Prejudice, strategic discrimination, and the electoral connection: Evidence from a pair of field experiments in Brazil
Prejudice, strategic discrimination, and the electoral connection: Evidence from a pair of field experiments in Brazil
Can electoral incentives mitigate racial and class prejudices toward underrepresented groups? We use a pair of large‐scale field experiments to investigate the responsiveness of Brazilian legislative candidates to information requests from fictitious voters before and after the 2010 elections. Our panel study design allows us to examine how politicians’ electoral incentives and prejudices jointly affect their responsiveness to voters with randomly assigned socioeconomic and partisan characteristics. Distinguishing between prejudiced and strategic discrimination in responsiveness, we find that socioeconomically privileged and competitive candidates are equally responsive to underrepresented voters in advance of the election, yet less responsive once in office.
781-795
Driscoll, Amanda
1a366b27-836d-4593-8930-dcfd0d960593
Cepaluni, Gabriel
0d9039ce-af21-46a1-9ef6-23a0d0d8b396
Guimarães, Feliciano De Sá
0d1bfc80-e762-4294-b834-602065973a1f
Spada, Paolo
aa830424-63f7-4baa-aecc-0bba595b8221
1 October 2018
Driscoll, Amanda
1a366b27-836d-4593-8930-dcfd0d960593
Cepaluni, Gabriel
0d9039ce-af21-46a1-9ef6-23a0d0d8b396
Guimarães, Feliciano De Sá
0d1bfc80-e762-4294-b834-602065973a1f
Spada, Paolo
aa830424-63f7-4baa-aecc-0bba595b8221
Driscoll, Amanda, Cepaluni, Gabriel, Guimarães, Feliciano De Sá and Spada, Paolo
(2018)
Prejudice, strategic discrimination, and the electoral connection: Evidence from a pair of field experiments in Brazil.
American Journal of Political Science, 62 (4), .
(doi:10.1111/ajps.12371).
Abstract
Can electoral incentives mitigate racial and class prejudices toward underrepresented groups? We use a pair of large‐scale field experiments to investigate the responsiveness of Brazilian legislative candidates to information requests from fictitious voters before and after the 2010 elections. Our panel study design allows us to examine how politicians’ electoral incentives and prejudices jointly affect their responsiveness to voters with randomly assigned socioeconomic and partisan characteristics. Distinguishing between prejudiced and strategic discrimination in responsiveness, we find that socioeconomically privileged and competitive candidates are equally responsive to underrepresented voters in advance of the election, yet less responsive once in office.
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Accepted/In Press date: 3 November 2017
e-pub ahead of print date: 24 August 2018
Published date: 1 October 2018
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 435213
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/435213
ISSN: 0092-5853
PURE UUID: 0ec3804d-486f-4fcd-9cf9-6db5f9875775
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Date deposited: 25 Oct 2019 16:30
Last modified: 17 Mar 2024 03:39
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Author:
Amanda Driscoll
Author:
Gabriel Cepaluni
Author:
Feliciano De Sá Guimarães
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