Female directors and managerial opportunism: monitoring versus advisory female directors
Female directors and managerial opportunism: monitoring versus advisory female directors
Going beyond the mere participation of female directors within boardrooms, we investigate which of the two major boards of directors’ roles (advisory versus monitoring) is best played by female directors in order to make a difference to shareholders. More specifically, we investigate the impact that advisory and monitoring female directors have on managerial opportunism with a specific focus on earnings management. Using sample of US firms, we find evidence suggesting that female directors holding monitoring roles mitigate managerial opportunism, as measured by discretionary accruals. In contrast to the current argument that advisory directors in general are better able to sustain and improve earnings quality, we find no evidence that suggests that advisory female directors are significantly associated with lower managerial opportunism. Overall, the results remain robust after controlling for potential endogeneity problems, corporate governance, and external auditor quality.
Female directors, gender differences, advisory versus monitoring directors, earnings management, economic versus social theories, gender differences, advisory versus monitoring directors, earnings management, economic versus social theories
Zalata, Alaa
0fc2c56d-97ad-44ce-ab31-63ca335dcef6
Ntim, Collins
1f344edc-8005-4e96-8972-d56c4dade46b
Choudhry, Taufiq
6fc3ceb8-8103-4017-b3b5-2d38efa57728
Hassanein, Ahmed
c77cd8fc-a14a-4425-8713-5890cf5bf8b3
Elzahar, Hany
2b4b6fac-1db4-4fba-b757-ed7a7bd027b9
October 2019
Zalata, Alaa
0fc2c56d-97ad-44ce-ab31-63ca335dcef6
Ntim, Collins
1f344edc-8005-4e96-8972-d56c4dade46b
Choudhry, Taufiq
6fc3ceb8-8103-4017-b3b5-2d38efa57728
Hassanein, Ahmed
c77cd8fc-a14a-4425-8713-5890cf5bf8b3
Elzahar, Hany
2b4b6fac-1db4-4fba-b757-ed7a7bd027b9
Zalata, Alaa, Ntim, Collins, Choudhry, Taufiq, Hassanein, Ahmed and Elzahar, Hany
(2019)
Female directors and managerial opportunism: monitoring versus advisory female directors.
The Leadership Quarterly, 30 (5), [101309].
(doi:10.1016/j.leaqua.2019.101309).
Abstract
Going beyond the mere participation of female directors within boardrooms, we investigate which of the two major boards of directors’ roles (advisory versus monitoring) is best played by female directors in order to make a difference to shareholders. More specifically, we investigate the impact that advisory and monitoring female directors have on managerial opportunism with a specific focus on earnings management. Using sample of US firms, we find evidence suggesting that female directors holding monitoring roles mitigate managerial opportunism, as measured by discretionary accruals. In contrast to the current argument that advisory directors in general are better able to sustain and improve earnings quality, we find no evidence that suggests that advisory female directors are significantly associated with lower managerial opportunism. Overall, the results remain robust after controlling for potential endogeneity problems, corporate governance, and external auditor quality.
Text
Main manuscript
- Accepted Manuscript
More information
Accepted/In Press date: 5 August 2019
e-pub ahead of print date: 21 August 2019
Published date: October 2019
Keywords:
Female directors, gender differences, advisory versus monitoring directors, earnings management, economic versus social theories, gender differences, advisory versus monitoring directors, earnings management, economic versus social theories
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 432996
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/432996
ISSN: 1048-9843
PURE UUID: 571a34a3-074c-444c-a9ea-0a36eff6c432
Catalogue record
Date deposited: 06 Aug 2019 16:30
Last modified: 17 Mar 2024 02:51
Export record
Altmetrics
Contributors
Author:
Ahmed Hassanein
Author:
Hany Elzahar
Download statistics
Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.
View more statistics
