Constitutivism about epistemic normativity
Constitutivism about epistemic normativity
According to constitutivists about epistemic normativity, epistemic normativity is explained by the nature of belief. Specifically, it is explained by the fact that, as a matter of conceptual necessity, belief stands in a normative relation to truth. We ask whether there are persuasive arguments for the claim that belief stands in such a relation to truth. We examine and critique two arguments for this claim. The first is based on the transparency of belief. The second is based on Moore-paradoxical sentences. We develop a common objection to both. Both arguments are reliant on implausible claims about the relation between accepting a norm and being motivated by it. This point has sometimes been made in connection with the transparency of belief. But its development and application to Moore-paradoxical sentences are, we believe, novel.
173-96
Greenberg, Alexander
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Cowie, Christopher
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Greenberg, Alexander
0f529d9c-1683-4f2d-94e5-2863e31a9c25
Cowie, Christopher
33472e45-7402-45f1-8e8d-69562ead5ba6
Greenberg, Alexander and Cowie, Christopher
(2018)
Constitutivism about epistemic normativity.
In,
Kyriacou, Christos and McKenna, Robin
(eds.)
Metaepistemology: Realism and Anti-Realism.
(Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy)
Cham, UK.
Palgrave Macmillan, .
(doi:10.1007/978-3-319-93369-6_8).
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Book Section
Abstract
According to constitutivists about epistemic normativity, epistemic normativity is explained by the nature of belief. Specifically, it is explained by the fact that, as a matter of conceptual necessity, belief stands in a normative relation to truth. We ask whether there are persuasive arguments for the claim that belief stands in such a relation to truth. We examine and critique two arguments for this claim. The first is based on the transparency of belief. The second is based on Moore-paradoxical sentences. We develop a common objection to both. Both arguments are reliant on implausible claims about the relation between accepting a norm and being motivated by it. This point has sometimes been made in connection with the transparency of belief. But its development and application to Moore-paradoxical sentences are, we believe, novel.
Text
epistemic-constitutivism
- Author's Original
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e-pub ahead of print date: 20 September 2018
Additional Information:
Publisher's statement: Cowie, Christopher & Greenberg, Alexander (2018). Constitutivism about Epistemic Normativity. In Metaepistemology: Realism and Anti-Realism. Kyriacou, Christos & McKenna, Robin Palgrave Macmillan. 173-196 reproduced with permission of Palgrave Macmillan. This extract is taken from the author's original manuscript and has not been edited. The definitive, published, version of record is available here: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93369-6_8
This was originally uploaded, by Christopher Cowie, to Durham University's online repository (DRO) within three months of acceptance: http://dro.dur.ac.uk/27209/
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Local EPrints ID: 432219
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/432219
PURE UUID: b8290298-dead-458b-b0cd-83019e7fa2c6
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Date deposited: 04 Jul 2019 16:30
Last modified: 12 Apr 2024 04:01
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Contributors
Author:
Christopher Cowie
Editor:
Christos Kyriacou
Editor:
Robin McKenna
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