns somewhat different?

On the first of these questions, there are good reasons for denying that what is gestured toward by the phrase '"vivid first impression" constitutes a 'true world'. As our summary of Clark's position in chapter one explained, inherent to the notion of a 'true world' is the thought that a realm exists behind our representations which we have no access to and can say nothing meaningful about it. The phrase "vivid first impression", however, is a placeholder for something which we can access and 'creatively correspond' (TL 90) to. Further, our representations are precisely how we do this and Nietzsche re-evaluates the subjective and creative aspects of our representations so that, contra the moral

sense, they come to be seen as ways of affording us a vantage point on to the "vivid first impression", as opposed to barriers to accessing it. It is precisely the process of forming new metaphors which enables us to develop our sensitivity to the "vivid first impression". Though it is again hard to translate this abstract phraseology into something more concrete here, it is clear that the "vivid first impression" does not have the distinctive characteristics which would make it qualify as a 'true world'.

Though Nietzsche does spend some time in *Truth and Lie* and his notebooks working through the internal logic of his position, and whilst he does hold out the "vivid first impression" as a placeholder denoting what we should attempt to develop our sensitivity to, I think it is a misstep to see him as here giving expression to a theory of truth or knowledge. The main focus of his rhetoric and argumentation in *Truth and Lie* is to dislodge the moral sense of truth and to work against its falsifying effects. In doing so he highlights the absurdity of claiming an inflated status for our knowledge and attempts to free us to employ the subjective and creative aspects of our cognitive mechanics more effectively. As Nietzsche describes the dominance of the influence of the herd perspective over how things appear to us so strongly, he provides the level of "vivid first impressions" in order to anchor the activity of developing new metaphors and to provide a fixed point to develop our sensitivity toward. Nietzsche's goal here is to provide a corrective to falsification and it should not be taken to amount to anything more than this from a theoretical perspective.

Throughout our discussion we have noted various similarities between *Truth and Lie* and later works. We have also seen that the dynamic between perspectivism, artistry and falsification made salient in chapter two is present in this early essay. Whilst there is no mention in this short essay of the virtue of honesty or the notion of intellectual conscience, the spirit of Nietzsche's work here also bears similarities to those virtues we identified in chapter two and will further examine in the next chapter. Nietzsche is preoccupied with enabling us

to break free of dominant perspectives, as we saw he was in GS 347 and A 54. He also encourages us to take control of our own cognitive orientation and to develop multiple metaphors, i.e. a many sided view. As we now move on the discuss the themes of falsification, perspectivism and artistry in the later works, it will become evident – contra Clark – that the dynamics present in nascent form in *Truth and Lie* continue to be present in the later work.

Chapter Five | Falsification, Perspectivism and Artistry

Introduction

This chapter brings our investigation to a close by highlighting the significant continuities present between *Truth and Lie* and the later philosophy, and by providing further textual evidence and interpretative argumentation which establishes that the dynamic between falsification, perspectivism and artistry sketched in chapter two is present in the later philosophy.

It will be possible in this chapter, given the analysis which we have undertaken hitherto, to revisit the six research aims set out in chapter one. The second of these research aims was to show that Nietzsche's understanding of falsification is not due to his requiring that true beliefs must correspond to a 'true world'. This claim will be argued for in section three, where I will demonstrate the shortcomings of Clark's interpretation of the aphorism in *Twilight* entitled 'How the 'True World' Finally Became a Fable'. The third research aim will also be established by arguing against Clark. I will argue against her claim that the falsification remarks in book III of *The Gay Science* and in *Twilight* are fundamentally different and incompatible with each other. By doing this, I will provide evidence, in section two, for the claim that the most fundamental cause of falsification is our overestimation the status of our truths; which we are disposed to understand as corresponding to a world of 'true being'.

Demonstrating how perspectivism and artistry are correctives against falsification – in section five – will provide good reason for thinking that perspectivism is best understood as a corrective against falsification and that artistry is positively related to the intellectual conscience; research aims five and six respectively. By reporting Nietzsche's account of how we can escape falsification, section five will also establish that the causes of falsification are

contingent and can be overcome; research aim one. This leaves only the fourth research aim, which was related to the continuity of Nietzsche's remarks on falsification from *Truth and Lie* up until 1888. This will be established throughout this chapter, and specifically through the way the structure of the dynamic between falsification, perspectivism and artistry given here recalls the interpretative work which has been undertaken on *Truth and Lie* in chapter four.

Section One | Clark on 'How the 'True World' Finally became a Fable'

1.1   'How the 'True World' Finally became a Fable'

Clark's interpretation of 'How the 'True World' finally became a Fable' provides her with the opportunity to summarise the major stages in Nietzsche's development away from the view that human truths necessarily falsify – because they fail to correspond to a 'true world' – and toward his abandonment of the falsification thesis. The mature Nietzsche occupies the sixth and final stage of this process, as he understands that the notion of a 'true world' is inconceivable and realises that there is therefore no reason to view the world to which we have access as false or illusory: 'The true world is gone: which world is left? The illusory one, perhaps? … But no! *we got rid of the illusory world along with the true one*! (TI *HTTWBAF*). The mature Nietzsche thus, for Clark, does not think that the world we inhabit, nor our representations or concepts, systematically or necessarily falsify reality. Instead, Clark observes that Nietzsche believes that the 'senses do not lie' and that their testimony is a reliable basis for knowledge (TI *Reason* 2; Clark, p121). I am in agreement with Clark, of course, that Nietzsche does not affirm an all-pervasive falsification thesis in his mature works. However, I disagree about her story of when and how Nietzsche gets to

this position. I also disagree with Clark's assertion that Nietzsche's thoughts on falsification change significantly from *Truth and Lie* through to *Twilight*. I will argue against Clark's chronology in section three; the remainder of this section summarises Clark's interpretation of 'How the 'True World' finally became a Fable' and of Nietzsche's development.

The first three stages in Nietzsche's history refer to Plato, Christianity and Kant respectively. This triumvirate express their instinct to *'avenge'* themselves on life (TI *Reason* 6) by creating the 'phantasmagoria of an "other", a "better" life' and a 'true world'. True being is thus ascribed to a realm other than our own. This presupposes that such a realm is conceivable and – as it is clear that the occupants of these stages ultimately view this 'true world' as something from which we are metaphysically distant – entails that these figures associate truth with a metaphysical world, or thing in itself, in a strong and objectionable sense.

Following the first three stages of Nietzsche's history, references to historical figures or movements seem to be absent and Clark takes this as evidence that Nietzsche is now addressing himself to stages in his own thought. Stage four, she believes, is a reference to the agnosticism of *Human, all too Human*. The 'true world' is, at this stage, something which may or may not be attainable, as is evidenced in his questioning: 'unattainable?'. What is clear from this – and crucial for Clark – is that, as Nietzsche leaves open the possibility that we might attain transcendent truth, the idea of a 'true world' is still very much deemed to be conceivable. Though Nietzsche clearly thinks the possible existence of such a 'true world' is largely irrelevant – as it is 'unattained [and] also unknown' and '[c]onsequently not consoling, redeeming, obligating either' – he doesn't formally rule out its conceivability and this allows Clark to hold that he still has the resources needed in his thought to consider all human beliefs to be necessarily false as they fail to correspond to the 'true world'. It is also the case for Clark, of course, that prior to *Human, all too Human* Nietzsche

straightforwardly associates truth with the 'true world' in *Truth and Lie* – though there is no space reserved for *Truth and Lie* in Nietzsche's six stage narrative here.

Stage five represents Nietzsche's views in *The Gay Science* and *Beyond Good and Evil* – according to Clark. The insight which distinguishes these works from *Human, all too Human* is that expressed in GS 54 where Nietzsche seems to demonstrate an awareness of the inconceivability of a 'true world', i.e. a metaphysical reality which stands behind all possible appearances:

> What is "appearance" for me now? Certainly not the opposite of some essence: what could I say about any essence except to name the attributes of its appearance!
>
> (GS 54).

In both stages five and six then, we not only lack knowledge of some supposedly existing metaphysical world, but also a way of making sense of the idea of such a thing: 'We lack not only knowledge of such a world, but also any noncontradictory way of conceiving of it' (Clark, p113). It is for this reason that Nietzsche thereby stops associating truth with such a realm, as is evidenced by his decision to place scare quotes around the phrase 'true world' at this point, though he hadn't in the preceding stages:

> The world whose existence stage 5 denies is not one to which it ascribes "true being," and it therefore becomes the "so-called 'true' world," a world to which others have ascribed "true being." This is precisely Nietzsche's position in GS and BG
>
> (Clark, p112).

As Nietzsche no longer ascribes 'true being' to a 'true world', we would expect – on Clark's interpretation – his references to our world being illusory or false

to cease. That this doesn't happen, Clark attributes to the fact that Nietzsche failed to see, in *The Gay Science* and *Beyond Good and Evil*, that his decision not to associate true being with another realm removed his justification for viewing this world as illusory or false. Thus Clark explains that

> [t]he absence of this realization means that stage 5 denies the existence of the "true" world, but continues to regard the empirical world as merely apparent or illusory. The empirical world is regarded as illusory, for instance, if one insists that empirical science cannot give us truth, or that human truths are really illusions

(Clark, p113).

Stage six then differs from stage five as it contains precisely the realisation described above.

Thus for Clark we can separate four stages of Nietzsche's thinking about falsification and the 'true world'. In *Truth and Lie* (1873), Nietzsche's most settled position is that the 'true world' is conceivable but unattainable. However, correspondence to it is a requirement for our beliefs being true – thus all human beliefs are false. In *Human, all too Human* (1878) Nietzsche remains agnostic about the possibility of a true world, but doesn't rule out its conceivability and continues to use correspondence to it as a standard for assessing human knowledge. Following this, in *The Gay Science* (1882), he comes to the realisation that we cannot conceive of a world which has an essence separate from all of its possible appearances. However, from this period up until 1887, Clark takes Nietzsche to associate truth with the chaos of sensation, for reasons which will be explained presently. As all human perception and cognition falsifies such a world, this means that Nietzsche still, unwittingly, associates true being with what amounts to a 'true world'. It is only from *The Genealogy* onwards that he is

clear-sighted about the fact that there is no justification for viewing the empirical world as illusory or false.

I have already argued against Clark's assertion that Nietzsche's falsification remarks in *Truth and Lie,* and *Human, all too Human*, are tied to an association of truth with a 'true world'. I've also shown that there is a significant degree of continuity between *Truth and Lie* and the works Clark places in stage five of Nietzsche's history, when it comes to the cognitive mechanics which underpin his thoughts. However, it is necessary to turn to the falsification claims in book III of *The Gay Science* and in *Twilight* (1888) in order to extend and strengthen my critique of the developmental nature of Clark's interpretation. I will need, in particular, to explain away the seeming incompatibility of the following statements from *The Gay Science* and *Twilight* respectively: that 'delusion and error' are 'a condition of cognitive and sensate existence' (GS 107) and that the senses 'do not lie' (TI *Reason* 2). For the remainder of this section, I will provide a short summary of Clark's account of Nietzsche's association of truth with the "chaos of sensations" between 1882 and 1886, before focusing in on her interpretation of the falsification remarks in GS 110 and GS 111. Following this I will lock interpretative horns with her in section two.

1.2 Clark on the "Chaos of Sensations" and the non-existence of "things"

In chapter one, we reported Clark's belief that Nietzsche's abandonment of the thing in itself, combined with his continued commitment to representationalism, led him to associate true being with whatever parts of our representations we do not "make up'" (Clark, p122); i.e. with the "chaos of sensations". This entails the falsification of human cognition because everything which enters human consciousness has already been subjected to

organisation on behalf of the human subject. Clark explains that Nietzsche reaches this position because '[h]e agrees with Kant's denial that the form or structural features of our representations derive from experience' (*ibid.*, 121).

Clark believes that Nietzsche thus takes falsification to be pervasive. The pervasiveness of falsification is evidenced, on her view, by the fact that Nietzsche, in *The Gay Science*, comes to see even our notion of a thing as a falsification. 'That we judge a thing to be present must result from the organization imposed on sensation, since it is nowhere to be found […] in the sense impressions themselves' (*ibid.*). The reason why even the notion of a thing falsifies then, is, for Clark, the same reason why 'delusion and error' are a 'condition of cognitive and sensate existence' (GS 107) in general. That is, because 'the a priori features the brain's organization imposes on sensations falsify reality, making it appear to have features it does not' and we are unable to transcend this organization (Clark, p121). The chaos of sensation is thus effectively 'always hidden from the knower by representation' (Clark, p119).

Clark's analysis of the falsification which we impose on sensation here, extends to Nietzsche's remarks on logic and mathematics as well. As Nietzsche 'believes that mathematical and logical truths presuppose the existence of substances (GS 111), – presumably as possessors of properties, and things to be counted and measured' – they too impose organisation on sensation and thus falsify the "chaos". Clark's view is clear then, in order to come into contact with the "chaos of sensation" we would need to transcend the features of our cognition which enable us to comprehend anything; which 'first make seeing into seeing something' (GM III 12).

Section Two | Falsification in *The Gay Science* and *Twilight*

2.1 Introduction

Clark (2005) provides a pithy synopsis of her interpretation of Nietzsche's apparent assertion of the falsification thesis in TI *Reason*, whilst defending her claim that the falsification thesis is absent from this passage. Though Nietzsche claims that we are drawn into an erroneous reification of the structure of our representations into reality by the 'prejudices of reason', Clark notes that this entails that our outlook is mired in falsification only if we accept these prejudices.

> He only says that *insofar as the prejudice of reason* forces us to posit any of these, we are compelled into error. What he says is therefore perfectly compatible with claiming that we have conceptions of identity, materiality, unity, thing or substance that are not forced on us by the "prejudice of reason" and are not contradicted by experience. To use this passage as evidence of an error theory, it must be argued that Nietzsche considers it necessary to operate under the influence of the prejudice of reason
>
> (Clark 2005, p14).

I agree with Clark's assertion that her falsification thesis is absent from this work and with her analysis of how the 'prejudices of reason', and our tendency to reify our concepts into reality, are the cause of the falsification highlighted in *Twilight*. However, in this section I will show that this reification, and an associated overestimation of the status of our beliefs, is also the predominant cause of falsification in *The Gay Science* – as well as in *Truth and Lie*, as we have seen, and in *Human, all too Human*, as I'll claim in section three.

In order to bring out the continuity between *The Gay Science* and *Twilight* I will focus on the similarity of the positions adopted in both of those works on the falsifying nature of our concept of a thing. Clark believes that it is only the metaphysical concept of a thing which is rejected by Nietzsche in *Twilight*, however, this is fairly clearly not the case. In TI *Errors* 4, for example, Nietzsche states that our concept of a thing – which is distinguished in the same passage from the metaphysical concept of the thing in itself – is an error:

> Is it any wonder that what [people] rediscovered in things later is only *what they had put into them in the first place*? – Even the 'thing', to say it again, the concept of a thing, is just a reflex of the belief in the I as cause ... And even your atom [...] how many errors [...] Not to mention the 'thing-in-itself'
>
> (TI *Errors* 4).

This puts pressure on Clark's view that it is only the metaphysical concept of a thing which is under attack here. Relatedly, it is also the case that here, and in TI *Reason*, Nietzsche is not only attacking a few metaphysicians who employ falsifying concepts but rather 'people' in general, and thus what he takes to be a widely held notion.[46]

This leaves Clark and ourselves with an interpretative dilemma which has been posed by Nehamas in a recent paper:

> if "the thing" is a metaphysical concept in *Twilight of the Idols*, there is no reason to think that it is not metaphysical in *The Gay Science*; if it is an ordinary, non-metaphysical object in *The Gay Science*, then it is also non-metaphysical in *Twilight*. So, either Nietzsche limited the range of the

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[46] Anderson (1996: p318) makes a similar point regarding TI *Reason* 2: 'it is not merely a few "metaphysicians" who employ the falsifying concepts listed in TI III, 2, but "we".'

> unknowable to metaphysical objects, which *The Gay Science*
> does not acknowledge as real, or he still holds what seems
> to be a falsification view as late as *Twilight*
>
> (Nehamas, p224).

My analysis in the rest of this section will substantiate the claim that Nietzsche's position on falsification is similar in all relevant regards in both of these works. The dilemma for Clark here is substantial. She either has to abandon her claim to all-pervasive falsification in *The Gay Science*, or she has to accept that Nietzsche continues to affirm a version of the falsification thesis in the later works as well. Clark has re-assessed her claims in *Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy* and incorporated the fifth book of *The Gay Science* and *Beyond Good and Evil* into Nietzsche's mature works (Clark and Dudrik 2012: p55). However, that even after making these amendments she has decided to hold firm to her claim that first four books of *The Gay Science* affirm the falsification thesis, suggests that she is not willing to budge on this point.

The danger of taking the other horn of the dilemma however, is that, by accepting that a strong version of the falsification thesis remains in Nietzsche's mature philosophy, Clark's position collapses into one reminiscent of the "radicals" who see in Nietzsche's "denial of truth" something philosophically significant – "radicals" which it seemed she had defeated. Or, at least, to agreeing with those commentators who see the falsification thesis, in something at least very much like Clark's sense, continuing into Nietzsche's mature work: e.g. Green (2002), Hussain (2004), Meyer (2012), Riccardi (2013).

I believe the problem for Clark here to be fatal. However, happily, it isn't for us. This is because, read closely, GS 107-111 do not assert that any and every notion of a "thing" falsifies, but only that (commonly held) metaphysically reified notions do. That is, I shall argue in this section that Nietzsche's position

in *The Gay Science* is the broadly the same as that which Clark defends with regard to *Twilight*.

Before we move on to consider the passages in question in detail, it is worth noting some initial reasons which count against Clark's assertion that Nietzsche asserts the falsification thesis in *The Gay Science* by comparing human cognition with the "chaos of sensation". The first is that Clark makes the claim that, in addition to logic and mathematics 'falsify[ing] reality in GS and BGE', 'science' does as well (Clark, p109). If this were the case, then one might ask precisely where the insight into the falsity of human cognition comes from. However, As Ridley points out, Nietzsche has already provided the answer to this question: 'the insight into general untruth and mendacity is [...] now given to us through science – the insight into delusion and error as a condition of cognitive and sensate existence' (GS 107). Thus Nietzsche's point here is pretty clearly 'not that *all* human knowledge is incurably erroneous, but, rather, that our scientific knowledge shows that our non-scientific knowledge is erroneous' (Ridley, p67). At the very least, it seems Clark would need to significantly weaken her claim that human cognition necessarily falsifies at this point, or argue that Nietzsche is again seriously confused about his own position.

The tactic of claiming Nietzsche is confused about his position is one which Clark has significant recourse to, as we have seen through our discussion of stage five of the history of the 'true world'. Indeed, as Hussain (2004: p330) points out, Clark asserts that Nietzsche affirms the falsification thesis in *Beyond Good and Evil* in spite of developing the means to overcome it, according to her, in section 15 of that work. In addition to this, Clark has to claim further confusion on Nietzsche's part in order to explain his direct assertions that his remarks on falsification are not bound up with the idea of a 'true world'. One passage in which Nietzsche makes such a claim is GS 354, where Nietzsche seems confident that his remarks on falsification are not bound up with 'the opposition between "thing in itself" and appearance'. The other notable passage

of this kind is the note from which Clark purloins the notion of the "chaos of sensation", WP 569. Here Nietzsche is clear and direct in stating that the "chaos of sensations" – what Clark takes to be playing the role of a 'true world' in the early- and mid-1880s – 'is not "the true world"'.[47]

These points count against Clark's chronology and speak in favour of emphasising the continuity of his position in the works under discussion. I will now move to provide further argumentation through direct reference to the passages under investigation. I will begin by giving an account of Nietzsche's position on falsification in *Twilight*, before turning to GS 110-111 to see if his position there is similar. Following this, I will summarise the continuity of Nietzsche's preoccupation with the strand of falsification related to the criterion of 'true being', before remarking on how falsification and Nietzsche's "sensualism" – his assertion that the senses 'do not lie' – intertwine.

2.2 The Criterion of 'True Being' and Falsification in *Twilight*

In TI *Reason* Nietzsche distinguishes the 'testimony of the senses' – which 'do not lie' – from what 'we *do* with the testimony of the senses' under the influence of the "prejudices of reason" and our "faith in grammar". "'Reason" makes us falsify the testimony of the senses' (TI *Reason* 2) as it seduces us into believing the reality is more solid, stable and calculable than our senses report it to be:

> we see ourselves mired in error, drawn *necessarily* into error,
> precisely to the extent that the prejudice of reason forces

[47] A further peculiarity of Clark's interpretation of this passage is the fact that she purloins from it the phrase "chaos of sensations" – and uses this to signify the world to which our beliefs fail to correspond in *The Gay Science* – even though this note is dated 'Spring-Fall 1887', i.e. in a phase of Nietzsche's philosophy Clark judges to be "mature". The oddness of this interpretative move is confounded by the fact that it is the only place where Nietzsche employs the phrase.

us to make *use* of unity, identity, permanence, substance, cause, objectification, being

(TI *Reason* 5).

What is more, these errors are in some sense implied by the structure of our language: the 'basic presuppositions of the metaphysics of language […] the presuppositions of reason' mean that '[b]eing is imagined into everything – *pushed under everything …*' (TI *Reason* 5).

As extreme as these claims might sound, Clark correctly notes that these concepts which we read into reality are things it is in principal possible to eradicate from our outlook:

> If the subject-predicate structure of language reflects the nature of the world, it can seem plausible, for instance, that all change involves an underlying substrate, something that does not itself change. […] If this interpretation is correct, the concepts Nietzsche calls "lies" are quite dispensable
>
> (Clark, p108).

After all, we can resist the 'prejudices of reason' and presuppositions of language. It is not the existence of these things *per se* which falsify, but rather our belief in their accurately reporting reality to us. That is, it is not grammar which leads to falsification, but our 'faith in grammar'.

This helps us to understand Nietzsche's slippage between the metaphysical concept of a thing and our everyday concept in TI *Errors* 4. Nietzsche attacks both the 'thing in itself' and the 'concept of a thing' because he believes the latter, under the influence of the grammar of our language and the prejudices of reason, implicitly includes a metaphysical reificiation which amounts to a falsification. As will be further established below, Nietzsche isn't

here claiming that any and every concept of a "thing" must falsify, only that one which implicitly reifies our concepts into reality, and establishes a criterion of true being, does.

2.3 Nietzsche's Critique of 'Things' in *The Gay Science*

Can something similar be argued to be going on in the crucial passages from *The Gay Science* though? The crucial passages, GS 110 and 111, suggest that it can, as they take the form of an explanation, or genealogy, of how we originally made the error of positing being, identity and a certain kind of 'thingness' into reality. As Nietzsche refers in these passages to a survival drive and a need to have control over one's environment, it seems that he is treading on similar ground to that which we discussed in chapter three. That is, something very much like an 'instinct of fear' (GS 355) is being said to render the world as more stable and solid, more familiar and easier to manipulate, than it in fact is. Looking at the account given in GS 111 of how the '[o]rigin of logic' presupposes an understanding of identity which involves a reification, will help bring out what Nietzsche's parallel claim concerning our concept of a thing amounts to. I'll first highlight this point about identity in GS 111, before demonstrating that Nietzsche similarly associates a reification of identity and a certain kind of 'thingness' with logic in the later notebooks. I'll then return to GS 110 in order to show that the discussion of 'thingness' in *The Gay Science* takes a similar form to that present in the later notebooks.

Nietzsche describes how logic originated out of a mixture of our survival needs and a beneficial error:

> he who subsumed too slowly and was
> too cautious in subsumption — had a slighter probability
> of survival than he who in all cases of similarity

immediately guessed that they were identical. The predominant disposition, however, to treat the similar as identical - an illogical disposition, for there is nothing identical as such - is what first supplied all the foundations for logic

(GS 111).

There are two cognitive deficits involved with this move to treat unequal things as equals – a move which we also saw Nietzsche comment on in *Truth and Lie*. Firstly, in treating two different things as the same, we lose sight of the peculiarities which distinguish them. More significantly, however, the thought that two things could be identical, which Nietzsche believes to be foundational to logic, involves a change in our understanding of reality.

Nehamas brings out the character of this change when he distinguishes thinking of things as similar – equality for one purpose or equality when considered from one perspective, i.e. that both birds are predators – from the thought that identity exists, that is, equality which transcends any perspective or the having-in-mind of any particular purpose. The point underlying Nietzsche's remarks here is simply that identity in this sense does not exist. Nehamas formulates this point in the following terms: 'That no two things can be strictly speaking identical outside logic and mathematics [...] this is true of everyone and everything, and a rather trivial point' (Nehamas, p236).

The error Nietzsche identifies here thus concerns the way that the presuppositions of logic cause us to reify a belief in the existence of identity, and identical things, into the world: 'that we project the logical concept of identity – equality independently of any particular purpose, equality-in-itself we might say – on to the ordinary objects of everyday experience' (Nehamas, p228). This in turn, 'leads us to believe that in saying "the same as" we establish something that is unconditioned by any phrase that begins with "as regards..."

and limits the application of the concept of sameness: *that* is the error' (*ibid.*). What would be required, after all, in order for us to posit identity between distinct things would be, at the very least, that these things all shared features which made them instances of a type or which showed that they shared some essence.

Our discussion here recalls Nietzsche's ridiculing of the thought that there exists some essence of 'leafness' which all instances of leaves in some sense participate (TL 83). Nietzsche's position here, as it was in *Truth and Lie*, is to deny that anything of this type exists, as Nehamas points out.

> There is no privileged set of features, no set of features
> that are shared necessarily by a class of objects and makes
> them all members of a single "natural" kind – a species-
> essence – that makes them all, strictly speaking, identical,
> equal independently of any particular purpose we may
> have in them
>
> (Nehamas, p228).

However, this point does not merely chime with Nietzsche's remarks in *Truth and Lie*. It also foreshadows his insistence that we reify our concepts into reality – '[b]eing is imagined into everything' – in TI *Reason* 5, and is closely linked to how he thinks about the relation between logic and our conception of "thingness" in section 521 of *The Will to Power* (dated 'Spring-Fall 1887').

2.4 Nietzsche's Critique of "Things" in the Late Notebooks

In WP 521 Nietzsche is discussing *"Logic Semblance",* and the concepts of individual and species, when he states that

One should not understand this compulsion to construct concepts, species, forms, purposes, laws ("a world of identical cases") as if they enabled us to fix the *real world*

(WP 521).

Instead, what happens when we take this to be the case is that we 'give false reality to a fiction' (*ibid.*). One point he is making here is that in treating something as identical with something else, we assume a 'form [which] counts as something enduring' which both things share – 'but the form has merely been invented by us'. Instead of uncovering some *type* of thing which adheres to a form, Nietzsche believes that

> what appears is always something new, and it is only we, who are always comparing, who include the new, to the extent that it is similar to the old, in the unity of the "form." As if a *type* should be attained and, as it were, was intended by and inherent in the process of formation.

The similarities with TL 83 here are striking as Nietzsche is clear that in identifying things which appear to share some species-essence or to be of a kind or 'type' which is sewn into the fabric of the world, what we are actually doing is reading out again the form which we originally posited.

However, Nietzsche makes another crucial link here by demonstrating how this positing of a type or kind is similar to other kinds of reification and, in particular, to our concept of a "thing":

> It is we who created the "thing," the "identical thing," subject, attribute, activity, object, substance, form, after we had long pursued the process of making identical, coarse and simple. The world seems logical because we have made it logical.

Nietzsche's claim about logic in this section – along with his claim that logic grew out of illogic in GS 110 – is clearly about the fact that we have reified a certain way of thinking about things into reality; and not as a claim to completely abandon any and every notion of logic, "thingness", etc., as a falsification. It is only the presupposition of logic – the presupposition that things can be identical in the strong sense described above (along with other similar reifications) – and the thought that things are all of some pre-existing type or kind, that Nietzsche wants to rule out.

Two considerations provide evidence for, and explain how, this is also Nietzsche's view in *The Gay Science*. Firstly, in GS 110 where Nietzsche lists 'erroneous articles of faith', he distinguishes these in the following way: 'that there are identical things; that there are things, kinds of material, bodies;'. Nietzsche uses semi-colons in this passage in order to demarcate separate items on his list. What this reveals is that he associates the concept of "thing" - with which we are primarily concerned - with 'kinds of materials' or 'bodies'. It is plausible, given the fact that Nietzsche goes on in the next section to discuss the "origins of logic" in a way which requires us to think of things belonging to some type of 'natural kind", to read the concept of "thing" which Nietzsche takes to be a falsification as being a falsification because it is polluted by the presuppositions of logic.

Further, it is the case that Nietzsche also identifies as a presupposition of logic a belief in substance and in the fixed and stable nature of things:

> Similarly, in order for the concept of substance to
> originate, which is indispensable to logic though nothing
> real corresponds to it in the strictest sense, it was necessary
> that for a long time changes in things not be seen, not be
> perceived; the beings who did not see things exactly had a
> head start over those who saw everything "in a flux"

(GS 111).

These two points, and the above analysis, provide good reason for understanding the falsification remarks in GS 110-111 as consonant with those in *Twilight*. Though it is true that in these passages the "presuppositions of logic" nudge us toward adopting a falsifying concept of a thing, these presuppositions are – as were the 'prejudices of reason' – quite dispensable.

I will shortly move on to demonstrate how the falsification we've seen is present in both *The Gay Science* and *Twilight,* is compatible with Nietzsche's late sensualism. Before doing this, however, it will be instructive to refer back to the claim related to the third research aim of this thesis: that it is our association of truth with a "criterion of true being" (and thus our overestimation of the status of our truths), which is the most fundamental cause of falsification for Nietzsche.

We have seen, in our analysis of *Truth and Lie*, *The Gay Science* and *Twilight* that Nietzsche believes we reify our concepts into reality. However, I have also tried to show that attached to this reification is a change in our conception of truth. WP 516 provides a pithy expression of this process and thus provides further support for my interpretation.

In this note, Nietzsche is again discussing the relation between logic and our belief in "things" – '*our belief in things* is a precondition of our belief in logic' – when he notes that the "'thing'" under discussion here is the thing as 'real substratum of "A"'. That is to say, the thing as rendered after our reifications, hence as 'a reconstruction of the thing'. The dangerous error that Nietzsche thinks we make is to forget that these reifications come from us and to instead take them as aspects of reality, indeed aspects which we require objects to have if they are to count as real. The result of our doing this is that we are drawn to posit another realm which corresponds to our expectations when the testimony

of the senses and the development of science reveals that our realm fails to do so:

> If we do not grasp this, but make of logic a criterion of true being, we are on the way to positing as realities all those hypostates: substance, attribute, object, subject, action, etc.; that is, to conceiving a metaphysical world, that is, a "real world"
>
> (WP 516).

The strand of falsification described here, and which we have seen is evident in different manifestations in three separate works, has two dimensions. One is that, as we saw in *Truth and Lie*, it can lead us to believe that our beliefs really do correspond to a metaphysically distinct realm of 'true being' – and thus overestimate the status of our truths, as no such realm exists. The other is that it can lead us to view features characteristic of reality, e.g. flux and becoming, as illusory (TI *Reason* 2-6).

Nietzsche's recurring interest in this theme signals its significance to him. It is also the case that the two other strands of falsification which I identified in chapter two, though important, aren't necessarily, directly or substantially error-producing. Our erroneous notion of knowledge obscures the functioning of our cognitive processes and helps detain us in falsity, and the herd schema hides aspects of reality behind its generalisations (only sometimes leading to falsity), however, the criterion of true being attaches to our beliefs a claim to metaphysical justification which makes them directly and systematically false.

2.5 Sensualism and Falsification

It is now time to return to the seemingly incompatible statements with which we began this section. Nietzsche's claim that 'delusion and error' are conditions of our cognitive and sensate existence, I read as the claim that certain elements of our habitual and inherited ways of making sense of the world are falsificatory. This is the case, for example, with the presuppositions of our logic and the notion of substance. These involve cognitive falsifications as we posit, e.g., identity – as "equality-in-itself" – when no such thing exists. However, they also attach to sensation as we alter the testimony of the senses so they feed back to us the concepts we read into reality. Thus, with the concept of substance 'it was necessary that for a long time changes in things not be seen, not be perceived' (GS 111).

This interpretation may seem to clash with the second statement – that the senses 'do not lie'. However, this will only be the case if we hold naïve view of the truthfulness of the senses. Nietzsche warns us against precisely this when he discusses 'the coarse sensualistic prejudice that sensations teach us truths about things' (WP 516). Nietzsche asserts only that our senses 'do not lie', not that they disclose the truth to us. This statement is thus compatible, as we have seen, with the testimony of the senses being polluted by, for example, the prejudices of reason and thus presenting an image of reality which suggests that reality is more stable than it really is. The key point here is just that the senses don't judge or assert at all[48].

I will revisit and nuance my account of Nietzsche's sensualism in the two final sections of this chapter when I discuss the importance of sharpening our senses in order to escape falsification and the role of the "chaos of sensation"

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[48] On this theme see, for example, WP 521: 'The same compulsion exists in the sense activities that support reason--by simplification, coarsening, emphasizing, and elaborating, upon which all "recognition," all ability to make oneself intelligible rests.'

in Nietzsche's later philosophy. However, at this point I take myself to have given good reasons for believing that the positions which Nietzsche adopts in *The Gay Science* and *Twilight* are mutually compatible and, in fact, very similar.

Section Three | How the 'True World' was not Nietzsche's Fable

By demonstrating the implausibility of Clark's assertion that Nietzsche holds the falsification thesis in *The Gay Science* – and highlighting the continuity between his remarks on falsification in this work and *Twilight* – the previous section has provided several reasons to doubt Clark's assertion that Nietzsche radically developed his epistemology in his late works. On this theme, Anderson notes the importance of Nietzsche's history of the 'true world' in Clark's story:

> Clark's reading is weakened by a lack of substantial internal evidence that Nietzsche made a fundamental shift in his epistemology in his very late works. He never explicitly criticizes or denies his earlier works. The only possible hint of a retreat is the famous chapter of *Twilight of the Idols* entitled "How the "True World" Finally Became a Fable"
>
> (Anderson 1996: p318).

Anderson's position is that even if Nietzsche's history can be read as a hint of a late development in epistemology, it shouldn't be. Stages five and six are, for him, not distinct phases in Nietzsche's philosophy – correlating with *The Gay Science* and *Twilight* respectively – but rather two sides of the same coin (*ibid.*, p319-321). In my interpretation of Nietzsche's history, I want to go one step further and claim that there is also little reason for thinking that stage four represents a position which is philosophically distinct from the final two stages.

The first three stages of Nietzsche's history are all manifestations of the same essential relation to the 'true world', and the world "of appearance", and thus Nietzsche links their inhabitants – Plato, Christianity and Kant – closely together[49]. I will here argue that the final three stages also express a single relation to reality, one which shuns the idea of a 'true world' altogether.

Clark's claim is that stages four, five and six are all steps away from an equation of truth with a 'true world'. We have seen that Clark's assertion that Nietzsche associated truth with the 'chaos of sensations' in *The Gay Science* – of stage five – to be implausible. However, we have also shown that he doesn't affirm the falsification thesis in any straightforward sense in that work – as he believes science can deliver truths about the falsity of our non-scientific beliefs. There are reasons for thinking that Nietzsche's position is similar in *Human, all too Human*, where he again – in places at least – asserts that it is science which uncovers the falsity of our common sense beliefs:

> [W]e continue to feel ourselves compelled to assume the existence of a 'thing' or material 'substratum' which is moved, while the whole procedure of science has pursued the task of resolving everything thing-like (material) in motions
>
> (HH 19).[50]

In the section preceding this, Nietzsche also writes something which suggests a consonance between his position in this work and what we have shown to be his position in *The Gay Science* and *Twilight*:

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[49] Nietzsche states for example that 'Christianity is Platonism for "the people"' (BGE, Preface) and that Kant is 'an *underhanded* Christian' (TI *Reason* 6).

[50] Matthew Meyer (2014: p140-147) has argued that Nietzsche adopts a position in *Human, all too Human* which is similar to that we found in *The Gay Science* and *Twilight*. His section on HH 18 & 19 is insightful and broadly consonant with my thoughts on Nietzsche's disregard of the concept of a thing in itself, contra Clark. Meyer's interpretation of the falsification thesis in general, however, seems inaccurate and, to me, to leave us with a Nietzsche whose philosophy is radically implausible and of little interest.

belief in freedom of the will is a primary error committed by everything organic, as old as the impulse to the logical itself; belief in unconditioned substances and in identical things is likewise a primary, ancient error committed by everything organic

(HH 18).

I won't investigate this line of interpretation any further with regard to *Human, all too Human* here, but will instead refer back to my thought as expressed in chapter four. There I argued that Clark is wrong in taking *Truth and Lie* as containing the adoption of a standard of truth as correspondence to a 'true world'. As Nietzsche does not associate truth with a 'true world' in that essay, Clark's assertion that Nietzsche's history of the 'true world' tracks errors in his own thought loses plausibility. Further, the metaphysical positions in *On Schopenhauer*, *Truth and Lie* and *Human, all too Human* are in tune. Clark is right that they allow the possibility and conceivability of a 'true world', or thing in itself, but is deaf to Nietzsche's utter disdain for the posit of any such world and, *a fortiori*, a theory of truth which demands correspondence to such a world.

Clark's story is that stages four, five and six track stages in Nietzsche's own development and that the crucial development between these stages is his realisation that the two 'true worlds' which he posits in stages four and five respectively – the 'thing in itself' and the 'chaos of sensation' – are in fact inconceivable. However, without Clark's back-story informing our reading of this passage, there is little reason for thinking that Nietzsche criticises himself for adopting a 'true world' at any point. Further, and most significantly, Nietzsche is explicit that the reason why the idea of a 'true world' is rejected is not to do with its inconceivability but is, rather, to do with its irrelevance:

> The "true world" – an idea that is of no further use, not
> even as an obligation, - now an obsolete, superfluous idea,
> *consequently* a refuted idea: let's get rid of it!
>
> (HTTWBAF, 5).

Nietzsche's use of italics here hammers home the point which we made with regard to the irrelevance of the metaphysical world being the reason why Nietzsche would not associate truth with any such world in *Human, all too Human* – and clearly favours my interpretation over Clark's.

This reason for refuting the idea of a 'true world' – given in stage five – follows on directly from what is said of the 'true world' in stage four: '[A]s unattained also unknown. Consequently not consoling, redeeming, obligating either […]'. Just as Anderson argues that stage five and stage six are two sides of the same coin, I am here arguing that stage four is merely a preliminary manifestation of a thought which is further elaborated in the final two stages.

Clark's interpretation of this passage is generally taken as a strength of her account. However, there are good reasons, external to this passage, for doubting that Nietzsche ever adopted a position which associated truth with a 'true world'. Further, there is no explicit evidence in this passage that Nietzsche identifies himself as adopting such a position. And, most conclusively, Nietzsche's reason for refuting the positions of the occupants of the first three stages of his history, i.e. the idea of a 'true world', is explicitly not the reason Clark asserts that it is. What has gone wrong in Clark's interpretation is ultimately linked with her attempt to read Nietzsche as engaged throughout his career in theoretical issues relating to theories of truth and knowledge. Nietzsche's concern with the idea of a 'true world' is not and never was theoretical. It is, instead, concerned with the very practical issue of the 'instinct for libelling, belittling, and casting suspicion on life', which gave birth to the idea of the 'true world' and which has since inhibited human honesty and

flourishing – the instinct which he addresses in the section immediately preceding his history of this idea (TI *Reason* 6).

Section Four | The Extent of Falsification

The fourth research aim of this thesis was to demonstrate the continuity of Nietzsche's remarks on falsification. I will summarise our findings on this issue in this section. Having done this, and in the process brought out the extent to which we are mired in falsehood for the later Nietzsche – as we were for the early Nietzsche – I will show how the later philosophy leaves open the possibility of our working against and transcending this falsehood. Section five of this chapter will thus report on how perspectivism and artistry play the role of correctives against falsification in the later philosophy – in line with research aims five and six respectively. Section six will then bring our discussion to a close by considering what we should make of the notion of the 'chaos of sensation', and thereby making salient the main difference between my interpretation of Nietzsche's falsification remarks and those of commentators who have been impressed, baffled and misled by this notion.

4.1 The Continuity of Nietzsche's Remarks on Falsification

Our discussion of Nietzsche's history of the 'true world' has suggested that, contra Clark, Nietzsche's thoughts on truth and falsification do not go through a series of violent shifts as he gradually moves away from an association of truth with a 'true world'. We have shown, instead, that Nietzsche's primary concern with regard to falsification – in *Truth and Lie*, *Human, all too Human*, *The Gay Science* and *Twilight* – is bound up with our tendency to overestimate the status

of our knowledge by reifying our concepts into reality and taking our truths to correspond to a true world.

In addition to this, we saw in chapter two that another strand of falsification is bound up with the prevalence of conception(s) of knowledge which Nietzsche associates with "objectivity", disinterested contemplation and the renunciation of interpretation. Nietzsche's concern with this strand of falsification is in evidence in GM III 12 & 24; in TI *Skirmishes* 7-8, where he laments an obsession with *petits faits*; and, for example, in GS 355, which critiques a conception of knowledge as the mere application of a pre-given schema – thus severely limiting the role of interpretation. In chapter four, we saw that in *Truth and Lie* Nietzsche takes as his target a conception of knowledge, allied with the moral sense of truth, which is similarly "objective" in its renunciation of metaphor.

Nietzsche's perspectivism is set up as a corrective to these two strands of (second-order) falsification. Perspectivism combats our claims to achieve knowledge of the 'true world' by asserting that there is 'only perspectival knowing' against claims to 'knowledge in itself' (GM III 12). Further, it replaces the idea that knowledge could be furthered without interpretation and without the engagement of our affects, with a picture of human cognition which embraces the necessary involvement of the will and revalues the creative and structuring aspects through which we explore the world. This revaluation, in turn, allows us to develop 'many-sided views' (BGE 230) on whatever subject matter we are concerned with and to work against (first-order) aspects of falsification bound up with the dominance of a particular schema.

As we've already discussed these first two aspects of falsification, particularly in chapter two, our main focus in giving an account of the extent of falsification will be on the third strand of falsification and the prevalence of the herd schema over our thought. Even if the first two strands of second-order

falsification are formally combatted by Nietzsche's perspectivism – and even if falsification is not all-pervasive – the extent of the falsehood in our outlook attributable to the herd schema still threatens to enclose us.

4.2 The Extent of Falsification

The extent to which we are mired in falsification for Nietzsche can be summarised by focusing on three factors motivating it: firstly, our need for control over our environment. Secondly, the tendency of drives to champion their perspectives as reality itself. Thirdly, the fact that we are straight-jacketed into a schema in perception and conceptualisation.

On the first factor, Nietzsche often associates knowledge with tracing the unfamiliar back to the familiar (e.g. GS 355, TI *Errors* 5, GS 110) – or, in the early philosophy, using conventional concepts (dead metaphors) to comprehend new experiences and objects (e.g., P 148, TL 81). We do this in order to rid ourselves of the anxiety of encountering unknown things: '[f]amiliarizing something unfamiliar is comforting, reassuring, satisfying […]. Unfamiliar things are dangerous, anxiety-provoking, upsetting, - the primary instinct is to *get rid* of them' (TI *Errors* 5). That is, we subsume things quickly under concepts (GS 110), or quickly apply a perceptual schema, in order to feel secure (BGE 192). In this way, our selecting drive is geared toward emphasising what is familiar and omitting from view what is not. Falsification results as we either – erroneously – take new objects or experiences to be instances of already known and conceptualised phenomena, or, obscure the individuating aspects of phenomenon which do share common features.

The second factor concerns the tendency Nietzsche identifies to believe in the dominant schema, through which we render our environment familiar, as disclosing 'reality itself' (GS 78; see also GS 347, A 54). Against the

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perspectivist imploration to develop a 'many-sided view' BGE 230, Nietzsche laments the fact that, like the 'antithesis of the strong spirit', we tend to lock ourselves into a single point of view (A 54). The enclosure within a perspective which results is linked with the 'lust to rule' of the drive which has become dominant: the drive which 'has its perspective that it would like to compel all the other drives to accept as a norm' (WP 481). The presentation of its schema as 'reality itself' is a move to block threats to its dominance in the form of challenges to the acceptance of its way of comprehending the world.

As this is the case, the schema of concepts of the dominant perspective are the only means we have for making sense of our environment. As the 'herd perspective' is what is dominant, we repeatedly understand things in terms of the aspects of reality which it foregrounds. Thus, it is the 'community- and herd-aspects' of our natures which are foregrounded (GS 354) and we live 'under the spell of that perspective which makes the nearest and most vulgar appear tremendously big and as reality itself' (GS 78). This places us within a straight-jacket as our conceptual schema is the means we have for navigating the world, but it brings with it the selectivity and foregrounding which we need to escape; thus 'our thoughts are continually as it were *outvoted* and translated back into the herd perspective' (GS 354) and the commonness of language is 'the most forceful of the forces that ha[s] controlled people so far' (BGE 268). Indeed, even the formation of the perceptual image is something which often happens via the recalling of a previously formed image (BGE 192; TL 87) and thus novelty is blocked and familiarity pushed, before the processes of concept formation get going.

These three factors go to show that even if the first two strands of falsification can be overcome, we are still mired in first order falsification. Even if we accept – as chapters three and four argued we should – that it is not conceptualisation *per se* which falsifies, but rather a certain way that we reify and believe in our concepts, and our "grammar", it is still the case that 'all becoming

conscious', in one sense does 'involves a vast and thorough corruption, falsification, superficialization, and generalization' (GS 354). Falsification is our default epistemic position. The grammar of our language, our survival instincts and the dominant schema all nudge us toward falsehood. However, Nietzsche does attempt to highlight ways that we can work against it.

Section Five | Perspectivism and Artistry as Correctives Against Falsification

5.1 Controlling the 'inhibiting, excluding instinct'

One way to bring out Nietzsche's thoughts on how we can work against falsification is by considering his view as an alternative to the outlook he associates with "modern objectivity" and with an obsession with *petit faits* (GM III 24, TI *Germans* 6, TI *Skirmishes* 7, Ecce Homo *Beyond Good and Evil* 2). One deficiency of these views is that, because they renounce interpretation, they have a 'false optic'. This is because it is the case that '[a]rtistically appraised, nature is no model' – it 'exaggerates, it distorts, it leaves holes' – studies which are undertaken "from nature" are thus cognitively impoverished (TI *Skirmishes* 7). They are cognitively impoverished, firstly, because – as they renounce interpretation – they fail to provide a clear narrative which 'force[s] out the main features' of the subject matter at hand, as artists are able to (TI *Skirmishes* 8). Practitioners of these studies instead present nothing but a 'mosaic' of facts and are ridiculed by Nietzsche for 'lying in the dirt in front of *petits faits*' (TI *Skirmishes* 7).

However, problems associated with renouncing interpretation extend further than this. Without forming their own interpretations, the modern objectivists are presumably susceptible to the influence of those drives which are usually in control of our cognitive capacities, and are thus susceptible to

falling back into interpreting the new and unfamiliar along the familiar and falsifying lines of the dominant perspective. Nietzsche is consistent in associating the will to "know" with the will to take control of our environment by rendering it stable and familiar, as we have seen in multiple sections (e.g., TI *Errors* 5, GS 355, GS 110). Further, as falsification is default and embedded in our current cognitive orientation, it is natural to think that unless interpretative action is taken against it, we will fall back into its clutches. It is the case, to say it again, that 'our thoughts [are] continuously outvoted' and translated back into the 'herd perspective' (GS 354) and that we are disposed to 'live entirely in the spell of that perspective which makes the nearest and most vulgar appear tremendously big and as reality itself' (GS 78).

Indeed, this problem is in the foreground in BGE 192 when Nietzsche discusses our tendency to trace the unfamiliar back to the familiar in perception – and in our processes of knowing and understanding generally. On perception he asserts that

> Given some stimulus, our eyes find it more convenient to reproduce an image that they have already produced before than to register what is different and new about an impression
>
> (BGE 192).

This passage clearly chimes with his and our previous discussion of the 'remembered image' of *Truth and Lie*, which we understood along the lines of a Papineauian sensory template. However, a link to a later passage, from *Twilight*, will be most helpful for our purposes here.

In TI *Germans* 6, Nietzsche is also discussing perception when he highlights the importance that educators ensure that their students "learn to see". Nietzsche is in this section again invested in attacking 'the famous modern objectivity' which instructs one 'to lie on [their] stomach, prone and servile

before every little fact'. He then links this servility to facts with the inability of modern objectivists to resist stimuli: 'every common piece of vulgarity is due to an inability to resist a stimulus – you have to react, you follow every impulse'. The most natural reading here is that Nietzsche is associating 'modern objectivity' – as he does with other instances of drives to know – with the tendency to immediately react and subsume stimuli and their content through a familiar schema. The reference to commonness and vulgarity here provide additional evidence that we are on the right path linking this passage with GS 78, GS 354 and BGE 268.

Nietzsche's alternative to the deficiencies of modern objectivity is presented through his advice to resist the usual urge to immediately react to a stimuli – the urge pushed by the 'instinct of fear' which motivates us to render the content of the stimuli familiar. Instead, he advises us '*not* to react immediately to a stimulus, but instead to take control of the inhibiting, excluding instincts'. The goal in doing this is to avoid immediately drawing the new and unfamiliar into the schemata of our dominant perspectives. In the case of perception – in TI *Germans* 6 and BGE 192 – Nietzsche is rehashing the point he made in *Truth and Lie*, about the necessity not to immediately reach for a 'remembered image' from a pre-existing stock, but instead to do justice to the particularity of the stimuli in front of one. As noted, however, the insight here extends beyond perception and to the processes of conceptualisation, knowledge, understanding and learning in general.

Nietzsche's language here also suggests a link with the 'selecting drive' mentioned in chapter three. Instead of allowing the 'inhibiting, excluding instincts' to be in the pay of the 'instinct of fear' and thus to quickly foreground the familiar and chase away the unfamiliar, our resisting the urge to react immediately to stimuli opens up the possibility that we can attend to the particularity of the object or state of affairs in question: 'You let foreign things, *new* things of every type, come towards you'. The need to refrain from the

tendency to try to process things too quickly is something which Nietzsche also remarks on in *The Antichrist*, where he talks of 'the art of reading well' that is of reading facts '*without* letting the desire to understand make you lost caution, patience, subtlety' – a desire which he associates directly with falsification (A 52).

What is prescribed by Nietzsche in TI *Germans* 6 is not merely in tune with his perspectivism, but is an expression of it. On my metaphysically deflated understanding of perspectivism (and its significance), it is a call to employ the processes of shifting out dominant affects, and allowing new points of view to develop, in order to combat (first-order) falsification. It is, as Nietzsche describes it here, 'getting your eyes used to calm, to patience, to letting things come to you; postponing judgment, learning to encompass and take stop of an individual case from all sides'. This is exactly the role Nietzsche needs perspectivism to play if it is going to successfully serve as a corrective to falsification which enables us to break free from our tendency to render the unfamiliar as familiar and to break free from our enclosure in dominant perspectives and their fixed points of view (GS 347, A 54).

The continuity between the target which Nietzsche is attacking here and the worries he is addressing in *Truth and Lie* and contemporaneous notebooks, is evidenced in a remark he makes in his lectures on *Ancient Rhetoric*:

> Our utterances by no means wait until our perception and experience have provided us with a many-sided, somehow respectable knowledge of things; they result immediately when the impulse is perceived. Instead of the thing, the sensation takes in only a sign
>
> (AR: 23).

5.2 Artistry and Selection

As has been mentioned, one key feature of the conceptions of knowledge and our epistemic processes which Nietzsche attacks is what he refers to in GM III 24 as their renunciation of interpretation; whether this is the result of a principled stance, as it appears to be for the ascetic scientist, or stems from the fear or laziness which motivates the application of a pre-meditated schema. Nietzsche's choice to associate modern objectivity and the renunciation of interpretation is, I believe, an indication that the dichotomy which he drew in 1873, between art and a scientific understanding of knowledge, is still playing a role in his philosophy. In GM III 12 & 24, just as in *Truth and Lie* and P55, we see Nietzsche attack a conception of knowledge which seeks the extirpation of interpretation and of the subjective and creative aspects of cognition. We also see, in the later philosophy as in the earlier works we have discussed, art associated with selection (TI *Skirmishes* 24) and with the good conscience to give form to things and construct new interpretations (GS 78, see also GM III 24).

As will be shown below, we ought, thus, to think of a similar dynamic obtaining in the later works (as was present in the earlier works), between artistry and the development of new points of view (new metaphors) – i.e., new points of view which hold out the possibility that we can transcend the dominant schema of concepts and its first-order falsifications.

5.2.1 Art and Interpretation

In TI *Skirmishes* 8 Nietzsche contrasts the psyche of the artist with that of the Parisian novelists he has lambasted in the previous section; those who have a proclivity for refraining from interpretation and for 'lying in the dirt in front of

petits faits' (TI Skirmishes 7). The artist is instead able to process the subject matter in front of him by trusting his 'instinct' and allowing his 'camera obscura, to sift through and express the "matter at hand"' (*ibid.*). As has been noted, this enables the artist to avoid the objectivist's 'false optic' and instead 'force out the main features' of the subject matter. The presentation of the artist as making selections and forming interpretations here is reminiscent of Nietzsche's association – discussed in the previous chapter – of the artistic power with the giving of form to the perceptual image: 'There exists within us a power which permits the *major* features of the mirror image to be perceived with greater intensity' (P 55).

What is key here is that art, as the imposition of form and thus as selective (TI *Skirmishes* 24) is a means we have for doing what is prohibited by the objective conceptions of knowledge which seek to extirpate the affects and interpretation. It does not completely still, or enable us to transcend, the selecting drive – to do so would, after all, be to transcend a fundamental feature of human cognition. What it does, rather, is to take this selecting drive out of the control of the 'instinct of fear' and more judiciously employ it.

This drive is, remember, 'above all a drive to exclude, to chase away, a selecting drive - which allows only certain facts to be presented to it' (WLN 34[131]). In P 55 the artistic power Nietzsche discusses is similarly described as selective: its chief means for forming an image are '*omitting*, *overlooking*, and *ignoring*'. Part of what is essential to art, then, seems to be – early and late – the co-opting of the selective drive and the employment of it in order to impose form on our experience with a good conscience. This happens in *Truth and Lie* through the creation of new metaphors which select and foreground novel or previously obscured similarities between things. In the later philosophy, it happens, as mentioned in chapter two, through the fact that art and artistry provide us with tools, and the licence, to rework appearance.

In chapter four we noted that Nietzsche's association of the creative and selective aspects of cognition with artistry was part of an attempt to ridicule the "scientific" conception of knowledge which demands the extirpation of all selection and creativity. That the same dichotomy between art and "science" is present in the later philosophy is evidenced by the similarity between Nietzsche's description of what is essential to all interpretation and his description of the techniques of artists which he encourages us to employ in order to furnish ourselves with new perspectives. The '*essence* of all interpreting' he describes, provocatively, as 'doing violence, pressing into orderly form, abridging, omitting, padding, fabricating, falsifying' (GM III 24). However, as we have seen these very processes are essential to the selective drive which operates in cognition and to the processes of conceptualisation through which conscious cognition proceeds. Nietzsche's presentation of the processes of interpretation here is clearly meant to offend, and what it is meant to offend, I assert, is the modern objectivist conception of knowledge as proceeding without interpretation and selection. That the 'techniques of artists' also offend this outlook (e.g., GS 299) shouldn't lead us to conclude that they are necessarily bound up with falsification. Instead, I am suggesting, these techniques are precisely what is required if we are to break free from the first-order falsification which the herd perspective threatens to enclose us within.

5.2.2 Artistry and Falsification

At this point, however, a worry might again arise concerning the fact that the role Nietzsche attributes to art in forming new interpretations is geared, not toward escaping falsification, but rather to producing it. The project of self-creation which Nietzsche associates with employing the techniques of artists (GS 299), does seem, for example, to be related to the project of '*attain*[ing]

satisfaction' (GS 290) with ourselves by chasing away aspects we would rather forget (as Young argues: p99-100). Indeed, the techniques seem to be designed to manipulate; by omitting, removing, adding, sweetening things, etc. (GS 299).

The first thing to say in response to this is, as admitted before, my claim is not that art cannot be used in order to falsify in something like the way Young supposes. My claim is just that this isn't essential to art and isn't what its primary function is. The second is that the association of artistry with the manipulation of how things appear shouldn't unduly worry us here. Indeed, this is exactly what we should expect if artistry is to enable us to work toward truth, given the extent of falsification. Nietzsche is clear that we are often dealing in perception with remembered images and that we are conditioned to render the world through concepts which are falsifying. Further, these concepts, the presuppositions of logic and reason – along with the grammar of our language – all bring with them a tendency on our part to "push being under everything" and falsify by reifying the objects we encounter in perception (TI *Reason* 5). Given that this is the case, our default methods of representing the world enclose us in falsity. The fact that artistry enshrines techniques which hold out the possibility that we can manipulate how things appear is necessary if it is to work as a corrective to falsification. Indeed, if Nietzsche reprimanded us for our employment of artistry along these lines, he would be falling back into the modern objectivist view that renounces interpretation and the subjective and creative aspects essential to our cognition.

Understanding this role for art in working against the erroneous default position we find ourselves in, helps us to further understand an aphorism mentioned in chapter two, TI *Reason* 6. Here Nietzsche associates artists with valuing and working with 'appearance' but makes clear that this appearance isn't the appearance of another realm (nor mere appearance, as illusion) and isn't a reason to associate art with falsity. It is, rather, "'appearance'" as 'reality *once again*, only selected, strengthened, corrected' (TI *Reason* 6). The techniques of

artists, and art itself, provide us with a way of correcting the erroneous way the world appears to us. Though Young is right in highlighting that artistry does on occasion seem to be linked with falsifying and sweetening our view of ourselves, there is also plenty of reason to think that – from *The Birth of Tragedy* through to Nietzsche's last books – art is associated with presenting truth: 'art presents a lot that is ugly, harsh, questionable in life, - doesn't this seem to spoil life for us?' (TI *Skirmishes* 24). Such a tendency is also in evidence in GS 78 where the artists are associated with being able to lift us out of what has been made 'foreground', i.e. 'that perspective which makes the nearest and most vulgar appear tremendously big and as reality itself'.

5.3 Summary

The above analysis serves to demonstrate how Nietzsche thinks perspectivism and artistry can enable us to work against falsification and in favour of truth. It thus also goes a long way to establishing that there is no reason for thinking that falsification is all-pervasive. Nietzsche is never concerned about a 'true world', his falsification remarks and perspectivism are, instead, geared toward helping us to get beyond strands of falsification which we are drawn into because of our tendency to read "true being" into reality, to believe knowledge requires the extirpation of aspects fundamental to our cognitive processes, and to understand the world through the herd schema.

In the preceding discussion, I have shown how perspectivism helps us overcome our tendency to overestimate the status of our truths as well as the bogus conception of knowledge I have here referred to as 'modern objectivity'. I have also shown that artistry gives one the tools and good conscience to break free from the herd schema and form new interpretations which hold out the possibility that we can encompass more of what is new and unfamiliar.

As correctives against falsification, perspectivism and artistry serve the goal of empowering our honesty as they encourage and enable us to take responsibility for our cognitive orientation and give us the tools to confront what is 'ugly and harsh' i.e. the truths of Nietzsche's naturalism.

Section Six | The Chaos of Sensation

In the foregoing, I have established that Nietzsche does not consider falsification the be all-pervasive (research aim one) and that it is a mistake to read his falsification remarks as being related to an association (on his part) of truth with a 'true world' (research aim two). It is the case, however, that many commentators who have broadly similar objections to many aspects of Clark's account – including to its developmental nature – still believe Nietzsche to affirm (something at least very much like) Clark's falsification thesis (Hussain 2004; Riccardi 2013; Anderson 1996; Meyer 2014; Green 2002; Constancio 2011). These views typically take the 'chaos of sensation' to be what Nietzsche asserts our beliefs must correspond to, and thus take any creative, selective, simplifying or generalising activity on the side of the subject to necessitate falsification. The fact that these aspects of our cognition are essential to it, means we are cut off from truth. Before concluding this thesis, it will be helpful – in order to position myself with regard to views of this kind – to say something about how I think we should understand the term 'chaos of sensation' and about what these interpretations get wrong. In this section, I will focus on the account of Riccardi (2013) in order to illuminate my position.

6.1 Compatibilism between Falsification and Sensualism

A significant proportion of Riccardi's paper is dedicated to the following two themes: (a) 'to explain how Nietzsche can hold to the falsification thesis despite endorsing sensualism' (b) 'to make sense of the "chaos of sensations"' (Riccardi, p225). Riccardi describes the falsification thesis in the same spirit as Clark: the falsification thesis is 'the view according to which we falsify reality by the way we cognize it' (*ibid.*, p220). Clark's view is, of course, that when Nietzsche develops his sensualism in TI (the view that the senses 'do not lie') he abandons the falsification thesis. However, as we have said, Anderson, Hussain, Meyer and Riccardi all argue against Clark's chronology here. What Riccardi wants is to demonstrate is how Nietzsche can hold that human cognitive capacities falsify, whilst it still being possible that we can have access to the 'chaos of sensations' which, for Riccardi, Nietzsche associates with reality (Riccardi, p239). Riccardi notes that both Anderson and Hussain offers compatibilist solutions, but has reservations about both.

Anderson's solution is to say that it is consciousness which is responsible for falsification, however,

> Lanier Anderson's interpretation of the falsification thesis, according to which consciousness is responsible for cognitive forgery, does not fit well with Nietzsche's strong sensualistic assumption that the senses 'do not lie at all' (TI, 'Reason' in Philosophy 2)
>
> (Riccardi, p220).

Riccardi's thought here is that if all consciousness falsifies, then it is hard to see how a chaos of sensation can exist which we have access to – given that sensory qualities are only given consciously (*ibid.*, p244).

However, Hussain's slightly different view – that conceptualisation is the cause of the falsification of the chaos of sensations – is also deficient. Hussain's view is that we have a pre-conceptual grasp of the chaos of sensation, but that upon thinking or formulating sentences about this chaos, we inevitably use concepts and thus falsify the 'formless, unformulable' world we aspire to correspond to. Thus, Hussain himself admits that we are only in one sense acquainted with the chaos of sensations:

> I say "in one sense" because the minute I use my representational capacities to state something about the world of sensory elements, falsification enters the picture. Given this falsification, there is thus another sense in which there is no unmediated access. Any attempt to have a thought that represents something about the world of sensory elements uses concepts that falsify—they are the falsifying medium, so to speak, that shape all attempts to represent something about the sensory elements
>
> (Hussain 2004: p351).

Riccardi rightly identifies what is wrong with Hussain's account: 'The problem with this view, however, is that it actually seems that we do *not* have any such pre-conceptual *awareness* of sensory qualities' (Riccardi, p245). He continues:

> when we see a cat, normally we do not first experience a formless muddle of sensory qualities: on the contrary, we perceive the cat *directly*. We are aware neither of the 'formless' 'chaos of sensation', nor of the cognitive processing which structures it into the conceptualized perceptual content 'cat', for all this happens under the threshold of our consciousness [...] Rather, we normally

lack access to unconceptualized content *in the first place*' (*ibid.*)

6.2 Riccardi's Compatibilism

Riccardi's own version of compatibilism accepts, as do Hussain and Anderson, that it must be the case – for Nietzsche – that the act of organising the perceptual image happens below the level of consciousness and that this amounts to a falsification of the chaos of sensation. However, he believes that Nietzsche thinks that the falsification which thus attaches to consciousness is something it is possible to momentarily or virtually transcend (*ibid.*, p245-247).

> In other words, even if we are normally aware of sensory
> qualities as already conceptualized, we can virtually attend
> to them in the 'unconceptualized mode'
>
> (*ibid.*, p245).

Thus, 'I can scan the different shades of red and yellow of the apple I am now holding' whilst 'abstract[ing] from the fact that they are qualities of the object "apple"' (ibid., p245). In so doing, the thought is, I can become sensitive to the fine-grained sensual data – instead of simply reactivating a remembered image, or utilising a concept, which foregrounds familiar aspects, patterns, shapes (etc.) whilst failing to encapsulate new and novel aspects of the sensory data.

This will all sound familiar from my discussion of the 'remembered image' and the 'vivid first impression'. However, there is one big difference between Riccardi's account and my own. Riccardi thinks that the processes governing the formation of the image, and the subsequent conceptualisation, necessarily falsify:

In turn, such cases provide additional evidence for the claim that the perceptual content we are normally aware of has already been unconsciously conceptualized and therefore - according to Nietzsche – falsified

(*ibid.*, p247).

Though Riccardi thinks that we are able to momentarily abstract away from our schema, this can only ever be something which we do momentarily – any normal perception, any conceptualisation and thus any thought about the world, is still mired in falsification for Riccardi's Nietzsche.

What this means is that we are in essentially in the same position as that which we saw Constancio to be in in chapter three. Any abbreviation or simplification is taken to necessitate falsification, but abbreviation, simplification (etc.) are also seen to be fundamental to human cognition. (Meyer, Green, Hussain and Anderson all adopt similar positions.) This position also has affinities with the moral sense of truth and its allied conception of knowledge, which were discussed in chapter four, and with the modern objectivity discussed above; the common theme is an association of the interpretative, selective and simplifying processes through which human cognition in fact proceeds with falsification.

6.3 Genuine Compatibilism

A flaw of Riccardi's account, and the other commentators mentioned above, is that they fail to consider in detail the contingent factors which Nietzsche asserts lead to falsification. They instead assume that he holds a theory of truth which is something like correspondence to the 'true world' of the chaos of sensation – this "chaos" being assumed to be radically particular and in principle

unknowable for us. In Riccardi's case this means that, even though he does fantastic work in, for example, discussing the importance of BGE 192, he considers its significance in a false context.

Through focusing on the contingent causes of falsification (along with the continuity, and long lineage, of these thoughts in Nietzsche's corpus) my account has a greater capacity to demonstrate the compatibility of sensualism and Nietzsche's falsification remarks. Riccardi is able to show how falsification is *technically* compatible with Nietzsche's sensualism – by explaining that content falsified by the application of a schema is 'virtually' or momentarily available to us – however, my account demonstrates that Nietzsche's preoccupation is only with contingent falsification and that this falsification is *meaningfully* compatible with sensualism. I am able to do this as I have shown that falsification stems not from the essential nature of our cognitive faculties but, primarily, from our tendency to overestimate the status of our knowledge and to cast the world as stable and familiar.

This approach enables us to see that, for example, in BGE 192, falsification is not bound up with perceptual organisation or conceptualisation *per se*, but with the fact that, instead of attending and reading out what is in front of us (via our perception, but also in other cognitive processing: 'knowledge and understanding'), we reach instead for a 'remembered image' or another familiar way of rendering the situation. Though this tendency is deeply embedded – as are our ways of reifying our concepts and structuring devices into reality – Nietzsche believes that we can work against it, and the falsification associated with it; as shown in the previous section.

The motivations behind Nietzsche's falsification remarks are thus properly understood – contra Clark and contra the commentators addressed in this section – as being bound up with his wish to highlight strands of falsification which are contingent, as part of a project to enable us to overcome

them. Thus, the falsification remarks are best understood, not as a part of any implicit theory of truth or knowledge, but rather as serving the practical goal of enabling us to develop our honesty in the face of the truths of Nietzsche's naturalism. They are geared toward preventing us from becoming the 'antithesis of [a] strong spirit' and allowing a single dominant perspective to govern our cognitive orientation. To this end, Nietzsche shows how the dominance of a perspective can be challenged by our shifting affects and interpretations in and out – and thus begins to reveal how we can take responsibility for our cognitive orientation. Instead of allowing our instinct of fear to falsify by casting what is new and unfamiliar as a further instance of something familiar and "known", Nietzsche pushes us to develop sensitivity to these aspects of reality. Instead of unselectively accruing facts like the ascetic scientist, and bowing down before them like the modern objectivists, Nietzsche pushes us to form interpretations which make sense of these facts and drive out their most significant aspects.

Thus, Nietzsche's remarks on falsification seek to enable us to become the strong spirit of BGE 34, not to report a confused and implausible theory concerning the complete falsity of human thought. The virtue of honesty, and the need to confront difficult truths, is something which remains central to Nietzsche throughout his philosophical work, not least because it is closely related to the theme of the affirmation of life.

Conclusion | The 'Chaos of Sensation' as a Placeholder

There are many good reasons for refraining from saying anything about how to understand the 'chaos of sensation'. For one thing, the phrase only occurs in a single unpublished note. For another, it has been infused with significance primarily by those commentators who mistakenly believe Nietzsche to implicitly hold a theory of truth as correspondence to the 'chaos of sensation'. I follow Gemes (1992), and what I take to be the spirit of Berry (2011), in denying that Nietzsche held, or was minded to seriously develop, any theory of truth. However, if we are to make use of the phrase, then it should be understood as a placeholder for those aspects of reality which are hidden behind the herd schema. As with the 'vivid first impression', the chaos of sensation shouldn't be understood as a completely formless and unformulable world in that it completely lacks content – lest we slip into relativism.

In *Truth and Lie* we saw that the 'vivid first impression', though hidden behind a schema, was attainable when new metaphors, new points of view, were developed. Similarly, by far the most natural reading of Nietzsche's falsification passages is that he is highlighting falsification, through the application of a schema or through the errors bound up with reification, in order to motivate and empower us to move beyond these falsifications (GS 354, BGE 268, GS 110, BGE 192). His goal is not to point out that all human cognitive endeavour is in vein – as many interpretations ultimately have to assert. It is instead, quite naturally, to motivate us to work against the generalising tendency of the herd, or the infusion of things with greater stability and endurance than they in fact have.

As I have tried to show, there is no reason to think that, for example, basic notions such as that of 'things' by themselves falsifies – as our analysis of TI *Reason* and GS 110-111 has shown. It is only when "pushing being under

things" and taking our concept of 'things' to pick out metaphysically robust entities that falsification ensues.

Having said all of this, it is important to keep in mind that, right up until the final years of his productive life, Nietzsche takes falsehood to characterise our default relation to the world. Thus, Clark's overly optimistic reading of Nietzsche's mature sensualism, which holds that we can generally trust the input we receive through the senses, is also mistaken.

Instead, Nietzsche conceives of humans as being in a constant struggle against our tendency to render the unfamiliar as the familiar, to "push being underneath" everything, to be seduced by grammar and to be pushed by dominant drives to consider their perspectives as an adequate representation of 'reality itself'. This struggle is so primitive that Nietzsche associates it with God: 'I am afraid that we have not got rid of God because we still have faith in grammar' (TI *Reason* 5). Thus, the process of working against the seductions of grammar, and the other strands of falsification, is rightly seen in the context of Nietzsche's project of de-deifying our picture of existence and taking responsibility for our cognitive orientation in the world by developing our intellectual conscience.

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