Respect and the reality of apparent reasons
Respect and the reality of apparent reasons
Rationality requires us to respond to apparent normative reasons. Given the independence of appearance and reality, why think that apparent normative reasons necessarily provide real normative reasons? And if they do not, why think that mistakes of rationality are necessarily real mistakes? This paper gives a novel answer to these questions. I argue first that in the moral domain, there are objective duties of respect that we violate whenever we do what appears to violate our first-order duties. The existence of these duties of respect, I argue, ensures that apparent moral reasons are exceptions to the independence of appearance and reality. I then extend these arguments to the domain of overall reason. Just as there are objective duties of respect for moral reasons that explain moral blameworthiness, so there are objective duties of respect for reasons (period) that explain blameworthiness in the court of overall reason. The existence of these duties ensures that apparent reasons (period) are exceptions to the independence of appearance and reality.
3129-3156
Sylvan, Kurt L.
507b57c8-e6ec-4a02-8b35-6d640b08b61c
October 2021
Sylvan, Kurt L.
507b57c8-e6ec-4a02-8b35-6d640b08b61c
Abstract
Rationality requires us to respond to apparent normative reasons. Given the independence of appearance and reality, why think that apparent normative reasons necessarily provide real normative reasons? And if they do not, why think that mistakes of rationality are necessarily real mistakes? This paper gives a novel answer to these questions. I argue first that in the moral domain, there are objective duties of respect that we violate whenever we do what appears to violate our first-order duties. The existence of these duties of respect, I argue, ensures that apparent moral reasons are exceptions to the independence of appearance and reality. I then extend these arguments to the domain of overall reason. Just as there are objective duties of respect for moral reasons that explain moral blameworthiness, so there are objective duties of respect for reasons (period) that explain blameworthiness in the court of overall reason. The existence of these duties ensures that apparent reasons (period) are exceptions to the independence of appearance and reality.
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Sylvan 2020 Article Respect And The Reality Of Apparent
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Accepted/In Press date: 2 September 2020
e-pub ahead of print date: 15 October 2020
Published date: October 2021
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Local EPrints ID: 436045
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/436045
ISSN: 0031-8116
PURE UUID: 72ca655b-ac29-454d-954d-0a4c62ab84c7
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Date deposited: 27 Nov 2019 17:30
Last modified: 05 Sep 2024 16:30
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