Nietzsche and the sceptics: towards a healthy life

Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to offer a critique of Nietzsche’s project for the revaluation of values interpreted as a philosophy for a way of living aimed at achieving ‘great health’. I argue that, in this respect, it is illuminating and aids the interpretation of Nietzsche’s views on sickness and the achievement of health to compare his philosophy with that of the Pyrrhonian Sceptics whom I argue share similar philosophical objectives.

This thesis also critiques and builds on Jessica Berry’s comparative study of Nietzsche and the Pyrrhonian sceptics regarding health in which she argues for a similarity between the Pyrrhonian sceptic’s notion of health and Nietzsche’s great health. I highlight difficulties in her arguments. Instead I offer my own comparative study on health which highlights alternative similarities between Nietzsche and the Pyrrhonian sceptics, principally their rejection of orthodox philosophical principles in favour of a new way of doing philosophy. I argue that both philosophies identify a psychological sickness which they associate with adherence to conventional values – the cure for which is achieved through a comparable methodology, specifically involving the attack on dogmatism and the adoption of scepticism, doubt and suspension. I also show that both consider that philosophical deliberation should be directed towards the Socratic question ‘how should I live a good life?’

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Identifiers

ORCID for Christopher Janaway: orcid.org/0000-0002-9600-8837

ORCID for Lee Walters: orcid.org/0000-0003-3899-3522

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