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Possibilistic randomisation in strategic-form games

Possibilistic randomisation in strategic-form games
Possibilistic randomisation in strategic-form games
Since the seminal work of John Nash, convex combinations of actions are known to guarantee the existence of equilibria in strategic-form games. This paper introduces an alternative notion of randomisation among actions – possibilistic randomisation – and investigates the mathematical consequences of doing so. The framework of possibility theory gives rise to two distinct notions of equilibria both of which are characterised in our main results: a qualitative one based on the Sugeno integral and a quantitative one based on the Choquet integral. Then the two notions of equilibrium are compared against a coordination game with payoff-distinguishable equilibria known as the Weak-link game.
0888-613X
204-225
Hosni, Hykel
5fea876f-a264-4ea6-8026-da7507f970c8
Marchioni, Enrico
729c9984-5949-438e-8de7-0e079bdb9f96
Hosni, Hykel
5fea876f-a264-4ea6-8026-da7507f970c8
Marchioni, Enrico
729c9984-5949-438e-8de7-0e079bdb9f96

Hosni, Hykel and Marchioni, Enrico (2019) Possibilistic randomisation in strategic-form games. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 114, 204-225. (doi:10.1016/j.ijar.2019.08.008).

Record type: Article

Abstract

Since the seminal work of John Nash, convex combinations of actions are known to guarantee the existence of equilibria in strategic-form games. This paper introduces an alternative notion of randomisation among actions – possibilistic randomisation – and investigates the mathematical consequences of doing so. The framework of possibility theory gives rise to two distinct notions of equilibria both of which are characterised in our main results: a qualitative one based on the Sugeno integral and a quantitative one based on the Choquet integral. Then the two notions of equilibrium are compared against a coordination game with payoff-distinguishable equilibria known as the Weak-link game.

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Submitted date: 2018
Accepted/In Press date: 19 August 2019
e-pub ahead of print date: 3 September 2019
Published date: November 2019

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 433986
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/433986
ISSN: 0888-613X
PURE UUID: a029378b-106c-4a07-940a-407f00aa1485

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Date deposited: 09 Sep 2019 16:49
Last modified: 15 Sep 2021 05:21

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Contributors

Author: Hykel Hosni
Author: Enrico Marchioni

University divisions

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