Do higher value firms voluntarily disclose more information? Evidence from China
Do higher value firms voluntarily disclose more information? Evidence from China
This paper examines the effect of guanxi on the relation between firm value and voluntary disclosure of information about new investment projects in China's institutional setting. We find a negative relation between firm value and voluntary disclosure for firms that rely heavily on guanxi in their value creation (e.g. non-high-tech firms, and firms located in regions with underdeveloped institutions). By contrast, for firms that rely less heavily on guanxi and more on other sources of core competencies (e.g. high-tech firms, and firms in high-marketisation regions), we find a positive relation between firm value and voluntary disclosure. The moderating role of guanxi on the relation between firm value and voluntary disclosure is explained by firms conscientiously balancing the costs and benefits of voluntary disclosure relative to guanxi. Specifically, high guanxi-dependence firms refrain from detailed voluntary disclosures for fear of revealing sensitive information that may harm their guanxi. In contrast, low guanxi-dependence firms rely more heavily on voluntary disclosures to reduce information asymmetry and financing cost, with such incentives being particularly strong for high value firms. Our evidence has implications for research on motives for disclosure and regulation of financial reporting.
18-32
Chen, Jean J.
094addaf-38fa-43b1-bc95-43a36600c885
Cheng, Xinsheng
e3772c95-d08c-4b53-8dd0-dafc17960022
Gong, Stephen X.
dd436698-37e8-4c4f-8dd8-022b2746f8fe
Tan, Youchao
8c280b70-da7c-4342-90d7-c8a7b2836134
1 March 2014
Chen, Jean J.
094addaf-38fa-43b1-bc95-43a36600c885
Cheng, Xinsheng
e3772c95-d08c-4b53-8dd0-dafc17960022
Gong, Stephen X.
dd436698-37e8-4c4f-8dd8-022b2746f8fe
Tan, Youchao
8c280b70-da7c-4342-90d7-c8a7b2836134
Chen, Jean J., Cheng, Xinsheng, Gong, Stephen X. and Tan, Youchao
(2014)
Do higher value firms voluntarily disclose more information? Evidence from China.
British Accounting Review, 46 (1), .
(doi:10.1016/j.bar.2013.06.003).
Abstract
This paper examines the effect of guanxi on the relation between firm value and voluntary disclosure of information about new investment projects in China's institutional setting. We find a negative relation between firm value and voluntary disclosure for firms that rely heavily on guanxi in their value creation (e.g. non-high-tech firms, and firms located in regions with underdeveloped institutions). By contrast, for firms that rely less heavily on guanxi and more on other sources of core competencies (e.g. high-tech firms, and firms in high-marketisation regions), we find a positive relation between firm value and voluntary disclosure. The moderating role of guanxi on the relation between firm value and voluntary disclosure is explained by firms conscientiously balancing the costs and benefits of voluntary disclosure relative to guanxi. Specifically, high guanxi-dependence firms refrain from detailed voluntary disclosures for fear of revealing sensitive information that may harm their guanxi. In contrast, low guanxi-dependence firms rely more heavily on voluntary disclosures to reduce information asymmetry and financing cost, with such incentives being particularly strong for high value firms. Our evidence has implications for research on motives for disclosure and regulation of financial reporting.
This record has no associated files available for download.
More information
Published date: 1 March 2014
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 431828
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/431828
ISSN: 0890-8389
PURE UUID: 4b6bcc9c-7513-4772-8019-5ff19bd2dceb
Catalogue record
Date deposited: 19 Jun 2019 16:30
Last modified: 16 Mar 2024 02:18
Export record
Altmetrics
Contributors
Author:
Jean J. Chen
Author:
Xinsheng Cheng
Author:
Stephen X. Gong
Author:
Youchao Tan
Download statistics
Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.
View more statistics