The University of Southampton
University of Southampton Institutional Repository

Epistemic worth

Epistemic worth
Epistemic worth
Actions can have, or lack, moral worth. When a person’s action is morally worthy, she not only acts rightly, but does so in a way that reflects well on her and in such a way that she is creditable for doing what is right. In this paper, I introduce an analogue of moral worth that applies to belief, which I call epistemic worth. When a person’s belief is epistemically worthy, she not only believes rightly, but does so in a way that reflects well on her and in such a way that she is creditable for believing what is right. While the notion of epistemic worth is independently interesting, the main aim is to show that appealing to it provides a response to arguments against the view that truth is the fundamental norm for belief and, thereby, to arguments for the view that knowledge is the fundamental norm for belief. The direction of travel does not only run from ethics to epistemology. In closing, I tentatively suggest that some of the points to emerge when developing the account of epistemic worth might prompt revisions to the account of moral worth.
2330-4014
105-129
Whiting, Daniel
c0847bb4-963e-470d-92a2-5c8aae5d5aef
Whiting, Daniel
c0847bb4-963e-470d-92a2-5c8aae5d5aef

Whiting, Daniel (2020) Epistemic worth. Ergo, 7 (3), 105-129. (doi:10.3998/ergo.12405314.0007.003).

Record type: Article

Abstract

Actions can have, or lack, moral worth. When a person’s action is morally worthy, she not only acts rightly, but does so in a way that reflects well on her and in such a way that she is creditable for doing what is right. In this paper, I introduce an analogue of moral worth that applies to belief, which I call epistemic worth. When a person’s belief is epistemically worthy, she not only believes rightly, but does so in a way that reflects well on her and in such a way that she is creditable for believing what is right. While the notion of epistemic worth is independently interesting, the main aim is to show that appealing to it provides a response to arguments against the view that truth is the fundamental norm for belief and, thereby, to arguments for the view that knowledge is the fundamental norm for belief. The direction of travel does not only run from ethics to epistemology. In closing, I tentatively suggest that some of the points to emerge when developing the account of epistemic worth might prompt revisions to the account of moral worth.

Text
Epistemic Worth Ergo Whiting - Accepted Manuscript
Download (293kB)

More information

Accepted/In Press date: 20 September 2019
e-pub ahead of print date: 21 January 2020
Published date: 2020

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 434447
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/434447
ISSN: 2330-4014
PURE UUID: ee2e8d34-6255-4450-8cba-151a69c531e7

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 24 Sep 2019 16:30
Last modified: 12 Dec 2021 06:30

Export record

Altmetrics

Download statistics

Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.

View more statistics

Atom RSS 1.0 RSS 2.0

Contact ePrints Soton: eprints@soton.ac.uk

ePrints Soton supports OAI 2.0 with a base URL of http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/cgi/oai2

This repository has been built using EPrints software, developed at the University of Southampton, but available to everyone to use.

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue without changing your settings, we will assume that you are happy to receive cookies on the University of Southampton website.

×