The experimetrics of public goods: inferring motivations from contributions
The experimetrics of public goods: inferring motivations from contributions
In public goods experiments, stochastic choice, censoring and motivational heterogeneity give scope for disagreement over the extent of unselfishness, and whether it is reciprocal or altruistic. We show that these problems can be addressed econometrically, by estimating a finite mixture model to isolate types, incorporating double censoring and a tremble term. Most subjects act selfishly, but a substantial proportion are reciprocal with altruism playing only a marginal role. Isolating reciprocators enables a test of Sugden’s model of voluntary contributions. We estimate that reciprocators display a self-serving bias relative to the model.
altruism, finite mixture models, reciprocity, tobit, trembles, voluntary contributions
161-193
Bardsley, Nicholas
4cc36030-2783-4def-a06f-9f2aee92663e
Moffatt, Peter G.
a05d5079-0e9d-4e20-9779-1b2a1946ab44
1 March 2007
Bardsley, Nicholas
4cc36030-2783-4def-a06f-9f2aee92663e
Moffatt, Peter G.
a05d5079-0e9d-4e20-9779-1b2a1946ab44
Bardsley, Nicholas and Moffatt, Peter G.
(2007)
The experimetrics of public goods: inferring motivations from contributions.
Theory and Decision, 62 (2), .
(doi:10.1007/s11238-006-9013-3).
Abstract
In public goods experiments, stochastic choice, censoring and motivational heterogeneity give scope for disagreement over the extent of unselfishness, and whether it is reciprocal or altruistic. We show that these problems can be addressed econometrically, by estimating a finite mixture model to isolate types, incorporating double censoring and a tremble term. Most subjects act selfishly, but a substantial proportion are reciprocal with altruism playing only a marginal role. Isolating reciprocators enables a test of Sugden’s model of voluntary contributions. We estimate that reciprocators display a self-serving bias relative to the model.
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Published date: 1 March 2007
Keywords:
altruism, finite mixture models, reciprocity, tobit, trembles, voluntary contributions
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Local EPrints ID: 42825
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/42825
PURE UUID: c1913cc2-0bb7-4d60-b2fd-f361a18ae2d4
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Date deposited: 02 Feb 2007
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 08:51
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Author:
Nicholas Bardsley
Author:
Peter G. Moffatt
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