Should I believe all the truths?
Should I believe all the truths?
Should I believe something if and only if it’s true? Many philosophers have objected to this kind of truth norm, on the grounds that it’s not the case that one ought to believe all the truths. For example, some truths are too complex to believe; others are too trivial to be worth believing. Philosophers who defend truth norms often respond to this problem by reformulating truth norms in ways that do not entail that one ought to believe all the truths. Many of these attempts at reformulation, I’ll argue, have been missteps. A number of these different reformulations are incapable of carrying out a central role a truth norm is meant to play, that of explaining justification. The truth norm I’ll defend, however, avoids the implausible results of a prescription to believe all the truths, but doesn’t thereby fail to explain justification. This norm, introduced (but not defended) by Conor McHugh, states that if one has some doxastic attitude about p—i.e. if one believes, disbelieves, or suspends judgement about whether p—then one ought to believe that p if and only if p is true.
3279–3303
Greenberg, Alexander
0f529d9c-1683-4f2d-94e5-2863e31a9c25
1 August 2020
Greenberg, Alexander
0f529d9c-1683-4f2d-94e5-2863e31a9c25
Abstract
Should I believe something if and only if it’s true? Many philosophers have objected to this kind of truth norm, on the grounds that it’s not the case that one ought to believe all the truths. For example, some truths are too complex to believe; others are too trivial to be worth believing. Philosophers who defend truth norms often respond to this problem by reformulating truth norms in ways that do not entail that one ought to believe all the truths. Many of these attempts at reformulation, I’ll argue, have been missteps. A number of these different reformulations are incapable of carrying out a central role a truth norm is meant to play, that of explaining justification. The truth norm I’ll defend, however, avoids the implausible results of a prescription to believe all the truths, but doesn’t thereby fail to explain justification. This norm, introduced (but not defended) by Conor McHugh, states that if one has some doxastic attitude about p—i.e. if one believes, disbelieves, or suspends judgement about whether p—then one ought to believe that p if and only if p is true.
Text
Greenberg 2018 Article Should I Believe All The Truths
- Version of Record
More information
Accepted/In Press date: 16 July 2018
e-pub ahead of print date: 24 July 2018
Published date: 1 August 2020
Additional Information:
This was previously uploaded to the University of Oxford's electronic repository (ORA) within three months of acceptance: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:806327ae-7094-4bdb-b7ca-d76b789afe59
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 432079
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/432079
ISSN: 0039-7857
PURE UUID: 22b3ee45-a707-4a47-9d80-b2091db3b22f
Catalogue record
Date deposited: 01 Jul 2019 16:30
Last modified: 16 Mar 2024 02:32
Export record
Altmetrics
Download statistics
Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.
View more statistics