Assessing the Responsibility to Protect’s motivational capacity: the role of humanity
Assessing the Responsibility to Protect’s motivational capacity: the role of humanity
While the concept of humanity is most often referred to as the moral source of the Responsibility to Protect’s motivational capacity, humanity’s normative status and value has continued to be left assumed and/or unexplored. Consequently, there remains a considerable lack of analysis into humanity’s role in supposedly helping to both locate moral harm and subsequently provide a motivational cause that can drive protection practices in support of the Responsibility to Protect principle. In response to this lacuna, this article puts forward three hypotheses regarding the motivational role of humanity in this process: (a) humanity functioning as a rhetorical tool with no motivational qualities, (b) humanity as a concept that works to redefine sovereignty in support of the Responsibility to Protect and (c) humanity as a motivating principle that ultimately diminishes in influence as the Responsibility to Protect principle is diffused into action. Through this analysis, the article offers a more rigorous and systematic evaluation of humanity’s limitations as a moral motivator for generating collective response to mass atrocity crimes, highlighting the need to further develop understanding of the complex interaction between morality and politics in international decision-making.
Humanitarian intervention, humanity, motivation, Responsibility to Protect, sovereignty
107-124
Jarvis, Samuel
7c3221a6-af64-41d2-bfbe-9f2bf6805a0c
1 February 2018
Jarvis, Samuel
7c3221a6-af64-41d2-bfbe-9f2bf6805a0c
Jarvis, Samuel
(2018)
Assessing the Responsibility to Protect’s motivational capacity: the role of humanity.
Journal of International Political Theory, 14 (1), .
(doi:10.1177/1755088217748673).
Abstract
While the concept of humanity is most often referred to as the moral source of the Responsibility to Protect’s motivational capacity, humanity’s normative status and value has continued to be left assumed and/or unexplored. Consequently, there remains a considerable lack of analysis into humanity’s role in supposedly helping to both locate moral harm and subsequently provide a motivational cause that can drive protection practices in support of the Responsibility to Protect principle. In response to this lacuna, this article puts forward three hypotheses regarding the motivational role of humanity in this process: (a) humanity functioning as a rhetorical tool with no motivational qualities, (b) humanity as a concept that works to redefine sovereignty in support of the Responsibility to Protect and (c) humanity as a motivating principle that ultimately diminishes in influence as the Responsibility to Protect principle is diffused into action. Through this analysis, the article offers a more rigorous and systematic evaluation of humanity’s limitations as a moral motivator for generating collective response to mass atrocity crimes, highlighting the need to further develop understanding of the complex interaction between morality and politics in international decision-making.
Text
Samuel Jarvi AAMs
- Accepted Manuscript
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Accepted/In Press date: 25 November 2017
e-pub ahead of print date: 22 December 2017
Published date: 1 February 2018
Keywords:
Humanitarian intervention, humanity, motivation, Responsibility to Protect, sovereignty
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 425718
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/425718
ISSN: 1755-0882
PURE UUID: 5f405ea6-514b-493b-b1b0-d2e10c55e9e4
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Date deposited: 01 Nov 2018 17:30
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 21:39
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Author:
Samuel Jarvis
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