The University of Southampton
University of Southampton Institutional Repository

Mood-driven choices and self-regulation

Mood-driven choices and self-regulation
Mood-driven choices and self-regulation
We model a decision maker who can exert costly effort to regulate herself, thereby reducing internal conflicts between her normative objectives and mood-driven choices. We provide an axiomatic characterization of the model, and show how costs of self-regulation can be elicited and compared across individuals. In a consumption-saving problem we show that self-regulation can generate unintended income effects, which have important implications for public policies on saving behavior. We also provide several examples to illustrate how self-regulation can rationalize many well-known choice anomalies. These behavioral implications follow from a key feature of the model that self-regulation decisions can respond to changes in incentives.
0022-0531
727-760
Mihm, Max
3123d6b8-55e0-4cd4-ada5-542cd1f1f58f
Ozbek, Kemal
e7edfcf5-cb17-4e64-bfa4-30fb527d2e46
Mihm, Max
3123d6b8-55e0-4cd4-ada5-542cd1f1f58f
Ozbek, Kemal
e7edfcf5-cb17-4e64-bfa4-30fb527d2e46

Mihm, Max and Ozbek, Kemal (2018) Mood-driven choices and self-regulation. Journal of Economic Theory, 176, 727-760. (doi:10.1016/j.jet.2018.05.006).

Record type: Article

Abstract

We model a decision maker who can exert costly effort to regulate herself, thereby reducing internal conflicts between her normative objectives and mood-driven choices. We provide an axiomatic characterization of the model, and show how costs of self-regulation can be elicited and compared across individuals. In a consumption-saving problem we show that self-regulation can generate unintended income effects, which have important implications for public policies on saving behavior. We also provide several examples to illustrate how self-regulation can rationalize many well-known choice anomalies. These behavioral implications follow from a key feature of the model that self-regulation decisions can respond to changes in incentives.

Text
publication - Version of Record
Restricted to Repository staff only
Request a copy

More information

Accepted/In Press date: 7 May 2018
e-pub ahead of print date: 9 May 2018
Published date: July 2018

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 436134
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/436134
ISSN: 0022-0531
PURE UUID: 5633a430-dd54-46a4-9896-867176579a25
ORCID for Kemal Ozbek: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0003-3265-233X

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 29 Nov 2019 17:30
Last modified: 17 Mar 2024 03:59

Export record

Altmetrics

Contributors

Author: Max Mihm
Author: Kemal Ozbek ORCID iD

Download statistics

Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.

View more statistics

Atom RSS 1.0 RSS 2.0

Contact ePrints Soton: eprints@soton.ac.uk

ePrints Soton supports OAI 2.0 with a base URL of http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/cgi/oai2

This repository has been built using EPrints software, developed at the University of Southampton, but available to everyone to use.

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue without changing your settings, we will assume that you are happy to receive cookies on the University of Southampton website.

×