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The Army of 1415: The Retinues of Thomas, Duke of Clarence, and Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester

Volume 1 of 1

By

Michael Philip Warner

Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

FACULTY OF HUMANITIES

History

Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

THE ARMY OF 1415: THE RETINUES OF THOMAS, DUKE OF CLARENCE, AND HUMPHREY, DUKE OF GLOUCESTER

Michael Philip Warner

At the heart of this project are in-depth case studies of the retinues recruited and commanded in 1415 by the dukes of Clarence and Gloucester. Drawing on their complete surviving muster rolls, nearly 1,760 of the men who mustered under their commands can be identified by name. This wealth of nominal data provides a solid foundation on which thorough study of these retinues can be built. Neither has been the subject of extensive research before. Employing a prosopographical approach will allow the methods by which the two dukes recruited men in 1415 to become apparent. Furthermore, we will be able to explore whether pre-existing ties, both vertical and horizontal, existed within these retinues. This project also engages with the significant historiographical issue relating to the 'dynamics of recruitment' in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries.

In addition to exploring the bonds between the men of these retinues, we will also explore their changing size and composition by utilising all the available administrative sources, for example the sick lists made after the fall of Harfleur and the post-campaign accounts. Particular focus will be given to ascertaining the comparative attrition rates between the two retinues. Before these case-studies a thorough examination of their complete muster rolls is undertaken, alongside all the other surviving 1415 muster rolls, in order to learn more about the process and mechanics of the muster. Following the case studies, a comparative analysis of the two ducal retinues is conducted in order to form a holistic study.

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Abbreviations

This project would not have been possible without the *Medieval Soldier Database*. In addition to the wealth of information contained in this database, I am very grateful to Professor Anne Curry for also allowing me to consult additional databases she has created. Consequently, many of the archival references relating to military service have been gained either from the *Medieval Soldier Database* and/or additional databases. All French archival references have been gained from these sources.

Abbreviation	Source
ACA	Arundel Castle Archive
Add. Ch.	Additional Charter
Add. Ms.	Addition Manuscript
ADSM	Archives départementales de la Seine Maritime
AN	Archives Nationales de France
<i>BHO</i>	<i>British History Online</i> , < www.british-history.ac.uk >
<i>BIHR</i>	<i>British Institute of Historical Research</i>
BL	British Library
BN	Bibliothèque Nationale de France
C [number]	Chancery class in The National Archives, Kew
<i>CCR</i>	<i>Calendar of Close Rolls</i>
<i>CFA</i>	<i>Calendar of Feudal Aids</i>
<i>CFR</i>	<i>Calendar of Fine Rolls</i>
<i>CIPM</i>	<i>Calendar of Inquisitions Post Mortem</i>
COL	Cambridge University: King's College Archive Centre
<i>CP</i>	Cokayne, G.E., <i>The Complete Peerage</i> , rev. and ed. V. Gibbs, H.A. Doubleday, H. de Walden and G.H. White, 13 vols published in 6 (Gloucester, 1982).
<i>CPR</i>	<i>Calendar of Patent Rolls</i>
<i>CSL</i>	<i>Calendar of Signet Letters</i>
Curry, <i>Agincourt</i>	Curry, A., <i>1415 Agincourt: A New History</i> , 2 edn (Stroud, 2015).
Curry, <i>Sources</i>	Curry, A., <i>The Battle of Agincourt: Sources and Interpretations</i> (Woodbridge, 2000, repr. 2009).
<i>DKR</i>	<i>Annual Report of the Deputy Keeper of the Public Records</i>
E [number]	Exchequer class in The National Archives, Kew
<i>EHR</i>	<i>English Historical Review</i>
<i>Foedera</i>	<i>Foedera, conventiones, litterae et cuiuscunque generis acta publica</i> , ed. T. Rymer, 20 vols (London, 1704-1735).
<i>HoP</i>	Roskell, J.S., L. Clarke and C. Rawcliffe. (eds.), <i>The History of</i>

	<i>Parliament: The House of Commons, 1386-1421</i> , 4 vols (Woodbridge: 1992), < www.historyofparliamentonline.org >.
<i>JMH</i>	<i>Journal of Medieval History</i>
<i>JMMH</i>	<i>Journal of Medieval Military History</i>
ms. fr.	Manuscript français
n.a.f.	Nouvelles acquisitions françaises
<i>ODNB</i>	<i>Oxford Dictionary of National Biography</i> , < www.oxforddnb.com >.
<i>PPC</i>	<i>Proceedings of the Privy Council of England</i> , ed. Sir N.H. Nicolas, 7 vols (1834-1837).
<i>PROME</i>	<i>The Parliament Rolls of Medieval England</i> , ed. C. Given-Wilson, P. Brand, S. Phillips, M. Ormrod, G. Martin, A. Curry and R. Horrox (Woodbridge, 2005), <i>British History Online</i> , < www.british-history.ac.uk/no-series/parliament-rolls-medieval >.
<i>Soldier in Later Medieval England</i>	Bell, A.R., A. Curry, A. King and D. Simpkin, <i>The Soldier in Later Medieval England</i> (Oxford, 2013).
SRO	Suffolk Record Office
TNA	The National Archives, Kew
<i>TRHS</i>	<i>Transactions of the Royal Historical Society</i>

Academic Thesis: Declaration of Authorship

I, Michael Philip Warner, declare that this thesis and the work presented in it are my own and has been generated by me as the result of my own original research.

The Army of 1415: The Retinues of Thomas, Duke of Clarence, and Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester

I confirm that:

1. This work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research degree at this University;
2. Where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or any other qualification at this University or any other institution, this has been clearly stated;
3. Where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly attributed;
4. Where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given. With the exception of such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work;
5. I have acknowledged all main sources of help;
6. Where the thesis is based on work done by myself jointly with others, I have made clear exactly what was done by others and what I have contributed myself;
7. None of this work has been published before submission;

Signed:

.....

Date:

.....

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Above all, I wish to extend my most heartfelt thanks to my mother, father, and sister. Your unstinting support, love, interest and motivation, for whatever endeavour it happens to be that I find myself undertaking, is appreciated more than you know. I dedicate this project to you.

Introduction



*'This story shall the good man teach his son;
And Crispin Crispian shall ne'er go by,
From this day to the ending of the world,
But we in it shall be remembered;
We few, we happy few, we band of brothers'*

Shakespeare, *Henry V*

In July 1415 over 12,000 combatants gathered around Southampton in preparation for their muster and embarkation to Normandy.¹ King Henry V's army, like all armies of this period, was comprised of a multiplicity of individual 'bands', or retinues, of men-at-arms and archers. The research of Anne Curry, and more recently Adam Chapman and Daniel Spencer, has shown that a total of 689 men entered into individual or joint indentures with the King in 1415 to provide troops or to serve in person.² The two largest retinues were recruited and commanded by the King's brothers, Thomas, duke of Clarence, and Humphrey, duke of Gloucester.³ Clarence contracted to recruit 960 men, while Gloucester indented to raise 800, collectively 15% of Henry's army. Neither of these retinues has been the subject of intensive study before.⁴ Consequently, at the heart of this project are in-depth case studies of these two retinues, which are presented in chapters two and three.

¹ Curry, *Agincourt*, p.83-84.

² Under the auspices of the *Agincourt 600* project, which received a £1 million grant by Government in 2015 to 'celebrate' the battle, campaign biographies for all who indented to serve in 1415 have been produced: A. Curry, D. Spencer and A. Chapman, 'The English Army in 1415', *Medieval Soldier Database*, <www.medievalsoldier.org/about/agincourt-600/the-english-army-in-1415/english-army-table/>, [Accessed 7 June 2018]. For the older catalogue: *Lists and Indexes, Supplementary Volume 9: Exchequer Records*, 2 vols (London: HMSO, 1964), 2: *Index of Warrants for Issues, 1399-1485*. On *Agincourt 600*: <www.agincourt600.com>, [Accessed 29 June 2018]. On the announcement of the grant by Chancellor George Osborne, where he forsook historical accuracy and teasingly claimed that the battle showed 'a strong leader defeating an ill-judged alliance between the champion of a united Europe and a renegade force of Scottish nationalists': <www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-31945666>, [Accessed 29 June 2018].

³ The terms of their indentures, which are explored in detail in chapter one, are known only from their surviving warrants for issue: E404/31/155; *Foedera*, 9, p.227 (Clarence); E404/31/250 (Gloucester).

⁴ The most detailed analysis has been conducted by: Curry, *Agincourt*, pp.73-74; Curry, *Sources*, pp.420-421, 429-430, 433. J.D. Milner has also conducted some research on the personnel of Clarence's retinues, in

In these case studies our main aim will be to learn about the men who served under the two dukes in 1415. One strand of this project focuses on the fates of the retinues, and their men, during the momentous 1415 campaign. In this manner we will track the changing composition of the retinues during the campaign and assess the impact that the campaign had on each, in particular in relation to attrition rates. More broadly, the research methodology of prosopography, which is explored more fully later in this chapter, will be employed to reconstruct the lives of some of those who served under the dukes in 1415. We will consider where the men came from, their careers before and after 1415, plus their personal histories. For each retinue we will explore whether ties pre-existed between members and their commander, as well as between the members themselves.

In reconstructing the lives of these men, our focus will naturally be shifted backwards in time from 1415 into the late fourteenth-century, and forwards into the fifteenth; into the period of the Lancastrian conquest and occupation of Normandy. This broad approach will be necessary in order to explore how the dukes recruited men in 1415, the extent to which they relied on pre-existing networks of acquaintances and the impact the 1415 campaign had on their future affinities. Adopting this broad view allows this study to add significantly to our understanding of the English military community in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth-centuries, particularly in regards to the changing ‘dynamics of recruitment’. The ‘dynamics of recruitment’ model is discussed more fully later in this chapter, but at this point it must be noted that in considering it we will encounter throughout this project issues associated with military careerism, professionalism, supply and demand, and, crucially, the stability and cohesion of retinues.

Suitability of Case Studies and Research Aims

It is possible to identify by name nearly 1,760 of the men who mustered under the two dukes in July 1415. This remarkably high level of nominal identification is possible

particular his 1412 force: J.D. Milner, ‘The English Enterprise in France, 1412-13’, *Trade, Devotion and Governance* ed. D.J. Clayton, R.G. Davies and P. McNiven (Stroud, 1994), pp.80-102; J.D. Milner, ‘The English Commitment to the 1412 Expedition to France’, *The Fifteenth Century: Concerns and Preoccupations*, 11, ed. L. Clark (Woodbridge, 2012), pp.9-24.

because, fortunately, both retinues have complete surviving muster rolls.⁵ These rolls provide us with a snap-shot image of the dukes' retinues as they prepared to embark for Normandy. These two muster rolls form our core sources and are explored in detail in chapter one, alongside all the other surviving muster rolls associated with the 1415 army. The investigation of the muster rolls associated with the 1415 campaign increases our understanding of the process and mechanics of the muster, plus details the links between the muster rolls to the other surviving documentation, such as the indentures, sub-indentures, financial accounts and post-campaign accounts.

While the rich seam of nominal data provided by the ducal muster rolls provides a solid basis for prosopographical study, it must be stated that considering the great number of men that can be identified, a career biography for every man is obviously far beyond the limits of one project. As such, our attention will be to a large extent on the sub-captains; those who recruited the majority of the retinues' manpower. In Clarence's retinue we will delve deeper and undertake more detailed investigations of some select sub-retinues, although time constraints have curtailed such a study in Gloucester's case. At the conclusion of these case studies, in chapter four we move to undertake a comparative examination of the two retinues alongside one another.

In addition to not having been the subject of extensive study before, being the largest retinues of Henry's army and having complete surviving muster rolls, there are further reasons why these two retinues are ripe for further research. The first of these relates again to their muster rolls. Not only are they complete, but they are particularly enlightening because they detail the retinues' sub-companies. In order to fulfil the terms of their indentures, and recruit the number of men they were contractually obliged to, even top-ranking captains like the dukes of Clarence and Gloucester would have needed to reach beyond their immediate households, estates and affinities. They would have needed to enter into sub-indentures with sub-contractors, which we shall term 'sub-captains'.⁶ These

⁵ E101/45/4 (Clarence); E101/45/13 (Gloucester).

⁶ On sub-retinues and sub-contracts: A. Ayton, 'Military Service and the Dynamics of Recruitment in Fourteenth Century England', *The Soldier Experience in the Fourteenth Century*, ed. A.R. Bell and A. Curry (Woodbridge, 2011), pp.9-61 (pp.21-22); A. Ayton, 'The Military Careerist in Fourteenth-Century England', *JMH*, 43 (2017), 4-23 (pp.13-14); J.W. Sherborne, 'Indentured Retinues and English Expeditions to France, 1369-1380', *EHR*, 79 (1964), 718-746; A. Goodman, 'The Military Subcontracts of Sir Hugh Hastings', *EHR*, 95 (1980), 114-120; S. Walker, 'Profit and Loss in the Hundred Years War: The Subcontracts of Sir John Strother',

sub-captains would have recruited their own companies of men-at-arms and archers, but have served within a larger retinue. The sub-retinues were the building blocks of large retinues. As we will see, these sub-retinues varied considerably in size. By detailing the sub-retinues, Clarence and Gloucester's muster rolls present us with interesting research opportunities. We will be able to explore the internal organisation of their retinues, examine their statistical composition, plus investigate the personnel of select sub-retinues in detail. There is great potential in both these retinues to conduct penetrative prosopographical research not only into the high-ranking members of the retinue, but also into the members of the sub-companies, the true rank-and-file.

Another reason for the attractiveness of studying these two retinues alongside one another is that they contrast so well with each other. The dukes were, after the King, the premier captains to serve under. Their comparable status will raise interesting questions regarding who they recruited in 1415, and how they recruited them. These questions take on an added layer of interest when their personal histories are considered. Clarence was a military veteran of many expeditions and held extensive lands across the whole of England. Thus, in recruiting his retinue in 1415 he had a large and developed network of acquaintances, built up over many years, to call on. Gloucester, on the other hand, although a captain of high status, nevertheless was a military virgin. He had no military experience, plus possessed nowhere near the wealth or lands as Clarence. Did these factors impact on how they recruited men, or, indeed, on whom they recruited?

The careers and fates of the dukes after 1415 is also another reason why these retinues are suitable for study. After the 1415 campaign both the dukes went on to play leading roles in the conquest and occupation of Normandy. Both frequently raised retinues and commanded significant campaigns. Indeed, in the case of Gloucester, he also played a major role in domestic politics for decades after Agincourt. Clarence, who did not fight at the Battle of Agincourt on account of sickness contracted during the siege of Harfleur, would certainly have done likewise if he had not inconveniently been killed at the Battle of Baugé in 1421. By re-constructing the lives of those who served under the dukes in 1415 we

Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, 58 (1985), 100-106; 'Private Indentures for Life Service in Peace and War, 1278-1476', ed. M. Jones and S. Walker, *Camden Miscellany*, Camden Series 5, 3 (1994), pp.1-190; *Soldier in Later Medieval England*, pp.130-133. For an example and translation of a sub-indenture from 1415: Curry, *Sources*, pp.439-441.

shall be able to assess the extent to which the 1415 campaign was important for creating bonds and relationships which continued to exist after the campaign ended. In other words, we will see how important the 1415 campaign was in enabling the dukes to expand their affinities. The final, and possibly most important reason for focusing on these two retinues, is the wide range of surviving source material which can be drawn on to grapple with these questions. This material is explored in the following chapter.

Methodology

The research methodology of prosopography is very well established and has a great deal of literature relating to it, so much so there is even a journal dedicated to it. It essentially involves the creation of many individual career biographies.⁷ Once created, these biographies, as Andrew Ayton has written, must be viewed 'collectively and *en masse*'.⁸ The results from this 'collective biographical approach' allows us to see links between individuals, identify trends, trace networks and, 'provides a substantial, nuanced foundation for understanding the political, socio-economic and cultural contexts of military service'.⁹ The creation of these biographies is achieved through 'nominal record linkage'. This simply means tracing an individual by their name through as many sources as possible in order to create a biography of that individual's life.¹⁰ In the context of this study, we are most concerned with certain events during a person's life, in particular military service, retention by a magnate, marriage, or issues related to lands and property. Of course, depending on which stratum of society an individual hailed from impacts significantly on our chances of finding information about them in the records.

The lower down the social ladder the researcher climbs, the more challenging their prosopographical research becomes. The Medieval Soldier Team has written, 'when dealing with rank-and-file soldiers, it is not always possible to identify individuals with precision'.¹¹

⁷ R. Gorski, 'A Methodological Holy Grail: Nominal Record Linkage in a Medieval Context', *Medieval Prosopography*, 17 (1996), 145-179.

⁸ A. Ayton, 'In the Wake of Defeat: Bannockburn and the Dynamics of Recruitment in England', *Bannockburn, 1314-2014: Battle and Legacy*, ed. M. Penman (Donnington, 2016), pp.36-56 (pp.36-37).

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Soldier in Later Medieval England*, pp.17-22.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p.18.

This, as we will see plentiful examples of, is often on account of the commonality of certain names, the tendency 'for eldest sons to possess the same forenames as their father' and the only partial survival of some record series, such as manorial accounts.¹² Yet, while acknowledging the difficulties and pitfalls of prosopography, Richard Gorski appropriately concluded that, 'the quest for biographical information is often difficult, but in piecing careers together discretion is the better part of valour'.¹³ Taking Gorski's advice, this project will necessarily proceed with caution when reconstructing the lives of those men who served under the dukes of Clarence and Gloucester in 1415.

Adopting a prosopographical approach will enable this project to reveal much about these men. Indeed, as Ayton has written, a 'collective biographical study of the men in Henry's army, exploring depth of military experience and the nature of relationships within retinues, would cast light on military performance, but also provide hard data for an assessment of impact on domestic politics, family fortunes and collective memory'.¹⁴ While admittedly detailed consideration of collective memory and domestic politics is beyond the scope of this particular study, we will nonetheless encounter mixed family fortunes and learn much about the English military community before and after the year 1415.

Historiography

The men who served on the 1415 campaign have, as Shakespeare wrote, 'been remembered', and have not been neglected by historians.¹⁵ This is partly because of nationalistic myths surrounding the battle, but also, on a more prosaic note, because of the amount of records which have survived.¹⁶ The wealth of information within these archival records, many of which relate to either the Chancery or Exchequer, the pillars of the

¹² Ibid, p.19.

¹³ Gorski, 'A Methodological Holy Grail', p.178.

¹⁴ A. Ayton, 'Review of Anne Curry's *Great Battles: Agincourt*', *British Journal for Military History*, 4 (2018), 178-181 (p.181).

¹⁵ A detailed bibliography of Agincourt literature is provided in: *The Battle of Agincourt*, ed. A. Curry and M. Mercer (London, 2015), pp.293-302.

¹⁶ The surviving records are explored more in the following chapter. On the remembrance and memorialisation of the battle: A. Curry, *Great Battles: Agincourt* (Oxford, 2015).

medieval government, has long been known to antiquarians and historians.¹⁷ Much ink has been spent writing about Agincourt, often by military men.¹⁸ The publication of Curry's *Battle of Agincourt: Sources and Interpretations* in 2000, however, and *Agincourt: A New History* in 2005 represented a volte-face in Agincourt studies. By drawing on this wealth of archival material, Curry busted many myths about the campaign and the battle, perhaps most notably that the English were so 'few' on the field at Agincourt. Employing database technology and using the nominally rich sources, such as the muster rolls, retinue rolls and sick lists, she demonstrated that approximately 9,500 (75%) of the men of the 1415 campaign can be identified by name.¹⁹ This level of nominal identification is exceptionally high for armies of this period.²⁰

This high level of nominal identification has meant a number of retinue-specific studies have been conducted into the men of the 1415 campaign. In the nineteenth-century William Durrant Cooper studied the 'Sussex Men at Agincourt', while more recently, with the aid of databases, Curry has investigated in detail the retinues recruited by Sir Thomas Erpingham and John Mowbray, the earl marshal.²¹ Using Mowbray's household accounts in concert with administrative and financial documents, she demonstrated the working of the indenture system and was able to conclude that, 'the earl's household was a central source of troops for him'.²² More recently, Gary Baker has turned his attention to the duke of York's retinue. He found that a large number of York's men were similarly recruited from his

¹⁷ Curry, *Sources*, pp.385-405; Sir N.H. Nicolas, *History of the Battle of Agincourt*, 3 vols (London, 1827, 1832, 1833); Sir J. Hunter, *Agincourt: A Contribution towards an Authentic List of the Commanders of the English Host in King Henry the Fifth's Expedition to France in the Third Year of his Reign*, (London, 1850); J.H. Wylie and W.T. Waugh, *The Reign of King Henry V*, 3 vols (Cambridge, 1914, 1919, 1929).

¹⁸ Curry, *Sources*, pp.394-402.

¹⁹ Curry first published these names in an appendix to the first edition of her *Agincourt: A New History*, (Stroud, 2005). This information is now available online via the Medieval Soldier Database. Although her figures are now generally accepted by most historians, her revisionist conclusions initially encountered stiff resistance. As she has written herself, 'the separation of truth and fiction proves difficult': *Great Battles*, p.111. On resistance to accepting her conclusions: J. Barker, *Agincourt: The King, The Campaign, The Battle* (London, 2006), p.xvi; I. Mortimer, *1415: Henry V's Year of Glory* (London, 2009), pp.564-566 (Appendix 4: Numbers at the Battle of Agincourt); C.J. Rogers, 'The Battle of Agincourt', *The Hundred Years War (Part II): Different Vistas*, ed. L.J.A. Villalon and D.J. Kagnay (Boston, 2008), pp.37-133 (pp.110-122); J. Sumption, *The Hundred Years War: Cursed Kings*, 3 (London, 2015), pp.441-449.

²⁰ *Soldier in Later Medieval England*, pp.7-16.

²¹ W.D. Cooper, 'Sussex Men at Agincourt', *Sussex Archaeological Collections*, 15 (1863), 123-137; A. Curry, 'Sir Thomas Erpingham', *Agincourt 1415*, ed. A. Curry (Stroud, 2000), pp.53-111; A. Curry, 'Personal Links and the nature of the English War Retinue: A Case Study of John Mowbray, Earl Marshal, and the Campaign of 1415', *Liens personnels, réseaux, solidarités en France et dans les îles Britanniques (XIe-XXe siècle)*, ed. D. Bates and V. Gazeau (Paris, 2006), pp.153-167.

²² Curry, 'A Case Study of John Mowbray', p.167.

landholdings, particularly in the Midland counties and Wales.²³ Baker also identified that there were military veterans in the duke's retinue, some of whom undertook further military activity after 1415. The case studies undertaken in this project locate themselves alongside these works.

While the 1415 campaign is exceptionally well served by nominal military sources, for the whole period of 1369-1453 there is a great range of nominal military sources available, as the work of the Medieval Soldier Team has demonstrated. Drawing on these sources, which include muster rolls, retinue rolls, Normandy garrison rolls and letters of protection and attorney, they launched the Medieval Soldier Database in 2009.²⁴ This publically-accessible database contains upwards of 250,000 entries for the period 1369-1453. It should be noted that this figure does not relate to unique individuals, rather the number of entries on the database as some men obviously served more than once. This database enabled the team to conduct a macro analysis of the military community between the years of their project, and assess many issues, including the impact that the changing nature of warfare had on the military community and the composition of armies. The Medieval Soldier Database will be used throughout this project to reconstruct the military service careers of the men who served under Clarence and Gloucester in 1415.

In addition to examinations focused specifically on retinues of the 1415 army, many further studies exist which have often, as the Medieval Soldier Team have observed, 'focused on localities and on the retainers of leading figures'.²⁵ Philip Morgan, for instance, was able to use muster rolls to explore the Cheshire archers, some of whom made up Richard II's bodyguard.²⁶ Michael Bennett similarly focused on Cheshire and Lancashire,

²³ G. Baker, 'To Agincourt and Beyond! The Martial Affinity of Edward of Langley, second Duke of York (c.1373-1415)', *JMH*, 43 (2016), 40-58.

²⁴ The Medieval Soldier Database <www.medievalsoldier.org>, along with the accompanying monograph, *The Soldier in Later Medieval England*, is the outcome of a major AHRC funded project focused on the English military community between the years 1369-1453. The project was headed by Prof. Anne Curry and Prof. Adrian. R. Bell, although many other scholars contributed. Those who worked on the project and authored the monograph are hereafter referred to collectively as the Medieval Soldier Team. The project originally ran from 2006-2009, although additions to the database have been made as a result of the *Agincourt 600* project.

²⁵ *Soldier in Later Medieval England*, pp.16-17.

²⁶ P. Morgan, *War and Society in Late Medieval Cheshire, 1277-1403* (Manchester, 1987). See also: J.L. Gillespie, 'Richard II's Cheshire Archers', *Transactions of the Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire*, 125 (1975), 1-39.

while Christine Carpenter looked at Warwickshire.²⁷ Others, as the Team identified, have focused on ‘the retainers of leading figures’. Tony Pollard, for instance, examined John Talbot and his affinity, in a similar style as did Simon Walker in his ground-breaking study of John of Gaunt’s affinity.²⁸ More recently, James Ross has studied the earls of Oxford.²⁹ All of these projects have tracked retinue membership, and in the process revealed relationships between members. Collectively, these studies have shown how interconnected the military community in England was, and also how large it was. Indeed, the Medieval Soldier Database has demonstrated, more than any other project, just how many men were involved in military activity during the period 1369-1453.

The Dynamics of Recruitment

In the century between Bannockburn and Agincourt, as David Simpkin has written, ‘the size, structure and composition of [English] military retinues changed a great deal’, as did the military community.³⁰ Broadly speaking, the significant increase in the size of retinues and the military community which occurred in the fourteenth-century was accompanied by a rise in military careerism (we may be bold enough to refer to these men as military professionals), plus structural changes in the composition of retinues led to a general decline in retinue stability.³¹ The forces which drove these changes were numerous. They were both endogenous and exogenous, meaning they originated inside and outside of the English military recruitment system. These forces have been considered in detail by Ayton in a highly important article on the changing ‘dynamics of recruitment’ in the fourteenth-century. The term ‘dynamics of recruitment’ is a conceptual model, presented by Ayton, which identifies and conceptualises the ‘circumstances and forces that, individually and through their interaction, contributed to, accompanied or were generated

²⁷ M.J. Bennett, *Community, Class and Careerism: Cheshire and Lancashire Society in the Age of Sir Gawain and the Green Knight* (Cambridge, 1983); C. Carpenter, *Locality and Polity: A Study of Warwickshire Landed Society, 1401-1499* (Cambridge, 1992). See also: N. Saul, *Knights and Esquires: The Gloucestershire Gentry in the Fourteenth Century* (Oxford, 1981).

²⁸ A.J. Pollard, *John Talbot and the War in France, 1427-1453* (London, 1983); S. Walker, *The Lancastrian Affinity* (Oxford, 1990).

²⁹ J. Ross, ‘The De Veer Earls of Oxford, 1400-1513’, D. Phil thesis (Oxford, 2004).

³⁰ D. Simpkin, *The English Aristocracy at War: From the Welsh Wars of Edward I to the Battle of Bannockburn* (Woodbridge, 2008), p.148.

³¹ Ayton, ‘Dynamics of Recruitment’, pp.9-61.

by the recruitment of armies in late medieval England'.³² Considering these circumstances and forces collectively, Ayton distinguished five key 'agencies of change' which contributed to the evolution of English war retinues and the military community in the 'long' fourteenth-century.³³

The first of these was a change in England's leading military captains during the middle of the fourteenth-century, through either 'death, retirement, redeployment to other responsibilities or political exclusion', coupled with the emergence of new captains who would have built new affinity and recruitment networks, or at least altered existing ones. The other agencies of change were the strategy and war management of the Crown, how armies were raised and organised, developments overseas, including the opportunities for foreign service, for example in the Italian states, and the socio-economic and cultural conditions the military community found itself in during the late fourteenth-century, particularly after the decimation of the population caused by plague. These 'agencies of change', which also included the highly important and powerful forces of supply and demand, significantly affected and altered the nature and composition of the English military community.

One clear way to demonstrate the tectonic changes which the military community underwent is to focus momentarily on the stability of retinues. A retinue with members vertically tied to its commander, and horizontally to each other, can be considered 'stable and cohesive'. Ayton identified some key indicators of retinue stability. These include a 'settled composition' of personnel, plus bonds based on factors such as shared military service history, similar geographic heritage, familial relations, career experiences and/or tenurial ties.³⁴ In a retinue of settled composition, the same men would have frequently served under the same captain, and alongside one another, on numerous campaigns, often sequentially. These loyal men would have served, in the words of N.B. Lewis, as a 'nucleus around which less stable elements could collect'.³⁵ In such a situation, as Nicholas Gribit has written in the conclusion to his study of Henry of Lancaster's war retinue during his

³² Ibid, pp.10-11.

³³ Ibid, pp.26-27.

³⁴ Ibid, pp.20-23.

³⁵ N.B. Lewis, 'The Organisation of Indenture Retinues in the Fourteenth Century', *TRHS*, fourth series, 27 (1945), 29-39 (pp.33-34).

expedition to Aquitaine in 1345-1346, 'camaraderie based on previous experience of fighting alongside one another, of serving under the same captain or campaigning in the same theatre of war, would have helped forge a collective identity among the troops and enhanced their effectiveness and efficiency as a team of combatants'.³⁶ Furthermore, in a stable retinue the web of connections between members would have facilitated the establishment of 'efficient networks of command and communication, discipline and tactical capabilities, all of which were vital to its [the retinue's] operational effectiveness'.³⁷

The period after the English defeat at Bannockburn has been identified as having been crucial for the development of retinue stability.³⁸ The high frequency with which military expeditions were undertaken ensured that military service based on 'shared traditions of service within families (i.e. for a particular captain), regional communities and social recruitment networks' became commonplace.³⁹ In this world where the demand for men to undertake military service was high, the military community, or as we may refer to it 'the pool of potential manpower', increased to meet this demand. Put simply, more men undertook military service, and the frequency of this allowed some to build careers on it.⁴⁰ This 'militarisation' ensured that the retinues of the early-mid fourteenth-century were often comprised of militarily experienced men, who returned to the same retinue from campaign-to-campaign. Of course, to a certain extent the personnel of retinues was always changing on account of deaths, replacements or retirements. When such changes occurred, the bonds of 'settled composition' would have been weakened. However, the additional bonds detailed above, for instance those based on geographic heritage and familial relations, would have become increasingly important in ensuring the retinue remained stable and cohesive. That retinues remained stable and cohesive, even as a result of personnel changes during the early and mid-fourteenth-century has been termed by Ayton as 'dynamic stability'.⁴¹ Dynamic stability emerged as a result of the high tempo of military

³⁶ N. Gribit, *Henry of Lancaster's Expedition to Aquitaine, 1345-1346: Military Service and Professionalism in the Hundred Years War* (Woodbridge, 2016), p.183.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ayton, 'In the Wake of Defeat', pp.41-56.

³⁹ Ibid, pp.55-56.

⁴⁰ Ibid, pp.52-56; Ayton, 'The Military Careerist', pp.6-11; A. Ayton, 'William de Thweyt: Deputy Constable of Corfe Castle in the 1340s', *Somerset and Dorset Notes and Queries*, 32, (1989) 731-738.

⁴¹ Ayton, 'Dynamics of Recruitment', pp.15-16.

expeditions and the small and compact nature of war retinues in the early-mid fourteenth-century.

This 'dynamic stability', in partnership with tactical innovations, technological improvements and a change of front-rank military leaders, ensured that by the middle of the fourteenth-century England had an experienced and active military community.⁴² This militarised community famously proved itself on 26 August 1346 at the Battle of Crécy. By employing a case study approach, similar to as is employed in this project, Ayton demonstrated that many of the retinues which made up the army were stable and comprised of a 'settled composition' of members. These included those captained by the Prince of Wales, the earls of Warwick and Northampton, Sir Bartholomew Burgherssh, Sir Michael Poynings, Sir Richard Talbot and many more.⁴³ The men of these forces were also bound to each by further ties of shared military service, plus geographic heritage, familial ties and, in some cases, tenure too. In turn, these stable retinues were also comprised of stable sub-companies, such as that commanded by Sir Thomas Ughtred.⁴⁴ The men of his force were similarly bound to each other by such ties, in particular many came from the East Riding of Yorkshire. The stability of the Crécy army was not unique, many forces of this period, including garrisons, benefitted from stability borne of 'settled composition', plus various additional ties.⁴⁵ Gribit, for example, discovered that in Henry of Lancaster's retinues of 1345-46 'much higher levels of cohesion and retinue stability existed in the earl's troops than has previously been thought'.⁴⁶ Over 20% were military veterans and a plethora of further ties based on shared geographic heritage, familial bonds and career experiences were also present in his retinue.⁴⁷

The situation changed, however, from the middle of the fourteenth-century onwards, 'the evidence suggests a less stable world, in which moderate to poor re-service

⁴² On tactics and technology during this period: D.J. Cornell, *Bannockburn: The Triumph of Robert the Bruce* (London, 2009), p.253; K. DeVries, *Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century* (Woodbridge, 1996), pp.66-86.

⁴³ Ayton, 'Dynamics of Recruitment', p.11-17 (Warwick); A. Ayton, 'The English Army at Crécy', *The Battle of Crécy, 1346*, ed. A. Ayton and Sir P. Preston (Woodbridge, 2005), pp.157-251 (pp.205-224).

⁴⁴ A. Ayton, 'Sir Thomas Ughtred and the Edwardian Military Revolution', *The Age of Edward III*, ed. J. Bothwell (Woodbridge, 2001), pp.107-132 (pp.122-125).

⁴⁵ D.J. Cornell, 'Northern Castles and Garrisons in the Later Middle Ages', PhD. thesis (University of Durham, 2006), pp.140-194.

⁴⁶ Gribit, *Henry of Lancaster's Expedition*, p.247

⁴⁷ Ibid, pp.187-189.

rates were more common and may, indeed, have become the norm'.⁴⁸ Not only did the agencies of change alter re-service rates and stability, but the size, structure and composition of retinues and the military community also evolved significantly.⁴⁹ A thorough account of the effects the agencies of change had on the military community is not necessary here, although a few certain points must be raised.

Following the collapse of the Treaty of Brétigny in 1369 and the resumption of war, the mechanics by which English armies were recruited changed, as did the size and composition of the retinues of which they were comprised. The days of the aged Edward III leading armies in the field were gone. Without the Crown at the head of English armies, they were no longer administered through the royal wardrobe. As Ayton has written, 'the indenture system was the mechanism which took over when the staff of the royal household were no longer holding the administrative reins'.⁵⁰ This is not to suggest, of course, that indentures were revolutionary. They had been used for garrisons and some field forces since the reign of Edward I.⁵¹ More recently, indentures survive for Henry of Lancaster's 1345 expedition to Aquitaine and the Black Prince's 1355 campaign.⁵² However, the point to be made is that indentures for military service had never before been used for a campaign commanded by the King. From 1369 onwards, campaigns were financed through the Exchequer and indentures were used near universally.⁵³

⁴⁸ Ayton, 'Dynamics of Recruitment', p.23.

⁴⁹ Ibid. On the stability of retinues before this time: A. Ayton, 'Armies and Military Communities in Fourteenth-Century England', *Soldiers, Nobles and Gentlemen: Essays in Honour of Maurice Keen*, ed. P. Coss, C. Tyreman (Woodbridge, 2009), pp.215-39; Simpkin, *The English Aristocracy at War*; D. Simpkin, 'The King's Sergeants-at-Arms and the War in Scotland, c.1296-c.1322', *England and Scotland at War c.1296-1513*, ed. A. King and D. Simpkin (Leiden, 2012), pp.77-117; A. Spencer, 'The Comital Military Retinue in the Reign of Edward I', *Historical Research*, 83 (2008), 4-59; P. Konieczny, 'London's War Effort during the Early Years of the Reign of Edward III', *The Hundred Years War: A Wider Focus*, ed. L.J.A. Villalon and D.J. Kagay (Leiden, 2005), pp.243-261.

⁵⁰ A. Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses: Military Service and the English Aristocracy under Edward III* (Woodbridge, 1999), pp.11, 122; Ayton, 'Dynamics of Recruitment', p.38; Sherborne, 'Indentured Retinues', pp.718-746.

⁵¹ B.D. Lyons, 'The Feudal Antecedent of the Indenture System', *Speculum*, 29 (1954), 503-511; N.B. Lewis, 'An Early Indenture for Military Service, 27 July 1287', *BIHR*, 13 (1935), 85-89; N.B. Lewis, 'An Early Fourteenth-Century Contract for Military Service', *BIHR*, 20 (1944), 111-118.

⁵² Gribit, *Henry of Lancaster's Expedition*, p.23; M.M. Madden, 'The Indenture between Edward III and the Black Prince for the Prince's Expedition to Gascony, 10 July 1355', *JMMH*, 12 (2014), 165-172.

⁵³ The only exception being the army of 1385 which Richard II led to Scotland, for which he issued a feudal summons: N.B. Lewis, 'The Last Medieval Summons of the English Feudal Levy, 13 June 1385', *EHR*, 73 (1958), 1-26; J.J.N. Palmer 'The Last Summons of the Feudal Army in England (1385)', *EHR*, 83 (1968), 771-775; N.B. Lewis, 'The Feudal Summons of 1385', *EHR*, 100 (1985), 729-743.

The rise of the indenture system was accompanied by a change in the size and composition of retinues. In expeditions before 1369, armies had often been comprised of a multiplicity of retinues. The army which fought at Crécy, for example, comprised at least 78 retinues with peers, such as Warwick and Northampton, recruiting around 300-350 men.⁵⁴ In regards to this example it must be noted that many of the small retinues were led by royal household knights or esquires, or were temporarily retained by the King, and so should more specifically be regarded as sub-retinues within the King's personal retinue, his 'household division'. Similarly, it is true to say that the army which Richard II recruited for his 1385 campaign numbered at least 142 companies.⁵⁵ Again, however, as N.B. Lewis showed in his study of the contemporary 'Order of Battle' and accounting information contained in the issue rolls, many of these retinues were actually attached to the royal household, and therefore part of the 'household division'.⁵⁶ Consequently, what we are seeing with these two armies is their internal organisation. We can also see the organisation of the army which Richard II led to Ireland in 1394-1395 for which 364 captains indented and Henry IV's Scottish expedition in 1400 which comprised at least 232 companies.⁵⁷ Henry V's 1415 force, as we have seen, likewise numbered over 500 retinues. Again, many of these served within the orbit of the King's household. These Crown-commanded armies were evidently made up of many small retinues and sub-retinues, the compact nature of which, in many cases, facilitated and promoted stability.

Conversely, in forces where the King deputised command after 1369, the number of retinues decreased, but their size increased significantly. In 1375, for example, the 4,000 strong force which sailed for Brittany was composed of only four retinues.⁵⁸ Similarly, in 1380 the earl of Buckingham's retinue comprised nearly 2,500 soldiers, almost half the entire army.⁵⁹ In such a force, the ties between men would have become disparate and stability would have decreased. It was not only high ranking captains who were raising large retinues at this time. In 1370 Sir John Minsterworth, a Gloucestershire knight of 'obscure origins' who held only limited lands, contracted to recruit 200 men-at-arms and 300

⁵⁴ Ayton, 'The English Army at Crécy', pp.245-251.

⁵⁵ A. Curry, A.R. Bell, A. King and D. Simpkin, 'New Regime, New Army? Henry IV's Scottish Expedition of 1400', *EHR*, 125 (2010), pp.1382-1413 (p.1398).

⁵⁶ Lewis, 'The Last Medieval Summons', pp.1-26.

⁵⁷ Curry, Bell, King and Simpkin, 'New Regime, New Army?', p.1398.

⁵⁸ Sherborne, 'Indentured Retinues', p.730.

⁵⁹ Ayton, 'Dynamics of Recruitment', p.31.

archers.⁶⁰ In order to fulfil the terms of his indenture he, like premier captains such as Buckingham and even Gaunt, would have needed to reach far beyond individuals from his immediate affinity, tenants and neighbours. Even socially minor captains like Misterworth would have needed to enter into sub-indentures. The forces of supply and demand were clearly forcing captains to break away from traditional recruiting networks, and cast their recruitment nets very wide.

That retinue captains were entering into sub-indentures highlights an important point. Even though huge 'super-mixed' retinues appeared in the mid-late fourteenth-century, they were still themselves comprised of many smaller sub-retinues. While on paper the 1375 army was comprised of just four retinues, this belies the fact that it was in fact constructed of a great multiplicity of sub-retinues – the building block of larger forces. Even though the retinues were huge, captains like Buckingham would still have recruited 'off-the-peg' companies, like Sir Thomas Ughtred's, which, as we have seen, were often stable.⁶¹ It was in the Crown's interest to seal indentures with few captains to raise huge retinues. The Crown needed only to make large payments to a few captains. Plus, per the terms of the indentures, it was the captain's responsibility to recruit men and handle their pay.⁶² Thus, to truly understand the stability of these forces detailed study of the sub-retinues would be required.

While there is undoubtedly scope for further research into the armies of the fourteenth-century and the personnel of the military community, what cannot be denied is that the existing research has shown clearly the trend of declining retinue stability and the major impact the agencies of change had upon the military community. By the final quarter of the fourteenth-century men seldom served under the same captain. Retinues were no longer of settled composition. Guy Lord Brian's retinue is a good example of this.⁶³ In total, only 11% of the men who had served under him in 1370 returned for at least one of his four subsequent expeditions. Similarly, Simon Walker observed that re-service under Gaunt, 'was never very high'.⁶⁴ In such forces, where turnover of personnel was rapid, the ties which had

⁶⁰ Ibid, p.33.

⁶¹ On the term 'off-the-peg': Ayton, 'Dynamics of Recruitment', p.22.

⁶² For example: Curry, 'A Case Study of John Mowbray', pp.156-158.

⁶³ Ayton, 'Dynamics of Recruitment', pp.24-25.

⁶⁴ Walker, *Lancastrian Affinity*, pp.50-51.

engendered stability, such as those based on shared military experience, geographic heritage, familial bonds and career experiences, would have become stretched and strained, if they existed at all.

The work of Adrian Bell into the fleets raised and commanded by the earl of Arundel in 1387 and 1388 also shines light on this issue of stability.⁶⁵ However, before going further, it must be noted that Bell's study was published in 2004, when the historiographical trend was focused on the issue of professionalism, not retinue stability. It was not until 2011 that Ayton's 'dynamics of recruitment' article was published and provided a conceptual framework for the study of the military community during the fourteenth-century and brought the issue of retinue stability firmly into the spotlight.⁶⁶ It was also the case that Bell's research was conducted before the publication of the Medieval Soldier Database (which he was involved in creating), so his figures relating to the military careers of individuals are in need of expansion in light of the wealth of data contained within the Soldier Database. An update to the military service figures he provides is detailed in the following chapter. Nevertheless, as Ayton noted in his review of Bell's monograph, his study contains much useful information pertaining to the issue of retinue stability and the 'dynamics of recruitment' model.⁶⁷

One of the most significant findings of Bell's in relation to this issue was that only 473 soldiers, 16% of the entire force, served on both the 1387 and 1388 campaigns.⁶⁸ While knightly re-service was considerably higher at 43%, further investigation revealed that 13% of esquires re-served and that of these only 23% of those served under the same captain. His figures for the archers present a similar picture, 16% served on each campaign, although 37% served under the same captain.⁶⁹ This indicates that while there may have been limited high-level stability, and thus the armies may have possessed a relatively stable high-

⁶⁵ A.R. Bell, *War and the Soldier in the Fourteenth Century* (Woodbridge, 2004), pp.97-101

⁶⁶ This is not to suggest it had not been considered before. The preceding footnotes make it clear that it featured in many articles. Rather, it is to highlight that it was given a conceptual framework by Ayton's 2011 'Dynamics of Recruitment' article.

⁶⁷ A. Ayton, 'Review of Adrian R. Bell's *War and the Soldier in the Fourteenth Century*', *EHR*, 121 (2006), 238-234.

⁶⁸ Bell, *War and the Soldier*, pp.97-101.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

command network, the composition of the sub-retinues was shifting considerably.⁷⁰ There does not appear to have been stability among the personnel of the sub-retinues. The unsettled composition of Arundel's force from the 1387 campaign to the 1388 suggests that the military recruitment market in England at the time was fluid, that there was a surplus of men willing to undertake military service, and that many men chose not to re-serve. In such a world, individuals seldom served under the same captain. Although exceptions can be found, such as Gaunt's 1373 retinue which I have shown had at its 'heart and in the surrounding arteries' a stable group of loyal, professional, veteran knights, the general trend for stability in English retinues was one of decline during the second half of the fourteenth-century.⁷¹

In addition to the changed level of stability, by the early fifteenth-century the composition of retinues had also changed. During the period 1369-1389 the number of men-at-arms to archers in retinues had most often been roughly equal.⁷² However, from 1389 onwards, the number of archers recruited began to outnumber the men-at-arms. As Curry has noted, from April 1406 onwards the ratio of 1:3 men-at-arms to archers appears to have been frequently employed.⁷³ Curry has suggested two reasons for the development and adoption of this ratio.⁷⁴ First, archers were cheaper. Esquires were generally paid 12d per day, an archer 6d. Secondly, she suggests, archers were easier to recruit, 'they needed less specialised equipment and multi-faceted training'.

Assessing the impact that this compositional change had on retinue stability is challenging on account of the fact that creating biographies for archers is hindered by their generally lower status which means they feature less frequently in the records. However, as the Medieval Soldier Team have shown, it is not impossible.⁷⁵ From their consideration of archers and retainers they concluded that, 'many of the archer-units around the year 1400 were much tighter and more compact than they had been a hundred years earlier'. This was

⁷⁰ Simpkin has shown that the stability of high-command networks increased during the early fourteenth-century: Simpkin, *'The English Aristocracy at War'*, pp.39-67.

⁷¹ M.P. Warner, 'A Prosopographical Study into John of Gaunt's Armies of 1373 and 1378', undergraduate dissertation (University of Southampton, 2014), *Medieval Soldier Database*, <<https://research.reading.ac.uk/medievalsoldier/about/miscellanea>>, [Accessed 9 April, 2018].

⁷² *Soldier in Later Medieval England*, pp.271-274.

⁷³ Curry, *Agincourt*, pp.77-78.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ *Soldier in Later Medieval England*, pp.155-162

as a result of the fact that the rise of the indenture system put paid to the massed levies of archers raised by the Crown. Like men-at-arms, archers were part of the small sub-retinues which made up the huge 'super-mixed' retinues which emerged in the late fourteenth-century.⁷⁶

This observation has clear implications for the 'dynamics of recruitment' in the last decades of the fourteenth-century and the early fifteenth. In addition to underscoring the importance of considering the personnel of the sub-retinues, these observations also show that the increase of archers and the decline of men-at-arms did not necessarily result in the disappearance of stability and cohesion. A further consideration of these issues in relation to the dynamics of recruitment model is much needed. Indeed, the end of the fourteenth century and the beginning of the fifteenth is currently without any major studies into the 'dynamics of recruitment'. The truce of 1389 with France undoubtedly reduced the demand for military service, and thus impacted on the size of the military community. However, its impact probably should not be overstated as numerous campaigns, to Ireland, Scotland and Wales, were launched in these turn-of-the-century decades. A more significant hindrance to studies in this particular period is the scarcity of muster rolls.⁷⁷ The majority of the personnel of the royally-commanded armies of 1385, 1394-95 and 1399 are unknown because of no surviving muster rolls.⁷⁸

The issue of limited muster rolls continues into the first decades of the fifteenth-century as well. While Henry IV's Scottish campaign of 1400 is comparatively well documented, the rest of the period until 1414, which includes Henry's Welsh wars, suffers from a particular drought of nominal data, with very few muster rolls surviving.⁷⁹ Of course, a lack of muster rolls does not necessarily give reason to despair. A host of subsidiary sources can be sought to learn the identity of some of those engaged in military service during this period. However, the lack of muster rolls is noticeable because they often allow us to identify many of the personnel of particular retinues, plus, if they exist in series, track changes in a retinue's personnel and manpower between campaigns. As a result of these

⁷⁶ On 'super-mixed' retinues: Ayton, 'Dynamics of Recruitment', p.31.

⁷⁷ *Soldier in Later Medieval England*, pp.10-11

⁷⁸ Comparatively more is known about the personnel of the 1394-95 campaign because of a surviving wardrobe book, however this does not fully compensate for the lack of nominal coverage which muster rolls would have provided: *Ibid*, p.11.

⁷⁹ *Ibid*, pp.10-11

difficulties, the 'dynamics of recruitment' in the final stages of the fourteenth-century and the early fifteenth has not been considered in detail before. This project, with its focus on the period before and after the 1415 campaign (which is a particularly well documented campaign, as we will see) therefore has an important role to play in drawing the discussion of the 'dynamics of recruitment' into the fifteenth-century, and testing whether the model can continue to be applied. Consequently, in examining the lives of those who served under Clarence and Gloucester in 1415 frequent reference will be made throughout to what their careers can tell us about the changing 'dynamics of recruitment' by the time of the 1415 campaign, and beyond.

The fleet which sailed from English shores on Sunday 11 August 1415 carried the largest overseas army England had dispatched since Edward III's 1359 Reims campaign. A great deal of change had occurred to the military community in the intervening decades, in relation to recruitment, administration, composition and stability. However, that Henry V succeeded in mustering such a large army in 1415 demonstrates that the military community in England was still large, and keen to undertake foreign expeditions. In exploring the two largest retinues of Henry's army, this project will significantly increase our understanding of those men who served on the campaign. The case studies will allow us to see the system of recruitment at work, plus our investigation of the ties between the sub-captains and their commander, and sub-captains themselves, will aid us in ascertaining the level of stability within each retinue. Furthermore, study of some select sub-retinues will further help us to investigate this issue at the lower levels, among the rank-and-file. The conclusions drawn from these case studies will impact on our understanding of how the dukes recruited their retinues, the respective stability of their retinues, and the importance of the 1415 campaign in expanding their affinities.

Chapter I



The Muster Rolls of the 1415 Expedition

The muster was an essential stage in the life-cycle of a late English medieval army.⁸⁰ Yet, no contemporary description survives as to how a muster was undertaken. Likewise, while the muster rolls associated with the 1415 expedition have been thoroughly utilised by Curry and other historians, as the Medieval Soldier Database stands as testament to, comparatively less focus has been given to considering how the process which led to their creation worked.⁸¹ Focusing specifically on the 1415 muster rolls, in this chapter we will explore what happened before the muster, then during it, and finally what happened afterwards. Particular attention will be given to the complete muster rolls associated with the retinues commanded by the dukes of Clarence and Gloucester, although all the surviving 1415 muster rolls will be considered.⁸² A number of key issues will be focused on to explore how the muster rolls were compiled and used. These include the possibility that captains submitted chits before the muster, the layout and format of the rolls, terminology used, membrane crossover, blank spaces in lists, pointing of names, number of hands, annotations, insertions, indenting, joining of membranes, likelihood of a second muster and the fate of the rolls after the muster. This systematic approach will help us to understand more about the recruitment of the army, the process and mechanics of the muster and how the rolls we see today in The National Archives were compiled.

The 1415 expedition is well served by surviving muster rolls, especially compared to the first decade of the fifteenth-century where there is a particular drought of muster roll

⁸⁰ On the 'life-cycle' of the 1415 army, from its recruitment to its eventual payment, plus an account and examination of the many surviving archival records associated with the campaign: Curry, *Sources*, pp.406-436.

⁸¹ For detailed summaries of the process: *Soldier in Later Medieval England*, p.11; Bell, *War and the Soldier*, pp.52-53, 55, 58-62, 66-68; Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses*, pp.166-169; R.A. Newhall, *Muster and Review: A Problem of English Military Administration 1420-1440* (Cambridge, 1940), pp.3-6. On the earlier workings of the muster and the appraisal of warhorses: Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses*, pp.50-71.

⁸² E101/45/4 (Clarence); E101/45/13 (Gloucester).

data.⁸³ A total of 11 muster rolls survive for the 1415 expedition, as table 1.1 demonstrates. Although we are primarily concerned with the 1415 muster rolls in this chapter, to fully understand their positions within the administration of the 1415 army a range of additional sources will also be detailed. These include indentures, sub-indentures, warrants for issue, issue rolls, post-campaign accounts and retinue rolls. It must be stressed that we are specifically concerned with the muster rolls in this chapter, not the retinue rolls which were submitted as part of the post-campaign accounting process.

Background and Purpose

The Medieval Soldier Team has observed that in their most basic state muster rolls are essentially, 'listings of troops serving in a particular expedition or garrison'.⁸⁴ The rolls list by name in hierarchical order the men-at-arms and archers serving under a particular captain. The muster rolls provide a retinue-by-retinue breakdown of an expedition or garrison's personnel. In the case of large retinues they usually detail the sub-captains and their companies, such as for the 1415 retinues of Clarence and Gloucester. In this manner they can allow us to see the internal structure of large retinues. The earliest known muster rolls date to 1215.⁸⁵ However, as we have seen in the introduction, concurrent with the increased use of recruitment by indenture following the collapse of the Treaty of Brétigny in 1369, muster rolls for expeditionary armies were necessarily employed more frequently. Now that the Crown entered into legal contracts with captains to pay set wages, it needed to ensure financial accuracy, and importantly auditability, in its accounts. The primary purpose of the muster rolls was thus to check that indentees met the terms of their indentures.⁸⁶

At the point of the muster taking place, Exchequer clerks would often place a small point/dot next to the name of an individual to designate that they had been present at the muster. This process has become known by historians as 'pointing'. This allowed the Crown's clerks to ascertain which captains had and had not fulfilled the terms of their

⁸³ *Soldier in Later Medieval England*, p.10.

⁸⁴ *Ibid*, p.7.

⁸⁵ S. Church, 'The Earliest English Muster Roll, 18/19 December 1215', *Historical Research*, 67 (1994), 1-17; *Soldier in Later Medieval England*, pp.7-9.

⁸⁶ Curry, *Sources*, pp.431-432.

indentures, plus calculate the size of the army which had gathered. It was intended that at the end of a campaign a captain's original muster roll would be used by Exchequer clerks to audit his post-campaign accounts. If the muster roll demonstrated that a captain had failed to muster the men required by his indenture, he would owe the Exchequer money, since he had been paid some money in advance. As the Medieval Soldier Team have highlighted, the system was taken seriously and was effective. In 1372 the earl of Salisbury was deducted pay for failing to muster enough troops.⁸⁷ Furthermore, in 1423 Sir Thomas Carew was forced to petition the Privy Council as he had been unable to obtain payment for a naval expedition he led in 1417 because the muster roll had been lost.⁸⁸ In an apparently unusual case, in 1420 the men of the Grace Dieu mutinied against their captain William Payne and expedition commander, the earl of Dorset, and threatened the two men sent to muster them, William Moryng and Peter Garneys.⁸⁹ In their report of the incident, the musterers noted that the leader of the mutiny, William Duke, 'seized the [muster] roll of sailors' names out of the hands of the clerk and himself threatened to throw it overboard into the sea'. Susan Rose suggests that overcrowding, bad weather and insufficient provisions may have led to the crew's dissatisfaction. Their anger at the musterers and the muster roll, Rose suggests, may have been as a result of the fact that the Crown would have had a record of their names, thus making it difficult for them to desert. Conversely, without the muster roll they would not have received payment. Whatever the specific reason, their anger at the musterers and their muster roll highlights that it was an integral part of the administration of military forces and was taken seriously. Yet, despite this centrality, as the Medieval Soldier Team has also observed, there was 'no set form of muster roll'.⁹⁰

Before the Muster

At the opening of Parliament in November 1414 Henry Beaufort, the Chancellor, orated that the King would, 'strive for the recovery of his inheritance and rights of his crown

⁸⁷ *Soldier in Later Medieval England*, p.9.

⁸⁸ *PPC*, 3, pp.xxi-xxii, 125-127. Interestingly, Carew's retinue had been mustered by Clarence and Henry, Lord FitzHugh, at Dartmouth on 1 March.

⁸⁹ S. Rose, 'Henry V's Grace Dieu and Mutiny at Sea: Some New Evidence', *Mariner's Mirror*, 63 (1977), 3-6.

⁹⁰ *Soldier in Later Medieval England*, p.9.

outside the realm'.⁹¹ Such overt foundations for the 1415 campaign were aided by covert machinations as well, like crafty negotiating which enabled Henry to claim a *casus belli* when negotiations with the French finally fell apart in March 1415.⁹² Shortly afterwards, at the Palace of Westminster on Monday 29 April 1415 the indentures for war for Henry's impending expedition were sealed. As Curry has identified, they were almost all sealed on this day and were 'standardised in form and content'.⁹³ The contracts were written in duplicate and separated in a jagged tooth (*dentes*) like pattern. The Chancery kept one copy, the indentee (the captain) the other. When the captain submitted his post-campaign accounts, one of the documents they would be audited alongside would be the Chancery's copy of the indenture.

The standardisation of the 1415 indentures demonstrates that their terms were decided by the King and his officials in advance. Indeed, that most of the indentures were sealed on the same day indicates they were physically prepared in advance as well. The King would have known how large an army he wanted and the number and type of troops, including specialist companies, which he desired. It must be remembered that for royal armies retinue sizes were assigned by the King, although almost certainly after discussion with the captains, particularly in cases where captains contracted to recruit large retinues. Curry has identified that these discussions began during the Parliament of 1414 when the lords and knights 'invited the king to indicate the size of retinues he desired'.⁹⁴ A 'Kalendar' of intended retinues was drawn up and kept by the keeper of the Privy Seal, plus there is a small chit of paper in Henry's own hand ordering indentures to be made.⁹⁵ Discussions regarding the indentures evidently began long before they were sealed in April 1415, and we may also presume that the negotiations between captains and sub-captains also began around this time. We can only speculate, but it is possible that any last minute discussion may have taken place on Tuesday 23 April at St George's Chapel, Windsor, when the Knights of the Garter, which included both Clarence and Gloucester, gathered for the St George's day

⁹¹ *PROME*, 'Henry V: November 1414'.

⁹² Curry, *Agincourt*, pp.51-56; C. Phillpotts, 'The Fate of the Truce of Paris, 1396-1415', *JMH*, 24 (1998), 61-80.

⁹³ *Ibid*, p.63.

⁹⁴ For this, and more on this subject: Curry, *Agincourt*, p.69.

⁹⁵ E101/69/7.

service.⁹⁶ A few days previously, Clarence and other leading lords had also met at the Palace of Westminster to advise the King on his expedition.⁹⁷ One major topic of the discussions must have revolved around what the King wanted from a captain (or prospective captain) and what that individual was able and willing to provide. We should also remember that the size of a captain's retinue generally reflected his social status. It is unsurprising that the King's brothers indentured to lead the largest retinues.

The workings of the indenture system have long been understood by historians, and Curry has thoroughly detailed the system at work in 1415.⁹⁸ Consequently, the administrative goings-on between the sealing of the indentures and the muster at Southampton need not be retold at length here. Instead, we shall briefly focus on the most salient clauses of the indentures which relate to the muster, before moving to look at the contracts sealed by the dukes of Clarence and Gloucester in 1415. Regarding the 1415 indentures, the example of Sir Thomas Tunstall's, which has been translated by Curry, serves as a good example.⁹⁹ Among its terms, such as the number and type of troops the captain was obliged to recruit, wages and the length of service required, it also states that it was the responsibility of the captain to ensure that his men were 'well mounted, armed and arrayed as appropriate for their rank, to make muster on 1 July'. The inclusion of the date of muster was standard practice. The place of muster was also frequently detailed, for example Clarence's 1412 indenture stated the muster should take place at Southampton on 6 July.¹⁰⁰ The omission of this information in 1415 may indicate that Henry was undecided as to where to gather his army.¹⁰¹ Instead, captains were told he would inform them of the muster location during the month of May.¹⁰²

The other mention of the muster in the indentures relates to pay and highlights the importance of the muster. It states that the contracted service started on the day of the muster and that captains would receive the second half of their first quarter's pay when

⁹⁶ *PPC*, 2, pp.153-159; *CP*, 2, pp.538-540; G.F. Beltz, *Memorials of the Most Noble Order of the Garter*, (London, 1841), pp.399-400.

⁹⁷ Curry, *Agincourt*, p.68.

⁹⁸ Curry, *Sources*, pp.406-436; Curry, *Agincourt*, pp.63-85; Sherborne, 'Indentured Retinues'.

⁹⁹ Curry, *Sources*, pp.436-439.

¹⁰⁰ E404/27/414; *Foedera*, 8, p.745.

¹⁰¹ Curry, *Agincourt*, p.68

¹⁰² *Ibid*, p.63.

their men had been mustered, and they had therefore fulfilled the recruitment terms of their contracts. The system of payment used in 1415 has been shown clearly by Curry in her account of Mowbray's 1415 retinue.¹⁰³ It shall suffice to say here that military campaigns of this period were divided into quarters, each quarter being three months. Captains would have received the first half of their first quarter pay shortly after sealing their indentures when a warrant for issue would have been dispatched by the Chancery to the Exchequer instructing the Exchequer to release said first instalment of pay. Captains would have used this initial money to help recruit men to their retinues by giving them a small advance on their pay. The payment of soldiers was always done through the captain. He was given the money, which in turn he was obliged to pass on to the men under his command.¹⁰⁴ As the indentures stated, the captain would have subsequently received the second half of the first quarter pay once his men had been successfully mustered.

Turning to the retinues of Clarence and Gloucester, sadly we cannot focus on their indentures because they have not survived. Yet, in the absence of these documents we are fortunate to be able to learn many of the terms of their indentures from their surviving warrants for issue.¹⁰⁵ The most significant of these are the number of men they were obligated to recruit. Clarence was to recruit 240 men-at-arms, including 1 duke, 1 earl, 2 knights banneret, 14 knights bachelor, 222 esquires and 720 archers. The specificity of the number of knights suggests the possibility that it was already known, or at least envisaged, who could be recruited.¹⁰⁶ Gloucester, on the other hand, contracted to recruit 1 duke, 6 knights bachelor, 193 esquires and 600 archers. Two wage rates were given, one for a campaign to France, another to Gascony. In France a duke was to receive the standard 13s 4d a day, an earl 6s 4d, knights banneret 4s, knights bachelor 2s, men-at-arms 12d and an archer 6d. He would also be granted the standard *regard* payment of 100 marks for 30 men-at-arms for each quarter. In Gascony men-at-arms would receive 40 marks per year and archers 20. The inclusion of the Gascon wage rate may further indicate that Henry was

¹⁰³ Curry, 'A Case Study of John Mowbray', pp.153-158; Curry, 'Sir Thomas Erpingham', pp.65-75; Matthew Raven, 'Financing the Dynamics of Recruitment: King, Earls and Government in Edwardian England, 1330-1360', *Military Communities in Late Medieval England: Essays in Honour of Andrew Ayton*, ed. G.P. Baker, C.L. Lambert and D. Simpkin (Woodbridge, 2018), pp.105-125.

¹⁰⁴ In the Parliament of 1439 a Statute was passed in an attempt to regulate more fully and ensure captains passed on payment to their men: *PROME*, 'Henry IV: November 1439'.

¹⁰⁵ E404/31/155; *Foedera*, 9, p.227 (Clarence); E404/31/250 (Gloucester).

¹⁰⁶ Curry, *Agincourt*, p.69.

undecided about the destination of his army, or that he wished to conceal this information.¹⁰⁷ Indeed, the first instalment of pay some captains received, half of their first quarter, was set at the Gascon rate, although by the time they received the final instalment of the first quarter wages it was set at the French rate.¹⁰⁸ Clarence's warrant also recounts the number of horses he and his men were expected to bring. The duke was allocated 50, an earl 25, a banneret 16, a knight 6, an esquire 4 and an archer 1. Furthermore, both warrants detail the terms of the indentures relating to prisoner taking and ransoming, as well as the fact that the King would pay for outward and return shipping, as was standard practice.

The financial pressure the 1415 expedition placed upon the Crown's resources was colossal. A special series of issue rolls were begun for the campaign in an attempt to keep the Crown's complex financial dealings in order. Only one of these rolls survives.¹⁰⁹ The root of Henry's financial woes was his lack of ready cash. In the indentures he had had to promise captains six months (two quarters) wages in advance. Yet, he could not pay his captains their wages for the second quarter, even though Parliament had granted him a double lay subsidy, half of which was to be collected by 2 February 1415 and the remaining half the following year, and he had secured a huge loan from the city of London.¹¹⁰ Henry was not, however, about to abandon his campaign on account of his barren coffers. As a surety to his captains that he would pay them in due course, he used royal jewels, plate and silver as security for later payment.¹¹¹ If the King had not redeemed the items within a year and seven months, the captains were legally entitled to keep and distribute among their soldiers the surety in lieu of payment. To Clarence was pledged the Crown Henry, 'the great crown of England, and the Lancastrian crown'.¹¹² Constructed chiefly of gold, it was garnished with sapphires, rubies and pearls.¹¹³ Henry IV had likely worn the glittering crown at his coronation in 1399.¹¹⁴ Similarly, to Gloucester two purses of gold garnished with

¹⁰⁷ Curry, *Agincourt*, p.68.

¹⁰⁸ For example: Curry, 'A Case Study of John Mowbray', p.155.

¹⁰⁹ E101/45/5; Curry, *Sources*, p.411.

¹¹⁰ Curry, *Agincourt*, pp.66-67.

¹¹¹ These were often detailed in the indentures: Curry, *Sources*, pp.412-413; J. Stratford, "'Par Le Special Commandement Du Roy". Jewels and Plate Pledged for the Agincourt Expedition', *Henry V: New Interpretations*, ed. G. Dodd (Woodbridge, 2013), pp.157-170.

¹¹² *Foedera*, 9, p.284; Mortimer, *Year of Glory*, pp.211-212.

¹¹³ Nicolas, *The Battle of Agincourt*, p.15-19 (Appendix 3: 'Jewels and plate pawned for wages'), citing: BL, Add. Ms. 4600, f.504. This document forms part of the notes collected by Rymer. For more: Curry, *Sources*, p.410.

¹¹⁴ Nicolas, *The Battle of Agincourt*, p.15 (Appendix 3); *CPR, 1413-1416*, pp.350-351.

jewels each valued at £2,000 were granted as collateral for the second quarter wages.¹¹⁵ As we shall see, the priceless crown was indeed broken up and distributed, as most likely were the purses too.

The mechanics by which the dukes recruited their retinues is one of the main subjects focused on in the following case studies and chapter four. However, it is necessary to consider here briefly the issue of sub-indentures. As detailed in the introduction, to fulfil the terms of their contracts, captains of large retinues would often have entered into sub-indentures with sub-captains. Unfortunately, no sub-indentures survive for the duke of Gloucester's 1415 retinue. For Clarence's retinue we are marginally more fortunate and have one. This was sealed in May between the duke and two esquires, William Hything and Bertram Mowbournchier.¹¹⁶ Bertram Mowbournchier was clearly a member of the notable 'Monboucher' family of Northumberland. The two men jointly indented with Clarence to provide him with four mounted archers. However, it would appear that neither Hything nor Mowbournchier fulfilled the terms of their contract as neither can be identified to have served under Clarence in 1415, or indeed at any time afterwards. While no more sub-indentures survive for either the dukes of Clarence or Gloucester, a corpus of 18 survive for the earl of Dorset's retinue and one for the earl of Salisbury's.¹¹⁷ It is interesting to note that the content and wording of all the surviving 1415 sub-indentures is strikingly similar to one another, and to the Crown's indentures. They detail wages, length of service, the number of horses allowed and contain articles regarding the taking of prisoners. For example, they state that if an archer were to take a prisoner, then the duke would receive one third of the captain's third.¹¹⁸

The similarity of the sub-indentures suggests that, akin to the Crown indentures, they followed a standardised form. That they follow this form points to the conclusion that, like the other indentures, they were drawn up centrally at the Chancery and have found

¹¹⁵ PPC, 3, pp.8-9.

¹¹⁶ Sheffield City Archives, CD/410. I am grateful to Dr Gary Baker for bringing this document to my attention.

¹¹⁷ E101/69/7/488-505; C47/2/49/7 (Dorset). For a translation: Curry, *Sources*, pp.439-444; E101/69/7/508 (Salisbury).

¹¹⁸ On prisoner taking and ransoming: R. Ambühl, *Prisoners of War in the Hundred Years War: Ransom Culture in the late Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 2013); R. Ambühl, 'The French Prisoners', *The Battle of Agincourt*, ed. A. Curry and M. Mercer (2015), pp.205-216; A. King, "'Then a great misfortune befell them': The Laws of War on the Surrender and Killing of the Prisoners on the Battlefield in the Hundred Years War", *JMH*, 43 (2016), 106-117.

their way into the Exchequer. This was irrespective of the fact that they were agreements between a retinue commander and a sub-captain, and thus not the direct concern of the Exchequer because, as already observed, the overall retinue commanders were given payment and expected to pass it on to their men. Alternatively, it may be the case that sub-indentures were drawn up according to a form copied from Chancery documents. Whatever the case, many more sub-indentures were surely drawn up, yet few have survived. Indeed, few survive from the whole period generally, although there are some from the period of the Lancastrian occupation of Normandy.¹¹⁹ The low survival rate of these documents may be attributed to a number of factors. First, it is conceivable that some contracts could have been made verbally, and were thus not administered by the Exchequer. This may have been the case for the lesser sub-captains who recruited very few men. The problem with this theory is that both parties would have been legally vulnerable without a document to support them if any disputes arose.¹²⁰ Furthermore, many of the surviving sub-indentures relate to sub-captains who recruited very few men. Jaquet Selby, for instance, entered into an agreement with the earl of Dorset to serve with just two archers.¹²¹ Secondly, it may be that once the post-campaign accounts were settled the sub-indentures were discarded. This implies that those which we have today may have survived where disputes arose and thus needed to be kept. Whatever the case, like the muster rolls, we are probably fortunate that so many sub-indentures have survived.

One final point to be made in regards to the workings of the indenture system is that although the system had its problems for both the Crown and captains, it was nonetheless generally beneficial for the Crown as it transferred both the responsibility of recruitment and dividing of payment down to the individual retinue captains. The system ensured the Crown did not need to concern itself with empowering many Commissions of Array, declaring feudal summons, issuing pardons or other similar methods to raise troops in 1415.¹²² Having said this, Commissions of Array were ordered in May for local defence. Although, as Curry notes, 'it is possible that on this occasion they were used as a means of

¹¹⁹ There is a corpus of 45 sub-indentures surviving which relate to the earl of Salisbury's 1428 army: E101/71/2/826-868B.

¹²⁰ Curry, 'A Case Study of John Mowbray', pp.159-163; Goodman, 'The Military Subcontracts of Sir Hugh Hastings', pp.119-120.

¹²¹ E101/69/7/488.

¹²² On the older system of recruitment: Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses*, pp.138-194. On pardons generally: H. Lacey, *The Royal Pardon: Access to Mercy in Fourteenth-Century England* (York, 2009).

at least alerting archers in particular to the King's need for troops'.¹²³ Furthermore, the Crown did call on archers from its demesne lands in Wales, Cheshire and Lancashire.¹²⁴ Notwithstanding these exceptions, the great burden of recruiting manpower in 1415 was placed on the shoulders of the captains and sub-captains.

¹²³ Curry, *Sources*, p.422.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

Table 1.1: The Muster Rolls of the 1415 Expedition

TNA Reference	Captain(s)	Location of Muster	No. Membranes & Size (cm)	No. hands¹²⁵	Indented	Predominant Language
E101/44/30, No.2	Sir Charles Beaumont, Sir John Robessart, Sir William Granson, William Courtenay, John Lewis, John Mungrivere, Lewis Deyville, John Fastolf, Nicholas Horton, Nicholas Merbery, William Walgrave, William Huddleston, William Duckworth, John Atherton, William Longshaw, Henry Foulter, Thomas Warde, William Loe, Robert Shottesbrok, William Pope, Bartholemew Frawns, John Topcliff, Andrew Grey, Oliver Barton, John Selby, Henry Langley.	Southampton Heath	m.1, 13x35 m.2, 14.4x30 m.3, 15x17.5 m.4, 14x15.5 m.5, 4x15 m.6, 6.5x28 m.7, 9.5x 32 m.8 & 10, 10.5x12.5 m.9, NA ¹²⁶ m.11, 15.5x32 m.12, 10.5x15 m.13, 9x10.5 m.14, 7x6.5 m.15, 4x4 m.16, 7.5x9.5 m.17, 8.5x7.5 m.18, 6.5x3 m.19, 6.5x6 m.20, 5.5x4 m.21, 8.5x9.5 m.22, 9.5x8.5	Total: 16 m.1,2,3 – same m.4 – unique m.5,6 – same (two hands on 5) m.7 – unique m.8 & 10 – unique m.9 – NA m.11,12,13,14,15,16, 17,18,19 – all unique m.20 – same as 13 m.21,22 – unique	m.1, left edge m.2, left edge m.3, top edge m.7, top edge m.8 & 10, top edge m.16, top edge m.21, top edge	Anglo-Norman
E101/44/30, No.3	Sir Thomas Erpingham, Sir John Scudamour, Sir William Legh, John Wene, John Waterton,	Southampton Heath	m.1, 5.5x15 m.2, 7.5x26.5 m.3, 16.5x48	Total: 4 All unique	m.1, none m.2, none m.3, left edge	Anglo-Norman

¹²⁵ The total number of hands detailed should be presumed a minimum. In instances where there is doubt as to the uniqueness of a hand, I have erred on the side of caution.

¹²⁶ This membrane is now missing, although the names it listed are detailed on the Medieval Soldier Database. This further underscores the value of such digitisation and transcription projects which capture information which is always at risk of being lost.

			m.4, 21x17		m.4, top edge	
E101/44/30, No.4	Nicholas Alderwich, John Puryan, John Holand, William Montenay, William Porter, Sir William Phillip		m.1, 11x15 m.2, 11x15 m.3 9x15 m.4, 10x15 m.5 23x28 m.6, 8.5x48	Total: 4 m.1,2 – same m.3,4 – unique m.5, same as 1 m.6 – unique	m.1, left edge m.2, left edge m.3, top edge m.4, top edge m.5, none m.6, right edge	Anglo-Norman
E101/45/2	Edward Duke of York (1 st)	Southampton Heath		Total: 2 Majority in one hand, annotations and insertions in different hand	None	Anglo-Norman
E101/45/4	Thomas, Duke of Clarence	St Catherine's Hill, New Forest	m.1, 14.5x62 m.2, 15x71 m.3, 14.5x54 m.4, 14.5x73 m.5, 14.5x44 m.6, 15x44 m.7, 15x64 m.8, 15x62 m.9, 15.5x35 m.10, 15x25.5 m.11, 15.5x70 m.12, 14.5x29	Total: 7 Majority in one hand, annotations and insertions in different hands	m.1, top edge	Anglo-Norman
E101/45/13	Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester	Michelmersham, near Romsey	m. 1, 17x62 m. 2, 17x67 m. 3, 17x63 m. 4, 17x61	Total: 4 Majority in one hand, annotations and insertions in different hands	m.1, top edge	Anglo-Norman
E101/45/17 ¹²⁷	William Eure, plus many with no	Hampshire	m.1, 9x65	Total:2	None	Latin

¹²⁷ It is possible this muster roll relates to another campaign. However, I have not been able to discount it and thus have included it here. Little commentary is given to this roll.

	captain detailed.		m.2, 9x71 m.3, 9x70 m.4, 10x75 m.5, 9.5x10 m.6, 8x40	m.1,2,3,4 – same m.5,6 – same		
E101/45/18	John, Earl of Huntingdon, William Lord Botreaux, Sir John Grey of Ruthin (Jnr), Sir Roland Lenthale, Sir Robert Chalons and Royal Household contingent	Swanwick Heath	m.1, 15x10 m.2, 16x60 m.3, 15-13x50 m.4, 13x50 m.5, 8x16 m.6, 17x50 m.7, 17x40 m.8, 7x19 m.9, 13x70	Total: 6 m.1,2,3 - same hand. m.2, annotations in additional unique hand. m.4 - unique m.5 - unique m.6,7 - same as 4. m.8,9 – same as 5	None	Anglo-Norman
E101/45/19	Edward Duke of York (2nd)	Harfleur	m.1, 13x80 m.2, 13x74 m.3, 13x60 m.4, 15x50 m.5, 13.5x21 m.6, 13.5x50	Total: 4-5 Majority in one hand, annotations and insertions in different hands	None	Anglo-Norman
E101/46/7	Robert Laurence		m.1, 8x40	1	None	Latin
E101/46/20	Welsh Archers	South Wales: Carmarthen, Brecon and Cydweli	No.2: m.1, 18x47 m.2, 18x51 No.3: m.1, 22x52 No.4: m.1, 13.5x23	Total: 4 No.2: m.1,2 - Majority in one hand, annotations and insertions in different hand No.3: m.1 - unique No.4 m.1 - unique	No.2: m.1, left edge m.2, left edge No.3: m.1, left edge No.4: m.1, left edge	Latin

During the Muster

Submission of Chits

Having sealed their indentures on 29 April, captains had just over two months to recruit men, put their affairs in order, make their wills, and journey to Southampton, the muster location Henry finally decided upon. Henry's intended muster date of 1 July came and went as men from all across the country slowly converged at their preassigned muster locations around Southampton.¹²⁸ Many of those closely associated with the King, such as the duke of York, Sir Thomas Erpingham and Sir Charles Beaumont, were mustered on Southampton Heath (now the Common). At Swanwick Heath gathered the earl of Huntingdon, along with a large contingent of the royal household. Nearby at Michelmersh, close to Romsey, was the duke of Gloucester's retinue, while further away at St Catherine's Hill in the New Forest Clarence's force assembled. We learn of the locations of these musters from the muster rolls themselves. At the top of some muster rolls there is a short preamble in either Anglo-Norman or Latin. The information in the preamble varies between each document, for example Gloucester's details the date of the muster, while Clarence's does not. In addition to the musters taken around Southampton, three musters of Welsh archers from the Crown's demesne lands in south Wales were conducted at Carmarthen, Brecon and Cydweli.¹²⁹

In March 1417 Henry decreed that the 1415 campaign commenced on Monday 8 July and that men could claim wages from this date.¹³⁰ We may presume, therefore, that the musters took place around this date as well. The first definitive muster date we know is 13 July, when a number of retinues were mustered on Southampton Heath under the direction of John Rothenale, the Controller of the Royal Household, and John Strange, Clerk of the King's Works at Westminster Abbey, the Tower of London and elsewhere.¹³¹ Henry V had appointed Strange to this position shortly into his reign on 7 April 1413. Strange was

¹²⁸ Curry, *Agincourt*, pp.80-83; Curry, *Sources*, pp.421-422.

¹²⁹ On this document and the role of Welsh soldiers: A. Curry and A. Chapman, 'The Battle of Agincourt and its Breconshire Connections', *The Journal of the Brycheiniog Society*, 47 (2016), 19-40; A. Chapman, 'The King's Welshmen: Welsh Involvement in the Expeditionary Army of 1415', *JMMH*, 9 (2011), 41-64; A. Chapman, *Welsh Soldiers in the Later Middle Ages, 1282-1422* (Woodbridge, 2015).

¹³⁰ Curry, *Sources*, pp.426-427, 448-449.

¹³¹ On Strange: *CPR, 1413-1416*, pp.11-12, 59, 178, 242, 346; *CPR, 1408-1413*, p.50. He had ties to Norfolk, having previously been escheator in 1409 and holding a prebend of the church of Flixton.

involved in the mustering of numerous 1415 retinues, although he cannot be identified to have had any previous experience of mustering, nor can he be identified to have been instructed to oversee any more during his time as Clerk of the King's works.¹³² On Tuesday 16 July he was at Michelmersh, where he oversaw the muster of Gloucester's retinue. This may have taken some time because a whole four days passed before he was instructed by the King to go with Sir Richard Redeman and muster Clarence's retinue.¹³³ Sir Richard and Clarence had met before when Sir Richard had mustered Clarence's men in 1404.¹³⁴ Indeed, Sir Richard was the step-father of Brian Stapleton, one of Clarence's sub-captains in 1415.¹³⁵ Sir Richard himself did not participate in the campaign, but was elected Speaker in the Parliament which met in November 1415, while Henry was overseas.

The dates of the musters indicate that those appointed to conduct the muster remained at each location for a number of days. This immediately highlights the fact that the muster was not a rapid or straightforward process. Reconstructing the mechanics of the mustering process is similarly not straightforward, although the process was undoubtedly well understood by the military veterans who gathered around Southampton in 1415. To begin, it is not clear what role the appointed musterers like Sir Richard Redeman, John Strange and others actually performed. As we will see in the course of this chapter, for numerous reasons, such as the multiplicity of hands present on the rolls, we can be certain that the appointed musterers did not write the names on the rolls themselves. They most likely supervised Exchequer clerks - because the muster rolls were Exchequer documents - in compiling and preparing the rolls and then, at the moment of the muster, either pointed the names themselves, or continued to supervise the clerks.

It is possible that the first stage of the muster would have entailed the submission of retinue lists, or 'chits', to those assigned as the musterers. The muster documents for the army which Henry IV led to Scotland in 1400, which have been studied by David Simpkin, illuminate this potential first stage.¹³⁶ Owing to the short duration for which the 1400 army

¹³² He was replaced by July 1421: *CRP*, 1416-1422, p.401.

¹³³ *Foedera*, 9, p.287; *CPR*, 1413-1416, p.407.

¹³⁴ *CPR*, 1401-1405, p.475.

¹³⁵ C. Rawcliffe, 'Redmayne, Sir Richard', *HoP*, <www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1386-1421/member/redmayne-sir-richard-1426>, [Accessed 9 July 2018].

¹³⁶ D. Simpkin, 'New Muster-Related Sources for Henry IV's Army in Scotland, August 1400', *Archives*, 35 (2010), 1-18; Curry, Bell, King and Simpkin, 'New Regime, New Army?', p.1384.

was in existence, no 'ordinary' muster roll was created. Instead, there is a corpus of 68 individual chits. As Simpkin noted, these chits were most likely drawn up 'by a variety of clerks on behalf of, or perhaps even by, the retinue leaders themselves'. These chits are mainly of parchment and are of various sizes. Many still have the wax seals of the captains attached, as well as the constable and marshal because in the absence of a muster roll the chits were used to issue wages. However, the intended use of these chits could have been for the compilation of a muster roll. A similar document exists for the 1388 naval campaign which Arundel commanded. Bell noted that this document, 'appears to be a collection of retinue lists in different hands and on different materials ... suggesting that they were not compiled in one go but have been prepared separately, perhaps in advance, being submitted by captains as lists of their men'.¹³⁷ The men who conducted Arundel's muster may have used these lists to compile the official muster roll for the campaign.

The first stage of the muster of the 1415 army may, therefore, have involved the musterers receiving from the captains, or sub-captains in the case of large retinues, chits listing the men of their companies. The musterers would then have transcribed the names from these chits to larger parchment membranes. At the point of mustering the men, these 'composite' membranes would have been used by the clerks to point the names of those who were present.¹³⁸ These are the membranes which make up the muster rolls we see today. The problem with applying this theory to the 1415 muster is that no such chits survive. There are, admittedly, a collection of small chits of parchment contained within an original leather Chancery bag (more on this bag and its contents later) which could conceivably have been such chits. Yet, there are three main reasons to doubt this identification



Fig.1: E101/44/30, no.2, m.19

(fig.1&2). First, none have wax seals attached, or show any evidence of ever having had such seals attached. Secondly, a number of them are indented down their left edges. There

¹³⁷ Bell suggests that the muster roll E101/40/33 is compiled from E101/40/34: Bell, *War and the Soldier*, p.53.

¹³⁸ I borrow the word 'composite' from the Medieval Soldier Team: *Soldier in later Medieval England*, p.9.

seems no particular reason why the chits submitted to the musterers would have needed to be indented, especially if they were only needed for the compilation of 'official' membranes. Alternatively, it is conceivable that some captains may have desired a copy, akin to a receipt, to show they had submitted their chit. Certainly such a method of duplication was frequently practiced by the Exchequer elsewhere, for instance consider the indentures and warrants for issue. A third and stronger reason to doubt that the surviving 1415 chits served to inform the creation of 'official' membranes is that many show pointing. This demonstrates that they were used to muster the men, and not to compile the membranes of the muster rolls. It must be noted that, conversely, the chits from 1400 generally show no signs of pointing or indenting. It seems, therefore, that if chits were submitted by captains to the musterers, or their clerks, none have survived. This is unsurprising as they would not have been needed after the transcription of names to the 'official' membranes.

Whether or not chits were submitted in advance of the muster, the musterers must have at least been told the names of those to expect from each captain before the muster either by the captain themselves, or someone deputised to act on their behalf. If the musterers had not been given the names of those to expect from each retinue and sub-retinue then they would only have been able to list and point the names of those who were present at the muster. That some names are unpointed on the muster rolls shows that the clerks knew the names of men even though they were absent from the muster. Evidently captains and sub-captains most often knew the names of those they expected to serve under them.¹³⁹ It seems highly likely this information was written down for their own personal reference, as it seems unlikely a captain, especially one of a large retinue, would have been able to remember the names of all the men he had recruited and expected to see arrive at the muster. This observation clearly has ramifications for our understanding of the military recruitment system. For most captains to know the names of those they expected to serve under them highlights that they most likely did not simply arrive at the muster location and recruit men. Rather, they recruited men beforehand and took a record of their names. This conclusion is supported by the fact that captains would also often submit to the Chancery prior to a campaign a list of men serving in their retinue whom required

¹³⁹ As is discussed later in this chapter, there is some evidence that certain soldiers arrived at Southampton seeking a captain to serve under and were sometimes successful.

protections.¹⁴⁰ These lists informed the issuing of letters of protections and often appear on protection receipts in Chancery enrolments. That the captains knew the names of the men they expected to serve under them, they must, correspondingly, also have known whether they had managed to meet the terms of their indentures, or sub-indentures. Ultimately, based on the corpus of surviving muster roll documents, it is unclear whether captains submitted chits before the muster. What is becoming clear, however, and will become clearer during the course of this chapter, is that many of the 1415 muster




Fig.2: E101/44/30, no.2, m.22

rolls we see today in The National Archives demonstrate signs that they are 'composite' documents which have been compiled from membranes which were prepared in advance of the muster.

Layout and Format

One aspect of the 1415 muster rolls which demonstrates that they were prepared in advance is their layout and format. The duke of Clarence's roll forms a suitable place to start. It is made up of 12 parchment membranes, most of which are roughly 14cm wide and of various lengths ranging from 25cm to 71cm. All the membranes are neatly stitched together end-to-end, one after the other, to form a continuous roll. The first three membranes of Clarence's roll lists only the men-at-arms. Clarence himself is listed first, followed by his step-son Henry Beaufort, earl of Somerset. Following Somerset is Lord Humphrey FitzWalter who is noted, along with Sir John Lumley, who is the next individual on the roll, as being of banneret status. Somerset and FitzWalter did not bring retinues of their own, on account of their youth. The first sub-retinue listed is that of Sir John Lumley. His name is written at the top of a list of 20 men-at-arms. The clerk who compiled the roll has made it easy to identify the sub-retinues as he has drawn a large bracket around each. Following Lumley is Sir John Dabridgecourt and the 20 men-at-arms under his command. There then follow, in an identical fashion, the retinues of another nine knights. The first

¹⁴⁰ Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses*, pp.160-163.

esquire captain on the roll is Thomas Beaumont who is noted, on membrane two, as being captain of five men-at-arms. Following Beaumont are detailed the men-at-arms of 50 esquire-captained sub-retinues of various sizes.

The archers of Clarence's retinue are detailed from membrane four onwards. At the top of the membrane there is a heading noting 'La retenu des archerys de mons de Clarence'. The first group of 152 archers formed the duke's personal company and are noted as being under his direct captaincy. The archers are then detailed for each of the duke's sub-captains. The format in which the clerk has detailed the archers is simple. He has listed their names and noted the captain's surname to the left of the list. The second group of archers is noted as under Sir John Lumley.

The clerk has not placed a bracket around Clarence and Sir John's archers, although he has for all subsequent companies. The archers which the clerk has detailed are listed to the end of the twelfth membrane, from where they are then noted on the dorse (reverse). As a result of this, from Thomas Chamber's archers onwards the names are recorded on the dorse of membranes 12 back to 10. That the men-at-arms and archers of Clarence's personal company and his sub-companies are listed separately is unusual. On all the other 1415




Fig.3: E101/45/13, m.2

muster rolls the archers of a company or sub-company are listed either directly after the men-at-arms or alongside. By separating them, it would seem that Clarence's men-at-arms and archers were mustered separately, while for all other retinues both troop types were mustered together. As we explore other aspects of Clarence's muster roll in this chapter, further evidence will be given to support this theory.

Moving to Gloucester's muster roll, it is made up of four membranes, all of which are of identical width at 17cm and similar length at around 65cm each. They are sewn together

end-to-end to form one continuous roll. The layout of the roll enables the easy identification of the sub-retinue companies, as the clerk has similarly used brackets (fig.3). The men-at-arms and archers for each company are detailed side-by-side and bracketed. The first membrane features a short preamble which, although faded, informs us of the location of the muster, plus the fact that John Strange oversaw it. Like for Clarence's retinue, the sub-retinues are again detailed in hierarchical order. The sub-retinues captained by Gloucester's six knights are listed first, followed by the 50 esquire-captained companies. The duke's personal company of 126 archers is noted at the end of the roll. It is also important to note that like Clarence's roll, the dorse of Gloucester's has been used from membrane four back to two. While using the dorse of membranes is present on certain muster rolls, these are the only two muster rolls from the 1415 expedition to utilise it. This was presumably done in order to save on costly parchment.

Another muster roll with an interesting layout is that relating to the duke of York's retinue.¹⁴¹ The duke's force actually has a second muster roll which was compiled after the siege of Harfleur, and is commented on later in this chapter. His first muster roll has a damaged first membrane making the names detailed impossible to read. It is made up of four membranes, and details that the retinue was comprised of 46 sub-retinue companies, plus the duke's personal household and some bargemen and dykers (ditchers). The clerk who compiled




Fig.4: E101/45/2, m.3

the roll has listed the name of the sub-captain first, followed by his men-at-arms. He has then placed a bracket to the right of them grouping them. To the right of this word the clerk has also noted how many men-at-arms he has detailed. The men-at-arms are then followed by the archers where he has repeated the same format (fig.4). At the end of membrane four, before detailing the duke's personal household, the clerk provides a total of how many

¹⁴¹ Baker, 'To Agincourt and Beyond!', pp.42-47.

men he has detailed on the roll. This is an unusual practice, which is not present on any of the other 1415 muster rolls, the only exception being York's second roll.

Moving away from the ducal rolls, the muster roll associated with the retinues which gathered at Swanwick Heath, near Southampton, provides further evidence of a lack of uniformity in format and layout. The first membrane contains only the preamble which states that the muster was taken by the esquires Hugh Mortimer and Robert Castle.¹⁴² The




Fig.5: E101/45/18, m.9

muster roll details the retinues of John, earl of Huntingdon, William Lord Botreaux, Sir John Grey of Ruthin (Jnr), Sir Roland Lenthale and Sir Robert Chalons, plus 149 *valets* and office holders of the King's household (fig.5). In total, 771 names are detailed on the roll and it is made up of nine membranes of various width and length. The men of Huntingdon's force are detailed on membrane two. The earl himself is noted first, and then his 22 men-at-arms. Following on from the final man-at-arms is a list of 75 archers. William Botreaux's retinue is next on the muster roll. Neither of these two lists detail any sub-companies, suggesting they fulfilled the terms of their

indentures without needing assistance from sub-contractors. Huntingdon indentured to recruit 20 men-at-arms, himself included, and 60 archers.¹⁴³ His muster details 23 men-at-arms and 75 archers, suggesting he went notably beyond the terms of his indenture. Similarly Botreaux indentured to recruit 19 men-at-arms and 40 archers, but the muster roll details 25 men-at-arms and 60 archers. His post-campaign accounts also tell us that he was in fact excused 5 men-at-arms and 4 archers. This discrepancy underscores the importance of using the muster rolls in conjunction with other surviving sources, as well as

¹⁴² Mortimer had been a King's esquire for some years and had undertaken various activities during this time, for example he was on a Commission of Oyer and Terminer in November 1414: *CPR, 1413-1416*, pp.89, 292.

¹⁴³ The terms of their indentures have been gained from, Curry, Spencer and Chapman, 'The English Army in 1415', <www.medievalsoldier.org/about/agincourt-600/the-english-army-in-1415/english-army-table/>, [Accessed 9 July 2018]. It should also be noted that the muster roll figures given here do not take into account the annotations on the roll, such as non-pointed names and deletions.

the ever-present need to be aware that much must have occurred which the surviving sources are simply too incomplete to reveal to us.

The following retinue, which is detailed on membrane four and lists the men under Sir John Grey of Ruthin, does note sub-companies. The 13 men-at-arms who served directly under Sir John are listed on the left of the membrane and bracketed, with the troop type indicator *launce* written to the left of the bracket. Directly after are listed 53 archers, similarly bracketed and noted as such. In another column to the right are noted the sub-retinues. These are also bracketed and troop type indicators inserted to the left. The use of two columns is repeated for the retinue captained by Sir Robert Chalons, which is detailed on membranes six and seven and was also comprised of sub-companies. The listing of names in columns has also been employed for Sir Roland Lenthale's company on membrane five, and the members of the royal household noted on membrane nine (fig.5). This further suggests that there was no standardisation in terms of how the clerks compiled the membranes in preparation for the muster.

The other 1415 muster rolls similarly demonstrate a lack of uniformity. The muster rolls contained in E101/44/30, which is an original leather Chancery bag, highlights this. In order to keep the many documents associated with a captain's account together, Exchequer officials stored them in leather bags which would have hung from pegs in the Exchequer. Some of these leather bags still exist, of which E101/44/30 is one example.¹⁴⁴ A note written on it in Latin notes that it contained 'musters of the time of King Henry the Fifth'.¹⁴⁵ Today, most likely as a result of documents being added and removed over the years, it contains a collection of documents, including three muster rolls, one retinue roll and two sick lists.¹⁴⁶ As table one shows, these muster rolls are comprised of many membranes of various sizes. We will learn more about these muster rolls and their numerous membranes as we proceed in our investigation. For the moment we may observe that the membranes demonstrate significant differences in terms of layout and format. Sir Thomas Erpingham's retinue is detailed on membrane three of E101/44/30, no.3. It begins with a preamble which informs

¹⁴⁴ Another example would be the bag relating to the Norfolk knight Sir Simon Felbrigg, an image of which is accessible from the TNA website: E101/45/3 <www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/agincourt/preparing-to-fight-raising-soldiers-and-supplies/pouch-of-sir-simon-felbrigg/>, [Accessed 12 June 2018].

¹⁴⁵ Curry, *Sources*, p.428.

¹⁴⁶ Retinue rolls are detailed later in this chapter, while the sick lists are explored in detail in chapter four.

us of the location of the muster and that it was overseen by Rothenale and Strange. Erpingham is listed first, followed by two knights and 17 esquires. The esquires have a bracket placed around them to the right and are noted as such. Following on is a list of his archers, who are not bracketed but are noted as archers at the beginning of the list. In contrast, on membrane two the archers of Sir John Scudamour's retinue have no troop type identifier, whereas his men-at-arms are noted, in abbreviated form, as *launces*.

Further examples of differences in layout and format could be given, although it is already clear that the layout and format of the 1415 muster rolls clearly varied between each roll. There was no standardised manner in which the clerks prepared the composite membranes they used to conduct the muster. The only consistent trait between the format and layout of the 1415 muster rolls is the hierarchical order of names. This had been a feature since the very earliest use of muster rolls, so should cause no surprise. It would only be remarkable if they were not listed in such an order. One further feature which appears to have been frequently employed when compiling the rolls was for the clerks to list the archers of a retinue or sub-retinue either directly after the men-at-arms or alongside. However, Clarence's roll demonstrates that even this method was not always practised as his men-at-arms and archers are detailed apart from each other on separate sections of the muster roll. Another area where there appears to have been little uniformity or standardisation was in relation to bracketing, which was employed on some rolls, but not on others. Similarly, troop type identifiers have been inserted on many rolls, such as York, Erpingham and Huntingdon's, but not on Gloucester's. Indeed, the terminology used on the rolls further demonstrates a lack of standardisation.




Fig.6: E101/44/30, no.2, m.7.

Terminology

The Medieval Soldier Team identified in their longitudinal study that the terminology used on the muster rolls was highly varied.¹⁴⁷ In an article on the issue of the languages used in the military profession in this period, they observed that during the fifteenth-century the languages used on the muster rolls changed from predominantly Latin to almost evenly Latin and Anglo-Norman for the period 1410-1419.¹⁴⁸ However, as table 1.2 shows, the most common language used on the 1415 muster rolls was Anglo-Norman. Names were sometimes listed in their Latin form, such as on Sir Thomas Erpingham's muster, although in this case the preamble and additional annotations were all made in Anglo-Norman. Indeed, preambles and titles were most commonly written in Anglo-Norman on the 1415 muster rolls, for example the title at the head of Clarence's archers reads, 'La retenu des archerys de mons de Clarence'.

Remaining with Clarence's retinue, two troop type identifiers are noted. The men-at-arms are noted as 'gens darmes' and the archers as 'archerys'. In fact, almost all the 1415 muster rolls display some form of troop type indicators. The clerk who compiled the membrane listing John Fastolf's retinue similarly employed the Anglo-Norman term 'gentz darmes' (fig.6). More commonly men-at-arms are noted as 'esquyers' or a derivation of this word.¹⁴⁹ This is the case, for example, for Sir Thomas Erpingham's retinue, plus those captained by Huntingdon, Botreaux and Robessart. Another Anglo-Norman term frequently employed to label the men-at-arms was the word *launce(s)*. This term became more specific in France as Philippe Contamine noted 'each lance normally consisted of three mounted men-at-arms properly so-called, a fighting auxiliary called a *coutilier*, and a *page*'.¹⁵⁰ In the English context, as the Medieval Soldier Team identified, it seems to have been simply used to identify an individual man-at-arms.¹⁵¹ An example of this word being employed in 1415 would be membrane four of the muster roll which was made at Swanwick Heath and details

¹⁴⁷ *Soldier in Later Medieval England*, pp.16, 100-108, 144-152.

¹⁴⁸ A. Curry, A.R. Bell, D. Simpkin, and A. Chapman, 'Languages in the Military Profession in Later Medieval England', *The Anglo-Norman Language and its Contexts*, ed. R. Ingham (Woodbridge, 2010), pp.74-93 (p.79).

¹⁴⁹ For an account of this title, and the changing status of those who bore it within the context of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries: P.R. Coss, 'The Formation of the English Gentry', *Past and Present*, 147 (1995), 38-64; M. Keen, *Origins of the English Gentleman: Heraldry, Chivalry and Gentility in Medieval England, c.1300-c.1500* (Stroud, 2002), pp.71-87 (The Rise of the Esquires).

¹⁵⁰ P. Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, trans. M. Jones (Oxford, 1984), p.127.

¹⁵¹ For a further discussion of this term: *Soldier in Later Medieval England*, pp.101-103.

the retinue of Sir John Grey. Similarly, this identifier has been employed on both the duke of York's rolls. The fact that Latin has been used predominantly only on the muster rolls relating to the Welsh archers and Sir William Eure is of note. It may be that Latin was used more frequently in the administration of the principality. Here the men-at-arms are identified as esquires in the abbreviated style of its Latin form, *armiger*. Nicholas Merbery is likewise noted as *armiger*, although his archers are noted in French as *valets*. Overall, the men-at-arms of Henry's 1415 expedition are predominantly noted on the muster rolls in a variety of Anglo-Norman identifiers.

Table 1.2: The Language of the 1415 Muster Rolls

	Captain(s)	Predominant Language	Troop type identifiers	Annotations
E101/44/30, No.2	Sir Charles Beaumont, Sir John Robessart, Sir William Granson, et al.	Anglo-Norman	Anglo-Norman	Anglo-Norman
E101/44/30, No.3	Sir Thomas Erpingham, Sir John Scudamour, Sir William Legh, et al.	Anglo-Norman	Anglo-Norman	Anglo-Norman
E101/44/30, No.4	Nicholas Alderwich, John Puryan, et al.	Anglo-Norman	Anglo-Norman	Anglo-Norman
E101/45/2	Edward Duke of York (1 st)	Anglo-Norman	Anglo-Norman and Latin	Anglo-Norman
E101/45/4	Thomas, Duke of Clarence	Anglo-Norman	Anglo-Norman	Anglo-Norman and Latin
E101/45/13	Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester	Anglo-Norman	NA	Anglo-Norman
E101/45/17	William Eure, plus many with no captain stated	Latin	Latin	Latin
E101/45/18	John, Earl of Huntingdon, et al.	Anglo-Norman	Anglo-Norman	Anglo-Norman
E101/45/19	Edward Duke of York (2 nd)	Anglo-Norman	Anglo-Norman and Latin	Anglo-Norman and Latin
E101/46/7	Robert Laurence	Latin ¹⁵²	NA	Latin
E101/46/20	Welsh Archers	Latin	Latin	Latin

¹⁵² Although names detailed in Anglo-Norman form.

The labelling of archers is likewise predominantly in Anglo-Norman. Most commonly they are noted as *valets*, or an abbreviated style of this word, as Fastolf's retinue highlights (fig.6). Sometimes, as on Clarence's muster roll, the archers are simply noted as 'archerys', or some near derivation. Both the duke of York's rolls are examples of this (fig.4), as is also the membrane detailing the retinue captured by Nicholas Norton (fig.7). In some instances the word *sagittarius*, a more specific




Fig. 7: E101/44/30, no.2, m.10

Latin term for an archer, has been employed. An example of this would be the 50 Lancashire archers who served under Robert Laurence. Although examples of Latin can be found, the conclusion that must be reached is that Anglo-Norman is the most common language on the 1415 muster rolls. This conclusion suggests that there was a significant spike in the use of Anglo-Norman within the military sphere, at least in relation to mustering, in 1415. There does not appear any obvious reason why this would be the case. Latin was the language of the Exchequer, while Anglo-Norman was the language of the Chancery.¹⁵³ The muster rolls were Exchequer documents, so the predominance of Anglo-Norman is surprising. One explanation, which is explored in the summary of this section in more detail, is that some of the membranes, especially those relating to the retinues of dukes, earls and leading knights, could have been written by their own clerks under the supervision of the appointed musterers. While any clerk worth his salt would have known Latin, they may have used Anglo-Norman for the benefit of their captains who may not have been so knowledgeable of Latin. It must be remembered that not many captains and sub-captains were leading members of the aristocracy who had benefitted from good language education. We will return to the issue of language and the authorship of the membranes in the conclusion to this chapter.

¹⁵³ Curry, et al, 'Languages in the Military Profession', p.80.

Membrane Crossover

One key issue which provides significant insight into how the muster was actually undertaken and the composite rolls were formed relates to retinues or sub-retinues being listed across membranes. To begin with Clarence's retinue again, it serves primarily as an example where companies do not cross membranes. There are 61 sub-companies in total. However, in only two instances on the whole muster roll are any of these companies




Fig. 8: E101/45/4, m.7.

detailed across membranes. The archers under the esquire Thomas Beaumont are listed across the end of membrane 10 to the very beginning of membrane 11, while the archers under John Bayhous are listed across membranes 11.d to 10.d. These two are in the minority. In most cases the clerk appears to have made a determined effort to keep each company, or in some cases a small group of companies, confined to one membrane. On membrane six, for example, the last two names of Sir John Lumley's archers have been squeezed on to the membrane (fig.8). The same is evident for Sir John Dabridgecourt's archers on membrane seven where the clerk began an adjacent column (fig.8).

Likewise on membrane nine, a small group of archers in Sir John Godard's retinue have been listed to the right of the main list and connected to it via a line. At the end of the same membrane the names of the final archers under Sir William Bowet have been crammed on. The lack of membrane crossover implies that the men-at-arms of a company were mustered as a group as they are confined to one particular membrane, and that at a later stage in the muster the archers of the company were also mustered as a group as they are confined to another particular membrane. There is also evidence that small sub-retinues were mustered together as they are detailed together on a membrane, for example membrane 12.d lists the archers of 8 sub-companies.

A number of the other 1415 muster rolls similarly demonstrate a lack of membrane crossover. On the muster roll which was created at Swanwick Heath, for example, no two

retinues are listed on the same membrane. This supports the theory that each membrane was drawn up in advance by the clerks. Furthermore, it suggests that each retinue was mustered individually, and that the muster roll we see today is actually a collection of retinue-specific musters. The muster rolls contained within the original leather bag, E101/44/30, strongly suggest that this theory can be applied to other muster rolls as well. On all three of the muster rolls contained within this bag, no retinues are detailed across membranes. Clearly some of the composite rolls we see today are formed of a collection of retinue-specific musters. How and why the individual membranes were joined into rolls is considered later in this chapter.

Remaining with the issue of membrane crossover and retinues being mustered individually, we may turn our attention to the muster of the men-at-arms and archers Robert Laurence led from Lancashire. On account of the county's special relationship with the Crown, it was required to provide the King with 500 archers in 1415.¹⁵⁴ These 500 were recruited in groups of 50, and it was one of these groups which Laurence led to muster and is detailed on E101/46/7. It is possible this list may once have been part of a larger roll or collections of documents, although there are no signs of stitching at either the top or bottom of the membrane. Alternatively, it is possible that this is in fact a retinue roll which




Fig.9: E101/45/13, m.2-3.

has become separated from Laurence's post-campaign accounts. However, there are no annotations to be found on the roll, such as notes on deaths or replacements, so it is more probably a muster roll. Another muster roll which relates to archers supplied from the Crown's demesne lands is E101/46/20, which records the musters of Welsh archers at Carmarthen, Brecon and Cydweli. Adam Chapman and Curry have explored the various documents in this roll, which relate to their payment and length of service, among other

¹⁵⁴ *Soldier in Later Medieval England*, p.422

issues.¹⁵⁵ Each of the retinues was mustered separate from one another and there is no evidence of membrane crossover between them.

There is, however, evidence of notable membrane crossover on two of the 1415 muster rolls, specifically those relating to Gloucester and York. Taking Gloucester's first, the archers in the sub-retinue captained by William Trussel begin on membrane two and continue over onto membrane three (fig.9). Similarly, Sir Thomas Clinton's sub-retinue is detailed from membrane one onto two. In total, half of the membranes which make up Gloucester's muster roll demonstrate membrane crossover. Similarly, on York's first muster roll, John Pelham's sub-company, for example, is detailed across membrane two and three, while Robert Browne's sub-retinue begins on membrane three and ends on number four. The clerks who prepared the membranes for the retinues captained by Gloucester and York appear not to have confined certain companies, or groups of small companies, to certain membranes. This implies that unlike the previous examples, these retinues were mustered as complete entities, and that individual companies were not mustered separately.

Blank Spaces

One particularly interesting feature on both Clarence and Gloucester's muster rolls is that in certain companies space for additional names has been left blank. Under Gloucester's sub-captain Thomas Burgh, for example, blank spaces are left for three further men-at-arms and eight archers (fig.10). In total, including Burgh's company, on the whole of Gloucester's muster roll four spaces are empty of men-at-arms and 23 of archers. In the case of Burgh, the blank spaces are at the bottom of the lists detailing the men-at-




Fig.10: E101/45/13, m.2.

¹⁵⁵ Curry and Chapman, 'The Battle of Agincourt and its Breconshire Connections', pp.19-40; Chapman, 'The King's Welshmen', pp.41-64.

A second issue with the blank spaces is in regards to their locations. Blank spaces at the end of a list of men implies that the clerks listed the names they had and left blank spaces up to the amount of men they expected to see when they conducted the muster. The presence of blank spaces in the middle of a list of men, as there is in both the personal companies of Clarence and Gloucester, is more intriguing. It may be that the clerks simply copied the chits given to them (if they had been given them), and left blank spaces as they saw them on the chits. Otherwise, if they were informed orally of the names of those to expect, they left blank spaces where instructed to by the person telling them the names. Admittedly this does not explain why there are blank spaces at these locations in the first place. Alternatively, it may have been at the discretion of the clerks where to leave blank spaces and they chose these locations by their own volition, for no particular reason. There appears to be no logical reason why blank spaces have been left in the middle of these lists of names, and no satisfactory answer can be gleaned from the surviving rolls.

Pointing of Names

The most important stage of the mustering process would have been the actual mustering of the men. Again, there are no contemporary descriptions of how this took place, but one way in which it could have been conducted would have been for the men assigned to oversee the musters to inform the men of a retinue, sub-retinue, or group of sub-retinues, that they were ready to conduct the muster. The men of these companies would then have presented themselves to the musterers and their clerks. Using their prepared membranes, those conducting the muster would have placed a point next to the names of those men who presented themselves – having presumably also checked the readiness of their equipment – and left blank those men who did not show up. The rolls of the dukes of Clarence, Gloucester and York are all examples of this. Most men are pointed, although some are not, such as the archers William Wodde and Thomas Moles, who were meant to serve under Clarence's sub-captain Sir John Godard.

In the majority of cases the men who conducted the musters of the 1415 army followed this method. The clerks who undertook the muster at Swanwick Heath, however, utilised a variety of different pointing methods. The clerk who created the first three

membranes of the roll employed the most unique method. These membranes detail the preamble, and the retinues captained by the earl of Huntingdon and William, lord Botreaux. Instead of pointing each man individually, the clerk has only pointed the name of the captain. None of the men detailed after the captain are pointed. The following membrane, number five, although written in a different hand to membranes one, two and three, shows a similar method of pointing. Only the captain Sir Roland Lenthale and the first archer of his retinue are pointed. We know from the post-campaign accounts that these captains mustered men, so even though their men are not pointed, we can reasonably conclude they did muster. The clerk simply employed an unusual method of pointing.

Moving to the following membranes, four, six and seven demonstrate another method of pointing. The clerk has listed the men-at-arms to the left, bracketed them, and noted them as *launces*. He has pointed the word *launces*. He has listed the archers to the right, noted them as valets, although he has abbreviated the word, and again pointed the troop type indicator. Membranes six and seven, which detail Sir Robert Chalons's force, displays the same method of pointing. As before, we know from the post-campaign accounts that Chalons did muster men, so the method of pointing employed by the clerk is again simply unusual.¹⁵⁷ The clerks who mustered 149 members of the royal household, which are detailed on the final two membranes, have used the more commonplace method of pointing to the left each name individually (fig.5).

Hands, Annotations and Insertions

The evident variety in format and layout, plus the various methods of transcription, terminology and pointing used indicates that a large team of clerks was involved in the compilation of the muster rolls, and the mustering process more generally. Much evidence is given to this observation when the number of unique hands that can be identified on the rolls is considered. Starting with the duke of Clarence's roll again, in total seven unique hands can be identified. The majority of the document has been written in a single neat hand, but a number of annotations and insertions have been made by a range of other hands. For example, the two archers William Scot and John Byggs have been added to the

¹⁵⁷ E358/6, m.2

right of Sir John Dabridgecourt's main list of archers in a different hand from that in which the majority of the document is written (fig.12). Similarly, the final three archers listed in the sub-retinue of Ralph Cromwell are clearly written in a different hand, as is the archer Richard Whetieacre, who appears as the final entry in the sub-retinue captained by John St Alban. In addition to the insertion of names, unique hands can be identified to have made

further annotations. On membrane four a note reading 'forios' has been written next to the archer named John Branton who served in the duke's personal retinue. The word is written in a different hand to that which detailed John Branton's name. It is not clear what this note means. It is possible it should read 'fodrium', Latin meaning fodder for horses. However, why this would be written next to the name of just one individual on the whole roll is not clear. He cannot have been the only person responsible for sourcing fodder, if indeed that is




Fig.12: E101/45/4, m.7.

what the note means. Another note has been written next to six of Sir John Dabridgecourt's archers. Written in the same hand as the names of those in Dabridgecourt's sub-retinue, it appears to say 'mynoces' or 'mynoeo' (fig.8). It seems likely this should be read as minutor, meaning miner. As we will see when exploring Sir John's sub-retinue in greater detail later, it can be strongly suggested that he recruited men from near his estates in Derbyshire and nearby Lancashire. Both counties were centres of led mining in this period, so he would have been well placed to have recruited miners. They were to play a dangerous role during the siege of Harfleur.

Gloucester's muster roll similarly exhibits a number of unique hands, although less than Clarence's at just four. The existence of unique hands on Gloucester's roll suggests that some of the blank spaces were filled during or immediately after the muster. While one hand can be identified to have written almost all of Gloucester roll, on the dorse of membrane four a separate unique hand has written the names of a number of archers, under various captains. For example, all three of the archers under the esquire John Hawkwood and the three under Peter Mordan, have been added by this second hand




Fig.13: E101/45/13, m.4d.

(fig.13). The fact that none of these names are pointed may further suggest that they arrived after the main phase of the muster had been completed and were added to the roll, but were not pointed because they were late. That these names have been added in a different hand suggests, as do the additional insertions and annotations on Clarence's roll, that additional names could be inserted into the blank spaces even after the main phase of the muster. The existence of this practice raises a number of interesting points and questions.

First, it is clear that not all of Henry's men were at their muster locations by the time the formal muster was taken. This is hardly surprising as men were coming from all over the country. Secondly, if captains had not been able to recruit men before the muster, and thus space was left blank on the muster roll in their companies, some may have been able to recruit men at the muster location. However, if captains could recruit men at or near Southampton and their names could be added to the muster rolls even after the main phase of the muster was complete, as the insertion of names in different hands suggests, why are there still blank spaces on Clarence and Gloucester's muster rolls? It could be that some men were simply very late to the muster, but this does not explain why blank spaces would be left in place of these names rather than just leaving their names un-pointed, as was the common practice.

A second possibility is that some captains simply failed to recruit men, either before arriving at Southampton, or once they arrived. Consequently, the clerks could not insert names into the spaces. However, there is also a problem with this explanation. When we look at the dukes' post-campaign accounts later, we will see that, according to these, neither was far short of fulfilling the terms of their indentures. This suggests that even though their muster rolls show that additional names were added, presumably after the main phase of the muster had been completed and the clerk responsible for compiling the majority of the roll had departed, more men kept arriving. Their post-campaign accounts

suggest that they arrived even after the point from which they could no longer be added to the muster rolls. As such, it must be noted that the information contained on the muster rolls may not tell the whole story, and, like with any investigation, must be used in concert with all other available sources. The continual arrival of men after the completion of the muster must have created a headache for the clerks at the end of the campaign when they tried to audit the post-campaign accounts against the original muster rolls.

In addition to highlighting that additions were made to the muster rolls, the presence of numerous hands also adds weight to the theory that many of the membranes represent retinue-specific musters. On the muster roll which was created at Swanwick Heath six different hands can be identified. Membranes one (preamble), two and three are all in the same neat hand, while one additional hand has inserted the archer John Manchester into the earl of Huntingdon's company. Membranes four, six and seven are also in the same hand, although a different hand to one, two and three. Membranes five, eight and nine have all been written by different hands. The number of hands identifiable on the various membranes thus further suggests that the roll we see today was not authored by one individual clerk, but by a team who mustered each retinue individually on individual membranes.

This theory is further supported by the rolls contained in the bag E101/44/30. The second 'roll' in this bag is not actually a roll at all; instead it is a collection of 22 membranes, most of which are separate from one another (fig.20). The first three membranes of this 'roll' detail the retinues of Sir




Fig.14: E101/44/30, no.3, m.4

Charles Beaumont (fig.16), Sir John Robessart and Sir William Granson. These membranes are all written in the same neat hand. The preamble to each informs us that they were made on Southampton Heath. As table 1.1 demonstrates, many further unique hands can be identified on the other membranes which make up this 'roll'. In total, 18 unique hands can

be identified. A similar situation is evident on the third and fourth rolls in this bag as well, as the table also shows. A total of 4 unique hands can be identified on each of these rolls, each membrane having been written by a unique hand. All this gives further weight to the observation that a large team of clerks were involved in mustering the 1415 army.

In addition to the multiplicity of hands on the muster rolls, a great variety of annotations are also present. We have seen some of those which are noted on Clarence's roll, although there are many present on the other rolls as well. On Sir Thomas Erpingham's membrane, for example, the clerk has listed an additional four men-at-arms and noted them as 'oultre sa nombre' indicating that an addition four men-at-arms were present at Erpingham's muster, presumably hoping a vacancy became available.¹⁵⁸ Curry has suggested that it could also be that small companies were attached to his retinue, or that Erpingham had 'deliberately chosen to take extra troops to fill any vacancies which might arise'.¹⁵⁹ Interestingly, similar annotations can also be found on membrane two of the roll which also includes Erpingham's muster. Six archers under Sir John Scudamour are noted as 'oultre son nombres'. Likewise, on the second muster roll in this bag many such annotations can be identified; six archers under Sir John Robessart, three under Sir William Granson, 14 in a company with no captain stated, three under William Pope and one under John Topcliff. Only on these membranes compiled on Southampton Heath can such annotations be found. This cannot be explained as the idiosyncrasies of one clerk, as multiple hands can be identified to have inserted these notes. It seems that additional troops hoping to serve on the campaign gathered on Southampton Heath, and thus these notes only feature on the membranes relating to this muster location.

Further annotations on the rolls sometimes relate to positions or offices held by the individuals listed. William Knewolmersh, for instance, is noted as cofferer to Sir Robert Chalons and John Cok is noted as William Philips's cook.¹⁶⁰ Likewise, within the royal household contingent noted on the final membrane of E101/45/18, a number of men are detailed as holding offices relating to catering. John Disell was clerk of the bakehouse, John

¹⁵⁸ Curry, 'Sir Thomas Erpingham', p.68.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ E101/45/18, m.6; E101/44/30, m.6.

Pibam clerk of the saucerie and Robert Hoghton clerk of the larder.¹⁶¹ Although these notes are brief, they nonetheless afford us a glimpse into the roles performed by some individuals, plus the presence of non-combatants in Henry's army. In addition to these notes, on membrane four of the third muster roll in E101/44/30, two archers under John Waterton have a note inserted next to their names concerning *prests* (fig.14). Prest was the advance on wages given before the muster. Such references to *prests* do not feature on any of the other 1415 muster rolls, so this is a unique annotation. Why it has been inserted here is not clear.

A great variety of annotations are thus evident on the 1415 muster rolls. The most common annotations, however, are the insertions of crosses next to names, in the place of points, or the scoring out of names completely and, in some cases, the insertion of others. Beginning with the use of crosses instead of points, such crosses can be identified on a number of the 1415 muster rolls, for example Clarence and Huntingdon's, although an unusually high number have been inserted next to some members of the duke of York's personal company (fig.15). Baker has concluded that 'the crossed men were not in receipt of crown pay' as York fulfilled the terms of his contract exactly without these men.¹⁶²

However, as Baker has also shown, 32 of the 53 crossed men appear on York's second muster roll as part of the paid retinue. Consequently, they either accompanied York to Normandy unpaid




Fig.15: E101/45/2, m.4.

'hoping to fill dead men's shoes', were paid by York out of his own pocket or were shipped across as reinforcements after the main army had departed. Baker concludes that, 'we cannot be certain either way'.¹⁶³ It is similarly not clear what a cross indicates. Its presence on many of the 1415 muster rolls demonstrates that it was widely used, and presumably

¹⁶¹ E101/45/18, m.9.

¹⁶² Baker, 'To Agincourt and Beyond!', pp.42-44.

¹⁶³ Ibid, p.43.

understood at the time. It has been suggested by R.A. Newhall that a cross may indicate that the soldier mustered with inadequate equipment.¹⁶⁴ In his study he was referring to the situation in Lancastrian Normandy, but can the same possible explanation be applied to the 1415 army?

As we have seen, the indentures stated that it was the responsibility of the captain to ensure that when his soldiers mustered they were 'armed and arrayed appropriate for their rank'.¹⁶⁵ The issue of suitable equipment was certainly a concern after the siege of Harfleur. On the duke of York's second muster roll, which was made after the siege, 23 archers are noted in Latin as having insufficient equipment.¹⁶⁶ Yet, three points need to be raised. First, none of the archers noted as having insufficient equipment have a cross next to their names. Secondly, no such notes are visible on any of the surviving musters taken before the army crossed to Normandy. Thirdly, it is plausible that the issue was especially relevant after Harfleur as those individuals concerned may have broken or lost their weapons during the siege.




Fig.16: E101/44/30, no.2, m.1.

The observation that a cross next to a name indicates a soldier mustered with inadequate equipment is thus not supported by available evidence and cannot be applied to the 1415 muster rolls. It is alternatively possible that, as the example of York's men suggests, a cross may indicate that the person was placed into a reserve force of some kind.¹⁶⁷ However, none of those crossed on Clarence's muster roll can be identified on the sick lists, which suggests that they did not accompany the army to Normandy at any time. On the other hand, it could be that they were shipped to Normandy as reinforcements after men left because of illness and thus do not feature on the sick lists. Like Baker, we cannot be certain either way. Precisely what a cross indicates is not clear.

¹⁶⁴ Newhall, *Muster and Review*, p.15.

¹⁶⁵ Curry, *Sources*, pp.436-438.

¹⁶⁶ Baker, 'To Agincourt and Beyond!', p.44.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid*, p.43.

Moving on to the complete scoring out of names, it is clear that this was practiced on many of the 1415 muster rolls. In some cases an additional name has been inserted in place of the one scored out. On the earl of Huntington's roll the archer John Maslee is scored out and a man named John Harry has been inserted in a different hand to the right. Similarly, in Gloucester's retinue a few names have been scored though completely and others inserted, such as the archer John Fraunceys whose name is scored out and has been replaced by William Piddle.¹⁶⁸ Also in Gloucester's retinue the sub-captain David Calverley is scored though. In his absence the second individual noted in his company, Hugh Calverley, took command. We know this as a number of the men noted on the muster roll in this sub-retinue can be identified on two of the sick lists. On these sick lists it states that they were under the sub-captaincy of Hugh Calverley.¹⁶⁹ The scoring out of an individual's name can only signify that they failed to pass muster. The reason for their failure is never noted, although it seems most likely it was because they did not turn up, or their equipment was inadequate. We can only imagine the reasons why some men did not turn up and performing their military service. Some were undoubtedly justifiable, others less so. In Clarence's retinue an archer named William Belle, a 'taverner' from London, who had sought a letter of protection prior to the campaign, no doubt to ensure legal protection for this pub, had his protection revoked by the King on November 7, as he delayed in London and did not turn up at the muster.¹⁷⁰ Similarly, as we saw earlier, of the two men whose sub-indenture with Clarence survives, William Hything and Bertram Mowbournier, neither appears to have turned up to the muster.

Indenting

One interesting feature of many of the 1415 muster rolls is the presence of indenting. As table 1.1 shows, many of the rolls feature some form of indenting. Clarence and Gloucester's are indented along the top edge, while Sir Thomas Erpingham, Sir Charles Beaumont and others are indented down their left edges (fig.16). Similarly, some of the very small membranes on the rolls in E101/44/30 exhibit indenting, such as membrane two of

¹⁶⁸ E101/45/13, m.4d.

¹⁶⁹ E101/44/30, n.1, m.4; E101/50/26, m.2.

¹⁷⁰ *CPR, 1413-1416*, p.370.

the fourth roll in the bag (fig.17) and the top of the fourth membrane of the third roll (fig.14). That these small membranes are indented signifies they are most likely not chits submitted by retinue captains before the muster, as could be presumed. The only example of indenting found down a right hand edge is on the membrane detailing the retinue of Sir William Philip (fig.18).




Fig.17: E101/44/30, no.4, m.2.

That these membranes are indented suggests that an identical copy was given to the captain after the muster was complete. This was so that the captain had something akin to a receipt which he could use to support his claim if any dispute arose with the Crown regarding pay at the end of the campaign. Of course, it also provided the Crown with similar insurance. If there was suspicion that a captain submitted a false or counterfeit retinue roll at the end of the campaign, the two parts simply needed to be pieced together, in the same way the indentures would have been. Like many aspects of the rolls we have explored, the practice of indenting was not standardised. The duke of York's rolls shows no signs of indenting.




Fig.18: E101/44/30, no.4, m.6.

Although not present on all the rolls, it is nonetheless interesting to note the high frequency with which indenting features on the 1415 muster rolls. As Newhall noted, the practice appears to have been employed more frequently during the period of the Lancastrian occupation of Normandy, when a range of anti-fraud measures were employed on both muster and garrison rolls.¹⁷¹ We may infer from the indenting of the 1415 muster rolls that on one hand the Crown was concerned about fraud, while on the other hand captains wanted a legal document to support their wage claims at the

¹⁷¹ Newhall, *Muster and Review*, p.15.

end of the campaign, or if subsequent disputes arose with the Crown. This observation should be viewed in light of the fact that Henry had to pawn his jewels as surety for the second quarter wages, presumably as a result of conversations with captains and in an attempt to assure them that they would receive the financial collateral they wanted and the pay they earned.

After the Muster

Joining of Membranes

When the army departed for Normandy, what then happened to the muster documents? Immediately after the muster, the membranes which were prepared in advance were presumably joined together into the rolls we see today for ease of transport and storage. The manner in which the membranes are joined is worth exploring. The membranes relating to the retinues of the dukes of Clarence and Gloucester are joined together one after the other to form continuous rolls. The duke of York's rolls also follow this style, as does E101/45/17. That the membranes of the ducal retinues are joined in this fashion is understandable as they represent one overall retinue, even if, in the case of Clarence and Gloucester's retinues, many of the membranes represent sub-retinue specific musters. The other 1415 musters display alternative styles of membrane joining.

Beginning with E101/45/18, two of the membranes of this nine membrane roll have been sewn into the roll after the majority of the document had been joined. Membrane five, which lists the retinue of Sir Roland Lenthale, is sewn to the join between membranes four and six and therefore overhangs onto membrane six. Likewise membrane eight has been stitched to the join between membranes seven and nine and overhangs onto membrane nine (fig.19). Both of the membranes which appear to have been inserted into the roll have




Fig.19: E101/45/18, m.8.

been written by unique hands. This further supports the observation made earlier that what we are seeing is a collection of retinue-specific musters. Presumably all of the retinues detailed in this roll gathered at Swanwick Heath and were mustered there. The individual retinue-specific membranes were then joined together to form the composite document we see today. The reason for the joining together was evidently based on the locality of their muster and for subsequent ease of transport.

Where the muster rolls were taken after the muster is not known for certain. It is possible that they were taken with the army across to Normandy and may have been used to assist a second muster of the army after the fall of Harfleur. This possibility is explored more shortly. What seems more likely is that the muster rolls were taken back to the Exchequer where they were stored until required to audit the post-campaign accounts. At the Exchequer they would have eventually been placed into leather bags and hung on pegs, such as E101/44/30.

The manner in which the membranes which make up the three muster rolls in this bag have been joined and collated is particularly interesting. Beginning with roll two, it is not in fact a roll at all. It is a collection of 22 individual membranes, which have been numbered 1 to 22 at some time by an archivist (fig.20&3).

Membranes 12 to 22, all of which are very small pieces of parchment and paper, are tied together at the top with a small length of string (evidently not original). The other membranes in this collection have small holes in them, most often near the top edge, where they were once presumably also tied together. None show any signs of ever having been sewn together. The variety in hands and sizes of the membranes, as table 1.1 shows, strongly suggests that we are seeing an



Fig.20: E101/44/30, no.2

artificial collection of membranes. Undoubtedly the first three membranes are related as they all state they were made at Southampton Heath and are in the same hand. The

remainder of the membranes seem unrelated to one another. The history of the muster rolls, and Exchequer records more generally since the end of the fifteenth-century, is too complex to detail here.¹⁷² Needless to say, the documents have been moved between locations a number of times, as well as plundered by early historians and enthusiasts. The collection of membranes and rolls in E101/44/30 is almost certainly a result of these movements. As membranes became separated from other rolls and as other small membranes were found, they were probably place into this convenient leather bag.¹⁷³ The collection of documents detailed as muster roll two in this bag must be viewed in light of this information.

Moving to the third and fourth musters rolls in this bag, they similarly comprise a variety of membranes. The third is comprised of four membranes, three of which are tied together at the top, and one, John Fastolf's (fig.6), is loose. Again, each of the membranes has a hole near the top. In the case of the three currently tied membranes this hole is in addition to the hole being used presently. It is of course impossible to know if these holes were made soon after the muster in 1415 to keep the documents together or if they were made much later. A similar situation is evident on the fourth roll where all four of the membranes are tied at the top. There is no evidence of sewing on any of the membranes which collectively make up the third and fourth muster rolls. It is clear that what we are seeing, particularly in the case of E101/44/30, but also E101/45/18, is that the muster rolls we see today are collections of retinue-specific musters. With E101/44/30 it is unclear how much of a relationship exists between the membranes which are joined together today. Certainly some were made at Southampton Heath, but the inclusion of so many membranes in these rolls, or collections of membranes, is likely artificial and the result of centuries of movement. It is likely that in some cases the muster rolls we see today are not as our medieval forbears created them.




Fig.21: E101/44/30, no.3, m.2.

¹⁷² For a detailed summary: Curry, *Sources*, pp.385-394.

¹⁷³ This is not to suggest that other bags do not exist, only that this one had muster documents in it already.

A Second Muster

We must assume that a complete army-wide second muster was conducted between the fall of Harfleur and Henry's departure for Calais. The reasons for the second muster was that, as Curry noted, and as we will see when investigating the retinues of Clarence and Gloucester in the following chapters, after the siege of Harfleur Henry's army required significant reorganisation on account of the number of casualties suffered from disease and from fighting.¹⁷⁴ Furthermore, a large garrison of 1,200 men under the command of Thomas Beaufort, earl of Dorset, was placed into Harfleur to hold it.¹⁷⁵ The indentures which Henry's captains had sealed in April anticipated that a further muster could be necessary. Sir Thomas Tunstall's indenture states, for instance, that 'after their arrival overseas, Thomas will be obliged to muster the men of his retinue before such a person or persons as it may please the lord king to appoint and assign'.¹⁷⁶ It must be noted that inclusion of such a clause was standard practice and is present on many indentures from this period.

Only one muster roll survives from this second muster. This relates to the duke of York retinue. As Baker noted in his study of the duke's retinue, it 'provides information on what had happened to the duke's troops since the beginning of the campaign'.¹⁷⁷ In this manner, the duke's second muster roll is the closest we come in 1415 to having a muster roll functioning as a 'dynamic working document' akin to those relating to the fleets commanded by the earl of Arundel in 1387 and 1388.¹⁷⁸ Baker also observed that, 'the muster roll for the second quarter is structurally identical to the first', although it is written in a different hand, and that 'companies appear in the same order on the second quarter roll with a few exceptions'.¹⁷⁹ This raises the intriguing possibility that the first muster roll was used as a template to create the second. If so, this could suggest that the original muster rolls were taken to Normandy with the army. However, as we will see when examining the sick lists in chapter four, this theory does not stand up to scrutiny.

¹⁷⁴ Curry, *Sources*, pp.425-434.

¹⁷⁵ The first muster roll for this force dates from 31 December 1415 to 1 April 1416: E101/47/39; *Ibid*, p.430.

¹⁷⁶ Curry, *Sources*, p.438 (The Indentures of Sir Thomas Tunstall).

¹⁷⁷ Baker, 'To Agincourt and Beyond!', p.43. For an image of this document, and a commentary: Curry, 'Preparing for War', *The Battle of Agincourt*, ed. Curry and Mercer, p.85.

¹⁷⁸ Bell, *War and the Soldier*, p.52.

¹⁷⁹ Baker, 'To Agincourt and Beyond!', p.43.

Post-Campaign Accounts and Retinue Rolls/Lists

All those captains who had entered into indentures with the Crown were required to present their accounts to the Exchequer after the campaign.¹⁸⁰ The collection of documents they were obliged to submit are referred to as Particulars of Account. The Exchequer officials would undertake an audit of a captain's accounts, taking into consideration the payment of wages, changes in the retinue's manpower during the campaign, war gains such as prisoners and also the issue of the jewels the captain had been given as collateral for the second quarter wages. The Exchequer clerks created a special series of rolls, like the unique issue rolls which were created before the campaign, on which they detailed accounts for each captain. Only one of these rolls survives today, E358/6, although there were surely more originally. This roll details some information for both the dukes of Clarence and Gloucester, and this is studied in more detail later. For both captains and the Exchequer administrators the process of submitting and auditing post-campaign accounts was complicated and highly time consuming. There also appears to have been little rush. Henry himself did not confirm until 6 March 1417 that the second quarter of the campaign had run from 6 October to 24 November.¹⁸¹ Finally with this information, the Exchequer clerks could begin calculating what was owed to captains, or by captains, plus war gains.

Many captains similarly appear to have been in no rush to submit their accounts. Sir Thomas Erpingham, for example, died in 1428 before having submitted his accounts. They were eventually submitted on his behalf by his executors.¹⁸² The Exchequer was likewise slow to pay out. Men were petitioning to receive their wages for the 1415 campaign well into the reign of Henry VI.¹⁸³ One of the key documents a captain would have submitted as part of his post-campaign




Fig.22: E101/45/7

¹⁸⁰ On this process: Curry, *Sources*, pp.426-434.

¹⁸¹ *PPC*, 2, pp.225-227; Curry, *Sources*, pp.448-449.

¹⁸² Curry, 'Sir Thomas Erpingham', pp.74-75.

¹⁸³ The Crown was not very successful in retrieving and redeeming its precious items. By 1437 it abandoned its efforts to obtain them. Furthermore, as petitions demonstrate, wages owed to captains for the 1415 campaign were outstanding long into the reign of Henry VI: *PROME*, 'Henry VI: November 1437'; Curry, *Agincourt*, p.80; Curry, *Sources*, pp.429, 450.

accounts would have been a list of those men who served under him during the campaign. In some instances the fates of these men would have been noted. These documents, which are similar in design and layout to the muster rolls, are referred to as retinue rolls or retinue lists.¹⁸⁴ The earl of Huntingdon's retinue roll, for instance, notes next to some men, 'mort a Agyngcourt' (fig.22).¹⁸⁵ Erpingham's retinue roll similarly notes the fates of some men, for instance the archer Stephen Gerneyng died at the battle, while the man-at-arms John Aungers died at Calais after the battle.¹⁸⁶ It must be remember that this account, like many others, was submitted more than a decade after the campaign. Clearly Erpingham and other captains would not have been able to recall the names and fates of men they had commanded decades ago. That they could submit retinue rolls so long after the campaign indicates that they must have created their own lists soon after the campaign, which they used when finally submitting their accounts. The distance in time between the end of the campaign and the submission of captains' post-campaign accounts undoubtedly meant mistakes were made.

Once submitted, Exchequer clerks would have audited a captain's retinue roll against his original muster roll to ensure correct wages were paid. Once payment had been made, the accounts were surplus to requirements. They were probably kept by the Exchequer in case disputes arose in the future. As noted earlier, during the roughly 600 years since their creation, the documents have been moved around and rehoused a number of times. As such, we are very fortunate to have as many documents surviving today as we do. In fact, there are far more retinue rolls surviving for the Agincourt campaign than there are muster rolls. Disappointingly neither the duke of Clarence or Gloucester has a surviving retinue roll. In the absence of these documents, in the following chapter we will have to rely on the information contained in E358/6 and the 'Agincourt roll'.

¹⁸⁴ It appears this term was invented by the Public Records Office at some time in the past.

¹⁸⁵ E101/45/18, m.2. For an image of Thomas, Lord Camoys's retinue roll, and a detailed commentary: Curry, 'Preparing for War', *The Battle of Agincourt*, ed. Curry and Mercer, p.86.

¹⁸⁶ Curry, 'Sir Thomas Erpingham', p.75.

Summary

A number of closing observations can be made based on this systematic study of the 1415 muster rolls. To begin, it is clear that a large team of clerks was involved in undertaking the muster, presumably under the supervision of royally-appointed musterers, such as Sir Richard Redeman, John Strange and others. This is evidenced by the large number of hands visible on the rolls, the variety in layout and format, plus the terminology used, annotations and pointing methods. Throughout this chapter the clerks have been referred to as Exchequer clerks because the muster rolls were Exchequer documents. Yet, the evident high number of clerks involved in the process makes this identification dubious. It is conceivable that some of the membranes, especially those relating to the retinues of dukes, earls and leading knights, could have been written by their own clerks under the supervision of the appointed musterers. As mentioned earlier, this may in part also explain the predominance of Anglo-Norman. Furthermore, it is worth highlighting that the musters relating to archers from the Crown demesne lands in South Wales and Lancashire are predominantly in Latin, whereas almost all the other musters are mainly in Anglo-Norman. Could it be that Exchequer clerks mustered men directly from the Crown's lands and used Latin, while retinue captains relied on their own clerks, who used Anglo-Norman, to compile their muster documents? The main problem with this suggestion is that certain hands can be identified to have compiled membranes relating to separate retinues. Consider, for example, the first three membranes of E101/44/30, no.2. We cannot know the truth, of course, as the muster rolls do not detail the names of those who compiled them.

Moving on, the lack of standardisation evident in almost every aspect of the 1415 muster rolls supports the observation made by the Medieval Soldier Team that there was 'no set form of muster roll'. Indeed, the lack of uniformity of the muster rolls reflects the uniqueness of the 1415 campaign. It was the largest overseas expedition launched since 1359, it was uniquely financed with the pledging of jewels and other precious objects as collaterals for the second quarter wages, plus it was administered distinctly with the creation of special issue rolls and post-campaign account rolls. Much of this can be ascribed to the fact that the King was leading the expedition himself. However, the 1415 campaign also represents a shift in the authority of the Crown and the willingness of the military community to enter into contracts for service. The evident negotiations with captains

before the campaign, plus the pledging of jewels as collateral, suggests a lack of trust in Henry's ability to pay, or perhaps his willingness. It also suggests that while the appetite for campaigning had been re-ignited in England by the 1412 campaign, men wanted assurances of payment that they hitherto had not. Considering the amount of time it took many captains to receive payment after the campaign, these reservations were well founded.

The final observation to be made is that it needs to be remembered that the muster rolls do not tell the whole story. As has been briefly mentioned in this chapter, and as will be explored more thoroughly in the following case studies, the information contained on the muster rolls does not always match with the post-campaign accounts. Furthermore, it is necessary to note that some of those not pointed on the muster rolls can in fact be identified to have accompanied the army to Normandy. The archers Roger Gilder and John Sy, for example, who are both listed on Clarence's muster roll, although not pointed, are both noted on the sick lists drawn up at the end of the siege of Harfleur.¹⁸⁷ In advancing to explore the retinues captained by the dukes of Clarence and Gloucester the muster rolls will be our foundation source, but they will be supplemented and supported by a host of additional sources. Overall, the muster of Henry's army in 1415 was a complex task undertaken by many individuals over a period of a few weeks. The muster rolls created as a result are similarly sophisticated and, as Curry has noted, on account of their nominal richness, hold 'tremendous potential for the detailed study of personnel'.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁷ E101/45/4, m.4 (Muster roll); E101/44/30, no.1, m.1; E101/50/26, m.1 (Sick lists).

¹⁸⁸ Curry, *Sources*, p.421.

Chapter II



The Duke of Clarence's 1415 Retinue

Thomas, duke of Clarence, indented to recruit 960 men for Henry's 1415 campaign; 240 men-at-arms, including 1 duke, 1 earl, 2 bannerets, 14 knights, 222 esquires and 720 archers.¹⁸⁹ Reflective of his status as heir presumptive, he commanded the largest retinue.¹⁹⁰ The 28-year-old duke was well prepared to recruit and lead such a force as he possessed an impressive military service record. On account of his personal military experiences and skills, he was a highly important member of King Henry's high-command network. Clarence had been militarily active since 1401 and had commanded both land and naval expeditions. The latter a feat his elder brother could not boast of having achieved. Much is known of the campaigns commanded by Clarence, yet, with the exception of the work of John Milner, relatively little is known of the men who served under his command.¹⁹¹ This is due in part to the sparse survival of documents. No muster rolls survive for any of Clarence's campaigns before or after 1415. However, a relatively large corpus of letters of protection have survived which afford a view, albeit a frustratingly restricted one, of the men under his command from 1401 until his death at the Battle of Baugé on 22 March 1421.¹⁹² Table 2.1 represents a chronological breakdown of these surviving letters of protection. That Clarence emerged as England's foremost military commander during his lifetime, for a period even eclipsing his elder brother, should occasion no surprise when his pedigree and career are considered.

Thomas of Lancaster was born to Henry Bolingbroke, the eldest son of John of Gaunt, second duke of Lancaster, and Mary de Bohun in the autumn of 1387.¹⁹³ Thomas

¹⁸⁹ E404/31/155; *Foedera*, 9, p.227.

¹⁹⁰ Curry, *Agincourt*, pp.69-76.

¹⁹¹ Milner, 'The English Enterprise', pp.80-102; Milner, 'The English Commitment', pp.9-24.

¹⁹² Letters of protection and attorney are discussed more in chapter four.

¹⁹³ The most substantial biographies of Clarence are: G.L. Harriss, 'Thomas, duke of Clarence (1387-1421)', *ODNB*, <<https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/27198>>, [Accessed 7 July 2018]; *CP*, 3, pp.258-260. On his birth: I. Mortimer, *The Fears of Henry IV: The Life of England's Self-Made King* (London, 2007), pp.370-372.

spent his childhood, along with his elder brother Henry and younger brothers John and Humphrey, in the great Lancastrian castles. For a short period he lived and was educated in Gaunt's own household. Although widely acknowledged as Bolingbroke's favourite son, who went into exile with him in 1398, Thomas did not share his elder brother's rapid social and financial advancements.¹⁹⁴ Following Bolingbroke's coronation as Henry IV in the late summer of 1399 Henry was created Prince of Wales, duke of Cornwall, duke of Aquitaine and earl of Chester. In contrast, Thomas was only knighted and appointed Steward of England; the latter a titular position under the tutelage of Thomas Percy, earl of Worcester.¹⁹⁵

In a show of virility to Scotland, France and Richard II's supporters, Henry IV was accompanied on his 1400 expedition to Scotland by his two eldest sons. For the two young princes, it was their first experience of warfare and military life.¹⁹⁶ War would shape, and ultimately end, the lives of both Lancastrian brothers. While Henry's military apprenticeship was concentrated in Wales, Clarence learnt the art of war and politics in Ireland (1401-1403 and 1408-1409), at sea (1405) and in Gascony (1412-1413). In July 1401 he was appointed the King's lieutenant in Ireland with instructions to, 'put down the rebellion of the Irish'.¹⁹⁷ Guardianship of the young 14-year-old prince was entrusted to Sir Thomas Erpingham, Sir Peter Bukton and eight others.¹⁹⁸ On their arrival, Lancaster and his guardians received a baptism of fire.¹⁹⁹

In 1401 Ireland was in a state of virtual anarchy.²⁰⁰ In an attempt to impose order, Thomas and his advisors, of whom Sir Stephen Scrope was foremost, planned a military expedition north up the east coast from Dublin.²⁰¹ Lancaster had roughly 100 men-at-arms

¹⁹⁴ *A Chronicle of London, from 1089-1483*, ed. Sir N.H. Nicolas (London, 1828), p.84.

¹⁹⁵ A.L. Brown, 'Percy, Thomas, earl of Worcester (c.1343-1403)', *ODNB*, <<https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/21955>>, [Accessed 6 July 2018].

¹⁹⁶ Curry, Bell, King and Simpkin, 'New Regime, New Army?', p.1401.

¹⁹⁷ *The Chronicle of Adam of Usk: 1377-1421*, ed and trans. C Given-Wilson (Oxford, 1997), p.147. Lancaster replaced Sir John Stanley: *CPR, 1399-1402*, p.338.

¹⁹⁸ *CPR, 1401-1405*, p.1; *Foedera*, 8, p.227.

¹⁹⁹ On Thomas in Ireland: A.J. Otway-Ruthven, *A History of Medieval Ireland* (London, 1968), pp.339-347.

²⁰⁰ *The Annals of Loch Ce: A Chronicle of Irish Affairs from 1014 to 1590*, ed and trans. W.M. Hennessy, 2 vols (London, 1871), 2, pp.93-101; J.H. Wylie, *History of England under Henry IV*, 4 vols (London, 1884-1889), 1, p.223-234; *PPC*, 1, pp.43-52, 182 (Petition to Parliament).

Table 2.1: Letters of Protections relating to service within the personal retinue of Thomas, duke of Clarence²⁰²

Year	Location	Force Size		Identifiable	
		Men-at-Arms	Archers	Letters of Protection	Percentage of force
1401 ²⁰³	Ireland	100	300	45	11.25%
1402 ²⁰⁴	Ireland			12	
1403 ²⁰⁵	Ireland			12	
1404 - 1407 ²⁰⁶	Ireland			76	
1405 ²⁰⁷	Naval Campaign	700	1,400	44	2%
1408 ²⁰⁸	Ireland			27	
1409 ²⁰⁹	Ireland			3	
1410 - 1412 ²¹⁰	Ireland			12	
1412 ²¹¹	France	500	1,500	85	4.25%
1415 ²¹²	France	240	720	53	6%
1416 ²¹³	France			8	
1417 ²¹⁴	France			34	
1418 ²¹⁵	France	60	180	25	10%
1419 ²¹⁶	France			15	
1420 ²¹⁷	France			10	
1421 ²¹⁸	France			1	
1406-1417 ²¹⁹	Castle of Guînes			67	

²⁰¹ Wylie, *Henry IV*, 1, pp.232-233. On Sir Stephen Scrope: *The Controversy between Sir Richard Scrope and Sir Robert Grosvenor in the Court of Chivalry, 1385-1390*, ed and trans. Sir N.H. Nicolas, 2 vols (London, 1832), 2, pp.45-53.

²⁰² Figure relates only to individuals who sought letters of protection to serve directly under Clarence. Consequently force size relates to Clarence's personal retinue, not to total expedition size.

²⁰³ *CPR*, 1399-1401; *CPR*, 1401-1405. Ten individuals in this group did not seek protection, but rather were appointed as guardians of the young Prince: *CPR*, 1401-1405, p.1; *Foedera*, 8, p.227.

²⁰⁴ *CPR*, 1401-1405.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁶ *CPR*, 1401-1405; *CPR*, 1405-1408. 1404, 21; 1405, 9; 1406, 28; 1407, 18.

²⁰⁷ *C76/88*, m.4-9.

²⁰⁸ *CPR*, 1405-08.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

²¹⁰ *Ibid.* 1410, 6; 1411, 4; 1412, 2.

²¹¹ *C76/95*, m.6-13; *C61/113*, m.6; *Foedera*, 8, p.751. For this group, 18 protections do not specify a captain. They are included in this count.

²¹² *C76/98*, m.6, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 19A, 20, 21, 22, 23.

²¹³ *C76/98*, m.5; *C76/99*, m.9, 12, 16.

²¹⁴ *C76/99*, m.4,6,8; *C76/100*, m.5,6,14,15,20, 21, 22, 23, 24; *C61/117*, m.6.

²¹⁵ *C76/100*, m.1, 2, 4; *C76/101*, m.5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11; *Foedera*, 9, p.545.

²¹⁶ *C76/101*, m.3; *C76/102*, m.7, 8, 9.

²¹⁷ *C76/102*, m.2, 4; *C76/103*, m.3, 6, 7. The total number of troops for this campaign is unknown. However, it was likely around 275 men-at-arms and 960 archers, a ratio of 1:3.5: *Soldier in Later Medieval England*, p.273.

²¹⁸ *C76/103*, m.3.

²¹⁹ *CPR*, 1405-08; *CPR*, 1413-1416; *C76/89*, m.12; *C76/90*, m.11,12,15,16,18,19,21; *C76/91*, m.18,21,22; *C76/92*, m.2,13; *C76/93*, m.7,13,15,18; *C76/94*, m.17,25,27; *C76/95*, m.2,4,10,11,14,19,21; *C76/96*, m.4,10,11,13,16; *C76/97*, m.6,23; *C76/99*, m.3; *C76/100*, m.24.

and 300 archers under his command.²²⁰ The campaign only got as far as Drogheda, roughly 30 miles north of Dublin, before it was hamstrung by a lack of finance.²²¹ The acute lack of finance was so severe that in early 1402 Scrope was dispatched to London with letters beseeching the King for additional money to pay his soldiers for fear they would desert due to non-payment.²²² No additional money was forthcoming and, in the words of G.L. Harriss, Lancaster was 'reduced to impotence in Dublin'.²²³ It was decided in November 1403 that Lancaster would return to England and that Scrope would be appointed deputy in his stead.²²⁴

On his return to England, the military skills and experiences Lancaster had gained campaigning in Ireland were soon put to use by his embattled father. In November 1404 he and Prince Henry mustered their troops near Hereford, in preparation for an expedition to 'rescue the lord of Coety (Glamorgan), besieged by the rebels'.²²⁵ This was the only occasion on which the eldest Lancastrian brothers campaigned together prior to 1415. After having successfully completed their rescue mission, Thomas was appointed Admiral on 20 February 1405.²²⁶ He had originally contracted to raise a large force of 700 men-at-arms and 1,400 archers for a naval expedition in September 1404, but this had been delayed by events in

²²⁰ *Soldier in Later Medieval England*, p.272.

²²¹ Insufficient finances plagued attempts to govern Ireland effectively, or efficiently: *CPR, 1401-1405*, pp.266, 269, 464; *CCR, 1402-1405*, pp.446-447; SC8/230/11452. The crux of the problem was that Henry IV was attempting to fight three wars simultaneously in Wales, Scotland and Ireland while also paying to garrison Calais and castles in Aquitaine. The Percy lords of Northumberland were frequently requesting payment for their soldiers. For example: *PPC*, 1, pp.151-2, 266-270; 2, pp.57-59. On the state of finances in Ireland: Otway-Ruthven, *Medieval Ireland*, pp.342-343. On the state of Henry's finances generally: A. Steel, *Receipts of the Exchequer* (Cambridge, 1954), pp.83-148; T.E.F Wright, 'Royal Finances in the latter part of the reign of Henry IV of England, 1406-1413', D.Phil. thesis (University of Oxford, 1984).

²²² *Royal and Historical Letters during the reign of Henry the Fourth*, ed and trans. F.C. Hingeston, 2 vols (London, 1860-1864), 1, pp.85-89. In 1405 the duke of York was forced to promise his men that he would not accept the rents due to him from his Yorkshire tenants until they (his soldiers) had been paid: *PPC*, 1, pp.270-274. In 1407 the Calais garrison was near to mutiny and wrote to the King declaring they did not wish 'to lyve lenger in this world' because they had not received their wages: *Historical Letters*, 2, pp.145-148.

²²³ Harriss, 'Thomas, duke of Clarence'.

²²⁴ *CPR, 1401-1405*, pp.188, 377, 419, 459, 467, 500; *A Roll of the Proceedings of the King's Council in Ireland*, ed. J.Graves (London, 1877), pp.269-272; Otway-Ruthven, *Medieval Ireland*, pp.343-344. In early 1404 Scrope 'suddenly departed': Wylie, *Henry IV*, 2, p.124. His position was filled by William de Burgo until his return in October 1404. He was then gone again by 25 June 1405 but back by August 1406. He left the office for the final time in 1407. However, he returned to Ireland in 1408 with Lancaster and met his death at the hands of the plague at Castledermot in Kildare on 4 September 1408: *Scrope vs Grosvenor*, 2, pp.45-52. For a complete list of Irish office holders (Lieutenants and Deputies): *Handbook of British Chronology*, ed. E.B. Fyrde, third edn (Cambridge, 1996), pp.160-167.

²²⁵ *CCR, 1402-1405*, p.478; C.T. Allmand, *Henry V* (London, 1992), p.27.

²²⁶ *Foedera*, 8, p.388.

Wales.²²⁷ With the Welsh momentarily placated, his naval force of around 1,200 men-at-arms and 2,400 archers was mustered at Dover and Sandwich in April 1405 by Sir John Pelham and Sir Robert Berney.²²⁸ The campaign was relatively successful.²²⁹ Initially the soldiers disembarked near Sluys and burnt some shipping in the harbour, although they were unable to take the town proper because of its defences. On the return trip, after having attacked La Hogue, Barfleur and Montebourg, the England fleet encountered a number of Genoese carracks off Cadzands. The details are confused, but it would appear that the English captured at least two of them, but one caught fire when the fleet returned to the port of Rye in 1405.²³⁰ The other was entrusted to the safe keeping of Sir Thomas Erpingham. In early 1406 the King ordered that it was to be returned to its master, Leonard de Maryn of Genoa.²³¹ On his return to dry land in 1405 Lancaster was appointed captain of Guînes castle, in the Pas-de-Calais. Officially he held the position only from 1405 until 1406; although in numerous letters of protection he is noted as captain until as late as 1417 and appears to have been in nominal command until his death in 1421.²³²

After a short career as Admiral, Lancaster indented with the King to return to Ireland in 1406. The original indenture was for 12 years service and stipulated that Lancaster was to raise 100 men-at-arms and 200 archers. Interestingly it also specified and that these men must have been residing in England. The final stipulation was made probably in an effort to ensure that the money available for the expedition was spent in England to send reinforcements to Ireland, rather than paying men who were already there.²³³ Understandably put off by his first experience, Lancaster delayed sailing until the contract

²²⁷ E101/69/2/314; *Soldier in Later Medieval England*, pp.98-99.

²²⁸ *CPR, 1405-1408*, p.59; *Foedera*, 8, p.389; Sumption, *Cursed Kings*, pp.151-152; *Soldier in Later Medieval England*, p.272.

²²⁹ The fleet's departure was held-up because of delays with the payment of wages: *PPC*, 1, pp.259-264.

²³⁰ *PPC*, 1, pp.259-260, 263-264; *The St Albans Chronicle: The Chronica Maiora of Thomas Walsingham; Volume II, 1394-1422*, ed. J. Taylor, W.R. Childs and L. Watkiss (Oxford, 2011), pp.438-439; *A Chronicle of London*, ed. Nicolas, p.89; *An English Chronicle of the Reigns of Richard II, Henry IV, Henry V and Henry IV*, ed. J.S. Davies (London, 1838), p.30; *La Chronique d'Enguerran de Monstrelet: en deux livres avec pièces justificatives, 1400-1444*, ed. L. Douet-d'Arcq, 6 vols (Paris, 1857-1862), 1, pp.106-107; R. Holinshed, *Chronicles of England, Scotland and Ireland*, 6 vols (London, 1807-1808), 3, pp.35-36. Wylie, *Henry IV*, 2, p.104; Sumption, *Cursed Kings*, pp.161-164.

²³¹ *CCR, 1405-1409*, pp.27, 29.

²³² E101/69/3/351. A number of those who sought protections for this posting were revoked for various reasons: C76/92, m.2. Revoked, *CPR, 1408-13*, p.205; C76/93, m.13. Revoked, *CPR, 1408-13*, p.189; C76/96, m.4. Revoked, *CPR, 1413-16*, p.194; C76/97, m.6. Revoked, *CPR, 1413-1416*, p.274. Lancaster also had difficulty receiving pay for the position: *PPC*, 1, pp.339-341.

²³³ E101/69/2/316; *Soldier in Later Medieval England*, p.244.

was slashed to only three years.²³⁴ Once in Ireland in late 1408 he launched a swift and successful campaign in Leinster, although he may have been wounded on the expedition.²³⁵ The following year, having received news of his father's illness, he returned to England.²³⁶ Following his return, Lancaster directed his energies towards attaining the wealth, titles and political power for which he had for so long desired but had been unable to obtain.

In 1412 Lancaster married Margaret Holand, widow of John Beaufort, earl of Somerset, and gained control of her lands which were estimated to have a significant yearly value of £1,400.²³⁷ Lancaster owed the subsequent political power and titles he achieved primarily to the French civil war.²³⁸ Since the murder of the duke of Orléans in 1407, the Armagnac and Burgundian factions had vied for English military support. By 1411, no longer tied to fighting in Wales, the English government, under the de facto control of Prince Henry due to his father's deteriorating health, chose to intervene. It was agreed, with the consent of the King, that an army would be sent to aid the Burgundians. Yet, at the last moment, due to a 'morbid guilt about his own seizure of power', the King ordered the campaign to be cancelled.²³⁹ Prince Henry, determined that the campaign would go ahead, countermanded the King's orders and appointed Thomas FitzAlan, earl of Arundel, its commander.²⁴⁰ The campaign climaxed with the Anglo-Burgundian victory at the Battle of St Cloud, near Paris. The victory allowed the Burgundians to maintain control of Paris and the mentally unstable King Charles VI.

The seeds were thus sown for division among the King and the heir to the throne. The Gordian knot around which tensions revolved was whether England should support the Armagnacs or the Burgundians. These divisions came to a head in November 1411 when

²³⁴ *CPR, 1405-1408*, p.143, 431; *PPC*, 1, pp.313-318; Harriss, 'Thomas, duke of Clarence'.

²³⁵ Wylie states that he was wounded, but provides no reference. The only other mention to Lancaster being wounded I have found is by Holinshed. However, by his own admission, he writes 'I know not how': Wylie, *Henry IV*, 3, p.168; Holinshed, *Chronicles of England*, 6, p.265.

²³⁶ *Loch Ce*, ed. Hennessy, p.127.

²³⁷ Harriss, 'Thomas, duke of Clarence'. T.B. Pugh scornfully writes, 'Clarence's greed for money led him to marry Margaret Holand ... for the sake of her great fortune': T.B. Pugh, *Henry V and the Southampton Plot of 1415* (Southampton, 1988), p.55.

²³⁸ Sumption, *Cursed Kings*, pp.278-332.

²³⁹ *Ibid*, p.284.

²⁴⁰ J.A. Tuck, 'The Earl of Arundel's Expedition to France, 1411', *The Reign of Henry IV. Rebellion and Survival*, ed. G. Dodd and D. Biggs (Woodbridge, 2008), pp.228-239.

Henry IV ostracised Prince Henry by dismissing him from the royal council.²⁴¹ His place was filled by Thomas. The King and Thomas decided to launch a military campaign in support of the Armagnacs, in response to pleas for support from both factions.²⁴² The Armagnacs agreed to grant the English Gascony in return for their support. The thorny issue of the duchy's sovereignty was sidestepped by vague terms. Henry was to hold the duchy, 'as freely as any of his forebears had'. It was originally imagined that the campaign would be commanded by the King himself. Yet, due to the perennial problem of insufficient finances, and the King's failing health, it was decided that Thomas would command the expedition; a move which undoubtedly infuriated Prince Henry.²⁴³ To give command of such an expedition to Thomas necessitated his elevation to the peerage. Moreover, it was anticipated that the campaign would receive reinforcements from the dukes of Alençon and Richemont once it landed in France and so, as Milner has written, 'the elevation was largely designed to enable the leader of the impending expedition to have a title to match that of the French lords'.²⁴⁴ Thus, Thomas of Lancaster was raised to the dukedom of Clarence, with the lordship of Holderness, on 9 July and made Lieutenant of Aquitaine two days later.²⁴⁵

The 4,000 strong force which landed at Saint-Vaast-la-Hougue in August comprised 1,000 men-at-arms and 3,000 archers.²⁴⁶ The duke's personal retinue comprised 500 men-at-arms and 1,500 archers.²⁴⁷ The English force was reinforced upon landing by approximately 2,000 men under the dukes of Alençon and Richemont and a further 600 Gascon men-at-arms.²⁴⁸ Owing to the fact that no muster roll survives for this expedition, identifying individuals who served on the campaign is a challenging task. However, by utilising all the surviving letters of protection, 85 members (4.25%) of Clarence's retinue can be identified. Within a short time of Clarence's force having landed in Normandy, the Armagnacs and Burgundians reached a peace accord. As a result, they had to buy off, at an

²⁴¹ Allmand, *Henry V*, p.52-53; P. McNiven, 'Prince Henry and the English Political Crisis of 1412', *History*, 65 (1980), 1-18.

²⁴² Sumption, *Cursed Kings*, p.310.

²⁴³ To raise the necessary funds the Crown resorted to a forced loan: *PPC*, 2, p.31-32. On Henry IV's health: P. McNiven, 'The Problem of Henry IV's Health, 1405-1413', *EHR*, 100 (1985), 747-772.

²⁴⁴ Milner, 'The English Enterprise', p.89; Milner, 'The English Commitment', p.9-24.

²⁴⁵ C61/113, m.129; *Foedera*, 8, pp.757-758.

²⁴⁶ Most of the contemporary and near-contemporary chronicles make references to the 1412 campaign. For example: *Chronica Maiora*, ed. Taylor, et al, pp.610-621.

²⁴⁷ *Foedera*, 8, pp.745-746; Milner, 'The English Enterprise', pp.81-82; E101/69/2/340 (Clarence's indenture).

²⁴⁸ Milner, 'The English Enterprise', p.81-82.

exorbitant cost of 210,000 écus (£40-42,000), Clarence's marauding army which was conducting a devastating chevauchée, reminiscent of those conducted during the previous century, south of the Loire.²⁴⁹ By December Clarence's army arrived at Bordeaux, where the duke remained until returning to England in late April 1413, by which time his father had died and his brother had been crowned King. On his return the differences of opinions and animosities which had existed between the brothers were laid to rest. Clarence owed his allegiance to his King, and Henry needed the support of his militarily experienced and capable brother.

At Southampton on 20 July 1415, less than three months after having sealed his indenture, Clarence's retinue was mustered at St Catherine's Hill, near Christchurch, in the New Forest. When taken as a whole, Clarence's muster roll records the names of 243 men-at-arms and 789 archers. At face value the roll suggest that Clarence went beyond his original indenture and, rather than raising a total of 960 men (240 men-at-arms and 720 archers), actually raised 1,032. However, as we have seen in the previous chapter, to presume that every individual identified on the roll was actually present at the muster would be a mistake. The number of pointed names and additional annotations on the roll need to be taken into consideration.²⁵⁰ On the whole roll, only one man-at-arms is not pointed. His first name is illegible but his surname reads Joce.²⁵¹ He was meant to serve under the command of the esquire Ralph Cromwell, the future Lord Cromwell. Clarence and his sub-captains must have been pleased to see almost all of their men-at-arms appear, presumably properly equipped, at muster.

The situation for the archers was rather different. In the personal sub-retinue of the duke, 21 archers are not pointed and one name is scored through. In addition, William Belle, an archer, who had sought a letter of protection prior to the campaign, had his protection revoked by the King on November 7, as he delayed in London.²⁵² Sir John Lumley was more successful, all of his archers are pointed. In Sir John Dabridgecourt's retinue three archers

²⁴⁹ J.L. Bolton, 'How Sir Thomas Rempston Paid his Ransom: Or, The Mistakes of an Italian Bank', *The Fifteenth Century: Conflicts, Consequences and the Crown in the Late Middle Ages*, 7, ed. L. Clark (Woodbridge, 2007), pp.101-119 (pp.104-105).

²⁵⁰ In instances where there is doubt around whether an individual is pointed I have presumed they are.

²⁵¹ It appears that an attempt was made to erase his name at some point. It is quite clear from the document, however, that his name was never pointed.

²⁵² *CPR, 1413-1416*, p.370.

are not pointed. Indeed, all three of these non-pointed archers also have a cross recorded next to their name.²⁵³ A further eleven sub-retinues have archers not pointed. The most notable of these is Sir Philip Branche's company which has eight archers listed, but of whom none are pointed. It would appear that, for an unknown reason, none of Branche's archers turned up to muster.

Table 2.2: The Duke of Clarence's 1415 Retinue²⁵⁴

MA = Man-at-Arms

A = Archer

Name	On Muster Roll			Annotations	Totals		
	Men-at-Arms ²⁵⁵	Archers	Total		Men-at-Arms	Archers	Total
Thomas, Duke of Clarence	12	152	164	22 (A) ²⁵⁶	12	129 ²⁵⁷	141
Sir John Lumley	20	40	60		20	40	60
Sir John Dabridgecourt	20	70	90	3 (A) ²⁵⁸	20	67	87
Sir Edward Burnell	9	24	33	3 (A)	9	21	30
Sir John Colville	16	50	66		16	50	66
Sir John Heron	10	25	35	1 (A)	10	24	34
Sir William Bowes	10	24	34		10	24	34
Sir John Godard	10	31	41	2 (A)	10	29	39
Sir William Bowet	9	23	32	1 (A)	9	22	31
Sir William	7	14	21		7	14	21

²⁵³ The only other example of a cross next to a name is for the archer John Todde in the sub-retinue of Roger Chamber on membrane 12.

²⁵⁴ The italicised captains were those whose archers failed to muster.

²⁵⁵ These figures include the captains themselves.

²⁵⁶ One archer is scored through.

²⁵⁷ I have also subtracted the archer William Belle whose protection was revoked: *CPR, 1413-1416*, p.370.

²⁵⁸ All are scored through.

Cromwell							
Sir Philip Branche	2	8	10	8 (A)	2	0	2
Sir John Pudsey	4	8	12		4	8	12
Thomas Beaumont	6	15	21	2 (A) ²⁵⁹	6	13	19
Brian Stapleton	10	31	41	1 (A)	10	30	40
Ralph Cromwell	9	23	32	1 (MA) 1 (A)	8	22	30
William Bonville	3	8	11		3	8	11
Morris Brune ²⁶⁰	1	24	25		1	24	25
Thomas Marney	4	10	14		4	10	14
Henry Noon	3	10	13		3	10	13
Roger Chamber	12	34	46	1 (A)	12	32	44
Thomas Chamber	2	8	10	3 (A)	2	5	7
Henry Godard	1	5	6		1	5	6
Robert Bitvelaine	1	3	4		1	3	4
Walter Intebergh	3	16	19		3	16	19
Thomas Thwaite	2	4	6		2	4	6
John Sutton	3	6	9		3	6	9
James Fresell	2	4	6		2	4	6
Thomas Corbet	1	2	3		1	2	3
Arthur Ormesby	1	9	10		1	9	10
Henry Mulso	1	4	5		1	4	5

²⁵⁹ One archer is scored through.

²⁶⁰ Hereafter referred to as Maurice Bruyn, as he more frequently appears in records under this spelling.

William Everingham	1	2	3		1	2	3
Ralph Neville	4	9	13		4	9	13
Robert Clifton	2	5	7		2	5	7
John St Alban	2	8	10		2	8	10
Thomas Ipstones	1	2	3		1	2	3
Thomas Strother	1	2	3		1	2	3
John Stokes	1	3	4		1	3	4
John Keynton	1	2	3		1	2	3
John Brewes	3	7	10	1 (A)	3	6	9
Robert Otterburn	1	2	3		1	2	3
William Bukton	1	4	5		1	4	5
William Rasyn	1	2	3		1	2	3
Andrew Derain	1	2	3		1	2	3
Thomas Gargrave	1	2	3		1	2	3
John Morsted	1	2	3		1	2	3
John Caleys	1	2	3		1	2	3
Robert St-Quentin	1	3	4		1	3	4
William Calthorn	1	2	3		1	2	3
William Langar	1	2	3		1	2	3
John Talbot	1	2	3		1	2	3
Alain Gauthorpe	1	3	4		1	3	4
Richard Boteler	1	4	5		1	4	5

John Bayhous	1	5	6		1	5	6
John Routh de Ockingham	1	2	3		1	2	3
John Berham	1	4	5		1	4	5
Maykin Kay	1	2	3		1	2	3
Thomas Scargill	1	2	3		1	2	3
Hugh Morton	1	3	4		1	3	4
John Driver	1	1	2		1	1	2
Edmond Secheford	1	1	2		1	1	2
John Middleton	4	8	12		4	8	12
William Kyghley	1	4	5		1	4	5
<i>Roland Dingley</i>	1	0	1		1	0	1
<i>Francis Toppyfeld</i>	1	0	1		1	0	1
<i>John Stormestre</i>	1	0	1		1	0	1
<i>William Hoton</i>	1	0	1		1	0	1
<i>John Heton</i>	1	0	1		1	0	1
<i>John Dupount</i>	1	0	1		1	0	1
<i>Hugh Curteys</i>	1	0	1		1	0	1
TOTALS	243	789	1,032	1 (MA) 49 (A)	242	738	980

Table 2.2 demonstrates that even though 1,032 soldiers are listed on Clarence's muster roll, it is unlikely they all departed for Normandy with the duke.²⁶¹ In total, 47

²⁶¹ Wylie incorrectly concluded that his retinue was 1,044 strong (246 men-at-arms and 798 archers). This figure was used by Mortimer: Wylie and Waugh, *Henry V*, 2, p.63; Mortimer, *Year of Glory*, p.563.

archers are not pointed, along with one man-at-arms. In addition, two archers have been crossed out completely, and one received a revocation of protection. Taking these annotations into considering, it must be concluded that, when Clarence's retinue departed for Normandy, it comprised 242 men-at-arms (1 duke, 1 earl, 2 bannerets, 11 knights, 227 esquires) and 738 archers; a total of 980 soldiers. Clarence did not specifically fulfil his contractual obligations. He was meant to recruit 14 knights, but appears only to have managed to recruit 11. It is possible that the additional archers he recruited were to make up for the shortfall in knights. In total, only 27 of all the soldiers detailed on the muster roll had sought letters of protection and attorney. We will return to this issue in chapter four.

The muster roll reveals that Clarence's personal sub-retinue was the largest with a total of 142 soldiers (12 men-at-arms and 129 archers). It is not clear what happened to the seven sub-captains whose archers failed to muster. As our exploration of the muster rolls in the previous chapter demonstrated, it is highly probable additional troops were at the muster location, so it is possible archers were recruited after the main phase of the muster had been completed, or simply arrived at the location late. On the other hand, our investigation also suggested that additional names could be added to the muster rolls, so the possibility of further archers being recruited or arriving is questionable. Considering the muster rolls are our principal source, we will work tentatively from the premise that further archers were not recruited and that those captains who failed to muster archers were absorbed into Clarence's personal sub-retinue. We will work from the premise that Clarence's personal retinue was comprised of 18 men-at-arms and 129 archers.²⁶² A statistical analysis of his retinue and that of Gloucester's is undertaken in chapter four, but it is necessary to note here that Clarence's retinue was comprised of 61 sub-retinues, in addition to the duke's personal company. Eleven of these sub-captains were knights, while the remaining 50 were esquires. The size of the 61 sub-retinues varied considerably. The largest was commanded by Sir John Dabridgecourt, who successfully mustered 20 men-at-arms and 67 archers. The second largest was commanded by Sir John Lumley, second lord

²⁶² The 18 men-at-arms were: Henry Beaufort, earl of Somerset, Humphrey Fitzwalter, John Mauley, Ralph Bredon, William Pyrley, Laurence Hikedon, William Berham, John Travas, John Armurer, William Kygheley, William Esturmy, plus the seven men whose archers failed muster; Roland Dingly, Francis Toppesfeld, John Stormester, William Hoton, John Heton, John Dupont and Huge Curteys.

Lumley, who mustered 20 men-at-arms and 40 archers. Two retinues consisted of only two soldiers, the captain and an archer.

Taking all the sub-retinues together, the average (mean) size was 16. There were only 15 sub-retinues with more than the average number of combatants. Of these, 8 were double the average with 32. These retinues were commanded by Sir John Lumley, Sir John Dabridgecourt, Sir John Colville, Sir John Heron, Sir William Bowes, Sir John Godard, Brian Stapleton and Roger Chamber. Cumulatively, these captains raised 404 soldiers, or 42% of the whole retinue. When considered with Clarence's personal company, these figure rises to 551, or 56% of the entire retinue. By identifying those who contributed most numerically to the overall retinue, its command, control and organisational structure begins to become apparent. This unique group of eight principal sub-captains would have formed part of Clarence's high-command network, along with the leading members of his personal company. Below this group, the captains who raised more than 10 men would have formed the middle level, while those who raised less than 10 constituted the lowest level of the command structure. In examining Clarence's personal company and his sub-retinue captains specifically, we shall witness the level of stability present within this network. However, before moving to this stage, it is first necessary to consider the role played by the sub-captains within the workings of the overall retinue.

This is not a straightforward task, as no contemporary description exists as to how the command of an individual retinue functioned. However, we are aided in this endeavour by the survival of a number of disciplinary ordinances. The earliest surviving examples relate to Richard II's army of 1385 and the Franco-Scottish force which gathered to face him.²⁶³ It is certain that such ordinances had been issued before, for example by Edward III upon the commencement of the Crécy campaign in 1346, but they have not survived.²⁶⁴ Henry V followed the example of his forbears and issued a series of similar orders during his

²⁶³ A. Curry, 'Disciplinary Ordinances for the English and Franco-Scottish armies of 1385: An International Code?', *JMH*, 37 (2011), pp.269-294; D. Martinez, 'Disciplinary Ordinances for English Armies and Military Change, 1385-1513', *History*, 102 (2017), 361-385; D. Martinez, 'Disciplinary Ordinances and Military Change, 1385-1585: A Comparative Analysis of English Army Ordinances', PhD. thesis (University of Southampton, 2017), pp.17-47.

²⁶⁴ A. Ayton, 'The Crécy Campaign', *The Battle of Crécy, 1346*, ed. A. Ayton and Sir P. Preston (Woodbridge, 2005), pp.35-107 (p.62).

invasions of France.²⁶⁵ Yet, as Curry noted in conclusion to a thorough study of his ordinances, 'it is not possible at this stage to date with certainty any of the surviving texts'.²⁶⁶ Whatever the date, Curry identified an 'established core of disciplinary ordinances' to which clauses were added or removed depending on the specific requirements of commanders. As Andrew Martinez has observed, these clauses can be placed into one of two categories, 'army security or the limitation of greed and internal conflict'.²⁶⁷ For example, men were not to cry havoc, burn property, raise banners of St George or ride ahead of the host without consent, for fear it would lead to chaos.²⁶⁸

To a large extent the expectation for the successful implementation of the ordinances was placed upon the retinue captains. In large retinues, such as those commanded by Clarence and Gloucester in 1415, retinue commanders would undoubtedly have delegated tasks to leading members of their personal companies, plus their principal captains; those who made up their command networks. It was thus paramount that these soldiers were experienced and capable in order to ensure the cohesive functioning of the retinue. In addition to the generic clauses listed above, the ordinances also made it clear that it was the specific responsibility of the captains to ensure their men did not lie about the adequacy of their equipment at muster.²⁶⁹ It is noteworthy that the responsibility for ensuring that their men were 'armed and arrayed' with sufficient equipment was a main clause in the indentures and sub-indentures as well, as we have seen. Furthermore, once the campaign was underway, captains had to inform the constable and marshal of the army of the names of the retinue's harbingers, plus assist each other in setting the watch.²⁷⁰

²⁶⁵ In a reflection of the changed nature of warfare, Henry issued garrison specific ordinances in 1419 and 1421: A. Curry, 'Disciplinary Ordinances for English Garrisons in Normandy in the reign of Henry V', *The Fifteenth Century: Essays Presented to Michael Hicks*, 14, ed. L. Clark (Woodbridge, 2015), pp.1-12; Martinez, 'A Comparative Analysis of English Army Ordinances', pp.81-94. Similar regulations governed naval forces. No ship, for example, was to hoist sail before the admiral, leave port or the fleet without prior consent, or attack another vessel before the admiral had investigated its charters and cargo: *Monumenta Juridica: The Black Book of the Admiralty*, ed. Sir T. Twiss, 4 vols (London, 1871-1876), 1, pp.24-40.

²⁶⁶ A. Curry, 'The Military Ordinances of Henry V: Texts and Contexts', in *War, Government and Aristocracy in the British Isles, c.1150-1550: Essays in Honour of Michael Prestwich*, ed. C. Given-Wilson, A. Kettle and L. Scales (Woodbridge, 2008), pp.214-250 (p.237).

²⁶⁷ Martinez, 'Disciplinary Ordinances for English Armies', p.365.

²⁶⁸ Curry, 'The Military Ordinances of Henry V', pp.242, 243, 248.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid*, p.249.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid*, pp.245, 249.

Another of the major duties specified in the ordinances, for which captains of large retinues would undoubtedly have turned to their leading sub-captains for assistance, was communicating the ordinances themselves to the rank-and-file soldiers. The authors of the ordinances identified this with one clause specifically stating that it was the responsibility of the captains to ensure their men were aware of the terms.²⁷¹ Certainly the command network would also have played a vital role in relaying orders in the heat of battle; although, as Martinez has highlighted, the ordinances tell us little about 'battlefield plans or manoeuvres'.²⁷² One particular issue that the ordinances focus on is the taking of prisoners. They state that in the eventuality that a soldier took a prisoner, the captain was obliged to take the unfortunate captive to the constable, marshal or King as rapidly as possible for interrogation.²⁷³ On the subject of prisoners, a number of clauses focused on the resulting division of ransom spoils. We have seen similar clauses in the indentures and sub-indentures, so the issue of prisoner taking was obviously a major concern for the Crown, captains, sub-captains and the rank-and-file. As Rémy Ambühl revealed, the mechanisms of ransom were well evolved by the early fifteenth-century.²⁷⁴ A system of thirds had developed whereby the individual who took a prisoner was required to pass one third of his profits to his captain. This passing of one third would continue up the hierarchy of command until the King himself. Above all, the ordinances highlight that the captains were responsible for their men and for insuring they kept the ordinances. In 1418 Henry Styng was ordered to investigate the men of his retinue who had committed rape in contravention to the clauses of the ordinances.²⁷⁵ To implement these clauses, commanders of large retinues evidently would have needed to rely on their command networks. These networks would have comprised the leading members of their personal companies, plus their principal sub-captains.

Clarence's personal company comprised, including the seven captains who failed to muster archers, 18 men-at-arms and 129 archers. Henry Beaufort, earl of Somerset, was the youngest member of the company at just 14 years-old.²⁷⁶ Beaufort had been born in late

²⁷¹ Ibid, p.224.

²⁷² Martinez, 'Disciplinary Ordinances for English Armies', p.365.

²⁷³ Curry, 'The Military Ordinances of Henry V', pp.241-249.

²⁷⁴ Ambühl, *Prisoners of War*, pp.145-150.

²⁷⁵ Curry, 'The Military Ordinances of Henry V', p.229.

²⁷⁶ CP, 12, p.45.

1401 to John Beaufort, earl of Somerset, and his wife Margaret. On 26 November Henry had been baptised in the presence of Henry IV himself, who was to be the child's godfather.²⁷⁷ Following the death of John Beaufort in 1410, Margret had married Thomas of Lancaster in 1412, shortly before his elevation to the dukedom of Clarence. Clarence thus became Beaufort's step-father. He died shortly after his eighteenth birthday on 25 November 1418, while at the siege of Rouen.²⁷⁸ The second highest ranking member of the retinue was Humphrey Fitzwalter, son of Walter, fourth lord Fitzwalter who had died in 1406 after having been a captive of 'Saracen' pirates.²⁷⁹ Humphrey was only 17 when he left England in 1415. The two highest ranking members of Clarence's retinue were evidently serving under the duke to benefit from his martial tutelage. Neither raised a company of their own.

Unlike the unbloodied Beaufort and Fitzwalter, some members of Clarence's personal company did possess military experience. In total, of the 18 men-at-arms of his company, five (28%) had previous military experience. Of those, three (17%) had served directly under the duke. Hugh Curteys had the most military experience. As his letters of protection often state, he was a merchant from London.²⁸⁰ However, he also frequently undertook military service. He served almost continuously throughout the 1380s as part of the Cherbourg garrison. He first served under the captaincy of Edmund Holand, earl of Kent, before his replacement in 1386 by Sir Stephen Scrope. Thenceforth Curteys remained with Scrope at Cherbourg until 1391. When Scrope took command of the standing force in Ireland in 1395-1397 Curteys continued to serve under him for the duration of his tenure. Sir Stephen and Curteys became close associates; both professionally and personally. In October 1404 Sir Stephen nominated Curteys as his attorney in England for one year while he went to Ireland.²⁸¹ As evidence of their personal relationship, Curteys was an executor of Sir Stephen's will. Indeed, Sir Stephen bequeathed 10 marks to Curteys when he died.²⁸² It was likely through his association with Scrope that Curteys entered Clarence's service in 1415. By 1401 Curteys was serving in the garrison of Roxburgh Castle. Although Curteys

²⁷⁷ *CPR*, 1401-1405, p.34.

²⁷⁸ *CIPM*, 22, pp.353-356.

²⁷⁹ *CP*, 5, pp.480-482; *CIPM*, 19, pp.90-93; C. Starr, 'Fitzwalter family (*per. c.1200–c.1500*)', *ODNB*, <<https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/54522>>, [Accessed 6 July 2018]; G. Baker, 'The English Way of War, 1360-1399', PhD. thesis (University of Hull, 2011), p.339.

²⁸⁰ Also: *CCR*, 1396-1399, p.287.

²⁸¹ *CPR*, 1401-1405, p.464.

²⁸² *Scrope vs. Grosvenor*, 2, pp.50-52; *CPR*, 1408-1413, p.188.

sought, and was granted, a protection for service in the garrison of Guînes castle under the nominal captaincy of Thomas of Lancaster in 1409, he failed to perform his service. On 12 June 1410 his protection was revoked because he had delayed 'in the city and suburbs of London'.²⁸³ He appears to have performed his military service under Clarence in 1412. Whether Curteys was militarily active after Agincourt is no known. There is no evidence he was. The final reference to Curteys is from November 1429 when a Robert Harsick, who owed Curteys 40s, was pardoned by the Crown.²⁸⁴ Curteys presumably died shortly after this event.

Table 2.3: The Military Service of Clarence's Personal Men-at-Arms: Before 1415²⁸⁵

† = Service directly under Clarence

* = Service under another Captain

Name	1378	1383	1384	1385	1386	1388	1391	1395	1396	1397	1400	1401	1409	1412
<i>John Heton</i> ²⁸⁶		*	*	*							*			
<i>John Dupont</i> ²⁸⁷														†
<i>Hugh Curteys</i> ²⁸⁸		*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		*	†	†
<i>John Stormester</i> ²⁸⁹														†
John Armurer ²⁹⁰		*												

²⁸³ CPR, 1408-1413, p.205.

²⁸⁴ CPR, 1429-1436, p.14.

²⁸⁵ The dates in bold indicate campaigns commanded by Clarence. The captains in italics are those who failed to muster their archers in 1415.

²⁸⁶ BL, Cotton Roll, XIII.8, m.1 (1383 and 1385); E101/40/5, m.2 (1384); E101/43/4, m.15 (1400). Heton may also have served in 1372 and 1373, although this would have made him roughly 60 by 1415: E101/31/34, m.2; C76/56, m.27.

²⁸⁷ C61/114, m.4.

²⁸⁸ C76/68, m.20, C76/67, m.6, C76/67, m.3 (1383); C76/69, m.22 (1384); C76/69, m.2, C76/69, m.9 (1385); C76/70, m.11 (1386); C76/73, m.14 (1388); C76/76, m.15 (1391); E101/41/39, m.6 (from 1395-1397); C71/76, m.7 (1401); C76/92, m.2 (1409). Protection was revoked: CPR, 1408-1413, p.205); C76/95, m.10, m.11 (1412).

²⁸⁹ C76/95, m.14.

²⁹⁰ C76/67, m.19.

Few of the men-at-arms of Clarence personal company in 1415 can be shown to have possessed significant military experience. Yet, at least three members occupied, or had occupied in the near past, significant positions within his household. John Stormester had been Clarence's chancellor in 1412, while John Dupont had been the duke's secretary since at least that year as well.²⁹¹ Both Stormester and Dupont had aided Clarence during his negotiations with the duke of Orléans in 1412 which resulted in the Treaty of Buzançais. They both profited handsomely from the Treaty. Stormester, who was dispatched to Rome by the duke, was gifted 100 écus, while Dupont was granted the considerable sum of 225 écus.²⁹² Dupont remained with Clarence and was residing in Bordeaux with him during the early months of 1413. During this period Clarence granted Dupont two houses within the city.²⁹³ Considering the generosity of the grant, it is likely he had been the duke's secretary for some time before 1413. On 1 December 1413 he was also granted, for life, the office of Royal Executor of Bordeaux with the keepership of the papers of the deceased.²⁹⁴ Dupont remained at Bordeaux in this capacity for the next four years, presumably having surrendered his position as secretary to the duke.²⁹⁵ The only discernible interlude of his residence at Bordeaux was in 1415 when he returned to serve under his former lord during the 1415 campaign. We know that Dupont had left Aquitaine by 1417 as he was nominated as Sir John Montlau's attorney in England in that year.²⁹⁶

Another man-at-arms of the duke's personal retinue who was associated with him was Francis Toppesfeld. He was from Essex, although he undoubtedly also possessed lands in Ireland, with his wife Alice, by 1410.²⁹⁷ By 18 April 1410 Toppesfeld was controller of Clarence's household. He headed the duchess's household when it travelled to France in

²⁹¹ BL, Add. Ms. 21359.

²⁹² J.E. Endell Tyler suggests the purpose of Stormester's mission to Rome was to gain the papal dispensation necessary for the duke to marry Margaret Holand. This interpretation is incorrect however, as Clarence had already received such dispensation in August 1410 and was married to Margaret by May 1412, before the Treaty of Buzançais was drawn up. The purpose of Stormester's mission to Rome is unknown: J.E. Tyler, *Henry of Monmouth: Or, Memoirs of the Life and Character of Henry the Fifth*, 2 vols (London, 1838), 1, p.277; Harriss, 'Thomas, duke of Clarence'.

²⁹³ C61/114, m.4.

²⁹⁴ Ibid, m.3.

²⁹⁵ C61/115, m5.

²⁹⁶ C61/117, m.5.

²⁹⁷ J. Ross, 'Essex County Society and the French War in the Fifteenth Century', *The Fifteenth Century: Conflicts, Consequences and the Crown in the Late Middle Ages*, 7, ed. L. Clark (Woodbridge, 2007), pp.53-80 (p.79); CPR, 1408-1413, pp.169, 185.

1419 and remained controller until the duke's death in 1421.²⁹⁸ What then, of the other men-at-arms of the duke's personal company? In short, they appear to have been background figures. William Kygheley was likely a younger brother of Gilbert Kygheley who had served under Clarence frequently during his tenure as Lieutenant of Ireland.²⁹⁹ The sub-retinue captain William Kygheley junior was probably son of William Kygheley. Similarly, William Berham and the sub-retinue captain John Berham were probably related, although by what degree is not known. Another member about whom only little is known is Roland Dingly. Dingly was the younger brother of Robert Dingly, son of Robert Dingly.³⁰⁰ Roland's father, Robert, was originally from Wiltshire, but had acquired estates in Hampshire towards the end of his life. Robert was known to John of Gaunt, who had gifted him venison in 1372 and 1373, and to Thomas Holand, earl of Kent, Richard II's half-brother. It was likely as a result of these associations and Lancastrian connections that Roland entered Clarence's service in 1415. About Roland, little more is known. In 1408 he was given a fourth part of the manor of Morton Underhill (Worcestershire) and Newbold Comyn (Warwickshire), by his brother, Robert. By 1420 these lands were back in his brother's hands, possibly indicating Roland was deceased.

Identifying further ties to Clarence's household is challenging because his household accounts for the period prior to 1419 have not survived.³⁰¹ While it may be likely that more members of his personal company were associated with his household, such as was the case with Mowbray's force, in the absence of these household records it is challenging to know for certain.³⁰² Indeed, about the archers of Clarence's personal company only little is known. The muster roll itself throws only a little light on the problem.³⁰³ Next to the archer John Chaumberlayn a note reading 'por mons Somerset' has been inserted, strongly suggesting that this person served as the young earl's chamberlain, or in some other official capacity. Similarly the archers John Boteler and Richard Wright are noted as 'valett Rector'. From the

²⁹⁸ C.M. Woolgar, *Household Accounts of Medieval England*, 2 vols (Oxford, 1993), 2, p.651.

²⁹⁹ *CPR, 1405-1408*, p.392 (1408); *CPR, 1408-1413*, p.241 (1410); Milner, 'The English Commitment', pp.21-22.

³⁰⁰ L.S. Woodger, 'Dingly, Robert (I)', *HoP*, <www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1386-1421/member/dingley-robert-i-1395>, [Accessed 6 July 2018]; L.S. Woodger, 'Dingly, Robert (II)', *HoP*, <www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1386-1421/member/dingley-robert-ii-1377-1456>, [Accessed 6 July 2018].

³⁰¹ For the accounts which do survive: Woolgar, *Household Accounts*, 2, pp.604-689.

³⁰² Curry, 'A Case Study of John Mowbray', pp.153-167.

³⁰³ E101/45/5, mm.4-5.

sick lists, which are explored more in chapter four, we learn that Clarence's chaplain was named William Alyngton, so these men were obviously his *valets*. Here, again, we have a problem associated with terminology. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the term *valet* is often used on the muster rolls to identify archers. However, in this context, it appears the clerk used it to highlight that these men were servants of the Rector, presumably in addition to being archers. They appear to have performed a dual function, both as soldiers and servants. Following these men are listed the names Thomas Nottingham and Henry Horneby, both of whom are noted as 'valett magister Gilbert'. Again, a Master Gilbert is noted on the sick lists, and so these men were clearly his servants. What Master Gilbert was a master of is not known, although it seems plausible he was a surgeon. The final note of relevance has been written next to Henry Mort and reads 'por le henchman'. Mort appears to have been the servant of the henchman. Who Clarence's henchman was is not known, but he would have been a page or squire to the duke, with particular responsibility for the wellbeing of his lord's horse.³⁰⁴ Although the notes are brief, they nonetheless demonstrate that some of the archers of Clarence's personal company were employed by the duke and served in his household, or served members of his household. It suggests that, like Mowbray, Clarence recruited men from his household. Had more of his household accounts survived, it seems likely more members of his personal company could be positively identified to have come from his household.

It is necessary to note here that after the 1415 campaign, a number of the members of the duke's personal company can be identified to have undertaken further military service. One individual who served again was John Stormester who served directly under Clarence in 1418.³⁰⁵ Ralph (or Robert) Bredon, from Coventry, returned to France in 1430, 1439 and 1441.³⁰⁶ John Heton probably served under Sir John Pilkington in 1421 while William Hoton served under Robert, Lord Willoughby, at Verneuil in 1428.³⁰⁷ William Esturmy served in the garrison of Eu in 1429.³⁰⁸ In addition, William Berham likely undertook further military service as he had been granted lands in Normandy by January 1421.³⁰⁹ On

³⁰⁴ "Henchman, n." *OED Online*, <www.oed.com/view/Entry/85907>, [Accessed 18 June 2018].

³⁰⁵ C76/101, m.9.

³⁰⁶ C71/112, m.14 (1430); BL, Add. Ch. 137 (1439); E101/53/33, m.6. (1441).

³⁰⁷ E101/50/1, m.2 (1421); ADSM, 100J/33/46 (1428).

³⁰⁸ BN, ms. fr. 25768/422.

³⁰⁹ *DKR*, 42, p.387.

the other hand, John Dupont and Francis Toppesfeld did not undertake further military activity. Dupont returned to England by 1417. While in England he was granted the manor of Aber in Carnarvon by the King.³¹⁰ In the following February he was noted as the 'King's servant' and appointed governor of the King's garden at Shene. In which capacity he was allowed to take fruit and herbs from the King's garden.³¹¹ Dupont did not dwell in England long. By May 1418 he had been appointed to the Writing Office of the Prévôté of the Ombrière at Bordeaux.³¹² Dupont appears to have remained in this position, and as Royal Executor of Bordeaux, until July 1440 when he retired due to 'old age and constant infirmity'.³¹³ With the death of Clarence in 1421, Francis and Alice Toppesfeld returned to Ireland. On 15 July 1427 Francis was nominated as John earl of Huntingdon's attorney in Ireland for three years, clearly indicating the couple were residing there at the time.³¹⁴

The image of Clarence's 1415 personal company is thus one of limited stability and cohesion. It does not appear to have contained many military veterans, although Curtyes, Dupont and Stormester, all of whom were with the duke in 1412, would have contributed military experience. It must be stressed again that the duke's household accounts are not extant for this period, nor are there muster rolls of any the duke's previous forces, so we do not know the men who made up his personal company on these occasions. Away from the military sphere, a developed and professional working relationship certainly existed between Clarence and Dupont, Toppesfeld and Stormester. Furthermore, the notes on the muster roll demonstrate that he was accompanied by at least some members of his household in 1415, although the predominant image emerging is one of limited vertical and horizontal rigidity. However, it must be remembered that the duke's personal company accounted for only 15% of the retinue's manpower. To learn more about the duke's retinue we must consider the sub-captains and their companies in greater detail.

³¹⁰ CPR, 1416-1422, p.119. Today referred to as 'Abergwynnregyn': C61/117, m.2, entry 92, n.3, *The Gascon Rolls Project*, <www.gasconrolls.org/en/edition/calendars/C61_117/document.html>, [Accessed 13 July 2018].

³¹¹ CPR, 1416-1422, p.136.

³¹² C61/117, m.2.

³¹³ C61/130, m.18. The council at Westminster had confirmed his position as Royal Executor in 1429: C61/123, m.3.

³¹⁴ CPR, 1422-1429, p.414.

The Sub-Retinue Captains

The sub-retinue captains form an illustrative group, who provide valuable insights into the mechanics and dynamics underlying the recruitment, stability and professionalism of the retinue. The clearest way to assess the vertical and horizontal stability engendered by the duke's sub-captains is to quantify their military service history.³¹⁵ Table 2.4 demonstrates that prior to serving under Clarence in 1415, 25 (41%) of his 61 sub-captains had undertaken military service. Digging deeper, it can be noted that 15 (26%) had performed military service under the direct command of the duke before, with the majority having marched through France with him in 1412. On this occasion, 10 (16%) of the sub-captains had served under him. Considering that less than 5% of Clarence's 1412 retinue can be identified, this is a high figure, indicative of, although on its own not proof of, vertical stability. It must be noted, however, that with the exception of Henry Mulso none of Clarence's 1415 sub-captains can be identified to have served under his direct military command more than once before the 1415 campaign. Indeed, even though Mulso is noted as having served under Clarence twice, this was in name only. There is no evidence that Clarence was present at Guînes castle in 1413, the time when Mulso was there under his nominal captaincy.

The apparent lack of direct re-service under Clarence may lead to suggestions that his retinue is evidence that the trend of declining retinue stability in the late fourteenth-century continued into the fifteenth. This would certainly seem to be the case when considered alongside Bell's study of Arundel's fleets of 1387 and 1388. As explained earlier, Bell's study was undertaken before the publication of the Medieval Soldier Database. Consequently, the military service statistics he provides for Arundel's captain on these campaigns are now outdated. In order to be able to draw reliable comparisons between the 1415 retinues of Clarence and Gloucester to Arundel's 1387 and 1388 forces, I have had to update the military service data contained within Bell's study.³¹⁶

³¹⁵ For references to the sources for the military service of the sub-captains: Table 2.4, below.

³¹⁶ It is necessary to highlight that I have not undertaken a complete update of Bell's military service data. I have focused only on the retinue captains and have added instances of service before the campaigns of 1387 and 1388 for these men. Having focused solely on their military service histories, I have been cautious not to conflate the careers of relatives (father and sons). In light of the creation of the Medieval Soldier Database,

The force which sailed under the command of Arundel in 1387 comprised 2,497 men, 1,107 men-at-arms and 1,390 archers.³¹⁷ These men were recruited in 29 retinues, including Arundel's personal company which was the largest. Excluding Arundel, of his 28 captains 20 (71%) can be shown to have had previous military experience. Some men, such as Sir William Elmham, had had long military careers by the time they boarded ships with Arundel in 1387. Furthermore, as Bell was able to show, various other ties bound the men of his 1387 force together.³¹⁸ Moving to the 1388 fleet, it numbered 1,578 men-at-arms and 2,014 archers and was recruited in 50 retinues. Excluding Arundel's personal company, Bell demonstrated that 28 (57%) of Arundel's 49 captains returned from the previous campaign.³¹⁹ In addition to securing the repeat service of a majority of his captains from the previous campaign, the 'new' captains whom Arundel recruited in 1388 were also, in many cases, military veterans. Of his 21 'new' captains, 12 (57%) possessed military experience. When considered together, it can be stated that at least 40 (82%) of Arundel's 49 captain in 1388 had military experience.

When considered in light of these findings, the figures relating to the military experience of the members of Clarence's 1415 retinue certainly suggest, at first glance, that significant change had occurred to the military community. Most obviously, they suggest that retinue stability had continued to decline and that men seldom served under the same captain from campaign to campaign. Furthermore, they suggest that the level of military experience among members of the military community had continued to decrease. If premier captains such as Clarence were unable to recruit military careerists (professionals), those with much previous military experience, then surely it follows that the experience of the military community as a whole had decreased by the time of the 1415 campaign. It would appear that the 'dynamics of recruitment' had altered significantly. However, while

plus what I have been able to produce here, a more thorough re-assessment of the military careers of the captains of Arundel's campaigns, plus the rank-and-file as well, would be highly enlightening.

³¹⁷ For what follows, and the figures presented by Bell: Bell, *War and the Soldier*, pp.52-68, 83-115. The total army sizes given here are those produced by Bell, *Ibid*, p.56. By my calculations the totals he provides at the foot of the table on this page are somewhat inexact. Based on the total of each troop type he provides, I calculate 1,109 men-at-arms, not 1,107.

³¹⁸ *Ibid*, pp.153-220.

³¹⁹ In fact, Bell suggests (p.96) that 28 of Arundel's 50 captains (excluding Arundel himself) returned in 1388. Although he claims to have excluded Arundel from his calculation, I believe he has not actually done so. Using the table he provides on pp.64-65 of the 1388 retinue, I count 49 captains, plus Arundel himself. All of my following calculations are based on Arundel having 49 captains in 1388.

such observations in light of these findings are justifiable, a number of cautionary and crucial points need to be raised.

First, Arundel's campaigns were undertaken during a period of significant English military mobilisation. No fewer than 19 campaigns were undertaken in the decade preceding 1387, nine of which had comprised over 2,000 combatants.³²⁰ Similarly the period is well served by nominal military sources. As the Medieval Soldier Team has calculated, of all the surviving muster and retinue rolls, 59% belong to the period 1369-1399.³²¹ As a result of the good nominal coverage of the military community, coupled with the high tempo of military expedition around the time of Arundel's campaigns, it is unsurprising to see men with much military experience present in the forces he commanded. To refer to the 'dynamics of recruitment' model, the forces of demand ensured the military community expanded to supply and meet these needs. As a result, there was ample opportunity for men to undertake military service and, in some cases, develop careers from it. Just one example from Arundel's forces would be the esquire Giles Weston who served on both campaigns as a retinue captain and had a long military service history before and after serving under Arundel.³²²

In contrast, in the decade before 1415, only eight significant armies were raised. Of these, only the armies of 1405, 1407 and 1412 had comprised more than 2,000 men. It is of note that two of these forces had been commanded by Clarence. Of course, Henry IV's Welsh wars provided some men with regular service, but the forces raised to face the Welsh were, with the exception of 1407, often small and in existence for only short periods of time. Furthermore, as already mentioned but necessary to highlight again, the period 1390-1415 suffers from a particular drought of nominal data. There are few muster rolls from 1390-1400, a handful from 1400-1405 and none from 1405-1415.³²³ None of the large campaigns of 1405, 1407 or 1412 have muster rolls. Indeed, as we have seen, only 4.25% of

³²⁰ *Soldier in Later Medieval England*, pp.271-272.

³²¹ Since the publication of their monograph other rolls, particularly relating to the Normandy garrisons, have been discovered, so the percentage referenced here may have changed marginally. Nonetheless, there are many rolls dating to this period which collectively provide a good level of nominal coverage.

³²² E101/36/25, m.1 (1377); E101/36/39, m.2 (1378); C76/65, m.16 (1381); C76/67, m.18 (1383); C76/71, m.17 (1386); E101/40/33, m.8 (1387); E101/41/5, m.18d (1388); C76/74, m.17 (1390); C76/77, m.11 (1392); C76/78, m.12 (1393).

³²³ *Soldier in Later Medieval England*, pp.10-11. The only exception being a small roll, which could be either a muster or retinue roll, and may relate to Thomas, earl of Arundel's 1411 campaign: E101/612/51.

Clarence's 1412 retinue can be identified by name, as a result of a small corpus of surviving letters of protections. As table 2.1 demonstrated, the coverage provided by the surviving letters of protection is also sparse and patchy.

It is also important to point out that one area which suffers particularly from a lacuna of nominal coverage is those men who undertook military activity in the Scottish Marches. Warfare in these northern areas was endemic. Yet, evidence of military service in these areas is greatly under-represented in the surviving sources. This is mainly because it was under-recorded at the time. Considering a number of Clarence's sub-captains came from these areas, men such as Sir John Lumley, Sir John Goddard, Sir John Heron and John Heton, it is plausible that they did possess military experiences which the sources simply do not reveal to us. In such a nominally-arid environment as the final decade of the fourteenth-century and the first decades of the fifteenth, that 41% of Clarence's 1415 sub-captains can be shown to have possessed military experience suggests that, contrary to what can be presumed at first glance, the level of identifiable military experience is actually quite high.

This identification is further borne out when the military careers of the principal sub-captains are considered. Of the eight captains, five (63%) can be shown from the (limited) surviving sources to have been military veterans, with three (38%) having served directly under Clarence. Admittedly, their military experiences varied considerably. Sir John Dabridgecourt was a true military professional having served in war on a total of eight occasions by 1415. A stalwart Lancastrian supporter of Hainault origin, Sir John had been educated within Edward III's household and eventually became Steward of John of Gaunt's household and served as an executor to his will.³²⁴ When Bolingbroke landed at Ravenspur in 1399 Dabridgecourt forsook Richard II, who, as Helen Castor has identified, had retained him in an attempt to 'establish his own lordship' in the regions of Derbyshire and Lancashire, and joined with the future King.³²⁵ An impeccable Lancastrian supporter, his

³²⁴ C. Rawcliffe, 'Dabrichcourt, Sir John', *HoP*, <www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1386-1421/member/dabrichcourt-sir-john-1415>, [Accessed 6 July 2018]; *CPR, 1396-1399*, p.534; *A Collection of the Wills, now known to be extant, of the Kings and Queens of England*, ed. J. Nichols (London, 1780), p.145-177 [Hereafter: *Royal Wills*]; Beltz, *Memorials of the Garter*, pp.lv, clvii.

³²⁵ *Chronicles of the Revolution, 1397-1400: The Reign of Richard II*, ed and trans. C. Given-Wilson (Manchester, 1993), pp.250-253; H. Castor, *The King, The Crown, and The Duchy of Lancaster* (Oxford, 2000), p.201. Richard's policy towards Derbyshire and Lancashire was not a complete failure. Four of the knights who raised retinues to fight under the duke of York, in defence of Richard, had previously been retained by Gaunt. They were; Sir Michael de la Pole, Sir John Bussy, Sir Henry Green and Sir William Bagot. However, many more did

loyalty was rewarded by promotion to the Captaincy of Calais in 1399, although he was removed from the position in April 1401, possibly indicative of Henry's weak grasp of the Crown during the early years of his reign; a problem which manifest itself in the crisis of 1406.³²⁶ Hereafter, Dabridgecourt became closely involved with Prince Thomas and accompanied him to Ireland in 1408.³²⁷ With the ascension of Henry V to the throne, Dabridgecourt was made a Knight of the Garter and appointed Constable of the Tower.³²⁸ In contrast to Dabridgecourt's active military career, Sir John Heron, of the Heron family of Eppleden, Durham, only appears to have engaged in military activity once.³²⁹ In 1404 he served with his father under Rustin de Villa Nova in Wales. Yet, with the exception of Sir John Heron, all the other martially-experienced principal sub-captains can be shown to have been engaged in military activity on more than one occasion prior to 1415. Indeed, on certain occasions some of the principal sub-captains had fought alongside each other. During Clarence's destructive but financially lucrative 1412 campaign, Sir John Colville, Sir William Bowet and Roger Chamber had all harried the French countryside alongside each other.

Sir John Colville's actions during the aftermath of the 1412 campaign demonstrate how military service provided soldiers with opportunities to develop strong vertical bonds with their commanders. In early 1413, while his army was recuperating after its long march through France, Clarence ordered Sir John to requisition eight merchant ships.³³⁰ Colville was then appointed captain of the vessels and charged with their 'good and proper safeguarding' as they transported some of the duke's soldiers back to England. During the voyage, as the flotilla approached the Belle Ile near the coast of Brittany, they encountered two Prussian hulks laden with wines and other merchandise. Colville dispatched an esquire

flock to Bolingbroke's banner. Given-Wilson suggests 'over half' of Bolingbroke's captains had been retainers of Gaunt's. My calculations suggest rather less than half at 19 of the 48 captains: *Chronicles of the Revolution*, ed. Given-Wilson, pp.252-253; Walker, *Lancastrian Affinity*, pp.262-284 (Appendix I: 'Retainers and Annuitants of John of Gaunt').

³²⁶ *CPR, 1399-1401*, p. 94; *CPR, 1401-1405*, p.56; M. Bennett, 'Henry IV, the Royal Succession and the Crisis of 1406', *The Reign of Henry IV. Rebellion and Survival, 1403-1413*, ed. G. Dodd and D. Biggs (Woodbridge, 2008), pp.9-27.

³²⁷ *CRP, 1405-1408*, p.393.

³²⁸ *CPR, 1413-1416*, p.103.

³²⁹ On his background and heritage: W. Betham, *The Baronetage of England*, 5 vols (London, 1801-1805), 4, pp.17-39. Betham refers to the Herons of Applynden, Durham. I have identified this place as Eppleton using, C.E. Jackson, *The Place Names of Durham* (London, 1916), pp.51-52.

³³⁰ *PROME*, 'Henry V: May 1413'.

to enquire as to whether the cargo was of English or French origin. The hulks refused inspection and the following day, 'like men of war and enemies ... of the King, they arrogantly launched an attack'. The resulting naval engagement led to the deaths of a 'great number' of Englishmen before the Prussians were overpowered and their vessels and cargo captured. The captured vessels were taken to Southampton and Poole. Sir John Colville was probably known to Clarence before 1412 as he had arranged the marriage of Blanche, Clarence's sister, to Louis, son of King Rupert of the Palatinate, in late 1400.³³¹ The professional and personal relationship which developed between Sir John and Clarence was long-lasting. By 1417 Colville had been personally retained by the duke.³³² Before his death, Clarence appointed Colville one of his feoffees (mortgagees) for his estates.³³³ Colville similarly nominated the duke as one of his feoffees for his estates in Newton, Cambridgeshire, in 1420.³³⁴ Clarence purchased some horses for Colville in 1418, paid off some of his debts in 1419 and had even nominated him as one of the executors of his will in 1417.³³⁵

Returning our focus to all the sub-captains, as table 2.4 demonstrates, it is possible to identify numerous horizontal ties forged through shared military experiences. In 1394, for example, Sir John Dabridgecourt and Sir Edward Burnell, son of Hugh, lord Burnell, served alongside each other in the personal retinue of John of Gaunt. For Burnell, who had been born sometime before 1386, the 1394 expedition was his first taste of military life.³³⁶ He seems to have impressed Gaunt during the campaign as he was retained by him as a personal retainer in 1397.³³⁷ During the 1394 expedition Burnell would undoubtedly have come into contact with Sir John Dabridgecourt. When the two met again in 1415, they would have been able to reminisce about their shared experience of the 1394 campaign. Similar examples include John Stokes and John Driver who sailed together under the command of Thomas, Lord Berkeley, in 1404, while Sir John Heron and Ralph Neville had served alongside one another under Rustin de Villa Nova in Wales in the same year.

³³¹ Wylie, *Henry IV*, 3, p.369 n.6; *CCR*, 1409-1413, pp.439, 440.

³³² Woolgar, *Household Accounts*, 2, p.628.

³³³ *PPC*, 3, p.30-33; *CPR*, 1422-1429, pp.59-60.

³³⁴ *CCR*, 1419-1422, p.107.

³³⁵ *Royal Wills*, ed. Nichols, p.230-236; *The Register of Henry Chichele Archbishop of Canterbury, 1414-1443*, ed. E.F. Jacob, 4 vols (Oxford, 1937-1947), 2, pp.293-296; Woolgar, *Household Accounts*, 2, pp.628, 636, 640.

³³⁶ *CP*, 2, pp.435-436.

³³⁷ Walker, *Lancastrian Affinity*, p.266.

At first glance the military service statistics for Clarence 1415 retinue suggest that significant change had occurred to the military community, and that the 'dynamics of recruitment' had shifted considerably. However, having considered the numerous limitations of the surviving sources, as well as the context which the military community found itself in during the period 1390-1415 this conclusion seems presumptive. Some of Clarence's men, even with the lacuna of nominal data, can be shown to have had significant military experience. They may have actively sought out military employment and it may have been their main profession. Furthermore, that as many as 10 (16%) of his 1415 sub-captains can be identified to have served with him in 1412 suggests a degree of loyalty to him. It would also seem that a core of principal captains existed at the heart of Clarence's retinue, which would have, as in the days of the fourteenth century, 'provided a nucleus around which less stable elements of the retinue could gather'. Consequently, the image we have of Clarence's retinue at this stage is not uniform and it may be that the 'dynamics of recruitment' had not altered so significantly as first appeared. It may be that Clarence's retinue is evidence of continuity from the late fourteenth-century into the early fifteenth, with regards to retinue level stability, and the number of militarily experienced individuals in the recruitment market. In order to explore these issues further, we need to delve deeper into the duke's 1415 retinue.

Table 2.4: The Military Service History of Clarence's Sub-Captains: Before 1415

† = Service directly under Clarence

* = Service under another Captain

Captain	1374	1378	1380	1383	1385	1386	1394	1395	1396	1397	1399	1400	1401	1402	1403	1404	1405	1408	1412	1413	1414
Sir John Dabridgecourt ³³⁸	*		*	*		*	*				*			*				†			
Sir Edward Burnell ³³⁹							*														
Sir John Colville ³⁴⁰							*				*								†		
Sir John Heron ³⁴¹																*					
Sir William Bowes ³⁴²															*		*				
Sir William Bowet ³⁴³																			†		
Sir Philip Branche ³⁴⁴																		†			

³³⁸ C76/57, m.20 (1374); C76/65, m.19 (1380); C76/68, m.19 (1383); C76/70, m.28 (1386); C61/104, m.9 (1394-1395); *Chronicles of the Revolution*, ed. Given-Wilson, pp.250-253 (1399); *CRP 1401-1405*, p.137. (1402); *CPR, 1405-1408*, p.456 (1408).

³³⁹ C61/104, m.7.

³⁴⁰ *CPR, 1391-1396*, p.472 (1394); *CPR, 1396-1399*, p.559 (1399); C76/95, m.12 (1412).

³⁴¹ C47/2/49/19, m.1.

³⁴² E101/43/21, m.1 (1403); C76/89, m.17 (1405).

³⁴³ C76/95, m.8 (Overseas); C76/95, m.11 (Guînes Castle).

Sir John Pudsey ³⁴⁵				*	*									*						
Ralph Cromwell ³⁴⁶																		†		
Henry Noon ³⁴⁷																		†		
Roger Chamber ³⁴⁸													*					†		
Henry Godard ³⁴⁹					*						*									
Robert Bitvelaine ³⁵⁰															*					
Walter Interbergh ³⁵¹																		†		
Thomas Thwaite ³⁵²								*	*	*										
James Fresel ³⁵³																		†		
Thomas Corbet ³⁵⁴																				†

³⁴⁴ *CPR, 1408-1413*, p.41.

³⁴⁵ BL, Cotton Roll, XIII.8, m.3 (1383 and 1385); *CPR, 1401-1405*, pp.247, 297 (1403).

³⁴⁶ *Foedera*, 8, p.751.

³⁴⁷ *CPR, 1408-1413*, p.41.

³⁴⁸ E101/43/18, m.1 (1402); C76/95, m.11 (1412).

³⁴⁹ E101/40/39, m.1 (1385); E101/42/16, m.38 (1400).

³⁵⁰ *CPR, 1401-1405*, p.335.

³⁵¹ C76/95, m.12.

³⁵² E101/41/18, m.10 (1395-1397).

³⁵³ C76/95, m.11.

³⁵⁴ C76/96, m.4. (Service to Guînes. Revoked: *CPR, 1413-1416*, p.194).

Arthur Ormesby ³⁵⁵													*		*						
Henry Mulso ³⁵⁶																			†	†	
Ralph Neville ³⁵⁷																*			†		
John Stokes ³⁵⁸		*	*													*					
John Talbot ³⁵⁹																	†				
Alain Gauthorpe ³⁶⁰																			†		
John Bayhous ³⁶¹																			†		
John Driver ³⁶²																*					

³⁵⁵ C61/108, m.9 (1401); E101/43/21, m.1 (1403).

³⁵⁶ C76/95, m.19 (Guînes, 1412); C76/95, m.4 (Guînes, 1413).

³⁵⁷ E101/43/29, m.3 and C47/2/49/19, m.1 (1404); C76/95, m.12 (1412).

³⁵⁸ E101/36/39, m.10 (1378); E101/39/7, m.1 (1380 - There were two people named John Stokes on this campaign. For the other: E101/39/9, m.3); E101/43/32, m.5 (1404).

³⁵⁹ C76/88, m.8.

³⁶⁰ C76/95, m.12.

³⁶¹ C76/95, m.10.

³⁶² E101/43/32, m.5.

In moving deeper into Clarence's retinue, it must be remembered that, as Ayton identified, much of a retinue's stability, or lack thereof, was due to non-military ties.³⁶³ These often stemmed from an individual's geographic origin, career experiences and familial connections. An exploration of the geographic origins of Clarence's sub-captains has revealed that he had a truly nationwide recruitment reach. As chart 2.5 shows, he recruited the majority of his captains from the North and Midland counties. This should occasion no surprise when it is remembered that his principal landholdings were concentrated in Holderness, in the east riding of Yorkshire, and in Lincolnshire, Middlesex and Shropshire.³⁶⁴ The majority of those who originated from the North came from the county of Yorkshire. These eight Yorkshiremen were bound to each other through their shared geographic origin, and together formed a 'regional comradeship group'.³⁶⁵

One member of this group was Sir John Godard. His father, Sir John Godard, had fought under John of Gaunt and the Black Prince at Nájera and had marched with Richard II to Scotland in 1385.³⁶⁶ In 1415 Sir John (junior) served alongside his younger brother Henry, who also held lands in Holderness. Another member of this Yorkshire based posse was Brian Stapleton, brother-in-law to Sir John.³⁶⁷ For Stapleton, who had married Sir John's younger sister Agnes around 1391, the 1415 campaign was particularly lucrative as he managed to take eight prisoners.³⁶⁸ Sir John was also vertically tied to Clarence, not just through his father's association with the Lancastrian family, but also through his own landholdings. He held a moiety of the manors of Sutton-on-Hull, Bransholme and Coinston, in addition to numerous other lands, from the duke.³⁶⁹ Less than five miles from Coinston, the manor of Benningholme was held by the Bukton family, of whom the esquire captain William Bukton

³⁶³ Ayton, 'The English Army at Crécy', p.214.

³⁶⁴ *CIPM*, 21, pp.308-309; *CFR*, 14, pp.378-379, 409; *CFR*, 15, pp.48, 63; Woolgar, *Household Accounts*, 2, pp.604-689. As stated in the *CP*, it appears Clarence never held the honour of Clare, in Suffolk, the ancestral lands associated with the dukedom of Clarence. Instead they were held in the York line of the Royal family: *CP*, 3, pp.258-259.

³⁶⁵ Ayton, 'Armies and Military Communities', pp.225-226.

³⁶⁶ C. Rawcliffe, 'Godard, Sir John', *HoP*, <www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1386-1421/member/godard-sir-john-1346-1392>, [Accessed 6 July 2018]; *Scrope vs. Grosvenor*, 2, pp.389-390.


³⁶⁷ *CIPM*, 23, p.230.

³⁶⁸ C. Rawcliffe, 'Stapleton, Sir Brian', *HoP*, <www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1386-1421/member/stapleton-sir-brian-1417>, [Accessed 6 July 2018]; Nicolas, *Battle of Agincourt*, p.61 (Appendix 15: 'Names of Persons Entitled to the Ransom of French Prisoners').

³⁶⁹ *CIPM*, 21, p.147.

belonged. William was the youngest son of Sir Peter Bukton, and must have been born during the early years of the fifteenth-century.³⁷⁰

Chart 2.5: The Geographic Origins of Clarence's 1415 Sub-Captains³⁷¹



William's vertical ties to Clarence were due to his father's close relationship with the royal family. Sir Peter had been a confidant of Bolingbroke's and was steward of his household by 1390. When Bolingbroke went into exile, he appointed Bukton to manage his and his son's estates. Following Henry's usurpation of the crown, it is highly likely that

³⁷⁰ C. Rawcliffe, 'Buckton, Sir Peter', *HoP*, <www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1386-1421/member/buckton-sir-peter-1350-1414>, [Accessed 6 July 2086]; *Testamenta Eboracensia; Or, Wills Registered at York*, ed. J. Raine, 6 vols (London, 1836-1902), 1, pp.360-361.

³⁷¹ The data presented in this chart is based, where known, on an individual's principal residence in 1415. In instances where this information is unknown, the county in which they possessed the most significant landed interest has been counted. Geographic data is available for 36 (59%) of the 61 sub-captains. The counties and individuals in regions are as follows: *North*, Yorkshire (William Bukton, William Calthorn, Sir John Godard, Henry Godard, Sir John Pudsey, John Routh, Brian Stapleton and Robert St Quentin), Northumberland (Sir John Heron, Sir John Lumley and James Fresell, Durham (Sir William Bowes); *Midlands*, Derbyshire (Sir John Dabridgecourt), Nottinghamshire (Sir William Cromwell), Staffordshire (Thomas Ipstones), Northamptonshire (John Bayhous, Thomas Chamber and Henry Mulso), Lincolnshire (Sir Philip Branche, Ralph Cromwell and Arthur Ormesby); *East Anglia*, Norfolk (Sir William Bowet, Robert Bitvelaine, Robert Clifton and Henry Noon), Cambridgeshire (Sir John Colville and Sir Edward Burnell), Buckinghamshire (John Stokes), Essex (Maurice Bruyn, Thomas Marney and Thomas Corbet); *South East*, London (John Morsted); *South West/West Country*, Devon (William Bonville and John St Alban), Dorset (Walter Interbergh), Somerset (Thomas Beaumont). This information has primarily been gained from the *CIPM*, *CFR*, *CFA* and various wills.

Bukton committed regicide for the newly-crowned King by murdering Richard II.³⁷² A host of lucrative and important positions followed, such as his appointment as master forester of Holderness in 1400 and the mayoralty of Bordeaux from 1411-1413. He was also enfeoffed by Clarence in 1407 as he prepared to depart for Ireland and was nominated as his attorney the following year.³⁷³ It was evidently on the coattails of his father that the young William Bukton entered Clarence's service in 1415. The same can be said for John Routh, son of Sir John Routh whose lands were concentrated in the village of Routh, less than 10 miles north of Benningholme.³⁷⁴

William Bukton's heritage also provided him with horizontal ties to some of his 1415 co-captains. One particular talking point existed between Bukton and Sir John Dabridgecourt. In 1390 Bukton's father had competed alongside Sir John and Henry Bolingbroke at the famous St Inglevert tournament.³⁷⁵ If asked about his participation, Sir John Dabridgecourt would undoubtedly have recounted his momentous engagement with Jean Le Maingre, better known as Marshal Boucicaut. As Froissart recounts, having defeated all comers, Boucicaut faced Dabridgecourt; 'they commenced their second course with vigour, and hit each other hard on the helmets, but the spears slipped off ... having lost their spears, they were brought to them by their squires, and they renewed the tilt. This time they were both severely unhelmed, and gallantly finished their course'.³⁷⁶ Two years after the tournament Sir Peter sat on a Commission of the Peace alongside his neighbour Sir John Godard.³⁷⁷ Similarly Sir Peter had worked alongside Sir John St Quintin, father or grandfather of Clarence's 1415 sub-captain Robert St Quintin, in 1395 when both were summoned to Parliament to represent Yorkshire.³⁷⁸ At this parliament also sat Sir William

³⁷² *Chronique de la traison et mort de Richart deux roy Dengleterre*, ed and trans. B. Williams (London, 1846), pp.248-251.

³⁷³ *CPR, 1405-1408*, pp.363, 439.

³⁷⁴ C. Rawcliffe, 'Routh, Sir John', *HoP*, <www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1386-1421/member/routh-sir-john-1430>, [Accessed 6 July 2018].

³⁷⁵ Probably the most well documented tournament of the later Middle Ages: *Sir John Froissart's Chronicles of England, France, Spain, and the Adjoining Countries*, ed and trans. T. Johnes, 12 vols (London, 1806), 10, pp.88-116; *Chronique de religieux de Saint-Denys, contenant le regne de Charles VI de 1380 a 1422*, ed and trans. L. Bellaguet, 6 vols (1839-1852), 1, pp.673-682; *Le Livre des Faicts du mon Messire Jean le Maingre, dit Boucicaut*, in *Novelle collection des memoires pour servir a l'histoire de France*, series I, 2, pp.230-232: *Jean Juvenal des Ursins*, *Ibid*, p.385.

³⁷⁶ *Froissart*, ed and trans. Johnes, 10, pp.114-115.

³⁷⁷ *CPR, 1391-1396*, p.91.

³⁷⁸ C. Rawcliffe, 'Quintin, Sir John', *HoP*, <www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1386-1421/member/st-quintin-sir-john-1347-1398>, [Accessed 6 July 2018].

Bonville, grandfather of William Bonville of Devon, another of Clarence's sub-captains from 1415.³⁷⁹ John Routh's father also knew his neighbours Sir Peter Bukton and Sir John Godard (the elder) from various shrieval commissions. In 1399, for example, Routh and Bukton were ordered to arrest Thomas Holme.³⁸⁰ The 'regional comradeship group' from Yorkshire were thus bound together by generation-old ties of geographic origin, career experiences and familial connections.

Looking beyond Yorkshire to the other counties in which Clarence held estates, further vertical and horizontal ties can be discovered. Sir William Bowes of Durham was certainly tied to Clarence as he was a personal retainer of the duke by 1415. Bowes had been employed by Henry IV during the early years of his reign. In 1405, for instance, he was tasked with delivering letters to the French ambassadors during the peace negotiations of that year.³⁸¹ By 1407 he had been retained by John, earl of Somerset, for 20l per year.³⁸² As a retainer of the Somerset household, Bowes almost certainly came into contact with Henry, son of John, the future earl. In this capacity he would also have come into contact with Clarence when he became Henry's step-father through his marriage to Margaret in 1412. Indeed, less than two years later, on 25 August 1414, Sir William was retained by the duke for 40l per year from the revenues of his lands in Holderness.³⁸³ Similar to the situation with the men-at-arms of Clarence's personal company, had more of his household accounts survived it may have been possible to identify more of his sub-captains as personal retainers. As such, with the exception of John Talbot who was probably a servant of Clarence's, no additional sub-captains from 1415 can be identified to have been personally retained by the duke by the time of the campaign.³⁸⁴

Looking beyond the 1415 campaign, seven of Clarence's sub-captains, including Bowes, were at some point retained by the duke.³⁸⁵ One individual who was quite likely

³⁷⁹ J.S. Roskell and L.S. Woodger, 'Bonville, Sir William (I)', *HoP*, <www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1386-1421/member/bonville-sir-william-i-1332-1408>, [Accessed 15 July 2018].

³⁸⁰ *CPR, 1389-1392*, p.434; *CPR, 1391-1396*, p.84; *CPR, 1388-1392*, p.434.

³⁸¹ *CPR, 1401-1405*, p.101, 285; *CCR, 1399-1402*, p.532; *PPC, 2*, pp.xl-xli, 57-59.

³⁸² *CPR, 1408-1413*, p.220.

³⁸³ *CPR, 1416-1422*, p.414; *CSL*, p.170.

³⁸⁴ *SC8/144/7171*.

³⁸⁵ Woolgar, *Household Accounts*, 2, p.605 (Sir John Lumley), 626 (Sir John Heron), 628 (Sir John Colville), 642 (Ralph Cromwell and Walter Interbergh), 651 (John Bayhous and Francis Toppesfeld. The latter was a member of Clarence's personal company in 1415).

retained by Clarence after 1415 was Sir John Lumley. He certainly held lands directly from the duke by 1418, as Clarence's surviving household accounts show.³⁸⁶ Sir John had done well to reintegrate himself with the Lancastrians after the actions of his father and brother. His father, Ralph, first lord Lumley, had been an active member of the Northumberland gentry and had been present in the Parliaments of 1384, 1390 and 1399.³⁸⁷ At Christmas of 1399, however, although originally having assented to the imprisonment of Richard II, Ralph, and his eldest son Thomas, joined the earl of Huntingdon's Epiphany Rising. It did not end well. Both Ralph and Thomas were captured by the town's people of Cirencester. Ralph was beheaded there, and Thomas died shortly afterward while in custody.³⁸⁸ Lumley's lands were entrusted to the keeping of John, earl of Somerset. In 1411 Sir John, who had been knighted before 1405, petitioned Parliament requesting them to recognise him as the rightful heir to Sir Ralph. The King, with the assent of Parliament, granted the petition.³⁸⁹ Ralph's actions evidently did not greatly hinder the advancement of his son. Nor did the King punish Ralph's widow, Eleanor. On 23 February 1400 he granted to her £100 from the bishoprics of Durham and York to help her support her 12 children.³⁹⁰ Feeding and raising the children was obviously an expensive task as she received an additional £20 grant from the King in November.³⁹¹

Returning to 1415, the two Northamptonshire men, Henry Mulso and John Bayhous, were close associates.³⁹² Following the death of John Bayhous, father of John Bayhous, his lands, which straddled the Northamptonshire and Huntingdon border, were taken by Henry Mulso on account of the minority of his son, who had been born in late 1390.³⁹³ Mulso was granted keeping of the property on April 17, and was instructed to look after the heir, and

³⁸⁶ Woolgar, *Household Accounts*, 2, p.605

³⁸⁷ *CP*, 8, pp.269-271. The *CP* does not note Lumley's presence at the 1390 parliament. For this: *PROME*, 'Richard II: January 1390'.

³⁸⁸ *A Chronicle of London*, ed. Nicolas, p.86; *The Chronicles of London*, ed. C.L. Kingsford (Oxford, 1905), p.62; *The Brut, or The Chronicles of England*, ed. F.W.D. Brie, 2 vols (London, 1908), 1, p.547; *Chronique de la Traison et Mort*, p.244; *CPR, 1401-1405*, p.425.

³⁸⁹ *PROME*, 'Henry IV: November 1411'. In the Parliament of November 1461, in a reflection of the changed dynasty, Edward IV posthumously pardoned Ralph Lumley: *PROME*, 'Edward IV: November 1461'.

³⁹⁰ *CPR, 1399-1401*, p.219.

³⁹¹ *Ibid*, p.369. Confirmed by Henry V in July 1413: *CPR, 1413-1416*, p.68.

³⁹² On Mulso: G.L. Harriss, 'Mulso family (*per. c.*1350-1460)', *ODNB*, <<https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/52789>>, [Accessed 6 July 2018].

³⁹³ He had possessed some lands in the neighbouring Honour of Tutbury. By 1401-1402 these lands were no longer his: *CFA*, 6, p.613.

support the buildings and lands.³⁹⁴ By May 1413 a proof of age inquisition was taken and it found that John Bayhous was aged 21 years on 3 November 1412. As such, it was ordered that Mulso hand the lands back to Bayhous, which he rapidly did.³⁹⁵ Henry Mulso was son of John Mulso and grandson of William Mulso. During the 1370s William had been Keeper of the Wardrobe for Edward III.³⁹⁶ John Mulso had served alongside Sir Roger Chamber, father of the sub-captain Thomas Chamber, on Commissions of Oyer and Terminer in 1391 and 1392.³⁹⁷ John was a stout supporter of Henry IV and had lent him 100l for his wars in 1401.³⁹⁸ In return he was granted six trees by the King and allowed to take two bucks per season from the royal park at Brigstock.

Moving southwards, a number of Clarence's sub-captains can be identified to have originated from various counties in the West Country. William Bonville, son of John Bonville and grandson of the more noteworthy Sir William Bonville, was, for example, from Shute, Devon.³⁹⁹ That Clarence's recruitment reach stretched as far south as the West Country is explained by the fact that the duchess, Margaret, possessed significant lands there from her previous marriage to John, earl of Somerset.⁴⁰⁰ Indeed, as the aforementioned example of Sir William Bowes highlights, it would appear that Clarence was able to recruit from the former earl's network after his death in 1410. It is also the case that Clarence recruited at least one sub-captain from the King's network. This was Sir William Cromwell, who had been retained by Henry IV as a knight of the Hall and Chamber soon after his ascension to the throne.⁴⁰¹ Sir William was the brother of Ralph, lord Cromwell, and uncle to the lord's son, Ralph Cromwell, who he served alongside in Clarence's retinue in 1415.

Returning to the West Country, one fascinating individual who was very closely associated with Clarence, and the Lancastrian family more generally, was Walter

³⁹⁴ *CPR, 1396-1399*, p.328; *CFR*, 11, p.228.

³⁹⁵ *CIPM*, 19, p.367; *CFA*, 6, p.463.

³⁹⁶ C. Given-Wilson, *The Royal Household and the King's Affinity: Service, Politics and Finance in England, 1360-1413* (London, 1986), p.298.

³⁹⁷ *CPR, 1391-1396*, pp.78, 292.

³⁹⁸ *CPR, 1401-1405*, pp.422, 518.

³⁹⁹ J.S. Roskell and L.S. Woodger, 'Bonville, Sir William (II)', *HoP*, <www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1386-1421/member/bonville-sir-william-ii-1392-1461>, [Accessed 6 July 2018].

⁴⁰⁰ *CIPM*, 25, pp.368-373.

⁴⁰¹ *CPR, 1399-1400*, p.195; A. Rogers, 'The Royal Household of Henry IV', PhD thesis (University of Nottingham, 1966), pp.288, 689. His annuity was in arrears by 1406: *CSL*, p.142.

Interbergh.⁴⁰² He had served Henry IV as a servant during his pilgrimage to Jerusalem in 1392-1393.⁴⁰³ He accompanied Henry all the way to the Holy City itself. During the pilgrimage he was entrusted with carrying important royal letters and, as the party returned to Paris, he was instructed to go ahead and prepare Henry's lodgings in the city. It was surely through his association with Bolingbroke that he entered Clarence service. He is first known to have served under him in Ireland in 1402. On this occasion he is noted as having been employed as his 'avenar', head of the stables.⁴⁰⁴ By 1408 Interbergh had been promoted to Receiver-General of Clarence's household and was also nominated as his attorney in England in the same year.⁴⁰⁵

Thus far, the geographic origins of Clarence's sub-retinue have related to the counties in which he and his wife held lands and property. However, as chart 2.5 demonstrated, a significant amount (37%) of his sub-captains, for whom geographic data is known, came from East Anglia, mainly Norfolk, Cambridgeshire and Essex. The countess held some lands in Essex; although neither she nor her husband held significant property in Norfolk or Cambridgeshire.⁴⁰⁶ That such a large contingent came from these East Anglian counties is thus surprising. One individual who came from Norfolk was Robert Bitvelaine, who held lands at Winfarthing and lands from Thomas Mowbray, earl of Norfolk in the village of Flordon.⁴⁰⁷ The early part of Bitvelaine's career was shaped by his association to the earl of Norfolk, for example he served under the earl in Wales in 1404.⁴⁰⁸ In 1405 Bitvelaine became caught up in the rebellion of the earl of Norfolk and Richard Scrope, archbishop of York, in support of Henry Percy.⁴⁰⁹ Following the debacle at Shipton Moor, Norfolk, Scrope and their comitivas were arrested and taken to the strategically-important Pontefract castle. One of those so arrested and taken to the castle was Bitvelaine. On July 20 the King ordered Sir Thomas Erpingham to collect Bitvelaine from the castle and to hold

⁴⁰² *CPR, 1399-1401*, p.543; *CFR*, 12, p.11; *CFA*, 6, p.431.

⁴⁰³ *Expeditions to Prussia and the Holy Land made by Henry of Derby*, ed. L. Toulmin-Smith, Camden Series 2, 52 (Westminster, 1894), pp.lxii-lxxx, 246, 247, 251, 253, 255.

⁴⁰⁴ *Rotulorum patentium et clausorum cancellariæ hiberniæ calendarium*, ed. E. Tresham (Dublin, 1828), p.165.

⁴⁰⁵ Rogers, 'The Royal Household', p.694 citing: E403/596; *CPR, 1405-1408*, p.439.

⁴⁰⁶ *CIPM*, 25, p.371.

⁴⁰⁷ *CIPM*, 18, p.111; *CFR*, 12, p.128; *CFA*, 3, pp.626, 643, 644. His father, Robert, had been a tax collector in the county: *CFR*, 10, p.118; *CFR*, 11, p.140; *CCR, 1402-1405*, pp.314-315.

⁴⁰⁸ Table 2.4.

⁴⁰⁹ Wylie, *Henry IV*, 2, pp.224-227.

him in his safe-keeping until further notice.⁴¹⁰ Bitvelaine was lucky, unlike his erstwhile lord who was beheaded at York, he was pardoned in October by the King for his part in the rising.⁴¹¹ The records are silent on Bitvelaine's subsequent activities until 1415.

That many sub-captains came from East Anglia is explained by the fact that, akin to the situation among his sub-captains from Yorkshire, Clarence's East Anglian sub-captains were often sons of men closely tied to him personally, or to the Lancastrian regime more generally. Henry Noon, for instance, was son of Sir Edmund Noon, steward of the duke's household in Ireland in 1401.⁴¹² Sir Edmund would undoubtedly have known Walter Interbergh and Sir Peter Bukton from their time in Ireland together. Another sub-captain from East Anglia was Thomas Marney, son of Sir William Marney.⁴¹³ Sir William had been Clarence's chamberlain from 1411 until his death in 1414, and was a feoffee for him in 1407.⁴¹⁴ Sir William's father, Sir Robert had a number of property agreements with Sir Ingram Bruyn, father of the sub-captain Maurice Bruyn. These agreements related to the manors of Rowner and Fordingbridge in Hampshire and South Ockington in Essex.⁴¹⁵ On the death of Sir Robert the agreements passed to Sir William and on his death to Thomas. The two families were closely associated with each other. When Sir Ingram died in 1400, Maurice was heir to his estates and properties in Essex, Dorset, Kent and Hampshire.⁴¹⁶ However, due to his youth, his inheritance was held by his mother until she died in 1403. Thereafter it was held by individuals appointed by the King, until he came of age in 1407.⁴¹⁷ One of those so appointed by the King was Sir William Marney.⁴¹⁸ Thus horizontal ties of shared landholding and familial association bound Thomas Marney and Maurice Bruyn together.

⁴¹⁰ *CPR, 1405-1408*, p.68

⁴¹¹ Wylie, *Henry IV*, 2, p.240; *CPR, 1405-1408*, p.80.

⁴¹² L.S. Woodger, 'Noon, Sir Edmund', *HoP*, <www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1386-1421/member/noon-sir-edmund-1413>, [Accessed 6 July 2018]; *Rotulorum patentium et clausorum*, pp.164-168.

⁴¹³ L.S. Woodger, 'Marney, Sir William', *HoP*, <www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1386-1421/member/marney-sir-william-1370-1414>, [Accessed 6 July 2018].

⁴¹⁴ *Ibid*; *CPR, 1405-1408*, p.490.

⁴¹⁵ *CCR, 1392-1396*, pp.124, 126; *CCR, 1389-1392*, pp.501-502; 'Parishes: Rowner', *A History of the County of Hampshire*, ed. W. Page, 5 vols (London, 1908), 3, pp.218-219.

⁴¹⁶ *CIPM*, 19, pp.32-33; *CFR*, 12, p.74.

⁴¹⁷ *CFR*, 10, p.222; *CPR, 1401-1405*, p.334; *CIPM*, 19, pp.62-63, 115-116; *CCR, 1405-1409*, p.298.

⁴¹⁸ *CPR, 1405-1408*, pp.122, 312.

Similarly Ralph Cromwell, son of Ralph, lord Cromwell, who mainly resided at Tattershall, Lincolnshire, had joint landholdings with Sir John Heron. In 1406 Cromwell (noted as the younger) and Sir John Heron were jointly gifted lands in Bingham by Robert Belle of Nottinghamshire.⁴¹⁹ In 1412 Cromwell gifted to Sir John Heron, and others, all his lands in Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire.⁴²⁰ These examples not only highlight that Cromwell and Heron knew each other well by 1415, but also that many members of the landed gentry held lands in numerous counties and often in areas geographically distant from one another. Sir John Dabridgecourt, as we will see, held lands from Derbyshire to Kent. Men of sub-knightly status also held estates which crossed county boundaries, just one example would be Thomas Chamber, son of Sir Roger Chamber, who held lands and property in Northamptonshire, Oxfordshire and London.⁴²¹

Another individual vertically tied to Clarence was Sir Edward Burnell, who, as we have seen, was son and heir of Hugh, lord Burnell. Lord Burnell has been a stalwart supporter of the Lancastrians and had been retainer of Gaunt's in 1397.⁴²² He had also fought with young prince Henry during the Welsh wars of the early fifteenth-century.⁴²³ Moreover, as is well known, lord Burnell was one of those who received the forced abdication of Richard II on 30 September 1399.⁴²⁴ In addition to the vertical ties to Clarence that Sir Edward Burnell's heritage gave him, his father's career and familial connections also afforded him some horizontal ties to his 1415 co-captains. In 1401 Burnell served on the Great Council of that year alongside Ralph, lord Cromwell (father of Ralph), Sir Walter FitzWalter (father of Humphrey), Sir Peter Bukton (father of William), Sir John Dabridgecourt and John Mulso (father of Henry).⁴²⁵ Lord Burnell also served alongside Clarence and Dabridgecourt on the council of 1405.⁴²⁶ Burnell and Dabridgecourt were also both present at the Coronation of Henry V, along with the young William Bukton, as they had all been

⁴¹⁹ CD/400.

⁴²⁰ CD/405.

⁴²¹ C. Rawcliffe, 'Chambre, Sir Roger de la', *HoP*, <www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1386-1421/member/chambre-roger-de-la-1400>, [Accessed 6 July 2018].

⁴²² Walker, *Lancastrian Affinity*, p.266.

⁴²³ *CPR, 1402-1405*, pp.266-267; Sumption, *Cursed Kings*, p.57.

⁴²⁴ *PROME*, 'Henry IV: September 1399'; *Chronica Maiora*, ed. Taylor, et al, pp.160-161; J. Capgrave, *De Illustribus Henricis*, ed. F.C. Hingeston (London, 1858), p.106; *Chronicles of the Revolution*, ed. Given-Wilson, p.169; *The New Chronicles of England and France in Two Parts by Robert Fabyan, Named by Himself the Concordance of Histories*, ed. H. Ellis (London, 1811), p.546.

⁴²⁵ *PPC*, 1, pp.155-164.

⁴²⁶ *Ibid*, 2, pp.98-100.

given robes especially for the occasion.⁴²⁷ Furthermore, Burnell had also sat alongside Ralph, lord Cromwell, Ralph Lumley (father of Sir John), Sir Edward Noon (father of Henry), Sir William Bonville (grandfather of William) and Sir Walter FitzWalter during the Parliament of 1399 which deposed Richard II. Lord Burnell's association with the FitzWalter family grew significantly when he married Joan, widow of Sir Walter FitzWalter, sometime between 1408 and 1409.⁴²⁸ By this marriage, Sir Edward Burnell and Humphrey FitzWalter became step-brothers. Staying with the FitzWalter family, following the death of Walter, Sir William Marny was involved with the countess of Hereford in 1412 in founding a chantry for the souls of Sir Walter, his wife Eleanor and his heirs.⁴²⁹ When Humphrey and Thomas served alongside each other in 1415 the actions of their fathers ensured a potent horizontal bond existed between them.

This investigation into Clarence's sub-captains has so far revealed a web of vertical connections to the duke, and horizontal ties between the sub-captains themselves, prior to their gathering at Southampton in 1415. The identification of 'regional comradeship groups' has been possible, plus we have highlighted associations with the duke, and the Lancastrian royal family more generally, which can, in some cases, be traced back generations. We have also been able to identify a core group of eight principal sub-captains who would have helped ensure the smooth operating of the retinue. They would have provided the retinue with a strong degree of stability, cohesion and professionalism and would have acted as the 'nucleus around which less stable elements could collect'.⁴³⁰ This stability and cohesiveness would have been of great importance during the siege of Harfleur.

The Siege of Harfleur

Following the successful and relatively uneventful disembarkation of his troops and equipment near Sainte-Adresse from Wednesday 14 August until Saturday 17, King Henry, as the *Gesta Henrici Quinti* informs us, formed his army into three 'battles'; three

⁴²⁷ It is also possible, although unlikely due to the commonality of their names, that the sub-captains, John Gerard, Thomas Corbet and John Middleton were also the ceremony: G. Dodd, 'Henry V's Establishment: Service, Loyalty and Reward in 1413', *Henry V: New Interpretations*, ed. G. Dodd (Woodbridge, 2013), pp.35-77 (pp.68-77).

⁴²⁸ *CP*, 2, pp.435-436.

⁴²⁹ *CPR, 1408-1413*, p.411.

⁴³⁰ Lewis, 'The Organisation of Indenture Retinues', pp.33-34.

divisions.⁴³¹ The first was placed under the command of Clarence, and included the duke of York's retinue. It was ordered to lay siege to Harfleur from the eastern side. As Clarence and his men marched to their position they found their way blocked by a lake formed by the defenders of Harfleur, in an attempt to hinder the English, by closing the town's northern sluice gates on the Lézarde river. Clarence's force had to undertake a 16km circuitous detour, not arriving at the eastern side of the town until Monday 19 August, by which time the French knight Raoul de Gaucourt had managed to rush 300 men-at-arms into Harfleur to bolster its garrison. The detour was not without incident. As the duke and his men passed the town of Montivilliers, the garrison sallied forth and attacked the division. When they eventually neared the eastern side of the town, Clarence's bloodied force stumbled upon a French supply convoy and succeeded in capturing many 'carts and wagons belonging to the enemy, with a great quantity of guns and powder-barrels and missiles and catapults'. These were the first in a series of brutal engagements between his men and the defenders of Harfleur.

With Henry in the west and Clarence in the east, and communication maintained between the two via boat across the Lézarde-lake, Harfleur was fully invested by 23 August. Once in position, both commanders sought to fortify their positions rapidly by ordering trenches to be dug and earthworks constructed. In taking the fight to the enemy, Henry instructed Clarence to have his men dig a tunnel and undermine Harfleur's walls. We saw earlier that these men are listed on Clarence's muster roll as having been under the command of Sir John Dabridgecourt. As the *Gesta* recounts, three times these miners tried this tactic, and each time were beaten back by the 'counter-mines and other technical skills' of the defenders. One can only imagine the dark, damp and dangerous conditions they worked in. The mine having failed, Clarence next sought to have his men build large faggots (bundles of wooden branches) with which to fill a section of the ditch around Harfleur. Again, the defenders were victorious in countering the English tactics. They had stockpiled 'powders and combustible' to set fire to the faggots and to the Englishmen attempting to place them in the ditch. With his assaults on Harfleur thwarted, and in clear recognition of his isolation from the main English force, Clarence ordered his men to fortify their camp,

⁴³¹ For what follows: *Gesta Henrici Quinti: The Deeds of Henry the Fifth*, ed and trans. F. Taylor and J.S. Roskell (Oxford, 1975), pp.27-53; *Chronica Maiora*, ed. Taylor, et al, pp.666-673; Curry, *Agincourt*, pp.85-107.

and protect his artillery and gunners, by digging new trenches and constructing additional defences with stakes and tree trunks.⁴³² Interestingly, the *Gesta* make it clear that the men-at-arms and archers dug the trenches together. Eventually, on 18 September, the defenders entered into negotiations with the English regarding the surrender of the town. Although the details are confused, and the chronicle accounts contradictory, it is highly likely that the defenders first approached Clarence, who passed on their desire for negotiations to Henry. The King received the surrender of the town and its keys on 22 September.

Although the siege had lasted only around four weeks, not long by medieval standards, the impact it had upon Henry's army was significant.⁴³³ We do not know how many perished at the siege for certain. Indeed, as Curry has commented, 'the post campaign accounts reveal very few losses from deaths at the siege'.⁴³⁴ This observation is supported by the fact that only three members of Clarence's entire retinue can be identified to have died outside the walls of Harfleur. The first to die was the young and inexperienced Humphrey FitzWalter, who died on 1 September.⁴³⁵ The second member known to have died at the siege was Sir Edward Burnell who passed away on 23 September.⁴³⁶ In an emotive reminder of the impact the war had on families, he left behind his wife, Elizabeth, and three daughters, Joyce aged 20, Margery 9 and Katherine 6. The third soldier known to have died at the siege was a man-at-arms named Hugh Willoughby who served under Sir John Dabridgecourt.⁴³⁷

Indeed, Sir John himself died at some point during the campaign. It is not known precisely when, but the lands he held from the Crown in Kent were given away by the King on 1 December.⁴³⁸ Before departing for the campaign Sir John had made a lengthy will on 25 July. From this document we get the distinct impression that he was fully aware of the risks of undertaking military service at his advanced age. Within the first few lines of this long and evidently well thought-out document, Dabridgecourt ordered that his body was to be buried

⁴³² On the role of artillery at the siege: D. Spencer, "'The Scourge of the Stones': English Gunpowder Artillery at the Siege of Harfleur", *JMH*, 43 (2017), 59-73.

⁴³³ J. Norris, *Medieval Siege Warfare* (Stroud, 2007).

⁴³⁴ Curry, *Agincourt*, p.128.

⁴³⁵ *CIPM*, 22, pp.192-198.

⁴³⁶ *CIPM*, 20, p.163; *CCR*, 1419-1422, p.150. He was not, as the *CP* states, 'slain at Agincourt': *CP*, 2, pp.435-436.

⁴³⁷ *CIPM*, 24, pp.222-224.

⁴³⁸ *CPR*, 1413-1416, p.370.

‘ubicumque Deus disposuerit’ (wherever God chooses). Sir John clearly entertained the possibility that God would ‘choose’ for him to fall during his coming expedition to France. He also added a further lengthy codicil on 25 August, presumably just before he left his estates in Derbyshire to travel to Southampton for the muster.⁴³⁹ Many must have had similar thoughts as they travelled to Southampton in the late summer of 1415.

The precise number of Englishmen who died at the siege of Harfleur is unknown. Unquestionably, though, many fell ill. As Walsingham tell us, the cause of the ‘stomach troubles or dysentery’ which so infected the English army was due to the men having eaten unripe fruit and from the contaminated foul-smelling water, which had become so polluted because animal carcasses had been cast into it.⁴⁴⁰ The spread of infection was hastened by the unseasonably warm daytime temperatures and the significant drop at night. The scale of the infection within the English army is revealed by the sick lists drawn up towards the end of the siege, or shortly afterwards. In total, they detail the names of almost 1,700 men who fell ill with approximately 1,330 of these being frontline soldiers.⁴⁴¹

There are five surviving lists relating to the sick at the siege of Harfleur. A detailed examination of these documents is presented in chapter four. At this stage we may be general and observe that Clarence’s retinue was notably affected by disease. Including the duke himself, 115 (12%) of his retinue can be identified on the sick lists and thus presumed to have fallen ill at the siege. As is discussed more in chapter four, of those 115, 73 can be identified on Clarence’s original muster roll, while 42 cannot. The sick lists therefore suggest that Clarence’s retinue was 865 strong following the surrender of Harfleur on 22 September and comprised 10 knights, 201 men-at-arms and 654 archers. However, the administrative documents created after the campaign provide a different picture. Although also explored in greater detail in chapter four, it is nonetheless necessary to briefly outline the information contained within these documents here. The only post-campaign information we have for the fate of Clarence’s retinue is an entry in E358/6.⁴⁴² This document, similar to the special issue rolls commissioned before the campaign, is a unique account roll created to aid the clerks in organising the army’s post-campaign accounts. According to E358/6, for the second

⁴³⁹ *The Register of Henry Chichele*, 2, pp.51-55 (esp. p.51).

⁴⁴⁰ *Chronica Maiora*, ed. Taylor, et al, p.671.

⁴⁴¹ Allmand, *Henry V*, p.211; Curry, *Sources*, p.425; Curry, *Agincourt*, p.129.

⁴⁴² E358/6, m.1.

quarter, which ran from 6 October to 24 November, Clarence's retinue comprised 6 knights, 151 men-at-arms and 585 archers; a total of 742 soldiers.

The discrepancy of 123 men between the sick list data and E358/6 is examined more in chapter four. However, it must be noted that of those 123 missing men we can be certain they did not all die at the siege of Harfleur. The young Henry Beaufort, earl of Somerset, for example, who did not die until 1418, probably returned to England with Clarence after the siege because E358/6 does not note an earl in Clarence's post-Harfleur retinue. Similarly, no bannerets are noted so it is also likely that Sir John Lumley, the only banneret left after the death of FitzWalter, also returned to England. According to E358/6, only six of Clarence's knights served for the second quarter. Which of the 9 surviving knights this was is unclear. What is known with certainty is that with the exception of Burnell and Dabridgecourt, all of Clarence's knights had careers after 1415. The three who did not accompany the army to Agincourt evidently had not died. They had either returned to England because of illness, but – with the exception of Sir John Colville – are not noted on the sick lists, or they were placed into the garrison of Harfleur.⁴⁴³

It is not known precisely when Clarence departed Harfleur; although by 12 October he had reached Calais, where he stayed only briefly to deliver the heavy artillery used at Harfleur.⁴⁴⁴ The speed of the duke's recovery on his return to England is difficult to gauge as the records are quiet about his activities. He appears to have resumed his seat at the Privy Council rapidly, but it is not clear whether he attended the Parliament which met at Westminster in November 1415, while Henry was overseas.⁴⁴⁵ By the summer of 1416 he was fit again and met King Sigismund of the Holy Roman Empire at Dartmouth in June and was appointed Steward of England around the same time.⁴⁴⁶ The retinue which Clarence left

⁴⁴³ Although there is no evidence that any of Clarence's knights were placed into the garrison of Harfleur: Chapter four.

⁴⁴⁴ Curry, *Agincourt*, p.126 citing: E. Deseille, 'Boulogne en 1415: Études sur les relations des communes du Nord lors du désastre d'Azincourt', *Mémoires de la Société Académique de l'arrondissement de Boulogne-sue-Me*, 9 (1879), pp.413-33 (p.423); *A Collection of the Chronicles and Ancient Histories of Great Britain, now called England, by Jean de Wavrin*, ed and trans. Sir W.L. Hardy and E.L.C.P. Hardy, 5 vols (London, 1864-1891), 2, p.189.

⁴⁴⁵ J.S. Roskell, L. Clark, and C. Rawcliffe, *The History of Parliament: The House of Commons, 1386-1421* (Stroud, 1993), p.72.

⁴⁴⁶ *Gesta Henrici Quinti*, ed. Taylor and Roskell, p.131; Clarence did not indent with the King for the 1416 campaign. Instead, he was appointed Steward of England. Nevertheless, a number of protections state Clarence as captain and the location of service as France. These protections were likely drawn up before it was

behind in France numbered 742 of his original 980 men; 6 knights, 151 men-at-arms and 585 archers.

In the absence of Clarence it is most likely that, as Mortimer has noted, command was given to Edmund Langley, duke of York, who was made constable and marshal of the army after the fall of Harfleur and was given command of the vanguard.⁴⁴⁷ The implication of York's appointment as commander of Clarence's retinue is clear; it remained in the vanguard even after the departure of its commander. Along with the duke of York's retinue, those of Clarence's men who remained after Harfleur fought in the frontlines at Agincourt. Indeed, during the early years of Henry VI's reign an esquire named Thomas Hostell, who served under Sir John Lumley in 1415, petitioned the King for financial help.⁴⁴⁸ To aid his plea he recounted his military service history which included fighting at Harfleur where he was 'smitten with a springolt through the head, losing one eye and having his cheek bone broken'. Not to be disabled by this flesh wound, Hostell stayed in France and fought at Agincourt and at the Battle of the Seine the following year.

At the Battle of Agincourt the English suffered remarkably few casualties and the duke of Clarence's retinue was no exception.⁴⁴⁹ The summary of Clarence's retinue on E358/6 indicates that no members died either on the march to Agincourt, or at the battle itself, as the Crown provided shipping to England for 742 men.⁴⁵⁰ The summary also suggests that the retinue did indeed fight in the front lines at the battle as it notes many prisoners were taken with a combined ransom total of around £600. Disappointingly, it does not detail who took prisoners, or who the prisoners were. Nevertheless, it can be identified that at least three sub-captains took prisoners during the campaign. Brian Stapleton took eight prisoners, while William Bukton was accused after the campaign by two archers named John Craven and Simon Irby of having taken by force their prisoners and ransomed

decided that Clarence would not take part in the campaign: A. Curry, 'After Agincourt, What Next? Henry V and the Campaign of 1416, *The Fifteenth Century: Conflicts, Consequences and the Crown in the Late Middle Ages*, 7, ed. L. Clark (Woodbridge, 2007), pp.23-52 (p.38). A number of chronicles mistakenly place Clarence on the campaign, for example: *Jean de Wavrin*, ed. Hardy and Hardy, 2, p.229.

⁴⁴⁷ Mortimer, *Year of Glory*, p.394 citing Curry, *Sources*, p.67 (Pseudo Elmham); Curry, *Agincourt*, p.94.

⁴⁴⁸ Curry, *Sources*, pp.449-450.

⁴⁴⁹ Curry, *Agincourt*, pp.242-244.

⁴⁵⁰ For more on this 'administrative neatness', see chapter four.

them for his own profit.⁴⁵¹ Sir John Heron took multiple prisoners during the campaign and in November 1416 the King ordered certain accompaniments, such as pots, six goblets and cloth from Paris to be supplied to Sir John 'for his use by certain prisoners'.⁴⁵² The final clause of note in E358/6 is a brief mention that Clarence had been granted the Crown Henry as surety for the second quarter wages. As we saw earlier, the duke was permitted to break and distribute the Crown Henry if he and his men had not received pay within a year and seven months.

This is exactly what happened, although it seems unlikely Clarence waited a year and seven months before portioning up the crown. Being heir presumptive to the throne he would surely have known Henry was never going to be able to raise enough cash in time. To Sir John Pudsey was given a pinnacle of the crown, plus two sapphires and six pearls while Maurice Brune similarly received a pinnacle of the crown which was eventually redeemed in 1431.⁴⁵³ We learn from a case heard in the Court of Chancery that in the 1430s Sir Robert Cromwell, son and heir of Sir William Cromwell and his wife Margaret, attempted to sue Sir John Colville for withholding his father's wages after the 1415 campaign.⁴⁵⁴ According to the case, Clarence had given to Sir John Colville a jewel and a number of precious stones to pass on to Sir William as surety for his wages. However, Sir Robert claimed that Sir William had never received any such collateral. Instead, he claimed that Sir John Colville pocketed the surety for his own keeping. Disappointingly, like the majority of Chancery cases from this period, the outcome is not recorded in the case documents. However, we know that Sir John Colville was given a large fleur-de-lys, one ruby, three great sapphires and ten great pearls by Clarence, so it is entirely possible that one or more of these stones was meant to be passed on to Sir William Cromwell.⁴⁵⁵ The case is emblematic of two issues. Firstly, Sir John Colville was part of Clarence's command network and was evidently trusted, perhaps wrongly, to handle the payments of lesser captains. Secondly, that Clarence's men appear to have had just as much difficulty in receiving pay for their service in 1415 as did many other

⁴⁵¹ *Select Cases in Chancery, 1369-1471*, ed. W.P. Baildon (London, 1896), p.110. There was an archer named John Craven in Clarence's 1415 retinue, under the sub-captain Richard Boteler: E101/45/4, m.11d. There is no reference to an archer named Simon Irby in the 1415 army. There was a man-at-arms of this name serving in 1421: E101/50/1, m.4d.

⁴⁵² *CCR, 1413-1419*, p.326.

⁴⁵³ Nicolas, *The Battle of Agincourt*, p.15 (Appendix 3).

⁴⁵⁴ C1/9/407.

⁴⁵⁵ Nicolas, *The Battle of Agincourt*, p.15 (Appendix 3).

men from many other retinues.⁴⁵⁶ This is further borne out with reference to one more example. In 1433 Ralph Cromwell, who had inherited his father's Lordship of Cromwell following the death of his paternal grandmother in 1419, was appointed Treasurer of England.⁴⁵⁷ In the Parliament which met in July of that year he presented his accounts.⁴⁵⁸ Within these accounts he specified that Margaret, duchess of Clarence, was still owed £1,102 6s and 6d which she had lent to Henry for his 1415 campaign. In return she had been granted certain parts of the Crown Henry as surety. Evidently Henry VI was no more keen, or able, to settle debts than his father had been, even to his own relatives and in-laws.

After Agincourt

As Clarence's battle-hardened but leaderless retinue slowly returned to English shores in late 1415, many must have been aware that they had been part of a significant event. Yet surely few could have anticipated that the war they had reopened would drag on for another four decades and end in almost total English defeat. The subsequent Lancastrian conquest and occupation, which began in earnest in the summer of 1417, provided some of Clarence's 1415 sub-captains, such as Sir Philip Branche and John Bayhous, with lasting employment. For others, such as Sir Maurice Bruyn, who had been knighted by 1417, military service was only sporadically undertaken.⁴⁵⁹ Finally, for some men, such as Thomas Beaumont and Sir John Colville, the 1415 campaign was their only, or final, documented participation in warfare. This is not to suggest that they retired to their estates, for they did not. Beaumont became heavily involved in the shrieval administration of Devon, for example serving as sheriff in 1412, 1420, 1422, 1427 and 1436.⁴⁶⁰ One of his duties as sheriff in 1422 was to escort all the prisoners in Devon 'for treasons or felonies' to wherever the King may have been in the country. Evidently the task was too great to be undertaken by Beaumont and his immediate staff alone, as he petitioned the King for assistance.⁴⁶¹ The King ordered that Beaumont was to be assisted by the keeper of the goal (Robert Baron)

⁴⁵⁶ Curry, *Sources*, pp.428-429.

⁴⁵⁷ R.L. Friedrichs, 'The Career and Influence of Ralph, Lord Cromwell, 1393-1456', PhD. thesis (University of Columbia, 1974); A.C. Reeves, 'Cromwell, Ralph, third Baron Cromwell (1393?-1456)', *ODNB*, <<https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/6767>>, [Accessed 6 July 2018].

⁴⁵⁸ *PROME*, 'Henry VI: July 1433'.

⁴⁵⁹ C76/100, m.6.

⁴⁶⁰ *Lists and Indexes: List of Sheriffs for England and Wales*, ed. A. Hughes (London, 1898), p.35

⁴⁶¹ SC8/306/15281A; SC8/306/15281B.

and the sheriffs of Somerset, Dorset, Wilshire, Southampton, Berkshire, Surrey and Middlesex.⁴⁶² By 1427 his services had been rewarded with a knighthood.⁴⁶³ He lived until March 1451.⁴⁶⁴ Sir John Colville, although a personal retainer of Clarence's until 1421 when he was retained by the King, cannot be identified to have gone to war again after 1415.⁴⁶⁵ Although he did not bear arms again, he did remain active in the shrieval administration of his home counties of Norfolk and Cambridgeshire and was also appointed to the English delegation heading to the General Council of Basle in 1433.⁴⁶⁶

Establishing the military careers of individuals after Agincourt is a task made significantly less burdensome by the survival of many Normandy garrison rolls and the Norman rolls series from 1417 onwards. Although, it must be noted, it is still a challenging task to identify the men of Clarence's retinues. Taking the known sub-captain deaths into consideration, table 2.6 demonstrates that 26 (45%) of the 58 sub-captains who survived the 1415 campaign undertook further military service. Of those 26 who went on to serve again, 12 (46%) can be demonstrated to have done so under Clarence. Eight (31%) served more than once under him. That so many returned to his banner is not surprising. Until his death in 1421, Clarence was, after the King, England's premier military commander.⁴⁶⁷

⁴⁶² CPR, 1416-1422, p.447.

⁴⁶³ CFR, 15, p.195.

⁴⁶⁴ CCR, 1447-1451, p.216.

⁴⁶⁵ CPR, 1416-1422, pp.321-322.

⁴⁶⁶ CPR, 1429-1436, p.342; E101/322/18; E101/322/26.

⁴⁶⁷ On the conquest of Normandy, and on Clarence's role: R.A. Newhall, *The English Conquest of Normandy, 1416-1424: A Study in Fifteenth Century Warfare* (Yale, 1924).

Table 2.6: The Military Service History of Clarence's Sub-Captains: After 1415⁴⁶⁸

† = Service directly under Clarence

* = Service under another Captain

Captain	1416	1417	1418	1419	1420	1421	1422	1424	1425	1426	1427	1428	1429	1432	1434	1436	1439	1440	1441	1442	1443	1445	1447	1451	1453	1461
Sir John Lumley ⁴⁶⁹			†		†	†																				
Sir John Heron ⁴⁷⁰		†	†		*																					
Sir William Bowes ⁴⁷¹			†	†	†	†																				
Sir John Godard ⁴⁷²	†	†	*																							
Sir William Bowet ⁴⁷³			†	†	*	†																				

⁴⁶⁸ Clarence did not serve on the campaign of 1416. However, a number of letters of protection state him as captain for this campaign; this data has been included here.

⁴⁶⁹ C76/101, m.9 (1418); C76/103, m.3 (1420); *The Chronicle of John Hardyng*, ed. H. Ellis (London, 1812), p.384; *Gesta Henrici Quinti, Regis Angliae, in Henrici Quinti Angliae regis, gesta, cum Chronica Neustriae, gallice ab anno M.CCCC.XIV ad M.CCCC. XXII*, ed and trans. B. Williams (London, 1850), pp.1-168 (p.274: Appendix 2) (1421).

⁴⁷⁰ C76/100, m.23 (1417); *Rotuli Normanniae in Turri Londinensi Asservati*, ed. T.D. Hardy (London, 1835), pp.294-296; *Foedera*, 9, p.552 (1418); *CIPM*, 21, p.121; *CFR*, 14, p.333 (1420).

⁴⁷¹ *Rotuli Normanniae*, ed. Hardy, pp.303-306; *Foedera*, 9, p.549 (1418); *DKR*, 41, pp.719, 798 (1419); *Gesta Henrici Quinti*, ed. Williams, p.144 (1420); *Chronica Maiora*, ed. Taylor, et al, p.763; *The Latin Brut*, in *English Historical Literature in the Fifteenth Century*, ed. C.L. Kingsford (Oxford, 1913), pp.310-337 (p.320); *Gesta Henrici Quinti*, ed. Williams, p.275 (1421).

⁴⁷² C76/99, m.12 (1416); *Gesta Henrici Quinti*, ed. Williams, p.267; *Actes de la Chancellerie d'Henri VI concernant la Normandie sous la domination anglaise (1422-1435)*, ed. P. Le Cacheux, 2 vols (Paris, 1907-1908), 1, p.17 (1417); *DKR*, 41, pp.711, 716; *Foedera*, 9, p.543 (1418).

⁴⁷³ C76/101, m.10 (1418) C76/102, m.7; C. Richmond, *The Paston Family in the Fifteenth Century* (Cambridge, 1990), p.207 (1419); *DKR*, 42, p.391 (1420-1421).

John Stokes ⁴⁹²			*	*		*		*	*	*																	
William Bukton ⁴⁹³						*		*	*	*	*	*	*		*	*											
Thomas Gargrave ⁴⁹⁴						*	*			*		*															
John Morsted ⁴⁹⁵				†																							
John Bayhous ⁴⁹⁶								*								*	*				*	*	*				

⁴⁹² DKR, 41, p.717 (1418); DKR, 42, p.314, 322 (1419); E101/50/28, m.10d (1421); C76/106, m.5 (1424); C76/107, m.5 (1425); ADSM, 100J/30/31 (1426); May also have served at Alencon in 1437: BN, n.a.f. 8602/19.

⁴⁹³ DKR, 42, p.410; E101/49/39; BN, ms. fr. 21495/23 (1421-1423); BN, ms. fr. 25767/116; CPR, 1422-1429, p.404 (1424-1429); BN, ms. fr. 25773/1085; BN, n.a.f. 8602/24; BN, ms. fr. 25774/1266; BN, ms. fr. 25775/1366; AN, K 64/23/9 (1434-1438); Ambühl, *Prisoners of War*, p.149-150 (1449). It has not been possible to plot all of Sir William's service on the above table on account of space constraints. For additional references: *Soldier in Later Medieval England*, p.91.

⁴⁹⁴ E101/49/40 (1421); ADSM, 100J/33/3 (1422, knighted by this time); BL, Add. Ch. 94 (1426); E. Hall, *Hall's Chronicle Containing the History of England During the Reign of Henry IV and the Succeeding Monarchs to the End of the Reign of Henry VIII* (London, 1809), p.145 (1428).

⁴⁹⁵ C76/102, m.8.

⁴⁹⁶ *Issues of the Exchequer, from King Henry III to Henry VI*, ed and trans. F. Devon (London, 1837), p.387 (1424); ADSM, 100J/30/35 (1439); BL, Add. Ch. 1505 (1440); BN, ms. fr. 25777/1705 (1445); BN, ms. fr. 25777/1772 (1447); C76/133, m.10 (1451).

In July 1417, Clarence mustered his retinue in the vicinity of Southampton. Disappointingly, unlike 1415, the muster roll has not survived. Nor do we have the indenture, or warrant for issue. Yet, once Henry's force had disembarked in France, Clarence was dispatched with 1,000 mounted men to capture the Abbaye aux Dames, near Caen.⁴⁹⁷ It is possible that this force was his entire retinue. Also, soon after having landed, Clarence was appointed Constable of Henry's army. He was assisted in his task of keeping order by Ralph Cromwell and Walter Interbergh. Both men remained part of this military court for a number of years.⁴⁹⁸ Indeed, at least five of his sub-retinue captains from 1415 joined him in 1417. These men would have fought alongside Clarence during the bloody sack of Caen.⁴⁹⁹ In a double pronged assault on the town, Clarence and his men scaled the city walls and 'caused such unexpected terror' among the defenders that they did not know whether to face Clarence or Henry, who was attacking the opposite side of the town. With the fall of the city Clarence was granted the plunder, which he distributed among his men.⁵⁰⁰

Throughout the subsequent conquest of Normandy, Clarence and his retinue served continually in the front lines. In the summer of 1418 he, along with Sir Ralph Cromwell (knighted shortly after the 1415 campaign), acting on the King's behalf, negotiated the surrender of Louviers. The city surrendered on 23 June.⁵⁰¹ Sir John Godard was appointed captain of the town after its capitulation.⁵⁰² In the same year Cromwell and Sir William Bowes successfully negotiated the surrender of Courtoen on behalf of the duke.⁵⁰³ Cromwell also served alongside his friend and 1415 co-captain Sir John Heron at the siege of Chambrays in the same year.⁵⁰⁴ The castles and towns of Harcourt, Le Bec-Hellouin, Vernon,

⁴⁹⁷ Sumption, *Cursed Kings*, pp.532-535.

⁴⁹⁸ *Rotuli Normanniae*, ed. Hardy, pp.195, 239, 249, 265-266, 316-317.

⁴⁹⁹ *Chronica Maiora*, ed. by Taylor, et al, pp.714-719; *The First English Life of Henry V, written in 1513 by an anonymous author known commonly as The Translator of Livius*, ed and trans. C.L. Kingsford (Oxford, 1821), pp.89-91; *The Brut*, ed. Brie, p.384; *Gesta Henrici Quinti*, ed. Williams, p.112; *A Fragment of the Chronicle of Normandy; From the year 1414 to the year 1422*, in *Henrici Quinti Angliae Regis, Gesta, cum Chronica Neustriae, Gallice ab anno M.CCCC.XIV ad M.CCCC. XXII*, ed and trans. B. Williams (London, 1850), pp.168-211 (French), pp.213-262 (English) (p.231); *An English Chronicle*, ed. Davies, p.45.

⁵⁰⁰ He was also granted lands and properties in Auge, Orbec and Pont-Audemer: *Chronicle of Normandy*, ed. Williams, p.231.

⁵⁰¹ *Chronica Maiora*, ed. Taylor, et al, pp.736-737.

⁵⁰² *DKR*, 41, p.711.

⁵⁰³ *Rotuli Normanniae*, ed. Hardy, pp.303-306; *Foedera*, 9, p.549.

⁵⁰⁴ *Rotuli Normanniae*, ed. Hardy, pp.294-6; *Foedera*, 9, p.552. Lord Cromwell became captain of Pontoise on 11 March 1419: *DKR*, 42, p.359.

Mantes and Blaru fell to Clarence and his men in 1418.⁵⁰⁵ By the time winter arrived, Clarence was in command of the vanguard at Rouen.⁵⁰⁶ Many of his 1415 sub-retinue captains who hailed from East Anglia were present at the siege. According to William Worcester, Sir William Bowet, Sir Robert Clifton (knighted after 1415) and Sir Philip Branche were 'logeynge felowys'.⁵⁰⁷ It is undocumented who they served under, but it is possible they were serving under Clarence's banner.

Throughout 1419 and 1420 Clarence continued to lead his retinue in France. He negotiated with the French in 1419 and besieged the cities of Melun and Montereau the following year.⁵⁰⁸ Outside the walls of Melun, the aged Sir John Heron was killed.⁵⁰⁹ Interestingly his estates were granted to the safe keeping of Clarence while his son, another John, was a minor.⁵¹⁰ Also in 1420, Clarence was present at the signing of the Treaty of Troyes, Henry's marriage to Katherine and their entry into Paris in December.⁵¹¹ When Henry departed France in early 1421 he appointed Clarence as lieutenant in his stead.⁵¹² Clarence's first action was to launch a punitive raid into Maine and Anjou.⁵¹³ As his army of around 4,000 men neared the village of Baugé on 21 March, it encountered a combined Franco-Scottish force of roughly 5,000 combatants. Acting on intelligence gained from a Scottish prisoner, Clarence quickly gathered together a troop of roughly 1,500 mounted men-at-arms and, hoping to catch the enemy off guard, rushed to attack. There was no time

⁵⁰⁵ *Chronicle of Normandy*, ed. Williams, p.243 (Also noted as having taken 'Rongny'. I have been unable to identify this place); *Chronica Maiora*, ed. Taylor, et al, pp.730-731; *DKR*, 41, p.739; *Foedera*, 9, p.679.

⁵⁰⁶ *Chronicle of Normandy*, ed. Williams, p.238; T. Basin, *Histoire de Charles VII*, ed and trans. C. Samaran, 2 vols (Paris, 1933-1944), 1, p.65; *The First English Life of Henry V*, ed. Kingsford, p.123; *The Brut*, ed. Brie, p.387; A. Curry, 'Henry V's Conquest of Normandy 1417-1419: The Siege of Rouen in Context', *Guerra y diplomacia en la Europa Occidental 1280-1480. XXXI Semana de Estudios Medievales. Estella 19-23 de julio 2004* (Pamplona, 2005), pp.237-254.

⁵⁰⁷ *Itineraries of Worcester*, ed. Harvey, p.361.

⁵⁰⁸ *Gesta Henrici Quinti*, ed. Williams, p.144; *Chronicle of Normandy*, ed. Williams, pp.245-246, 253; *Chronica Maiora*, ed. Taylor, et al, pp.754-755.

⁵⁰⁹ *CIPM*, 21, p.121; *CFR*, 14, p.333; LR 14/1 (His will).

⁵¹⁰ *DKR*, 42, p.386. On the duke's death they passed to Margaret, duchess of Clarence: *CPR*, 1422-1429, p.451.

⁵¹¹ *Jean de Wavrin*, ed. Hardy and Hardy, 2, pp.291, 325; *Chronique de Jean Le Fèvre, seigneur de Saint-Remy*, ed. F. Morand, 2 vols (Paris, 1876-1881), 2, p.21; *Gesta Henrici Quinti*, ed. Williams, p.137; *Chronicle of Normandy*, ed. Williams, p.252; *An English Chronicle*, ed. Davies, pp.50-51; *Memoires de Pierre de Fenin*, ed. E. Dupont (Paris, 1837), p.135; *The Brut*, ed. Brie, pp.425, 563.

⁵¹² *DKR*, 42, p.408; *Foedera*, 10, p.49. This appointment is noted by numerous chronicles as well, for example: *Chronicle of John Hardyng*, ed. Ellis, p.383; *The Brut*, ed. Brie, p.425; *Jean de Wavrin*, ed. Hardy and Hardy, 2, p.353.

⁵¹³ Almost all the contemporary and near-contemporary chronicles make mention to the Battle of Baugé. Although, as Milner identified, the comprehensiveness of the accounts vary greatly: J.D. Milner, 'The Battle of Baugé: Impact and Memory', *History*, 91 (October, 2006), pp.484-507; Sumption, *Cursed Kings*, pp.719-734.

to gather the archers. The Scottish lookouts spotted the English as they approached and made ready to receive them. With the advantage of surprise gone, Clarence's attack was next hindered by the difficult topography of the undulating land which included not only a marsh, but a bridge as well. As the cavalry force neared the enemy they were met by a hail of arrows loosed by Scottish longbowmen. Forced to dismount, the battle descended into a bloody brawl. Clarence, wearing a coronet encrusted with glittering jewels, made an easy target. He was probably one of the first to fall in the mêlée.⁵¹⁴ The Franco-Scottish force was eventually pushed back the following morning (or possibly that evening) by the English when their archers arrived under the command of Sir John, Clarence's bastard son, and Thomas Montague, earl of Salisbury.⁵¹⁵ The contemporary chronicler Thomas Basin noted adroitly of the battle that it was a massacre.⁵¹⁶

One of the most striking features of Baugé is the number of Clarence's 1415 sub-captains who can be identified to have fought with him, and in many cases to have died with him. Sir John Lumley, Sir John Pudsey, Sir William Bowet, Sir Thomas Marny (knighted by November 1416), Sir Henry Godard and Sir Robert Bitverlaine (both knighted by Clarence shortly before the battle) all died alongside the duke.⁵¹⁷ Clarence's long time retainer Sir William Bowes was taken prisoner. Walter FitzWalter, brother and heir of Humphrey FitzWalter, and John, earl of Somerset, brother and heir of Henry Beaufort, were also taken prisoner at the battle.⁵¹⁸ It is also highly likely that Sir Philip Branche, Sir Maurice Bruyn (knighted by 1417), Walter Interbergh, Sir Henry Noon (knighted by 1421) and Ralph, third lord Cromwell, were all at the battle as they were all militarily active in Normandy at the

⁵¹⁴ Legend has it that he was killed by a member of the Buchanan clan: G. Eyre-Todd, *The Highland Clans of Scotland: Their History and Tradition*, 1 (New York, 1923), pp.9-10; M. Brown, *The Black Douglasses: War and Lordship in Late Medieval Scotland, 1300-1455* (East Linton, 1998), pp.216-218.

⁵¹⁵ *Chronica Maiora*, ed. Taylor, et al, pp.762-763. Sir John, Clarence's bastard son, was more ruthless than his father. In 1429 he was charged with laying siege to the castle of Torcy, near Paris, by the duke of Bedford. When the castle finally yielded after six months of protracted siege, Sir John discovered that twelve or thirteen of the garrison were English turncoats. They were 'cruelly executed ... and the fortress was entirely burned and demolished': *Jean de Wavrin*, ed. Hardy and Hardy, 3, p.212; *La Chronique d'Enguerran de Monstrelet*, ed. L. Douet-d'Arcq, 4, p.368.

⁵¹⁶ Basin, *Histoire de Charles VII*, 1, p.77.

⁵¹⁷ *Gesta Henrici Quinti*, ed. Williams, p.274-275. On their knighting: *CCR, 1413-1419*, p.375 (Sir Thomas Marney); *Soldier in Later Medieval England*, p.71 citing: College of Arms, MS. M9, ff 42r, 43v-44r (Sir Henry Godard); *Itineraries of Worcester*, ed. Harvey, p.361 (Sir Robert Bitvelaine).

⁵¹⁸ *The Latin Brut*, ed. Kingsford, p.320; *Gesta Henrici Quinti*, ed. Williams, p.275; *Chronica Maiora*, ed. Taylor, et al, p.763.

time.⁵¹⁹ In April, Interbergh had mustered Lord Cromwell's retinue.⁵²⁰ In the aftermath of the defeat the English administration rushed to shore up its position in Normandy.⁵²¹ Sir Maurice Bruyn was appointed captain of Pont de l'Arch and Lord Cromwell was appointed captain of Harfleur and Bec-Hellouin with Henry Mulso as his lieutenant. Across the water from Cromwell and Mulso, Walter Interbergh was charged with the captaincy of Honfleur while William Bukton became captain of Beaumont-sur-Oise.⁵²² Including the heirs of those who accompanied Clarence in 1415, just over a quarter of his sub-captains can be seen to have been either directly under his command, or at least to have been militarily active in the his vicinity, in 1421. Indeed, even after the death of the duke, as table 2.6 shows, a number of his 1415 sub-captains remained in France and carved careers as professional soldiers.

One such individual to whom the conquest of Normandy gave lasting employment was Sir Philip Branche. As we have seen, Sir Philip was present at the siege of Rouen where he shared his lodgings with Sir William Bowet and other Norfolk notables such as Sir Henry Ingolse and Sir Robert Clifton.⁵²³ Shortly after the fall of Rouen, Sir Philip was granted a number of lands and fortalices within the bailiwicks of Mantes, Chaumont and Rouen.⁵²⁴ In early 1421 he was ordered to array the men under William Hudleston.⁵²⁵ Sir Philip's standing in Normandy was significantly increased in 1422 when he was appointed *bailli* of Mantes with jurisdiction over the surrounding bailliages and the garrisons of Montjoie, St Germain-en-Laye and Poissy (the office of *bailli* was approximate to that of the English sheriff).⁵²⁶ He did not have long to become acquainted with his new role. In late 1422 the Viconte of Narbonne and the Count of Aumale invaded southern Normandy with a large force. They faced little opposition as many of the region's principal English commanders, and their troops, had been drawn away from the area to the siege of Saint-Valery then being conducted by John, duke of Bedford, who had taken over Clarence's position as Lieutenant

⁵¹⁹ E101/70/6/733, *CPR, 1416-1422*, pp.369, 417 (knighthood of Sir Henry Noon).

⁵²⁰ *DKR*, 42, p.425.

⁵²¹ *Ibid*, p.410.

⁵²² *Ibid*, pp.426, 429. In 1423 Lord Cromwell was granted some of Clarence's estates and properties in Lincolnshire for 10 years, specifically the castle and manor of Somerton and Carleton: *CFR*, 15, p.63.

⁵²³ *Itineraries of Worcester*, ed. Harvey, p.361; Richmond, *The Paston Family*, p.207.

⁵²⁴ *DKR*, 41, p.791.

⁵²⁵ *DKR*, 42, p.406.

⁵²⁶ A. Curry, 'Did Sir William Tirwhit Serve on the Campaign?', *Agincourt 600*, <www.agincourt600.com/did-sir-william-tirwhit-serve-on-the-campaign>, [Accessed 25 May 2016], citing: Dupont-Ferrier, *Gallia Regia*, 4, pp.55-57; *Actes de la Chancellerie d'Henri VI*, 2, pp.361-362

of Normandy. The invasion force plundered the area laying waste the unwallled city of Bernay before scattering a small English resistance force hastily gathered by Thomas, Lord Scales.⁵²⁷ Yet, on their march out of the duchy, the French encountered another English force, this time under the command of Sir Philip Branche who had stripped the local garrisons to face the French at Mortagne. According to the *Monk of St Denys*, Branche had gathered more than 2,000 men.⁵²⁸ Akin to Henry V's strategy at Agincourt, Branche had his men plant stakes in front of their position in an attempt to repulse cavalry. However, unlike at Agincourt, the strategy failed and Branche's force was overrun and trampled by the French cavalry.⁵²⁹ An indication of the scale of the defeat can be inferred from the chronicler's estimates of the number who died and were taken prisoner. *Perceval de Cagney* estimates 1,200 were killed and 300 taken prisoner, while the *Monk of St Denys* and *Gesta des Nobles Francois* are more conservative estimating seven or eight hundred killed with many prisoners taken.⁵³⁰

While many Englishmen were undoubtedly killed in the engagement, Sir Philip was one of the lucky few who escaped with his life. He remained in France, for example serving under his brother-in-law, Sir John Fastolf, in 1424.⁵³¹ It was likely under Fastolf that Sir Philip served at the Battle of Verneuil on 17 August. Here he also served alongside his Agincourt co-captain Sir Thomas Gargrave who had been knighted after Agincourt and had become Master of the King's Ordinance under Henry VI.⁵³² In late 1426 and into 1427 Branche served under the command of Sir Thomas Rempston, a retainer of the earl of Suffolk, who conducted a raid into Brittany with six or seven hundred men as far as Rennes. Rempston and Branche then captured the strategically important castle of Saint-James-de-Beuvron on

⁵²⁷ *Actes de la Chancellerie d'Henri VI*, 6, pp.31-33.

⁵²⁸ *Chronique de Religieux*, ed. L. Bellaguet, 6, pp.476-479.

⁵²⁹ *Chronique de Perceval de Cagney*, ed. H. Moranville (Paris, 1902), pp.124-125; Sumpton, *Cursed Kings*, pp.765-766.

⁵³⁰ *Chronique de Religieux*, ed. L. Bellaguet, 6, pp.476-479; *Gesta des Nobles*, ed. Viriville, pp.186-189.

⁵³¹ BN, ms. fr. 25767/93; Sir Philip is mentioned by Sir John Fastolf in his will. He writes that Sir Philip had been 'slayn in Fraunce'. Richmond has misinterpreted this as an indication that Sir Philip died at the Battle of Baugé: Richmond, *The Paston Family*, p.207. For Sir John's will: *The Paston Letters, 1422-1509*, ed. J. Gairdner, 6 vols (London, 1904), 3, pp.147-160 (esp. p.157).

⁵³² *Letters and Papers Illustrative of the Wars of the English in France During the Reign of Henry VI, King of England*, ed. J. Stevenson, 2 vols, (London, 1861-1864), 2, p.394. On Gargrave: *Miscellanea Genealogica et Heraldica*, series 1, ed. J.J. Howard (London, 1868), 1, p.226; Hall, *Hall's Chronicle*, p.145.

the borders of Brittany.⁵³³ In early 1427 Arthur de Richemont, duke of Brittany, besieged and assaulted the castle with, according to the *Chronique de la Pucelle*, 6,000 men. The siege only lasted two weeks before Richemont withdrew. However, at some stage during the engagement Sir Philip Branche had been killed. His heir was his son Henry, who in 1417 was Captain of Louplande Castle, near the border of Brittany.⁵³⁴ It is possible he fought alongside his father in 1427 as he was taken prisoner in this year.⁵³⁵ He was held captive for a staggering 18 years.⁵³⁶

Other individuals who must be considered as professional soldiers include John Bayhous and William Bukton. Following the death of Clarence, Bayhous continued to undertake military service in Normandy. In 1424 he was retained by Henry VI to serve under John, duke of Bedford.⁵³⁷ He served frequently in Normandy garrisons; in 1439 under Edmund earl of Dorset, in 1440 and 1445 at Coutances under Sir George de Thibult, in 1447 at Rouen and in 1451.⁵³⁸ It is unknown when Bayhous died, but he probably lived to see the Hundred Years War draw to a close.⁵³⁹ We find William Bukton in a similar situation. Being the third son, Bukton had little chance of inheriting land and wealth from his father or elder relatives. It is thus hardly surprising that we find him frequently undertaking military service in Normandy. From 1421 until 1424 he held the captaincies of Beaumont-sur-Oise and then of Montereau.⁵⁴⁰ As the Medieval Soldier Team have noted, Bukton had a long career serving a bailli of Mantes from 1424 until 1429.⁵⁴¹ A knight by 1424, during this period of

⁵³³ *Gesta des Nobles*, ed. Viriville, pp.199-200; *Chronique de la Pucelle*, ed. Viriville, pp.239-241; Hall, *Hall's Chronicle*, p.129.

⁵³⁴ *Gesta Henrici Quinti*, ed. Williams, p.278.

⁵³⁵ *CFR*, 15, p.187; In Norfolk he held 1/8th of a knight's fee from Thomas, duke of Exeter: *CIPM*, 22, p.703. Sir Philip also had a daughter named Elizabeth who married, firstly, John de Clere of Ormesby, Norfolk. She married, secondly Sir John Rothenhale. She died 16 October 1438: F. Blomefield, 'East Flegg Hundred: Ormesby', *An Essay Towards A Topographical History of the County of Norfolk*, 11 vols (London, 1805-1810), 11, pp.231-240, *BHO*, <www.british-history.ac.uk/topographical-hist-norfolk/vol11/pp231-240>, [Accessed 7 April 2016]; A. Suckling, 'Pakefield', *The History and Antiquities of the County of Suffolk*, 2 vols (Ipswich, 1846), 1, pp.279-287, *BHO*, <www.british-history.ac.uk/no-series/suffolk-history-antiquities/vol1/pp279-287>, [Accessed 7 April 2016].

⁵³⁶ SC8/336/15867. Incorrectly dated to the Parliament of 1442. It must relate to the Parliament of 1445 as it states that Henry's father had been slain in France 19 years ago.

⁵³⁷ *Issues of the Exchequer*, ed. Devon (London, 1837), p.387.

⁵³⁸ *Ibid* (1424); *ADSM*, 100J/30/35 (1439); *BL*, Add. Ch. 1505 (1440); *BN*, ms. fr. 25777/1705 (1445); *BN*, ms. fr. 25777/1772 (1447); *C76*/133, m.10 (1451).

⁵³⁹ A William Bayhous was a tax collector in Huntingdonshire in 1449. It is possible he was a relation of, or heir to, John: *CFR*, 18, p.128.

⁵⁴⁰ E101/49/39; *BN*, ms. fr. 21495/23.

⁵⁴¹ *Soldier in Later Medieval England*, p.91.

service Bukton was also part of the field army centred in Maine.⁵⁴² He briefly returned to England in 1427 to raise additional men before being mustered by Ralph, Lord Cromwell, as he prepared to return to France.⁵⁴³ In 1434 he accepted the captaincy of Bayeux and held the captaincy of Lisieux from 1436 until 1438.⁵⁴⁴ During his tenure as captain of Lisieux he was briefly dispatched to reinforce the field army operating near Crotoy and Berney; he was back at Lisieux by mid-1438.⁵⁴⁵ He was also sub-lieutenant of Rouen under John, Lord Talbot.⁵⁴⁶ As Ambühl has shown, while serving in 1434 Bukton purchased the rights to a French prisoner in order to secure the release four of his comrades.⁵⁴⁷ Indicative of the longevity of his career, he was captain of Pont-Audemer, near Harfleur, in 1449.⁵⁴⁸ Indeed, in the same year he and his co-captain Osbert Mundeford were forced to negotiate the surrender of the town to the Bastard of Orléans.⁵⁴⁹ Sir William Bukton lived to see the Hundred Years War draw to a close in 1453, and finally died by October 1455.⁵⁵⁰

Looking back on his career towards the end of his life, Sir William Bukton would surely have been struck by the complete reversal of fortunes suffered by the English in Normandy. The glory days of Agincourt must have seemed a distant memory as his countrymen were mown down by artillery at Castillon. Bukton was one of a generation of individuals whose primary employment was dedicated to holding the English position in the Duchy and its neighbouring lands. For some, such as Bukton, Sir Henry Godard and Sir Robert Bitvelaine, the war provided opportunities of continual employment as well as the chance to advance their social status. Yet few were fortunate enough to survive the war as long as Bukton. Of Clarence's 61 1415 sub-captains, at least 16 (26%) died as a direct result of military action.⁵⁵¹

⁵⁴² BN, ms. fr. 25767/120.

⁵⁴³ *CPR, 1422-1429*, p.404.

⁵⁴⁴ *Soldier in Later Medieval England*, p.91; BN, ms. fr. 25773/1085; BN, n.a.f. 8602/24.

⁵⁴⁵ BN, ms. fr. 25774/1266; BN, ms. fr. 25775/1366; AN, K 64/23/9

⁵⁴⁶ Curry, *Sources*, p.451.

⁵⁴⁷ Ambühl, *Prisoners of War*, p.61.

⁵⁴⁸ Clarence had captured the fortress in 1417: *Chronicle of Normandy*, ed. Williams, p.231.

⁵⁴⁹ Ambühl, *Prisoners of War*, pp.149-150.

⁵⁵⁰ *CFR*, 19, pp.138-139.

⁵⁵¹ These were: Sir John Lumley, Sir John Dabridgecourt, Sir John Godard, Sir Henry Godard, Sir John Heron, Sir William Bowet, Sir William Bowes, Sir Brian Stapleton, Sir Thomas Marney, Sir Robert Bitvelaine, Sir Henry Noon, Sir Edward Burnell, Sir John Pudsey, Sir Philip Branche, Sir Thomas Gargrave and John St Alban.

The Sub-Retinue Companies

In moving to investigate the personnel of the sub-retinue companies, we enter a murky world in which nominal record linkage, a challenging and uncertain business at the best of times, becomes increasingly more difficult. As we move down the social ladder from the upper and middling gentry, those who served as sub-captains, the lesser gentry and yeomen, the esquire men-at-arms and archers, become visible. In order to reach a reliable conclusion regarding the stability and cohesion of the sub-retinue companies both the esquires and archers must be investigated. Yet, as Baker has observed, we are far more likely to find matches with the names of men-at-arms than archers due to the former originating from loftier social backgrounds.⁵⁵² The veracity of this observation will be borne out throughout the following paragraphs, although it will also become evident that the commonality of certain names can hinder investigations just as much.

The preceding sections of this chapter have demonstrated that many of Clarence's sub-captains had raised retinues before 1415 and continued to do so after. As a result, the first stage in examining the stability of the sub-retinue companies is to examine their continuity of personnel. In total, six of Clarence's 1415 sub-captains have surviving muster rolls or garrison rolls for forces raised before and/or after the 1415 campaign.⁵⁵³ Although these surviving rolls provide a reasonably large amount of nominal data, there is no evidence that any of those who served under these sub-captains in 1415 had ever served under them before, or did so again in the future. The only example of re-service, and even this was not technically under the same captain, is the archer Walter Lyons who served under Sir William Marney in 1404 and then under his son, Thomas, in 1415. The surname Lyons is fairly unique so we can be reasonably sure this is the same individual. Likewise, there is also very little evidence of sub-retinue members moving between Clarence's sub-captains. The only soldier who appears to have served under another of Clarence's 1415

⁵⁵² Baker, 'To Agincourt and Beyond!', p.48.

⁵⁵³ They were: Ralph, Lord Cromwell, E101/50/9/no.1 and 2 (1421, garrison, Harfleur); Sir William Marney [father of Thomas], E101/43/32 (1404, muster, Keeping of the Seas); Sir William Bonville, E101/695/40 (1443, muster, Standing Force in Aquitaine); Sir Robert Clifton, E101/53/22 (1439, muster, Standing Force in Aquitaine); Sir Brian Stapleton, E101/51/2, m.10 (1417, muster, campaign); Sir William Bukton, E101/43/4, m.21-21d (1400 [father's retinue], muster, Scotland), E101/49/39 (1421, garrison, Beaumont-sur-Oise), BN, ms. fr. 21495/23 (1423, garrison, Montereau), BN, ms. fr. 25767/116 (1425, garrison, Maine), BN, ms. fr. 25773/1085 (1436, garrison, Lisieux), BN, n.a.f. 8602/24 (1437, garrison, Lisieux), BN, ms. fr. 25774/1266 (1437, garrison, Crotoy), BN, ms. fr. 25775/1366 (1438, garrison, Bernay), AN, K 64/23/9 (1438, garrison, Lisieux), E101/53/33 (1441, muster, France).

captains later in his career is the archer William Saltmarsh who served under Sir William Bukton in 1425.⁵⁵⁴

This is not to say that those members of the sub-companies in 1415 were not military veterans or would not go on to serve again in Normandy, rather it is to say that there was an almost total lack of re-service under the same sub-captains. This suggests the existence of a fluid recruitment market among the rank-and-file, in which soldiers seldom re-served under the same sub-captain. This impression is supported by the data presented in table 2.7 which demonstrates that some sub-retinue members can be shown to have had military careers before 1415 and continued to undertake military service, evidently under different captains, after 1415. This clearly suggests that the sub-retinues were unstable entities, with few ties binding their members together. To investigate this further four sub-retinues will be explored in detail here, with a fifth commented on towards the end of this section. The four sub-retinues under consideration are those captained by Sir Edward Burnell, Sir William Bowet, Robert Clifton and Robert Bitvelaine.

Table 2.7: Sub-Retinue Military Experience Before and After the 1415 Campaign

Captain	Size of 1415 Retinue	Number and Percent of Sub-Retinue with Military Experience Prior to 1415	Number and Percent of Sub-Retinue with Military Experience Post 1415
Sir Edward Burnell	9 [MaA] + 21 [A]	2 [6%]	25 [8]
Sir William Bowet	9 + 22	1 [3%]	4 [13%]
Robert Clifton	2 + 5	1 [16%]	1 [16%]
Robert Bitvelaine	1 + 3	0	1 [33%]

The low figure of prior service displayed in table 2.7 may be explained in part by the dearth of nominal data for the military campaigns of the late fourteenth and early fifteenth-centuries, which has already been commented on. Just one example of a man-at-arms who bore arms before and after 1415 is William Bolton. As a young man he had served under

⁵⁵⁴ BN, ms. fr. 25767/120.

Thomas Mowbray, earl of Nottingham and later duke of Norfolk, on Arundel's expedition of 1388.⁵⁵⁵ He again served under a member of the Mowbray family, this time John, son of Thomas, in the garrison of Pontoise in 1422.⁵⁵⁶ It is possible that it was his association with Norfolk which enabled him to enter the service of Sir Edward Burnell in 1415, as he was a leading member of the East Anglian nobility. Interestingly, a number of archers can also be identified to have served again after 1415. In 1433, for example, the uniquely-named Davy Bromfield was present at the siege of Louviers under the command of Sir John Montgomery while John Wylie served under John Mowbray, earl of Norfolk, in 1417.⁵⁵⁷ It is also possible that the Geoffrey Newton, who served as an archer in 1415 under Robert Bitvelaine, had been promoted to a man-at-arms by 1423 and was serving in the garrison of Vernon.⁵⁵⁸ The same was probably the case for William Saltmarsh who appears as a man-at-arms while serving in the garrison of Pontoise alongside William Bolton under John, earl of Norfolk, in 1422.⁵⁵⁹ In many instances it has not been possible to accurately reconstruct the military careers of some men owing to the commonality of their names. The archer Robert Norton, who served under Sir William Bowet in 1415, is emblematic of this issue. In 1421 two archers of this name can be identified to have been militarily active in Normandy; one was part of the Standing Army, while the other was in the garrison of Falaise.⁵⁶⁰ Many similar examples could be given. The military service history of the sub-retinue members, as far as it can be discerned, suggests the existence of a world in which few vertical and horizontal ties bound the sub-retinues together, making them unstable entities.

However, as we have already had occasion to observe, military service statistics are not always an irrefutable litmus test of retinue rigidity. To study this issue further we must consider whether the companies were bound by other ties. Indeed, we must also consider the question, how did the sub-captains recruit their companies? We have seen that Clarence drew many of his sub-captains either directly from, or from within the vicinity of, areas of the country in which he possessed estates. We may expect the sub-captains to have employed a similar method in raising their companies. The company raised by Robert

⁵⁵⁵ E101/41/5, m.3.

⁵⁵⁶ C76/104, m.14; E101/50/19.

⁵⁵⁷ Emblematic of the confused state of the siege, Bromfield mustered in a number of retinues throughout the siege: BN, mf. fr. 25769/530. On Wylie: E101/51/2, m.29.

⁵⁵⁸ BN, ms. fr.25767/42.

⁵⁵⁹ E101/50/19.

⁵⁶⁰ E101/49/37, m.1d (Standing Army); BL, Egerton Charter. 146 (Garrison of Falaise).

Clifton, son of Sir Adam Clifton who died in 1411, provides a good example of the difficulties inherent in proving this assumption. Clifton was a notable member of the Norfolk gentry having served as sheriff of Norfolk and Suffolk in 1412.⁵⁶¹ His landholdings mainly comprised the manor and farmland of Freebridge in Norfolk.⁵⁶² In 1415 he raised a small force, excluding himself, of just one man-at-arms and five archers. It is highly likely that the man-at-arms, John Bray, originated from East Anglia. However, precisely where in East Anglia is hard to pinpoint because of the frequency with which people of this name appear in records. There was an esquire of this name from Felstede, near Braintree in Essex, who served on a Commission of Array in 1403, yet there was also an individual of this name from Norfolk who was ordered to investigate the robbery of some Prussian merchants in 1405.⁵⁶³ To complicate matters still further there were a John Bray from Tilbury, another from Cambridge and, according to the poll tax records, a further five from Essex and Norfolk alone.⁵⁶⁴ If one were to expand the search beyond the borders of East Anglia, men of this name can be discovered all over the country. The archers Thomas Cook and Ralph Mason also probably originated from East Anglia; although a search of the records reveals a similarly high number of possible identifications. The difficulty of name commonality is not confined, of course, to Robert Clifton's sub-retinue. The problem is endemic. Within the 32-strong retinue raised by Sir William Bowet another notable East Anglia landholder (9 men-at-arms and 23 archers), served an archer named Robert Baker. Reconstructing the career of Baker, or even identifying where in East Anglia he came from, presuming he did come from East Anglia, is impossible because of the commonality of his name.

The point must be made that the names John Bray, Thomas Cook, Ralph Mason and Robert Baker are hardly unique and so to encounter so many references is not surprising. It is possible that investigating individuals with more unique names would be more advantageous. However, this is not necessarily the case. Owing to the lower social status of the sub-retinue members, the chances of finding information on someone with a unique name is low. Nevertheless, identifications in some cases can be positively made. For

⁵⁶¹ *List of Sheriffs*, p.87.

⁵⁶² *CIPM*, 19, p.341; *CPR*, 1389-1392, p.250.

⁵⁶³ *CPR*, 1401-1405, p.358 (1403), 511, (1405).

⁵⁶⁴ *CIPM*, 19, p.34; *CPR*, 1385-1389, pp.110-111 (Tilbury); Cambridge University: King's College Archive Centre, CAM/5 (Cambridge). All references to the poll tax are gained from Dr Sam Gibbs's database. I am grateful to him for allowing me to consult his research.

example, from his Inquisition Post Mortem dated July 1444 it is possible to identify that Edmund Walweyn, an esquire who served under Sir Edward Burnell, originated from Deddington in Oxfordshire.⁵⁶⁵ On the other hand, the sources are silent for others, such as John Laverant, an archer who also served under Burnell. It is becoming clear that due to the commonality of certain names and the lower social background for sub-retinue members, obtaining a geographical fix on them is a highly challenging task. However, in an attempt to negate these problems we may make use of the surviving manorial records for the estates held by the sub-retinue captains.

Manorial documents hold a wealth of information for the medieval military prosopographer. In his investigation of the duke of York's retinue Baker was able to utilise the Great Court Rolls for the manors of Oakham and Langham, in the county of York, to demonstrate that at least 32 of York's men hailed from these manors.⁵⁶⁶ Of the four sub-retinue captains we are here concerned with, three, Sir William Bowet, Sir Edward Burnell and Robert Bitverlaine, have surviving manorial accounts relating to the estates they held throughout East Anglia.⁵⁶⁷ The most common manorial documents which have been consulted here are court rolls. These provide a range of information relating to land transfers and agreements, manorial fines, enforcement of labour services and, in some cases, localised legal proceedings. In addition to the court rolls, other diverse manorial accounts and documents have been consulted and searched such as sheriffs' accounts, bailiffs' accounts, farmers' accounts and rental rolls. In general, the documents examined have been in good condition and cumulatively they provide many hundreds of names. However, the outcome of a thorough search of these documents has revealed, disappointing, very little. In only two instances is it possible to match a member of a sub-retinue with a name on the captain's manorial documents. In Arundel Castle archive are located a series of court rolls relating to Sir William Bowet's manor of Wrentham, Suffolk,

⁵⁶⁵ *CIPM*, 26, pp.96-97.

⁵⁶⁶ Baker, 'To Agincourt and Beyond!', p.48.

⁵⁶⁷ Sir William Bowet: Cambridge University, King's College Archive Centre, COL/469, COL/ 477, COL/478, Col/ 487 (Great Hautbois, Norfolk); SC6/931/26, SC6/931/27-30, SC6/932/1-9, SC12/12/35 (Burgh St Margaret, Norfolk); Suffolk Record Office [SRO] V5/1/2/2, SRO V5/19/2/1, SRO V5/19/2/2, SRO V5/19/2/3, SRO, V5/19/2/4, SRO V5/19/2/5, SC2/204/25 (Covehithe, Suffolk); SRO HA30/314/5 (Henstead, Benacre and Thorington, Suffolk); SRO HA30/372/2 (Thorington, Suffolk); SRO HB20/50/15/13, Arundel Castle Archive [ACA] M1024-1026, ACA M1027-1030, ACA M1031-1033, ACA M427 (Wrentham, Suffolk); Sir Edward Burnell: Norfolk Record Office [NRO] NRS 2605-2606, NRO NRS 2812, NRO NRS 2819, NRO NRS 2810-2814 (Thurning, Norfolk); Robert Bitvelaine: NRO PD78, NRO NAS 1/1/3/114, NRO MC547/6c 769x1 (Winfathing, Norfolk).

which he inherited around 1401.⁵⁶⁸ At the top of a roll relating to the years 1381-1387 is found a small chit listing some tenants of the manor. On this chit can be found the name John Gerard, who, it is possible, is the same individual who served under Sir William in 1415.⁵⁶⁹ Similarly we find John Potter, who served as an archer under Bowet in 1415, on a Wrentham court roll from 1396.⁵⁷⁰ No further plausible matches can be made.

In total, the geographical origin of only 7 (9%) of the 72 sub-retinue members considered here can be ascertained with anything near certainty. In most cases this geographic origin relates only to the county in which they dwelt, not the specific town or village. There is very sparse evidence that any of the sub-retinue members served under a particular sub-captain because of tenurial ties. In regards to horizontal ties, the only evidence is of a familial nature is based on shared surnames. Under Sir William Bowet served a William and Philip Palmer and a John and Cornyus Wylie, while under Sir Edward Burnell served a John and Robert Sherman. It is possible that William Palmer was the father of Philip and son of William Palmer parson of Hadleigh Church, Suffolk.⁵⁷¹ Based on the examination of these four sub-retinue companies, it would appear that they almost completely lacked vertical and horizontal rigidity. The only evidence of any rigidity is a very weak sense of shared regional comradeship and some horizontal familial ties. Without doubt this image of sub-retinue fluidity is warped to a certain extent by the limitations inherent with the available sources. The commonality of names makes nominal record linkage risky, the lower social standing of sub-retinue members precludes them from featuring frequently (or ever) in records, while the manorial documents seldom form an unbroken series of accounts. There is only one avenue of investigation which has not yet been considered which could throw light onto the geographic origins of some sub-retinue members and that is their surnames.

Attempting to identify a medieval individual's geographic origin based on their surname is not an exact science. Indeed, before going any further it is important to highlight the word *origin*. It is often the case that a locative surname indicates an individual or

⁵⁶⁸ C. Richmond, 'How the First 'Paston Letter' came to be written in Suffolk', *Proceedings of the Suffolk Institute of Archaeology and History*, 41 (2005-2008), pp.461-466.

⁵⁶⁹ ACA M1025, m.1.

⁵⁷⁰ ACA M1028, m.1.

⁵⁷¹ *CPR, 1388-1392*, p.284.

family's origin, rather than their current place of residence. One is often named after the place they hailed from when they move somewhere different, rather than bearing a locative surname in the first instance. However, bearing this in mind, a wealth of substantial literature exists on the history of British surnames, their development and on naming conventions. The historian Richard McKinley identified six main categories of surname.⁵⁷² The three most relevant to this study are locative, topographical and occupational. Locative surnames derived from the names of specific places, such as counties like Kent and Derbyshire, but also from large cities like London and York and from smaller towns and villages like Drayton and Pickering. Locative surnames are not to be confused with topographical surnames which originated from general features of the landscape such as Bridge, Hill and Ford.⁵⁷³ Occupational names originated from crafts and trades, although they could also refer to offices held, for example Reeve or Hayward. In some cases they represent the father's occupation. Looking at the members of the sub-retinue companies under consideration here some men can tentatively be identified to fall into one of these three categories.

Table 2.8: Sub-Retinue Members with possible Locative, Topographical or Occupational Surnames⁵⁷⁴

Name	Captain	Locative		Topographical	Occupational
		Locative	Place		
Ralph Mason	Clifton				X
Adam Rougham	Clifton	X	Rougham, Norfolk		
Thomas Cook	Clifton				X
Richard Norton	Bowet	X	Norton, Worcester or Bury St Edmunds or Daventry		
William Hexham	Bowet	X	Hexham,		

⁵⁷² R.A. McKinley, *A History of British Surnames* (New York, 1990), pp.10-11, 22.

⁵⁷³ Ibid, p.51.

⁵⁷⁴ All combatants in this table were archers. Place names have been identified using Google Maps and E. Ekwall, *Oxford Dictionary of English Place-Names* (Oxford, 1951).

			Northumberland		
Richard Beverley	Bowet	X	Beverley, Yorkshire		
John Cook	Bowet				X
John Potter	Bowet				X
Robert Baker	Bowet				X
Thomas Smith	Bowet				X
William Bolton	Burnell	X	Bolton, Manchester		
Cornyus Wylie and John Wylie	Burnell	X	Wyrley, Staffordshire		
William Bromley	Burnell	X	Great Bromley, Essex		
Hugh Cross	Burnell			X	
William York	Burnell	X	York		
John Clerk	Burnell	X			X
John Fowlmere	Burnell	X	Fowlmere, Cambridgeshire		
Davy Bromfield	Burnell	X	Bromfield, Cumbria or Shropshire		

Ten (14%) of the sub-retinue members can tentatively be identified to have had locative surnames. Of these, three relate to places within East Anglia. In addition, seven possible occupational and one topographical surname can be identified. The surprising lack of East Anglian locative surnames may suggest that few of the sub-retinue members came from this area. Considering Robert Clifton's principal landholdings were in Norfolk, it is likely Adam Rougham entered his service through this geographical link. Yet, as the case of Richard Beverly highlights, it is possible that some had their geographic origins far from East Anglia, although it is highly unlikely that the Richard Beverly we are interested in came from

Yorkshire as William Bowet had, as far as can be discerned, no landed or business interests in that county. The same illogicality calls into doubt the identification that Sir Edward Burnell's archer William Bolton was from Bolton. On the other hand, it is possible that William Hexham was from Cumbria as Bowet had been born there and so had some ties to the county, albeit distant after he relocated to East Anglia. Similarly it is possible that Davy Bromfield was from Shropshire as Sir Edward's father, Hugh, Lord Burnell, held considerable estates in the county. Overall, although possible East Anglian heritage can be identified for some sub-retinue members from their surnames, we still have very scant evidence that the sub-captains were raising men from within the vicinity of their principal estates.

That few locative surnames can be identified for East Anglia is unsurprising. As Percy H. Reaney noted in his study of English surnames, locative surnames were far more common among those living further north. He demonstrated that in Cambridgeshire in 1327 only 23% of names were locative and in neighbouring Suffolk such names were only marginally more frequent at 26%. In contrast, in Yorkshire and Lancashire the figures were, respectively, 43% in 1327 and 49% in 1332.⁵⁷⁵ McKinley found similar results in his investigation, although he adopted a slightly different classification system.⁵⁷⁶ Simply a cursory comparison of the names recorded in the published poll tax returns for Derbyshire and Devon, a southern county, reveals that locative surnames were more common in Derbyshire.⁵⁷⁷ Turning our attention northwards then, away from East Anglia and the four sub-retinues we have focused on so far, we may be able to bring more precision to this issue of sub-retinue stability.

Moving from East Anglia, we relocate to Derbyshire and Lancashire to examine the sub-retinue commanded by that stalwart supporter of the House of Lancaster, Sir John Dabridgecourt. The elderly Dabridgecourt raised the largest sub-retinue (20 men-at-arms and 70 archers) for Clarence's 1415 force. Owing to the number of archers Sir John raised, for the purpose of this investigation will only focus on his men-at-arms. Following his marriage to Maud, widow of Sir John Tuchet, in 1378, Dabridgecourt acquired the lands of Markeaton and Mackworth, both on the periphery of Derby. Through this marriage,

⁵⁷⁵ P.H. Reaney, *The Origin of English Surnames* (London, 1980), p.22.

⁵⁷⁶ McKinley, *History of British Surnames*, p.23.

⁵⁷⁷ *The Poll Tax Records of 1377, 1379 and 1381: Part 1, Bedfordshire-Leicestershire*, ed. C.C. Fenwick (Oxford, 1998), pp.95-114 (Derbyshire), 114-145 (Devon).

Dabridgecourt established himself as a prominent member of the Derbyshire gentry. Over the next four decades Sir John significantly expanded his landholdings across the country primarily because of generous royal grants as a result of his loyal and continual service. By the time of the 1415 campaign he held more lands in Derbyshire plus estates in Rutland, Hertfordshire, Kent and London. His principal landholdings were in Derbyshire, and so it is from this area and its localities, such as Lancashire, that we would expect his 1415 soldiers to have come from. This expectation is partially borne out when the surnames of some of his men-at-arms are considered.

Table 2.9: The Locative Surnames of Sir John Dabridgecourt's Men-at-Arms

Forename	Surname	Location
James	Barton	Barton Blount, Derbyshire; Barton-in-the-Beans, Derbyshire; Barton, Lancashire
Thomas	Hatfield	Hadfield, Derbyshire
John	Langlegh	Langley, Derbyshire
William	Schotilworth	Shuttleworth, Lancashire
William	Shyngolton	Singleton, Lancashire
John	Sweppston	Swepstone, Derbyshire
Edmond	Warde	Wardle, Lancashire
Elys	Worslegh	Worsley, Lancashire
Richard	Worslegh	Worsley, Lancashire

When it is considered that Dabridgecourt had been a leading member of the Derbyshire gentry for nearly forty years by the time of the 1415 campaign, it is entirely plausible that he drew men to his company from the neighbouring county of Lancashire.⁵⁷⁸ Of those whose surnames suggest Derbyshire origin, John Langlegh probably dwelt closest to Dabridgecourt as the village of Langley is less than 3 miles from Markeaton. Indeed, in addition to those whose locative surnames indicate they were born or dwelt in Derbyshire or Lancashire, a further three of Dabridgecourt's men-at-arms can be demonstrated to have hailed from Derbyshire. The first is Robert Twyford who had been an active member of the shrieval administration of Derbyshire, for example serving as escheator in 1403.⁵⁷⁹ Twyford's principal lands in Derbyshire were located near Langley Mill,

⁵⁷⁸ Henry was very successful in recruiting Derbyshire knights in 1415: S.M. Wright, *Derbyshire Gentry in the Fourteenth Century* (Derbyshire, 1983), p.8.

⁵⁷⁹ CCR, 1402-1405, p.28.

and in 1406 his possessions in the county were increased when he was granted the manor of Bolsover.⁵⁸⁰ By the time of the 1415 campaign Twyford possessed some military experience as in 1400 he had campaigned in Scotland under the command of Thomas Gresley, another prominent and respected member of the Derbyshire gentry.⁵⁸¹ The second individual we can be certain came from Derbyshire is Wat Twyford. There is no mention of Wat specifically in any sources, but his position on the muster roll immediately after Robert strongly suggests they were related.⁵⁸² A similar case exists for the men named Elys and Richard Worslegh. The two men are listed one after the other (Elys first) on the muster roll, clearly indicating the two men were related.

The third individual identified to have come from Derbyshire was the esquire John Fynch who was granted a pardon in 1400 and noted as being from Ashleyhay, roughly ten miles north of Markeaton.⁵⁸³ It is also likely that Fynch had military experience by 1415. Two muster rolls note an individual named John Fynch serving under the command of Walter, Lord Fitzwalter, in the standing army in Scotland in 1384 and under Edward Courtney, earl of Devon, on the naval campaign of 1387.⁵⁸⁴ In addition to Fynch and Twyford, one further soldier can be shown to have fought before 1415. A Normandy garrison roll from 1405 records the name of a John Langley serving in the garrison of Hammes castle in that year. No further members of Dabridgecourt's 1415 company can be identified to have had previous military experience, although further vertical and horizontal ties within Dabridgecourt's retinue are demonstrable.⁵⁸⁵

A number of Sir John's soldiers were bound to him through familial bonds. These relationships become visible because of Sir John's surviving will.⁵⁸⁶ From this, it is possible to identify that Robert Dabridgecourt was Sir John's son. Sir John bequeathed to Robert,

⁵⁸⁰ *CPR, 1405-1408*, p.85.

⁵⁸¹ C. Rawcliffe, 'Gresley, Sir Thomas', *HoP*, <www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1386-1421/member/gresley-sir-thomas-1445>, [Accessed 6 July 2018].

⁵⁸² Robert Twyford acted on the King's behalf in Derbyshire on Commissions of Inquisitions Post Mortem in 1417 and 1418. *CIMP*, 20, p.848; *CIPM*, 21, pp.30-33.

⁵⁸³ *CRP, 1399-1401*, p.260.

⁵⁸⁴ E101/39/38, m.3; E101/40/33, m.3.

⁵⁸⁵ This may in part be because very little nominal data remains for the forces raised by Sir John. There are four letters of protection relating to his 1374 naval retinue, plus another ten relating to the period when he was captain of Calais (1399-1401). However, there are no nominal matches between these protections and his 1415 retinue.

⁵⁸⁶ *The Register of Henry Chichele*, 2, pp.51-55.

among other items, a large amount of silver, fine red clothes and a number of highly valuable white falcons. To his nephew, also named John Dabridgecourt (son of Sir Nicholas who died in 1400) Sir John left 20 gold marks.⁵⁸⁷ John Dabridgecourt followed his uncle's example by becoming a knight but died in August 1417.⁵⁸⁸ In addition to showing the familial bonds between Sir John and two of his 1415 sub-retinue members, his will also shines light onto his relationship with another member, Hugh Willoughby. We learn that Hugh Willoughby was Sir John's son-in-law having married his daughter Joan.⁵⁸⁹ Evidently because of this close tie, Sir John nominated Willoughby as an executor to his will and bequeathed him many gold marks in addition to lands around Alvaston in Derbyshire. Sadly, Willoughby did not live to enjoy his new wealth or lands as he died alongside his erstwhile friend at the siege of Harfleur on 10 September.⁵⁹⁰ Willoughby left behind his wife, Joan, and two young sons, the eldest of whom was named John and who was only 6 years old.

In total, excluding Sir John himself, of the 19 men-at-arms he raised in 1415, 14 (74%) can be identified to have come from within the vicinity of his lands in Derbyshire with near certainty, or bore locative surnames suggesting such geographic origin. This figure, which is considerably higher than that which was produced for any of the East Anglian sub-retinue companies, suggests that Dabridgecourt's sub-retinue had many vertical and horizontal ties of shared geographic origin. He succeeded in raising a regional comradeship group. Moreover, familial ties also bound some members of the retinue vertically to Sir John, while others tied members horizontally. The overall impression of Sir John Dabridgecourt's sub-retinue is that while its members appear to have lacked military experience, there were a reasonably high number of vertical and horizontal ties which bound the force together.

⁵⁸⁷ L.S. Woodger, 'Dabridgecourt, Sir Nicholas', *HoP*, <[www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1386-1421/member/dabridgecourt-sir-nicholas-\(or-collard\)-1400](http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1386-1421/member/dabridgecourt-sir-nicholas-(or-collard)-1400)>, [Accessed 6 July 2018].

⁵⁸⁸ E101/51/2, m.9. On his death his lands in Berkshire, London, Wiltshire and Hampshire passed to his second wife, Joan, to whom he was married at the time. She died in September 1419, and the lands passed to their son William. Following his death on 1 July 1422 it was found that the lands should have never have passed down the line of Sir John's second marriage, but rather it should have passed to his first son, another John, the offspring of his first wife, another Joan: *CIPM*, 23, pp.33-36. A detailed pedigree of the Dabridgecourt family exists, although should be used with caution as it contains a number of errors: *The Topographer and Genealogist*, ed. J.G. Nichols, 3 vols (London, 1846-1858), 1, p.197.

⁵⁸⁹ The Dabridgecourt and Willoughby families had a long and complex history. For a summary: Castor, *The King, The Crown*, pp.291-292.

⁵⁹⁰ *CIPM*, 24, pp.222-224.

Summary

The findings of this case study are considered in more detail and contrasted with the duke of Gloucester's retinue in chapter four. At this juncture, however, a number of closing observations need to be made. In regards to the manner in which Clarence recruited his retinue, it would seem he was able to draw on a developed recruitment network. At the high level, Clarence's force benefitted from a stable group of principal sub-captains, plus the leading members of the duke's personal company were closely bound to him. These experienced soldiers, administrators and negotiators brought considerable competence to Clarence's high-command network. Indeed, even allowing for the patchiness of the nominal coverage of the military community in the period 1390-1415, a comparatively large number of the sub-captains, particularly the principal sub-captains, can be shown to have had previous military experience. This suggests that even though the period before the 1415 campaign was one where the forces of supply and demand necessitated the scaling back of the military community, some men still actively sought to undertake military service. Furthermore, that a comparatively large number of Clarence's 1415 sub-captains can be identified to have served with the duke in 1412 suggests a degree of loyalty to him.

Moving into the middle level of the retinue, many of the duke's sub-captains have been shown to have had ties to the duke and to each other based on previous military service, as well as geographic origin, career experiences, tenure and, in some cases, family too. These ties would have engendered stability into the retinue and helped to ensure its effective operating. About the duke's low level captains, those who recruited fewer than 10 men, reasonably little can be known, primarily as a result of the sporadic survival of sources and their generally lower status. Viewed collectively, Clarence's sub-captains represent a heterogeneous group corralled together by war, each of whom would have performed vital roles in facilitating the effective operating of the duke's force.

The situation among the sub-retinues considered in this chapter is not uniform. On the one hand in the companies from East Anglia there is little evidence of internal stability, with virtually no re-service under the same sub-captains evident. This suggests that the sub-retinue companies were fluid in composition. Men seldom re-served under the same sub-captain. Whereas there was a degree of loyalty and 'settled composition' among the

personnel of Clarence's high-command, the same does not appear to have been the case in the sub-retinues. The impact this fluidity of personnel had on the 'dynamics of recruitment' is considered in more detail in chapter four. On the other hand, it must also be remembered that in Sir John Dabridgecourt's sub-retinue comparatively more ties, and thus stability, became evident. In order to gain more data to engage with these issues our attention must be turned toward the duke of Gloucester's 1415 retinue.

Chapter III



The Duke of Gloucester's 1415 Retinue

On Tuesday 1 November 1390 an English sailor arrived at Königsberg, situated on the Baltic coast, today known as Kaliningrad.⁵⁹¹ The messenger sought Henry Bolingbroke, then earl of Derby, who was wintering in the city, having aided the Teutonic Knights. The sailor carried news of the birth of Bolingbroke's fourth son, Humphrey. Considering the substantial distance from England to Königsberg, it is likely Humphrey was born in mid-late September. A child of reasonably little note during the 1390s, Humphrey's early life was spent at Eaton Tregoes, in Herefordshire, with his sisters under the watchful eye of Sir Hugh Waterton. The most substantial biography of Humphrey is that written by Kenneth Vickers which, although now dated, astutely identifies that Humphrey's early training, 'was more that of a scholar than of the soldier or politician'.⁵⁹² For much of his childhood Humphrey studied under the tutelage of a priest named Thomas Bothwell, and in his adolescent years attended Balliol College, Oxford.⁵⁹³

Following his father's usurpation of the Crown in 1399, Humphrey's status changed from that of a third son of a leading nobleman, to a prince of the blood. However, with the exception of being knighted at the coronation in October 1399 and becoming a Knight of the Garter in 1400, Humphrey continued to lead an unremarkable life. Unlike his elder brothers, he was given no military command, political appointment or meaningful title.⁵⁹⁴ The only military experience he gained during his father's reign was in 1403 when he accompanied him and his elder brother Henry to the Battle of Shrewsbury.⁵⁹⁵ Only 12 at the time, Humphrey probably watched the engagement from afar. Following the death of his father in 1413 and the coronation of his eldest brother, Humphrey's standing within the Kingdom

⁵⁹¹ *Expeditions to Prussia*, p.107.

⁵⁹² K.H. Vickers, *Humphrey, duke of Gloucester*, (London, 1907), p.8; G.L. Harriss, 'Humphrey, duke of Gloucester (1390–1447)', *ODNB*, <<https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/14155>>, [Accessed 2 July 2018]; *CP*, 5, pp.730-737.

⁵⁹³ Vickers, *Humphrey*, p.8.

⁵⁹⁴ John, the future duke of Bedford, participated in warfare in the Welsh marches.

⁵⁹⁵ *Jean de Wavrin*, ed. Hardy and Hardy, 2, p.58.

improved significantly. On 7 May 1413 he was appointed Chamberlain of England, and was raised to the peerage as duke of Gloucester on 16 May 1414. It should be noted that this was only a life peerage.⁵⁹⁶ To support his new title he was also granted the earldom of Pembroke, which included its castle and lordship. As Vickers has eloquently written, 'with the stroke of the pen he became one of the chief men of the kingdom'.⁵⁹⁷

Befitting his status, Gloucester contracted to recruit the second largest retinue for Henry's 1415 campaign at 1 duke, 6 knights, 193 esquires and 600 archers.⁵⁹⁸ The total size of his retinue was therefore supposed to be 800 combatants. They were to be paid the standard wage rates as specified earlier for service in France or Gascony. As collateral for the second quarter wages, Gloucester was granted by Henry two purses of gold garnished with jewels, each valued at £2,000.⁵⁹⁹ When considering how Gloucester recruited his 1415 retinue it must be remembered that, unlike his brother Clarence, he did not have an extensive existing recruitment network to draw on. In some ways Gloucester was in a similar situation as the Black Prince had been when first building his retinue. Gloucester had no military service history and possessed nowhere near the amount of lands or properties as his brother. Indeed, in regards to his military inexperience, Vickers puts the problem succinctly by stating that Gloucester was wholly 'ignorant of war, and unused even to military methods'.⁶⁰⁰ Nonetheless, even with his inexperience, Gloucester succeeded in bringing a retinue to muster. As we have seen, they gathered at Michelmersh, near Romsey, and were mustered on 16 July.⁶⁰¹

⁵⁹⁶ *PROME*, 'Henry V: April 1414'.

⁵⁹⁷ Vickers, *Humphrey*, p.10.

⁵⁹⁸ E404/31/250.

⁵⁹⁹ *PPC*, 3, pp.8-9.

⁶⁰⁰ Vickers, *Humphrey*, p.21.

⁶⁰¹ E101/45/13.

Table 3.1: The Duke of Gloucester's 1415 Retinue

MA = Man-at-arms

A = Archer

Captain	On Muster Roll			Annotations	Totals		
	Men-at-Arms ⁶⁰²	Archers	Total	Not Pointed	Men-at-Arms	Archers	Total
Sir Henry Husse	31	72	103	3 (MA) 4 (A) ⁶⁰³	28	68	96
Sir William Beauchamp	9	30	39		9	30	39
Sir Lewis Berney	5	20	25	1 (A)	5	19	24
Sir Thomas Clinton	6	14	20	1 (A) ⁶⁰⁴	6	13	19
Sir Thomas Morley	6	14	20	2 (MA) 4 (A)	4	10	14
Sir Nicholas Haute	4	9	13		4	9	13
John de Veer	6	13	19	1 (A)	6	12	18
William Harrington	6	13	19		6	13	19
Robert Roos	6	19	25	2 (A)	6	17	23
David Calverley ⁶⁰⁵	5	9	14	1 (MA) 2 (A)	4	7	11
Thomas Burgh	4	7	11	1 (MA) 1 (A)	3	6	9
William Trussell	6	13	19		6	13	19
Geoffrey	6	17	23		6		

⁶⁰² These figures include the captains themselves.⁶⁰³ Final non-pointed archer also marked with a cross to the left of his name.⁶⁰⁴ Also marked with a cross to the left of his name.⁶⁰⁵ The captain's name is scored through completely and not pointed. The second on the list, Hugh Calverley, took command as he is noted on the sick lists (chapter four) as captain. No evidence has been found to suggest these men were related to the famous Hugh Calverley of the fourteenth-century. Two archers are marked with a cross to the left of their names.

Lowther						17	23
John Tyrell	6	18	24		6	18	24
Conan Aske	9	15	24	2 (MA) 1 (A) ⁶⁰⁶	7	14	21
John Smiths	4	9	13		4	9	13
Thomas Deschalers	6	10	16		6	10	16
William Hyde	6	13	19		6	13	19
William Cressoner	5	14	19		5	14	19
Nicholas Chorley ⁶⁰⁷	4	9	13		4	9	13
Robert Lacre	5	11	16		5	11	16
Richard Skelton	3	4	7		3	4	7
John Giffard	1	4	5		1	4	5
James Patrick	2	7	9		2	7	9
Richard Beaumont	4	9	13		4	9	13
James Fenys ⁶⁰⁸	3	6	9		3	6	9
James Croft	3	7	10	1 (MA) 1 (A)	2	6	8
John Belle	2	5	7		2	5	7
Edward Haughton	2	6	8		2	6	8
John Oke	2	7	9		2	7	9
Walter Strickland	2	5	7		2	5	7

⁶⁰⁶ The two men-at-arms are scored though and the archer is marked with a cross to the left of his name.

⁶⁰⁷ This person's name appears in most related sources as 'Thorley'. Hereafter noted as Thorley.

⁶⁰⁸ Noted hereafter as Fiennes.

Nicholas Burdet	2	5	7		2	5	7
Robert Neumarche	2	6	8	1 (A)	2	5	7
Peter Mordan	1	3	4	3 (A)	1	0	1
John Clinton	1	3	4	1 (A)	1	2	3
John Hawkwood	1	4	5	4 (A)	1	0	1
Robert Sala...[illegible]	1	2	3		1	2	3
John Huet	1	2	3		1	2	3
William Rokell	1	3	4		1	3	4
Robert Langford	1	2	3		1	2	3
Walter Beauchamp	1	3	4		1	3	4
Thomas Mulgrave	1	3	4		1	3	4
John Lowthe	1	3	4		1	3	4
John Warde	1	2	3		1	2	3
George Lampet	1	3	4		1	3	4
Hugh Walton	1	0	1		1	0	1
Thomas Berwick	1	2	3		1	2	3
William Wroth	1	3	4		1	3	4
John Eveas	1	3	4		1	3	4
Richard Colfax	1	3	4	3 (A)	1	0	1

Walter Schyrington ⁶⁰⁹	1	2	3		1	2	3
Guy Whittington	1	3	4		1	3	4
Thomas Gloucester	1	4	5	1 (A) ⁶¹⁰	1	3	4
Nicholas Griffon	1	2	3		1	2	3
Adam Adria	1	0	1		1	0	1
Henry Forster	1	3	4		1	3	4
Captain unstated	0	126	126	9 (A) ⁶¹¹	0	117	117
TOTALS	196	604	800	10 (MA) 40 (A)	186	564	750

The muster roll lists exactly 800 names, although 10 men-at-arms and 40 archers are not pointed. This suggests that when Gloucester's retinue was mustered at Michelmarsh in July, it comprised 1 duke, 6 knights, 180 esquires and 564 archers, and thus had a total strength of 751 men. According to the muster roll then, Gloucester failed to recruit the 800 soldiers he was contractually obliged to. As we have seen, it is possible, indeed even likely, that the men for whom space was left blank on the muster roll turned up after the main phase of the muster had taken place. In the duke's post-campaign accounts, which will be studied more closely later, it is stated that he was not paid the wages for four men-at-arms for the duration of the campaign.⁶¹² This suggests that additional archers were found, although he fell marginally short of the number of men-at-arms required by his indenture. As was standard practice, some men took out letters of protection before embarking for war. However, there are a number of issues associated with the letters of protection sought by members of Gloucester's retinue in 1415. These issues are dealt with in the following

⁶⁰⁹ Noted hereafter as Sherrington.

⁶¹⁰ Also scored through.

⁶¹¹ One is also marked with a cross to the left of his name.

⁶¹² E358/6, m.4

chapter, but at this stage it can simply be observed that eight of all those detailed on the muster roll were granted such letters.⁶¹³

The internal structure of Gloucester's retinue is revealed by the muster roll. It was intended to comprise 55 sub-retinues, plus one large company of archers who, presumably, formed the duke's personal company. Yet, as was the case with Clarence's retinue, five of Gloucester's sub-captains similarly failed to muster any archers or additional men-at-arms.⁶¹⁴ Their archers may have subsequently arrived after the muster had taken place, or the captains may have been able to recruit some men while waiting to embark. However, as Gloucester's retinue was not mustered again – or if it was, the associated muster roll has not survived – there is no evidence that these captains did recruit additional men. As such, they may have served alone, been absorbed into another retinue, or have served directly under the duke. As in the previous chapter, in the absence of any real indication as to what happened to these men, we will presume, cautiously, that they were absorbed into the duke's personal company. As such, for the purpose of this investigation we will work from the position that Gloucester's overall retinue was comprised of 51 sub-retinues, plus 117 archers and four men-at-arms who served directly under the duke.

Gloucester directly commanded 121 men, 16% of his retinue's strength. The remaining 84% of his soldiers were recruited by the sub-captains. As in his brother's retinue, the size of the 51 sub-retinues varied considerably. The largest, at 96 men, was captained by Sir Henry Husse, although the majority of sub-retinues comprised less than 10 men. In all of these small forces the captain was the only man-at-arms. The average (mean) sub-retinue size was 12 and there were 20 companies with the average number of combatants or more. Only the companies captained by Sir Henry Husse, Sir William Beauchamp, Sir Lewis Berney and John Tyrell comprised double the average or more. Between them these captains recruited 183 soldiers, 24% of the retinue's manpower. Because of this, these men would have been Gloucester's principal captains and part of his high-command network. They would have assisted Gloucester in ensuring that Henry's ordinances were adhered to.

⁶¹³ Letters of protection and attorney are discussed in chapter four.

⁶¹⁴ Richard Colfax, Hugh Walton, John Hawkwood, Peter Mordan and Adam Adria. These captains have been removed from the above table.

Within the duke's personal company, the five men-at-arms who were most likely absorbed into it cannot be identified to have had any particular bonds with Gloucester, or with each other. Indeed, about Adam Adria, Peter Mordan and Hugh Walton nothing is known. Rather more is known about John Hawkwood. As his name suggests, he was the son of the famous routier captain who found fortune and fame in Italy in the fourteenth-century.⁶¹⁵ Born in 1386, as a youth Hawkwood had served under freelancers near Bologna.⁶¹⁶ However, on attaining his majority in 1406 he returned to England, to the family's ancestral home in Sible Hedingham, Essex, where he was granted naturalisation.⁶¹⁷ The 1415 campaign appears to have been his only foray into English military service. He spent the rest of his life managing his inherited estates.⁶¹⁸ The date of his death is not certain. Christopher Starr suggests it was 1412, while Francis Stoner Saunders and John Temple Leader suggest he lived until 1464.⁶¹⁹ The former suggestion is evidently too early, while the other appears based on a misinterpretation of an entry in the Parliament Rolls relating to lands 'once held' by Hawkwood and his wife Margret.⁶²⁰ William Caferro, who has written the most definitive biography of the elder Hawkwood, suggests, most convincingly, that the younger Hawkwood died sometime before 1420.⁶²¹ Prior to 1415, with the exception of his noted service near Bologna and holding an honorary post in the Florentine army, there is no further evidence of military activity recorded in English records.⁶²² It is entirely possible that he participated on further campaigns in Italy, or, indeed, was present on English campaigns before 1415. Yet, owing to the partiality of the surviving English sources, evidence of his service in English forces has not survived. Whatever the case, it is pertinent to ask, what motivated him to go to war in 1415? Could it have been that the opportunity to serve under a young English King, like his father may have done in 1346 and 1356, would have been too good to pass up? As the son of the great

⁶¹⁵ K. Fowler, 'Hawkwood, Sir John (d. 1394)', *ODNB*, <<https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/12693>>, [Accessed 9 July 2018].

⁶¹⁶ W. Caferro, *John Hawkwood: An English Mercenary in Fourteenth-Century Italy* (Baltimore, 2006), pp.243, 323.

⁶¹⁷ *CPR, 1405-1408*, p.279.

⁶¹⁸ *CCR, 1405-1409*, pp.519-520, 522.

⁶¹⁹ C. Starr, *Medieval Mercenary: Sir John Hawkwood of Essex*, (Chelmsford, 2007), p.72; F.S. Saunders, *Hawkwood: Diabolical Englishman* (London, 2004), p.307; J.T. Leader, *Sir John Hawkwood (L'Acuto): Story of a Condottiere* (London, 1899; repr. 2010), p.74.

⁶²⁰ *PROME*, 'Edward IV: April 1463'.

⁶²¹ Caferro, *Hawkwood*, p.330.

⁶²² *Ibid*, pp.243, 323.

routier captain, whose name was known across Christendom, did he also have expectations to live up to? Certainly the fact that the 1415 army was commanded by the King in person encouraged many individuals to enlist. The same was certainly true for the army which Henry IV led to Scotland in 1400.⁶²³ Finally, was the lure of fighting the 'old enemy' too strong in 1415 to ignore? Surely a combination of all these reasons influenced his decision.

Hawkwood's reasons for serving under Gloucester in particular were almost certainly more prosaic. Hawkwood's estates were within 25 miles of one of Gloucester's main castles at Hadleigh, in Essex. As we will see, Gloucester drew heavily from Essex. For the duke, the inclusion of such a famous son to his retinue would surely have granted him a certain amount of prestige. In addition, Hawkwood's military experiences from Italy, although slight, nonetheless would have been valuable to Gloucester. Although, as already observed, Hawkwood appears to have actually failed to bring any men with him to muster, so his numerical contribution to Gloucester's retinue was minimal. There is no evidence that he had any personal relationship with Gloucester before 1415, or that they had anything to do with each other afterwards. There is, however, evidence of a relationship between Hawkwood and John Tyrell, another of Gloucester's 1415 sub-captains. Not only were they both Essex men, but by 1412 Tyrell was married to Alice Coggeshall, who was Hawkwood's niece.⁶²⁴

The final of the five men-at-arms who failed to muster any archers or additional men-at-arms was Richard Colfox. He was lucky to have been alive in 1415. The son of Sir Nicholas Colfox, who himself had helped murder Thomas, duke of Gloucester, in 1397, Richard was a strong supporter of Lollardy and a close ally of Sir John Oldcastle, former friend and confidant of the King and principal Lollard agitator.⁶²⁵ Although he had been employed by Prince Henry in 1402, so had some association with the Lancastrians, Richard Colfox's allegiances were with his co-religionists in early 1414.⁶²⁶ In January he rose in rebellion with Oldcastle, who had escaped from the Tower, and headed for St. Giles's Fields

⁶²³ Curry, et al, 'New Regime, New Army?', p.1398.

⁶²⁴ Hawkwood's sister, Antiochia, married William Coggeshall and had one son and four daughters. Their second daughter, Alice, married John Tyrell: Starr, *Medieval Mercenary*, p.69.

⁶²⁵ C. Knightly, 'The Early Lollards: A Survey of Popular Lollard Activity in England, 1382-1428', PhD. thesis (University of York, 1975), pp.502-504; *CPR, 1401-1405*, p.381. On Oldcastle: J. Thomson, 'Oldcastle, John, Baron Cobham', *ODNB*, <<https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/20674>>, [Accessed 2 July 2018].

⁶²⁶ *CPR, 1422-1429*, p.77.

in central London. Although the details are scarce, Colfox probably played a key role in orchestrating the rebellion. During the fiasco which followed, Colfox managed to evade capture. On 28 March Henry decreed that many of those involved in the rebellion were to be pardoned, with the exception of Oldcastle, Colfox and a handful of others.⁶²⁷ His name alongside Oldcastle's demonstrates his high standing in the Lollard movement, and that he most likely played a key role in organising the botched revolt. He had been a close associate of Oldcastle for some time as in 1413 they both received payment from the Crown for a clasp worth over 400 marks which they had sold to the King.⁶²⁸ Realising discretion to be the better part of valour, in 1414 he sought reconciliation with the Crown. What form this took is unknown, but while his former friends were hung and burned at the stake, Colfox received a pardon on 12 December.⁶²⁹ His decision (if indeed it was his) to serve under the King's brother in 1415 can only have been to demonstrate his newfound, or rather rediscovered, loyalty to the Lancastrian regime. Although the relationship between Colfox and Gloucester was evidently not based on friendship, they nevertheless almost certainly knew of one another. Like Hawkwood, Colfox's violent past undoubtedly stood him in good stead for military service.

Among those captains who failed to recruit sub-retinues we can see little stability. None can be identified to have had any pre-existing personal ties to Gloucester, or to each other. Indeed, with the exception of Hawkwood and Colfox who bought with them certain attributes which would have assisted the duke, nothing is known of the other three. They were evidently background figures. As we have observed, the majority of Gloucester's personal retinue was the 117 pointed archers at the end of the muster roll. It is highly probable that many of these individuals were in some way attached to the duke's household, either as servants, or even office holders. Yet, demonstrating this is near impossible because almost none of his household accounts survive, and certainly none from the early period of his life. For this reason Vickers, when writing his biography of the duke, was forced to rely heavily on chronicle accounts and miscellaneous documents, such as letters and other correspondences. Moving to rather more uneven ground, some of the surnames of Gloucester's men could imply that they were household members, for example

⁶²⁷ *CCR, 1413-1419*, pp.176-177.

⁶²⁸ *Ibid*, p.73.

⁶²⁹ Knightly, 'The Early Lollards', p.504, citing: KB 27/615/14.

George Avener (head of stables) and Gerard Amourer. Yet, without additional corroborating evidence to support these identifications, firm conclusions certainly cannot be drawn.

Similar to the situation with Clarence's retinue, the sick lists, which we will examine more closely in the following chapter, cast some further light on the issue. When listing the sick of Gloucester's retinue after the siege of Harfleur they provide details of the rank for all soldiers, apart from members of this company of archers/*valets*. That they do not provide rank information for these men, when they do for others, suggests that their role was not primarily combative. Looking forward, only 17 of these individuals can be identified to have served in the duke's personal company again in 1417, which comprised 53 members.⁶³⁰ This low figure may suggest that the membership of his household was fluid, possibly on account of casualties suffered during the 1415 campaign (an issue dealt with later), or a surplus of individuals in the household. Disappointingly, little more can be said about this company of soldiers because of their low status, coupled with the absence of household accounts or further documentary information. Based on the limited available evidence, it appears that the duke of Gloucester's personal company was not a cohesive group of soldiers. Its members lacked vertical ties to the duke and horizontal ties to one another. Similarly, none can be identified to have had any long-lasting relationship with the duke after the campaign. As was the case with Clarence's retinue, we must not, of course, presume the instability evident within the duke's personal company was endemic throughout his whole retinue. To further inquire into the retinue's overall stability our attention must once more be turned to those individuals who raised the bulk of the retinue's manpower; the sub-captains.

The Sub-Retinue Captains

The duke of Gloucester had never commanded soldiers before 1415. On account of this, none of his sub-captains had served under him previously. However, it was not the case that they were all militarily inexperienced. Some, as table 3.2 shows, were veterans of

⁶³⁰ They were (all spellings as appears on the 1415 muster roll): John Patryk, Thomas Dore, John Hylton, William Grenhale, John Message, Robert Medecreste, Thomas Clerc, John Bakyngham, William Hawys, John Whyte, John Hert, William Aldebourne, Thomas Turnour, Simon Parke, Thomas Pykeryng, David Parker, Robert Freman; E101/51/2 (1417 muster roll). Re-service figures between the 1415 and 1417 campaign are discussed more below, and in chapter four.

numerous conflicts. For others, such as Sir Thomas Morley and William Harrington, the 1415 campaign was the first time they recruited a military retinue. In total, 10 (20%) of Gloucester's 51 sub-captains had previous military experience. Looking more closely at Gloucester's militarily-experienced sub-captains, the majority had served infrequently and less than three times. Even his four principal sub-captains, who made such a large numerical contribution in terms of manpower to his retinue, cannot be demonstrated to have had much military experience. In fact, with the exception of Sir William Beauchamp, who assisted Henry IV in Wales in 1403, from his position as Constable of Gloucester castle, none of the other principal sub-captains can be shown to have had any military experience prior to 1415. Indeed, nothing at all is known about Sir Lewis Berney. The lack of military bonds between these men and their commander would have limited the high level stability of the retinue.

While many of Gloucester's captains appear to have been as inexperienced at warfare as their commander, there were three notable exceptions. The most hardened military veteran in the retinue was Sir Thomas Clinton, who was certainly aged over 50 by the time of the campaign. He had participated on at least eight campaigns before serving in 1415. According to his own testimony given in the *Scrope vs. Grosvenor* trial of 1389, Sir Thomas had campaigned in Scotland twice before 1386.⁶³¹ Although he does not state which campaigns he was part of, it is most likely he was present on the 1380 and 1385 expeditions because Gaunt was present on these campaign, and it was under him whom he served in 1386.⁶³² Another of Gloucester's sub-captains who had served under his grandfather was Conan Aske. The oldest of Gloucester's sub-captains, Aske had first served under Gaunt in Spain way back in 1369.⁶³³ He returned to the duke's banner in 1373 for the 'Great March' from Calais to Bordeaux and accompanied the duke to Scotland in 1385. On this occasion he and Sir Thomas Clinton may have campaigned alongside one another. Like Clinton, Aske also claimed during the *Scrope vs. Grosvenor* trial to have gone to Scotland one further time, but does not state when this was, or under whom he served. Based on his

⁶³¹ *Scrope vs. Grosvenor*, 2, p.214; L.S. Woodger, 'Clinton, Sir Thomas', *HoP*, <www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1386-1421/member/clinton-sir-thomas-1415>, [Accessed 9 July 2018].

⁶³² Woodger, 'Clinton, Sir Thomas'.

⁶³³ *Scrope vs. Grosvenor*, 2, pp.331-332.

evident association with Gaunt, it is probable that he was present on another campaign with Clinton during the early 1380s.

Sir Thomas Clinton returned to Gaunt's banner in 1386 and accompanied the duke to Spain. Also present on this campaign was his 1415 co-captain Sir Nicholas Haute.⁶³⁴ It is clear that although none of Gloucester's captains had served directly under him before, some had served under his illustrious grandfather. Indeed, some had also served under his father before, and after, he made himself King. Following Bolingbroke's arrival at Ravenspur in 1399, Sir William Beauchamp and his younger brother Walter rapidly changed allegiance to support him.⁶³⁵ Walter evidently impressed Bolingbroke as he was granted a yearly income of £40 from the revenues of Gloucester county on 23 October 1399.⁶³⁶ He went on to fight with Henry IV at the Battle of Shrewsbury in 1403, while his brother supported the King's war in Wales.⁶³⁷ Indeed, before this battle Walter had even gone to Germany for the wedding of the King's daughter, Blanche, to King Rupert. Although no specific relationship can be discovered to have existed between Walter Beauchamp and Gloucester, their association was clearly a result of Walter's affinity with the royal household and his brother's standing in Gloucestershire. While the Beauchamp brothers rapidly moved to support Bolingbroke following his landing at Ravenspur, Sir Thomas Clinton did not. Instead of supporting the son of his erstwhile lord, he supported Richard II. Following Bolingbroke's seizure of the throne, Sir Thomas was quickly pardoned for his lapse of judgement.⁶³⁸

It is evident that although none of Gloucester's captains were tied to him through previous military service under him, some men were bound to him via their previous military service under the duke's relatives, specifically his grandfather and father. This demonstrates that in building his recruitment network the duke was recruiting men who had existing relationships with the Lancastrian family. Indeed, as we will see, these

⁶³⁴ L.S. Woodger, 'Haute, Sir Nicholas', *HoP*, <www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1386-1421/member/haute-sir-nicholas-1357-1415>, [Accessed 9 July 2018]; P. Fleming, 'Haute family (per. c. 1350–1530)', *ODNB*, <<https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/52786>>, [Accessed 9 July 2018].

⁶³⁵ L.S. Woodger, 'Beauchamp, Sir William', *HoP*, <www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1386-1421/member/beauchamp-sir-william-1421>, [Accessed 9 July 2018 March 2017]; J.S. Roskell and L.S. Woodger, 'Beauchamp, Sir Walter', *HoP*, <www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1386-1421/member/beauchamp-sir-walter-1430>, [Accessed 9 July 2018].

⁶³⁶ *CPR*, 1399-1401, p.35.

⁶³⁷ *CPR*, 1401-1405, p.296; Roskell and Woodger, 'Beauchamp, Sir Walter'.

⁶³⁸ *CPR*, 1399-1401, p.28.

relationships took many forms; they were not purely military. The few militarily-experienced members of Gloucester's retinue would have played an important role in bringing some stability to it. They would have provided the duke with much needed experience-backed knowledge and advice. Yet, although men like Sir Thomas Clinton and Sir Nicholas Haute did have useful expertise, overall the level of military experience among Gloucester's sub-captains was low. Unlike the duke of Clarence's retinue, the military service history of Gloucester's captains does not reveal a web of interconnectedness. Even at the highest level in the retinue, the principal sub-captains also lacked military experience.

Table 3.2: The Military Service History of Gloucester Sub-Captains: Before 1415

Captain	1369	1373	1378	1380	1381	1385	1386	1387	1388	1389	1390	1391	1394	1399	1403	1404
Conan Aske ⁶³⁹	*	*				*										
Sir William Beauchamp ⁶⁴⁰														*	*	
Walter Beauchamp ⁶⁴¹														*	*	
Richard Beaumont ⁶⁴²				*				*			*					
Thomas Berwick ⁶⁴³		*	*													
David Calverley ⁶⁴⁴																*
Sir Thomas Clinton ⁶⁴⁵				*		*	*		*	*		*	*	*		
Sir Nicholas Haute ⁶⁴⁶					*		*	*								

⁶³⁹ C61/82, m.13 (1369); *Scrope vs. Grosvenor*, 2, pp.331-332 (1373 and 1385. He also claims to have gone to Scotland on one further occasion. On which expedition is unknown).

⁶⁴⁰ *CPR, 1399-1401*, p.171 (1399); *CPR, 1401-1405*, pp.294-296 (1403, Wales)

⁶⁴¹ *CPR, 1399-1401*, p.35 (1399); *CPR, 1401-1405*, p.255 (1403, Shrewsbury).

⁶⁴² BN, ms. fr. 25768/440 (1380); C76/71, m.15 (1387); C76/75, m.11 (1390).

⁶⁴³ C76/56, m.31 (1373); E101/36/32, m.3 (1378).

⁶⁴⁴ E101/43/29, m.3; C47/2/49/19, m.1.

⁶⁴⁵ *Scrope vs. Grosvenor*, 2, p.214 (1380 and 1385); C76/70, m.28 (1386); E101/41/5, m.3 (1388); E101/41/17, m.1 (1389); C76/76, m.10 (1391); C76/78, m.10 (1394); *Chronicles of the Revolution*, ed. Given-Wilson, p.251 (1399).

William Rokell ⁶⁴⁷			*													
John Warde ⁶⁴⁸																*

⁶⁴⁶ C76/65, m.18 (1381); C76/70, m.17; C76/71, m.4 (1386-1387).

⁶⁴⁷ E101/36/39, m.8; C76/62, m.18.

⁶⁴⁸ E101/43/36, m.2; E101/43/32, m.5; C47/2/49/19, m.1.

The military service history of Gloucester's sub-captains is, of course, only part of the story. As our investigation into Clarence's retinue demonstrated, numerous additional bonds could exist between retinue members, such as shared geographic heritage, career experiences or familial connections. These ties could be important in establishing cohesion and fostering stability. Beginning with shared geographic heritage, chart 3.3 shows that Gloucester recruited the majority of his captains from East Anglia and South East England. In 1415 the duke possessed estates and properties in numerous counties throughout England and southern Wales, including Essex, Suffolk, Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Kent and Pembrokeshire.⁶⁴⁹ Yet, because he was unmarried, he held nowhere near as many estates as Clarence, or gained as much income per year. The estates Gloucester did possess had almost all been granted to him by his father. His estates and properties were most heavily concentrated in East Anglia and South East England. In Essex, for example, he held Hadleigh Castle and the nearby manors of Thundersley and Eastwood. While in Kent he held the manor of Milton, near Gravesend, and Marden in the Kentish heartland. It is therefore unsurprising to see that the majority of his sub-captains, for whom we have geographic data, hailed from these regions.

Among his East Anglian estates the duke possessed a number of manors in Suffolk, in addition to his significant presence in Essex. In Suffolk the duke held the manor of Great Wrating, among others. The property had been held by Sir Edmund Mortimer before it was granted to Gloucester in 1403 following Sir Edmund's support for Henry Percy at the Battle of Shrewsbury. Roughly 25 miles east of Great Wrating lived Gloucester's captain Thomas Deschalers.⁶⁵⁰ An individual of reasonably little note, his only brief association with any member of the royal family before 1415 had been in 1412 when he was appointed to a Commission to arrest two men and take them to the King in Chancery.⁶⁵¹ Another captain from Suffolk was William Cressoner. He was a young man at only 23 when he mustered under Gloucester in 1415. Neither he nor his relatives had any demonstrable relationship with Gloucester or his relatives before 1415. Cressoner's decision to serve under the duke in 1415 was probably based on the fact that as a youth he resided at Hawkedon, less than 10


⁶⁴⁹ *CIPM*, 20, p.7; *CPR*, 1399-1401, p.143; *CPR*, 1401-1405, pp.121, 160, 256, 468; *CPR*, 1405-1408, p.191; *CPR*, 1408-1413, p.303; *CPR*, 1413-1416, pp.170, 387, 397.

⁶⁵⁰ L.S. Woodger, 'Deschalers, Thomas', *HoP*, <[www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1386-1421/member/chalers-\(deschalers\)-thomas-1383-1443](http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1386-1421/member/chalers-(deschalers)-thomas-1383-1443)> [Accessed 9 July 2018].

⁶⁵¹ *CPR*, 1408-1413, p.429.

miles from Great Wratting. Having proved his age in 1414, Cressoner inherited his father's properties in Suffolk, Huntingdonshire and Essex.⁶⁵²

Chart 3.3: The Geographic Origins of Gloucester's Sub-Captains⁶⁵³



One of the Essex manors which Cressoner inherited was Ferrers, today known as South Woodham Ferrers. This property was only 12 miles from Gloucester's castle at Hadleigh, and 10 miles from his estates in Thundersly. One of Cressoner's immediate

⁶⁵² *CIPM*, 19, pp.300-301; *CCR, 1413-1419*, p.137; *CPR, 1408-1413*, p.278; C138/10/49.

⁶⁵³ The data presented in this chart is based, where known, on an individual's principal residence in 1415. In instances where this information is unknown, the county in which they possessed the most significant landed interest has been counted. Geographic data is available for 32 (57%) of the 56 sub-retinue captains (included in this calculation, and presented on this chart is, where known, the region of origin for the five sub-captains who failed to muster retinues). The counties and individuals in regions are as follows: *North*, Cumberland (Geoffrey Louther and Richard Skelton), Lancashire (James Croft), Westmoreland (Walter Strickland), Yorkshire (Conan Aske and Henry Forster); *Midlands*, Leicestershire (William Trussell), Lincolnshire (Robert Roos), Warwickshire (Nicholas Burdet), Worcestershire (Sir William Beauchamp); *East Anglia*, Cambridge (Thomas Deschalers), Essex (James Tyrell, John Hawkwood, Nicholas Thorley, Thomas Berwick, Sir Thomas Morley and William Rokell), Suffolk (William Cressoner); *South West/West Country*, Dorset (John Oke), Gloucestershire (Guy Whittington and John Warde), Somerset (William Harrington), Wiltshire (Sir Walter Beauchamp); *South East*, Berkshire (Robert Langford), Kent (Sir Nicholas Haute, Sir Thomas Clinton and Walter Shirrington), London (George Lampet), Middlesex (William Wroth), Oxfordshire (James Fiennes and Thomas Gloucester), Surrey (Sir Henry Husse). This data has primarily been gained from the *CIPM*, *CFR*, *CFA*, and various wills.

neighbours was John Tyrell who held the close-by manor of Rawreth.⁶⁵⁴ Tyrell, in fact, possessed a number of estates throughout Essex, for example at Ramsden Crays, Hockley and Heron. In 1412 he was residing at Heron, near Brentwood. Another captain who lived in the same vicinity as Cressoner and Tyrell was Thomas Berwick. He lived at Stanford Rivers and had been a retainer of Gaunt's from 1388 until the duke's death in 1399.⁶⁵⁵ Indeed, even before he was retained by the duke, he had served in armies under his command on a number of occasions. In 1373 he served under Edward, Lord Despenser, whom Gaunt had summoned back from abroad especially.⁶⁵⁶ In 1378 Berwick was present at the siege of St Malo in the retinue of Richard FitzAlan, earl of Arundel. During these campaigns he evidently impressed Gaunt enough for him to retain him by 1388, if not earlier. Berwick's association with Gloucester in 1415 was therefore probably based on his geographic proximity to a number of the duke's estates, but also from his past relationship with Gaunt. Berwick's close geographic proximity to Tyrell and Cressoner would have ensured a bond of shared regional heritage existed between them.

This regional comradeship group would also have included Sir Thomas Morley whose family possessed estates in Great Hallingbury, less than 15 miles from Stanford Rivers. Sir Thomas Morley was the grandson of Thomas, fourth Lord Morley (d.1416).⁶⁵⁷ During his long career the fourth Lord Morley had been a strong supporter of Henry IV, and a virulent critic of the earl of Salisbury.⁶⁵⁸ The fourth Lord was held in high regard by the Lancastrian regime. This is clear from the fact that when he died in September 1416, after having been wounded at the Battle of the Seine, Henry V himself and the Emperor Sigismund, who was then visiting England, attended his funeral.⁶⁵⁹ The author of the *Gesta Henrici Quinti* also wrote, 'he winged himself to heaven, to the grief of almost everyone'.⁶⁶⁰ It was evidently on the back of his grandfather's reputation, connections and status, that the 22-year-old Sir Thomas entered Gloucester's service in 1415.

⁶⁵⁴ J.S. Roskell and L.S. Woodger, 'Tyrell, John', *HoP*, <www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1386-1421/member/tyrell-john-1382-1437>, [Accessed 9 July 2018]; R. Horrox, 'Tyrell family (*per.* c.1304–c.1510)', *ODNB*, <<https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/52799>>, [Accessed 9 July 2018]; J.S. Roskell, *Parliament and Politics in Late Medieval England*, 3 vols (London, 1983), 3, pp.277–315.

⁶⁵⁵ C76/56, m.31; Walker, *Lancastrian Affinity*, p.264.

⁶⁵⁶ *Froissart*, ed. Johnes, 4, pp.200–201.

⁶⁵⁷ *CP*, 9, pp.216–219.

⁶⁵⁸ *Chronicles of the Revolution*, ed. Given-Wilson, pp.46, 205–209.

⁶⁵⁹ Wylie and Waugh, *Henry V*, 2, p.356.

⁶⁶⁰ *Gesta Henrici Quinti*, ed. Taylor and Roskell, p.163.

Returning to John Tyrell, he was also closely bound to the Kentish captain, Sir Nicholas Haute.⁶⁶¹ Following the death of his first wife, Alice, in March 1400, Sir Nicholas married Eleanor, who was the widow of William Tyrell and mother of John.⁶⁶² By this marriage, Sir Nicholas Haute became John Tyrell's step-father. As we have already seen, Haute possessed previous military service having served under Gaunt on a number of occasions. He had also served as sheriff of Kent in 1395 and had sat on numerous Commissions of Array.⁶⁶³ Approaching his sixtieth year in 1415, he was one of Gloucester's eldest captains, but also one of the most experienced. His relationship with John Tyrell would have provided some further horizontal stability to Gloucester's retinue. Sir Nicholas was also associated with his neighbour Sir Thomas Clinton. In addition to having served alongside one another during the 1386 campaign, they were also neighbours. Haute's estates at Waltham were near to Clinton's at Bensted.⁶⁶⁴ The two had also served together on a Commission of Array in Kent in January 1400 and both acted as witnesses to a Charter of Warranty in November 1408.⁶⁶⁵ The 1415 campaign was the final time the two friends served together, as they both died either during the campaign, or shortly afterwards.

Regional comradeship groups can thus be identified to have existed among the captains from Essex and Kent. Moving to other areas of the country, similar groups can be discovered. In Berkshire, for example, Robert Langford held the manor of Binfield which was around 20 miles from Gloucester's manor of Cookham.⁶⁶⁶ Robert was around 26 in 1415, but already a significant member of Berkshire society. He owed this position to his father, Sir William, who had been a Justice of the Peace from 1399 until 1405 when he became Sheriff.⁶⁶⁷ Before his death in August 1411, he had also served as an MP in 1394 and January 1404. Although there is no evidence that Sir William himself ever undertook military service, in his will he bequeathed to his son, Robert, an array of armour, such as a basinet, breastplate, paunce, vambraces, rearbraces and a pair of white plate metal gloves.⁶⁶⁸ Robert

⁶⁶¹ Woodger, 'Haute, Sir Nicholas'.

⁶⁶² *CIPM*, 18, p.5.

⁶⁶³ Woodger, 'Haute, Sir Nicholas'.

⁶⁶⁴ *Ibid*; Woodger, 'Clinton, Sir Thomas'.

⁶⁶⁵ *CPR, 1399-1401*, p.211; *CCR, 1405-1409*, p.468.

⁶⁶⁶ *CIPM*, 19, pp.343-344.

⁶⁶⁷ L.S. Woodger, 'Langford, Sir William', *HoP*, <www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1386-1421/member/langford-sir-william-1366-1411>, [Accessed 9 July 2018].

⁶⁶⁸ *The Fifty Earliest English Wills, 1387-1439*, ed. F.J. Furnivall (London, 1882), pp.18-21.

may well have worn these items in 1415. His association with Gloucester in 1415 may be attributed to his father's connections, plus the important fact that he held the manor of Binfield directly from the duke.⁶⁶⁹ At the time of his father's death the manor was declared to have an annual value of 5 marks. This is a rare example of one of Gloucester's sub-captains having a direct financial and tenurial relationship with the duke prior to the 1415 campaign. While this tie would not have garnered much friendship between the two men, it does at least give an insight into how Robert Langford was recruited by Gloucester in 1415.

Within five miles of Langford's home at Bradfield dwelled Thomas Gloucester. His ancestral home was at Whitchurch in Oxfordshire. Thomas Gloucester undoubtedly served under the duke of Gloucester in 1415 because of his connections to the royal household. He had been retained by the King on 24 June 1413 for 8 marks annually.⁶⁷⁰ His connection with the royal household was because of his father, Sir Thomas Gloucester.⁶⁷¹ He was Marshal of Bolingbroke's household from May 1390 until Oct 1399 and then Master of the King's Hall until his death in 1406. Considering he was a royal esquire in 1415, it is surprising to find him serving under the duke of Gloucester. The same was also the case for the Yorkshireman Geoffrey Louthier. He was retained by Henry IV in August 1405 and had this appointment confirmed by Henry V.⁶⁷² It is possible that Henry V instructed these men to serve under Gloucester in an effort to help his youngest brother build his war retinue. As already discussed, the duke was creating his 1415 retinue essentially from scratch, so would have needed any help he could secure.

Another captain who held property near to Robert Langford was Sir Henry Husse. He possessed the manor of South Moreton which was 10 miles from Bradfield.⁶⁷³ Sir Henry captained the largest of Gloucester's sub-retinues, with 28 men-at-arms and 68 archers. It is impressive that he managed to recruit almost 100 soldiers because there is no evidence he had ever undertaken military service before. His father, also called Sir Henry Husse,

⁶⁶⁹ *CIPM*, 19, pp.343-344; *CCR*, 1409-1413, pp.253, 256-257.

⁶⁷⁰ *CPR*, 1413-1416, pp.48, 57.

⁶⁷¹ L.S. Woodger, 'Gloucester, Sir Thomas', *HoP*, <www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1386-1421/member/gloucester-thomas-1406>, [Accessed 9 July 2018].

⁶⁷² *CPR*, 1405-1408, p.45; *CCR*, 1413-1419, p.206.

⁶⁷³ Biography of father: L.S. Woodger, 'Hussey, Sir Henry', *HoP*, <www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1386-1421/member/hussey-sir-henry-1361-1409>, [Accessed 9 July 2018].

undertook a short spell of garrison duty in Sangatte castle, in the Pas-de-Calais, in 1395 but there is no evidence of additional service.⁶⁷⁴ It is possible that the younger Husse served in either the 1411 or 1412 campaigns as he was knighted sometime between 1409 and 1415. Yet, there is no hard evidence of his participation in these campaigns. Following the death of the elder Husse in 1409, the younger Husse inherited estates and properties in Surrey, Gloucestershire, Wiltshire, Berkshire, Sussex and probably also Kent and Hampshire.⁶⁷⁵ Sir Henry's principal estates were in Surrey, where he resided. As such, even though he owned property near Robert Langford, they were not neighbours. Husse was likely able to raise so many men in 1415 because of the significant wealth he drew from his multiplicity of estates.

Moving slightly northwards, a number of Gloucester's captains came either from the Midland counties, or at least had landed interests there. Robert Roos, for example, held and lived at the manor of Gedney in Lincolnshire.⁶⁷⁶ Roughly 20 miles from Gedney were the manors of Stretton and Howell, each of which Gloucester held. Roos took seisin of Gedney in 1411 after he had proved his age. His father, Sir James Roos, who died in 1403, had been a prominent member of Lincolnshire society and had served as a Justice of the Peace on a number of occasions. Thus, Robert Roos entered Gloucester's service for the first time in 1415 because of his familial and geographic heritage. We will see that for Roos, like a number of Gloucester's sub-captains, 1415 was the beginning of a lifelong association with the duke.

From the Midland counties Gloucester was also able to draw to his banner at least two violent men. The first was William Trussel who lived during his early life at Easton Maudit, in Northamptonshire.⁶⁷⁷ In 1399 he inherited a number of estates and properties throughout the Midlands. Hereafter he entered into a number of bad property and financial deals and was unable to gain possession of all of his inheritance until he was more than 50 years old. While not a shrewd businessman, he was a violent man. As L.S. Woodger has noted in her *History of Parliament* biography of Trussell, 'he bore a grudge against a neighbour, John Mortimer'. In late 1413 he led 'many evildoers' to Mortimer's house at

⁶⁷⁴ C76/79, m.3.

⁶⁷⁵ *CIPM*, 19, pp.188, 285.

⁶⁷⁶ J.S. Roskell, *The Commons in the Parliament of 1422: English Society and Parliamentary Representation under the Lancastrians* (Manchester, 1954), pp.213-214.

⁶⁷⁷ L.S. Woodger, 'Trussell, Sir William', *HoP*, <www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1386-1421/member/trussell-sir-william-1385-1464>, [Accessed 9 July 2018].

Grendon, less than two miles from Easton Maudit. Woodger relates how, 'finding him clothed only in his doublet, while shaving his beard, they assaulted him to cries of 'slee, slee' and 'houghsynowe hym' [hamstring him]'. They then kidnapped him and held him hostage at Easton Maudit until Justices arrived and ordered his release. He was also associated with the notorious Staffordshire ruffian Hugh Erdeswyk, for whom he provided bail in 1414.

The second violent Midlands man was Nicholas Burdet. Born in 1390 to Sir Thomas Burdet, a prominent member of Warwickshire society, and his wife Isabelle, Nicholas was raised at Arrow.⁶⁷⁸ During his early life Nicholas shadowed his father, a 'man of violent temperament' who on a number of occasions perpetrated serious violent crimes.⁶⁷⁹ In 1413 Nicholas followed his father's example and led 80 men to Shipston, in Worcestershire. There they killed a number of the tenants of the priors of Coventry and Worcester. Nicholas was forced to flee to Ireland and was only able to return a year later after his father had paid a sizeable recognisance of 300 marks to Richard, earl of Warwick, for his and his son's future good behaviour. Indeed, even on his return, he was still required to pay physical reparations to Worcester cathedral, in the form of a large taper of wax, seek the personal pardon of the prior and monks he had harmed and pay them personal reparations.⁶⁸⁰ Gloucester was undoubtedly keen to recruit Trussell and Burdet because of their evident penchant for violence. As we will see, Gloucester's decision to recruit both these men paid off handsomely. They remained associates of his and dedicated to the war in France for decades after 1415.

Less than one mile from Burdet's home at Arrow was the manor of Alcester which was owned by Sir William Beauchamp.⁶⁸¹ He was the son of Sir John Beauchamp who had been a member of Edward III's chamber. Sir William Beauchamp, knighted around 1399, had no particular association with Bolingbroke before 1399. Indeed, he had been retained by Richard II in 1392 and appointed Constable of Gloucester Castle. This was a comfortable position because he already resided in the county. Following Bolingbroke's invasion, Sir William hedged his bets and did not outright support either contender. However, when it

⁶⁷⁸ L.S. Woodger, 'Burdet, Sir Thomas', *HoP*, <www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1386-1421/member/burdet-sir-thomas-1442>, [Accessed 9 July 2018].

⁶⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸⁰ Allmand, *Henry V*, p.327; *CCR, 1413-1419*, pp.448-500; *CPR, 1413-1416*, p.111.

⁶⁸¹ Woodger, 'Beauchamp, Sir William'.

became clear that Bolingbroke would be victorious he quickly moved to support the new regime. In the following years, as we have seen, he provided military assistance to Henry's Welsh expeditions. He also served as Sheriff of Worcestershire on multiple occasions. For his part, immediately after his conquest Bolingbroke needed loyal constables in command of strategically important fortresses. As a result, he confirmed Beauchamp's appointment. This confirmation was probably also as a result of the fact that his brother, Walter, was a royal retainer.⁶⁸² He had been retained on 23 October 1399 for the attractive sum of £40 per year.⁶⁸³ From this point onwards Walter Beauchamp served the Crown loyally until his death in 1430.

Neither of the brothers appears to have had any particular relationship with Gloucester before 1415. However on 11 June, in preparation of his imminent departure for Normandy, the duke enfeoffed Sir William Beauchamp, along with Geoffrey Louthur, Walter Sherrington and Nicholas Thorley for various manors.⁶⁸⁴ That Gloucester chose these men to act as his feeoffes indicates that they were well trusted and that a personal relationship existed between them. That Sir William was chosen by the duke was certainly because of his status, his clear loyalty to the Lancastrian regime, his wealth, and probably also his familial heritage. Sherrington, who was from Kent, was chosen because he was the duke's clerk by 1415.⁶⁸⁵ Indeed, he, along with Louthur and Thorley, would go on to work with the duke for a long time after the 1415 campaign. In 1415, however, the relationship between the duke, Thorley and Louthur is unclear. It is possible that Thorley was the son of Sir Robert Thorley, who had been the King's Receiver-General in Somerset during the 1380s and early 1390s.⁶⁸⁶ It may have been as a result of his father's standing that Thorley entered Gloucester's affinity. Originally from Louthur Castle, near Penrith in Cumberland, Louthur trained as a lawyer and during his early life was associated with Thomas, Lord Furnivall.⁶⁸⁷ As we have already seen, in 1405 he was retained by Henry IV and this was later confirmed by Henry V. Although no direct relationship can be identified to have existed between Gloucester and Louthur before 1415, it was no doubt based on the reputation that Louthur had built in

⁶⁸² Woodger, 'Beauchamp, Sir Walter'.

⁶⁸³ *CPR, 1399-1401*, p.35.

⁶⁸⁴ *SC8/85/4220; CPR, 1413-1416*, p.338

⁶⁸⁵ *CPR, 1413-1416*, p.338.

⁶⁸⁶ *CFR*, 10, p.338; *CFR*, 11, p.279.

⁶⁸⁷ Roskell, *The Commons in the Parliament of 1422*, pp.201-203; *CPR, 1416-1422*, p.129.

Cumberland, alongside his association with the royal household and possibly also his legal training.

Within a few miles of Louthers' Castle in Cumberland lived Richard Skelton. In 1399 the Sheriff of Cumberland was instructed to arrest Skelton.⁶⁸⁸ What crimes had resulted in his incarceration are unknown, although they cannot have been heinous as he himself was Sheriff of Cumberland by 1405.⁶⁸⁹ From this position, and his close geographic proximity to Louthers Castle, he almost certainly knew of Louthers and had come into contact with him before 1415. In addition to serving as sheriff, Skelton also sat on a Commission of the Peace in 1409-1410 and served as escheator in Westmorland.⁶⁹⁰ He served on further Commissions of the Peace in March and November 1413 as well as July 1414.⁶⁹¹ He does not seem to have had any association with Gloucester before mustering under him in 1415.

In many ways Skelton is emblematic of some of the sub-captains who mustered under Gloucester. A man of middling status, he had an active life before 1415, but had never been to war before. For Skelton, his life had mainly focused on developing his career in shrieval administration. For other captains, such as Sir Henry Husse and Thomas Deschalers, their lives had been spent consolidating and then expanding their estates and properties. In all of these cases clear vertical links to Gloucester, or the royal family more generally, are seldom evident. Likewise, these men also did not possess horizontal bonds to their co-captains, other than ties of shared geographic heritage. Other sub-captains who lacked vertical and horizontal ties to Gloucester and their comrades included the delinquents William Trussell and Nicholas Burdet. In the case of these two, it was likely Gloucester recruited them, or at least welcomed them to his banner, because of their evident suitability for military employment.

Another group of sub-captains were surely welcomed to Gloucester's banner because of their familial heritage. As was the case with Clarence's retinue, it is clear that Gloucester was also recruiting the sons of loyal Lancastrian supporters. Into this group would fall Robert Langford, son of Sir Nicholas Langford, and Guy Whittington, son of Robert

⁶⁸⁸ *CCR, 1396-1399*, p.520; *CCR, 1399-1402*, p.105.

⁶⁸⁹ *List of Sheriffs*, p.27.

⁶⁹⁰ E153/606; *CPR, 1405-1408*, p.490.

⁶⁹¹ *CPR, 1413-1416*, p.417.

Whittington. Guy's father had been retained as a 'King's esquire' in 1400.⁶⁹² Not coincidentally this was also the period when his younger brother, the famous Richard 'Dick' Whittington was a member of the Royal Council. Also within this group would fall Sir Thomas Morley, the future fifth Lord Morley. Moreover, as we have seen, Morley was also part of the 'regional comradeship group' from Essex which also included John Tyrell, Walter Cressoner and Thomas Berwick. These men were horizontally bound to each as a result of their shared geographic heritage.

Although he had no established recruitment network, Gloucester nonetheless succeeded in mustering a large retinue at Michelmarsh, and almost fulfilled the terms of his indenture. Our investigation of his sub-captains has shown the existence of vertical and horizontal bonds, for instance 'regional comradeship groups', plus familial ties between captains. However, no stable high-command network has become visible as there appears to have been few ties between Gloucester and his principal captains. While this instability was undoubtedly negated to some extent by other forms of stability, such as the 'regional comradeship groups', the image developing of Gloucester's retinue is one of limited stability and cohesion, in which the sub-captains generally possessed neither vertical ties to Gloucester, nor horizontal ties to one another. This instability would have been overcome, at least to an extent, by the collective experience of the siege of Harfleur, which would have forged new bonds between the members of Gloucester's retinue and moulded them into an effective military force.

The Siege of Harfleur and the Battle of Agincourt

The hardships the men of Gloucester's retinue endured together at the siege of Harfleur undoubtedly improved their military skills and fostered comradeship. At the siege, Gloucester and his retinue were based with the King to the west of the city. According to Tito Livio Frulovisi, whose patron was Gloucester and who penned his account of the siege in his work *Vita Henrici Quinti* around 1438, Gloucester was granted command of part of the

⁶⁹² L.S. Woodger, 'Whittington, Guy', *HoP*, <www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1386-1421/member/whittington-guy-1440>, [Accessed 9 July 2018].

army.⁶⁹³ To which specific section of the army he was appointed commander is not entirely clear.⁶⁹⁴ He was certainly not in the east with Clarence. It is possible he oversaw the wooden bastion built by English carpenters opposite the French redoubt at Porte de Leure, near Harfleur's western gate. However, this is again unlikely because he is not detailed by John Hardyng as one of the captains assigned to this position.⁶⁹⁵ Consequently, it is most likely that he commanded the section of the army positioned slightly southwards of the King's main camp at Mont le Comte, near to Porte de Leure.

This was Gloucester's first experience of military command. In fact, it was his first experience of military action.⁶⁹⁶ One of the duke's first orders to his men was to have them dig a series of trenches within range of Harfleur's significant walls. Similar to the activities of the Pals Battalions of the First World War, Gloucester's men, and indeed men all along the English lines including Clarence's, 'dug ceaselessly day after day'. Even more strikingly like the Great War, once these trenches were dug artillery pieces were moved forward and purpose-built defensive embrasures were constructed. These wooden embrasures were akin to the gun ports of an eighteenth-century naval ship which could be lifted open for a short period to allow the gun to fire before being lowered again to protect the gunners as they went about the laborious task of reloading these early gunpowder weapons. It was necessary to build such defences because, like in the east towards Clarence's force, the French defenders put up brave resistance. They shot back at the English with their 'guns, catapults and engines', covered the 'alleys and lanes' with clay, earth and dung to absorb the impact of incoming English cannonballs and prepared 'jars of combustibles'. They also gathered together jars of quicklime which they could hurl at English attackers to blind them, or at least cause painful irritation to their eyes, nose and skin. This was the medieval equivalent of chemical warfare.

To counter this, Gloucester's men were ordered, like Clarence's, to build faggots which could be thrown into the ditch, which circled the city, to fill it. However, unlike Clarence's men, Gloucester's were also instructed to build ladders and siege towers 'as high

⁶⁹³ *The First English Life of Henry V*, ed. Kingsford, p.37.

⁶⁹⁴ For a map: Curry, *Agincourt*, pp.299-300.

⁶⁹⁵ *Chronicle of John Hardyng*, ed. Ellis, p.374.

⁶⁹⁶ For what follows: *Gesta Henrici Quinti*, ed. Taylor and Roskell, pp.27-53; *Chronica Maiora*, ed. Taylor, et al, pp.666-673; Curry, *Agincourt*, pp.85-107.

as the walls'. It was anticipated that these towers would advance to the walls over the faggots which filled the ditch. Ultimately, this did not happen. The *Gesta* informs us that this plan was abandoned because of Henry's justifiable fear that the French would set fire to them with their 'jars of combustibles'. The tactics employed by Henry, and the bravery demonstrated by his men in carrying them out, highlights the ingenuity and technologically-advanced nature of medieval siege warfare. The core strategy and techniques employed by the English, such as the digging of trenches and strategic deployment of artillery, and the defensive actions of the French were startlingly similar to the trench warfare faced by men 500 year later at the Somme. While there the tide was turned partly by technological developments, such as the tank and airpower, the siege of Harfleur was advanced by brute strength and bloody hand-to-hand combat alone. On 16 September the French advanced from Porte de Leure to attack the English bastion opposite. The previous day they had succeeded in starting a small fire there, but no major damage was done. This time the English were more prepared and under the earl of Huntington they counter-attacked and drove the French out of their redoubt and into the city proper. With their defences crumbling, the defenders entered into negotiations of surrender a few days later.

It is clear that like his elder brother's retinue, Gloucester and his men faced significant hardships during the siege of Harfleur. This is borne out by the evidence contained within the sick lists. As already mentioned, these nominally-rich sources are considered in far greater detail in chapter four. At this stage, it is necessary to state that the sick lists indicate that 234 of Gloucester's men fell ill at the siege, 3 knights, 51 men-at-arms and 180 archers. According to the sick lists alone then, Gloucester's retinue was comprised of 517 men following the siege; 1 duke, 3 knights, 129 men-at-arms and 384 archers. As was the case with Clarence's retinue, Gloucester's post-campaign accounts, the entirety of which is contained in E358/6, tell a different story.⁶⁹⁷ The entry on this document which relates to Gloucester's retinue, which is also considered more in chapter four, states that wages were to be deducted for 5 knights, 61 men-at-arms and 211 archers (277 men) for 49 days. This means the retinue would have comprised 1 duke, 1 knight, 119 men-at-arms and 353 archers, a total of 474 men, for the second quarter which began on Saturday 7 October, two days before the army departed Harfleur for Calais. There is a discrepancy of 43 soldiers, 2

⁶⁹⁷ E358/6, m.4.

knights, 10 men-at-arms and 31 archers, between the sick list data and Gloucester's post-campaign information in E358/6. The possible reasons behind this discrepancy, plus the figures for Gloucester's retinue provided by the 'Agincourt roll', are considered more in the following chapter. For the purpose of this investigation we will take the information presented in the E358/6 as the most accurate and thus work from the position that Gloucester's retinue was 474 strong after the siege of Harfleur.

It is possible to identify who the one knight was that accompanied Gloucester to Agincourt through a process of elimination. Sir Henry Husse, Sir William Beauchamp and Sir Nicholas Haute are noted on the sick lists and thus may be tentatively presumed to have returned to England. Sir Nicholas died shortly after returning.⁶⁹⁸ Indeed, his neighbour Sir Thomas Clinton, who is not noted on the sick lists, was also dead by 11 November, suggesting he had died at the siege or shortly after it.⁶⁹⁹ This leaves Sir Thomas Morley and Sir Lewis Berney. Nothing more is heard of Sir Lewis Berney, so it is possible that he died at the siege. Therefore, it is most likely that Sir Thomas Morley, the future fifth Lord Morley, was the one knight who accompanied Gloucester to Agincourt. It is not possible to identify any other members of Gloucester's retinue to have died at the siege of Harfleur.

The comradeship formed during the siege would have been very important for enabling the retinue to function optimally during the subsequent gruelling march across Normandy and at the Battle of Agincourt itself. At Agincourt, Gloucester and his retinue served in the centre battle (division) of the army commanded directly by the King.⁷⁰⁰ It seems likely that the duke was not given command of one of the three battles because of his military inexperience; like many of his captains, he had never fought in a set-piece battle before. Instead, Henry fatefully appointed York commander of the vanguard, which was positioned on the right wing, and Thomas, Lord Camoys, commander of the rear-guard, which was positioned on the left wing. We know from the work of Curry that much of the French assault smashed into the English right wing.⁷⁰¹ Their objective had probably been the centre battle, but they were pushed onto the right wing by arrows loosed by the archers. Here the fighting was fiercest and bloodiest. We can be certain that the centre battle was

⁶⁹⁸ Woodger, 'Haute, Nicholas'.

⁶⁹⁹ Woodger, 'Clinton, Sir Thomas'.

⁷⁰⁰ Curry, *Agincourt*, pp.191-196.

⁷⁰¹ *Ibid*, pp.207-218.

also engaged during the fight. Whether they faced a direct assault, or whether they wheeled to attack the flank of the force engaging York's battle is not clear. Whatever the specifics, they were certainly involved in the *mêlée* because the chronicle accounts record that both King Henry and Gloucester suffered blows from the French.

According to the *Liber Metricus*, Henry's crown was smashed from his helmet during the battle. This account also relates that Gloucester was stabbed in the groin and that as he lay on the ground, 'the King stood over him to assist him'.⁷⁰² That Gloucester was wounded in the groin may go some way to supporting the more detailed account provided by the anonymous author of the *Pseudo Elmham*. In this chronicle, the author writes that Gloucester was, 'pushing forward perhaps too vigorously on his horse into the conflict, [when he] was grievously wounded and cast down to the earth by the blows of the French'.⁷⁰³ The account continues that seeing this, Henry dismounted from his horse and protected his brother against 'dangers scarcely possible to be borne'. The most interesting feature of this account is that both Gloucester and Henry were apparently on horseback. A foot soldier could easily have stabbed upwards and wounded the duke in the groin. Another chronicler to relate Gloucester's injury was Tito Livio Frulovisi. Commissioned to write his history by the duke, he wrote that 'having been pierced by the point of a sword, he [Gloucester] was thrown to the ground half-dead'.⁷⁰⁴ Like the other accounts, Henry stepped over him and protected him. Frulovisi also notes that the duke fell with his feet facing towards the enemy, which suggests he had been facing the enemy when he was wounded. The description that Gloucester was thrown to the ground could be read that he had been on horseback. It makes sense that, at least during the opening stages of the battle, the army leaders would have been on horseback to get the best possible view of events. It would also, of course, have had the adverse effect of allowing the enemy to see the commanders clearly. Like the gaudily uniformed officers of later centuries, they would have become prime targets for the opposing troops.

Ultimately it does not matter how Gloucester came to be injured. Simply the fact that he was injured demonstrates that he and his retinue engaged with the French at

⁷⁰² Curry, *Sources*, p.47.

⁷⁰³ *Ibid*, p.73.

⁷⁰⁴ *Ibid*, p.62.

Agincourt. Correspondingly, we would expect to discover fatalities within his force. However this is not the case. The post-campaign information presented in E358/6 states that he received shipping for 507 men, clearly more than the 474 soldiers calculated to have left Harfleur with him. The additional men cannot all have been prisoners as E358/6 states that only two prisoners were taken by his men at the battle. However, on this E358/6 is most likely incorrect. Although according to E358/6 only two were taken at the battle, Gloucester's captains had apparently taken many more during the campaign, presumably at the siege of Harfleur or the march to the battle.⁷⁰⁵ Why E358/6 does not record these prisoners is unclear. The most successful captain in this regard was Sir Henry Husse. He managed to take 10 prisoners. Ambühl has demonstrated that the considerable value of these prisoners was around £400.⁷⁰⁶ In 1438 the Crown bought a legal case against Husse because he had never paid the Crown its entitled share (a third of a third) of the profits. It may be for this reason that they are not noted in the account detailed in E358/6. Similarly successful was William Trussell who took 9 prisoners during the campaign.⁷⁰⁷ It may have been as a result of this that Trussell was knighted during the siege itself. We learn of his elevation to knighthood from his designation as such on the sick lists.⁷⁰⁸ Another captain who succeeded in taking some prisoners was William Rokell.⁷⁰⁹ There is no evidence he returned to England with sickness, so it is possible that the three prisoners he took include those detailed in E358/6.

The numerous figures for the size of Gloucester's retinue for the second quarter of the campaign highlights the immense administrative task the Exchequer clerks faced in dealing with the army's pay. As we have already seen, many captains had difficulty in obtaining their pay after the campaign ended. This was no different for Gloucester or his men. Indeed, as we will see, Gloucester was still owed money in 1427 and may have still possessed the jewel-encrusted purses he had been granted as collateral. One of Gloucester's captains found himself in a position soon after the campaign to rectify the problem for himself. During the Parliament of 1416, Sir Walter Beauchamp, who had been

⁷⁰⁵ Nicolas, *The Battle of Agincourt*, p.61 (Appendix 15).

⁷⁰⁶ Ambühl, 'The French Prisoners', p.211.

⁷⁰⁷ E101/45/12.

⁷⁰⁸ E101/50/26, m.2; E101/44/30, no.1, m.3.

⁷⁰⁹ Nicolas, *The Battle of Agincourt*, p.61 (Appendix 15).

knighted shortly after the campaign, was elected Speaker.⁷¹⁰ His election to the Speakership is surprising because this was his first and only time serving as an MP. It is possible that his association with Gloucester aided his rise to the Speaker's chair. From this powerful position, he managed to ensure payment to himself of the £286 he and his men were owed for having campaigned in France.⁷¹¹ Other captains were not so fortunate and had to wait many years before receiving their just deserts.

After Agincourt

When Henry returned to conquer Normandy in 1417, Gloucester was again by his side. Of the roughly 11,000 men whom Henry commanded in 1417, we can identify by name 7,919 (72%).⁷¹² We are fortunate that Gloucester's retinue is among those which we can identify. According to the surviving muster roll, Gloucester recruited 376 men, in addition to himself (6 knights, 90 men-at-arms and 280 archers).⁷¹³ Evidently much smaller than his 1415 retinue, his force in 1417 was nonetheless still comprised of 46 sub-retinues, plus the duke's personal company, and adhered to the standard ratio of 1:3 for men-at-arms to archers. On account that Gloucester has muster rolls for both 1415 and 1417, a comparison between his retinues is possible, unlike Clarence who has no 1417 muster roll. By the time of the 1417 campaign three of Gloucester's sub-captains from 1415 are known to have died: Sir Thomas Clinton, Sir Nicholas Haute and Conan Aske. Taking this into consideration, it can be calculated that of the remaining 48 sub-captains, 18 (38%) returned to Gloucester's retinue in 1417.⁷¹⁴ Together, these 18 loyal sub-captains recruited 97 men, 26% of the retinue's manpower. The presence of these sub-captains would have provided the retinue with a loyal and experienced chain of command.

Moving down to the men-at-arms and archers of the sub-retinues, 54 (7%) from 1415 can be identified to have served within Gloucester's retinue in 1417. When this figure

⁷¹⁰ Roskell and Woodger, 'Beauchamp, Sir Walter'.

⁷¹¹ Ibid.

⁷¹² E101/51/2.

⁷¹³ Ibid, m.1.

⁷¹⁴ They were: Sir William Beauchamp, Robert Roos (knighted by 1417), Robert Lacre, Walter Beauchamp, Robert Langford, John Warde, James Patrick, John Clinton, William Rokell, Richard Beaumont, Edward Houghton, Nicholas Griffon, George Lampet, Hugh Calverley, James Fiennes, William Cressener and John Belle, Richard.

is combined with the number of sub-captains from 1415, we can conclude that 72 men (10%) of Gloucester's 1415 retinue returned to his banner in 1417. They made up 19% of his 1417 retinue. Continuing to focus on the 54 sub-retinue members who returned to Gloucester's banner in 1417, 35 (65%) can be identified to have served under the same sub-captains. The sub-captain Richard Beaumont, for example, returned with three of his archers from 1415, although none of his men-at-arms returned with him. On the other hand, 18 individuals (35%) from 1415 who served under Gloucester again served under different sub-captains in 1417. This demonstrates that there was fluidity between the members of sub-companies. Just one example would be the man-at-arms William Barre who served under Sir Henry Husse in 1415, but under Gloucester's new sub-captain Sir Reginald Cobham in 1417. Digging deeper into the data, certain members can be identified to have improved their social and economic standing between the two campaigns.

Table 3.4: Comparative Continuity of Service between the 1415 and 1417 Campaigns⁷¹⁵

Rank	Continuity of Service from 1415-1417	Total no. in 1415	Total no. in 1417	Overall re-service percentage	
				1415 ⁷¹⁶	1417 ⁷¹⁷
Peers	1	1	1	100	100
Knights	1	6	6	17	17
Esquires	29	180	90	16	32
Archers	43	564	280	8	15
Total	73	751	377	10	19

The most obvious example of this is Sir Robert Roos who served as an esquire in 1415, but had been knighted by 1417.⁷¹⁸ It is worthy of note that even though his status had

⁷¹⁵ This table is based on the same comparison Bell undertook for the armies of 1387 and 1388. It shows the continuity between the campaigns in terms of the numbers of each rank, and then as a percentage of the whole force for the stated year: Bell, *War and the Soldier*, pp.100-101.

⁷¹⁶ This column shows the percentage of soldiers from 1415 who fought again in 1417.

⁷¹⁷ This column shows the percentage of those who served in Gloucester's 1417 force, who had also served in his 1415 force.

been elevated, he Sir Robert recruited fewer soldiers in 1417 than he had two years before. In 1415 he raised six men-at-arms (included himself) and 19 archers, but in 1417 he only recruited three men-at-arms (included himself) and six archers. It is interesting to observe that one of his men-at-arms and three of his archers had served under him in 1415. In addition to Sir Robert's elevated status, a further three men-at-arms who served as sub-retinue members in 1415 returned in 1417 as captains of their own sub-retinues.⁷¹⁹ This indicates that their social standing had improved and that upward mobility within the sphere of military service was possible. It further suggests the economic situation of these three men had improved as well because raising a retinue, or sub-retinue, could be an expensive undertaking, especially in the short term. Indeed, if the Crown was parsimonious with pay, as it was after the 1415 campaign, it could cost the captain in the long term as well. There is no evidence of anyone moving from the rank of archer to man-at-arms, or, unsurprisingly, vice-versa.

Turning our attention to the whole 1417 army, it can be discovered that 37 men who served in sub-retinues under Gloucester in 1415 served under completely different retinue captains in 1417. For William Lovell, who in 1415 served under Gloucester's sub-captain Sir Lewis Berney, this is easily explained. Lovell inherited the Lordship of Lovell when he proved his age sometime around 1416.⁷²⁰ Consequently he served in 1417 as a full retinue commander in his own right. His experience of the Agincourt campaign stood him in good stead. Only one of Gloucester's 1415 sub-captains served under a completely different commander in 1417. This was William Harrington who served under his elder brother John, Lord Harrington. When considering the whole 1417 army it can be concluded that 110 (15%) of Gloucester's 1415 retinue were present; 72 (66%) served under him again, while 37 (34%) either served as full retinue commanders in their own right, or served under other retinue captains.

Undertaking comparisons of large nominal datasets, such as was done here, is by no means a fine art. The bedevilling issue of the commonality of medieval names means that

⁷¹⁸ As noted on the 1417 muster roll: E101/51/2, m.1.

⁷¹⁹ They were: Gerard Johnson (served under Nicholas Thorley in 1415), Edmund Dacre/Lacre (under Robert Lacre in 1415), and Ralph Braunspeith (under James Patrick in 1415).

⁷²⁰ M.E. Simon, 'The Lovells of Titchmarsh. A Late Medieval Baronial Family (1297-148?)', D.Phil Thesis (University of York, 1999), pp.63-64.

rock solid conclusions cannot be reached. Numerous examples could be given here to highlight this point. Just one such example would be the archer named John Clerk who served in Sir Lewis Berney's sub-retinue in 1415. Many men of this name can be identified in the 1417 army. It is possible that the John Clerk from 1415 did re-serve in 1417; however, the chances of misidentification are too high to say so with certainty. As such, although every effort has been taken to ensure accurate information is presented here, the conclusions reached have been done so only tentatively. Notwithstanding this, the observations made here suggest that at least 72 men (19%) of Gloucester's 1417 retinue were veterans of the 1415 campaign. These conclusions correspond with the findings of Curry and David Cleverly who have compared the 1415 and 1417 armies. They discovered that 15% of the 1415 force went on to serve in 1417, meaning 16% of the 1417 force were veterans of the Agincourt campaign.⁷²¹ This detailed study of Gloucester's retinue adds significant support to their findings. It also influences our understanding of the 'dynamics of recruitment' by the time of the 1415 campaign. Evidently a degree of loyalty existed among the sub-captains who re-served with Gloucester in 1417. However, as we will see in the following chapter when considering the 'dynamics of recruitment' more thoroughly, those who returned in 1417 seldom returned again after this campaign. The army of conquest which Henry led into France in 1417 comprised military veterans of the Agincourt campaign, as well as, of course, veterans of other previous campaigns. Indeed, Curry and Cleverley have concluded that a minimum of 75% of the 1417 retinue commanders and 58% of the knights had previous military experience. Considering that not all that many had served in 1415, this figure indicates that the military community (the pool of potential manpower) was large even after the relatively scaled back military endeavours of the Crown during the first decade of the fifteenth-century. We will return to this important issue in the following chapter.

The duke of Gloucester would have welcomed back in 1417 those who had served under him in 1415. The ties of shared military experience from the Agincourt campaign would have greatly aided his retinue to function during the subsequent conquest of Normandy. Yet, before the conquest of Normandy could begin in earnest, the English were

⁷²¹ This information is based on the research undertaken by Prof. Anne Curry and David Cleverly, which David presented in a paper at the 2017 *Medieval Soldier Study Day* at the University of Southampton. I am grateful to Prof. Curry and him for allowing me to consult their research and mention it here.

forced to defend their hard-won prize of Harfleur. As Curry has written, the preparations for this expedition, which it was originally intended Henry would lead in person, were 'on a scale and at an intensity not witnessed in England since the mid-1340s'.⁷²² Gloucester contracted to recruit a retinue of 600 men; 1 duke (himself), 9 knights, 191 men-at-arms and 400 archers.⁷²³ We know the size of his retinue from the surviving warrant for issue; however we can only identify three members by name because of no surviving muster roll, retinue roll or many letters of protection.⁷²⁴ Like all best-laid plans, things changed at the last moment.⁷²⁵ On 22 July, as the army was gathering at Sandwich, Henry announced he would not command the expedition and that command instead would be granted to Bedford. The following day the King ordered all his retainers and close advisors, of whom Gloucester was evidently one, to leave the army and head to Dover where they would accompany him to Calais. The purpose of his Calais trip was to negotiate with John, duke of Burgundy. The negotiations, which as Curry has noted are 'shrouded in mystery', had been arranged by Emperor Sigismund whom Gloucester had welcomed to England at Dover in April. During the negotiations Gloucester acted as a hostage.⁷²⁶ Although Gloucester himself did not participate in the 1416 campaign, we know his retinue did, as their wages can be identified on the issue roll.⁷²⁷ It is worth noting also that Sir Walter Beauchamp served as a retinue commander in his own right on the campaign.⁷²⁸ The naval victory achieved at Harfleur in 1416 by Bedford and his men ensured the English foothold in upper Normandy was maintained. Henry could now focus on planning for the conquest of the whole duchy; a military campaign in which Gloucester himself, and his war retinue, played a leading role.⁷²⁹

On 1 August 1417 Henry and his army landed near Touques, south of Harfleur. Upon landing, Gloucester was rapidly appointed commander of the vanguard and dispatched to

⁷²² Curry, 'After Agincourt', p.41.

⁷²³ Ibid, p.46, citing: E101/48/10/146.

⁷²⁴ The three identifiable individuals are: Walter Mite, vintner from Boston in Lincolnshire (C76/99, m. 25), William de Apulderfeld (C76/99, m. 25) and John Tot, grocer from London (C76/99, m. 23).

⁷²⁵ Curry, 'After Agincourt', pp.41-44.

⁷²⁶ *Foedera*, 9, p.390. Also noted by many chronicles, for example: *Jean de Wavrin*, ed. Hardy and Hardy, 2, p.230.

⁷²⁷ Curry, 'After Agincourt', p.46, citing: E403/624, m.4.

⁷²⁸ Ibid, p.43. It may also be the case that the Sir William Harrington noted is the William Harrington who served under Gloucester in 1415 and went on to become Lord Harrington.

⁷²⁹ On Gloucester's role during the conquest: Newhall, *The English Conquest of Normandy*; Vickers, *Humphrey*, pp.45-80, 96-101.

siege the nearby castle.⁷³⁰ It capitulated on 9 August; the subjugation of Normandy was underway. Like Clarence, Gloucester played a significant role in commanding the King's forces during the conquest of the duchy. As table 3.5 demonstrates, many of his sub-captains from 1415 either served directly under him, or under other retinue captains, during the conquest and subsequent defence of the duchy. In total, 31 (65%) of his 48 surviving captains from 1415 undertook further military service. A statistical analysis and investigation into the level of re-service between the ducal retinues is undertaken in chapter four.

Before returning to the role the duke and his retinue played during the conquest of Normandy, it must be noted that from 1422 onwards he never campaigned in the Duchy again. Indeed, on only two subsequent occasions did he raise and command military forces. The first of these was as a result of his marriage to Jacqueline of Hainault in early 1423.⁷³¹ Following the death of her father William II duke of Bavaria and Count of Hainault in 1417, she expected her inheritance, and to rule as duchess. However, for a variety of complex reasons which need not be detailed here, this was not to be. Her lands in Holland and Zeeland were taken by her uncle, John of Bavaria, and Hainault by her estranged husband John of Brabant. Thus, by marrying Jacqueline, Gloucester gained, in his eyes, the right to rule these lands. Consequently on 18 November 1424, after months of preparation, he ordered the army he had raised, and which was commanded by the Earl Marshal because of the duke's bad health, to march out of Calais and capture Hainault.⁷³² Both John of Bavaria and Brabant were supported by the duke of Burgundy, Philip the Good, thus Gloucester's actions were in direct contravention of the Treaty of Troyes and risked destroying the Anglo-Burgundian alliance which was enabling Bedford and the English to remain in Normandy.

Unsurprisingly, the Crown, under the de facto control of Cardinal Beaufort, wanted nothing to do with the Gloucester's personal imbroglio and would not finance it. Gloucester had to finance the expedition from his own pocket, and thus the normal Exchequer records do not exist. Owing to the dearth of records relating to Gloucester's personal accounts and household, it is hard to know specifics regarding the campaign. When writing his biography

⁷³⁰ *The First English Life of Henry V*, ed. Kingsford, p.82.

⁷³¹ For what follows: Vickers, *Humphrey*, pp.137-161.

⁷³² *Jean de Wavrin*, ed. Hardy and Hardy, 3, p.56-140; *Chronique de Jean Le Fèvre*, ed. Morand, 2, pp.88-116; *Memoires de Pierre de Fenin*, ed. Dupont, pp.229-239; *Chronique d'Antonio Morosini*, ed. G. Lefevre-Pontalis, 2 vols (1898-1899), 2, pp.300-301.

of the duke, Vickers was therefore forced to rely as his main source on a letter sent to Cardinal Beaufort detailing the progress of the campaign, in addition to chronicle accounts.⁷³³ From these sources Vickers estimated the size of the army to be around 1,000 men-at-arms and 3,000 archers. No further sources have come to light, so we must accept these figures cautiously. It is not possible to identify the size of the duke's personal retinue, or the personnel as no muster roll exists. Indeed, only from letters of protection and attorney can we identify a total of 15 combatants.⁷³⁴ The only individual from his 1415 retinue known with certainty to have served under him on this expedition was Nicholas Thorley. The possible reasons for his presence on the campaign are given later. The campaign started well and numerous cities, including Mons, were captured. However, by March 1425 the duke of Burgundy arrived at the head of an army and challenged Gloucester to single combat. The duke turned tail and fled to England, claiming he was going to prepare and left Jacqueline behind to continue to fight on his behalf. She struggled on for a short while, but was eventually overcome by the forces arrayed against her.

The second force which Gloucester commanded was to Calais in 1436.⁷³⁵ Again he found himself in conflict with the duke of Burgundy. By this point the Anglo-Burgundian alliance, which Gloucester's Hainault fiasco had so damaged, was in tatters. Following the Congress of Arras, Burgundy switched his support from Henry VI back to Charles VII, the King of France. Burgundy invaded the Pas-de-Calais and laid siege to Calais. The English hastily despatched a relief force numbering 1,173 men-at-arms and 8,587 archers under the command of Gloucester. The ratio of 1:7 men-at-arms to archers clearly demonstrates the rapidity with which the army was summoned, and the significant compositional change which had occurred in English armies over the few decades they had fought to conquer and hold Normandy. By the time Gloucester and his force arrived it was already too late. The Burgundians had already left. In fact, the Calais garrison, under the command of Edmund Beaufort, had counter attacked and Burgundy's disorderly Flemish infantry had broken and

⁷³³ Vickers, *Humphrey*, pp.137-161; *Letters and Papers*, ed. Stevenson, 2, pp.396-400.

⁷³⁴ They were (all spellings as appears on the letters of protection): John Kent, William Relseye, John Burgeys, Robert Stafford (chaplain), William Drewe, John Sutton, John White, Henry Mulso, John Kighley, William Pirton, John Grove, Nicholas Thorley, Richard Broughton, John Burgh and John Happeford.

⁷³⁵ Vickers, *Humphrey*, pp.248-254; *Chronicle of John Hardyng*, ed. Ellis, p.396; *The Brut*, ed. Brie, pp.573-584; *A Chronicle of London*, ed. Nicolas, p.122; *An English Chronicle*, ed. Davies, p.55; *Chronique d'Enguerran de Monstrelet*, ed. L. Douet-d'Arcq, 5, p.249; *Jean de Wavrin*, ed. Hardy and Hardy, 4, pp.197-206; Basin, *Histoire de Charles VII*, 1, p.247; *The Latin Brut*, ed. Kingsford, p.321.

fled, forcing him to flee after them. Keen not to return to England immediately, Gloucester simply led his force on a chevauchée into the surrounding countryside. It achieved nothing, other than to disrupt the lives of the unfortunate inhabitants of the area. Although funded in the normal fashion through the Exchequer, there is very little information relating to the 1435 army, and Gloucester's retinue specifically. In total, from his retinue we can identify only 14 soldiers, none of whom can be identified to have served with the duke before.⁷³⁶ Thus, while the duke did command men after 1422, the vast majority of his military career was during the conquest of Normandy. Many of those who served with him during the 1415 campaign returned to his banner during this period.

⁷³⁶ They were (all spellings as appears on the letters of protection): Robert Lorde, Geoffrey Lesyngham, Walter Kebbyl, Nicholas Jones, John de Sutton, Thomas Seggebroke, Edmund Selet, Thomas Gymlyn, William Cokkes, Robert Aleyn, Nicholas Bolthorp, John Brixworth, William Faryngdon and Albright Rosegardin.

Table 3.5: The Military Service History of Gloucester's Sub-Captains: After 1415⁷³⁷

† = Service directly under Gloucester

* = Service under another Captain

Captain	1416	1417	1418	1419	1420	1421	1422	1423	1424	1425	1426	1427	1428	1429	1430	1431	1432	1433	1434	1435	1436	1437	1438	1439	1440	1441
Sir William Beauchamp ⁷³⁸		†	†	†																						
Walter Beauchamp ⁷³⁹	*	†	†	*	*	*	*																			
Richard Beaumont ⁷⁴⁰		†																								
John Belle ⁷⁴¹		†	*				*		*																	
Nicholas Burdet ⁷⁴²					*		*	*	*	*	*				*	*	*	*	*	*	*					*

⁷³⁷ The dates in bold indicate years when Gloucester commanded soldiers abroad.

⁷³⁸ E101/51/2, m.1 (1417); *Rotuli Normanniae*, ed. Hardy, pp.289-92, 298-301 (1418); *Foedera*, 9, p.618 (1419)

⁷³⁹ Curry, 'After Agincourt', p.43 (1416); E101/51/2, m.2; C76/100, m.21; C76/100, m.23 (1417); *Rotuli Normanniae*, ed. Hardy, pp.289-292, 298-300, 358 (1418); *DKR*, 41, pp.711, 724; *DKR*, 42, p.331, 390; C76/104, m.15 (1419-1421); C76/105, m.2; C76/105, m.2 (1422).

⁷⁴⁰ E101/51/2, m.2.

⁷⁴¹ E101/51/2, m.1 (1417); E101/48/19 (1418); AN, K 62/4 (1422); BN, ms. Fr. 25767/101 (1424).

⁷⁴² E101/49/36, m.2 (1420); BL, Add. Ch. 25, 838; C76/104, m.4 (1422); *Jean de Wavrin*, ed. Hardy and Hardy, 3, pp.8-10 (1423); BN, ms. fr. 4485; BN, ms. fr. 25767/71 (1424); *Chronique de la Pucelle*, ed. Viriville, p.219-221; *Chronique du Mont-Saint-Michel, 1343-1468*, ed. S. Luce, 2 vols (Paris, 1879-1883), 1, p.26-27, 146-150, 160-171 (1425); *Ibid*, p.240; *Jean de Wavrin*, ed. Hardy and Hardy, 3, pp.148-149 (1426); BN, ms. fr. 25769/547; BN, ms. fr. 26052/1242 (1430); BN, ms. fr. 25770/609; BN, ms. fr. 25771/874; BL, Add. Ch. 11827 (1431-1433); *CPR, 1429-1436*, p.359 (1434); BL, Add. Ch. 1462; BN, ms. fr. 25772/930 (1435); BN, ms.fr, 2606/3008 (1436); BN, ms. fr. 25775/1499 (1441).

Thomas Burgh ⁷⁴³			*		*	*		*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*											
Hugh Calverley ⁷⁴⁴		†																									
John Clinton ⁷⁴⁵		†																									
William Cressoner ⁷⁴⁶		†						*												*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
James Croft ⁷⁴⁷										*											*						
Thomas Deschalers ⁷⁴⁸			*	*	*	†																					
James Fiennes ⁷⁴⁹		†				*		*	*						*	*											
Thomas Gloucester ⁷⁵⁰			*	*	*										*	*											
Nicholas Griffon ⁷⁵¹		†					*	*	*																		
William Harrington ⁷⁵²	*	*	*	*	*	*	*																				

⁷⁴³ *Soldier in Later Medieval England*, p.69 n.83.

⁷⁴⁴ E101/51/2, m.1.

⁷⁴⁵ E101/51/2, m.1

⁷⁴⁶ E101/51/2, m.1 (1417); BN, ms. fr. 25767/11 (1423); E403/724, m.2; E101/71/3/892; E403/731, m.3; *CPR, 1436-1441*, pp.235, 297 (1435-1441).

⁷⁴⁷ AN, K 62/11/19 (1425); BN, ms. fr. 25772/1053 (1436).

⁷⁴⁸ *DKR*, 41, p.711 (1418); *DKR*, 42, pp.326, 388 (1419 and 1420); C76/104, m.16; C76/104, m. 16 (1421).

⁷⁴⁹ E101/51/2, m.1 (1417); BN, ms. fr. 25766/798; *DKR*, 42, p.426 (1421); BN, ms. fr. 25767/11; BN, ms. fr. 25767/32; BN, ms. fr. 25771/811; BN, ms. fr. 25767/19 (1423-1424); BN, ms. fr. 25769/567 (1430-1431).

⁷⁵⁰ *DKR*, 41, p.711 (1418); *DKR*, 42, p.326 (1419); *DKR*, 42, p.388 (1420); C76/112, m.13; C76/113, m.9 (1431-1431). He appears to have performed an administrative role).

⁷⁵¹ E101/51/2, m.1 (1417); BN, ms. fr. 25770/730 (1422); BN, ms. fr. 25767/24 (1423); BN, ms. fr. 25767/17 (1424).

Edward Houghton ⁷⁵³		†																								
Sir Henry Husse ⁷⁵⁴			*	*		*	*	*				*												*		
Robert Lacre ⁷⁵⁵		†																								
George Lampet ⁷⁵⁶		†																								
Robert Langford ⁷⁵⁷		†																								
Sir Thomas Morley ⁷⁵⁸			*	*	*		*							*	*											
James Patrick ⁷⁵⁹		†																								
William Rokell ⁷⁶⁰		†																								
Robert Roos ⁷⁶¹		†		†																						

⁷⁵² Curry, 'After Agincourt', p.46 (1416); E101/51/2, m.14; C76/100, m.20 (1417); *The Paston Letters*, ed. Gairdner, 2, p.8; *DKR*, 41, p.715; *DKR*, 41, p.697 (1418-1419); *Gesta Henrici Quinti*, ed. Williams, p.144 (1420); *Ibid*, p.279 (1421); BN, ms. fr. 25766/803 (1422).

⁷⁵³ E101/51/2, m.1.

⁷⁵⁴ C76/101, m.8, 9 (1418); *DKR*, 41, p.787 (1419); *DKR*, 42, pp.425, 427, 433 (1421); *DKR*, 42, pp.433, 438, 447, 452 (1422); C76/106, m.15, 18 (1423); C76/109, m.16, 13 (1427); *CPR, 1436-1441*, p.383; BN, ms. fr. 25775/1449 (1440).

⁷⁵⁵ E101/51/2, m.1.

⁷⁵⁶ *Ibid*.

⁷⁵⁷ *Ibid*, m.2.

⁷⁵⁸ C76/101, m.11 (1418-1419); *Gesta Henrici Quinti*, ed. Williams, p.144 (1420); E101/70/5/710 (1422); C76/112, m.12 (1430-1431).

⁷⁵⁹ E101/51/2, m.1.

⁷⁶⁰ *Ibid*, m.2.

⁷⁶¹ *Ibid*, m.1 (1417); *Foedera*, 9, p.585 (1419).

Walter Shirrington ⁷⁶²						†																							
Walter Strickland ⁷⁶³						†																							
Richard Skelton ⁷⁶⁴		†	†																										
Nicholas Thorley ⁷⁶⁵									†	†																			
William Trussell ⁷⁶⁶					*										*	*													
James Tyrell ⁷⁶⁷		*																											
Hugh Walton ⁷⁶⁸								*																					
John Warde ⁷⁶⁹		†		*					*			*		*															

⁷⁶² C76/104, m.16. In his role as secretary to the duke, Sherrington likely accompanied him on more expeditions. However, evidence of his presence on the duke's campaigns has not survived.

⁷⁶³ C76/104, m.16.

⁷⁶⁴ E101/51/2, m.1; C76/100, m.14 (1417); C76/101, m.5 (1418).

⁷⁶⁵ C76/107, m.9 (1424); C76/107, m.7 (1425).

⁷⁶⁶ E101/49/36, m.1; C76/102, m.2 (1420); C76/112, m.17 (1430-1431).

⁷⁶⁷ E101/51/2, m.11.

⁷⁶⁸ BN, ms. fr. 25767/1.

⁷⁶⁹ E101/51/2, m.2 (1417); *DKR*, 41, p.745 (1419); BN, ms. fr. 25767/95 (1424); BN, ms. fr. 25767/211 (1427); BN, ms. fr. 25768/401 (1429).

Following the fall of Touques, Gloucester and his retinue, along with the rest of the English army, headed for Caen.⁷⁷⁰ The experiences the duke and his men had gained at Harfleur were brought into play at Caen. Still in command of the vanguard, Gloucester was also made commander of the artillery. In this capacity he oversaw the bombardment of Caen's imposing walls. Following the bloody assault on the city, Gloucester and his men were dispatched to take nearby Bayeux. After a short period of resistance, it surrendered on 23 September.⁷⁷¹ Back with the King at Alençon shortly afterwards, the next city sieged by the English was Falaise.⁷⁷² The defenders put up stiff resistance for three weeks before entering into negotiations. One of those assigned to the delegation to negotiate terms of surrender was William Harrington, the same individual who had served under Gloucester in 1415.⁷⁷³ He had also successfully negotiated the surrender of Caudebec in July.⁷⁷⁴

On 16 February 1418 Gloucester was instructed to 'reduce the Cotentin to obedience'.⁷⁷⁵ This was his first major military assignment independent of anyone else's oversight. King Henry evidently now believed his brother to be up to the task; he was no longer 'unused to war'. Setting out from Falaise, Gloucester and his force captured a string of towns and villages en-route to the stronghold of Vire. Acting on behalf of the duke, Sir William Beauchamp negotiated the surrender of the town.⁷⁷⁶ Sir William was also appointed to negotiate the surrender of Cherbourg on 22 August, although only after the city had held out against Gloucester's forces for a whole five months.⁷⁷⁷ The siege of Cherbourg became the defining feature of Gloucester's efforts to subdue the Cotentin.⁷⁷⁸ While the majority of cities and towns offered either no resistance at all, or only face-saving opposition, Cherbourg fought unstintingly against the English. The detailed account of the siege provided by Tito Livio highlights the innovative methods of assault ordered by Gloucester,

⁷⁷⁰ *Chronicle of Normandy*, ed. Williams, p.228; *The First English Life of Henry V*, ed. Kingsford, p.85; *Chronique de Perceval de Cagney*, ed. Moranville, p.109.

⁷⁷¹ *Rotuli Normanniae*, ed. Hardy, pp.164-167.

⁷⁷² *The First English Life of Henry V*, ed. Kingsford, pp.98, 101; *Gesta Henrici Quinti*, ed. Williams, p.118; *Chronicle of Normandy*, ed. Williams, p.230.

⁷⁷³ *Foedera*, 9, p.532.

⁷⁷⁴ *DKR*, 41, pp.697, 715.

⁷⁷⁵ Vickers, *Humphrey*, p.55; *The First English Life of Henry V*, ed. Kingsford, pp.106-107; *Gesta Henrici Quinti*, ed. Williams, p.120; *Chronicle of Normandy*, ed. Williams, pp.232-235; *Foedera*, 9, p.544.

⁷⁷⁶ *Foedera*, 9, pp.545, 553-557, 565-566; *The First English Life of Henry V*, ed. Kingsford, pp.107-109

⁷⁷⁷ *Foedera*, 9, p.618.

⁷⁷⁸ *The First English Life of Henry V*, ed. Kingsford, pp.109-115; *Chronicle of Normandy*, ed. Williams, p.241; *An English Chronicle*, ed. Davies, p.46; *Jean de Wavrin*, ed. Hardy and Hardy, 2, p.237; *Chronique de Jean Le Fèvre*, ed. Morand, 1, p.320; *Chronica Maiora*, ed. Taylor, et al, pp.734-736.

such as the damming of rivers and the construction of siege machines. He also explains that a great fortified market place was constructed, 'where victuals and all other things necessary were sold for the comfort of the host'.⁷⁷⁹ The defenders nonetheless inflicted significant casualties on the English with sorties from the city, plus their continued and expert use of heavy artillery. The city was only forced to enter into negotiations for surrender because of a lack of food and water. The English entered on 29 September.

From Cherbourg, Gloucester led his troops back to the King who was then laying siege to Rouen. He and his men were given no respite as they were positioned close to Rouen's north-eastern gate, the Porte Saint-Hilaire, where they faced regular sorties from the defenders and artillery fire from the city's walls.⁷⁸⁰ Following the fall of the city, Gloucester stayed with the King and set about organising the administration of the city, and of the Duchy more generally. It was no coincidence that Sir Walter Beauchamp (knighted shortly after Agincourt), the younger brother of Sir William, was made Bailli of Rouen.⁷⁸¹ He had loyally served under Gloucester in 1415 and throughout the conquest of Normandy. Around the same time Sir William became Chamberlain to the duke.⁷⁸² As a result of this position he was appointed in 1419 to negotiate the marriage of Gloucester to Blanche, the queen of Sicily and daughter of Charles III of Navarre.⁷⁸³ Although the negotiations came to nothing, indeed the negotiations may never have even taken place, it demonstrates the close bond which existed between the duke and Sir William Beauchamp. A similarly strong tie evidently also existed between the duke and Sir Walter.

With Rouen safely in English hands, Henry was keen to obtain the surrounding strongholds. Gloucester was ordered to take the town of Ivry-la-Bataille, near Evreux, in April 1419.⁷⁸⁴ Few of Gloucester's 1415 captains can be identified to have still been serving under him by this time. However, we can be certain that Sir Robert Roos was present as he was dispatched, along with Sir Walter Beauchamp, to negotiate the surrender of the city.⁷⁸⁵

⁷⁷⁹ *The First English Life of Henry V*, ed. Kingsford, p.114.

⁷⁸⁰ *Ibid*, pp.123-127; *Jean de Wavrin*, ed. Hardy and Hardy, 2, pp.255-257; Curry, 'The Siege of Rouen in Context', pp.237-254.

⁷⁸¹ *DKR*, 41, p.724.

⁷⁸² Woodger, 'Beauchamp, Sir William'.

⁷⁸³ *Foedera*, 9, p.716.

⁷⁸⁴ *The First English Life of Henry V*, ed. Kingsford, p.141; *Chronicle of Normandy*, ed. Williams, p.244.

⁷⁸⁵ *Foedera*, 9, p.585 (Incorrectly dated to 1418). This Sir Robert Roos is not to be confused with his namesake who also served frequently in Normandy and became a 'wolf hunter' in 1421: *Foedera*, 10, p.56.

They were successful and the city surrendered on 10 May. From this time onwards Gloucester and his force remained primarily with the King, first at Mantes and then Meulan. The only interruption to Gloucester's presence with the King was short and swift campaign to take Poissy, St Germain and Montjoye in the winter of 1419.⁷⁸⁶ By December, Gloucester had returned to England where he remained until returning to France with Henry in 1421 at the head of an army to avenge the death of his brother, Clarence. When Gloucester returned to France in 1421 four of his 1415 sub-captains can be identified to have returned with him. He contracted to recruit 100 men-at-arms and 300 archers, but did not manage to recruit enough men by the time he left England.⁷⁸⁷ Unfortunately, there is no muster roll relating to this force. From letters of protection and attorney we can identify the names of only 33 men-at-arms. That four of his 1415 sub-captains can be identified is thus a high figure. The role of Gloucester and his retinue in 1421-1422 was minimal. They were present at the siege of Dreux and Melun before being sent to protect Paris.⁷⁸⁸ The duke was back in England by March 1422.

The role of Gloucester and his retinue during the conquest of Normandy was clearly significant and varied. Throughout the conquest, Gloucester was accompanied by men who had served under him during the 1415 campaign. The presence of such men within his retinue would have improved its stability, cohesion and effectiveness. When Gloucester commanded those men in 1415 he had been 'unused to war'. The string of military campaigns provided by the conquest, however, enabled the duke to develop a great range of military skills, particularly in relation to artillery and siege warfare. His knowledge of siege warfare was probably unmatched, even by Clarence or the King himself, as a result of the time he had spent at Cherbourg. Yet, when Gloucester returned to England in March 1422, his contribution to the expansion and defence of the hard-won Duchy effectively ended. With the exception of the 1436 fiasco to relieve Calais, Gloucester never again commanded troops in Lancastrian Normandy. Instead, after much debate over the wording of Henry V's

⁷⁸⁶ *Gesta Henrici Quinti*, ed. Williams, p.132; *Chronicle of Normandy*, ed. Williams, p.245; *The Latin Brut*, ed. Kingsford, pp.318-319; *The First English Life of Henry V*, ed. Kingsford, p.152.

⁷⁸⁷ Vickers, *Humphrey*, p.96. Vickers mentions his indenture, but provides no reference. I have been unable to locate this document.

⁷⁸⁸ Vickers, *Humphrey*, pp.98-102.

will, he became Protector and Defender of England while Bedford was abroad acting as Regent of France.⁷⁸⁹

The duke of Gloucester's career in France was cut abruptly short. He did, however, continue to promote the continuance of the war and the defence of the Duchy for the rest of his life. He virulently opposed the release of the duke of Orleans in 1440 – which Henry V had expressly forbidden in his will – and decried him as a 'capital enemy' of the English Crown.⁷⁹⁰ Ultimately his protestations made little difference. The King, under the advice of Beaufort, was forced to publish a manifesto explaining his decision to release Orleans, yet the release went ahead. As Vickers notes, by 1440 Gloucester was, in regards to foreign policy, 'a disappointed and helpless man'.⁷⁹¹ It must also be noted that Gloucester's rivalry with Burgundy, and his insistence that the English make very few concessions to the French at the Congress of Arras, undoubtedly drove Burgundy away from the English and back into the orbit of Charles VII.⁷⁹² Gloucester's intransigence and actions certainly led, intentionally or otherwise, to the continuation of the war, but also hastened England's inevitable defeat. As Vickers has eloquently observed, the desertion of Burgundy to Charles VII in 1435 ensured that, 'even the most shadowy hope of retaining his [Henry VI's] hold on France passed from the King of England, and the claims [to the French Crown] ... were to end in the disaster which had been inevitable from the first'.⁷⁹³

The duke of Gloucester's support for the war and his belief in its justness cannot be questioned. Yet, after 1422, with the brief exception of 1436, the bloody business of actually continuing the war in Lancastrian Normandy fell to other men. Among these individuals were some of the captains who had served under the duke in 1415, and during the subsequent conquest of the duchy. As table 3.5 demonstrated, the three captains with the most substantial careers as professional soldiers were Nicholas Burdet, Thomas Burgh and William Cressoner. We have already observed that Burdet was particularly suited for military service because of his violent past. Although there is no evidence he participated in the campaigns of conquest immediately after 1415, by 1420 he was back in France as

⁷⁸⁹ Ibid, pp.110-116.

⁷⁹⁰ Ibid, pp.262-269; *Royal Wills*, p.236-243; P. Strong and F. Strong, 'The last will and codicils of Henry V', *EHR*, 96 (1981), 79-89.

⁷⁹¹ Vickers, *Humphrey*, p.264.

⁷⁹² C.T. Allmand, *The Hundred Years War* (Cambridge, 1988), pp.34-35.

⁷⁹³ Vickers, *Humphrey*, p.245.

captain of a sub-retinue under Bedford.⁷⁹⁴ From this point on, he campaigned near-continually and rapidly rose to prominence. In late 1422 he was appointed captain of the important fortress town of Neufchâtel.⁷⁹⁵ He was only briefly present there as by early 1423 he was back in the field with Bedford. Together they successfully sieged the bridge of Meulan which capitulated on 1 March, and acquired a great quantity of gunpowder in the process.⁷⁹⁶ Burdet appears to have impressed Bedford during the siege as he was raised on 26 April to the notable positions of Chief Butler of Normandy and then soon afterwards made Bailli of the Cotentin and Captain of Carentan.⁷⁹⁷ By October he was also given the captaincy of Torcy, but was discharged from this in May 1424.⁷⁹⁸

Even by Burdet's standards, 1424 was a very busy year. He spent the first months in command of the garrison of Neufchâtel.⁷⁹⁹ By 17 May he had left and mustered the men under his command as Bailli of the Cotentin.⁸⁰⁰ The reason for his sudden activity is not completely clear, but it is probable he was summoned to assist the earl of Suffolk's siege of Ivry-sur-Seine.⁸⁰¹ By August, Charles VII's multinational army, under the command of Jean, Count of Aumale, had entered Normandy to relieve Suffolk's siege. In response to this countermove by the French, Bedford pulled men to him from garrisons around Normandy to bolster Suffolk's forces. Disregarding an agreement made between Suffolk and the French commander of Ivry to do battle at a set time and place – a *journée* – Aumale cunningly gained control of the nearby town of Verneuil by a ruse. With the ground of their choosing lost, the English, who among their number was Burdet and his men, were forced to give battle outside the town of Verneuil. On account of strong and capable leadership, the longbow and the hot headedness of the Lombard cavalry (who fought for the French), the English were able to win the day.

⁷⁹⁴ During the intervening years he married Jane, sister of the notable Worcestershire man Henry Bruyn. By 1420 as they had a son who they named Thomas: Woodger, 'Burdet, Sir Thomas'.

⁷⁹⁵ BL, Add. Ch. 25, 838; C76/104, m.4.

⁷⁹⁶ *Jean de Wavrin*, ed. Hardy and Hardy, 3, pp.8-10.

⁷⁹⁷ AN, K 62/10 (Butler); BN, ms. fr. 4485 (Balli and Capt. Carentan).

⁷⁹⁸ BN, ms. fr. 2604/108 (Torcy); BN, ms.fr. 4485 (Discharge).

⁷⁹⁹ BN, ms. fr. 25767/71.

⁸⁰⁰ BN, ms. fr. 25767/76 (May); BN, ms. fr. 25767/99 (October).

⁸⁰¹ For an account of the siege, its role in the lead up to the Battle of Verneuil, and of the battle itself: R. Wadge, *Verneuil: The Second Agincourt, 1424* (Stroud: The History Press, 2015), pp.151-185.

Looking to capitalise on their surprising victory at Verneuil, Bedford instructed Burdet, who he had knighted on the field, to lead a force to capture Mont St Michel. The imposing fortification, located atop a tidal island, had so far resisted English attempts to capture it. Earlier in 1424 Thomas Burgh, the same individual who had served under Gloucester and alongside Burdet in 1415, had attempted to capture the fortress town through subterfuge. In June he had offered, with Bedford's blessing, a Norman esquire named Henry Meudrac a colossal 1,750 livres to open the gates for the English.⁸⁰² The Norman agreed and gave his son to the English as a hostage. When it came to it though, the gates remained shut. Why Meudrac failed to follow through is not known, but he never received his cash and the fate of his son is similarly unknown. When Burdet arrived at Mont St Michel in November he wasted no time in getting to work. He mustered his men at Ardevon, a few miles from the town, and ordered them to construct a great fortress from wood capable of billeting 40 men-at-arms and around 120 archers.⁸⁰³ From their new fortress, the soldiers - who are aptly described by the chronicler Cousinot as 'the miserable English' - repeatedly sallied forth and attempted to take the city. Yet, after a ten month siege through the depths of winter the city remained defiant. The misery of the English was undoubtedly compounded by the defeat of the naval force attempting to blockade the city, and the capture of Burdet himself during one of the many assaults on the city.

Burdet's imprisonment was brief as he was free to serve under Sir Thomas Rempston in late 1426 when he led a force to capture the castle of Saint-James-de-Beuvron on the borders of Brittany.⁸⁰⁴ On this occasion he would have served alongside Sir Philip Branche. Following the fall of the castle and the subsequent defence of it against Arthur de Richemont's forces, Burdet briefly returned to England. In February 1427 he was instructed to muster various retinues at Sandwich which were about to sail for France.⁸⁰⁵ His respite in England was short as by early 1430 he had returned to France and was back in the field, this time at the siege of Louviers, having been stationed at Lisieux earlier in the year.⁸⁰⁶ By 1431 he was back at Carentan where he appears to have remained for a few years, before

⁸⁰² *Chronique du Mont-Saint-Michel*, ed. Luce, 1, pp.138-9, 149-150.

⁸⁰³ AN, K 62/11/12; *Chronique de la Pucelle*, ed. Viriville, pp.219-221; *Chronique du Mont-Saint-Michel*, ed. Luce, 1, p.26-27, 146-150, 160-171; Newhall, *English Conquest*, pp.321-322 n.299.

⁸⁰⁴ Newhall, *English Conquest*, p.240; *Jean de Wavrin*, ed. Hardy and Hardy, 3, pp.148-149.

⁸⁰⁵ *CPR, 1422-1429*, p.404.

⁸⁰⁶ BN, ms. fr. 25769/547 (Louviers); BN, ms. fr. 26052/1242 (Lisieux).

transferring to the garrison of Rouen where he took up the lieutenancy of the castle in March 1433.⁸⁰⁷

During June 1434 he was summoned to Calais to oversee the mustering of various retinues, although he returned to Rouen quickly.⁸⁰⁸ The following year he was back in charge of the garrison of Carentan.⁸⁰⁹ He had returned to the garrison of Rouen by October 1436, although by December he was captain of Évreux.⁸¹⁰ His presence for the next few years is unknown, but by 1441 he was defending the small town of Elbeuf.⁸¹¹ He appears then to have joined the duke of York's army and gone to the relief of Pontoise. He, along with others, was left in command when York departed. However, once the duke and his large army had left, the French reappeared. They surprised the garrison and captured the town rapidly. Burdet died attempting to defend it.⁸¹² Sir Nicholas Burdet was evidently one of the individuals to whom the Lancastrian conquest of Normandy provided constant employment. He was able to carve for himself a notable career as a professional soldier. Like Thomas Burgh, his Agincourt comrade, Burdet built his life and career around the duchy. They were both career soldiers who captained various garrisons across Lancastrian Normandy from 1418 to 1433.⁸¹³ Indeed, Burdet assimilated into the Norman society considerably by marrying a native woman.⁸¹⁴

For many of Gloucester's other 1415 sub-captains, military service after 1415 was not their sole occupation in life. Although men such as Thomas Deschalers, Thomas Gloucester, William Harrington and James Fiennes undertook further service during the conquest of the duchy, they did not dedicate their lives to its defence. Thomas Gloucester, for example, who had been retained by the King in 1413 and served the Crown diligently as a King's esquire for his whole life, was in Normandy in 1419 and had been instructed to

⁸⁰⁷ BN, ms. fr. 25770/609; BN, ms. fr. 25771/874; C76/116, m.7 (Carentan); BN, ms. fr. 25770/767; BL, Add. Ch. 11827 (Rouen).

⁸⁰⁸ *CPR, 1429-1436*, p.359.

⁸⁰⁹ BL, Add. Ch. 1462; BN, ms. fr. 25772/930.

⁸¹⁰ BN, ms. fr. 25773/1136 (Rouen); BN, ms. fr. 2606/3008; (*Évreux*).

⁸¹¹ BN, ms. fr. 25775/1499.

⁸¹² *CFA*, 5, pp.319, 331, 333; 6, p.599. An account of his military adventures in France, particularly the siege of Saint-James-de-Beuvron and his death at Pontoise, are retold in the Tudor anthology of poems: *The Mirror for Magistrates*, ed. L.B. Campbell (Cambridge, 1938), pp.463-482.

⁸¹³ *Soldier in Later Medieval England*, p.69 n.83.

⁸¹⁴ C.T. Allmand, *Lancastrian Normandy 1415-1450: The History of a Medieval Occupation* (Oxford, 1983), p.73 n.102.

oversee the mustering of the duke of Gloucester's retinue and the retinue of his 1415 co-captain Sir Walter Beauchamp.⁸¹⁵ Clearly serving in an administrative capacity, he was still in France in 1420 when he was again tasked with overseeing more musters, this time concerning the duke of Clarence's retinue.⁸¹⁶ After this time he returned to England and served as administrator for Randolph Appleton, sergeant of the Avenary (stables). How well he performed this position is questionable as he was pardoned for 'negligences' in October 1427.⁸¹⁷ In 1430-1431 he, along with his 1415 comrade James Fiennes, returned to France for the coronation of Henry VI.⁸¹⁸ Gloucester continued to serve the King principally in an administrative role, and rose to the office of Receiver-General of the Duchy of Cornwall by November 1439.⁸¹⁹

A number of Gloucester's sub-captains served in Parliament during their lives and on certain occasions served alongside some of their 1415 comrades. Few served before 1415. Yet, in 1416 the Beauchamp brothers were both present along with John Tyrell.⁸²⁰ Indeed, Walter Beauchamp was elected Speaker in this Parliament. The following year Thomas Deschalers represented Cambridge while John Tyrell again represented nearby Essex. In 1421 Henry Forester was present alongside Sir William Trussell, in 1432 Geoffrey Louthur represented Kent while Guy Whittington represented Gloucestershire. By the 1440s a few of the captains were still active. In 1442 James Fiennes served alongside Lord William Harrington and in 1445 alongside William Wroth.

James Fiennes carved one of the most notable careers of any of Gloucester's 1415 sub-captains.⁸²¹ After holding various captaincies during the 1420s, he became a royal esquire in 1430 and spent the rest of the decade consolidating his landholdings in Kent and establishing himself as a prominent member of the county. By the early 1440 he was closely associated with William de la Pole, earl of Suffolk, and thus came into conflict with his

⁸¹⁵ *DKR*, 41, p.711; *DKR*, 42, p.326.

⁸¹⁶ *DKR*, 42, p.388.

⁸¹⁷ *CRP*, 1422-1429, p.463.

⁸¹⁸ A. Curry, 'The Coronation Expedition and Henry VI's Court in France, 1430-1432' *The Lancastrian Court: Proceedings of the 2001 Harlaxton Symposium*, ed. J. Stratford (Donnington, 2003), pp.29-52.

⁸¹⁹ *CPR*, 1436-1441, p.345.

⁸²⁰ Those who had served as Members of Parliament before 1415 were: Sir William Beauchamp, Sir Thomas Clinton, Henry Forester and Sir Nicholas Haute. For references, see their *HoP* or *ODNB* biographies.

⁸²¹ J.A. Nigota, 'Fiennes, James, first Baron Saye and Sele (c.1390-1450)', *ODNB*, <<https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/9411>>, [Accessed 9 July 2018]; *CP*, 11, pp.479-482.

erstwhile captain, the duke of Gloucester, over the issue of peace negotiations with the French. On 23 February 1447 the duke of Gloucester died suddenly and unexpectedly. He died a prisoner at St Saviour's Hospital in Bury, having been arrested on charges of treason a few days previously.⁸²² His arrest had been orchestrated by Suffolk. Following the duke's death rumours of foul play were not immediately reported in many of the English chronicles, although some, such as the London Chronicle, which was written shortly after the event, erred on the side of caution and suggested he died 'howe God knowes'.⁸²³ The London Chronicle's scepticism is unsurprising given the well of support the people of London had for the late duke. Foreign chroniclers are not so cautious. Wavrin sums up their feelings when he writes that Gloucester was 'murdered inhumanly'.⁸²⁴

As time went on, and Suffolk's influence waned, rumours that the duke had been murdered began to circulate more widely in England and abroad.⁸²⁵ In 1463 the Burgundian chronicler George Chastellain wrote in his work *Le Temple de Bocace* that Gloucester had been grotesquely murdered.⁸²⁶ In a clear reflection of the murder of Edward II in 1327, Chastellain claimed Gloucester had been first bound to a table and then subjected to great pain as a red-hot poker (*une ardant broche de fer*) was inserted into his fundament up to his heart in an attempt to make his death appear natural (*sembler sa mort venir de nature*).⁸²⁷ While the story is almost certainly false – how would Chastellain have come by this knowledge? – it does highlight that the gruesome tale of Edward II's death, as told by the Brut, was still in circulation and continued to capture imaginations.⁸²⁸ The 'red-hot poker' was evidently still considered an effective way of concealing murder. Unsurprisingly, the story was seized upon by Tudor historians such as Hall and Holinshed.⁸²⁹ Moreover, although an extreme example, Chastellain's tale demonstrates that the duke of Gloucester's

⁸²² Vickers, *Humphrey*, pp.292-305.

⁸²³ *A Chronicle of London*, ed. Nicolas, p.135.

⁸²⁴ *Jean de Wavrin*, ed. Hardy and Hardy, 5, p.3.

⁸²⁵ Vickers, *Humphrey*, pp.296-297.

⁸²⁶ G. Chastellain, *Oeuvres*, 8 vols (Brussels, 1863-1866), 7, p.87.

⁸²⁷ On the death of Edward II: *The Brut*, ed. Brie, p.253; I. Mortimer, *The Greatest Traitor: The Life of Sir Roger Mortimer* (London, 2010), pp.185-195.

⁸²⁸ In a short article published in 2012 Julian Luxford identified two images of Edward, one a sculpture the other a painted panel in a church, in each of which Edward is displayed holding the royal orb in one hand and a long metal spit/poker in the other: J. Luxford, 'The Iconography of 'Saint' Edward II', *Burlington Magazine*, 154 (2012), pp.832-833.

⁸²⁹ Hall, *Hall's Chronicle*, p.209; Holinshed, *Chronicles of England*, 3, p.211; *New Chronicles of England*, p.619.

death was, although not immediately so, soon widely believed to have been an act of murder.

At the top of the suspect list, alongside Suffolk, was James Fiennes. The evidence against him is significant. The very day after the duke's death he was appointed to some of the offices formerly held by the duke, most notably warden of the Cinque Ports and constable of Dover Castle. The rapidity with which these appointments were made strongly suggests they were premeditated and that the necessary documents had been drawn up in advance. Within weeks Fiennes was also raised to the peerage as Lord Saye and Sele, appointed Constable of the Tower and made Chamberlain of the Household.⁸³⁰ As one further insult to the late duke, Fiennes was also appointed to oversee the disposal of his goods.⁸³¹ Vickers is thus correct to note that for the duke's death, 'On Suffolk and Lord Saye de Sele [sic] falls the chief suspicion'.⁸³² It is most probable that the duke of Gloucester was either murdered by, on the order of, or at least with the acquiescence of, James Fiennes - his Agincourt comrade. Fiennes ultimately paid for his actions when the men of Kent rose in rebellion in 1450 under Jack Cade. Fiennes was one of their principal targets. He was accused, among other things, of treason and of having been involved in the death of Gloucester. He was beheaded at the hands of a mob on 4 July. His head was placed on London Bridge.

Although both Fiennes and Thomas Gloucester had contact with the duke after the 1415 campaign, their association with him was neither strong nor frequent. Other members of the duke's retinue had more significant non-military relations with him after the campaign. It was no coincidence that during the periods of the duke's greatest power, his sub-captain Sir Robert Roos occupied significant shrieval office.⁸³³ He was a Justice of the Peace in Lincolnshire in 1420 and was reappointed in 1423.⁸³⁴ He was also sheriff in 1420-1422, 1431-1432, and 1435-1436.⁸³⁵ Sir Robert was clearly trusted by the duke as he was the duke's co-feoffee to Sir John Keighley for manors in Lincolnshire from 1424 until 1431. In addition, he served as mainpernor for the duke in 1432 in relation to the wardship of Walter

⁸³⁰ Nigota, 'Fiennes, James'.

⁸³¹ *Foedera*, 11, p.160.

⁸³² Vickers, *Humphrey*, p.302.

⁸³³ Roskell, *The Commons in the Parliament of 1422*, pp.213-214.

⁸³⁴ *CCR, 1419-1422*, p.194; *CPR, 1415-1422*, p.455.

⁸³⁵ *List of Sheriffs*, p.79

FitzWalter.⁸³⁶ Previously Sir Robert had been involved in an agreement concerning these lands with his 1415 co-captain, John Tyrell. A similar professional relationship existed between the duke and Sir William Trussell.⁸³⁷ In 1436, for example, he witnessed the conveyance of a Leicestershire manor to the duke. Again, it was no coincidence that this was at a time when the duke's political power was greatest.

Military service under Gloucester could evidently be beneficial. It was clearly as a result of his connection to the duke that Roos was able to hold powerful shrieval office. The relationship also worked the other way. Raising a retinue in 1415 benefitted the duke because it provided him with loyal contacts to call upon to fulfil necessary bureaucratic needs during the times when he held political sway. Service as a sub-captain under the duke also had other benefits, as the example of John Warde highlights. He petitioned Parliament in May 1421 for redress against Simon Bodenham who had seized some of his lands in Denham, Buckinghamshire.⁸³⁸ Surely not coincidentally the duke was one of those assigned in this Parliament to receive and decide on petitions. Warde's petition was undoubtedly further helped by the fact that he was a personal retainer of the duke by this point. The petition notes he was the duke's esquire. The outcome of his petition is not known, but Warde's association with Gloucester can only have aided his plea. Warde is just one of a number of Gloucester's 1415 sub-captains who came to be associated either with his household directly, or part of his wider affinity. Another such individual was George Lampet. He appears to have been a lifelong retainer of the duke's. In 1426 his yearly retention fee was increased to the significant sum of £10.⁸³⁹ He seems to have remained in the duke's service until the duke's death in 1447 when he is recorded as one of the duke's cofferers at his funeral.⁸⁴⁰

Nicholas Thorley was another of Gloucester's sub-captains who became part of his affinity. During the late 1420s he was the duke's Receiver-General.⁸⁴¹ That Thorley was able to rise to this position is impressive because during the early part of the decade he found

⁸³⁶ *CCR, 1422-1429*, pp.261, 263.

⁸³⁷ Woodger, 'Trussell, Sir William'.

⁸³⁸ SC8/150/7487.

⁸³⁹ A.C. Kamilewicz, 'The Military Career of Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester, 1390-1447', M.Litt thesis (University of Oxford, 2000), p.125.

⁸⁴⁰ *An English Chronicle*, ed. Davies, p.118.

⁸⁴¹ Roskell and Woodger, 'Tyrell, Sir John', esp. n.12.

himself in serious trouble. In 1421 he had married Alice, countess of Oxford, whose husband, Richard de Veer, had died in 1417.⁸⁴² In October it was found that they had married without licence and Thorley was hauled before Gloucester, in his role as Regent, and a range of other powerful men. They confiscated all of the Countess's lands and sent Thorley to the Tower. Like everything, it came down to money. It was ordered that he was to remain in the Tower until he paid a fine equivalent to a whole year's value of her lands. He was eventually released in February 1424. The pair were finally pardoned in 1426.⁸⁴³ Once out of goal, in what was possibly a show of loyalty, he rapidly returned to Gloucester's service.⁸⁴⁴ He accompanied the duke to Hainault as he attempted to gain his wife's lands there. On his return, he evidently entered the duke's personal service and was rapidly promoted to the position of Receiver-General. How long he remained in this position is unknown, but by 1431, by which point he had been knighted, he was elected Sheriff of Essex, indicating he no longer held the position. His association with Gloucester did not end, as in 1436 he was awarded an annuity of £40.⁸⁴⁵ The previous February he had been gifted some herrings from the Crown.⁸⁴⁶ It is possible that his continued presence in Gloucester's affinity was because of his standing in Essex; a county in which, as we have seen, the duke had a significant presence.

In 1427 and 1429 Thorley served on a Commission of the Peace in Essex alongside John Tyrell, his Agincourt comrade.⁸⁴⁷ John Tyrell was, as Roskell and Woodger acknowledge, one of Gloucester's most trusted and loyal retainers.⁸⁴⁸ Tyrell owed much of his advancement to Gloucester and as such supported the duke whenever possible. In 1427, for example, when he was elected speaker of Parliament, Gloucester himself and Thomas Montague, earl of Salisbury, petitioned to be discharged from the money they still owed the Crown in relation to the 1415 campaign.⁸⁴⁹ In response the King granted their petition, on the condition that the debts owed by the Crown to them were also cancelled and that the

⁸⁴² *CP*, 10, p.236; *PPC*, 2, p.303.

⁸⁴³ *CPR*, 1422-1429, pp.9, 422.

⁸⁴⁴ *C76/107*, m.9; *C76/107*, m.7.

⁸⁴⁵ Kamilewicz, 'The Military Career of Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester', p.128.

⁸⁴⁶ *CCR*, 1429-1435, p.330.

⁸⁴⁷ *CPR*, 1422-1429, p.563; *PPC*, 3, p.145.

⁸⁴⁸ Roskell and Woodger, 'Tyrell, Sir John'.

⁸⁴⁹ *SC8/115/5705*.

jewels granted as surety were returned within three years.⁸⁵⁰ During his career Tyrell frequently undertook tasks on behalf of Gloucester and held various high offices. Among the most noteworthy of these offices was that of Chief Steward of Lancaster, to which he was appointed in 1428. By 1431 Gloucester had managed to appoint three of his most loyal supporters, men who had served under him as captains during the 1415 campaign, to key positions within the duchy's administration. In addition to John Tyrell, Geoffrey Louthur was Receiver and Attorney General, and Walter Sherrington was Chancellor.⁸⁵¹ Sherrington had served the duke loyally since 1415 as his secretary. He held the position of Chancellor until his death in 1449.⁸⁵²

Of all Gloucester's 1415 sub-captains who maintained connections with the duke after the campaign, none served him more diligently or loyally than Geoffrey Louthur.⁸⁵³ On 27 November 1415 Gloucester was appointed Warden of the Cinque Ports and Constable of Dover castle. Almost immediately he appointed Louthur his deputy. He occupied this position for over three decades and worked closely with the duke throughout. Evidently well trusted by the duke, he again served as feoffee to him in 1418.⁸⁵⁴ Louthur's association with Gloucester and the establishment of himself in Kent ensured his election to Parliament in 1422, 1426 and 1432. It was again no coincidence that his election coincided with the periods when Gloucester's power was at its highest. His position as Gloucester's deputy meant he was frequently appointed to commissions and given specific orders, such as November 1419 when he was ordered to oversee the repair of Dover castle.⁸⁵⁵ These repairs seem to have gone on for a very long time as he did not submit his report to Gloucester until 1425.⁸⁵⁶ Indeed, the upkeep of the castle was a continual burden. In 1444 Gloucester was forced to petition the Privy Council directly in an attempt to receive reimbursement for the repairs he had funded out of his own pocket. In this petition he noted that Louthur was his deputy and referred to him as his 'beloved squire'.⁸⁵⁷ From July 1420 until 1446 Louthur

⁸⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁸⁵¹ Roskell, *Parliament and Politics*, pp.295-296.

⁸⁵² R. Somerville, *History of the Duchy of Lancaster* (Lancaster, 1953), pp.194-195.

⁸⁵³ Ibid, pp.201-203.

⁸⁵⁴ CPR, 1416-1422, p.129.

⁸⁵⁵ CPR, 1416-1422, pp.247, 249 (Dover repairs), 199, 210, 323, (Commissions of Array), 204, 213, 329, 388 (Musters).

⁸⁵⁶ CPR, 1422-1429, p.283.

⁸⁵⁷ PPC, 6, p.26.

served continually as a Justice of the Peace. In this capacity, he was sometime taken away from the south coast. In 1422 he was reunited with John Tyrell when they were ordered to investigate whether William Karre, a Scot, had been 'despoiled' while a prisoner.⁸⁵⁸ When Louthur and Tyrell met again in 1431 they would have been able to reminisce about their time serving alongside one another during the 1415 campaign.

Summary

The retinue Gloucester recruited for the 1415 campaign provided him with contacts and relationships which, in some cases, he maintained for the rest of his life. The importance of the campaign in establishing bonds between individuals must not be underestimated, nor should the potency of the ties formed on the campaign. When Gloucester and the men of his battle-worn retinue boarded ships at Calais headed for England, they were all bound to one another to a far greater degree than they were at the beginning of the campaign. As we have seen, when his retinue mustered at Romsey it comprised no stable core, although a range of ties between some of the other sub-captains have become visible, based on shared geographic heritage, familial relations and tenure. However, in many cases we may reasonably question the potency of these ties and conclude that few strong ties bound Gloucester's sub-captains to him, or to one another. To fully understand the importance of this conclusion the retinues commanded by the dukes of Clarence and Gloucester need to be compared alongside one another.

⁸⁵⁸ Ibid, p.78.

Chapter IV



A Comparison of the Retinues of the Dukes of Clarence and Gloucester

The preceding case studies have thrown significant light on the retinues commanded by the dukes of Clarence and Gloucester in 1415, including their personnel, recruitment, internal organisation, stability and cohesion. Thus far, however, we have mainly considered each retinue in isolation. Now, a comparison of the two retinues alongside one another will be undertaken. Such an analysis will allow more substantial and nuanced conclusions to be drawn, and will also locate many of the findings of this project in relation to current historiography. In the first instance, this chapter will focus on how the retinues were recruited and undertake a statistical analysis of the two forces, before moving to further assess the impact the siege of Harfleur had upon each retinue. In doing this the sick lists will be explored in detail. This will help to evaluate the size of both retinues at various points during the campaign. Indeed, in concert with the sick lists, we will also consider the information provided by the post-campaign accounts and the 'Agincourt roll'. Finally, this chapter will close with a discussion centred on the stability and cohesion of the two retinues, and locate the findings of the two case studies conducted here within the wider historiographical context.

Recruitment and Statistical Analysis

In recruiting their 1415 retinues, the dukes of Clarence and Gloucester employed similar long-established methods. We have been able to see clearly the well-developed system of recruitment by indenture at work. Having sealed their indentures with the King on 29 April, the dukes had just over two months to recruit their retinues. In a fashion familiar to any captain of this period they would, as Ayton has written, 'naturally look first to the manpower of their estates' and, certainly in the case of noble captains such as the dukes,

also to their personal households.⁸⁵⁹ These men, particularly those from the household, as we have seen, would form the commander's personal company. The findings of Curry's investigation into the earl marshal's 1415 retinue, that his household was a 'central source of troops for him', can be applied to both the ducal retinues considered here as well.⁸⁶⁰

The quote from Ayton given above was written in reference to the manner in which the earl of Huntingdon recruited his men for the Crécy campaign of 1346, yet it remains entirely relevant to the 1415 army. In 1346 Huntingdon recruited at least six of his archers from his manor of Worfield in Shropshire.⁸⁶¹ Studies of the gentry of Cheshire have revealed similar trends, while Ayton's recent work on the men who fought at Bannockburn has also demonstrated this.⁸⁶² Baker has similarly shown that in 1415 the duke of York recruited 32 men from his manors of Oakham and Langham, in Rutland.⁸⁶³ As the work of Christine Carpenter on Warwickshire and Philip Morgan on Cheshire has shown, the greater a captain's standing in a local community, the greater his recruitment pull.⁸⁶⁴ Many individuals served under a particular captain because of that captain's standing within their locality. Thus by recruiting men from their households and estates, the duke of Clarence and Gloucester, as well as York, employed long-established methods of recruitment. Even though the composition and organisation of English armies changed drastically during the fourteenth-century, the initial method for recruitment used in the early fifteenth-century was still the same as it had been previously. The ties of shared regional heritage which such a method of recruitment promoted, and the impact this had on the 'dynamics of recruitment', as well as the stability of the overall retinue, is considered in more detail later in this chapter.

In order to fulfil the terms of their contracts and recruit the number of men they were obliged to, commanders would often have needed to look beyond their immediate

⁸⁵⁹ Ayton, 'The Military Careerist', p.12.

⁸⁶⁰ Curry, 'A Case Study of John Mowbray', p.167.

⁸⁶¹ Ayton, 'Military Careerist', p.12.

⁸⁶² Ayton, 'In the Wake of Defeat', pp.55-56; Bennett, *Community, Class and Careerism*; Morgan, *War and Society*, pp.75-76.

⁸⁶³ Baker, 'To Agincourt and Beyond!', p.48.

⁸⁶⁴ Carpenter, *Locality and Polity*, pp.364-367; Morgan, *War and Society*, pp.75-76; Bell, *War and the Soldier*, pp.117-125. On the much-studied topic of gentry involvement in warfare: S. Payling, *Political Society in Lancastrian England: The Greater Gentry of Nottinghamshire* (Oxford, 1991); S. Payling, 'War and Peace: Military and Administrative Service amongst the English Gentry in the Reign of Henry VI', *Soldiers, Nobles and Gentlemen: Essays in Honour of Maurice Keen*, ed. P. Coss and C. Tyerman (Woodbridge, 2009), pp.240-58.

affinities, estates and households; their personal acquaintances would rapidly have been exhausted. The emergence of the mixed and super-mixed retinues of the fourteenth-century, on which we have already touched, required sub-captains to cast their recruitment nets wide and engage with sub-contractors from across the country. As a result of these developments, they cast their nets wide and recruited sub-captains with whom they cannot be shown to have had any previous ties. Gloucester, for example recruited Sir Henry Husse, who contributed a large company. The extent to which these sub-captains provided 'off-the-peg' companies is difficult to assess because of the limitations of the nominal source, as our investigation of some of Clarence's sub-retinues has shown clearly.

As our examination of the geographic ties within the ducal retinues has revealed, in many instances when recruiting their sub-captains the dukes of Clarence and Gloucester drew them from areas of the country in which they had landed interests. Indeed, in some cases we have seen that men were drawn directly from estates which the dukes held. Gloucester, for example, recruited Robert Langford because he resided at the manor of Binfield which the duke personally held. More generally, Gloucester drew many of his sub-captains from East Anglia, in particular southern Essex, while Clarence recruited a large contingent of sub-captains from Yorkshire, in particular the Holderness region. That these trends have emerged is no surprise. Many of Gloucester's main holdings, including his longest held properties, were located in southern Essex, while on the other hand Clarence had been granted the lordship of Holderness following his elevation to the peerage in 1412. The frequency of East Anglian men in their retinues should also cause no surprise. As the recent work of Craig Lambert and Ayton has revealed, the estuarine communities of East Anglia, and of Essex in particular, had been 'making a disproportionately heavy contribution to the war effort', for both naval and land-based campaigns, during the late fourteenth-century.⁸⁶⁵ This high level of militarisation within the county and the region more generally in the late fourteenth-century was evidently still present in the early fifteenth. East Anglia was a fertile land for captains to recruit soldiers from.

⁸⁶⁵ A. Ayton and C. Lambert, 'Shipping Troops and Fighting at Sea: Essex Ports and Mariners in England's Wars, 1337-1389', *The Fighting Essex Soldier*, ed. C. Thornton, J. Ward and N. Wiffen (Essex, 2017), pp.98-143 (p.132). See also: S. Gibbs, 'The Fighting Men of Essex: Service Relationship and the Poll Tax', *Ibid*, pp.78-98.

The exact methods by which the dukes communicated with and recruited their sub-captains is not known with certainty. As noted in chapter one, negotiations had been going on for a long time before the sealing of the indentures, although it is plausible last minute discussions occurred in London in April when the indentures were sealed.⁸⁶⁶ In early April, Clarence had been at St George's chapel for the annual gathering of the Knights of the Garter.⁸⁶⁷ During this event he would have encountered, among many others, Sir John Dabridgecourt and Hugh, Lord Burnell, both of whom he was familiar with, having known them most of his adult life. It is entirely conceivable that during this event he discussed with Sir John the possibility of him accompanying him to France as captain of a sub-company, and with Lord Burnell for his son, Edward, to accompany him as well (or vice versa). Such situations and access to the dukes and their officials was, of course, only available to those sub-captains of a certain social standing and financial ability. How did the dukes recruit the lesser sub-captains, those esquires who recruited only a few archers? We know, as has been shown in the previous chapters, that some had historic ties to the dukes, or dwelt near to lands or properties held by them, such as Clarence's sub-captains Robert St-Quentin and John Routh. Yet, how did they actually get recruited? Did the dukes' clerks and secretaries, like Walter Sherrington, write to these individuals on account of their historic ties to the dukes (or their family), or because of where they resided? Alternatively, did these lesser captains write (if they could) to the dukes, or go to the dukes in person, requesting to serve under them? It is even less clear how the dukes recruited the minor sub-captains, men like George Lampet and John Eveas who had no discernible ties of any sort with their commander, Gloucester. Disappointingly, satisfactory answers to these intriguing questions cannot be given as the records, frustratingly, simply do not provide this level of detail. Undoubtedly, though, news that the King was raising a great army must have spread rapidly across the country. It had long been known that a major expedition to France was planned. As we have seen, it had been publically proclaimed during the November Parliament of 1414.⁸⁶⁸ Men desiring to serve as sub-captains under the dukes would have been aware of the need to be in contact with them.

⁸⁶⁶ Curry, *Agincourt*, pp.66-76.

⁸⁶⁷ *PPC*, 2, pp.153-159; *CP*, 2, pp.538-540; Beltz, *Memorials of the Garter*, pp.399-400.

⁸⁶⁸ *PROME*, 'Henry V: November 1414'.

While overall retinue commanders were hastily recruiting men to their personal companies, the sub-captains would have been likewise seeking recruits. As our investigation of Sir John Dabridgecourt's sub-retinue demonstrated, similar factors which influenced and affected the ability of the dukes to fulfil the terms of their contracts were also relevant for the sub-captains.⁸⁶⁹ Their standing in the county and local community affected their recruitment reach, in addition to their financial position. Raising a sub-company could be a costly undertaking for a sub-contractor, especially if the Crown was not forthcoming with payment, which it often was not because of its perennial shortage of ready cash.⁸⁷⁰ In such situations the overall retinue commander would often pay his captains from his own pocket and seek reparations from the Crown directly. Of course, military service also carried the risk of being taken captive by the enemy and having to pay a costly ransom to regain one's liberty. The military experience of a sub-captain, and his career experiences, played a significant role in his ability to draw recruits to his service. Sir John Dabridgecourt, as we have seen, had a long history of military service, was a leading member of Derbyshire society and had an extended family, all of which allowed him to recruit his 1415 sub-retinue with, one would imagine, comparative ease. Ayton showed clearly in his study of Sir Thomas Ughtred's retinue of the early-mid fourteen-century the important role repeat military service could play in developing a stable 'off-the-peg' sub-retinue.⁸⁷¹ In contrast, Gloucester's sub-captain John Hawkwood, although of very famous heritage, was not a leading member of Essex society and appears to have had no relevant military contacts to call on. As a result, he appears to have been unable to recruit men to his service, at least according to the muster roll.

It is clear that the dukes of Clarence and Gloucester recruited captains in 1415 with whom they shared regional heritage and geographic ties. Yet, the motivation to serve under these particular captains was not based wholly on these factors. The dukes also attracted men to their banners for a multitude of other reasons. One of the main attractions to serve under them, as opposed to the earl of Huntingdon, for instance, was their standing in the kingdom. As, respectively, the heir presumptive and a royal prince, the dukes were, after the King himself, the premier captains to serve under. Such reasoning may have been partly

⁸⁶⁹ Ayton, 'Dynamics of Recruitment', pp.21-22.

⁸⁷⁰ Ayton, 'Sir Thomas Ughtred', p.126

⁸⁷¹ Ibid, pp.107-132.

why men such as Sir John Pudsey and Sir Henry Husse, neither of whom possessed significant lands near to those owned or held by either of the dukes, contracted to serve under them in 1415. Furthermore, service under a notable captain stood an ambitious young soldier in good stead. As Gemma Minihan demonstrated in her study of Sir Thomas Couen, military service was one avenue through which ambitious middling gentry could build a network of useful acquaintances, which in turn would improve their social standing and yield future employment opportunities.⁸⁷² Sir Robert Roos clearly benefitted from Gloucester's patronage as he held the office of Sheriff of Lincolnshire during the periods of Gloucester's greatest power.⁸⁷³ Likewise, as we have seen, a number of those who served under Gloucester in 1415 went on to have successful careers in his service, such as Geoffrey Louthur, and eventually occupied key positions in the administration of the Duchy of Lancaster. Charting similar associations with Clarence is difficult because of his untimely death.

Military service, of course, also had the potential of being financially beneficial, as the career of Sir John Fastolf makes clear.⁸⁷⁴ The prisoners taken by members of the ducal retinues' highlights the relevance of this point to the motivations of the men to serve in 1415 and beyond. Both dukes proved that service under them could result in prisoners being taken, and thus financial advancement for the men who captured them. Indeed, in regards to the possibility of earning (or taking) good money while serving under the dukes, Clarence's military service history assuredly gave him an advantage over his brother. The 1412 Treaty of Buzançais and the 'danegeld' levelled on the French surely attracted military professionals and ambitious men, such as Ralph Cromwell and Henry Muslo, to his service. Michael Bennett has put it succinctly, 'military service remained the most celebrated avenue of social advancement'.⁸⁷⁵ We may add to this that, in some cases, it provided significant financial advancement as well.

Clarence's military service history undoubtedly gave him an advantage over his brother when recruiting his retinue in 1415. During the first decade and a half of the

⁸⁷² G. Minihan, 'Ightham Mote in the Fourteenth Century: The lived Experience of Sir Thomas Couen', PhD. thesis, (University of Southampton, 2015), pp.165-208.

⁸⁷³ Roskell, *The Commons in the Parliament of 1422*, pp.213-214.

⁸⁷⁴ G.L. Harriss, 'Fastolf, Sir John (1380–1459)', *ODNB*, <<https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/9199>>, [Accessed 10 July 2018].

⁸⁷⁵ Bennett, *Community, Class and Careerism*, p.162.

fifteenth-century on only three occasions, in 1405, 1407 and 1412, did England raise armies of over 2,000 combatants.⁸⁷⁶ Two of these large forces had been commanded by Clarence. Indeed, in both 1405 and 1412 his personal retinue had comprised 2,000 or more men. On these occasions his retinues resembled the super-mixed forces raised by individuals such as Thomas of Woodstock, earl of Buckingham, and John of Gaunt in the latter half of the fourteenth-century. In raising their huge retinues, Buckingham and Gaunt, both princes, were able to draw on established recruitment networks enhanced by their significant landed estates, wealth and status. Although likewise a prince, when recruiting his retinue in 1405 Clarence had few estates, comparatively little wealth and held no peerage title. After his marriage to Margret Holand in 1412 his situation improved notably, but the estates and wealth he gained from his marriage and his elevation to the dukedom of Clarence would have taken time to impact on his recruitment network. How then, was he able to raise such huge retinues in 1405 and 1412?

The answer is threefold. First, through his service in Ireland and subsequent campaigns, Clarence had already succeeded in building a network of military acquaintances. Sir Stephen Scrope, for example, served under him repeatedly in Ireland.⁸⁷⁷ Sir John Kyghley similarly served under him on a number of occasions.⁸⁷⁸ Furthermore, although he was not a peer in 1405 and thus lacked titular status, his position as second in line to the throne undoubtedly assisted him in attracting men to his banner. This recruitment pull was strengthened by his ability as a commander. Although his campaigns in Ireland were inglorious and curtailed by insufficient funds, the 1405 naval campaign was relatively successful. His men plundered the villages around Sluys and carried away their church bells as plunder.⁸⁷⁹ Service under Clarence was therefore attractive because of the spoils of war it could yield. All three of these factors facilitated the creation and development of a network of military-centric acquaintances, which the duke was able to utilise and exploit when recruiting his retinue in the spring and summer of 1415. His proven ability as a commander, coupled with his long and varied military service record, ensured he had access to sub-

⁸⁷⁶ *Soldier in Later Medieval England*, pp.272-273.

⁸⁷⁷ *CPR, 1399-1401*, p.507 (1401); *CPR, 1401-1405*, p.223 (1403), 459 (1404), 493 (1405); *CPR, 1405-1408*, p.226 (1406).

⁸⁷⁸ Milner, 'English Commitment', p.21.

⁸⁷⁹ Sumption, *Cursed Kings*, pp.162-163.

captains of significant standing and ability, such as Sir John Dabridgecourt and Sir John Colville, which Gloucester did not, or at least not to the same extent.

Gloucester's captains, as has been shown, were generally not military veterans. Indeed, of his four principal captains, only Sir William Beauchamp had any military experience, and even this had been fleetingly short. Thus, as a result of Gloucester's lack of a developed recruitment network, which itself was in large part a result of his lack of military experience and the reputation associated with this, he was forced to recruit a far greater number of small sub-retinues.⁸⁸⁰ His lack of military experience was also undoubtedly partly down to his younger age. He was forced, as observed earlier, to cast his recruitment net very wide. The impact of this is clear: Gloucester had more captains serving under him with whom he had no previous ties. Nevertheless, he succeeded in gathering to his retinue a number of military, grey-bearded professionals, such as Sir Thomas Clinton and Sir Nicholas Haute. Again, the importance of his standing in the kingdom should be considered, as well as the role played by the royal affinity. We know, for example, that two of his captains, Geoffrey Louthier and Thomas Gloucester, were already in receipt of annuities from the King when they served under him in 1415.⁸⁸¹ That these men mustered under Gloucester may indicate that Henry assisted his younger brother fulfil the terms of his contract. It is possible this was discussed during the gathering in London in April. Whatever the case was, according to the muster roll, when Gloucester mustered his retinue near Romsey he failed to fulfil the terms of his contract. His recruitment network was insufficient, unlike his brother's which enabled him to go beyond the numbers specified in his contract (although even Clarence failed to recruit the number of knights he was contractually obliged to). Turning again to the information contained within the ducal muster rolls, a statistical analysis and comparison of their retinues is possible.

In both the ducal retinues, the dukes' personal companies contributed a similar percentage of men to the overall retinues' strength.⁸⁸² In Clarence's force the duke directly commanded 142 soldiers, 15% of his retinue's strength. Gloucester directly commanded 119 men, 16% of his retinue's strength. Interestingly, the duke of York's personal company


⁸⁸⁰ Chart 4.1.

⁸⁸¹ *CPR, 1405-1408*, p.45; *CCR, 1413-1419*, p.206 (Louthier); *CPR, 1413-1416*, pp.48, 57 (Gloucester)

⁸⁸² Curry, 'A Case Study of John Mowbray', pp.153-167.

accounted for only a marginally higher percentage of his retinue's manpower at 18%.⁸⁸³ The remaining 85% of Clarence's retinue was raised by the sub-retinue captains. In total, there were 61 such captains.⁸⁸⁴ In Gloucester's retinue there were 51 sub-captains. As chart 4.1 highlights, in both the ducal retinues the most frequent size of a sub-retinue company was from between 1 to 5 soldiers. In all of these esquire-captained retinues, the captain was the only man-at-arms.

Chart 4.1: A Comparison of the Frequency of Sub-Retinue Size



The average (mean) size of a sub-retinue in Clarence's force was 16 combatants, while in Gloucester's it was 12. Gloucester's force was made up of comparatively fewer large companies than Clarence's. Indeed, the average size of a sub-company for Gloucester's force was 12, whereas for Clarence's it was higher at 16. So, while the most frequent size of sub-company in both the ducal retinues was from between 1-5 soldiers, Clarence nonetheless recruited a greater number of large sub-retinues. It is pertinent to ask

⁸⁸³ Baker, 'To Agincourt and Beyond!', p.43.

⁸⁸⁴ Sir N. Nicolas included 14 of Clarence sub-retinue captains within his list of 'The Retinue of Henry V', compiled from BL, Add. Ms. 4600 (an unpublished section of Rymer's *Foedera*) and Carte's *Catalogue des Rolles Gascons, Normans et François*. The majority were from the latter source. However, in only two instances does he state that the individuals concerned (Walter Interbergh and John Stokes) were part of Clarence's retinue. Likewise, he lists six of Gloucester's sub-captains, in addition to the duke himself (Walter Beauchamp, Thomas Berwick, Robert Lacre, William Trussell and John Tyrell). In no case does he identify that they were in fact sub-captains: Nicolas, *The Battle of Agincourt*, pp.371-389.

why this was the case? It must in part be explained by the fact that many of Clarence's principal sub-captains were of knightly status and had previous military experience, as we have seen. Like their commander, these men would have had their own network of acquaintances to call upon to recruit large companies. In many instances, because all these men were military veterans, these networks had undoubtedly been expanded as a result of their military service. Indeed, even Clarence's principal captains who were not knights, Brian Stapleton and Roger Chamber, were men of significant standing and thus were able to recruit sizeable companies. It is also worth highlighting that knights (bannerets and bachelor) raised larger companies than esquires. This may seem an obvious point, but in Bell's study of Arundel's fleets, he demonstrated that in some cases esquires raised retinues larger than knights.⁸⁸⁵ Furthermore, he noted that in one case an esquire captain, John Sly (Slegh), actually had a knight serving under him.⁸⁸⁶ No such situations are evident in any of Clarence or Gloucester's 1415 sub-retinues. Overall, the structural make-up of Clarence and Gloucester's 1415 retinues are more similar to the retinues at Crécy, for instance the earl of Warwick's (under whom Sir Thomas Ughtred served), than to the armies recruited and commanded by Arundel.

One of the sources we have only lightly touched on so far are the letters of protection and attorney.⁸⁸⁷ Both of these sources, which formed part of the core group of documents databased by the Medieval Soldier Team, can add supporting information to data contained on the muster rolls. In the absence of muster rolls, such as for the duke of Clarence's 1412 expedition, the letters can cast some light on the personnel present.⁸⁸⁸ A letter of protection was legally powerful in that it ensured an individual could not be prosecuted, or have legal action taken against them or their property, for the period of time stated in the protection. An individual would request a protection, and pay a small fee, when they were going abroad, either on military service or some other reason such as a diplomatic mission. In some cases, especially in the fourteenth-century, a captain would sometimes submit a list of his men to the Chancery requesting they all be granted protections. Where these lists survive they are valuable for they allow us to see some (or in

⁸⁸⁵ Bell, *War and the Soldier*, pp.56, 64-65.

⁸⁸⁶ Ibid, p.96.

⁸⁸⁷ Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses*, pp.157-163; *Soldier in Later Medieval England*, pp.4-7.

⁸⁸⁸ Table 1.1.

a number of cases all) the men-at-arms of a retinue.⁸⁸⁹ A letter of attorney nominated certain people to act as an individual's attorneys while that individual was out of the country, possibly on military service or a diplomatic mission. For these reasons, letters of protection and attorney are 'heavily biased towards the propertied'.⁸⁹⁰ On account of this, they most often relate to members of the landed gentry and seldom the archers in an army. The letters themselves are standard in form, and, as Ayton has observed, due to a lack of muster rolls for the early fourteenth-century, are 'very much the staple diet of the student of Edwardian armies'.⁸⁹¹ The student of the Henrician armies of the fifteenth-century can still make good use of these letters, although a far smaller proportion of men sought them.⁸⁹² Indeed, from 1422 onwards their numbers decline significantly.

In the case of Clarence's retinue, 53 men sought protections to accompany him to France, while for Gloucester the figure is lower at just 13. Yet, of the 53 men granted protections in Clarence's retinue, of which most were granted in May, June and July, only 27 can be identified on the muster roll.⁸⁹³ It would appear that 26 men who had been granted protections failed to perform military service.⁸⁹⁴ They cannot be identified to have served in different retinues in 1415. Similarly in Gloucester's case, of the 13 men who took out protections for service in his retinue, just eight can be located on the muster roll.⁸⁹⁵

⁸⁸⁹ Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses*, pp.161-162.

⁸⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁸⁹¹ Ibid, p.157.

⁸⁹² *Soldier in Later Medieval England*, p.5.

⁸⁹³ All document references here relate to C76/98. They were: Robert Barrow, esquire under Roger Chamber, m.23; John Bedford, esquire under Sir John Colville, m.19A; William Belle, archer directly under Clarence, m.13 (protection revoked in November: *CPR, 1413-1416*, p.370); Richard Boteler, m.14; Sir William Bowet, m.21, m.14; Maurice Bruyn, m.19A; Robert Bitvelaine, m.18; Roger Chamber, m.19A; John Cobbe, archer directly under Clarence, m.16; Thomas Corbet, m.18; Ralph Cromwell, m.13; Hugh Curteys, m.22; Sir John Dabridgecourt, m.13; John Elys, archer under John Brewes, m.18; William Gardiner (Gelria), esquire under Sir John Pudsey, m.21; Sir John Godard, m.13; Walter Interbergh, m.22; Sir John Lumley, m.15; John Marshall, archer under Sir John Lumley, m.12; Thomas Merston, archer under Roger Chamber, m.21; Henry Noon, m.13; John Stokes, m.20; John Stormester, m.22; William Swenge, archer under Sir John Colville, m.19A; William Wyngate, archer directly under Clarence, m.21.

⁸⁹⁴ All membrane references here relate to C76/98. They were: Thomas ap Henry, m.13; John Ashbornham, m.8; Thomas Baudewyn, m.19; Edward Bistowe, m.14; William Chapell, m.13; William Cotton, m.19A; John Cowpell, m.12; Thomas Hannevell, m.19A; Richard Haufford, m.16; Simon Hoo, m.22; Robert Hopper, m.17; John Keene, m.19A; John Lawney, m.21; John Lynton, m.18; Richard Maring, m.15; Nicholas Merbury, m.18; Hans Newiler, m.17; John Oliver, m.12; John Orgore, m.19A; Richard Stonham, m.22; John Stoning, m.12; John Thorpe, m.12; William Westacre, m.9; William Wycombe, m.6.

⁸⁹⁵ Those who can be identified on the muster roll are: Robert Medcroft, archer under Gloucester (C76/98, m.20); William Grantham, esquire under Nicholas Thorley (C76/98, m.21); William Rokell (C76/98, m.19); Nicholas Coule, esquire under Sir Henry Husse (C76/98, m.19); William Trussell (C76/98, m.19A); Ralph Brauncpath, esquire under James Patrick (C76/98, m.13); Robert Lacre (C76/98, m.20); Thomas Berwick

Interestingly, of these, one was an archer named Robert Medocroft who served in Gloucester's personal company and was therefore likely a member of his household. All the others were men-at-arms. Four of those who sought protections were sub-captains. Considering the two retinues together, only two of those granted protections can be identified as having them revoked. One was an archer named William Belle, who was meant to serve under Clarence, while the other was Thomas Bernes, an esquire who was meant to serve under Gloucester.⁸⁹⁶

Notwithstanding these two men, no more of those who had sought letters of protection and attorney to serve under Clarence or Gloucester can be identified to have had their protections revoked, even though they failed to turn up to muster, and thus appear to have failed to perform military service. It is conceivable that they either arrived late to muster or were non-combatant, and are therefore not noted on the muster roll. This is highly unlikely though, as they cannot be identified on any other documents associated with the campaign, such as the sick lists which also detail non-combatants. They may simply have been fortunate and the Crown may not have pursued them for their failure to perform service, or, more likely, their revocations have simply not survived, or were never enrolled. Alternatively, they could have served under other captains, although no evidence of this has survived. It was also certainly the case that during the late fourteenth-century revocations of protection became more common, which suggests that the issue of abscondment from military service was becoming a more noticeable problem. This may have been as the result of changes to military recruitment and the emergence of a less 'rooted' soldiery.⁸⁹⁷ Conversely, it may simply highlight that prior to this time the system of protections was poorly regulated and presented an opportunity for some men to abuse the system.⁸⁹⁸ This was certainly the case in 1384 when men were being recruited for a campaign to Portugal. As P.E. Russell has written, some men were 'certainly more concerned with obtaining the letters of protections which would give them immunity from their creditors at home than

(C76/98, m.9): Those who cannot be identified on the muster roll are: Thomas Bernes (C76/98, m.12); John Bristowe (C76/98, m.19); Richard Aldelein (C76/98, m.19); Thomas Pateswyke (C76/98, m.13); Robert Attemore (C76/98, m.19A).

⁸⁹⁶ *CPR, 1413-1416*, pp.360 (Bernes), 370 (Belle).

⁸⁹⁷ Ayton, 'Dynamics of Recruitment', pp.58-59.

⁸⁹⁸ Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses*, pp.158-159.

with the prospect of campaigning in Portugal'.⁸⁹⁹ Protections were powerful legal documents which, undoubtedly, could be used to great effect by men willing to subvert the law.

A final explanation could be that some of those who sought protections were merchants and victuallers who supplied the retinues. Their occupation would have meant they were non-combatant and would not have featured on the muster rolls. There is some evidence to support this theory. Of Clarence's 53 men who sought protections, 9 have occupations stated. Of these 9, only 3 feature on the muster rolls.⁹⁰⁰ Although, it should be noted, this includes William Belle, the taverer from London whose protection was revoked. The remaining six do not feature on the muster roll and have their occupations noted as, rector, stockfish monger, merchant, baker, goldsmith and barber.⁹⁰¹ Unfortunately no further evidence is provided by Gloucester's 1415 retinue as none of those granted protection have any occupation noted, although for further campaigns some men are noted as merchants and victuallers. Collectively this suggests that some of those who sought protections may have been non-combatants who were involved in supplying the retinue with food and other items. In this manner they did not serve in a military capacity and thus are not detailed on the muster rolls. All of this underlines the importance of using the information provided by the letters of protection and attorney critically. In conjunction with the muster rolls, the letters provide us with further information, such as the geographic origin of some soldiers. Yet, overreliance on the letters for identification of individuals who served on the 1415 campaign, and other campaigns more generally, would be unwise.⁹⁰²

It has become clear that the locality in which a noble held land, a sub-captain resided and a basic recruit lived and worked, played, at all levels, an important role during the recruitment of a medieval army. It was also the case that a network of acquaintances built

⁸⁹⁹ The mustering of the men for this campaign was also problematic. Indeed, although the men-at-arms numbered only a few hundred, those appointed to oversee the muster were empowered to imprison anyone who refused to settle their differences or 'declined to embark': P.E. Russell, *English Intervention in Spain and Portugal in the time of Edward III and Richard II* (Oxford, 1955), pp.371-373

⁹⁰⁰ William Belle, taverer (C76/98, m.13); John Elys, grocer (C76/98, m.18); William Swenge (C76/98, m.19A).

⁹⁰¹ Thomas Baudewyn, rector (C76/98, m.19); William Chapell, stockfish monger (C76/98, m.13); William Haufford, merchant (C76/98, m.16); Robert Hopper, baker (C76/98, m.17); Hans Newiler, goldsmith (C76/98, m.17); William Wycombe, barber (C76/98, m.7).

⁹⁰² Table 1.1 exemplifies how letters of protection can provide data where muster roll coverage is only non-existent, or partial.

upon shared previous military service helped a retinue captain recruit military veterans. Therefore, even though the composition of English war retinues changed significantly during the fourteenth and early fifteenth-centuries, the main methods of recruitment, for both captains and sub-captains, essentially remained unchanged.

Impact of the Siege of Harfleur

The siege of Harfleur had a significant impact on both the ducal retinues. The sick lists, which were created towards the end of the siege or shortly afterwards, provide a significant quantity of nominal data detailing those who fell ill.⁹⁰³ In total, they detail the names of around 1,700 men. Curry has suggested that the lists may have been compiled as men boarded ships bound for England, or waited to board.⁹⁰⁴ In addition to listing men-at-arms and archers, they also note many non-combatants, such as servants and office holders. It appears that a similar system to that used for mustering the army at the beginning of the campaign was probably employed when creating the lists. Physically all the lists, which are explored in detail here, are similar to the muster rolls. They are comprised of numerous membranes which are sewn together end-to-end to form continuous rolls, although they are all of differing lengths. It is possible that they were created while the second muster was being conducted.

There are five surviving lists relating to the sick. The immediate purpose of the lists was to ascertain the number of men who had fallen ill within each retinue. As such, the lists provide a retinue-by-retinue breakdown of casualties. It is possible that further lists once existed as many retinues do not feature on the surviving lists. Alternatively, it may be that those retinues which are not detailed suffered no casualties. Once created, the lists would then have been kept by Exchequer officials who would have used them, in conjunction with the muster rolls and retinue rolls, to audit the post-campaign accounts when submitted following the end of the campaign. The sick lists would enable the clerks to identify those captains who needed to have wages subtracted for the second quarter because members of their retinues failed to perform military service from this point onwards. The sick lists were

⁹⁰³ Curry, *Agincourt*, pp.127-130; Curry, *Sources*, pp.456-426; Allmand, *Henry V*, p.211.

⁹⁰⁴ Curry, *Sources*, p.425.

thus primarily documents designed to assist in ensuring financial accuracy in the Crown's accounts. Consequently, along with the post-campaign accounts, we must be aware of any 'elements of trouble-saving fiction', as McFarlane has written in relation to medieval administrative documents, in the data they yield.⁹⁰⁵ As mentioned earlier, the post-campaign accounts, which include the retinue rolls, were often drawn up quite a long time after the campaign, so the information they contain may not be totally accurate.⁹⁰⁶ Ultimately it was the final figure on the account (that which related to money due) that the Crown's clerks were most interested in. As long as this figure was correct, the manner in which it was arrived at was rather less important. As Curry has said, 'this is war according to accountants'.

Bearing these issues in mind, one more point needs to be raised before looking at the information contained within the sick lists. An individual's inclusion on a sick list does not necessarily mean they left the army and departed for England. On only one sick list does it explicitly state that those listed were granted permission to return to England, this is E101/45/14. This is the first of the five documents we will consider. It is a small chit of parchment which granted 12 men, all of whom were members of the royal household, permission to depart the siege to England. None of Clarence or Gloucester's men is detailed. That permission to depart was granted to some individuals highlights, as Curry has noted, that the fear of desertion was undoubtedly present.⁹⁰⁷ The remaining four documents, all of which are rolls, are lists of those who fell ill at the siege. They do not specifically grant, like the above document, permission to depart. Two of these four sick lists are found in the original leather Chancery bag which we have already encountered in chapter one, E101/44/30. One of these, E101/44/30, no.6, can be discounted from our investigation as it only details the sick from the retinues captained by Sir Roland Lenthale and Sir William Porter, neither of whom served under Clarence or Gloucester. The other sick list in this bag, E101/44/30, no.1, is of great importance as it details many of the sick from both the ducal retinues, plus many others. Similarly, E101/50/26 and E101/45/1 also detail the sick from the ducal retinues. For this reason, our attention will now be fixed to these three documents.

⁹⁰⁵ K.B. McFarlane, *The Nobility of Later Medieval England* (Oxford, 1373), p.16.

⁹⁰⁶ Curry, *Sources*, pp.426-434.

⁹⁰⁷ Curry, *Agincourt*, p.128.

The first document to be considered is E101/44/30, no.1. This roll is made up of 24 membranes, all of which are 15cm wide and commonly around 20cm long, with only a few exceptions. They are stitched together end-to-end to form one continuous roll. It is in a well preserved state and is written in one clear neat hand. Grouping brackets are placed around the various soldier types as well as non-combatants. Like many of the muster rolls, there is little evidence of membrane crossover with many of the retinues listed contained on either one or two membranes. This suggests the rolls were created in a similar fashion as the muster rolls where retinues were inspected in turn by clerks who then joined the various membranes together to form the composite document we have today. The roll demonstrates the hierarchical order of the army with Clarence's retinue being listed first, followed by Gloucester's. In total, E101/44/30, no.1 details the names of 47 men of Clarence's retinue, 12 men-at-arms, 17 archers and 18 of unknown rank. We will return to the issue of unknown rank shortly. For the duke of Gloucester's retinue, which is listed on membranes one to four, 221 men are listed, 3 knights, 49 men-at-arms and 169 archers.

Moving to E101/50/26, it is clear that it was created in a similar fashion as E101/44/30, no.1 as all the membranes are sewn together to form one continuous roll. The membranes differ in length, but are all approximately the same width. The first three membranes are faded, although still legible. At least three different hands can be identified on the document and grouping brackets have been used in only some instances. Unlike E101/44/30, no.1 many retinues, particularly for the second third of the roll, cross over membranes suggesting that these companies were inspected together. It is important to note that much identity can be seen between E101/50/26 and E101/44/30, no.1. Dealing with Clarence's retinue first, all those present on E101/44/30, no.1 are similarly listed, with near identical spelling and in the same order, on E101/50/26. Yet, E101/50/26 is especially enlightening as it lists a further 54 names. This fact may indicate it was created after E101/44/30 no.1, by which time more of Clarence's men had fallen ill, and that E101/44/30, no.1 was used as a template. This observation is supported by the fact that the majority of additional names are located not within the list relating specifically to Clarence's retinue, which is located on membrane one, but elsewhere on the roll. On membrane seven, for example, 12 sick men of Sir John Dabridgecourt's sub-retinue are detailed while on membrane four the sick of Sir John Colville's company are noted.

A similar situation is evident for Gloucester's retinue, although E101/50/26 provides no additional names. In fact, interestingly, it provides 75 fewer names than E101/44/30, no.1. The sick under the sub-captains Geoffrey Louthier and William Harrington are, for example, noted only on E101/44/30, no.1. While the majority of Gloucester's retinue is detailed on membranes one and two, on membrane four the sick of Sir Henry Husse's sub-retinue are noted. This is unexpected as Sir Henry himself, along with 44 of his men, are also locatable on membrane one under Gloucester directly. It is not clear why he and his men are noted twice. That some of the sub-retinues from both Clarence and Gloucester's retinues are noted separate from the lists relating to the dukes' personal companies and the majority of their sub-retinues is intriguing. It suggests three possibilities. First, during the compilation of the roll additional men were found to have fallen ill in the dukes' retinues and these were added to the document separate to the dukes' main list. Secondly, it may indicate reorganisation within the army and that some sub-captains became full retinue commanders in his own right. This interpretation, however, is not supported by the post-campaign accounts which do not provide details for any of these sub-captains specifically. Although, of course, not all the documents associated with the post-campaign accounting procedure have survived. Thirdly, it is plausible that the retinues were physically broken up and dispersed around Harfleur during the siege and the order of companies on the sick lists displays the order in which the clerks encountered each retinue during their compilation of the rolls. Again, this interpretation is highly problematic. As noted, Clarence and Gloucester's retinues are listed one after the other, irrespective of the fact they were located essential opposite each other during the siege. What is without doubt is that the sick lists demonstrate that the army was fluid in composition and that significant reorganisation took place as a result of illness following the siege of Harfleur, as Curry demonstrated clearly when considering the fate of Thomas, lord Camoys's retinue.⁹⁰⁸

Reorganisation is also strongly evidenced by the fact that many individuals noted on the sick lists as serving one of the two dukes cannot be identified on their original muster rolls. Taking Clarence's retinue first, on E101/44/30, no.1 are listed 18 men, with no rank

⁹⁰⁸ A. Curry and M. Mercer, 'The English Army at the Battle and its Commanders', *The Battle of Agincourt*, ed. A. Curry and M. Mercer (London, 2015), pp.178-189 (pp.178-183).

recorded, who cannot be found on the muster roll.⁹⁰⁹ Likewise, E101/50/26 lists the same 18 but also adds an additional six.⁹¹⁰ Of the sick of Sir John Dabridgecourt's retinue, two men-at-arms are not locatable on the muster roll, along with four archers.⁹¹¹ In Sir John Colville's retinue three men-at-arms cannot be located on the muster roll, along with nine archers.⁹¹² In total, 42 of Clarence's soldiers from the sick lists cannot be identified on the original muster roll. Much the same is the case of Gloucester's retinue. Of the 221 men on E101/44/30, no.1, 34 cannot be identified on the original muster roll.⁹¹³ A similar situation is evident on the final sick list, E101/45/1. This roll appears mainly to document individuals associated with the royal household, although a few of Clarence and Gloucester's sub-retinues can be identified on the list. On membrane three are noted 10 men who served under Clarence's sub-captain Sir John Heron, and 7 men who served under Ralph Cromwell. In both cases the men are listed in an identical order to how they are on E101/50/26, again suggesting that copying between documents took place. For Gloucester, four men can be identified under his sub-captain Thomas Deschalers (himself included); two men-at-arms and two archers. Only one archer cannot be located on the muster roll. Also listed are nine archers under the command of Walter Beauchamp, although none can be found on the

⁹⁰⁹ They are (all spellings as found on 44/30): William Alryngton (chaplain), Nicholas Banbury, Robert Cheir, Merster Gilbert, John Tukke, Guiere Deyne, Colbrond Baillie, Robert French, John Couper, William Olde, Richard James, Adam Smyth, Geoffrey Lavender, Richard Hull, Henry Page, John Stoneveille (presumably a clergyman as noted on 50/26 as 'brother'), John Beaumond and John St Barbe.

⁹¹⁰ They are (all spellings as found on 50/26): Thomas Ascow, John Huggefard, Igor John Autregate, John Creker, Hely Heron, John de Wetherby.

⁹¹¹ They are (all spellings as found on 50/26): Men-at-Arms, Robert de Bryforde and William Wodocok; Archers, Henry Coomn, Thomas Horrow, Thomas Summdre, John Daskellon.

⁹¹² They are (all spellings as found on 50/26): Men-at-Arms, John Prkynhum, William Enostre, William Bonkyng; Archers, Ranlyn Curters, John Bonet, John Longday, Simon Bello, Simon Chasso, Geoffrey Plon, John Aronsand, John Cramit and John Lodoya.

⁹¹³ They are (all spellings as found on 50/26, m.2, 4): Men-at-arms (all under Sir Henry Husse), John Chamber, John Sanston, Thomas Walls, William Port, Robert Smyth, Illegible Boharp. Archers: John Lokyngton (under fchamp), Thomas Barbour (Beauchamp), John Horsman (Beauchamp), William Court (Beauchamp), John Bushebroke (Sir Henry Husse), John Cloyne (Husse), John Buston (Husse), Robert Smyth (Husse), Andrew Bache (Husse), Robert Toly (Sir William Trussell), John Allynbery (Trussell), John Yonge (Trussell), William Tayllour (William Wroth), Robert Tanner (Sir Thomas Clinton), Walter Golde (Clinton), Richard Ferrer (Sir Thomas Morley) and Morris Pole (John de Veer); All spellings as found on 44/30: Robert Mylles (John Smyth), William Greyson (Geoffrey Louther), John Rede (Louther), Thomas Croke (Conan Aske), Patrick of Ireland (Aske), Thomas Mordon (Patrick Mordon), Robert Witlyseye (John Huet), William Devenysse (John Gyffard), John Water (Unknown), William Sprout (Unknown) and Richard Newport (Unknown).

muster roll.⁹¹⁴ The same three possible explanations as given above can be applied to the question of why these sub-retinues of the duke's retinues are noted on E101/45/1.

That some men are locatable on the sick lists but not the original muster rolls is a crucial point. It indicates that as men died, others were available to fill their shoes. Reinforcements were evidently available. As both Curry and Baker have suggested, it is likely that either reinforcements had been shipped across while the army encamped at Harfleur, or, as Erpingham and York's muster rolls suggests, 'extra soldiers had crossed in the first place in the hope of gaining employment'.⁹¹⁵ The influx of these extra men supports the suggestion made in chapter one that a second army-wide muster was conducted at the end of the siege. It is also interesting to consider whether some of those men noted on the sick lists, but not identifiable on the ducal muster rolls, were originally intended for the spaces left blank on the original muster rolls. As we have seen, for example, space was left blank under Thomas Burgh for three further men-at-arms and eight archers. Closer inspection reveals this explanation to be unlikely. None of the 34 who cannot be identified on the original muster roll had any apparent relationship with Burgh, or the men under his command.

It should also be noted that none of those detailed on the sick lists but not identifiable on the original ducal muster rolls can be identified to have come from other retinues. In other words, there is no evidence that men moved from other retinues to reinforce the ducal retinues. It is also possible that these men not detailed on the muster rolls were non-combatants. This was most probably the case for William Alyngton, Clarence's chaplain, for example. Another point to highlight is that it is possible that these men were those for whom protections survive, but who are not listed on the original muster rolls. However, a cross reference of these names reveals no matches, so this was not the case. It must be concluded, then, that those men detailed on the sick lists but not on the original muster rolls were either reinforcements who had arrived from England, or served as supernumeraries off the payroll since the start of the campaign, or were non-combatants who did not need to be detailed on the original muster rolls. Whichever possibility is

⁹¹⁴ They are (all spellings as found on 45/1, m.5, 8): John Ginlay (Deschalers), William Newton (all from here under Walter Beauchamp), John Warner, John Forster, Raulyn Tytte, John Langstone, Walter Smyth, John Speck, John Mark and John Fletcher.

⁹¹⁵ Curry, *Agincourt*, p.129; Baker, 'To Agincourt and Beyond!', p.43.

correct, and it is impossible to know for certain, this conclusion has implications for the issue regarding the overall number of soldiers present at any time during the course of the campaign. Evidently there was a pool of manpower which could be drawn on during the campaign which the surviving administrative sources do not allow us to see. The size of this ‘reserve’ pool of manpower is unknown, but its existence demonstrates that the overall campaign figures given by Curry should be taken as a minimum and not, as some have suggested, as a maximum for the total number of men who participated on the 1415 campaign and fought at the Battle of Agincourt.⁹¹⁶

Table 4.2: The Sick of Clarence’s 1415 Retinue: A Comparison of the Sick Lists⁹¹⁷

Forename	Surname	Rank	45/1	44/30 (1)	50/26	Sub-Captain
John	Mauley	MaA		m.1	m.1	Clarence
Thomas	Holt	A		m.1	m.1	Clarence
Robert	Cauthorn	A		m.1	m.1	Clarence
Richard	Hacun	A		m.1	m.1	Clarence
Richard ⁹¹⁸	Sunnyng	A			m.1	Clarence
Roger	Gilder	A		m.1	m.1	Clarence
John	Sy	A		m.1	m.1	Clarence
William	Overton	A			m.1	Clarence
William	Compton	A		m.1	m.1	Clarence
Robert	Haydok	A		m.1	m.1	Clarence
Clement	Chauntrye	A			m.1	Clarence
John	Feyrefaxx	A		m.1	m.1	Clarence
John	Pantrye	A			m.1	Clarence
John	Marschall	A		m.1	m.1	Sir John Lumley
William	Skarlet	A		m.1	m.1	Sir John Lumley
Robert	Gaynsford	A			m.1	Sir John Lumley
Richard	Stanestrete	A			m.7	Sir John Dabridgecourt
William	Langton	A			m.7	Sir John Dabridgecourt
Thomas	Wodecok	A		m.1	m.1	Sir John Dabridgecourt
Richard	Chamberlayn	A			m.7	Sir John Dabridgecourt
Richard	Steredale	A			m.7	Sir John Dabridgecourt
John	Kymberlegh	A			m.7	Sir John Dabridgecourt
Thomas	Robynsone	A		m.1	m.1, 7	Sir John Dabridgecourt
John	Ferror	A		m.1	m.1	Sir John Colville
Sir John	Colville	MaA			m.4	Sir John Colville
Laurence	Danzel	MaA			m.4	Sir John Colville

⁹¹⁶ Mortimer, *Year of Glory*, pp.564-566

⁹¹⁷ Only those who can be identified on the original muster roll are listed here.

⁹¹⁸ Given as Robert on the muster roll.

William	Berkyry	MaA			m.4	Sir John Colville
Robert	Fulford	MaA			m.4	Sir John Colville
Nicholas	Welby	A			m.4	Sir John Colville
John	Hakebeche	A			m.4	Sir John Colville
William	Fadre	A			m.4	Sir John Colville
John	Bynglee	A			m.4	Sir John Colville
John	Coston	A			m.4	Sir John Colville
Richard	Bradley	A			m.4	Sir John Colville
Robert	Tanjels	A			m.4	Sir John Colville
Thomas	Topclyf	MaA	m.3		m.9	Sir John Heron
John	Vrpath	MaA	m.3		m.9	Sir John Heron
William	Heron	MaA	m.3		m.9	Sir John Heron
Richard	Kelby	MaA	m.3		m.9	Sir John Heron
William	Botherford	MaA	m.3		m.9	Sir John Heron
John	Raulyn	A	m.3		m.9	Sir John Heron
William	Chilton	A	m.3		m.9	Sir John Heron
Thomas	Urpeth	A	m.3		m.9	Sir John Heron
John	Davy	A	m.3		m.9	Sir John Heron
Thomas	Jonessone	A	m.3		m.9	Sir John Heron
Hugh	Bylle	MaA		m.1	m.1	Sir William Bowes
William	Myles	A		m.1	m.1	Sir William Bowes
Richard	Watton	MaA		m.1	m.1	Sir John Godard
Thomas	Rasse	A			m.1	Sir William Bowet
William	Lykelyng	MaA	m.3		m.9	Ralph Cromwell
Thomas	Fyndern	MaA	m.3		m.9	Ralph Cromwell
John	Wylan	MaA	m.3		m.9	Ralph Cromwell
William	Cogmour	MaA	m.3		m.9	Ralph Cromwell
John	Kent	A	m.3		m.9	Ralph Cromwell
John	Bartram	A	m.3		m.9	Ralph Cromwell
William	Basage	A	m.3		m.9	Ralph Cromwell
William	Offord	MaA		m.1	m.1	Thomas Marny
Robert	Elkenhed	MaA		m.1	m.1	Roger Chamber
Richard	Shirley	A			m.1	Walter Interbergh
William	Wyse	A			m.1	Walter Interbergh
Ralph	Neville	MaA		m.1	m.1	Ralph Neville
John	Sutton	MaA		m.1	m.1	John Sutton
John	Kyrkeby	A		m.1	m.1	John Sutton
Richard	Geddyng	MaA		m.1	m.1	James Fresell
Thomas	Corbet	MaA		m.1	m.1	Thomas Corbet
William	Sompterman	A			m.1	Henry Mulso
John	St Albyn	MaA		m.1	m.1	John St Alban
Walter	Webbe	A		m.1	m.1	Robert Otterburn
John	Burford	A		m.1	m.1	John Caleys
Richard	Boteler	MaA		m.1	m.1	Richard Botiller
Henry	Garstange	A		m.1	m.1	John Bayhous

John	Routh	MaA		m.1	m.1	John Routh
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In summary, then, the surviving sick lists indicate that the siege of Harfleur had a notable impact on both the ducal retinues, as table 4.3 shows. Working cautiously from the position that all those detailed left the army and returned to England, Clarence's retinue suffered 115 casualties, 12% of his force. Of these, 73 can be identified on the duke's original muster roll, while 42 cannot. Breaking this down further, 31 of the sick were men-at-arms (including the duke), 60 archers and 24 of unknown rank. The sick lists thus suggest that Clarence's retinue was 865 strong following the surrender of Harfleur on 22 September, 10 knights, 201 esquires and 654 archers. Considering the marshy and isolated position of Clarence's siege camp, along with the fact that it faced significant French resistance, this figure is surprisingly low. However, it does correspond with the relatively low level of sickness within the duke of York's retinue, which was most likely stationed nearby, of around 10%.⁹¹⁹ The lists indicate that for Gloucester's retinue, 234 fell sick (31%), 3 knights, 51 men-at-arms and 180 archers. Of these, 6 men-at-arms and 38 archers cannot be identified on the original muster roll. According to the sick lists, Gloucester's retinue was comprised of 517 men following the siege, 1 duke, 3 knights, 129 men-at-arms and 384 archers.

The sick lists, however, do not tell the whole story. Turning to the administrative documents created after the campaign, a more holistic image of the ducal retinues becomes visible. Disappointingly, both of the dukes' surviving post-campaign accounts are incomplete as their particulars of account, which would have contained their retinue rolls, have not survived. However, both retinues are detailed on E358/6.⁹²⁰ Similar to the special issue rolls created before the campaign, the post-campaign accounts for many retinues were eventually enrolled into account rolls separate from the Foreign Account rolls. A number of these unique rolls were created. The only one which survives is E358/6, which is noted as number 6. It provides varying levels of detail for 59 retinues. It begins with the exemplar account of Sir Robert Babthorp. It records that for the second quarter of the campaign, which Henry decreed on 6 March 1417 had run from 6 October to 24 November, Clarence's

⁹¹⁹ It is unclear precisely how many of York's men succumbed to illness because of the partial coverage of the surviving sick lists and the duke's complex post-campaign accounts: Baker, 'To Agincourt and Beyond!', p.45.

⁹²⁰ E358/6, m.1 (Clarence), m.4 (Gloucester).

retinue comprised 6 knights, 151 men-at-arms and 585 archers, a total of 742 soldiers.⁹²¹

For Gloucester the account is slightly more detailed. It states that wages were to be deducted for 5 knights, 61 men-at-arms and 211 archers (277 men) for 49 days. This means the retinue would have comprised 1 duke, 1 knight, 119 men-at-arms and 353 archers, a total of 474 men. Considering Henry's decree in March 1417 that the campaign officially ended on 24 November, we can calculate that these soldiers stopped receiving pay on Friday 6 October, the end of the first quarter. Henry had left Harfleur for Calais by Monday 9 October, so it makes perfect sense that those not accompanying him would have stopped receiving pay a few days before. There is thus a discrepancy between the sick list data and the available post-campaign account information in E358/6. For Clarence this discrepancy is 123 soldiers, and for Gloucester it is 43. Table 4.3 provides a breakdown of all this data.

That there is a discrepancy between the sick lists and E358/6 may be ascribed to a number of factors. To begin, some men surely died, but their deaths were not recorded. Others may have deserted, while some may have returned to England with sickness, but were never noted on the sick lists, or, as is likely, there were more sick lists. Alternatively, some men may have been placed into the garrison of Harfleur. In order to protect his hard-won prize, Henry installed a large garrison into Harfleur under the captaincy of Thomas Beaufort, earl of Dorset. The specific size and composition of the garrison immediately after the fall of the city is not known with certainty. A muster roll from early 1416 sheds light on the issue. The 1416 roll details 1,198 men who, as Curry suggests, were 'probably men who had served in Harfleur since its surrender'.⁹²² A search of this document reveals 19 plausible matches with members of Clarence's retinue, most of whom were archers, but none for Gloucester's.⁹²³

⁹²¹ For text of the decision: Curry, *Sources*, pp.448-449.

⁹²² E101/47/39; Curry, *Agincourt*, p.128.

⁹²³ The matches are: William Wenynghton, archer (captain, Roger Chamber); John Lymbury, man-at-arms (Roger Chamber); William Halle, archer (Sir John Pudsey); Richard Stanley, man-at-arms (Sir John Lumley); John Cook, archer (Clarence); Thomas Smyth, archer (Sir William Bowet or Sir William Cromwell); John Warde, archer (Clarence); Robert Barbor, archer (Clarence); John Broun, archer (Roger Chamber); John Abbot, archer (Clarence); John Roos, archer (Ralph Neville); John Caley, man-at-arms (John Caley); John Stokes, archer (Roger Chamber); John Clement, archer (Clarence); William Lacy, archer (Walter Interbergh); John Dalton, archer (Henry Godard); John Sotherton, archer (John St Alban); John Gerard, archer (Sir William Bowet); John Davy, archer (Sir John Heron).

In addition to providing figures regarding those requiring payment, E358/6 also details shipping costs. In the case of Clarence's retinue this was simply for the 742 soldiers he was entitled to claim wages for for the second quarter. This exact match suggests that none of his men died during the second quarter, either on the march to Agincourt, or at the battle itself. It must be remembered, of course, that as a result of Henry's decision in March 1417 pay was not deducted for Agincourt casualties.⁹²⁴ As Curry has written, 'technically, therefore, what the documents [post-campaign accounts] show us is who was *present* at the battle'.⁹²⁵ So, while the exact match between payments to personnel and shipping numbers in E358/6 suggests no casualties in the retinue, this most likely was not the case. To some degree, what we are seeing here is an 'unconvincing neatness' in the Crown's post-campaign accounts.⁹²⁶

Nevertheless, even in spite of this, E358/6 is a highly important and enlightening document. From it we learn that Clarence's men returned to England with 1,225 of the 1,824 horses they were permitted to take. The equine casualty rate was thus 599 (33%), significantly higher than the human casualty rate, which is presented in table 4.3. The duke of Gloucester, on the other hand, was allowed to claim shipping for 507 men; 1 knight, 125 men-at-arms and 380 archers. According to the sick lists, after the siege of Harfleur his retinue comprised 517 men; 1 duke, 3 knights, 129 men-at-arms and 384 archers. E358/6 suggests that further men either died shortly after the siege, on route to the battle, or at the battle itself. Yet, the shipping cost figures are at odds with the overall payment figure of 474 provided by E358/6 which, as already mentioned, stated Gloucester could claim wages for the second quarter for 474 men, 1 duke, 1 knight, 119 men-at-arms and 353 archers. It is plausible that following the battle the duke may have permitted additional retinues to accompany his force back to England. This would explain why he claimed additional shipping costs. Before moving to compare attrition rates between the two ducal retinues, it is necessary to also consider the 'Agincourt roll'.

⁹²⁴ Curry, *Sources*, pp.448-449.

⁹²⁵ *Ibid*, p.431.

⁹²⁶ I borrow this phrase from: Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses*, p.147.

The 'Agincourt roll', as Curry has noted, is based on three near identical lists of individuals supposed to have been at the Battle of Agincourt.⁹²⁷ All date from the late Tudor period and were attempts by the herald Robert Glover to detail the names of those present at the battle. The creation of these lists allowed nobles and the gentry to trace their ancestors back to the Battle. As such, with their focus on the upper levels of the army, the lists detail only men-at-arms by name, which they describe as 'lances'. They provide a figure for the number of archers present, but no nominal information. The list commonly known as the 'Agincourt roll', an amalgamation of two of the three lists, was printed by Sir N. Harris Nicolas in his *History of the Battle of Agincourt*. Interestingly the Agincourt roll does not provide any information regarding Clarence's retinue, but instead begins by detailing the duke of Gloucester's. Presumably Clarence's roll is not listed because the roll from which Glover copied in the late sixteenth century was not complete. In total it lists 140 names for men-at-arms who served under Gloucester. A comparison with the duke's muster roll reveals that 33 of those listed were sub-captains and that a further 100 men can be identified as sub-retinue members. In total, 133 (72%) of Gloucester's 186 men-at-arms are listed on the Agincourt roll. In addition, one sub-captain is noted twice (William Hyde) and 6 soldiers cannot be located on the original muster roll, the sick lists, or the letters of protection associated with the duke's retinue.

At the end of the list of Gloucester's men-at-arms two totals are given. These state that the duke commanded 142 men-at-arms (although it provides only 140 names) and 406 archers at the battle. This suggests that his retinue had a total size of 548 when it engaged with the French at Agincourt. This figure is evidently different from both those provided by E358/6 (507 for shipping and 474 for wages) and the figure arrived at from a close study of the sick lists (517). The source of the Agincourt roll was, as Harris Nicolas, Wylie and Curry have all noted, a roll submitted to the Exchequer in November 1416 by Sir Robert Babthorp, Controller of the King's Household. This unique document, which has unfortunately been lost, apparently contained 'part of the names of the men who were with the King at the battle of Agincourt'.⁹²⁸ Although it is not known precisely when this document was created, it probably served, as Curry has suggested, as the 'master list' of those who were at the

⁹²⁷ Curry, *Sources*, pp.407-408.

⁹²⁸ *Ibid*, p.408.

battle and would have been consulted by Exchequer clerks as part of the post-campaign accounting procedure. This list would have been used in conjunction with the muster rolls, retinue rolls and sick lists to ensure captains received only the pay they, and their men, were entitled to.

Table 4.3: A Comparison of Sick List Data with the Muster Rolls, Post-Campaign Accounts and the 'Agincourt Roll'

	Clarence	Gloucester
On Sick Lists and Muster Roll	Knights: 1 Men-at Arms: 24 Archers: 47 Total: 72	Knights: 3 Men-at-Arms: 45 Archers: 142 Total: 190
On Sick Lists Only	Men-at-Arms: 5 Archers: 13 Unknown Rank: 24 Total: 42	Men-at-Arms: 6 Archers: 38 Total: 44
Total Retinue Size after Harfleur according to the Sick Lists	Knights: 10 Men-at-Arms: 201 Archers: 654 Total: 865	Duke: 1 Knights: 3 Men-at-Arms: 129 Archers: 384 Total: 517
Total Retinue Size after Harfleur according to Post Campaign Accounts	Knights: 6 Men-at-Arms: 151 Archers: 585 Total: 742	Duke: 1, Knights: 1 Men-at-Arms: 119 Archers: 353 Total: 474
Discrepancy between Sick Lists and Post-Campaign Accounts	Knights: 4 Men-at-Arms: 50 Archers: 69 Total: 123	Knights: 2 Men-at-Arms: 10 Archers: 31 Total: 43
Shipping	Total: 742	Knights: 1 Men-at-Arms: 125 Archers: 380 Total: 507
Agincourt Roll	NA	Men-at-arms: 142 Archers: 406 Total: 548

Yet, even though these documents were created to help ensure financial accuracy in the Crown's accounts, the information presented in them must still be approached with caution. In the case of Gloucester's retinue (it does not list Clarence's) there are a number of reasons to doubt the veracity of the information presented. First, Sir Thomas Morley is not noted even though, as has been demonstrated in chapter three, he remained after Harfleur and fought at Agincourt as the fates of all Gloucester's other knights can be accounted for. Second, a number of those present on the Agincourt roll are also present on the sick lists, for instance Sir Henry Husse. This raises the interesting question of whether inclusion on the sick lists necessarily indicates an individual returned to England.⁹²⁹ Third, Husse is actually detailed twice on the roll, first as a member of Gloucester's retinue, then later as a full retinue commander in his own right. This may indicate confusion on the part of the clerks who compiled the roll. It should also be remembered that Husse was also noted as a full captain on the sick lists. In fact, the order in which the men of Husse's company have been detailed on the Agincourt roll is striking. They are listed in an almost identical order to the names on the original muster roll, with only a few exceptions. Could it be that the original muster roll was consulted by Glover? Unfortunately no more of Gloucester's sub-companies are detailed on the Agincourt roll, so this issue cannot be further investigated in relation to Gloucester's retinue specifically. However, looking beyond the two ducal retinues considered here for a moment to other 1415 retinues noted on the Agincourt roll, a similar trend cannot be identified. The men of Sir Thomas Erpingham's retinue, for example, are in a different order from his original muster roll and retinue roll.⁹³⁰ This suggests that the original muster rolls were not used to inform the creation of the Agincourt roll. Likewise, although the order and spelling of the names of Clarence and Gloucester's men on the sick lists E101/44/30, no.1 and E101/50/26 are very close, they differ markedly from the original muster rolls. It would appear, therefore, the original muster rolls were not taken to Normandy, or at least if they were they were not used as a template by the clerks who compiled the sick lists.

The most significant problem with the Agincourt roll is that the original 1416 version is now lost. There is no way to verify the information detailed by Glover. On the original

⁹²⁹ Curry, *Agincourt*, p.129.

⁹³⁰ Curry, 'Sir Thomas Erpingham', pp.69-77.

document submitted to the Exchequer by Babthorp, the names of the archers were also listed with the men-at-arms.⁹³¹ The exclusion of the archers' names limits its usefulness to prosopographers. Yet, in attempting to ascertain the size of Gloucester's retinue at the battle and afterwards it has evidently been a valuable source. Although the roll was intended to form a 'master list' of those present at Agincourt, we are not able to take the figures it provides outright because of the issues discussed. In the absence of Babthorp's original we will continue to take the information presented in E358/6 as most accurate. Ultimately it was in the interest of all parties - the Crown, captains and soldiers - that the accounts relating to pay were accurate. For this reason we shall maintain the conclusion that for the second quarter Clarence's retinue comprised 742 soldiers, 6 knights, 151 men-at-arms and 585 archers, while Gloucester commanded 474 soldiers, 1 duke, 1 knight, 119 men-at-arms and 353 archers.

The retinues of Clarence and Gloucester both suffered significant rates of attrition. Drawing on the information in E358/6 it can be stated that, overall Gloucester's retinue suffered more heavily than Clarence's, possibly indicating that the fighting was fiercest and disease most prevalent in his sector of the army. It could also be very tentatively suggested that the higher level of military experience in Clarence's force is another possible explanation as to why his retinue suffered fewer casualties. Yet, as we have seen, both retinues undertook significant combative actions at the siege. In total, 238 of Clarence's original force had either returned to England sick, died in France, deserted, or been placed into Harfleur's garrison. Clarence himself was among those who returned to England. Along with the duke, seven (11%) of his sub-captains are noted on the sick lists and can be cautiously presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to have also returned to England. These were, Sir John Colville, Ralph Neville, John Sutton, Thomas Corbet, John St Alban, John Routh and John Botiller. When it is also considered that Sir John Dabridgecourt and Sir Edward Burnell had died at the siege, at least nine of Clarence's sub-retinues were leaderless after the fall of Harfleur, ten (16%) including the duke's personal company. Considering that 123 men are unaccounted for, it is highly likely that other sub-retinues had also lost their leaders.

⁹³¹ Curry, *Sources*, p.408.

Table 4.4: Comparison of Attrition Rates

Rank	Clarence			Gloucester		
	Number before and after Harfleur		Attrition Rate	Number before and after Harfleur		Attrition Rate
	Before	After		Before	After	
Duke	1	0	100%	1	1	0
Earls	1	0	100%	0	0	NA
Knights (Inc. Bannerets)	11	6	45%	6	1	83%
Esquires	228	151	34%	180	120	33%
Archers	738	585	21%	564	353	37%
Overall	980	742	24%	751	474	37%

Mirroring the overall attrition rates, comparatively more of Gloucester's sub-retinues were leaderless after the siege. In total, 14 (27%) of his sub-captains were no longer with him after the siege. This, as we have seen, included all the knights apart from Sir Thomas Morley. It also included John de Veer, William Trussell, John Tyrell, Thomas Deschalers, John Giffard, Edward Haughton, Robert Neumarche, Walter Beauchamp and William Wroth. Indeed, in some cases whole sub-retinues from Gloucester's force had been decimated, such as that commanded by John Giffard. The impact of the siege on the ducal retinues raises important questions; what was the fate of the leaderless sub-retinues and what impact did these leadership changes have on the stability and cohesion of the overall retinue? In the case of their leadership, the original muster roll casts light on who would have taken command after the death or departure of the captain. Clarence's muster roll, like all muster rolls, lists the men in hierarchical order. Taking Sir John Dabridgecourt's sub-retinue as an example, after Sir John is listed another John Dabridgecourt. This John was the nephew of Sir John, so following the death of his uncle the younger John most likely took command. In the other leaderless sub-retinues the most senior remaining member must have similarly inherited the command.

The loss of so many sub-captains from both the ducal retinues, and Clarence himself from his force, would undoubtedly have negatively impacted on the stability of the retinues. Moreover, the functioning of the retinue, which as we saw earlier the sub-captains played a major part in ensuring was smooth, must have been negatively affected. The sub-captains played a key role in ensuring discipline and order in the retinues. Yet, it must also be remembered that this breakdown of internal cohesion must have been negated to a major extent by the fact that those soldiers who remained after the siege were bound much more tightly to one another, and in the case of Gloucester's retinue to their commander, through their collective experience of the siege. They had dug trenches alongside each other, constructed siege towers, assaulted Harfleur's walls together and withstood determined French counterattacks. Although bloodied, understrength and with a dearth of sub-captains, both the ducal retinues were able to continue to function for the remainder of the campaign and prevail at Agincourt.

The Dynamics of Recruitment

During the 'long' fourteenth-century, English armies and the military community changed significantly, as was detailed, with reference to Ayton's agencies of change, in the introduction to this work. Much of the existing historiography has focused on the period before and after the year 1369. For good reasons this period has attracted such attention. As we have seen, it was undoubtedly when tectonic changes occurred and the 'dynamics of recruitment' altered. Ayton's 'dynamics' model has allowed us to conceptualise the 'circumstances and forces that ... contributed to, accompanied or were generated by the recruitment of armies' in the fourteenth-century. However, moving into the fifteenth century, the model has not before been specifically applied. This is surely partly because of the particular lack of nominal information regarding the military community in the years 1390-1415 (especially 1399-1415) which has been explained. The campaign of 1415, however, as should have become clear by now, is, by comparison, very well documented. Consequently, it has been possible to undertake detailed case studies here which situate themselves firmly alongside the earlier works of Curry and Baker. Collectively, five of the leading retinues of the 1415 campaign have now been thoroughly investigated (Clarence, Gloucester, York, Mowbray and Erpingham), plus other smaller forces have been studied by

Curry.⁹³² In light of all these studies we have a fairly representative view of the English army in 1415, although now, of course, research on the smaller companies would be a welcome advance. Taking these existing studies together, we have a good image of the English military community and the 'dynamics of recruitment' at work in 1415. As a result, the 'dynamics of recruitment' model can be tested in regards to the 1415 campaign, and brought into the fifteenth-century.

The broad case study approach adopted in this project has allowed us to trace careers forwards from 1415 with precision and, although to a somewhat lesser extent because of the sources, trace them back into the late fourteenth and early fifteenth-centuries as well. To explore the implications these studies have, along with Curry and Baker's, for the 'dynamics of recruitment' model let us begin with the military service statistics. Taking an overall view, of Clarence's 61 sub-captains, 25 (41%) had military experience, 15 (26%) of them had served under him directly, mostly in 1412. On the other hand, of Gloucester's 51 sub-captains, only 10 (20%) had previous military service and none, of course, had served under him before.

In addition to these ties based on previous military service, other ties bound Clarence's retinue together, particularly among the members of his high-command network. Simpkin demonstrated that the stability of the high-command networks of English retinues improved significantly during the reigns of Edward I and II, while Ayton has shown that the retinues at Crécy had similarly stable command networks.⁹³³ Likewise, Bell has shown such cohesive networks in Arundel's forces from 1387 and 1388.⁹³⁴ The stability of Clarence's 1415 high-command network shows a continuation of this trend into the fifteenth-century. The experienced soldiers, administrators and negotiators who made up his network brought considerable competence to Clarence's high-command. They would have provided a 'nucleus around which less stable elements could collect'.⁹³⁵ One can imagine these men providing knowledge and encouragement to more inexperienced members of the retinue, while also ensuring that their own companies were organised and effective. By recruiting

⁹³² See, for example, the force of the royal household: Curry, *Agincourt*, pp.69-82.

⁹³³ Simpkin, *The English Aristocracy at War*, pp.39-67; Ayton, 'The English Army at Crécy', pp.205-224.

⁹³⁴ Bell, *War and the Soldier*, pp.97-101.

⁹³⁵ Lewis, 'The Organisation of Indenture Retinues', pp.33-34.

such men in 1415, Clarence ensured his high-command was stable and cohesive, similar to the retinues of the fourteenth-century.

In the case of Gloucester's retinue the situation was clearly very different. He appears to have been unable to recruit many military veterans, with the notable exceptions of Sir Thomas Clinton and Sir Nicholas Haute. Similarly, we have been unable to identify any stable core of sub-captains. There was no nucleus to provide stability. The four principal sub-captains, with the exception of Sir William Beauchamp, brought none of the competencies to Gloucester's retinue that Clarence's principal captains did to his. Resultantly, when comparing the high-command networks of each retinue we are left with one clear conclusion, Clarence's was more stable and cohesive than Gloucester's. It was far superior in terms of the experience of its members, both with regards to previous military service and career experiences.

These observations impact on our understanding of the 'dynamics of recruitment' in the early fifteenth-century. On the one hand, in Clarence's case we can see a continuation of high-level stability, while in Gloucester's case we cannot. Opening our lens more broadly, it seems that, with reference to Clarence's retinue, the figure of 26% with previous military experience is actually quite high, especially in light of the lacuna of nominal military sources. Similarly, as mentioned earlier, that as many as 10 of his 1415 sub-captains can be shown to have accompanied him in 1412 suggests that a level of loyalty to him existed. It is worth remembering that the 1412 campaign was a great success, so was undoubtedly a motivational factor in ensuring men re-served with him. Secondly, in regards to the recruitment market (pool of potential manpower), there were clearly militarily experienced individuals within it who may have been actively seeking military service, men such as Sir William Bowes and Sir John Pudsey. This was the case irrespective of the fact that the forces of supply and demand would have shrunk the military community in the period 1390-1415. Consequently, by adopting this broad view, it appears that the image we are seeing in regards to the 'dynamics of recruitment' in the early fifteenth-century is one of continuity and not of change. A note of caution, however, must be given. Drawing parallels between those who undertook military service in the middle of the fourteenth-century and the early fifteenth is problematic because, as Maurice Keen has written in regards to the testimonies

given in the *Grey v. Hasting* and *Scrope v. Grosvenor* controversies, the campaigns of the late fourteenth-century and the early fifteenth were ‘rather small beer’ and ‘the quality of English military experience in the two periods [middle and late fourteenth-century] was, clearly, rather different’.⁹³⁶ These observations lead Keen to consider whether the changed social composition of armies during the Lancastrian conquests and occupation of Normandy found their genesis in the late decades of the fourteenth-century. While this is most likely an adroit observation, it also seems that, considering the previous military service of Clarence and Gloucester’s sub-captains in 1415, in order to recruit these men a developed recruitment network was required. Clarence had built such a network as a result of having previously commanded large expeditions, particularly his 1412 campaign, while Gloucester had not. This underscores the importance of previous military service in the recruitment of military professionals in 1415, even for premier captains.⁹³⁷

Looking at the sub-companies examined in Clarence’s retinue, more observations about the ‘dynamics of recruitment’ and the military community can be made. It has become clear that the four East Anglian sub-retinues investigated show little signs of stability. Low-military re-service rates, coupled with a silence on the part of the manorial accounts, suggests that the world of the sub-retinues was fluid. This fluidity would have impacted negatively on the stability and cohesion of the sub-retinue companies as the men appear to have had no discernible ties to either their captain, or to each other. It must also be mentioned here that during the fourteenth-century London became a major recruiting hub, as Minihan and Konieczny have shown.⁹³⁸ This raises the possibility that the sub-captains simply recruited people in the city with whom they had no existing ties. This would go some way to explaining why nothing much has been learned about these sub-retinues in the case studies in this project. Sir John Dabridgecourt’s sub-retinue, on the other hand, presents an alternative picture. Here we have discovered a sub-retinue bound by ties of military service, shared geographic heritage and family. It is possible to state that Dabridgecourt’s sub-retinue was a comparatively stable company, akin to Sir Thomas

⁹³⁶ M. Keen, ‘English military experience and the Court of Chivalry: The Case of Grey v. Hastings’, *Guerre et société en France, en Angleterre et en Bourgogne, xive – xve siècle*, ed. P. Contamine, et al (Lille, 1991), pp.123-142 (pp.136, 144).

⁹³⁷ See also: Baker, ‘To Agincourt and Beyond!’, pp.42-47

⁹³⁸ Minihan, ‘Ightham Mote’, pp.176-177; Konieczny, ‘London’s War Effort’, pp.243-261.

Ughtred's.⁹³⁹ These observations highlight that even though the forces of supply and demand must have resulted in a smaller military community in the early fifteenth-century, nonetheless many men were still willing to undertake military service in 1415. This may in part be attributed to the fact that the King was leading the campaign in person, but also highlights that the military community was larger than the surviving nominal data allows us to see. This large size, coupled with the apparent extinction of retinue stability in some sub-retinues, clearly suggests that the 'dynamics of recruitment' model can be applied to the period immediately before 1415. The agencies of change which altered the military community so much in the fourteenth-century evidently continued to have an effect in the fifteenth.

This is clearly witnessed when the careers of Clarence and Gloucester's men after 1415 are considered. Looking forward to the Lancastrian conquest and occupation of Normandy, the lives of Clarence and Gloucester's men can roughly be assigned to one of three categories. For some, such as Sir Nicholas Burdet and William Bukton, military service became their main occupation and they undertook continuous or highly frequent military service, and as such may be considered military professionals. Others, such as Maurice Bruyn and Henry Noon, sporadically performed military service alongside other careers, for example in shrieval administration or in a household. Finally, for some, the 1415 campaign is their only recorded participation in warfare, on account of retirement, developing a career completely separate from the military sphere, or disappearance from the records altogether.

Looking at the statistics, it is possible to compare the levels of military re-service the dukes were able to obtain from their sub-captains after the 1415 campaign. Although a comparison between the dukes' 1417 retinues cannot be made, because Clarence's muster roll has not survived, an interesting comparison can nonetheless be conducted on a more broad level. As we calculated, in total, 31 (65%) of Gloucester's 48 surviving sub-captains from 1415 are known to have undertaken further military service, including in 1417 when 18 returned to his banner. This is significantly higher than the 26 (45%) of Clarence's surviving 58 retinue sub-captains who can be identified to have served again. Of Gloucester's 31 sub-

⁹³⁹ Ayton, 'Sir Thomas Ughtred', pp.107-132

captains who served again, a very high proportion, 22 (67%), served directly under him. However, in the majority of cases, their re-service under Gloucester was in 1417 only. As table 3.5 showed, Gloucester did not succeed in obtaining the repeat service of many of his 1415 sub-captains long after the 1417 campaign, although many continued to undertake military activity. On the other hand, while fewer of Clarence's sub-captains re-served, those that did were more loyal to him and returned to his banner more frequently. Of those 26 who went on to serve again, 12 (46%) served under the duke directly, while eight (31%) served more than once under him.

These figures illuminate the fact that directly after the 1415 campaign both the dukes, although more so Gloucester, were able to obtain the repeat service of some of their sub-captains. This highlights that a degree of loyalty to the dukes did exist. Such repeat service would have served to create stability in their forces. Indeed, as our study of Clarence's retinue showed, men who had served with Clarence before were given important roles during the conquest, such as Ralph Cromwell and Walter Interbergh.⁹⁴⁰ However, it is also clear that in most cases this loyalty disappeared rapidly. The increased tempo with which English armies and reinforcements were sent abroad during the Lancastrian conquest and occupation of Normandy, and its *pays de conquête*, increased the fluidity of the military recruitment market. The demand for military service ensured that the military community expanded to meet this need. Within this changed recruitment environment there was ample opportunity for men to create careers as professional, careerist, soldiers. Unlike the early fourteenth-century, this increased military mobilisation appears to have led not to the (re)development of retinue stability, but to increasing instability. Conversely, it could be that the changed nature of warfare, to one where garrisons featured heavily, did, in fact, lead to greater stability, as the work of Curry has suggested.⁹⁴¹ Certainly a wider consideration of the 'dynamics of recruitment' and the issue of stability is required in this context.

The data available for the retinues of Clarence and Gloucester suggest, however, that even though men continued to undertake military service, for many the days of loyalty

⁹⁴⁰ *Rotuli Normanniae*, ed. Hardy, pp.195, 239, 249, 265-266, 316-317.

⁹⁴¹ A. Curry, 'The garrison establishment in Lancastrian Normandy in 1436 according to surviving lists in Bibliothèque Nationale de France manuscrit français 25773' *Military Communities Late Medieval England: Essays in Honour of Andrew Ayton*, eds. G. P. Baker, C. L. Lambert, & D. Simpkin (Woodbridge, 2017), pp.237-270.

serving one captain from campaign-to-campaign were truly gone. During the conquest and occupation there was a plethora of retinue commanders for sub-captains to indent with, and ample opportunity for members of the rank-and-file to serve under different captains or sub-captains. Add into this the changed nature of warfare, to one of siege and long-term garrison, and it is clear to see that the 'dynamics of recruitment' and military service were altered significantly. As the Medieval Soldier Team have observed, during the occupation 'Increasingly, only those willing to commit themselves to the soldiering life on a long-term basis were serving in Normandy'.⁹⁴² While this is probably true, and the 'dynamics of recruitment' were altered, the model can nonetheless still be applied to the early fifteenth-century, and, indeed, can help us to understand the changes which continued to occur to English armies and the military community.

The results from these case studies, alongside the existing works of Curry and Baker, highlight that careerism rapidly re-emerged with the increase in military service opportunities and that there appears to have been plenty of men, some of whom can be known to have had previous military experience, willing to undertake military service in 1415 and beyond. At a retinue and sub-retinue level, there appears, at least in the case of Clarence's retinue, to have been a good degree of high and medium level stability, but very little cohesion and regularity among the personnel of the sub-companies. These conclusions confirm the observations made by Ayton that even in the wake of the Black Death there was, 'a very large pool of potential recruits' ready and willing to undertake military service.⁹⁴³ This appetite for military service had in part been stoked by the success of Clarence's 1412 campaign. As Milner has written, those who served on the campaign 'had tasted the scent of victory' and had profited handsomely from it.⁹⁴⁴ Moreover, it was 'an indication to the very many who participated in the campaign that foreign war could be advantageous'. The existence of a stable high-command network in Clarence's 1415 retinue, which comprised many veteran knights, also indicates that significantly beyond 1389, 'the nobility and gentry remained quite as committed to performing an active military role as they had been in the earlier century' and that 'a good deal of this service [was] delivered, as

⁹⁴² *Soldier in Later Medieval England*, p.129. On the issue of retinue stability in the 1440s see the fascinating work of Anne Marshall on York's 1441 force and Somerset's 1443 campaign: A.E. Marshall, 'The Role of English War Captains in England and Normandy, 1436-1461', M.A. thesis (University of Wales, 1975).

⁹⁴³ Ayton, 'Military Careerist', pp.20-21

⁹⁴⁴ Milner, 'English Enterprise', p.94.

before, through traditional recruiting networks'.⁹⁴⁵ To build on these case studies a more full study of the 'dynamics of recruitment' in the context of the Lancastrian conquest and occupation of Normandy is needed.

⁹⁴⁵ Ayton, 'Military Careerist', pp.21-22.

Conclusion



We began this project with the aim of learning about the men who served under the dukes of Clarence and Gloucester in 1415. In the preceding chapters we have met many of these individuals, and learned about their military service histories, their careers outside the sphere of military adventure, plus where they came from, their families and familial heritage. In doing this, we have witnessed the system of recruitment by indenture at work in 1415. The dukes of Clarence and Gloucester recruited their retinues in a similar fashion. They called on their immediate households, men from the locality where they personally resided and/or where they held land. They also sought and welcomed the service of men who had either served them personally before, or the Lancastrian regime more generally. Furthermore, in order to fulfil the terms of their contracts they were forced to cast their recruitment nets wide and engage with sub-captains with whom they had no existing relationships. The retinues the dukes mustered at Southampton were statistically similar to each other, for example their personal companies both comprised about 15% of the overall retinues' manpower. The study of the men who served under Clarence and Gloucester in 1415 has only been possible because of the survival of so many nominal records, in particular their complete surviving muster rolls.

Their muster rolls have provided the bed-rock of names on which these case studies have been built. They have facilitated a statistical analysis of the dukes' retinues, plus, when used in concert with all the available administrative sources, such as the sick lists and the post-campaign account information contained in E358/6, they have allowed us to track the changing composition of the two retinues and assess the impact that the campaign had on each, in particular in terms of attrition rates. It must be emphasised that, as a result of the varied information contained within the surviving sources, plus information they do not detail, knowing exactly what happened to a retinue during the campaign is challenging. It is not known for certain, for example, where Clarence's retinue fought at Agincourt, or why Gloucester paid for more men than he received pay for to be shipped back to England after the battle.

As chapter one has shown, while ‘essentially lists of names’, the muster rolls are sophisticated documents, which were essential to the administration of the 1415 army, and indeed all expeditionary armies post-1369. Through a thorough study of all the surviving muster rolls associated with the 1415 army, this project has been able to demonstrate the complexities of the mustering process, and highlight that there was virtually no standardisation. The variety of hands present on the rolls, plus the clear differences in layout and format, terminology and indenting practice highlights that a great number of clerks were involved in compiling the rolls which we see today. Indeed, the lack of uniformity between the rolls means that the exact mechanics by which the muster was undertaken and the rolls compiled is still not known with certainty. However, the investigation of the 1415 muster rolls conducted here has at least increased our understanding of the rolls, and has raised interesting questions worthy of further consideration. Could it be, for instance, that in the case of large retinues household clerks wrote the names, or in the case of smaller retinues the captains themselves, on the membranes we see today, while the royally-appointed Exchequer clerks oversaw the process?

While the muster rolls have been of paramount importance to this project, a great number of additional nominal sources have also been utilised in order to reconstruct the lives of those who served under Clarence and Gloucester. Yet, the limitation of these nominal sources, and the inherent pitfalls of undertaking prosopographical research and employing nominal record linkage in the environment of the fourteenth and fifteenth-centuries, needs to be stressed once more. Throughout this project the majority of our focus has been directed towards the sub-captains, and in the case of the investigation into the sub-retinues towards the men-at-arms of these companies. That men-at-arms have received much of our focus rather than the archers is not by design, but rather is as a result of the fact that a thorough search of the surviving records has revealed very little about the archers. The surviving sources have facilitated the reconstruction of the lives of many men-at-arms, but very few archers. In exploring some of Clarence’s sub-retinues from East Anglia, a number of weeks were spent searching regional archives in an attempt to learn about the men of these companies, both the men-at-arms and the archers. Yet, as presented in chapter two, almost nothing about the archers was learned. Positive identifications were

not possible, primarily because of the commonality of names, and the sporadic survival rate of relevant nominal documents, such as manorial rolls. In his study of York's retinue, Baker appears very fortunate to have been able to match so many of the duke's archers to his personal estates.

That similar identifications regarding the archers of the sub-retinues considered here has not been possible must not be viewed as a failure. Rather, it must be viewed as a conclusion in itself, and serve as an example of the difficulties in undertaking this kind of research. The surviving records have been searched, but they have not yielded the information it was hoped they would. Two explanations may be given. First, those men who served under these East Anglian sub-captains in 1415 had no relationship with their captains, and/or were not from East Anglia at all. Alternatively, the records to demonstrate their relationships simply have not survived, if indeed they ever existed. Whichever explanation is correct, the conclusion remains the same. The archers of the sub-retinues investigated in this project, and indeed most of the men-at-arms of these companies as well, cannot be shown to have had pre-existing relationships with their captains. This may suggest that the recruitment marked in East Anglia was particularly fluid, and that companies from this area were particularly unstable, or that captain recruited men from London. Of course, this suggestion can only be made tentatively because of the limitations of the sources described which inhibit us from creating a universal picture of the military community in East Anglia.

Throughout this project, particular focus has been given to ascertaining the levels of stability in Clarence and Gloucester's retinues, as well as assessing what their retinues tell us about the changing 'dynamics of recruitment'. This has provided a theoretical framework for the reconstruction of the lives of those who served under the dukes. It has also meant that a broad view has been taken when creating these biographies, which, when viewed 'collectively and *en masse*', have allowed us to look backwards from 1415, and forwards into the Lancastrian conquest and occupation of Normandy. This has demonstrated that even though the military community had changed a lot by the time of the 1415 campaign, it was nonetheless large, with military veterans in it and many people were willing to undertake military service. Indeed, in regards to re-service after 1415 this study supports the findings

of Curry and Cleverly in their study of the 1417 army.⁹⁴⁶ As a result of these case studies, as well as the earlier work of Curry and Baker, Ayton's 'dynamics of recruitment' model has been brought firmly into the fifteenth-century. The model can certainly be applied to the fifteenth-century. It allows us to conceptualise the forces behind the continuing changes which armies and the military community underwent, for instance in regard to careerism. However, in closing it is important to state that a more full study of the impact the agencies of change had on armies and the military community in the fifteenth-century is much needed.

When Henry's army set sail from Southampton on Sunday 11 August, it was the largest expeditionary army to leave England since 1359. Commanded by the King himself, it was a unique force. It was comprised of a great number of individual retainers, plus it was administered in an unusual fashion with the creation of special issue rolls and the pledging of precious items as collateral for wages. Owing to the survival of so many nominal military sources, in particular the muster rolls, Curry observed that they held 'tremendous potential for the detailed study of personnel'. Alongside her work and that of Baker, it is hoped that the case studies at the heart of this project have demonstrated and acted on some of this potential. Of course, there is potential for more. In particular there is a need for more retinue-specific case studies, especially focused on the smaller companies, to provide a more representative view of the whole army, plus to aid us in understanding the armies and the military community of the early fifteenth-century.⁹⁴⁷ Nonetheless, as the historiography currently stands, we probably know more about the men of the 1415 campaign than any other military expeditions of the later Middle Ages.

With the potential for further research, and the wealth of archival documentation, much more will surely be written about the momentous 1415 campaign. Debates will continue to take place around the importance of the campaign to Henry's political position, the economy of England and the impact it had on the military community. What is undeniable, however, is that for the men who participated on the 1415 campaign it was a

⁹⁴⁶ This information is based on the research undertaken by Prof. Anne Curry and David Cleverly, which David presented in a paper at the 2017 *Medieval Soldier Study Day* at the University of Southampton. I am grateful to Prof. Curry and him for allowing me to consult their research and mention it here.

⁹⁴⁷ This is not to suggest, of course, that such studies have not been conducted, as they certainly have by the Medieval Soldier Team and A. Marshall. Rather, it is to highlight that more specific focus on the 'dynamics of recruitment' the impact the conquest had on this would be beneficial.

significant moment in their lives. During the campaign strong bonds of collective experience would have been formed. To return to Shakespeare, the campaign, from the siege of Harfleur to the Battle of Agincourt itself, forged those who participated in it into a 'band of brothers'. All of those who served in 1415 would have forever been bound to each other through their collective experience of the campaign. They would have had tall tales to tell to their loved ones, friends, associates, or anyone willing to listen, on their return to English shores.

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