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Leadership in singleton congestion games

Leadership in singleton congestion games
Leadership in singleton congestion games

We study Stackelberg games where the underlying structure is a congestion game. We recall that, while leadership in 2-player games has been widely investigated, only few results are known when the number of players is three or more. The intractability of finding a Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) in normal-form and polymatrix games is among them. In this paper, we focus on congestion games in which each player can choose a single resource (a.k.a. singleton congestion games) and a player acts as leader. We show that, without further assumptions, finding an SE when the followers break ties in favor of the leader is not in Poly-APX, unless P = NP. Instead, under the assumption that every player has access to the same resources and that the cost functions are monotonic, we show that an SE can be computed efficiently when the followers break ties either in favor or against the leader.

447-453
International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
Marchesi, Alberto
c626cdff-b4a0-4bd4-874c-00cb7ae49034
Coniglio, Stefano
03838248-2ce4-4dbc-a6f4-e010d6fdac67
Gatti, Nicola
aceed282-d524-4b1d-9ad8-0685eac20d3a
Marchesi, Alberto
c626cdff-b4a0-4bd4-874c-00cb7ae49034
Coniglio, Stefano
03838248-2ce4-4dbc-a6f4-e010d6fdac67
Gatti, Nicola
aceed282-d524-4b1d-9ad8-0685eac20d3a

Marchesi, Alberto, Coniglio, Stefano and Gatti, Nicola (2018) Leadership in singleton congestion games. In Proceedings of the 27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2018. vol. 2018-July, International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence. pp. 447-453 . (doi:10.24963/ijcai.2018/62).

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)

Abstract

We study Stackelberg games where the underlying structure is a congestion game. We recall that, while leadership in 2-player games has been widely investigated, only few results are known when the number of players is three or more. The intractability of finding a Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) in normal-form and polymatrix games is among them. In this paper, we focus on congestion games in which each player can choose a single resource (a.k.a. singleton congestion games) and a player acts as leader. We show that, without further assumptions, finding an SE when the followers break ties in favor of the leader is not in Poly-APX, unless P = NP. Instead, under the assumption that every player has access to the same resources and that the cost functions are monotonic, we show that an SE can be computed efficiently when the followers break ties either in favor or against the leader.

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Leadership in singleton congestion games - Accepted Manuscript
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Published date: 2018
Venue - Dates: International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, , Stockholm, Sweden, 2018-07-13 - 2018-07-19

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 426546
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/426546
PURE UUID: e7de6eb0-b7ab-4cfa-8188-c607f67bb2a9
ORCID for Stefano Coniglio: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0001-9568-4385

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Date deposited: 30 Nov 2018 17:30
Last modified: 16 Mar 2024 04:24

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Contributors

Author: Alberto Marchesi
Author: Nicola Gatti

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