The experimetrics of public goods: inferring motivations from contributions


Bardsley, Nicholas and Moffatt, Peter G. (2007) The experimetrics of public goods: inferring motivations from contributions Theory and Decision, 62, (2), pp. 161-193. (doi:10.1007/s11238-006-9013-3).

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Description/Abstract

In public goods experiments, stochastic choice, censoring and motivational heterogeneity give scope for disagreement over the extent of unselfishness, and whether it is reciprocal or altruistic. We show that these problems can be addressed econometrically, by estimating a finite mixture model to isolate types, incorporating double censoring and a tremble term. Most subjects act selfishly, but a substantial proportion are reciprocal with altruism playing only a marginal role. Isolating reciprocators enables a test of Sugden’s model of voluntary contributions. We estimate that reciprocators display a self-serving bias relative to the model.

Item Type: Article
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi:10.1007/s11238-006-9013-3
Keywords: altruism, finite mixture models, reciprocity, tobit, trembles, voluntary contributions
Subjects:
ePrint ID: 42825
Date :
Date Event
1 March 2007Published
Date Deposited: 02 Feb 2007
Last Modified: 16 Apr 2017 18:51
Further Information:Google Scholar
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/42825

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