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Inducible equilibrium for security games

Inducible equilibrium for security games
Inducible equilibrium for security games

Strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) is the standard solution concept of Stackelberg security games. The SSE assumes that the follower breaks ties in favor of the leader and this is widely acknowledged and justified by the assertion that the defender can often induce the attacker to choose a preferred action by making an infinitesimal adjustment to her strategy. Unfortunately, in security games with resource assignment constraints, the assertion might not be valid. To overcome this issue, inspired by the notion of inducibility and the pessimistic Stackelberg equilibrium [20, 21], this paper presents the inducible Stackelberg equilibrium (ISE), which is guaranteed to exist and avoids overoptimism as the outcome can always be induced with infinitesimal strategy deviation. Experimental evaluation unveils the significant overoptimism and sub-optimality of SSE and thus, verifies the advantage of the ISE as an alternative solution concept.

Inducible Stackelberg equilibrium, Security games, Utility guarantee
1947-1949
International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
Guo, Qingyu
9922ab2c-9e8f-484f-ae29-0455d5edc6b3
Gan, Jiarui
eaa9f4a0-ced7-48e9-b03e-ee10f21b76dc
Fang, Fei
b43b315a-bb91-4540-b3ef-8605994ea763
Tran-Thanh, Long
e0666669-d34b-460e-950d-e8b139fab16c
Tambe, Milind
a620fda8-c4fe-4193-a396-fe6de595fc6f
An, Bo
41434b7b-ca34-4595-8861-44f41b664fc4
Guo, Qingyu
9922ab2c-9e8f-484f-ae29-0455d5edc6b3
Gan, Jiarui
eaa9f4a0-ced7-48e9-b03e-ee10f21b76dc
Fang, Fei
b43b315a-bb91-4540-b3ef-8605994ea763
Tran-Thanh, Long
e0666669-d34b-460e-950d-e8b139fab16c
Tambe, Milind
a620fda8-c4fe-4193-a396-fe6de595fc6f
An, Bo
41434b7b-ca34-4595-8861-44f41b664fc4

Guo, Qingyu, Gan, Jiarui, Fang, Fei, Tran-Thanh, Long, Tambe, Milind and An, Bo (2018) Inducible equilibrium for security games. In 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2018. vol. 3, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS). pp. 1947-1949 .

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)

Abstract

Strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) is the standard solution concept of Stackelberg security games. The SSE assumes that the follower breaks ties in favor of the leader and this is widely acknowledged and justified by the assertion that the defender can often induce the attacker to choose a preferred action by making an infinitesimal adjustment to her strategy. Unfortunately, in security games with resource assignment constraints, the assertion might not be valid. To overcome this issue, inspired by the notion of inducibility and the pessimistic Stackelberg equilibrium [20, 21], this paper presents the inducible Stackelberg equilibrium (ISE), which is guaranteed to exist and avoids overoptimism as the outcome can always be induced with infinitesimal strategy deviation. Experimental evaluation unveils the significant overoptimism and sub-optimality of SSE and thus, verifies the advantage of the ISE as an alternative solution concept.

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More information

Published date: 2018
Venue - Dates: 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Stockholm, Sweden, 2018-07-11 - 2018-07-13
Keywords: Inducible Stackelberg equilibrium, Security games, Utility guarantee

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 425697
URI: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/425697
PURE UUID: a41ab387-87ba-49d5-9669-508372c6a0d6
ORCID for Long Tran-Thanh: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0003-1617-8316

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 01 Nov 2018 17:30
Last modified: 14 Mar 2019 01:38

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Contributors

Author: Qingyu Guo
Author: Jiarui Gan
Author: Fei Fang
Author: Long Tran-Thanh ORCID iD
Author: Milind Tambe
Author: Bo An

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