Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions
Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions
In combinatorial auctions using VCG, a seller can sometimes increase revenue by dropping bidders. In this paper we investigate the extent to which this counterintuitive phenomenon can also occur under other deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auction mechanisms. Our main result is that such failures of “revenue monotonicity” can occur under any such mechanism that is weakly maximal—meaning roughly that it chooses allocations that cannot be augmented to cause a losing bidder to win without hurting winning bidders—and that allows bidders to express arbitrary known single-minded preferences. We also give a set of other impossibility results as corollaries, concerning revenue when the set of goods changes, false-name-proofness, and the core.
441-456
Rastegari, Baharak
6ba9e93c-53ba-4090-8f77-c1cb1568d7d1
Condon, Anne
a1c1e645-b4b0-4449-a18e-6e43a440cce8
Leyton-brown, Kevin
bbf18b1f-b857-48b6-b33c-5b26a6ed6b13
1 February 2011
Rastegari, Baharak
6ba9e93c-53ba-4090-8f77-c1cb1568d7d1
Condon, Anne
a1c1e645-b4b0-4449-a18e-6e43a440cce8
Leyton-brown, Kevin
bbf18b1f-b857-48b6-b33c-5b26a6ed6b13
Rastegari, Baharak, Condon, Anne and Leyton-brown, Kevin
(2011)
Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions.
Artificial Intelligence, 175 (2), .
(doi:10.1016/j.artint.2010.08.005).
Abstract
In combinatorial auctions using VCG, a seller can sometimes increase revenue by dropping bidders. In this paper we investigate the extent to which this counterintuitive phenomenon can also occur under other deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auction mechanisms. Our main result is that such failures of “revenue monotonicity” can occur under any such mechanism that is weakly maximal—meaning roughly that it chooses allocations that cannot be augmented to cause a losing bidder to win without hurting winning bidders—and that allows bidders to express arbitrary known single-minded preferences. We also give a set of other impossibility results as corollaries, concerning revenue when the set of goods changes, false-name-proofness, and the core.
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e-pub ahead of print date: 31 August 2010
Published date: 1 February 2011
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Local EPrints ID: 426398
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/426398
ISSN: 0004-3702
PURE UUID: c55ebcfa-58f6-43bd-b799-b83fa18554b5
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Date deposited: 27 Nov 2018 17:30
Last modified: 16 Mar 2024 04:39
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Author:
Baharak Rastegari
Author:
Anne Condon
Author:
Kevin Leyton-brown
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