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## **Populist elements in the election manifestoes of AfD and UKIP<sup>1</sup>**

Abstract

The term populism is omnipresent in current political science and political discourse. This paper discusses, how so-called “populist” discourse is linguistically construed in the 2017 election manifestos of the German Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) and the British United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). It does so by operationalising populism concepts from political science, specifically the difference between exclusive and inclusive populism. In order to investigate how “populist” discourses depend on the respective political culture of a discourse community, these categories are employed in a corpus based comparative politico-linguistic analysis. Based on a corpus of German and British election manifestos from 2017, the paper demonstrates that both UKIP and the AfD combine elements of inclusive populism based on demands of a democratic renewal, and an exclusive populism based on the idea the people as a homogeneous ethnos. The discursive realisation, however, differs because of general historic and political differences such as Britain being a state of four nations and the AfD aiming to avoid a rhetoric known from Germany’s past. Particularly pronounced are differences in the delineation to the enemy “European Union” as both parties link their euro-sceptical discourse to different central signifiers of the German and British political culture.

Keywords

Comparative politico-linguistic discourse analysis, populism, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)

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# 1 Introduction

Triggered by the rise of new right-wing parties in Europe and the election of Donald Trump as 45th President of the United States, the term *populism* has emerged in political discourse as a political battle cry, and it has re-emerged as an analytical category in political science and linguistic discourse analysis. But what are the characteristics of populist discourse and how is it linguistically constructed? In order to examine this question, I will briefly outline political science approaches to the description of populism, and based on this, explicate corresponding elements of populist discourse. I will then analyse the linguistic construction of these elements in the election manifestoes of the British *UK Independence Party* (UKIP) and the German *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD). My comparative, corpus-based approach to politico-linguistic discourse analysis is intended to allow a discussion of the relation between text and context, and to demonstrate how “populist” discourses depend on the respective political culture of a discourse community (cf Kranert, in press). My empirical basis consists of the most recent national election manifestoes of the two parties, as well as two reference corpora containing all election manifestoes of the parties represented in the German Bundestag and the House of Commons respectively.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> British reference corpus (78,073 words): Conservative Party, Green Party, Labour party, Liberal Democrats + UKIP (24,599) – German corpus (192,971): CDU, FDP, the Greens, the Left, SPD + AfD (16,692).

## 2 Elements of populist discourse

A clear distinction between the analytical and political use of the term *populism* is a prerequisite to analysis in order to avoid circular argumentation, which, on the one hand, stipulates that particular parties are “populist”, and, on the other hand, aims to show just that. However, this distinction is complicated by the fact that the term is somewhat controversial even within political science. The range of theories that use the term range from theories of ideology (e.g. Mudde/Rovira Kaltwasser 2013) over approaches to populism as a political style of top politicians (Moffitt 2016) to discourse-theoretical approaches (Stavrakakis 2017). A common element of these approaches is the assumption that populist discourses on the one hand have a (variously constituted) “people” as a central concept, and on the other hand attempt to differentiate themselves from an “elite”, which often remains undefined.

However, Rydgren (2017: 9) points out that these approaches to populism run into difficulties when it comes to describing the policy of right-wing parties in an unambiguous manner because even established catch-all parties like to point to the “will of the people” as a basis for political decisions, and because mobilisation against elites is a characteristic of many new or renewed political movements.<sup>3</sup>

A possible solution to this problem is offered by a Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser’s (2013) distinction between inclusionary and exclusionary (or inclusive and exclusive) populism, which also avoids the left-right metaphor which is too relative to the political spectrum of a particular political culture to allow cross-cultural assessments and which therefore is particularly problematic for a comparative approach. Three dimensions of inclusionary and exclusionary populism are distinguished here:

- the material inclusion or exclusion of specific groups,
- the political participation of specific groups, i.e., their inclusion or exclusion with respect to the political process,
- symbolic inclusion and exclusion, i.e., the constitution of a people and its identity and the differentiation from non-people (e.g., elites, foreigners).

Although authors point out that populist discourses often comprise both inclusionary and exclusionary elements, they tend to present populist discourses in Latin America as prototypically inclusionary, while characterising the so-called populist right in Europe as prototypically exclusionary.

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<sup>3</sup> Take, for example, the emphasis in the old/new distinction made by Third Way social democratic parties.

Stavrakakis (2017) extends these ideas on the basis of Laclau's discourse theory (cf., e.g. Laclau 2005). He distinguishes between *people* as an empty and fluid signifier in inclusionary populism, and *people* as a transcendental and phantasmatic signifier in exclusionary populism. While in inclusionary populism *the people* is understood as the demos constituting the democratic state, the polis, in exclusionary populism it is constituted as a transcendental and phantasmatic signifier on the basis of a nation or race. Wildt (2017, 45 f.) points out that right-wing populists intend to fix the meaning of people as nativist and naturalised, leading to an understanding of the people as an ethnos, homogenous in essence and identity.

Following Laclau, Stavrakakis (2017) stipulates that political discourses divide the discursive space into two halves: "us" and "them". He applies this division to the notions of inclusionary and exclusionary populism and argues that inclusionary populism divides the space vertically into nation and elite, while exclusionary populism divides it horizontally into the inside – us, born here –, and the outside – them, the ones born there, the ones who do not belong here.

From a discourse-analytic and politico-linguistic point of view, these elements are construed linguistically, and a central question that may be answered by a comparative analysis is that of potential systematic commonalities in the above/below and the inside/outside in the political language of the so-called right-wing populist parties. In this paper, I will address the following questions:

- Who is the "people", and how is it constituted?
- How is the horizontal delineation constructed – who does not belong to Germany/Great Britain and why?
- Can an explanation for the differences in the constitution of the term the people be found in the rules of local political discourse or political culture as such?
- How is the vertical delineation constructed – who is the elite?

Manual and computer-assisted analysis of keywords and their contexts serves as a methodological basis for answering these questions. Word lists, keyword lists and concordances are created using the Sketch Engine software (cf. Kilgarriff et al. 2014), in order to identify linguistic usage patterns (cf. Bubenhofer 2009, Baker 2006). Even though the underlying corpus is too small for statistically valid analyses<sup>4</sup>, a quantitative analysis of keywords and concordances yields a useful overview of the language use in the corpus, which can be then analysed in qualitatively.

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<sup>4</sup> The necessity of a statistically valid analysis of corpora has been called into question by authors pointing out that language is never random (cf. Kilgarriff 2005).

# 3 Text and context. Election manifestoes in the elections in Germany and Great Britain in 2017

## 3.1 Political context in Germany and Great Britain

In order to discover elements of right-wing populist language by means of comparative politico-linguistic analysis, a comparison of the AfD and UKIP suggests itself because both parties emerged from EU-sceptic movements, which strived or still strive to be acknowledged as parties with full-fledged right-wing manifestoes. The fact that there are substantial differences between the parties speaks in favour of a comparative analysis because the expected contrasts in the language use will be even more pronounced.

The two parties differ fundamentally in that their opposition towards the EU is based on different reasons: while UKIP historically concentrates on the withdrawal of Great Britain from the EU (*Brexit*), and treats *Brussels* as a metonymy for a bureaucratic and non-democratic EU which deprives Great Britain of its allegedly natural sovereignty, the AfD was founded as a melting pot of critics of the Euro rescue mechanism and originally supported a return to national currencies in its manifesto, where the *D-Mark* was a symbol of national, self-developed economic stability. The AfD accused the *Altparteien* (“old/established parties”) of not having ensured this stability in the transition to the euro, of not having enforced it in the negotiations, and thus of having “expropriated” the German populace (Lucke 2013, 195 ff.).

Although both parties were initially, like all parties, coalitions of various political currents, they soon established themselves as so-called “right-wing populist” parties. The UKIP developed its “Brussels plus” strategy for this purpose (Ford and Goodwin 2014), which combines criticism of the EU with anti-immigration policies and anti-establishment rhetoric. The AfD, on the other hand, is often described as a coalition of three political currents: “economically liberal”, “national-conservative” and “right-wing populist” (Decker 2016, 10). These currents are interrelated and all three hint on racist ideologemes more or less explicitly using a strategy of “calculated taboo breaking” (Friedrich 2017) or “calculated ambivalence” (Wodak 2016).

In addition to these differences in the origin and structure of the two parties, there are, of course, differences in the context of the 2017 election campaigns in Britain and Germany. The date of the elections to the German Bundestag was known long in advance, while the elections to the British House of Commons were announced only about eight weeks before the election date on June 8th, 2017. The UKIP election campaign, and thus their election manifesto, must be interpreted in the context of the

Brexit referendum of June 23rd, 2016 and the debate about the interpretation of this result as well as the radical Islamic terrorist acts in London and Manchester. In Germany, the election campaign was dominated by the so-called “refugee crisis”, as well as debates concerning the events of New Year's Eve 2015/2016 in Cologne and terrorist acts in Würzburg, Ansbach and Berlin. The similarities in the election campaigns of the AfD and UKIP thus essentially consist in debates following terrorist acts and in the ongoing power struggles within the respective party.

### 3.2 Election campaigns as discursive junctions

To base an analysis of the election campaign language on election manifestoes is a widely accepted and conventional method, and it is central to comparative research because this text type is well described. Thus, the text type can be treated more or less as a fixed variable, albeit with some limitations, which will be briefly outlined here.

Girnth (2002) and Klein (2000) describe election manifestoes as advertising texts that address potential voters – Girnth (2002, 38) places them in the “political advertising” field of action while Klein (2000, 741) defines them as a text type that is “externally-directed” and “determined by parties/groups”. However, he also points out that election manifestoes provide campaigners with an ideological orientation and help mobilise the party base (cf. Klein 2000, 743).

Election manifestoes are also well-suited as an analytical basis because they are compromise texts that reflect the results of a number of discussions, votes and revisions. Although they are formulated in one voice, they are outcomes of discursive fights that contain traces of diverse voices. As results of internal debates and as legitimisation bases for subsequent election campaigns, election manifestoes are particularly suitable for isolating the main discursive elements of the language of a party's election campaign – they can be seen as discursive nodal points.

It is also essential, however, to point out some country-specific differences in the text type. In general, British election manifestoes display a stronger personalisation and external orientation than their German counterparts, which is also expressed in a more multimodal presentation style. This difference has intensified over the past decades (cf. Kranert 2016, 260 ff.) and can also be observed in the election manifestoes analysed here: while the AfD manifesto contains no pictures or references to top politicians, the UKIP manifesto is highly multimodal in that it uses pictures to illustrate various national narratives. Furthermore, top politicians of other parties are frequently mentioned – especially Theresa May (11 times), but also Jeremy Corbyn (once). In contrast, the AfD's main opponent, chancellor Angela Merkel is mentioned only once in their election manifesto, as *Kanzlerin* (“chancellor”) rather than by name.

# 4 Linguistic construction of populist elements in the election manifestoes of the AfD and UKIP

## 4.1 The main populist element: who is the people?

The question concerning the linguistic construction of the main populist element *people* can only be answered with a contrastive analysis on the basis of a corpus-based method, specifically, using a combination of traditional qualitative methods of text analysis and computer-based analysis.<sup>5</sup> A purely corpus-driven analysis, which begins with keyword lists, faces difficulties on two levels: firstly, as will be shown below, if it relies exclusively on keywords, it will miss important differences in language use. Secondly, there are systematic problems in comparative linguistics. For instance, the English word *people* is ambiguous and can be used without a determiner simply as *people* (German: *Menschen*) or with a determiner as *the people* (German: *Volk*) (cf. Truan, this issue). Such distinctions are not straightforwardly captured by a simple keyword analysis (see also Stefanowitsch, this issue).

In an analysis of the election manifesto of the AfD in Rhineland-Palatinate, Scharloth (2017, 12) observes that although the notion of *Volk* is central, “there is no evidence for völkische ideology”. A purely statistical analysis of the use of *Volk*, a lemma which emerges as the second keyword in comparison to other election manifestoes, also confirms this for the German Bundestag election manifesto. However, through a close reading of the election manifesto it became evident that the term *Bevölkerung* (population) is systematically used as well. Therefore, the query on which the following analysis is based was formulated as *\*v?lk\** in order to capture all compounds and derivatives.

From a qualitative point of view, it is immediately obvious that the manifesto of the AfD contains substantially more hits than the reference corpus of the other parties' manifestoes: 3,203.64 pmw<sup>6</sup> (AfD) compared to just 603.08 pmw in the reference corpus).

After sorting the concordance by words, the following tendency can be observed: the singular form *Volk*, which does not appear in the reference corpus at all, is

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<sup>5</sup> For the distinction between “corpus-based” and “corpus-driven” approaches see Bubenhofer (2009, 99–101).

<sup>6</sup> Throughout this text, I use the measure pmw (per Million words) as a measure of relative frequency.

frequently used as agent and is associated in this use with sovereignty and grassroots democracy. *Volk* is also part of the compounds *Volkssouveränität* (“people’s sovereignty”) (4)<sup>7</sup> and *Volksabstimmung/-entscheid* (“people’s referendum”) (5) about the nation’s *Schicksalsfragen* (“fateful questions”).

In this context, a repeated use of *wieder* (“re-/again”) and *wiederherstellen* (“restore”) can be observed, which evokes the myth of a Golden Age that has been described as typical for new right-wing parties (Wodak 2017, 5), but can also be found in other discourses of political renewal (Kranert 2018).

The plural form *Völker* is used in the thematic context of a discussion about essential *Selbstbestimmung der Völker* (“self-determination of the peoples”). Up to this point, Scharloth’s analysis also applies to the manifesto analysed here – it, too, uses *Volk* in the sense of demos. However, this changes with the use of the compound *Staatsvolk* (“state people”) (5), in which nationalist ways of thinking are naturalised and rationalised through a spatial metaphor, as in the following example:

Es gibt weder ein europäisches Staatsvolk, das für ein solches Vorhaben [eines Europäischen Bundeataates, MK] konstitutiv wäre, noch ist erkennbar, dass sich ein solches auf absehbare Zeit herausbildet. Kulturen, Sprachen und nationale Identitäten sind durch Jahrhunderte dauernde geschichtliche Entwicklungen entstanden. Sie stellen für ihre Angehörigen unverzichtbare Identifikationsräume dar, die nur in nationalen Staaten mit demokratischer Verfassung wirkungsvoll ausgestaltet werden können. (AfD 2017: 7). (“Neither does there exist a European constitutive people, for whom a European federal state would be constitutive, nor are there signs that such a people will develop in the foreseeable future. Cultures, languages and national identities emerged in the course of historical developments over centuries. For their members, they present vital identification spaces, which can only be effectively shaped within national states with democratic constitutions.”)

Based on such metaphors, the manifesto then demands the *Erhalt des eigenen Staatsvolkes* (“preservation of one’s own constitutive people”) as a responsibility of the government (AfD 2017, 37). Although the discourse is still about demos here, connotations of ethnos become apparent with the demand to return to *jus sanguinis* to determine citizenship<sup>8</sup>.

The word *Bevölkerung* is used as a general term for the people of a country in the election manifestoes of all parties analysed here. However, it is more frequent in the AfD manifesto (465.04 pmw, as compared to 207.03 in the reference corpus), and it is strongly associated with the topic of biopolitics. With the exception of demanding to return to *jus sanguinis*, the manifesto does not positively define who is part of the

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<sup>7</sup> In the following, absolute frequencies are given in brackets.

<sup>8</sup> Until 2000, German citizenship legislation was based purely on a *jus sanguinis*, which is defined by decent, i.e. German citizenship was determined by the citizenship of a child’s parents. Since 2000, it is a mix of *jus sanguinis* and *jus solis*, as children born in Germany to parents with foreign nationality have the right to German citizenship if their parents have been legal residents for at least 8 years.



German populace; instead, this is achieved mainly via exclusion, as will be discussed in Section 4.2.

The biopolitical connotation of *Bevölkerung* becomes apparent in the manifesto of the AfD through the argument that the German population has to grow in order to survive. The party demands that a Ministry for *Bevölkerungsentwicklung* (“population development”) (4) be created in order to act against *Selbstabschaffung*<sup>9</sup> (“self-abolition”). A momentum of danger is generated through metaphors of *Bevölkerungsexplosion* (“population explosion”) in Africa and through the discussion of birth rate among migrants. However, the manifesto avoids open biological nationalism or racism and thus a proximity to the programme of the NSDAP from 1920, which Kämper (2017, 30 f.) observes for AfD’s party platform. The election manifesto substitutes the platform text’s *deutschstämmige Frauen* (“indigenous German women”) (AfD 2016, 42) with *einheimische Bevölkerung* (“local population”), an expression relying on space metaphors.. Nevertheless, the biologicistic, social Darwinistic argument concerning the danger of a “population explosion” in competing nations and “self-abolition” of the German people is maintained.

The biological argumentation is complemented by the construction of identity through *deutsche Sprache* (German language) – a phrase that is used seven times by the AfD.<sup>10</sup> War metaphors in particular stand out in this context, which points to a contextualisation of the discourse of culture war, for example:

*An deutschen Schulen darf es kein Zurückweichen des Deutschen vor Einwanderersprachen geben.* (AfD 2017, 47) (“In German schools, the German language may never retreat from immigrant languages”.)

In order to avoid the mentioned problem of the ambiguity of people, I searched for *british\** in the UKIP election manifesto to identify basic populist elements. The query yielded a relatively high frequency of hits of 3076.48 pmw in comparison to 939.2 pmw in the reference corpus.

With 13 hits, *the British people* turns out to be a central collocation. While this phrase does not appear for the Labour Party at all and appears only once for the Green party, the Liberal Democrats use it in connection with their demand for a second Brexit referendum after the conclusion of the negotiations. The Conservatives use it 5 times in the context of the keywords *investment*, *prosperity* and *freedom*. In contrast, UKIP uses it in contexts discussing dangers of mass migration and questions concerning

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<sup>9</sup> Note the intertextual reference to common (albeit scientifically refuted, cf. Schäfer et al. 2011) right-wing arguments about immigration, demography and intelligence, prominently introduced into the German political discourse by former Bundesbank board member Thilo Sarrazin in several highly controversial books.

<sup>10</sup> In comparison: FDP (2), CDU (2), SPD (1), the Greens (1).

British *sovereignty* (5), which they portray as jeopardised by the EU. Questions concerning British sovereignty are also dealt with using the keyword *the people* (6), where the use of the definite article suggests unity and homogeneity in the decisions made by the demos, for example in the statement “we want to ensure that the people get the kind of Brexit they voted for on 23rd June last year” (UKIP 2017, 3).

Similarly to the the AfD manifesto, which does not define *deutsch* (German), the UKIP manifesto does not define *British*. However, the nation is constructed by means of a “banal nationalism” (Billig 1995) using the specific multimodal construction of a Golden Age narrative, which is much more pronounced than in the AfD manifesto. Great Britain, the chapter on Brexit explains, must be great again, must be a sovereign nation again, and the blue British passport (a large image of which is included in just this chapter) must be re-instated. Pictures of the sea, fishing, and beaches dominate the chapter, while demands are made using verbs with the prefix *re-* (“again”): *rebuild*, *reclaim*, *re-establish*, *regain*, *regenerate*, *restore*, *rejuvenate*, *reinstat*e. The purposive topos of the argumentation is an explicit return to the alleged Golden Age of Great Britain, while avoiding any hint of colonialism. Fishing and the blue British passport remain as symbols of this time.

## 4.2 Horizontal delineation: X does not belong to Y

The manifestoes of the AfD and UKIP share two essential elements of horizontal delineation: both view unregulated immigration and Islam as a danger. However, they construct these elements discursively in different ways.

A “politics of fear” (Wodak 2016) clearly dominates the AfD manifesto. Migration is first mentioned in the chapter on *innere Sicherheit* (“internal security”), which equates organised crime and *Ausländerkriminalität* (“foreigner crime”) and presents them as the most important problem of German internal politics. In doing so, the manifesto uses the metaphorical scenario of *Völkerwanderung* (an allusion to the mass migration movements in Europe from the 4th to 6th century) and the container metaphors typically found in xenophobic discourses – *Einwanderung in die Sozialsysteme* (“immigration into the welfare system”), *Migrantenströme* (“migrant flow”). In addition, it uses a scenario described as *body politic* (Musolff 2010): *Die AfD wird nicht zulassen, dass Deutschland aus falsch verstandener Toleranz sein kulturelles Gesicht verliert* (“The AfD will not allow Germany to lose its cultural face because of false notions of tolerance”) (AfD 2017, 47). All these structures are also found in the UKIP manifesto.

A substantial difference between the manifestoes consists in the discursive construction of migration. While *Migranten, Flüchtlinge und Asylbewerber* (“migrants, refugees and asylum seekers”, note the conjunction of these very different

groups in a single phrase) often occur in agent position in the AfD manifesto, UKIP presents the abstract process of immigration itself as an agent, which constitutes a grammatical metaphor in the sense of Halliday (1985: 321):

Immigration has placed huge pressure on public services and housing. It has affected the domestic labour market, where wages for manual and low-paid jobs have stagnated (UKIP 2017, 32).

On the one hand, the metaphorical nominalisation of a process dehumanises it and thus makes it even more threatening; on the other hand, this metaphor protects UKIP from accusations of racism – a typical argument is that UKIP is not against the immigrants, but against the system being overwhelmed by wrong political decisions.

For quite some time, the keyword *islam* has been evolving towards an empty signifier representing the Other and for the challenges of globalisation (Betz and Johnson 2004). By now, discourse-analytic literature assumes core set of consolidated anti-islamic topoi in right wing populism (cf. Betz 2013), and so it is hardly surprising to find them in the two party manifestoes analysed here – for example, in the form of a homogenisation of a very heterogeneous religious community through the use of a definite article as *der Islam* (“the Islam”) and *the Muslim Community* respectively. Nevertheless, these topoi appear in different frames in the two texts: while the AfD posits the existence of a *Kulturkrieg* (“culture war”), the UKIP concentrates on what they term *cultural crimes*, such as female genital mutilation (*FGM*).

The AfD devotes a whole chapter to Islam, which begins with the statement *Der Islam gehört nicht zu Deutschland* (“Islam is not a part of Germany”).<sup>11</sup> The AfD manifesto accepts the freedom of religion granted by the German constitution and rejects a characterisation of its position as islamophobic, but then it moves straight to the topos of a *Kulturkrieg* (AfD 2017, 34), claiming that

*Islamische Staaten wollen durch den Bau und Betrieb von Moscheen den Islam in Deutschland verbreiten und ihre Macht vergrößern.* (AfD 2017: 34) (“Islamic states intend to spread Islam in Germany and increase their power through building and running mosques”)

For this reason, they claim, minarets and muezzins’ calls to prayer constitute *islamische Herrschaftszeichen* (“signs of islamic domination”) and *religiöser Imperialismus* (“religious imperialism”) (AfD 2017: 35) and must be opposed, as must the burqa as *religiös-politisches Zeichen der Unterordnung von Muslimas unter den Mann* (“a religious-political sign of subordination of Muslim women to men”). This explicitly constructs a frame of cultural conflict, which merges seamlessly with the

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<sup>11</sup> This is an allusion to a well-known statement to the opposite effect made by the German President Christian Wulff in 2010: *Der Islam gehört zu Deutschland* (“Islam is part of Germany”). See also Detjen (2015), who shows that this sentence has a longer discourse tradition.

larger social Darwinist frame of the manifesto, as well as with the metaphorical framing of immigration as war.

In the UKIP manifesto, Islam is addressed in the chapter “Britain United Under One Law for All”, which deals with the issue of integration. It begins with a discussion of women’s rights (which are alluded to in the AfD manifesto by the reference to burqas), and moves straight to the topos of *female genital mutilation (FGM)* and other *cultural crimes* such as *breast ironing*. This topos is so central that the keyword *FGM* is ranked in eighth position compared to the reference corpus. The central keyword in this argumentation is *multiculturalism*, which is claimed to be directly responsible for the increased incidence of “cultural crime”:

Multiculturalism has prevented criticism of certain religious beliefs and cultural practices, even those the overwhelming majority of British people would consider repugnant, and which threaten rights and equalities established in Britain for decades. (UKIP 2017, 35)

The construction of Islam as culturally dangerous and the urge for a uniform cultural identity are also expressed in the context of the keyword *Multikulturalismus* (“multiculturalism”) in the AfD manifesto, but it is not connected to the topos of *Kulturkrieg*. Instead, it is dealt with in a chapter about culture and media, which presents the German language as the centre of German identity, discusses the dangers of political correctness and demands the establishment of a German *Leitkultur* (“guiding culture”). The dimensions of culture and domestic policy are thus treated as separate. The difference in conceptualisation is due to the different way in which the keywords *multikulturelle Gesellschaft* and *multicultural society* are politically charged in Germany and Great Britain respectively. As Schröter (2013) shows, *multicultural society* describes the status quo in Britain, a country long characterised by immigration. In contrast,

In Deutschland [...] ist *multikulturelle Gesellschaft* kaum je über den Status eines umstrittenen Konzepts hinausgelangt. Hier beschreibt es eine mittlerweile weithin als naiv erachtete Vorstellung von einer Einwanderungsgesellschaft, welche Diversität wertschätzt und es vorzieht, die daraus resultierenden Konflikte zu ignorieren. (Schröter 2013, 98)<sup>12</sup>

In addition, in Germany the concept of *Leitkultur* is a well-established conservative counter-argument to multiculturalism, which the AfD can refer to. The UKIP manifesto uses its own topos of “cultural crime” as a counter-argument to the established notion expressed in the keyword *multicultural society*.

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<sup>12</sup> “In Germany, multicultural society has never been more than a contested concept. It describes an idea, widely considered naïve, of an immigration society that treasures diversity and chooses to ignore the resulting conflicts.”

### 4.3 Defence against the accusation of radicalism

Both UKIP and the AfD defend themselves in their manifestoes against a characterisation as far-right parties based on accusations of islamophobia and racism. Both manifestoes explicitly address the linguistic issues in metalinguistic comments (*Sprachthematisierung* in the sense of, e.g., Schröter 2008: 51, Niehr 2002), delegitimising such accusations as defamation attempts and accusing their critics in return, of preventing a rational debate of the true problems. The AfD goes further in this respect:

*Einer Diffamierung rationaler Religionskritik als „Islamophobie“ oder „Rassismus“ tritt die AfD entgegen. Wir fordern jedermann dazu auf, solche Polemik durch intellektuellen Diskurs zu ersetzen. Verfassungsfeindlichen Vereinen, die nach Art. 9 Abs. 2 Grundgesetz zu verbieten sind, ist der Bau und Betrieb von Moscheen wegen der konkreten Gefahr zu untersagen, dass Imame dort Lehren verbreiten, die zu einer gegen unsere Rechtsordnung gerichteten politisch-religiösen Radikalisierung von Muslimen beitragen. (AfD 2017, 34)* (“The AfD rejects any defamation of a rational critique of religion as ‘islamophobia’ or ‘racism’. We challenge everyone to substitute such polemics by rational discourse. Anti-constitutional organisations, which are to be banned based on Art. 9, Sec. 2 of the Basic Law, must be forbidden from building and operating mosques, due to the imminent danger that imams will use them to spread teachings directed against our legal order that contribute to a political and religious radicalisation of Muslims.”)

This passage shows an additional defence strategy by the AfD against possible accusations of radicalism, which becomes obvious in the keyword analysis as well: The abbreviation *Art.* (for *Artikel* “article”) is ranked fourth in the comparison against the reference corpus, after *AfD*, *Volk* (“people”) and *Zuwanderung* (“immigration”). By systematically appealing to articles of the Basic Law, the AfD attempts to demonstrate that it is firmly grounded in the German constitution. The AfD uses this strategy in other places, too, for example, in arguing against the legality of the government’s immigration policy, over which the AfD attempted to sue the German chancellor Angela Merkel (Spiegel Online 2015).

### 4.4 Vertical delineation: Who is the elite?

While the horizontal delineation is readily apparent in the keyword lists, for instance in keywords such as *foreign*, *Zuwanderung*, *Islam* and *Ausländer*, the vertical delineation is not immediately discernable in the keyword lists, but it becomes clear on a closer reading of the manifestoes. The AfD manifesto uses stigma terms with a strongly evaluative component throughout the program. *Volk* in the sense of *demos* is presented in contrast to phrases from the semantic fields of crime and corruption describing politicians of the other parties, for example *politische Oligarchie* (“political

oligarchy”) (2), *politische Klasse* (“political class”) (2), *Ämterpatronage* (“nepotism, spoils system”), *totalitäre Herrschaftsordnung* (“totalitarian regime”). Although the word *Partei* (“party”) is not statistically a keyword, it is used as stigma term as well: in contrast to other election manifestoes in the corpus, it is solely used as xenonym, frequently with the modifier *etabliert* (“established”), almost always with definite article. The usage contexts are mostly negative. The language of the UKIP manifesto is very similar in this respect – it, too, delineates itself from the old parties or establishment parties, which are portrayed as unaccountable elites and cronies. Unlike the AfD, UKIP also links the “established” parties with international corporations: *big business* (5) is used as a stigmatising word in examples like the following:

Government has become bloated and unmanageable. Politics is corrupted by self-interest and big business. An unaccountable elite revels in mutual back-scratching and cronyism. (UKIP 2017, 58)

It is contrasted with the phrases *small business* (7) and *British Business* (4). This rhetoric is directed at voters of the Labour party, from whom UKIP seems to expect skepticism towards international corporations.

## 4.5 The EU – a horizontal or vertical delineation?

As both the AfD and UKIP were originally founded as Eurosceptic parties, I will conclude by addressing the question whether their delineation against the European Union constitutes a vertical or a horizontal delineation.

Although the AfD distances itself from the European Union in its manifesto and opposes any EU policies that are in conflict with the notion of sovereign nation states, it differs from UKIP in that it does not treat the European Union as an urgent topic. A search for EU in the two manifestoes shows this (see Table 1): the AfD uses the word with the same frequency as the other parties, while UKIP uses it more than three times as frequently (a search for *Europäische Union* and *European Union* yields very similar results).

	Party Manifesto	Reference Corpus
AfD	16 (826.75 pmw)	184 (828.12 pmw)
UKIP	110 (3935.04 pmw)	103 (1179.73 pmw)

Table 1. The keyword *EU* in the AfD and UKIP party manifestoes

However, in the keyword analysis of the AfD manifesto, *EZB* (*Europäische Zentralbank*, “European Central Bank”) is ranked seventh, between *Islam* and *ideologisch* (ideological). This is due to the AfD’s critical stance towards the ECB, which they see as a central opponent in the system of the European Union. This keyword can be found in the context of words like *Enteignung* (“expropriation”) (2) and *Manipulation* (“manipulation”), evoking a central topos of German EU policy, namely the stability and efficiency of the common currency, which played an important role in the so-called euro crisis starting in 2010. However, there is no evidence for a categorisation of the ECB as undemocratic or elitist, i.e. the idea of an independent central bank that is not subject to democratic control is tacitly accepted. Similarly, there is no evidence that the ECB is presented as an external power – accusations concerning misguided European financial policies are addressed at the German federal government and the *etablierte Parteien* (“established parties”). Thus, the topos is supported by an indirect delineation from the elites.

In the UKIP manifesto, distancing oneself from the EU is a central topic, as shown by the frequencies in Table 1 above. The EU is consistently presented metaphorically as a foreign power, and politicians from the old parties are described as having *capitulated* to the EU, thus having committed an *act of treachery*, while UKIP’s goal is to be *free of the EU*, to *free the UK*, etc. This is in line with the overall final topos of the pro-Brexit discourse focusing on making Great Britain a sovereign and independent nation again in order to save British democracy. This topos underlies the main slogan of UKIP’s election campaign – *Take back control* –, which occurs in twenty different variations in the election manifesto.

## 5 Conclusions

As we have seen the discursive construction of the AfD’s and UKIP’s political manifestoes can be analysed as a combination of a vertical and horizontal delineation of “the people”. This shows clearly that the populism of right-wing parties combines elements of an inclusive populism, which is based on demands of a democratic renewal, and an exclusive populism, which bases these demands on the idea of *Volk* or *the people* as a homogeneous ethnos.

The analysis also shows that UKIP bases this homogeneity on an idea of cultural unity constructed by means of banal nationalism (cf. Billig 1995). This can be explained with reference to the British political and cultural context, which is rooted in the idea of Britain as a federation of different groups with national identities. In

contrast, the AfD intentionally chooses the less historically burdened word *Bevölkerung* to introduce *völkische* elements into their election manifesto. This difference was also used here to stress the methodological importance of combining qualitative and quantitative analyses of political discourses (vgl. Niehr 2015).

While a delineation from an elite is a shared characteristic of the two manifestoes, the delineation from the EU is constructed on the basis of specific, local EU critical discourses.

Both manifestoes construct a horizontal delineation using anti-Islam sentiments and a fear of migration, but, again, the specifics of the construction depend on local discourse structures – in particular, differences in the use of the keywords *multicultural society* and *multikulturelle Gesellschaft*. This points to the importance of cross-linguistic keyword analysis, which provides a basis for the interpretation of parallel political discourses (cf. Niehr 2012).

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