UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON

FACULTY OF HISTORY

SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES

The Military Organisation of Southampton in the Late Medieval Period, 1300-1500

by

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Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

June 2009
ABSTRACT

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By Randall Porter Moffett

Throughout the late medieval period the town and port of Southampton fulfilled many functions as a centre of trade, society, and military organisation, although the latter is often overlooked. The town has many unexplored aspects that indicate its military organisation. The first aspect is the fortifications the town constructed for their protection. The second is the troops raised to fulfil the town’s military activities at home and away. Third, the structured schemes designed for town defence by the civic leadership and the king. The military equipment employed in the town defence and by the townsmen is a fourth point of military preparations. These themes all indicate a strong military function that Southampton played in the kingdom’s wars, both domestic and foreign.
# List of Contents

Author’s Declaration ......................................................... 4  
Acknowledgements ........................................................... 5  
Source Abbreviation ....................................................... 6  
Introduction ................................................................. 7  
Chapter One ................................................................. 26  
Chapter Two ................................................................. 69  
Chapter Three ............................................................ 113  
Chapter Four ............................................................... 155  
Conclusion ................................................................. 196  
Figures .................................................................. 209  
Appendixes
  Chapter One Appendix ................................................. 225  
  Chapter Two Appendix ............................................... 227  
  Chapter Three Appendix ......................................... 243  
  Chapter Four Appendix ........................................... 256  
Bibliography ............................................................... 264
DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP

I, Randall P. Moffett, declare that the thesis entitled The Military Organisation of Southampton in the Late Medieval Period, 1300-1500 and the work presented in the thesis are both my own, and have been generated by me as the result of my own original research. I confirm that:

- this work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research degree at this University;
- where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or any other qualification at this University or any other institution, this has been clearly stated;
- where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly attributed;
- where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given. With the exception of such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work;
- I have acknowledged all main sources of help;
- where the thesis is based on work done by myself jointly with others, I have made clear exactly what was done by others and what I have contributed myself;
- none of this work has been published before submission.

Signed: ........................................................................................................

Date: 9 May 2009
Acknowledgements

After these last years of research, writing and revision for this PhD Thesis I think one would need make a fairly lengthy list of acknowledgements to do proper credit to all those who have had a part in this work. The students, staff, and faculty of the University of Southampton for all their varied assistance, both directly and indirectly related to my thesis. Every friend I have or member of my family has probably played some part in the development of this thesis. From simply listening to me formulate my information into ideas to nearly constant assistance with revision with the many changes I have made over the years, I have had a great amount of help in this venture and I owe everyone a heartfelt thank you.

Several people have given a great amount of time and help to me in this project. Eddie Stevens, Southampton’s ‘Town Gunner’, for allowing me to spend inordinate amounts of time at God’s House Tower searching for hints on the ins and outs of the building and sharing my enthusiasm regarding Southampton’s martial history. A-Space Art Gallery for their kindness in tolerating my often short notice intrusions at Bargate to get familiar with the structure. Dr. Andy Russel, Head of Southampton City Council’s Archaeology Unit, has spent much time ranging over the medieval monuments of Southampton and in interpreting them. My Father-in-law, Robert Wilson for his revision and comments on nearly every draft of this thesis since I started writing it. Adam Chapman, a fellow PhD student, for his time in research and discussing my thesis. My two advisors, Professor Anne Curry and Professor Matthew Johnson, for their endless patience and assistance in making this thesis what it is and pushing me to constantly improve it.

Last I need to thank my two children, William and Elanor and my wife, Nicole. My children will probably not remember this time as William was born two weeks after I started and Elanor just weeks before I finished it but they both brought a bit more happiness and joy into my days of research, writing and revision. This would be severely lacking if I did not thank Nicole for the constant support and help she has offered through this degree; first in following me half way around the world as newlyweds and then for pushing me to continue on the days that I wanted to sit down. I would never have been able to do this degree without her help.
### Sources Abbreviations

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<th>Archives</th>
<th>TNA</th>
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<td>The Black Books of Southampton</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Books of Remembrance of Southampton</td>
<td>BRS</td>
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<tr>
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<td>BrBS</td>
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<td>The Oak Books of Southampton</td>
<td>OBS</td>
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<td>The Portage Books of Southampton</td>
<td>PBS</td>
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<td>The Steward’s Books of Southampton</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>The Calendar of Patent Rolls</td>
<td>CPR</td>
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Introduction

Research Question

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the military organisation of the town of Southampton during the late medieval period, 1300-1500. This research will explore this theme by focusing on several key questions. The first and most fundamental is this: what characterizes military organisation? This question will be investigated by studying several important martial functions Southampton fulfilled. The selected features studied are: town fortifications, manpower raised for conflict, schemes of defence and the military equipment owned by those present in the town. Each one of these themes indicates how Southampton was involved in the preparation, provision and execution of conflict, which demonstrates its military organisation. While there certainly are more aspects that could have been explored for this purpose, from Southampton’s importance in financing war to the town’s sponsorship of piracy to wage war, these four previously stated categories form a strong framework of evidence for the town as a military organisation. While these other possible themes related to Southampton’s military organisation are important, they will not be examined. If the townsmen of Southampton fulfilled these obligations and responsibilities this would be a strong indicator of an effective military organisation.

Further specific questions remain for the general military organisation of Southampton that need be examined. Did the town fulfil these varied military responsibilities adequately? If they did, to what extent was it done? How did these military obligations change over time? What influenced these developments in the town’s military activity? Were these activities usually in preparation for conflict or as a result of one? Perhaps even more pertinent is how important was Southampton to the king, the region and locality and how the town fit into a larger context of military organisations. How can the study of Southampton’s military organisation be valuable in our understanding of larger historical context? All of these questions pose possibilities to examine the ways in which Southampton acted as a military organisation.

Each individual aspect being examined of Southampton’s military organisation in this thesis carries with it other inquiries that require scrutiny. The study of the fortifications of the town has several. Did the town of Southampton have an organised or haphazard building program? Did the town maintain up-to-date developments in military engineering
for their defences? How were these fortifications funded? Did contemporary events/threats influence the phases of these defences? How is the construction and maintenance of fortifications an indicator of the town's military organisation? The chapter on fortifications will examine these and the overlaying general questions above to prove if Southampton's management of fortifications demonstrated it as a military organisation or not.

I will review the manpower employed by Southampton for evidence of military organisation. Consideration of the manpower provided by the town leads to other research questions. How was Southampton's manpower employed, at home or abroad? What roles did townsmen play in fulfilment of these military obligations? Who was it that employed those men raised in Southampton for conflict? How frequently was Southampton required to provide men? Was the use of townsmen in conflict usually in preparation or response to a threat? How was Southampton's provision of men for war a marker of its military organisation? As with the chapter on fortifications, that of manpower will look at Southampton's provision of men in respect to both these more specific as well as broader questions to see how it was structured to fulfil these military obligations.

The employment of schemes of defence will be attended to in the third chapter. The way in which Southampton organised for conflict, participated in espionage for information and fit into a wider defence structure in the kingdom begs its own particular questions. How did these defensive schemes develop in Southampton? Were these schemes created in response to or in preparation for dangers posed to the town? How did the town fit into a larger context of defence in the locality, region and kingdom? What role did Southampton play in the acquisition of military information? How was this information employed by the town for their protection and that of others? How did outside forces, such as the king, towns and others fit into Southampton's defence scheme? How were these defence schemes organised and executed? In what ways do the town's own defence schemes, those of others and their ability to gather and employ military information illustrate their military capabilities as an organisation? These queries regarding various defensive structures employed, both in and outside Southampton, can provide significant evidence of the town as a military organisation.

In the last chapter of this thesis I will address the military equipment possessed by those in Southampton, an feature that influences all other military aspects. As with all four themes discussed, equipment, arms, armour and artillery present their own questions. How was the town equipped with military equipment such as armour, arms, artillery and other
martial equipment? Did the town adopt new military technology to fulfil their military obligations? Was this equipment employed and how? The same must be asked for the individual townspeople who also played a role in the town's military obligations, at home and abroad. How were they equipped for conflict? How well armed were townspeople compared to the average soldier of the period? As the king had a castle that made up a vital part of the town's defence, how were this fortification and the garrison there armed and equipped? How did the ownership of martial gear, arms, armour and artillery by the town government, individual townspeople, and royal garrison in the town denote the town's ability as a military organisation? Answering these questions is important in understanding how the town was prepared for conflict as well as how the town could fulfil its varied military obligations.

Each of these queries and the broader opening questions stated will be explored to determine whether, and how effectively, Southampton was able to act as a military organisation. All of these aspects of town military responsibilities have their own individual as well as a more general importance to the military capabilities of the town. For example, the walls of the town are of limited use if undefended by men. Conversely, the men would be of limited use without walls and weapons for defence and so on. Each element of town military obligation complements the other and viewed collectively presents how Southampton was or was not a military organisation.

**Importance of Southampton**

The importance of Southampton as a military organisation has many facets. On a large scale Southampton was part of a larger network of defence systems locally, regionally and in the realm. Southampton's location in particular, nearly at the middle of the southern coast of England, made its placement of vital importance to these geographic groups and their security. The town also provided men, equipment and ships abroad for the king's many wars, further increasing the town's importance. On a smaller scale Southampton's military organisation was important to itself. The town was its own primary guardian and this required planning and administration to ensure success. These military duties complemented other roles the town had, socially, culturally, economically and otherwise, showing just how versatile the town leadership was. These military activities also

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1 See Figures One, Two and Three.
demonstrate the place the individual townsman had in a larger network of obligations and duties. Just as towns played a variety of roles, so to did their inhabitants.

While some of these issues have been addressed separately in the past, the combined focus of this research will give a more complete understanding of Southampton’s military organisation. In fact medieval towns and cities in general have not received attention in regard to their military organisations in any great detail. The vast majority of research on town military structure including that of Southampton has been specific to one or a few limited aspects. Understanding the military organisation of the town is vitally important to understanding the other aspects of town structure and history which alone cannot give a clear idea as to the many capacities the town fulfilled nor the importance it held in them.

One reason for this disparity is perhaps that the focus of most of this research is usually on either the medieval military or medieval urban topics. Few have combined these two themes in great detail. A brief description of scholars and works on peripherally related topics to Southampton’s military organisation can help to clarify this discrepancy in study on urban military organisation.

Few scholars have done as much on medieval Southampton as Colin Platt in furthering it’s history. Utilizing both history and archaeology, Platt has written a number of works that bring to light various aspects of medieval Southampton. The most detailed account of Southampton’s military functions to date was written by Platt in his book *Medieval Southampton*. Though the book is not exclusively focused on the military organisation of the town, Platt often indicates factors of importance to it: the town fortifications, the ordnance and other equipment the town employed, military schemes organised for defence, and the recruitment of men and ships from Southampton. Platt makes a strong case for the town as a military body over a number of chapters and covers briefly many of the features that are key points for this thesis on the military organisation of Southampton.

Another of Platt’s works co-edited with Richard Coleman-Smith is the two volumes of *Excavations in Medieval Southampton 1953-1969*. These books account the various excavations in Southampton after the devastation cause by heavy bombing in World War II.

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and in advance of equally destructive civil redevelopment. From an archaeological aspect, it highlights the town’s military organisation through the fortifications the townsmen built to the weapons and armour they employed. While many archaeological works on the town focus on one or two specific structures in relation to a particular subject, Piatt’s work covers all fortifications, giving a history of each of them both independently and as part of the whole town system of self-defence.

Some aspects of Southampton’s town military organisation have been discussed in the past by other scholars. In the introduction to *The Southampton Terrier of 1454*, L.A. Burgess gives a brief explanation of the town defences schemes. Most other scholars have written on specific aspects of medieval Southampton’s fortifications, namely the Arcade, Catch Cold Tower and God’s House Tower. This research had been limited by their exclusive focus on the structures’ ties to early firearms. While this research is vital to appreciating Southampton’s military organisation much still need be done to provide a more complete understanding of it.

The study of medieval town defences in general has been examined by several scholars. Barley wrote a chapter on the organisation and use of urban defences in *Town Defences of England and Wales after 1066*. Kenyon studied a number of urban fortifications in his book, *Medieval Fortifications*, including research on Southampton’s fortifications. Colin Platt also makes mention of urban fortifications in his previously mentioned books and *Medieval English Towns*.

Few works have focused on town military organisation in England. Peter Konieczny’s ‘London’s War Effort During the Early Years of the Reign of Edward III’ is

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7 J. Kenyon, *Medieval Fortifications* (Leicester: 1990)
unique in this. Konieczny develops features such as recruitment of soldiers, gathering of equipment for war, levying of sailors and other martial aspects to demonstrate the military organisation of London over a brief timeframe. His work has set a clear framework in examining urban military activity and organisation for future research.

Outside England few works have been done on urban military activity and organisation as well. Those that have cover varied locations and a wide time frame of medieval Europe. James Powers on Castile, Sergio Boffa on Brabant, and Albert Winkler with the Swiss have brought into view the importance that urban military activity held in their respective locations and eras. While primarily useful to this work in establishing what constitutes urban military organisation, in future research comparisons with these different groups and times with those in England could be valuable in determining the general importance of urban military activity in medieval Europe.

Several urban historians have done research that should be utilized for the study of medieval English towns' military organisations. Christian Liddy in War, Politics and Finance in: Late Medieval English Towns: Bristol, York and the Crown, 1350-1400 touches upon many functions of military organisation in Bristol and York. Though Liddy focuses on military activity generally, he examines how towns balanced economics, society and their involvement in war. Caroline Barron has written a number of works on the overall organisation of medieval London. Although primarily focused on social, economic, political and other functions she does on occasion discuss military activities of the city. At times she portrays the military aspect of London peripherally to the town structure. At one point Barron describes London's civic leadership as having a 'non-military ethos in regards to war.' Lorraine Attreed's works on York, The Relations Between the Royal Government

and the City of York, 1377-1490 and The Kings Towns: Identity and Survival in Late Medieval English Boroughs present further valuable information on urban military involvement. Her works as with Barron focus on many features of civic life though are somewhat dismissive of urban military activity, at one point stating 'the golden age of urban militias belong to a time and place other than that of late medieval England.' While this scholarship on urban history is imperative to any study of town military organisation, further work must be carried out to close the gap in our understanding of medieval towns and their involvement in warfare.

There is no shortage of research on military recruitment and armies in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in general. Clifford Rogers, Anne Curry, Maurice Keen, Malcolm Vale, Michael Jones, Adrian Bell, Matthew Bennett, Kelly DeVries, Christopher Allmand, Andrew Aytoun, Jim Bradbury, A. Brown, Philip Contamine, Keneth Fowler, Anthony Goodman, Bernard Guenee, H. Hewitt, N. Lewis, Michael Prestwich and others have written volumes on a variety of subjects related to late medieval warfare. Some mention

16 L. Attreed, The Relations Between the Royal Government and the City of York, 1377-1490 (York, 1979) and The Kings Towns: Identity and Survival in Late Medieval English Boroughs (New York, 2001).
17 Attreed, Kings Towns, p 181.
the contributions of civic bodies in the wars of the period, but these often are not the focus or related closely enough to the topic of urban military organisation to be involved in their works. Some historians have put forth the idea that civic militias or soldiers were of greatly limited use in warfare or were even insignificant. While in some cases this is true, it is overly general and ignores the vital place urban troops played as a part of war.

Looking at previous works related to Southampton’s military organisation it is clear that there is still much room for research to be done. While both military and urban activity and organisation have been explained by the valuable contributions of past scholars little has been done on urban military organisation, particularly in England. This research will attempt to fill a gap in our understanding in both medieval urban and military history, starting where this scholarship has ended.

The town of Southampton

Vital to understanding of Southampton’s military organisation is an appreciation of the medieval town, its location and general organisation. Susan Rose said of medieval Southampton, ‘Southampton’s natural advantages as a port have always underlain the town’s growth and its prosperity’. The town of Southampton is located almost exactly in the middle of the southern coast of England, between where the rivers Test and Itchen meet.

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first the Southampton Water and then the Solent. With a deep, well-protected harbour shielded by the Isle of Wight and a double tide daily allowing extra departures, the town of Southampton was ideally located for maritime activity. These features can in great part be seen as one of the reasons that the town of Southampton was able to become one of the leading ports of medieval England.

The town’s activity in great part depended on trade, but combined with the nearby resources, shipbuilding was important as well. Southampton particularly was an important trading post for the wool leaving the kingdom and the wine entering it. Southampton’s proximity to Continental Europe gave the town an advantage to merchants from England as well as other kingdoms who wished to avoid a lengthier journey. The trade that came in and out of Southampton made many of the townspeople of Southampton wealthy. This was reflected on the town itself, as Southampton was one of the earliest English towns to have most of its fortifications built of stone instead of earth and wood.

Civic Government

By the reign of Henry II Southampton was run by the town Guild. As time passed the town government grew numerically and in complexity but never fully separated from the guild. The most powerful position in the governance of Southampton was that of Mayor, first appearing in 1217. The guild and civic government maintained a longstanding dispute trying to govern the town independently. In the end, the resolution came when the head of the guild became the mayor. One right the mayor possessed that was central to the town military organisation was the authority to raise the posse comitatus, to array the townspeople to arms in fulfilment of their military necessities.

From the time that the mayor merged with the guild leader, as well as other guild positions with town offices, the lines between the town government and the guild became hard to draw. From then on the guild was the most powerful body in the town. Only

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21 See Figure One.
22 Ibid, p. 2.
26 Ibid, pp. viii-ix.
members of the town guild were able to elect their town officials, another indication of the
power the guild came to possess as well as to exclude those who were outside it.\textsuperscript{29}

The next most powerful member of the guild, the treasurer, was made the town
steward further resolving the issue of guild versus town government, but further entangling
them.\textsuperscript{30} The town Steward was also responsible for keeping of the town’s financial
accounts.\textsuperscript{31} Through this role as town financial representative he had dealings in all of the
town’s business and a measure of influence and control in them. As second in authority
behind the mayor, the town Steward also fulfilled a number of functions aside from
accounting in the town.\textsuperscript{32}

Below the offices of Mayor and Steward were a number of town officials fulfilling a
wide variety of duties. Directly below the Mayor and Steward were the town Aldermen.\textsuperscript{33}
These men were over five official wards and Portswood, a town suburb. Those inside the
walls had two aldermen each, the ward above Bargate three, and Portswood had one.\textsuperscript{34} The
Aldermen were to keep order, enforce town ordinances and protect and lead their wards in
conflict.\textsuperscript{35} Another office in the town was that of town bailiff and sergeants. Typically,
from records found in the Stewards’ Books, there appear to have been four town sergeants
at one given time.\textsuperscript{36} The bailiff and sergeants worked with the various Aldermen in
keeping the peace as well as other town business.\textsuperscript{37} Later as firearms played a more
important part in the town defence a new office was created, that of town gunner.\textsuperscript{38} As the
title implies he was charged with keeping the town guns and related equipment in good
condition and was to be able to employ them. After 1447 when Southampton became a
county they also gained the right to elect their own sheriff.\textsuperscript{39} This act freed the towns from
the jurisdiction and interference of the county Sheriff of Hampshire in most aspects.\textsuperscript{40} The
town sheriff was involved in town policing and defence as well as to raise men to arms, as

\textsuperscript{29} Ibid, p. ix.
\textsuperscript{30} Gidden, \textit{SBS 1434-1439}, p. ix.
\textsuperscript{32} Gidden, \textit{SBS 1434-1439}, p. ix.
\textsuperscript{33} C. Platt, \textit{Medieval Southampton}.
\textsuperscript{34} \textit{OBS} \textit{c.1300 vol.1}, pp. 55-59.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid, pp. 55-59.
\textsuperscript{36} \textit{SBS 1428-1334}, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{37} Platt, \textit{Medieval Southampton}, p. 55.
\textsuperscript{38} \textit{SBS 1428-1434}, p. xv.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid, p. xv.
the county sheriff had done before, but in regards to the town and its liberties. All these leaders played a part in administration and command in the town’s military activities as will be described in Chapter Three.

From the time of Henry II the Guild of Southampton began to acquire rights from the king such as tax exceptions and freedom from tolls, for payment of a fee farm of £200. It is probable at this time they were given some legal authorities as well. Later kings only increased these rights. Henry VI and Edward IV granted the town freedom from all the king’s officials within their boundaries. Southampton was also given freedom from maritime authority of the Cinque Ports by Henry III, who until this time had legal, economic and military rights over ports of England. The area in which Southampton exercised their authority from the king was a fairly substantial area including most of the New Forest all the way to Portsmouth. In 1447 Henry VI granted the town of Southampton to become a county which gave them increased freedom from royal ministers in the governance and selection of their own county officials. This area remained little changed until the 1490s when the boundary in the east was pushed back to the Hamble River, around the time Henry VII made Portsmouth into his main naval base. From the time of King John, Southampton had control of the town of Portsmouth. King Henry VI reiterated this in his reign once more demonstrating the dominant relationship of Southampton over Portsmouth in this period. While this was economically useful for Southampton who received a share of the taxes and customs arriving in Portsmouth, it led to innumerable disputes and arguments throughout the late medieval period.

Sources

The archives of the city of Southampton have several records that survived from the late medieval period. These sources are useful in establishing the town’s function as a

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41 Ibid, p. xv.
43 Ibid, p. vi.
44 Charters 1199-1480, p. 93.
46 Charters, pp. 3, 5 and 7; Platt, Medieval Southampton, p. 15; See Figure Two.
49 Charters 1199-1480, p. 5.
50 Ibid, p. 61.
military organisation. Civic records can be supplemented by the royal records that survive for further evidence. While Southampton’s records from the fourteenth century are fewer in number than those of the fifteenth century, there are sufficient of them to provide a view of the town’s military structure. Many of these town records have been published by the Southampton Records Society and later by the continuation of this group, the Southampton Records Series.

Civic sources

The Oak Book of Southampton has been published in several volumes, the first three covering the late medieval period. It is probably the oldest civic record of Southampton and contains a wide array of different themes. A number of the town ordinances deal with the town’s military organisation and establish their plan of town defence. Other accounts in the Oak Books include arms and armour, murage grants, orders from the king to Southampton to complete their walls and accounts on the complicated relationship of Southampton’s authority over Portsmouth. While not specifically about the military nature of the town these records give excellent evidence for the town military organisation.

The Black Books of Southampton contain a number of varied topics, often only related in that they pertain to the town government’s business. Most are land transactions, though some wills are included. The first three volumes cover 1388 to 1620. There are several accounts related to the town military organisation, some on an individual level including ownership of military equipment and individual military obligation. The town fortifications, their importance to the town, keeping them maintained and fit for war also are mentioned. Royal grants to civic leaders excluding them from service as a town official and from crown offices, including many military positions can also be found. The Black Books offer a more individual look at the town’s military structure as well as the town in general.

51 OBS c.1300 vol.1; OBS c.1300 vol.2; Supplement to the Oak Book of Southampton of circa 1300 A.D., Ed. P. Struder, Southampton Record Society vol. 12 (Southampton, 1911).
52 OBS c.1300 vol. 1; OBS c.1300 vol. 2; Supplement to the OBS c.1300.
53 BIBS 1388-1414, p. vi; BIBS 1414-1503; BIBS 1497-1620.
54 BIBS 1388-1414, p. vi.
The Southampton Books of Remembrance, like the Black Books, are of a miscellaneous nature relating to various aspects of town business and life in general.\textsuperscript{55} From civic ordinances, punishments, military equipment, and lists of town officers, to taxation, crimes and fines, all are included in the Books of Remembrance. The town military organisation is given in volume one in great detail for the early sixteenth century including place names, the groups that defended them, and even the civic leader charged with these defences and men. This scheme is continued from earlier documents showing how the town prepared itself for defence. Volume two contains many details throughout the record of local law enforcement, crimes and punishments. The interdependency of the suburbs and the town is evident in the relationship between Portswood and Southampton. Volume three contains records of arms and armour the town kept and more information on law enforcement and defensive ordinances. The Book of Remembrance contains some aspects of town military organisation that would be unknown, except for this record.

The Sign Manual and the Letters Patent of Southampton are letters patent from the king and others to Southampton, and the town’s reply until 1422.\textsuperscript{56} Many of these letters can also be found in the Patent Rolls, though some are not. All of these records were kept in the town archives and related to the town rights, privileges and responsibilities. This record contains a number of the king’s orders of a military nature. An indenture of the town garrison of 1339 as well as other equipment that the king sent to defend the town is included. Many important charters and documents are included in the Sign Manual and the Letters Patent dedicated to the town’s military organisation.

The Charters of the Borough of Southampton describe the obligation the town had to the king and the freedoms, rights and liberties the king offered in return.\textsuperscript{57} Some record the importance the king and his advisors placed on Southampton, the town’s defences and the place the king played in the town’s protection. In some of the charters the king clearly states that the town’s location as a port and possible landing place for invading ships makes it of utmost importance to the kingdom. These charters, as with the Sign Manual and Letters Patent, show the military obligations and rewards given to the town.

\textsuperscript{55} BRS 1440-1620; BRS 1303-1518; BRS 1483-1563.
\textsuperscript{57} Charters 1199-1480; The Charters of Southampton 1484-1836 Volume Two, Ed. H. W. Gidden, Southampton Record Society vol. 9 (Southampton, 1910).
The Stewards' Books that exist are from the late medieval period, starting in 1428 and continuing on throughout the entire medieval period. They are the works of various town stewards accounting the town's financial activity. Since most anything done in Southampton required money or payment of some form, from food and minstrels at feasts to materials for walls and payment for men building and repairing the town fortifications, most aspects of town life can be found in these accounts. The years 1428 to 1434 and 1434 to 1439 have been published. Some fifteen of these Steward Books are in typescript form by Berry Chinchen. Along with these published years of Stewards' Books are many years thereafter of manuscripts. Many accounts give an idea of what fortifications were in existence and evidence of their upkeep. They also include costs of armaments and other military equipment, both purchase and repair, which as before gives us an idea of how the town was employing these as well as maintaining them. At times these records contain messages from the king, including military issues. One frequent occurrence is town inventories made by the outgoing to the incoming steward, for the items he was given charge of when made steward. The 1438 record is such an inventory, including artillery and other such equipment giving a clear idea of the weapons and equipment the town owned at one specific time.

The Local Port Books of Southampton are the records of the Waterbailiff who kept track of the tolls on all goods entering and leaving the port of Southampton. There are a number of years published: 1427 to 1430, 1435 to 1436, 1439 to 1440, 1448-1449, 1469 to 1471, and 1509 to 1510. These have proved of limited value to the present study as most of the items are textiles and luxury goods, but they do indicate a fair amount of military goods passing through the port by sea as well as the indication that some goods themselves were made in the town. Mostly large numbers of bow staves are mentioned but a few other items appear occasionally. This perhaps indicates the easy access the townsmen had for the acquisition of arms and armour for sale, some of which were perhaps made locally.

58 SBS 1428-1434; SBS 1434-1439; SBS 1469-1470; SBS 1470-1471; SBS 1478-1479; SBS 1481-1482; SBS 1492-1493; The Steward's Book of 1492-1493 and the Terrier of 1495. Ed. Anne Thick, Southampton Record Series vol. 38 (Southampton, 1995); SBS 1497-1498.
60 PBS 1427-1430, PBS 1435-1436; PBS 1439-1440; PBS and BrBS 1448-1449; PBS 1469-1471; PBS 1509-1510 vol. 1; PBS 1509-1510 vol. 2.
The Brokage books of Southampton\textsuperscript{61} are the accounts of the other bailiff of Southampton who watched the tolls of the goods that entered and left Southampton by land. Many of these books survive and have been published for the years 1439 to 1440, 1443 to 1444, 1448 to 1449, 1477 to 1478 and 1527 to 1528. As with the Port Books, the Brokage books proved of limited value but do indicate a fair amount of military goods passing through Southampton by land, as well as the indication that some goods themselves were made in the town. As with the Port books, it mentions the items arriving in the town from sea, of interest to this research being the military equipment. This once more makes clear the availability of arms and armour to townsfolk.

The probate inventories of Southampton deal with the goods of deceased individuals of the town.\textsuperscript{62} The first volume covers town probate inventories from 1447 to 1575, just over the last 50 years of the period studied.\textsuperscript{63} Of these published inventories only two are pre-1500 and only one of them shows arms and armour that individual townsfolk owned. While two such inventories account for only a small fraction of the townsfolk before 1500, these types of accounts give us great insight into the lives of individuals, and the items they owned and used in everyday town life. One of these remaining inventories listed significant military equipment, an indication of the type of arms that the specific townsman could and had possessed, no doubt to fulfill his military obligations.

The Terrier of 1454 is a remarkable example of the military organisation of Southampton showing an in-depth military town structure.\textsuperscript{64} While terriers in general identify plot listings of who owns or inhabits property in a specific location, the Southampton Terrier of 1454 includes military preparations for repair and defence of the town wall. It clearly and decidedly dictated who was to defend what part of the town walls, loop by loop, assigning loops by plot size, one person or plot at a time. This not only lays out what locations would be maintained and protected in conflict on a very individual level but also states what structures existed at the time, how many loops the town had to defend, the current names of these edifices and those who owned or dwelt in the property. It is very useful as it demonstrates the framework for the town’s defence plan in case of invasion, and

\textsuperscript{61} BrBS 1439-1440 vol. 1; BrBS 1443-1444 vol. 1; PBS and BrBS 1448-1449; BrBS 1477-1478 and 1527-1528 vol. 1.


\textsuperscript{63} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{64} The Southampton Terrier of 1454, Ed. L.A. Burgess, Southampton Record Series vol. 15 (Southampton, 1976).
is detailed, giving certain households specific duties for the defence of the walls and towers. This document plainly is one of the most obvious indications of a prepared plan of town defence and military organisation in an urban setting.

Another record of use to ascertain the military organisation of Southampton is the Assize of Bread Book, 1477 to 1517. The Assize of Bread is the town’s record of regulations for the bakers and production of bread and other fines. It details the many types of bread and fines for illicit activities in relation to the trade. It also deals with a great number of other fines in the town. While having little to do with town military matters in general it does contain a vast number of affrays and assaults that took place in the town and their associated fines or punishments. While not directly the military organisation of the town it does indicate the large number of armed inhabitants as well as the town’s attempts to regulate the use of weapons within the town.

Royal records

The Calendar of Patent Rolls includes a number of grants and orders between the king and his subjects. These were to attest, sanction, recommend or warrant any number of benefits or orders by the king to one or more of his subjects. These letters receive their name from being sent open, with the Great Seal attached at the bottom. There are many accounts in the Patent Rolls that are related to the town military organisation between the crown to the town and county of Southampton. There also are a number of references to defensive strategies employed by the King for the town itself and the region. These records also contain instructions to the king’s ministers in the town, the keepers of Southampton, as well as other royal officials empowered to help protect the town. Southampton was used often for coastal defence as well as a headquarters for fleets that protected the kingdom. As the king of England was at times very involved in Southampton’s military organisation in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Patent Rolls provide a large number of accounts showing this often complex and important relationship.

The Close Rolls are letters from the king to individuals and are of varied themes and subjects but unlike the Patent Rolls these were ‘closed’ or intended for only the recipient

66 CPR volume 3 of Edward I to volume 1 of Henry VIII reign.
from the king and had the Great Seal closing the letter.\textsuperscript{67} As with the Patent Rolls there are interesting events that relate to Southampton’s military status and their relation to the monarchy. This is especially true regarding the position of Keeper of Southampton. There are also numerous letters sent to specific town leaders in the town regarding the king’s wishes in how they fulfilled their military obligations.

Feodera is an eighteenth century compilation of a number of accounts including many royal records edited by Thomas Rymer.\textsuperscript{68} These records come from a number of sources including the Calendar of Close Rolls and Calendar of Patent Rolls, and create a clearer view of the administration taking place in the kingdom of England. Many of these accounts are military in nature and give details on the military organisation of the kingdom. Many requests for men and other military obligations can be found in these records relating to military service to the king. These volumes help to give a perspective on how the town and county of Southampton acted in its military organisation on a national level alongside the accounts found in the Close and Patent rolls.

\textbf{Timeframe of research}

The period of research in question was one of social, political, military and cultural change as well as several historically significant events. This study will start at the turn of the century with wars with Wales, Scotland and France England began the fourteenth century steeped in conflict. As several of the wars early in the fourteenth century were continuations of those in the late thirteenth these examples were included in the research. These wars would continue throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries under several of the English kings who in turn would turn to Southampton to comply with their military duties.

In the 1330s war with France culminated with the start of the Hundred Years’ War in 1337. For more than a hundred years England and France grappled with each other until the English were finally expelled in 1453. This war brought several periods of heavy military activity during much of Edward III reign and all of Henry V’s. These times of heavy warfare would find Southampton under heavy demands to fulfil their military obligations. Some of the first blows of the Hundred Years’ War were dealt to Southampton.

\textsuperscript{67} CCR volume 3 of Edward I to volume 1 of Richard III’s reign.
\textsuperscript{68} Thomas Rymer, Foedera, conventiones, literae, et ejusque generis acta publica, inter reges Angliae et alios ... habitat aut tractatae Three Volumes (London, 1816-1869) http://www.anglo-norman.net/texts/foedera-contents.html.
October 1338 A French fleet landed in the town, leaving a large portion of the town in ruins. The recovery from this was further hindered in the late 1340s with the arrival of the Black Death. Southampton spent decades recovering. The late medieval period has been characterised as one of urban decline, partially because of the Black Death and other issues, which further would have impacted Southampton and its military organisation.

No sooner had the Hundred Years' War ended than England's own internal issues burst into civil war. The Wars of the Roses began in 1455 with the Duke of York's rebellion and ended with the battle of Stoke in 1487. This is not completely accurate though as it was not truly concluded until 1499 when the last challengers to Henry Tudor were executed. As with any civil war this conflict was primary based in country and relied in great part upon the same country for resources to carry out these military actions. The reason that 1500 was selected as a finish date is it concludes the last possible conflict of the Wars of the Roses with no possible contenders remaining.

These many events and factors all set the stage for this work on the military organisation of Southampton. The primary influences are those of direct warfare. Southampton would have been required to fulfil its military obligations to the king in various needs. Other issues such as the Black Death are important in part by how they impact Southampton's ability to act within its military organisation. These occurrences all set the context in which Southampton was employed in military planning, preparation and action.

Another reason this time period was selected was that it was before the major changes to English coastal defence done by Henry VIII. Many scholars have focused on how Henry revolutionized English defence schemes and strategy. By examining the period previous to this development in English coastal protection it is possible to see if indeed Henry was creating a new scheme of defence or simply adding to one in place that had been in existence long before his reign.

Thesis outline
The thesis will be divided into four chapters, a conclusion and an appendix of further information related to the individual chapters. Chapter one will examine the town of Southampton and its fortifications. This will be divided into two main sections, the civic defensive structures and those of the king. The civic fortifications will be separated into four time periods: 1300 to 1338, 1338 to 1400, 1400 to 1450 and 1450 to 1500 and those of
the royal defences into two time periods, the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Chapter two will discuss the use of town manpower as mariners and soldiers, both at home and abroad. These will be divided by reign of the various kings of England. The next chapter will focus on first the defensive schemes the town created and employed, as well as their organisation to acquire and utilize military information. Chapter Three will continue with how Southampton fit into a wider defensive network of the locality, region and kingdom and this reciprocal relationship. Chapter Four will address the various forms of military equipment employed by the town, townsmen and royal officials present in Southampton. This chapter will be separated further by chronology throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Last the conclusion will examine the four chapters combined and explain some of the occurrences and changes over time drawn from the four primary themes regarding Southampton's military organisation. The analysis of the themes above, taken as a whole, demonstrates clearly Southampton's military organisation, its efficacy and importance.
Chapter One-
The Fortifications of Southampton

Southampton’s fortifications are perhaps one of the most visible signs of the military organisation of the town. These massive structures incorporated a system of walls that ran one and one-quarter miles and averaged twenty-five to thirty feet tall. They were strengthened by twenty-nine towers and seven main gates. These fortifications required a huge amount of planning, labour and funding to construct and maintain.⁶⁹ There were two main forces directing and funding these fortifications, both directly and indirectly; the town leadership, and the king and his advisors. These two groups determined and formed the defences for the protection of the town.

Southampton, as all English towns, was generally responsible for its own defence and fortifications.⁷⁰ The townsmen funded these works largely with their own money and with local labour. Though various forms of grants, tolls, privileges and payments were sent from the king to aid the townsmen, generally speaking the expenses were met out of the town’s coffers.⁷¹ Only on rare occasions was there a direct payment from the king for the town defences.

The king was directly and indirectly involved with Southampton’s fortifications. He was directly involved by his ownership of Southampton Castle.⁷² The responsibility of upkeep and defence often passed to royal servants.⁷³ As one of the earliest fortifications in the town it played a main role in the western defence.⁷⁴ Indirectly the king dictated his

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⁷¹ Kenyon, Medieval Fortifications, p. 195.
⁷³ CPR 1330-1334, p. 260; CPR 1370-1374, p. 79; CPR 1377-1381, p. 190; CPR 1381-1385, p. 311; CPR 1385-89, p. 177; CPR 1396-1399, p. 151; CPR 1413-1416, p. 168.
⁷⁴ Platt, Medieval Southampton, p. 9 and 36-67.
wishes regarding the town’s defence. If displeased with the town’s actions or lack thereof, the king’s usually passive relationship with the town could change drastically. This happened in 1338, as a result of the raid, when Edward III placed keepers over the town with specific orders to build fortifications. Because of his involvement in creating fortifications it is apparent Edward III placed great importance upon the coastal defences of England. In most cases the punishment for not realizing his desires was less severe than a complete loss of rights, and depending on the situation, it might be nothing at all.

Southampton’s fortifications often show the military attitude of the town by how these structures were built and developed, by their persistence and preparation. The town’s military attitude directly affected the building of fortifications: whether they were built in haste prior to an attack or threat of an attack, or were well planned and organised in times of peace in preparation for danger in general. These numerous themes blend together to give an ever changing picture of the military organisation of the town through the structures they built.

Medieval scholars in the past have mainly studied Southampton’s fortifications in relation to their use of early firearms, as it is one of the earliest places this developed in England. Saunders wrote, ‘Southampton water has been the forcing-ground for military engineering in England since the introduction of cannon to warfare.’ This statement implies that specialised fortifications for artillery in the area began with the advent of firearms, but, as the historical accounts indicate, this was not so. Southampton made use of both non-gunpowder artillery and specialized fortifications long before firearms played any meaningful part of warfare. This section will discuss these artillery fortifications, while Chapter Four will discuss the artillery itself. The effective design of many of the town

fortifications further demonstrates the military planning the town was involved in to fulfil its military duty.

The fortifications of Southampton often were directly linked to the rights and privileges that the town enjoyed. In Richard II’s reign, and others including those of Henry V and Henry VI, the agreement of the town charter was specifically linked to ‘the betterment and fortification of the aforesaid town, notoriously situated in front of our enemies.’ These rights and privileges were ways in which the king motivated towns to conform more to his desires for the town and kingdom’s protection. Additionally, Southampton’s fortifications reflected the town’s own identity. They were both a physical show of the town’s military ability, and a demonstration of the wealth, power and organisation that were required for their construction and maintenance.

As the subject and time covered in this chapter is quite extensive, it will be broken into two main sections: the town fortifications, and the royal fortifications of Southampton. These sections will be further subdivided by date to explain the development of these fortifications throughout the period in question and will further illuminate the town and king’s military works in the town of Southampton. It will also examine generally the defences that existed before the period covered in this thesis to lay a foundation for what followed in the late medieval period and the tradition of fortifications in the town.

**Town fortifications of Southampton**

**Fortifications of 1300 to 1338**

By 1300 Southampton had built fortifications along the north and east borders of the town. There were two main town gates breaking the perimeter wall: Bargate to the north and Eastgate to the east. A moat encircled Southampton to the north and east. A stone wall ran along this same length strengthened by gates and towers, replacing earlier earth and timber defences. Murage grants were recorded yearly from 1260 on for decades

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80 See Figure Four.
presumably to fund this effort.\textsuperscript{64} Multiple towers probably were completed as well including what later became Polymond’s Tower.\textsuperscript{65} These fortifications greatly improved the town’s defences, but still left the seaward approach to the town open.\textsuperscript{66} The town defences prior to the raid of 1338 were clearly inadequate, as evidenced by the success of the raid. Earlier attacks, such as those made by the Venetians in 1319 and the men of the Cinque Ports in 1321 were detrimental, but paled when compared to the attacks in 1338.\textsuperscript{67} Without substantial defences along the seaside the walls of the town offered limited protection.

In May 1321 Edward II granted the townspeople murage for their fortifications for three years.\textsuperscript{68} In 1326 the king once more granted the town murage at \(\frac{1}{2}d.\) on every 10s., and \(\frac{1}{4}d.\) on 5s. for the span of seven years, though this grant was carried out mostly by his son.\textsuperscript{69} Edward III continued financial grants allowing the burgesses in 1327 to charge all merchandise entering the town for six years to raise funds to complete the encircling wall.\textsuperscript{70} In 1336 this was once more granted for five years, again with instruction to finish the wall.\textsuperscript{91}

The town leaders knew the unfortified seaward side of their defences was a threat to their safety, so they built a timber barbican during Edward II’s reign for this reason.\textsuperscript{92} Its location is described as facing the sea but little else is certain. It could be referring to the southern portion of God’s House Gate that faced the sea but the structure is never referred to as the barbican in any other record. Another possibility is that it was on the west side of the town defences perhaps attaching to the castle’s outer wall to the south where the town wall projected out, once more facing the sea. The barbican was rebuilt in 1336 in stone to improve its defensive qualities.\textsuperscript{93} This new structure was too small to make a drastic change in the protection of the seaside and perhaps was more of a token gesture than a move to truly protect the town. While this structure was an attempt to fortify the waterfront, it proved unable to stop the French invaders in 1338. The merchants of the town, rich from

\textsuperscript{64} CPR 1258-1266, p. 126; Kenyon, Medieval Fortifications, p. 184; Platt, Medieval Southampton, p. 38; Turner, Town Defences in England and Wales, p. 54. See Appendix Chapter One- Murage Grants to Southampton.

\textsuperscript{65} Turner, Town Defences in England and Wales, p. 167.

\textsuperscript{66} Platt, Medieval Southampton, p. 39.

\textsuperscript{67} CPR 1318-1323, pp. 486, 490, 696; CPR 1321-1324, pp. 276 and 368; Platt, Medieval Southampton, pp. 45 and 107.

\textsuperscript{68} CPR 1317-1321, p. 590.

\textsuperscript{69} CPR 1324-1327, p. 252.

\textsuperscript{70} CPR 1327-1330, p. 64.

\textsuperscript{90} CPR 1334-1338, p. 240.

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid, p. 240; Platt, Medieval Southampton, p. 108.

\textsuperscript{92} CPR 1334-1338 pp. 240-241.
their sea related trade, were the root of the reason no walls were built before 1338 along the
town’s seaside.

Without substantial defences on the seaward side of the town, the remaining town
walls provided little protection. Enemies could simply circumvent the fortifications and
enter the town. The townsmen were not ignorant of this. On the contrary, the town leaders
clearly knew the seaward side of their defences needed protection as demonstrated by the
building and rebuilding of the barbican. This fortification was a move in the right direction,
but once again was an insignificant move on its own to truly protect the seaside of the
town. Whether by the complacency of not having been attacked in recent years or the
power the town merchants exercised in blocking construction of a fully enclosed wall, the
seaside remained unfortified. The kings of England from Edward I onward knew the
weakness of the incomplete wall of Southampton and continually ordered them to remedy
this. They were indeed quite accurate and astute in their assumption, as was proved by the
raid.

Fortifications of 1338 to 1400

After the raid the king became forceful in his command to enclose the town in
stone. The town also realized the necessity to finish the wall for their own safety. Thereafter work on Southampton’s fortifications focused greatly on completing the town
wall. In the past the king had sent orders in writing, but after the raid he did so by placing
a keeper and garrison in the town to ensure that the work took place. To further
demonstrate his resolve any townsmen who avoided participation in the town defence,
either financially or physically, risked confiscation of all their goods and property. Edward also paid a large share of the costs of the fortifications, spending hundreds of
pounds in just a few months. Edward III was anxious to make sure that the raid of 1338
was not repeated. This urgency perhaps should not be overemphasized as it took decades to

95 CPR 1324-1327, p. 252; CPR 1334-1338, p. 240.
96 CCR 1339-1341, p 55; Platt, Medieval Southampton, pp. 108 and 113.
Excavations (Southampton, 1975) p. 294; Turner, Town Defences in England and Wales, p.80.
99 CCR 1339-1341, p. 55.
101 TNA E101/22/11; Platt, Medieval Southampton, p. 114.
complete the walls, although this was not unusual considering the associated costs in time and money.

In March 1339 Edward III ordered men to purvey material for building fortifications. His haste was tied to the threats of renewed attacks upon the coasts, including the now weakened Southampton. In April the king allowed payments from religious houses to him, from and near Southampton, to be used in the rebuilding of the town fortifications to accelerate the town's progress. The townsmen were not idle, as in September the townsmen cleaned the moat running the length of the eastern wall. Once finished it was twelve feet deep by twenty-four feet wide.

Financial grants such as murage were imperative to the town and its building and repair of their fortifications. In March 1341 the murage was renewed for the town giving 1d. on every £1 of goods for an extended time of six years. That same year in December Edward III also freed the town from half the town fee farm; in 1351 this became a full freedom from the farm for eight years. The spending of these funds was called into question by the king, who sent men to investigate this misappropriation later in 1341. In 1345 it was reissued for six years, seemingly by accident, and again in April 1347 for four additional years to begin May 1348. The king later merged these two overlapping grants to 1352. From the raid to 1352 there are records of murage every year. After a possible lapse in 1353 to 1354, another was issued June 1355 when the king granted ten more years of murage grants. In 1366 murage once more was given to the town for ten years. This indicates that for almost four decades the king made financial grants nearly nonstop to fund the town fortifications.

During this period many existing fortifications were strengthened. Bargate had yet another period of works and was fortified with the addition of machicolation and reinforced

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102 CPR 1338-1340, p. 237.
103 Ibid, p. 275.
104 Platt, Medieval Southampton, p. 114.
105 CPR 1340-1343, pp. 136 and 339.
106 Ibid, p. 572; CPR 1350-1354, p. 56; See Appendix Chapter One Freedom from the King’s Fee Farm.
107 CPR 1340-1343, p. 441.
108 CPR 1343-1345, p. 467; CPR 1345-1348, p. 279.
111 CPR 1354-1358, p. 254; CCR 1354-1360, p. 214; OBS c. 1300 vol.2, pp. 119-121.
112 Charters 1199-1480, p. 23.
battlements. If the murder holes in Bargate are of the fourteenth century, it follows that the increased battlements were added at this time as well. These improvements show the continued importance that Bargate played in the town's defensive organisation.

God's House Gate was also upgraded to a strong fortification after being initially built in the fourteenth century as a small gate. It is difficult to discern the various stages of this structure as there are limited evidences to base the earlier versions. The large addition to the south of the building facing the Southampton Water had a number of windows that are wide for embrasures and dissimilar to most of the arrowloops that can be found in the other town fortifications. It is possible that these were simply small windows to allow for light, but the design of the room suggests a different use. The structure is such that the semi-rectangular room is terminated to the south in a triangular shape that points south. This strange shape would allow an additional degree of movement for missile weapons indicating that it possibly housed weapons such as giant crossbows or springalds. It is important to note that the two gunports on the southeast and southwest faces of God's House are post-medieval, and had previously been similar to the others. If this structure was intended for such weapons, which existed in great numbers in Southampton, this would indicate a major precedence in the use of fortifications designed specifically for artillery in the area of God's House long before the great allowances made for firearms in the next century.

As the west town wall was being built, the need for a gate to the west quay was required and by the mid fourteenth century Westgate was completed. The tower was basically flush with the wall providing no flanking support, although it had two gates and two portcullises with murder holes. It currently features very unusual gunports that have been attributed to the fourteenth century. However they are unlike any other gunports of the century or even the next century, which makes Saunder's dating of them as a sixteenth century addition more probable. As modern illustrations show large windows in place of

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115 See Figures Six to Nine.
116 See Figure Eight.
118 See Figures Ten to Twelve; Faulkner, 'Surviving Medieval Buildings', Excavations vol. I, pp. 56 and 70.
119 Ibid, p. 70; Turner, Town Defences in England and Wales, p. 60.
120 Saunders, 'Hampshire Coastal Defence', p. 137.
where these loops are located, these were not original. Some form of embrasure perhaps existed but little evidence now remains.

During the mid-fourteenth century Watergate was the only opening of the town to the main quay.\textsuperscript{121} It was flanked on the east by the town wall, which ran north to south for several yards, and on the west by a large ‘D’ shaped tower that provided cover to the gate.\textsuperscript{122} It was new or completely built over the previously existing gate. As with Bargate it had machicolations.\textsuperscript{123} At one time the structure that made up Watergate was much larger, with a gate and superstructures. These would have connected to the standing structure to the east, and a tower would have protruded southward to connect to the town wall from God’s House Gate. Watergate also served as a residence, and at times as the residence and headquarters of the clerk of the king’s ships.\textsuperscript{124} While obviously planned as a strong military defence with flanking towers and murder holes, battlements, gates and portcullises, Watergate was not lacking in comfortable amenities either.

A 1353 inquest found part of the ramparts and walls on the east side of the town in poor condition.\textsuperscript{125} Evidently the bank had eroded, its poplar board ‘parapets’ destroyed. Some scholars take this to mean that at least part of this wall was earth ramparts and palisades.\textsuperscript{126} Further evidence that reinforces this hypothesis are excavations done at Polymond’s Tower, indicating two separate building phases, the stone work of the wall to the south being inferior.\textsuperscript{127} On this information it is estimated that the eastern wall there could not have been built until 1360 to 1372.\textsuperscript{128} However, even if the walls south of Polymond’s Tower were of inferior workmanship, and although the wall was not continuous with the tower, the inquest may not mean the walls were ramparts and palisades in 1353. While ramparts still possibly existed, the inquest mentions earthen walls, possibly referring to earth backing to supporting the stone wall with wooden defences built atop them. From the same excavations it seems that the eastern length of stone wall was poorly built. A thin stone wall would have needed reinforcing from behind with earth, as other

\textsuperscript{121} See Figures Thirteen to Fifteen; Faulkner, ‘Surviving Medieval Buildings’, \textit{Excavations vol.1}, p. 67; CPR 1377-1381, p. 230- Watergate stated by 1378.
\textsuperscript{123} See Figure Fourteen; Faulkner, ‘Surviving Medieval Buildings’, \textit{Excavations vol.1}, p. 56.
\textsuperscript{125} CM1 1348-1377, p. 38.
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid, p.142.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid, p.142.
scholars have agreed, which may perhaps be another interpretation of the reviewer’s statement in 1353. In either situation this indicates that the townsmen had slacked in their responsibilities to maintain their defences along the eastern perimeter.

Until the seaward walls were completed, it is probable that traditional artillery and wooden defences were used to defend the waterfront. Even after the wall was completed artillery remained in use for additional protection. One weapon, a mangonel, was placed beside Westgate, and the site later bore the name ‘mangell’ for at least a hundred years. Ammunition for such a device was found in excavations there. With the probable combination of temporary defences of timber, the seafront would have been better protected than before the raid, while the stone circuit was being completed. The completion of the stone walls and continued employment of these devices would have further strengthened the town’s defences.

A review of the town fortifications in 1360 by the town keeper indicated that the single moat twenty-four feet wide by twelve feet deep should be enlarged, and a second added. During excavations these ditches were shown to be 38 feet wide, and the second 40 feet wide. The combined area from the stone wall of the town to the outer bank of the outer moat would have to have been close to 100 feet wide. This would have been a very formidable distance to cross even before being hampered by the double ditches with the middle rampart between them before reaching the walls.

A 1366 murage grant from the king to the town highlights a number of aspects of the relationship between them and the state of their fortifications. From this grant it is clear the king knew the precarious place Southampton had and the importance of its fortification. It was apparent the town had difficulty completing such a financially taxing obligation. Edward was willing to aid his subjects if they lived up to his expectations. By 1366 the stone walls still were not complete, though other defences may have been in use. In 1369 the king ordered all land owners and renters to remain in the town

129 CMI 1348-1377, p. 38; Platt, Medieval Southampton, p. 122.
131 Ibid, p. 37.
133 Ibid, p. 37.
134 CMI 1348-1377, p. 154.
136 Charters 1199-1480, p. 23.
137 Ibid, p. 23.
continually. This was done to maintain the manpower needed for town defence and so sufficient funds could be gathered quickly for the current fortifications, especially to finish the town walls. The town leadership also had the right to arrest and seize carpenters, masons and workers. In 1374 the mayor and bailiff were granted the power to arrest twenty stone hewers for works on town fortifications for as long as needed. These powers may indicate that even into the 1360s to 1370s the town may have been depopulated from the raid and the plague, or perhaps simply the need for more manpower outstripped the town’s abilities. These actions by the king show his continued and increasing concern that the town fortifications be completed sooner than later.

Friary Gate and its garite, a structure that enlarged the wall-walk battlements for increased flanking power, were two more fourteenth century additions to the town’s defences. Both buildings are rectangular, and the garite beside the gate offered flanking defence to it. Friary Gate was finished before the garite and so it probably existed before 1372. Friary Gate was probably roofed at one point and had a second story, perhaps of timber. Friary Gate has two embrasures flanking the entrance facing straight to the east to cover the bridge. These two loops have been classified as having been used for guns, though there is no evidence that guns were located there until after 1450. As will be examined later in Chapter Four, the number of guns in the town appears quite small into the second quarter of the fifteenth century, so there is little reason to assume that there were a great number of them in the late fourteenth much less mid century.

As mentioned above Friary Gate’s garite, as other garites in the town, was simply a large platform built aside the wall-walk to increase the area for defence of the battlements. There is no reason to assume that the Friary garite was markedly different than the rest. Once more there is no record of firearms there until later in the fifteenth century. There are no design features in the remaining fabric of the building or building descriptions recorded that give evidence for gunports at this time either. That the garite provided flanking defence for the gate is obvious, though evidence that it was built for firearms is

138 CPR 1367-1370, p. 229.
139 Ibid, p. 229.
140 CPR 1370-1374, pp. 405-406.
141 Platt, Medieval Southampton, p. 127.
142 See Figures Sixteen and Seventeen.
lacking. It would appear that the large platform could have been home to any number of traditional artillery and even more so for archers armed with bows and crossbows.

The west length of the town wall was complete by 1377. The same summer brought renewed attacks by the French and their Castilian allies including raids on Isle of Wight, Yarmouth and Rye. The town of Hastings was raided and burned down during these renewed raids. In June 1377 another keeper, John Arundel, was placed in the town. His duties were specifically limited to military matters with power to do all needed to make the town defendable. This power was, perhaps, intentionally given in broad and vague terms, allowing him flexibility to encroach on civil matters. One of Arundel’s main duties to which multiple orders were given, one in June and another in July, was to find masons, carpenters and labourers to work on the town’s defences. It does not state to build new defences but ‘for the repair and amendment of its defects indicating the walls were complete. Expenses were high and townsmen made multiple petitions to the king to take over their defence, particularly these costs. The king refused but granted a continuation of fee farm freedom for two years on 1 December. Eight days later the king ordered the mayor and bailiffs to survey the walls for sections in disrepair then to ‘compel’ all in the town to contribute according to their wealth to it, even if by ‘distress’, as the French invasion was imminent and it was rumoured that they planned to attack Southampton. The townsmen spent £1000 over the fee farm on these works, and many men left the town and their goods, as they were unable to meet these costs.

The arcade, coupled with God’s House Tower, is the medieval fortification that has received the most study of any other in Southampton. The arcade was formed from existing stone houses there, with pre-existing arches forming machicolation. Scholars

145 CPR 1377-1381, pp. 4, 7 and 9; Platt, Medieval Southampton, p. 122; Turner, Town Defences in England and Wales, p. 50-Wall works 1363-1370s or later.
146 CPR 1377-1381, p. 4; Platt, Medieval Southampton, pp. 125-127
147 CPR 1377-1381, pp. 4, 7 and 9.
149 Ibid, p. 127.
150 Ibid, p. 76.
151 Ibid, p. 80.
152 Ibid, p. 6.
155 See Figures Eighteen and Nineteen.
have dated the keyhole gunports of the western arcade to the late fourteenth century.\textsuperscript{156} Saunders concludes that the openings were blocked in the 1360s and the gunloops were added later in the century after the 1378 to 1379 French raids which overran the Isle of Wight.\textsuperscript{157} O'Neil assumes that the passages were blocked in the 1360s to 1370s with the gunloops being contemporary.\textsuperscript{158} The closest English contemporary gunports are Winchester Westgate dated around 1392 to 1394, and Carisbrooke Castle in the 1380s.\textsuperscript{159} Saunders makes the possible connection to Henry Yevele, a well known late medieval architect for the inclusion of gunports.\textsuperscript{160} The existing gunports themselves have deteriorated; many are asymmetric, possibly indicating they were added into existing stone work, perhaps in haste, where function constituted more of a priority than aesthetics.

There are three gunloops remaining, with perhaps others now sealed.\textsuperscript{161} According to Renn the arcade at one point was pierced with multiple gunloops every 30 to 40 feet apart, making the wall defensible from twenty yards away, which left the men on the wall to protect the remaining area.\textsuperscript{162} All three of the loops appear to have some restoration, one recently. It is probable that these loops were intended for early hand cannons, as O'Neil and others have stated, as they would have been unusable for bows and crossbows.\textsuperscript{163} From outside it does not appear difficult to use a crossbow or bow, but inside these three foot tall slits are very steep with only twenty-two to twenty-four inches available from side to side at the very back, a mere two inch opening at the front and a five to six inch circular opening at the bottom. Such an embrasure would appear somewhat daunting to an archer with a bow or crossbow, though it should be noted that in Renn's testing regarding arrowloops, a much smaller slit could be used for traditional missile weapons such as bows and crossbows.\textsuperscript{164} However the somewhat confined nature of these loops would appear to limit their angle of fire significantly. It is obvious then why many scholars assume these were for firearms.\textsuperscript{165}

\textsuperscript{156} See Figure Twenty; Platt, 'Introduction' Excavations vol. 1, p. 38.
\textsuperscript{157} Saunders, 'Hampshire Coastal Defense', p. 137.
\textsuperscript{158} O'Neil, Castles and Cannons, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{159} Saunders, 'Hampshire Coastal Defence', p. 137.
\textsuperscript{160} Ibid, p. 137.
\textsuperscript{161} D. F. Renn, 'The Southampton Arcade', p226-228; Saunders, 'The defences of Southampton in the later Middle Ages', p. 23.
\textsuperscript{162} D. F. Renn, 'The Southampton Arcade', p226-228.
\textsuperscript{163} O'Neil, Castles and Cannons, p.7.
\textsuperscript{164} P.N. Jones and D.F. Renn, 'The Military Effectiveness of Arrow loops; Some Experiments at White Castle', Château Gaillard 9-10. 1982, pp. 445-456; Creighton and Higham, Medieval Town Walls, p. 111.
\textsuperscript{165} O'Neil, Castles and Cannons, p.7.
This fortification probably includes one of the earliest gunports in England, showing the town’s readiness to take up new military technology in their defence.\(^{166}\)

The royal grants for town fortifications continued under Richard II. In December 1377 Richard granted freedom from the town fee farm of £200 for two years plus freedom from all royal debt to Edward III.\(^{167}\) In 1380 it was renewed for three years and upon expiration renewed at half payment for three more years.\(^{168}\) These grants stated that the freed monies were to be used on the fortifications under royal supervision.\(^{169}\) Apparently the grants were in effect throughout the 1380s as the Earl of Arundel and Surrey came in 1389 as the king’s auditor for these funds and to survey the town fortifications.\(^{170}\) These grants would probably not have covered the entire costs of the town’s military needs but it was a valuable benefit to the town over these decades in financing the work on their many fortifications.

John Flete and John Polymond oversaw a number of the town defences during the fourteenth century.\(^{171}\) Two towers, Polymond’s Tower and Arundel’s Tower were rebuilt over existing towers probably of the thirteenth or early fourteenth century.\(^{172}\) These towers probably were in construction during one of the many terms that Polymond was Mayor of Southampton.\(^{173}\) It is difficult to discern what Polymond’s Tower to the Northeast was like in the fourteenth century as it has been greatly altered. At the time of its construction it was considerably taller. One early nineteenth-century water colour of Polymond’s Tower shows it standing twice as tall as it is currently.\(^{174}\) An illustration dated to 1828 shows this shortening of the tower taking place.\(^{175}\) The parapets in this illustration also are very similar to those that are existent on Arundel’s Tower today. The large openings now in Polymond’s Tower were for cannons and were added after the fifteenth century. Since the original embrasures of the tower are impossible to distinguish with the many alterations to the masonry, it is probable that they were similar to the arrowloops of Arundel’s Tower.\(^{176}\)

\(^{166}\) SCA 5/1/7 f.2v.
\(^{167}\) CPR 1377-1381, p. 76.
\(^{168}\) Ibid, p. 448; CPR 1381-1385, p. 184.
\(^{169}\) CPR 1377-1381, p. 448; CPR 1381-1385, p. 184; CPR 1389-1392, p. 57.
\(^{170}\) Ibid, p. 57
\(^{171}\) Platt, Medieval Southampton, p. 125.
\(^{172}\) See Figures Twenty-one and Twenty-two; Turner, Town Defences in England and Wales, pp. 167, 171.
\(^{174}\) See Figure Twenty-three.
\(^{175}\) See Figure Twenty-four.
\(^{176}\) See Figure Twenty-five.
Arundel’s Tower was also remade in the fourteenth century, and O’Neil states it is tempting to date it to 1377 when John Arundel was keeper.\(^{177}\) The tower has three very tall arrowloops, which give it a wide field of fire protecting the Northwest of the town.\(^{178}\) Such reinforcement makes these two towers strong points in the town’s defence.

Previous research has stated that by the mid fourteenth century allowances were made in the defences for gunpowder artillery.\(^{179}\) While possible, pushing this date from mid fourteen to late or even the end of the century seems sensible. If the Arcade gunports date to the 1380s this timeframe is even more plausible. In addition to the Arcade, Saunders states that Westgate’s gunports were not original to the fourteenth century tower but were much later. This removes the possibility that the gunports date to the mid fourteenth century. Additionally, no reference of firearms appears in the town until the 1380s.\(^{180}\) As some research rightly states, the progression to firearms continued from this point onward during the fifteenth century.\(^{181}\)

The cost of these fortifications was staggering. A late fourteenth-century account from the tailors’ guild illustrates this. It states that the tailors continually were under ‘great charges, taxes, and imposts which have run and now run continually in the said town for the aid, repair, and defense of the town.’\(^{182}\) It continued stating that such constant charges were virtually making them destitute and that they ‘have not the wherewithal to live nor to maintain their simple estate’.\(^{183}\) Such a situation clearly was not isolated to the tailors’ guild but shows the financial obligations on the town for their fortifications.

In 1400 Henry IV turned his attention to Southampton in response to possible French attacks.\(^{184}\) In January Ivo FitzWaryn was made keeper with ‘full power to fortify the town with walls, towers, loups, gates, garrets, ditches and other defences’.\(^{185}\) He was ordered to have the mayor’s ‘advice’, possibly for insights on the fortifications, but more so as he retained civic powers and the townsfolk were to pay the costs.\(^{186}\) There apparently

\(^{179}\) Faulkner, ‘Surviving Medieval Buildings’, *Excavations vol 1*, p. 56.
\(^{182}\) Ibid, ‘Surviving Medieval Buildings’, *Excavations vol. 1*, p. 56.
\(^{183}\) Ibid, pp. 98-99.
\(^{184}\) Ibid, pp. 186 and 239; Platt, *Medieval Southampton*, p. 142.
\(^{185}\) Ibid, p. 186.
was great urgency, this work to be done ‘with all speed’. During FitzWaryn’s keepership the town made a number of improvements to the defences. In February the king allowed the town to use stone from the Isle of Wight without payment to him for it. They also were allowed workmen, masons, carpenters, labourers and others from anywhere in England, even church lands, under the agreement that they paid fair wages. In March Henry released the townsfolk of the £200 fee farm as long as it was spent on the defences. In addition he gave them £100 from the wool customs for fortifications, a total of £300 pounds annually. Initially three men were selected to supervise the money: the mayor, the king’s esquire and controller in the town. This quickly changed to the king’s controller having sole supervision of this £300. Henry IV clearly was attentive to Southampton and their defences.

With urgency instilled in the townsfolk after the raid of 1338 Southampton’s fortifications were radically improved. These developments included the completion of the town walls, new towers, gates and aggrandizement of existing fortifications. These works should be seen not as one continuous labour but as many phases of projects to improve the town’s defences, though some spanned decades with only short breaks. Many of these phases were planned, organised and carried out in times without immediate threats. These periods of building often were the result of military minded civic leadership and royal officials sent to the town by the king. On other occasions they were done in times of threat to the town. These phases are marked by less organised and hurried works, as the closer the threat the greater the haste.

Whether these works were the result of great planning in times of relative peace or of great speed in times of threat, they all were part of the same greater town military organisation. These defences built in the fourteenth century were the continuation of older traditions of fortification building. At the same time, the raid of 1338 was a catalyst to push the town merchants into the realisation of the pressing need to complete the encircling walls. Although Southampton had always had its share of men involved with the king’s military matters, it was not until after the raid that the fortifications could be completed.

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188 TNA E364/55/F, CPR 1399-1401, pp 186 and 239; Platt, Medieval Southampton, p. 142.
189 CPR 1399-1401, p.239.
190 Ibid, p.239.
193 Ibid, p.245.
because of a combination of this understanding coupled with the awareness of the danger posed to the town without a complete wall.

While the town defences would continue to improve in the fifteenth and even sixteenth centuries, in the fourteenth century the change was drastic. The wall circuit around the town doubled in size completing it along the west and south, a second moat was created, the original moat was enlarged and many of the older structures greatly increased in size and function. Polymond’s and Arundel’s Towers were built into the strong defences that protected the ends of the north wall. God’s House Gate began the improvement that would continue into the fifteenth century into God’s House Tower, a major fortification of the town. The new western and southern walls also were to have their fair share of towers and gates, particularly the main gate of the south, Watergate, and to the west, Westgate.

Another aspect of the town military organisation that during the fourteenth century greatly developed was the use of improved military technology. The town began to adapt fortifications for use with artillery, both traditional: great crossbows, springalds, catapults and later gunpowder technology. Beginning with traditional artillery and then later firearms the town was able to improve its own protection with structures that increased their effectiveness by the addition of artillery. Such structures as the Arcade, Friary Gate and God’s House Gate set the precedents that continued and increased in the fifteenth century and afterwards. The town also implemented the use of machicolation in a number of their structures such as Watergate, Bargate, the Arcade and others. These facets not only show that the town was willing to try new military technologies but that they were prepared and competent to deploy it.

With such developments and improvements it is little wonder that nothing like the raid of 1338 occurred in the later fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The wall was completed around the town, surrounded by a double ditch of great width. New and old towers were improved with innovative technologies and enlarged to be formidable to many forms of attack. But the fourteenth century was less of an end for the town fortifications and more of a foundation. In little more than sixty years the town had made great improvements to its physical defence structure that shows the constantly changing military organisation of the town.
The first half of the fifteenth century

The development of fortifications created for artillery continued into the fifteenth century in the town engineering of their defences. The improvement of these fortifications is a sign of the town’s recognition of its military purpose. Older forms of defences such as town walls, moats, towers, gates, bridges and other fortifications remained the primary form of defence throughout the entire period. As firearms evolved and became a greater asset, they were integrated into existing fortifications and new structures built to accommodate them. These new fortifications were also constructed to maximise the use of traditional arms that would remain mainstays in medieval warfare. The adoption of ever changing fortifications that developed alongside the latest in technology showed that Southampton was aware of recent innovations and their possible uses for town protection. Gunports that were constructed alongside and even built into existing arrowloops to allow both weapons to be used for town defence, epitomizing this symbiotic relationship between the new and the old weapons employed with one purpose, for the town’s safeguarding.

Kings continued making payments or donating materials to the town fortifications, the usual contribution of murage and other tolls. In 1401 Henry IV continued the townspeople’s freedom from the fee farm of £200 for six years. This grant was to be used exclusively on fortifications or other preparations for their defence. Henry was keen to ensure that such funds were spent well. In July 1407 he commissioned Henry Bishop of Winchester, Henry Popham, Richard Wallop and the Sheriff of Southampton to verify that the grant money had been used on fortifications. Employment of men from outside the town to confirm this spending would perhaps be a nuisance to the townsmen but would verify the money collected would be used in accordance to the king’s wishes.

In September 1403, with threat of French attacks while the king was at war with the Welsh, Henry began preparing the south coast to resist. He commissioned John, Lord Lovell, Thomas Lord Camoys, Thomas Skelton, and John Lisle, knights, to view the fortifications and fortify the town. These men were also to array the townsmen and also

195 Ibid, p. 56.
196 See Figure Twenty-six.
197 CPR 1399-1401, p. 535.
198 CPR 1405-1408, p. 356.
199 CPR 1401-1405, p. 286.
defend the town.\textsuperscript{200} This account demonstrates the king’s interest in the town’s protection in a time of danger. Henry IV made moves to reinforce the town with armed men who primarily would act as leaders to assist and lead the townsmen in defence but further would aid organise the town fortifications.

Another continued form of defence that would see increased use was that of machicolation. During the early fifteenth century Eastgate received murder holes.\textsuperscript{201} In the fourteenth century these machicolations were becoming a common feature in many of the existing and new military structures of the town: Bargate, Arcade, Westgate and perhaps Watergate. If Eastgate did have them added into the existing gate it would indicate that all the four main gates of the town featured these defences.

During the 1410s God’s House Gate was strengthened. The new structure, God’s House Tower, bolstered the defences of the gate and the southeast approach to the town from the sea.\textsuperscript{202} The tower was first mentioned in 1417, though must have been finished earlier, as the account was for repairs being made to it.\textsuperscript{203} This phase was partially funded by the king, Henry V donating £100.\textsuperscript{204} Henry V had also freed the town of half the fee farm.\textsuperscript{205} This newer structure protruded from the wall past the gate to provide flanking cover over the gate and wall.\textsuperscript{206} The Tower had many features that showed the town’s keen understanding of military engineering and technology. Like other town fortifications it had machicolation. The tower’s position along with the neighbouring wall to the north coupled with the existing God’s House Gate structure gave reciprocal flanking cover, creating a location of great strength in a potentially high danger area of the town. Watergate and the quays below it to the south would all have benefitted from the construction of God’s House Tower as a defence.\textsuperscript{207} So while the tower of God’s House received protection from its surrounding fortifications it greatly enhanced their protective qualities.

One key innovation of God’s House Tower was its adaption for firearms, continuing the earlier developments of the Arcade.\textsuperscript{208} It had a number of keyhole gunports, particularly in the main tower at the east end. What is peculiar about the gunports is they have long

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\textsuperscript{200} Ibid, p. 287
\textsuperscript{201} Faulkner, ‘Surviving Medieval Buildings’, \textit{Excavations vol.1}, p. 56.
\textsuperscript{202} See Figure Twenty-seven.
\textsuperscript{203} CPR 1416-1422, p. 109; Turner, \textit{Town Defences in England and Wales}, p. 175.
\textsuperscript{204} CPR 1416-1422, p. 109; Turner, \textit{Town Defences in England and Wales}, p. 175.
\textsuperscript{205} Charters 1199-1480, p.39
\textsuperscript{207} Ibid, pp.65-69.
\textsuperscript{208} See Figure Twenty-eight.
vision slits at 32 inches. This is unusual as this increases the area projectiles could enter with little benefit, most contemporary gunports being much shorter. It is assumed the guns used here were larger than those of the Arcade. These would have been significantly smaller than the ten inch diameter embrasure to allow movement. O’Neil thought some of the gunports in the tower were of the original construction, though many do not appear in old photos and illustrations of the structure. One of the main issues with the gunports at the east end of the tower is that they leave blind spots. The east tower at the northeast, southeast and southwest corners have two gunports each at ninety degrees to each other. Their placement in the wall slopes allowed the guns to be pointed straight forward or away from the centre of the walls they were located in. This would have left most of the tower walls as dead angles. In addition to these gunports it may have had rooftop guns. This has been assumed by the tower’s wide crenelations and roof design. If so then the tower would have housed a number of guns of a variety of sizes and possible uses. The introduction of structures adapted for firearms shows the town’s willingness to use new military technology.

Another unusual feature in God’s House Tower is huge windows which seem to compromise its strength. One reason put forward is that these large windows were needed for light. This seems logical as artificial light, such as fire, near gunpowder was potentially dangerous. The main tower at the east has a large number of these windows. However the placement of these large windows in such a vulnerable position, even for light, seems unlikely. When the city of Paris was refortified in 1415, similar windows are mentioned. An account detailing the refortification of Paris states that ‘two double Flemish windows’ were built for large crossbows and other missile weapons. Liebel writes that large crossbows and other such weapons were often used from large windows, stone vaulting or atop walls. If this was a common feature of fortifications then it would be no
surprise that great crossbows, crossbows and bows were employed at these embrasures, remedying the blind spots of the gunports. By this arrangement, we again see traditional arms alongside newer ones employed for the town defence, integrated it into the town defence organisation. All these windows are located on the first floor which also decreases the threat such large windows posed. In addition some manner of shutter was also used to close the windows for peace or war, allowing more protection for those inside whether from the elements or enemy attack.

As God’s House Tower was constructed, Watergate was involved in major works. This addition possibly included machicolations if, as previous scholarship has pointed out, the similarity between them and God’s House Tower’s machicolation are contemporary. Watergate was enlarged with a great length of parapets for the increased defensive, though the main purpose of this rebuild was domestic. Later in 1434 Richard Romsey worked on Watergate for over two weeks with the help of two men, receiving ale and gifts from the town in addition to payment. In March 1442 the face of the portcullis was reinforced with 103lbs. of iron. The continued works on the military aspects of Watergate show that both military and domestic needs could be met by the same structure and that the town was aware of its continued defensive use.

It is possible that during this period Eastgate received rooftop guns. In the only existent illustration it has wide crenelation, similar to those at God’s House Tower, so it is possible this modification was contemporary. How many of these fortifications, Eastgate included, that had these works is debatable as it isn’t until 1468 that the location of all the town firearms can be verified. Only Bargate and God’s House are clearly listed as having had guns before 1450 though this does not mean the others did not. It is probable that till 1450 the number of firearms in the town was somewhat limited, as the 1434 inventory lists only four smaller guns and one great cannon. In the late 1440s the number of town firearms had increased to at least six smaller guns, an organ gun on a cart, and a cannon

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220 SBS 1428-1434, p.121.
221 SBS 1441-1442, p. 27.
223 See Figure Thirty.
224 SBS 1467-1468, pp. 34-35.
225 SBS 1449-1450, pp. 33-37, 57.
named ‘Thomas with the Beard’. This small number indicates that not all the existing fortifications of the town would have needed such modifications for gunpowder artillery, so it is probable most were adapted at a later date.

Bargate had many works done to maintain its military utility throughout this period. In 1428 a new bridge was built, £3 1s. and 8d. was spent on the timber alone, 12d. to haul it; £3 10s. 5d. in total. Around this time the drawbridge had work done to secure it. In 1433 three men, a mason, one paver, and one labourer, carried out works amounting to £3 8s. 9½d. The town paid for two posts called ‘stulpes’ for the repair of Bargate, installed by John Forster and Thomas Swainsey. At this time the town paid Roger Swyn for repairs to Bargate’s wall. In 1441 and 1442 a number of general repairs were done to Bargate. The bridge to Bargate was repaired in March 1441, the walls in October, the gate and prison in November. As would be expected, as the gate and bridge were made of wood and in use continually, they often needed repairs. For most of the time between 1400 to 1450 Bargate was maintained, with works increasing in the 1440s. Thus Bargate was probably in good strength during the first half of the century.

Repairs to the walls were ongoing as they were during the fourteenth century, with periods of intense building, staggered with quiet periods. In the 1420s John Bartelot was paid £5 16s. 8d. for various works. John was also given 8d. as a gift for his work and drink while he worked on this project. Around this same time Richard Mason was paid 6d. daily with two workers to repair the walls of Watergate. For two days these three men hauled lime, sand and other materials to the site to repair the fortifications. In July 1438 works on walls by Westheath were undertaken by Thomas Bartlett for 20s. In March and August 1442 townsmen were paid for unspecified repairs to the town walls. In 1450 John

227 SBS 1449-1450, pp. 33-37, 57.
228 SBS 1428-1434, pp. 90-92.
229 Ibid, p. 11.
230 Ibid, p. 25.
231 SBS 1428-1434, p.79.
232 SBS 1434-1439, p. 33.
233 Ibid, p. 33.
234 SBS 1441-1442, p. 29, 30 and 38.
235 Ibid, p. 29, 30 and 38.
236 SBS 1428-1434, p.29.
238 Ibid, p.63.
239 SBS 1434-1439, p. 87.
240 SBS 1441-1442, pp. 27 and 28.
Williams was paid 12d. for timber used to repair the walls.\textsuperscript{241} While most entries do not give exact locations, the walls were receiving repairs, probably those in prominent places or in severe disrepair first. As one of the largest forms of physical protection of the town, the walls were very often in need of repairs.

While the fortifications were clearly military in function they also were a sign of clear civic pride and status. In 1428 the town paid a labourer named Robert 2s. to clean God’s House Gate and Watergate over a six day period.\textsuperscript{242} It is perhaps interesting as well that God’s House Gate and Watergate would be the first major fortifications that would be seen to persons arriving by sea into Southampton port, a show of the town’s military might, social class and economic wealth.

While most of the records account for the works on the major gates and fortifications of the town there were many lesser structures that were maintained for the protection of the town. One such gate, named Reynold’s Gate along the west wall, probably a postern to either Blue Anchor Gate or Simnel Gate, was repaired by John Foster and his boy for 22s. 8d. in the mid 1430s.\textsuperscript{243} In August 1442 Pilgrims Gate, Soper Tower and the Woolbridge received work.\textsuperscript{244} John Foster and his man worked on Eastgate’s bridge during this same month.\textsuperscript{245} It seems these repairs were simple maintenance as the account entries state the work was done and paid for small amounts of both time and money. These smaller gates would be a huge liability if the town failed to maintain them, and were at times sealed for security if the danger outweighed the utility.

The moat was repaired on occasion during this period. In May 1438 five labourers cleared and maintained the town ditch and were paid 2s. 1d. for a day’s labour.\textsuperscript{246} As one of the first lines of physical obstacles to an enemy, letting these defences fall into disrepair by the accumulation of silt or rubbish could severely hamper their effectiveness. These repairs and cleanings were important to maintain the width and depth of the moats. This ensured that the enemy would have no place to find shelter if they did reach the ditches, allowing the defending archers and others to retain the advantage.

\textsuperscript{241} SBS 1449-1450, p. 33.
\textsuperscript{242} SBS 1428-1434, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{243} SBS 1434-1439, p. 27.
\textsuperscript{244} SBS 1441-1442, p. 28.
\textsuperscript{245} Ibid, p. 40.
\textsuperscript{246} SBS 1434-1439, p. 83.
One new fortification made during this period was Catchcold Tower. The first account listing is unclear if it is an initial building or maintenance. It states, April 1438, James Johnson and Lawrence Strode were paid 20d. for carrying piles to Catchcold Tower. Yet as this appears to be the earliest record of Catchcold it could be either building or maintenance. More works were done soon after. On 16 May five labourers were paid for work at Catchcold Tower 2s. 1d. A day later work continued with seven men paid 2s. 11d. plus 4d. for two gallons of ale at the mayor’s orders for their good work. While the account is vague it is clear that the town put a great deal of work into this new fortification, whether it was new construction or repairs to the tower. What is clear is that it appears nowhere before 1438 and no similar tower was mentioned. It can then be assumed that somewhere in the mid to late 1430s it was built and completed.

Catchcold Tower, as God’s House Tower, was a very important development in urban military technology as a specially built artillery tower. It is located at the northwest of town, south of Arundel’s Tower. It has three keyhole gunports of eleven inch apertures with eleven inch vertical slits. The north gunport faces directly toward Arundel’s Tower. The Southern gunport faces dead on the town wall and depending on the size of the gun’s barrel would be nearly impossible to hit anything besides the town or castle walls. The centre gunport is the only gunport not directed toward town defences, as it was aimed directly over the sea. The alignment of these gunports could be for a number of reasons, and the type of shot and size of gun are vital to determining this. If a large gun, around seven to ten inches, was in use it would lose much of its range of fire and only be able to fire ahead, possibly damaging the defender’s own fortifications. It is also possible that such a gun could have used some type of grapeshot but use of such ammunition at this time with firearms is poorly accounted for. A medium to small gun would have a larger range of fire and the shot would not damage their own fortifications, which perhaps indicates it was specifically used for flanking fire to Arundel’s Tower and the other fortifications around it. It is also probable that a larger rooftop gun was present atop Catchcold Tower.

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247 Ibid, p. 79, 83; and O’Neil, Castles and Cannons, p. 31.
248 Turner, Town Defences in England and Wales, p. 175.
249 SBS 1434-1439, p. 83.
250 Ibid, p. 83; Turner, Town Defences in England and Wales, p. 175.
251 O’Neil, Castles and Cannons, p. 31; Saunders, ‘Coastal Defence’, p. 137. (Catchcold Tower received gunports at the same time as Polymond’s Tower.
252 Turner, Town Defences in England and Wales, p. 66.
253 Creighton and Higham, Medieval Town Walls, p. 111.
To the north of God's House a garite was built in 1441. The space under the garite was rented as a stable. The garite was probably built along the walls to reinforce them, as were others of the town. From these platforms townsmen and other defenders could protect the walls. Increasing the width of the wall-walk also makes it possible to have an increased number of men in one place and the possibility of artillery, both traditional and firearms.

Town supplies also appear to have been bought and stored for the fortifications. Many times payment for works on the defences list only labour, so apparently the materials from the town stores were employed. Stone from the Isle of Wight was often acquired, as sailors were paid for bringing it to the town. Richard Batteley hauled wood from Bargate to Watergate but no specific purpose is disclosed. In May 1442 the town purchased a supply of lime, stone and a large store of timber. Such huge quantities of materials bought and stored by the town give us insight into the vastness of the town's responsibilities.

Henry VI's government recognized the importance of the town and its fortifications. In 1426 the fee farm was reduced to £100. In a letter from the king to Southampton from 1445 the military obligation between the king and the town is stated as were the high costs to the town. The king recognized the many adversities the town faced: harsh weather, the sea, attackers, all caused damage and harm to the townsmen and the town. The king also stated that these attacks happened 'too frequently' upon the town resulting in huge financial and physical burdens to the townspeople. Henry then released the town completely from the £200 fee farm. The king expected these funds to be employed in financing the town's fortifications to prepare for current and future dangers.

Late in the first half of the fifteenth century a new type of fortification began to appear in towns and Southampton was no exception. As firearm artillery came into its own few changes to town fortifications were as common as the bulwark, which was first built outside Bargate in 1450. Timber was recorded and barriers were recorded as part of

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254 SBS 1441-1442, p. 5.
255 Liebel, Slingals and Great Crossbows, p. 50.
256 SBS 1428-1434, p.29.
257 Ibid, p.77.
258 SBS 1441-1442, pp. 34 and 38.
259 Charters 1199-1480, p. 41.
260 Ibid, pp. 55 and 83.
261 Ibid, p. 83.
262 Ibid, p. 83.
264 SBS 1449-1450, p. 57.
its construction. As one of the earliest records of these structures in the town, if not the earliest, its location at Bargate is appropriate in many ways, both militarily and as the head building of the town government. This defence indicates the town was making more adaptations of firearms and fortifications to counter them to further protect themselves.

The way these fortifications were used outside times of threat was tied to their wartime roles. Watergate in particular is a good example of this occurrence. In a will left by William Soper in 1458 it seems that he and his family had dwelled in Watergate prior to 1450. At this time it appears he actually rented from the town all of Watergate and its related buildings and gardens. It was granted to his wife and children upon his death for a fixed number of years. Now in this account no mention was made of the military obligations except that they could not interfere with the gate’s defensive utility and had maintenance responsibilities. By combining this lease agreement with an earlier account of Watergate and one that takes place in the later part of the fifteenth century, the mid fifteenth century agreement can be better understood. As other agreements for the rental of Watergate directly include the military obligation of maintaining the structure, the Sopers’ would have been required to maintain it as well, although the town likely remained involved with larger repairs.

In 1450 an account in the Steward’s Book of the town for that year lists Bargate as having firearms. John Wayte was paid for work ‘pertaining to the guns of Bargate’. While the exact number of guns is unknown, gun is plural so at least two were housed there. The account also does not specify how the guns were used in the fortification. What is clear is that this was one of the few fortifications that had guns by this date besides God’s House Tower.

The first half of the fifteenth century can be seen as a gradual increase in military developments that began in the fourteenth century. Both traditional means of fortifications and ones that utilized gunpowder technology were combined to increase the town’s protection. The kings of this period remained interested to varying degrees in the town’s defensive preparations by making concessions, and on occasion increasing their

265 Ibid, p. 57.
266 BIBS 1414-1503, pp. 101-103.
268 Ibid, p. 103.
269 Ibid, pp. 78-87.
270 SBS 1449-1450, p. 57.
271 Ibid, pp. 33 and 57.
272 See Figure Thirty-one.
involvement when they deemed necessary. The period was busy in regard to fortifications, spending at least two of the five decades building God's House Tower, Catchcold Tower, major repairs to Watergate and a great number of small works of maintenance. The town continued developing its military fortifications acting in a clear military organisation which included design, administration of materials and manpower, building new structures for military use, and repairing and improving those already existing.

The second half of the fifteenth century

Southampton continued to rely on traditional means of protection in the second half of the fifteenth century alongside newer firearms. Walls, ditches, portcullises and gates were created and repaired to protect the town were often adapted for firearms. The increased use of bulwarks throughout the century indicates the increased importance of firearms. Although they appeared in the first half of the fifteenth century, in the second half they were a major facet of the town’s defences. After 1450 the town’s possession of firearms increased greatly as will be examined in Chapter Four. From the inventories of 1434 to 1450 this proliferation of gunpowder technology can be seen. Yet, as Chapter Four will demonstrate, it is not until after 1450 that firearms were present in sufficient numbers to play a crucial part of town defence.

Many alterations to fortifications to accommodate firearms probably took place from 1450 to 1500. One account, the 1468 inventory, gives the number and location of the town guns. Polymond’s Tower, the two towers east of it, the Watchtower and other existing towers were modified, as a circular embrasure was added to the base of the arrowloops for guns by this date. The two towers beside Polymond’s Tower are examples of this, both containing arrowloops that have been modified to allow for firearms. Only two of the loops were modified in this way, both facing Polymond’s Tower, those remaining to be used by archers. Each of these towers had one gun each, so it can be assumed that the tower remained in use by both archer and gunner throughout the fifteenth century. Polymond’s Tower at this time also was listed as having one gun, the probable arrowloops modified to allow guns as was done with some of the arrowloops alongside it.

275 SBS 1467-1468, pp. 34-35.
As we have seen, during the mid fifteenth century the Soper family dwelled at Watergate and was responsible for its care. This arrangement alleviated the costs of general maintenance but this was not always sufficient. Watergate appears to have been somewhat dilapidated during part of the third quarter of the fifteenth century for which the repairs were stated ‘at no little cost.’ Roger Kelsale, a royal servant, soon after rented the property for 12d. per annum, a very low cost for such a building. The true costs were not in the yearly rent but primarily the military needs of Watergate. If he failed to maintain the tower the town could seize it from him, and most importantly it was still the town’s responsibility to defend the tower in war. In 1481 a new lease was made, once more designating the tenant with military obligations in exchange for living there. While the town made repairs to Watergate at times, the tenant clearly had special military obligation regarding the structure. These contracts were important as they demonstrate how the town was able to maintain its fortifications for war during peace times, while utilizing it in various aspects of urban life.

One of the most devastating enemies of the town defences was nature. With half the town defences along the seaside, erosion and violent storms inflicted great damage to them. A storm in early February 1473 left the fortifications in need of repair. On 6, 7 and 13 February men worked to repair the damage. On 6 February, five men began repairs from the storm on Watergate, which continued through March as follows: three men for six days, two for five and a half days, one for four days, two for three days, and two for two days. This totals ten men working varying amounts there. The town lost no time after the storm to correct the damage the storm had done. Such promptness, only days after the event, shows the town leaders were vigilant custodians of their fortifications.

Maintenance of fortifications is an indication that the town continually was involved in their military obligations. Bargate had mostly small repairs with few works done after

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276 BIBS 1414-1503, pp. 101-103.
277 Ibid, p. 78.
278 Ibid, pp. 78-87.
279 Ibid, p. 83.
280 Ibid, p. 83.
282 Ibid, p. 87.
1450. In 1456, 1457, 1470, 1498 and 1500 Bargate had multiple projects done.\textsuperscript{286} God’s House Tower had more work done to it during the same era. In 1457 in preparation for attacks multiple repairs were done.\textsuperscript{287} The walls themselves were repaired and stairs made for the townsmen and the town gunner.\textsuperscript{288} Saunders Lokyer made ‘for twysts and locks and bolts for windows in the tower that weighs 15lbs. at \$1/2d. per pound.’\textsuperscript{289} This entry in the Steward’s Book indicates lockable shutters were employed to strengthen the large windows for the comfort of those working or dwelling in the structure. More repairs to God’s House were completed in 1468, 1473, 1482, 1485, 1492, 1498 and 1500, though they appear to have been simply maintenance, and in 1482 and 1500 it was cleaned.\textsuperscript{290} Westgate in 1461, 1467, 1472, 1485 to 1486 and 1500 had repairs done, and once more in 1472 it was cleaned, but previous to 1500 for a decade no works are recorded.\textsuperscript{291}

Watergate for the first few decades had little or no recorded works done on it, so perhaps the tenants made these repairs, or let it fall into disrepair. In early 1470 and 1471 works were done, those in 1471 costing £7 14s. 1d., an indication of the scale of these repairs.\textsuperscript{292} In 1471 a new gate was hung and waterproofed, and the old gate was burned and pillaged for iron fittings.\textsuperscript{293} In 1474, 1478 and 1500 more maintenance to Watergate was done, including cleaning in 1500.\textsuperscript{294} The works at Watergate in 1500 were quite extensive and at one point some twenty-three labourers were employed.\textsuperscript{295} The Steward’s Book states it was painted within the Portcullis and without at this time as well.\textsuperscript{296} Eastgate of all the town’s major gates and towers shows the least repairs during this period. Only in 1482 and 1500 does the Stewards’ Books indicate works done, in 1482 to the gate and in 1500 the bridge.\textsuperscript{297} Most of the works related to these defences at this time were small repairs, with few instances of large scale projects upon them. Whether the fortifications simply were in

\textsuperscript{286} SBS 1456-1457, p. 15; SBS 1469-1470, p. 36; SBS 1497-1498, pp. 13 and 15; SBS 1500-1501, p. 43.
\textsuperscript{287} SBS 1456-1457, p. 23.
\textsuperscript{288} Ibid, p. 22.
\textsuperscript{289} Ibid, p. 27.
\textsuperscript{290} SBS 1467-1468, p. 18; SCA 5/1/15 SBS 1474-1475, pp. f.24r. and f.26; SCA 5/1/20 SBS 1484-1485, p. f.37; SBS 1492-1493, p. 15; SBS 1497-1498, p. 5; SBS 1500-1501, pp. 38, 46.
\textsuperscript{291} SBS 1461-1462, p. 16; SBS 1467-1468, p. 6; SBS 1472-1473, p. 13; SBS 1478-1479, p. 11; SCA 5/1/20 SBS 1484-1485, p. f.38r; SCA 5/1/21 SBS 1485-1486, p. f. 29; SBS 1500-1501, p. 32.
\textsuperscript{292} SBS 1469-1470, p. 26; SBS 1470-1471, p. 29; SBS 1470-1471, pp. 46-51.
\textsuperscript{293} Ibid, pp. 47-51.
\textsuperscript{294} SCA 5/1/15 SBS 1474-1475, p. f.23, f.23r, f.24 and f.24r; SBS 1478-1479, p. 15; SBS 1500-1501, pp. 39 and 40.
\textsuperscript{295} Ibid, p. 40.
\textsuperscript{296} Ibid, p. 42.
\textsuperscript{297} SBS 1481-1482, p. 32; SBS 1500-1501, p. 46.
good condition needing little repair or left to fall into slight disrepair is impossible to
discern.

The town walls continually received work from 1450 to 1500. Various sections
were repaired in 1456 and 1457.\(^{298}\) Robert Carpenter worked on the walls and placed guns
upon them.\(^{299}\) In 1460 the king ordered Southampton readied for attacks by Richard, Duke
of York; arraying men, setting watches, sending spies and fortifying the town, specifically
the ‘Loupes’.\(^{300}\) In 1467 general repairs were done by three townsmen for eighteen days at
a number of sections. One work was the addition of wooden stairs to the wall-walk, all for
£2 19s. 10d.\(^{301}\) In March 1468 John Bevy, carpenter, repaired damaged loops, and later
twenty-eight of them were painted by Thomas Whyght, Stainer.\(^{302}\) The walls near God’s
House Gate were repaired in the mid 1470s.\(^{303}\) From 1478 to 1479 the town walls were
repaired at various locations including those near Bargate.\(^{304}\) During the late 1470s major
works were underway, huge amounts of materials used, thousands of feet of timber and
hundreds of tons of stone purchased.\(^{305}\) Repairs were done to ‘walls where damaged’ in
1485, though the steward does not indicate where or how the walls were damaged, though
much timber was used.\(^{306}\) Whether this was for the added walkways behind the walls to
widen the wall-walk or some type of hoarding is unknown. These wall repairs continued in
1485 with two other phases of repairs to the walls at unspecific points.\(^{307}\) In 1492 the town
spent £8 on wall repairs, such expense indicating major works were done.\(^{308}\) For years
afterwards the town spent more than normal, demonstrating increased maintenance to the
walls.\(^{309}\) In 1498 renewed works began on various but small projects on the walls including
works on the walls near Friary Gate.\(^{310}\) In 1500 repairs and cleaning were done to the wall
from Watergate to the Watch Bell Tower.\(^{311}\) The town’s works on their walls 1450 to 1500

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\(^{298}\) SBS 1456-1457, pp. 9, 22-24.
\(^{299}\) Ibid, p. 24.
\(^{300}\) CPR 1452-1461, p. 602.
\(^{301}\) SBS 1467-1468, p. 5.
\(^{302}\) SBS 1467-1468, p. 23.
\(^{303}\) SCA 5/1/15 SBS 1474-1475, pp. f.24r and f.26
\(^{304}\) SBS 1478-1479, p. 13.
\(^{305}\) Ibid, pp. 20-22, 27, 30, 31 and 32.
\(^{306}\) SCA 5/1/20 SBS 1484-1485, p. f.36r and f.37r.
\(^{307}\) Ibid, p. f.39 and f.40.
\(^{308}\) SBS 1492-1493, p. 9.
\(^{309}\) SCA 5/1/20 SBS 1484-1485, p. f.39 and f.40.
\(^{310}\) SBS 1497-1498, pp. 7 and 13.
\(^{311}\) SBS 1500-1501, p. 39.
show for the greater part small maintenance works every decade, with heavy spending toward the end in 1485 to 1492.

Another development during the last half of the fifteenth century was strengthening of the town’s quays for defence. The possible weakness of an unprotected landing site is obvious as the raid of 1338 illustrated. The main quay of the town was fortified in 1457, probably in response to the threat of French raids, with a timber and earth structure, and with one of the ‘great guns’.312 This structure while not called a bulwark appears to be exactly that, as these fortifications became common in such vulnerable places. The Western Quay also was strengthened in 1457.313 John Myles and two other carpenters were paid to create a gate through the town walls at West Quay.314 Later that year six men worked on the walls there.315 Five men dug a ditch outside the western walls as an additional protection.316 During the works of 1457 to 1458 the West Quay ditch was shored with timber.317 No other building was done until 1482 when West Quay was repaired and cleaned.318 As West Quay was enlarged and therefore more useful for disembarkation of merchandise, this also made the quay ideal for landing men-at-arms. The town employed these means of fortification as simple yet effective ways to increase their ability to defend the town, especially the vulnerable quays.

In the mid fifteenth century new bulwarks of earth and timber appeared in Southampton. Hutchinson states that at the time many harbours created such fortifications.319 Many of the town bulwarks were fitted with gates, and in 1457 Saunders Lokyer made three keys, three ‘staples’, two pairs of ‘twysts’ and two hooks for one bulwark’s gate.320 Will Taylor worked for two and a half days placing guns and filling the bulwark with earth. Two men also for four days set up ordnance at the bulwark, indicating large guns or a large number of them were used there.321 These could be significant structures, as great numbers of planks, nails and other materials were used in their construction.322 In 1470 at Watergate, the first phase of the bulwark was carried out by

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312 SBS 1456-1457, p. 23.
313 Ibid, p. 18.
315 Ibid, p. 20.
316 Ibid, p. 20.
317 Ibid, p. 11.
318 SBS 1481-1482, pp. 32-33.
319 Hutchinson, Medieval Ships and Ship Building, p. 163.
320 SBS 1456-1457, p. 21.
321 Ibid, p. 22.
322 Ibid, p. 22.
seven men, including two Londoners, for a week.\textsuperscript{323} Richard Yryshe sawed 125 feet of lumber for this bulwark indicating its substantial size, and Gyllam Carter then carted this timber and other materials for it. Seven men for most of a week set up 'pipes' then filled the bulwark with earth. A cooper made iron hoops for the bulwark to bind the timber piles together. The king's master of ordnance, William Temple, oversaw these defensive improvements.\textsuperscript{324} The description in this account gives a very interesting view of how bulwarks were made. The timber posts were bound together, making them a solid defence on their own.

After the wood structure was finished the front of it was covered with earth, for repelling firearms. The fact that outside, skilled men were employed shows the town's interest in getting the best technical help available. In 1474 two men spent a day repairing Watergate Bulwark.\textsuperscript{325} Works on the bulwarks increased in the mid 1480s. In 1485 a large number of labourers and materials, mainly planks, were involved in these works.\textsuperscript{326} More timber was later needed for the project.\textsuperscript{327} In June and July 1485 repairs continued on the bulwarks at West Quay.\textsuperscript{328} Related works continued in the mid- to late 1480s. In 1488 two phases of works were done to the bulwark of God's House Gate.\textsuperscript{329} At this time the bulwark of West Quay was repaired as well.\textsuperscript{330} These bulwarks would be the first defences of the town, protecting the vulnerable wooden gates of the town from cannon fire. The adoption of these fortifications mirrors many other towns and fortifications all over Europe as the threat of firearms increased, showing the town's ability to cope with new threats and technologies.

In 1457 a fortification was built in the salt marshes to the east of the town. A number of entries from 1457 record various projects there. These works began with six labourers working on 'the walls'. Soon after the town gunner and his man worked five days there as well.\textsuperscript{331} These works continued with more men for weeks if not longer. Bread and beer were sent for the workers provided by the town. Later the town gunner was once more

\textsuperscript{323} SBS 1469-1470, p. 31.  
\textsuperscript{324} Ibid, p. 32.  
\textsuperscript{325} SCA 5/1/15 SBS 1474-1475, p. f.24r.  
\textsuperscript{326} SCA 5/1/20 SBS 1484-1485, pp. f.35r., f. 36 and f.36r.  
\textsuperscript{327} Ibid, p. f.36r.  
\textsuperscript{328} Ibid, pp. f.37r. and f.38.  
\textsuperscript{329} SBS 1487-1488, pp. 41 and 49.  
\textsuperscript{330} Ibid, p. 57.  
\textsuperscript{331} SBS 1456-1457, p. 22.
at work there with one of his men and two other town labourers. Richard Smith carted ‘turfs’ to this fortification in the salt marshes, indicating the defence was at least partially earthen. Perhaps more bulwarks were being built to protect the town in the salt marshes, or some type of timber and earth fortress was built outside the town walls to protect from attack from the east. Its function would have depended on how far into the marshes the town built this fortification. It may be that this defence was built somewhere along the Itchen River to keep ships from landing unopposed, especially with unloading equipment and artillery and protecting the suburbs, and the ships moored there. If built close to the town it would serve as any of the other bulwarks, protecting vulnerable points of the town, usually gates, from assault.

In 1458 Edmund, a labourer, cleaned the town ditches to the walls for four days. This work fulfilled two obvious functions. First, it kept the ditches clear of obstacles and freed the moat of refuse to maintain its depth and width which was important militarily. It was also important for the image of the town, to look well to those approaching it from outside as a social statement. In 1478 it again was cleaned. It seems the townspeople maintained the castle moat, though they were not officially responsible, as in 1485 repairs were made to it. In 1488 men worked for seven and a half days to ‘scour’ the town ditches. These few repairs probably were sufficient to keep the moats operational, though the duration of time between maintenance might indicate they were cluttered much of the time.

Southampton petitioned the Council of Lords for aid with their fortifications in 1460. The condition of the defences is stated as a third or more of the landward side of the walls were ‘so feeble that they may not resist against any gunshot’. They were so thin that they needed wood wall-walks to defend them, and had to be reinforced with earth to strengthen them to keep them from falling. These repairs needed be done yearly at great expense. Their purpose was to build a thicker wall that would be stronger and offer less yearly costs, but the initial cost was too great for them without the king’s help. The constant rebuilding of the wooden wall-walk and the inner rampart could be the same

332 Ibid, p. 23.
335 SBS 1478-1479, p. 13.
336 SCA 5/1/20 SBS 1484-1485, p. f.37r.
337 SBS 1487-1488, p. 43.
338 Letters of the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries, p. 21.
process that was used during the investigation in 1353 of eroded earthen walls and poplar board palisades that were ruined.\textsuperscript{340} It may indeed be that the landward sides of the town defences had received few major changes since they were created. The account also numbers the loops of the wall at 472.\textsuperscript{341} Their next largest complaint was the castle’s weakened state. This account portrays the town defences in some detail, though care is needed as it is a request for aid and if the townsmen said all was in fine condition no aid would have been granted.

In 1461 Edward IV offered the town aid and praise for their past service to the crown and the kingdom for protecting themselves. Edward stated that the town’s location by the sea had made it often an enemy target and that the town had resisted those wishing to invade with great costs and burdens to themselves. The king then granted them more freedoms that, ‘they will be more strongly and effectually bound to pay to us and our heirs similar gratitude for the future, and will show themselves the more ready to serve us according to their means’.\textsuperscript{342} This account reveals unique aspects of the relationship that existed between the town and king. First that the king realized that the town put great efforts both in terms of money, planning and manpower into the construction of the walls and other fortifications for defence. He also realized their vital importance to the kingdom’s safe keeping from invasion. The king used this grant in an attempt to gain the town of Southampton’s support.\textsuperscript{343}

Often the enactment of military obligations by the town led to royal rewards. In May 1469 Edward rewarded Southampton for military services, including aid for their fortifications.\textsuperscript{344} He granted freedom from customs on 50 sacks of wool leaving their port yearly. One stipulation was that at least £135 was to be spent on the town defences.\textsuperscript{345} This benefit was for sixteen years starting in 1469. Such a grant was a welcome bonus for the townsmen in their military obligations and showed the king’s gratitude for the town’s diligence and loyalty. In November 1478 King Edward granted the town £40 from the town customs for fortifications.\textsuperscript{346} This allowance by the king was due to an earlier report from

\textsuperscript{340} CMI 1348-1377, p. 38; Platt, Medieval Southampton, p. 122.
\textsuperscript{341} Letters of the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries, p. 21.
\textsuperscript{342} Charters 1199-1480, p. 101.
\textsuperscript{343} Ibid, p. 101.
\textsuperscript{344} CPR 1467-1477, p. 154.
\textsuperscript{345} Ibid, p. 154.
\textsuperscript{346} CCR 1476-1485, p. 100.
June that sections of the town walls were in disrepair.\textsuperscript{347} The report though states that only some sections were in disrepair indicating that most of the town walls were in good condition, which fits with the consistency of wall repairs. Henry VII continued such grants offering the town £50 to repair the west defences in 1493.\textsuperscript{348} He broke this £50 in two payments, the first being £34, and the rest following after so he could ensure the works had begun and that they were done to his expectations.\textsuperscript{349} This system of splitting the payment in two halves was an excellent way to motivate the townsmen into action. These grants were always invaluable to fund the building and repairs to the town's fortifications.

A new protective device was also being built in the early 1470s. The description that the steward of the town uses is a 'sea side hedge'. While this is unclear as to exactly what it is or what was used in its building, the labour supplied indicates it was a large project. The labour force added up to sixteen men working on the structure for sixteen days.\textsuperscript{350} 21s. and 9½d. was spent on the labour alone.\textsuperscript{351} It was probably some type of sea breaks made to keep enemy ships from vulnerable places in the town's defence.

The years between 1450 and 1500 can be seen in great part as upkeep of existing fortifications with few new structures created. After 1450 few totally new structures were built in comparison to the period from the raid of 1338 to 1450. This perhaps is not surprising considering the amount of works that had taken place in the last hundred years. In the fourteenth century the town walls were finished, as well as many of the towers and gates of the town, and those existing were enlarged. Fortifications designed for firearms like the arcade in the fourteenth century and God's House and Catchcold Towers in the earlier fifteenth century were supplemented by bulwarks and other fortifications adapted for firearms in the second half of the fifteenth century.

What does change from 1450 onward is the increase of firearms and their use in town defence. While in the fourteenth century and first half of the fifteenth century they remain limited in location, by 1468 they made up a great part of the town security. While not the primary protection for the town, as traditional missile weapons remained common into the next century, they had a designated place in the town's scheme of protection. With existing fortifications modified for carrying firearms, arrowloops expanded to be used with

\textsuperscript{347} Ibid, p. 109.
\textsuperscript{348} SBS 1492-1493, p. 73.
\textsuperscript{349} Ibid, pp. 73, 73a. and 73b.
\textsuperscript{350} SBS 1469-1470, pp. 35-36.
\textsuperscript{351} Ibid, pp. 35-36.
bow, crossbow and handgun, Southampton in the second half of the fifteenth century embraced gunpowder technology. Another indication of this understanding is the town’s incorporation of ways to counter firearms. While the building of bulwarks clearly took place before the turn of 1450 it was only afterwards that they became a major feature in the town’s defence, protecting the main gates and quays. These structures became an integral part of the town fortifications before long.

Both the existing and the new fortifications needed repair and attention before long for them to remain operational. This was the main theme of the second half of the fifteenth century: maintenance. There were not more than a few years without some repair to the defences and we would probably know of more if more of the Stewards’ Books had been preserved. While there are many years of Stewards’ Books remaining that do not include expenses for mending of fortifications, these years are by far the exception. For the most part it seems the town was interested in keeping their military structures in order, whether at times it was more for social status or defence. The town clearly designated the building and maintaining of their fortifications as an important part of their military organisation.

**Royal Fortifications of Southampton**

**Previous to the fourteenth century**

The primary way the king contributed directly to the Southampton’s defence was through his castle. According to Speed in his *History of Southampton*, the castle was built by William the Conqueror. He records though that the earliest written evidence was from the reign of King John when Adam de Port was constable there. He also states it was the only fortification until the raid in 1338, which is not correct, but perhaps more accurate if applied to the town’s western defences. The earliest literary evidence of the castle is a treaty from 1153 between King Stephen and Henry of Anjou that some type of castle existed, probably of motte and bailey construction as was common at the time. By the mid twelfth century at the latest some type of royal fortification was in Southampton. This castle was not just a way to show the king’s authority and command of the people in the area but also to protect his kingdom from threats both internal and external. This castle

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353 Ibid, p.15.
continued throughout the medieval period to be one of the primary ways the king participated in the town's protection.

The castle received only sporadic attention in the medieval period. Henry III visited the castle in Southampton on a number of occasions and appears to have maintained it in good order.\(^{355}\) Edward I had extensive work done on the castle from 1272 to 1273.\(^{356}\) While these repairs may have placed the castle in good condition, it seems that just decades afterwards it was in a state of disarray.\(^{357}\) By 1286 it supposedly once more was in need of major repairs.\(^{358}\) This pattern of maintenance continued for the entire working life of the castle, with periods of great works and disrepair. This trend of attention to the castle by various kings often coincides with their attention to the town, probably because of some fear of attack on the town.

The fourteenth century

The king's interest in the castle fluctuated throughout the late medieval period as it had done for hundreds of years before. By the early fourteenth century the castle had been in some degree of disrepair for several decades.\(^{359}\) In December 1307 Edward II commissioned the Keeper of Southampton Castle to see it repaired and 'diligently and safely guarded'.\(^{360}\) He ordered the Sheriff of Southampton in 1308 to 'fortify and safely guard' the castle that no 'danger arise' by disrepair or insufficient watch.\(^{361}\) The gates and houses of the castle were commanded to be repaired shortly afterwards.\(^{362}\) Throughout 1307 to 1308 it seems the king went about putting the castle in order.\(^{363}\) It is clear the castle was seen as an important part of town defence by both the town and the king.

In 1330 Edward III ordered the castle be repaired, particularly as he planned in the near future to stay there.\(^{364}\) For much of his reign there was little other activity, Platt stating that during the closing years of Edward III's reign there were no accounts indicating the king was maintaining Southampton Castle at all.\(^{365}\) This lack of activity may be more of a


\(^{357}\) *CPR 1281-1292*, p. 13; Brown, Colvin and Taylor *A History of the Kings Works vol. 2*, p. 841.

\(^{358}\) *CPR 1281-1292*, p. 13; Brown, Colvin and Taylor *A History of the Kings Works vol. 2*, p. 841.

\(^{359}\) *CPR 1307-1313*, pp. 29-30 and 50.

\(^{360}\) *CCR 1307-1313*, p. 50.

\(^{361}\) Ibid, p. 29.

\(^{362}\) *CCR 1307-1313*, p. 31.

\(^{363}\) *CPR 1307-1313*, pp. 29-30 and 50.

\(^{364}\) *CCR 1330-1333*, p. 5.

lack of accounts as Queen Phillipa had control of the castle which she granted to a custodian in 1333, so the repairs would therefore not have been held in the king's accounts but her own.\(^{366}\) If this was the case, the castle may have remained in readiness through much of Edward's reign. Even though the queen had a constable there in mid January 1337 the king commanded Roger Norman and Thomas de Byndon to select carpenters from the county of Southampton for the king's works in Southampton, though whether these were for the castle or town it is left vague. They were given power to arrest those rebellious to this order.\(^{367}\) Even before the raid of 1338 the king was paying attention to the town and castle of Southampton so that it might be readied. The castle's keepers were important as they acted for the king, or the queen, to ensure the castle was in fair condition to repel an enemy. If the keeper was therefore engaged, then the castle probably would be well repaired and guarded. If not, the castle would have fallen into disrepair and become a liability to the town defence.

In November 1361 the king granted Richard Pembridge a pardon for his keeping of the castle so it can be assumed he was actually active in this duty.\(^{368}\) While it is unstated what specifically the £30 he was paid was intended for or how much work Richard did on the castle it appears that the king intended this money to cover the costs of the castle. In January 1372, John Foxle was made Keeper of Southampton castle.\(^{369}\) One aspect of this duty was that he was required to maintain the walls, buildings and other structures of the castle.\(^{370}\)

In the mid 1370s fear of French attacks on Southampton motivated the king to strengthen the castle.\(^{371}\) John Polymond of Southampton financially headed this work.\(^{372}\) Polymond accounted that £202 10s. was spent on the town defences and castle initially. These projects continued and intensified from summer 1377 to spring of 1378.\(^{373}\) In April 1378 the king ordered more work done on the town fortifications.\(^{374}\) Henry Maunnesfeld, Thomas Harpecote, John Pyper and Richard Baillyf supplied stone, iron, lime, planks,
timber, lead and all other needed things for the refortification of the ‘Le Oldecastell’ with ‘a tower with gate’. They were to arrest carpenters, masons, labourers and other craftsmen as needed from several counties: Somerset, Dorset, Wiltshire, Southampton, Oxford, Berkshire, Surrey and Sussex, except those on church works. These ‘Oldecastell’ works were quite extensive. In May 1378 Master William Wyndford and Master Henry Yevele, were sent to the castle to direct the increased works. They were given similar powers ‘to choose and take and set on work, at the king’s charge, as many stonemasons and other workmen as shall be necessary for the works ordered at Southampton’. From August 1378 Robert Grondon and John de Thorpe took over these offices.

John Polymond and William Bacon, two civic leaders and prosperous citizens were employed to oversee the financial aspects, particularly that wages of the workers and the costs of materials were paid. John Polymond remained in charge of this till the castle was more or less completed in 1380. In August 1378 Robert Grondon and John de Thorpe were given power for the next five months to take as many masons, carpenters, and labourers as were needed from anywhere for the ‘tower with mantlet and barbican at Southampton, which the king has ordered’. In mid January 1379 more details of the castle were set forth in another financial record for John Polymond and William Bacon’s expense on timber. The following describes much of the work on the castle: ‘in the erection of a tower and four turrets and for making a bridge, three gates, and three portcullises there.’

From 1378 to 1380 the castle of Southampton was basically rebuilt by Richard II. An idea of the scale of this labour can be gleaned from the cost of these works, as between 6 April 1378 and Christmas 1379 £1193 6s. 6d. was spent on the castle. In total from 1378 to 1388 the central tower cost £1700 with the costs on the castle completely totalling

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376 Ibid. p. 174.
378 CPR 1377-1381, p. 199.
379 Ibid. pp. 264 and 338.
382 Ibid. p. 446.
383 Ibid. p. 264.
384 Ibid. p. 313.
£1991 2s. 11½d.\textsuperscript{386} These changes seem mostly to have been to the keep, where the motte was strengthened and enlarged and surrounded by a mantlet, and the keep received a barbican with two gates.\textsuperscript{387} It probably was mostly compete by 1380 as afterwards no major expenses are recorded. No mention of firearms nor specialty work done to the fortifications for firearms exists until 1386 when three guns were sent to the castle.\textsuperscript{388} All these changes were the way in which the king fulfilled his defensive role in the town of Southampton, apparently placing a very strong and advanced fortress in their town.

By August 1380 the works on the castle seem to have been completed or close to it, as a man was hired as custodian of the new gate of the castle tower.\textsuperscript{389} However, the first mention of his payment shows up in December 1379, so it may have been completed even before this time.\textsuperscript{390} Other expenses appear in the Patent Rolls in 1383 to be paid by Thomas de Appelbys for continued works indicating that the castle had not been completely finished.\textsuperscript{391} William Bacon, the elder, also was listed that year in November as being surveyor of the works on a mantlet and pavement around the new tower at Southampton and the payment of wages and costs of materials.\textsuperscript{392}

The king ordered an official, John Philip, in May 1390 to gather masons, carpenters and labourers for repairs to the castle.\textsuperscript{393} A month later Philip lacked sufficient men to complete his task and the area he was allowed to draw upon for manpower was increased from Hampshire and enlarged to include Wiltshire as well.\textsuperscript{394} It seems that Richard was keen to keep the castle at the ready, probably hoping to maintain his massive investment. No specific repairs were noted as being performed, though the fact that Southampton was under fairly consistent threat from French attacks in the 1380s might have instilled in Richard II a desire to keep the castle he had spent a great deal of effort rebuilding in readiness for attack.

The changes over the fourteenth century in works and repairs to the castle of Southampton show the attention and concern various kings had for Southampton in general.

\textsuperscript{386} Brown, Colvin and Taylor \textit{A History of the Kings Works} vol. 2, p. 843.
\textsuperscript{387} \textit{CPR} 1281-1292, p. 13; \textit{CPR} 1377-1381, p. 264; Brown, Colvin and Taylor \textit{A History of the Kings Works} vol. 2, p. 842.
\textsuperscript{388} O'Neil, \textit{Castles and Cannons}, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{389} \textit{CPR} 1377-1381, p. 532.
\textsuperscript{390} \textit{CCR} 1377-1381, p. 395.
\textsuperscript{391} \textit{CPR} 1381-1385, p. 324.
\textsuperscript{392} Ibid, p. 334.
\textsuperscript{393} \textit{CPR} 1389-1392, p. 244.
\textsuperscript{394} Ibid, p. 279.
Even within a single reign this could change, as within both the reigns of Edward II and Edward III this can be seen. Edward II was involved with the castle for years, while others less so.\textsuperscript{395} There is no evidence of work on the castle during the closing of the reign of Edward III but accounts exist of his earlier works there.\textsuperscript{396} Richard II seems to have been the most attentive of the English kings during this century in regards to Southampton castle. In the third quarter of the fourteenth century Henry Yevel, the famous medieval engineer, and others rebuilt much of the castle including barbicans, portcullises, a ditch, a new gate with a bridge and a new, larger keep.\textsuperscript{397} These works continued from the mid 1370s to into the early 1380s and repairs were found after that at somewhat regular intervals showing perhaps more interest and concern in the town’s protection. This may not have been limited to Southampton, as nearby Portchester castle received additions both to its defences and accommodation during Richard II’s reign. This attention or lack thereof in the castle continued in cycles even into the late fifteenth century.\textsuperscript{398}

The fifteenth century

This pattern of involvement by the kings and the castle continued into the fifteenth century. As threats of attacks or increased use of the town for the king’s own purposes increased or decreased the king paid more or less heed to the state of his castle. Some kings such as Henry V proved to have been extremely interested in the castle and the town defences, in large part because he spent a great deal of time in the town, as it was used as one of the main ports for his wars in France.

Special attention was paid by Henry V in concern to the castle’s condition and readiness to be defended. In January 1415 King Henry V commissioned his uncle, Henry Bishop of Winchester, Edward Duke of York, Thomas Skelton and John Berkeley, knights, and William Brocas to ensure that all the fees and customs to repair and maintain the castle in Southampton were being used as they should, as news had reached him that men of the area were misusing these funds.\textsuperscript{399} This account indicates that those in control of these funds were not appropriately employing them as they should have been. In this case Henry had found out and made provision to deal with it.

\textsuperscript{395} CCR 1307-1313, pp. 29 and 31.
\textsuperscript{396} Platt, Medieval Southampton, pp. 107, and 125-126.
\textsuperscript{397} CPR 1377-1381, pp. 80 and 199; TNA E364/13/6; Platt, Medieval Southampton, p. 128.
\textsuperscript{398} Letters of the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries, p.21.
\textsuperscript{399} CPR 1413-1416, p.293.
For the first time in decades if not longer the king added a new fortification in Southampton, though outside the castle grounds. This second structure was built in the early fifteenth century by the king’s servants in Southampton. In 1416 this ‘great bulwark of wood’ was created to aid in the defence of the king’s ships kept in Southampton at the River Hamble. This fortification was seen as an important defence to protect the king’s vessels of war from attacks that might steal from, destroy or cripple his navy. While not immediately part of the town defences it would have played a role in the town’s larger defensive responsibilities, and in some cases did in the later fifteenth century.

The king at times appears to have neglected to maintain his castle, especially in years when he visited the town infrequently. In the account mentioned above from 1460 when the town corporation wrote regarding the dire need of aid from the king, their greatest fortification concern seemed to be the king’s failure to maintain Southampton Castle. This clearly was a huge weakness in the town defences and this obviously was why they were concerned. The town leaders stated that it was ‘most doubtful ground to keep.’ In the account they related how at high tide the walls were so low that men possibly could come alongside them in boats and assault them or that at low tide there was enough land aside the walls that enemies could disembark. They continued that the castle walls ‘be there also feeble as in any other place of the town’. The Donjon or keep of the castle also had no water now as the well had run dry, which was a serious danger in the possibility of a siege. It is probable this was just one of many ways that Southampton petitioned the king for financial assistance. The king appears to have accepted this plea and the next year in 1461 he financially aided the town in maintaining and repairing their fortifications but nothing is noted regarding repairs to the castle directly.

Whether Southampton castle was a strength or weakness to the town’s defence varies greatly over time. For much of the period this is one question that is hard to answer. As kings changed and their officials were placed over the castle, threats and danger of attacks caused repairs to fluctuate. It seems at least in the mid fifteenth century with the town leaders’ complaints that the castle was a weak point in the town defences that the need for repair was recognized as danger. This concern by the town leaders appears to have

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400 Hutchinson, *Medieval Ships and Ship Building*, p. 163.
401 *Letters of the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries*, p. 21.
403 *Charters 1199-1480*, p. 101.
404 *Letters of the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries*, p. 21.
led to the townsmen to make a number of repairs to the castle itself and its fortifications either in fear of the castle’s weakness and the king’s failure to correct them, to gain the king’s favor, or perhaps a bit of both. Either way the castle played a great role in the defence of the western circuit of town defence, making up a great percentage of the west wall’s length. If the king or his officials failed in this it could clearly have become the Achilles heel of the town military defence.

Conclusion

As can be seen from these periods of works on the town fortifications Southampton’s military organisation fluctuated greatly. Earlier in the fourteenth century the townspeople seemed little interested in expanding their defences, even knowing their inadequacies. After the raid of 1338 this changed and for the majority of the fourteenth century afterwards the townsmen were engaged in works that greatly strengthened their town’s protection. In part this was clearly because of the king’s increased interest and influence in the town with keepers and a garrison, but townsmen such as John Polymond, William Bacon and others contributed to these works. New structures of this period employed traditional defences and weapons such as God’s House Gate, towers, garites, moats, walls and others such as the Arcade were later adapted for firearms as well. All these structures melded to create a strong town system of fortifications, clearly illustrating their military organisation.

It is evident that after the raid of 1338 for decades work on the town defences moved slowly, especially finishing the town walls. This delay in completing the town wall probably rested on the lack of manpower in the town after the raid of 1338 and the Black Death. This was further complicated by the related loss in income for funding these projects with a decrease in population. While there were clear signs of apathy or even opposition to fortification building in the town, especially in regards to the royal authority in executing these works, these seem minor issues compared to the lack of manpower and funding.

The first half of the fifteenth century continued this work with maintenance on earlier defences but continued with improvements such as machicolation and firearm-equipped structures such as God’s House Tower and Catchcold Tower. Another new occurrence in Southampton was bulwarks to protect the town from firearms. The second

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half of the fifteenth century can be seen as a time of maintenance with few exceptions. These repairs included increased numbers of bulwarks and a number of firearms, the building of a fort in the salt marshes, and few other new fortifications built. This is not to say that the town had become less military minded, more that their focus was spent on the existing system of defence that was deemed sufficient, with modifications made as needed.

The developments of firearms in siege warfare had two defined effects on fortifications throughout Europe; first how these new weapons were integrated for defence, and second how they were defended against. God’s House and Catchcold Towers are clear indications of structures developed for the use of gunpowder artillery. The use of bulwarks demonstrates the reverse with Southampton creating defences against firearms. Both the employment of firearms and structures to defend against them in Southampton fit well into the increase in use of these new weapons not just in England but much of Medieval Europe.

The phases of building from 1300 to 1338, 1338-1400, 1400 to 1450 and 1450 onward all demonstrate various aspects of Southampton’s military organisation. The building, repair or neglect of fortifications were indicators of the town’s sentiment toward their military obligations. Until the raid the town showed little interest in completing their town defences. Once the raid took place a move toward correcting this remained in effect for the rest of the century. Even into the fifteenth century new additions and upgrades to the town fortifications signify the town remained diligent in their military improvement. Only after 1450 did the building of new protective structures decrease. This may be because the town then had completed a formidable series of defences more than apathy toward them as repairs remained constant as well as the addition of several small protective ancillary structures, such as bulwarks. From these phases of building it is clear that over much of the period from 1300 to 1500 the town was attentively engaged in fortifying their town, an important factor in the town’s military organisation.
Chapter Two-
Manpower of Southampton

While the knightly class bore much of the weight of war during the medieval period they did not do so alone. Commoners were also involved, and far from replacing the knightly class, they enlarged armies numerically and filled positions necessary to developing medieval armies such as archers, hobelars and additional men-at-arms to reinforce the dwindling number of knights available. While not superior to knights, they were essential to the success of any campaign. As demand grew for these soldiers, commoners were obligated to the king to take up arms. While the ancient levy of all males 16 to 60 could be employed for many military purposes, it was primarily used in defence. The commission of array was also utilized to raise soldiers for defence as well as conflicts abroad. The men of Southampton were an involved part of this military system, sworn to preserve the king’s peace by force of arms.

While these troops had limitations compared to professional soldiers and knights, they also had benefits to offer. Because they were a much greater part of the population than the knightly class, their available manpower was more extensive. Although the strain of providing manpower was lessened by distributing it over a wide area, often this system still removed more manpower from areas closer to an enemy front. Places such as York or

410 CPR 1272-1281, p. 218.
Southampton often provided a greater number of men than those further inland to fight along the frontiers with their respective enemies.

It has been commented that common soldiers were a poor alternative to professional soldiers and their knightly equivalents.\textsuperscript{412} The most common assumptions about their deficiencies were they were poorly disciplined, inexperienced and ill-equipped.\textsuperscript{413} There is some truth to this, but it was not always the case. Many of the upper tiers of the commoner’s class were wealthy and could afford to own adequate equipment, and often did.\textsuperscript{414} In addition, discipline could be learned by both commoner and noble.\textsuperscript{415}

Commoners from rural and urban environments were under military obligations to the king. In the medieval period England was still largely rural with thousands of villages dotting the land. Towns contained fewer people in comparison to the countryside as a whole, but the density of people who lived in urban locations was much greater. Towns often had a more developed civic government which made fulfilment of military duties more efficient. These duties were primarily the defence of the immediate town or region, though towns had a much greater place in the military schemes of the kingdom.\textsuperscript{416} Some towns were vital to the defence of the borders and coasts. Another responsibility was in provisioning gear, food and manpower to the king while he was outside the country. Southampton was employed in such a way providing both soldiers and sailors throughout the medieval period.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine Southampton’s military organisation as it relates to the manpower it was capable of arraying. The ability of the town to raise men was imperative to all the other military functions of the town. This employment of manpower took place in several ways with townsmen acting as soldiers and sailors, at home or abroad. All these roles formed part of the manpower provided by Southampton in fulfilment of their military organisation and obligations.

\textsuperscript{413} Attreed, King’s Towns, p. 202; Sumption, Hundred Years’ War, p. 64.
Men raised by Southampton for war both at home and abroad

Throughout the late medieval period the men of Southampton and Hampshire were raised for war by the same leadership and system. This did not change until the town was made a county in its own right by Henry VI, though even afterward the townsman were part of the county’s arrays on occasion. Leadership in this military system, including the sheriff, usually relied on local inhabitants. As the town was part of the county defence, the county also was part of the town defence, and their safety was interdependent. In the town the mayor, bailiff, and other town officials were responsible to array the townsman. Southampton’s contribution to the king’s forces often is impossible to calculate as they formed part of Hampshire’s array, though as exclusions appear in the king’s records it can be assumed the town was obliged to participate.

The requirement of males in England to offer military service to the king was obligatory and ancient. English kings required their subjects to fight at home and abroad, on land and on sea. These levies were often for defence, and Southampton’s responsibility largely was the same, though also including military activity outside the town and county. In the late thirteenth century, as military traditions gave way to more efficient systems, the commission of array was employed in great part to create the armies that Edward I used offensively and defensively. The men of Southampton had heavy demands upon them to provide men as soldiers and others to crew and protect vessels at sea.

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418 R. Gorski, The Fourteenth-Century Sheriff (Woodbridge, 2003) pp. 4-6, 11, 14 and 34.
420 CFR 1337-1347, p. 124.
Reign of Edward I

At the turn of the century England was embroiled in several conflicts. One theatre of military action was in France. During this period, Southampton provided crews to transport the king’s army and equipment to Flanders in 1295, 1297 and 1304. These ships were often very well armed with large crews, as was that of 1295. The 1297 command for all vessels 40 tuns and above would have required large numbers of sailors. With perhaps twenty crewmen per 40 tun vessel and many more for larger ships, recruitment of a few ships would have amounted to hundreds of mariners. With the Treaty of Paris in 1303 Philip required military aid in French affairs by Edward. In 1304 sailors and ‘fencible men’ were sent to Flanders, this time allied with the French. Not only does this example show the rapid reversal in the king’s alliances but how Southampton was involved in them. Over a decade, Southampton gave support both in sailors (which often involved included conflict) and fighting men.

At the same time Edward I was occupied in Flanders, he was also at war in Scotland. Southampton continued their involvement providing men for these campaigns. In February, March and May 1301, sailors were required for ships going to Scotland. On the first two occasions two ships were required, while the last only ships in general was stated. Even if only six ships were provided, one or two hundred men would have been required. In November 1302 mariners for two more ships were sent, and again in March 1303 crews for ‘ships’ with ‘able men-at-arms’ were commanded. While Southampton was involved in various aspects of provision of men, they were engaged primarily as crewmen, this contribution having amounted to several hundred men.

Southampton’s employment in France and Scotland proved a useful tool to Edward. Heavy needs to transport men, equipment and foodstuffs would have made ports like Southampton imperative to a successful campaign. Though less common, Edward did employ soldiers of the town, further demonstrating the town’s military utility.

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424 TNA E. 101/5/2, 12; Anderson, ‘English Galleys in 1295’, pp. 220-241; Platt, Medieval Southampton, pp. 61-62
425 CCR 1296-1302, pp. 76 and 81.
426 See Appendix Chapter Two- Ship Size to Crew. CPR 1321-1324, p. 417.
427 CCR 1302-1307, p.205.
428 CCR 1296-1302, pp. 482-483; CCR 1302-1307, pp.78, 205 CPR 1292-1301, pp. 583-584, 595; CPR 1301-1307, p. 75.
429 CCR 1296-1302, pp. 482-483; CPR 1292-1301, pp. 583-584, 595.
430 CCR 1302-1307, p.78; CPR 1301-1307, p. 75.
Reign of Edward II

In 1308 Edward II raised men to continue his father's wars in Scotland. From Southampton he ordered the mayor and bailiffs 'to choose and arm 42 of the strongest and most able bodied' to defend a ship of the town travelling to Scotland. The size of this force could have been larger if these 42 men were exclusive of mariners, which seems to be the case. The fact that the ship was armed for war indicates that Edward II expected to attack or be attacked from the sea. In this way Southampton would have been valuable by providing skilled men familiar with maritime life.

From 1309 to 1314 Southampton was involved yearly in military activity, from 1309 to 1311 with the Scots. In December 1309, September 1310, and May 1311 soldiers were ordered from the town, men-at-arms in 1309 and armed men in 1310. Mariniers were also being provided from the town. In September 1310 crews for two ships were commanded, and in May 1311 crews for 'ships' were required. From the start of Edward's reign to the conflict with his barons, Southampton annually made contributions to the war efforts in Scotland with the provision of men both as mariners and soldiers.

In August 1312 the king commanded Southampton to provide men, though this time not toward Scotland but to combat internal rebels. The murder of Piers Gaveston the previous June by disgruntled barons showed Edward the need to bolster his precarious position. The town provided sailors and soldiers against the rebellious nobles. As Edward was being hounded by many of the baronial class, he realized the usefulness of Southampton as a military asset. Edward II, as his father before, utilized these commissions to build and strengthen his forces. These events also demonstrate that the town was employed in all and any of the king's military needs.

With the seditious barons put down, Edward II turned his attention back to Scotland and Robert Bruce. In July 1313 an array was made over many English counties, Dorset, Devon, Hampshire and Sussex, to provide mariners for thirty ships. Edward II ordered the ships taken from the sea coast, which may indicate that ports on rivers and other waterways were usually included. He also ordered that the vessels be manned not just by mariners but

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431 CCR 1307-1313, pp. 75 and 122.
432 Ibid. p. 122.
435 Ibid. p. 477.
436 Ibid. p. 477.
'footmen well armed' and ready by late summer. It is probable these men and ships were in preparation for Edward's Scottish campaigns, which in 1314 culminated in defeat at Bannockburn. If this was the case, Edward was already preparing his 1314 campaign before Bruce's ultimatum to Scottish nobles for fealty late in 1313, and before the siege of Stirling in the summer of 1314, which indicates that Edward II was better prepared for the war than often imagined.

After Edward's defeat at Bannockburn, calls for men and military aid from Southampton ceased for more than half a decade. It was not until renewed conflict with France and internal dissention in the 1320s that the town raised men for war once more. Edward II heavily relied on the town as evident by the near constant demands placed upon them during these conflicts. From the start of Edward II's reign to 1314, the town supplied him men. Later in his reign, with the huge issues he faced, his demands on the town further increased.

Late in 1321, in November and December, and January 1322 Edward II faced several issues, including insurgency. To counter this rebellion, a general levy of all men was made to raise as many men as possible, both on foot and on horse. On 1 March 1322 crews and soldiers were ordered by Edward to defeat rebels and Scots in the north. As civil war grew more imminent, the need to recruit men to fill his armies to protect himself and his adherents increased. Men of this array probably were part of the royal army that proceeded north against the Earl of Lancaster forcing him into the battle of Boroughbridge in March 1322 with Andrew Harclay. This effectively ended the rebellion, at least temporarily.

In April 1322 Edward pressed for men, this time to deal with the Scots, issuing arrays to various counties. As the conflict with Scotland had never completely ended and they had allied with Lancaster, his now-defeated enemy, Edward needed to direct his attention northward. Hampshire was to provide 500 footmen, these men organised into companies of twenties and hundreds and armed with at least aketons, bascinets and iron gauntlets. Not only did Edward II expect soldiers of his counties, but also that they would be well armed. In October he ordered 'all men between 16 and 60' arrayed though

437 CPR 1313-1317, p. 6.
438 CPR 1321-1324, p. 39.
440 CCR 1318-1323, pp. 524 and 531.
441 CPR 1321-1324, pp. 96-100.
442 Ibid, pp. 96-97.
no reason or enemy was given. At the same time he asked to keep these two ships and their soldiers for an additional two months at the town's expense. Not only was Edward II entangled in conflict with internal parties and the Scots, but so too was Southampton indirectly, by the constant draw on them for manpower.

Location was a consideration in providing men to the king. In 1322 an array for 500 men of Hampshire for war with the Scots excluded all those living within the maritime lands, which included Southampton. This account illustrates that those living along the coasts primarily were needed for its protection and therefore excluded to focus on defence. It also indicates a shift in the offensive use of manpower against rebels (or Scots or French) from anywhere in the county without consideration, to a greater focus on defence.

However, townsmen were still occasionally called outside the county throughout the remainder of Edward II's reign.

In March 1323 the king gathered men for further activity in Scotland. 500 archers of Hampshire were raised, the second largest force ordered of the counties. In addition the king ordered a general levy of men aged 16 to 60 for defence while he was away. In May 1323 the king ordered more arrays from the counties. Hampshire was to again provide 500 archers, perhaps as reinforcements or indicating a lack of fulfillment of the March array. This force was combined with those of counties Dorset, Somerset and Wiltshire, all to be armed in aketons, bascinets or palets (a simple helmet or skull cap of iron). Edward not only expected men but armoured men, though not as heavily equipped as earlier demands. Shortly thereafter a treaty was made between the king of Scotland and Edward II for thirteen years of peace, allowing these forces to be released.

443 Ibid, p. 213.
444 CCR 1318-1323, p. 559.
446 Ibid, p. 548.
448 CPR 1321-1324, pp. 264-265.
450 CCR 1318-1323, p. 645.
452 Ibid, p. 559.
453 CPR 1321-1324, p. 264.
To further complicate Edward's reign, in the 1320s conflict with France grew in Gascony. Mariners for six specific ships and all vessels 40 tuns and larger were commanded of Southampton on 10 March 1324. In June 1324 as Edward II prepared for further war in Gascony, he commanded ships, supplies, equipment and 150 bowmen. Later in June 450 more men were ordered, though Edward shortly after amended it to 250. Less than ten days later, the king required 400 additional men of Hampshire. In August 1324 Edward continued requests for military service, these men to be equipped in 'steel armour'. Just days later the king demanded 800 men of Hampshire to be armed in 'haketons and steel bacinets and other competent arms' and organised into units of twenties and hundreds. An additional 200 men were ordered on 21 August 1324. Between March and August 1324 the county was ordered to provide 1400 men for the king’s wars in Gascony. This number is exclusive of the hundreds if not more employed as captains, constables and other crewmen of ships needed for transport and war there.

Additional men were called to military service in November 1324. All knights, esquires, men-at-arms and fencible men were commanded to be ready for war in Gascony. Hampshire was to array, the arrayers ordered to spare no one nor take bribes. While no numbers were given at this time in addition to those raised earlier, Edward apparently was in a dire situation trying to assemble as many men as possible. On 21, 22 and 23 December Edward pushed for supplementary troops for Gascony. The order on 21 December required soldiers from nearly 50 of the more important English towns and all counties, including Hampshire. On the 22 Edward ordered 250 footmen in addition to those already sent. On the 23 a further ten men-at-arms and 100 archers were required. This later addition does indicate that the troops had been raised, as the call for men was not renewed. In just months Edward probably had readied hundreds, if not more men, of Hampshire presumably in preparation for the expiration of the truce in spring 1325.

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454 Sumption, *Hundred Years' War*, pp. 91-99.
455 *CPR 1321-1324*, p. 417; *CCR 1323-1327*, pp. 182-183 and 187
456 *CPR 1321-1324*, p. 424; *CCR 1323-1327*, p. 200.
457 *CPR 1321-1324*, p. 430; *CCR 1323-1327*, p. 123.
458 *CPR 1324-1327*, pp. 9-10.
460 Ibid, p. 15.
461 Ibid, pp. 53-55.
462 Ibid, p. 53.
463 Ibid, p. 53.
464 Ibid, p.77; *CCR 1323-1327*, p 226.
466 *CPR 1324-1327*, pp. 77-78.
Late in Edward II’s reign, Hampshire and Southampton were constantly arrayed, primarily in defence from French and rebel English attacks. General levies were issued December 1325, January and February 1326. The array of January granted arrayers the right to elect deputies over the multiple hundreds to organise their specific locations, which was vital to local defence. These general levies were the chief means of local defence, a valuable method for kings to protect themselves during civil war. In addition to soldiers, mariners were ordered in June to man a ship to ‘divers parts’ on the ‘king’s business.’ The vagueness leaves only questions, though it is probable these men were used to fight at sea, or in reconnaissance for Edward to gain ready news of his enemies both at home and abroad.

August 1326 brought more arrays, with Hampshire ordered to provide 200 armed footmen to the king. The order was to the sheriff who was commanded to choose men with the ‘counsel and advice of the mayor and bailiffs of Southampton’. These men were to be provided with thirteen ships from Southampton to fight the ‘French’. Once more the importance of the town for both land and naval conflicts is illustrated. On 15 August an array from various counties was ordered to meet in Portsmouth. From Southampton the king ordered 200 footmen and 400 archers arrayed and present by the Decollation of St. John the Baptist (29 August) and then surveyed by John de St. John and John de Scures. It is unclear what Edward’s intentions were, but regardless he was making moves throughout 1325 to 1326 to protect himself and his position in the kingdom from his wife, her English allies and her brother, the French King. These plans relied heavily upon Southampton and other towns in varied military functions.

On 27 September 1326 the king raised large numbers of troops for defence. Southampton was asked to provide 1,000 archers and ‘others’. A few weeks later he appointed Hugh Despenser, as captain of the forces of Cornwall, Devon, Dorset,
Hampshire, Somerset and Wiltshire against invaders and to punish the disobedient. Clearly those arrayed were intended to deal with the newly landed army of Queen Isabel and Roger Mortimer, in one last effort to defeat his enemies. With Edward’s fading popularity it is doubtful if the force ever materialized. Regardless, the expectations of Southampton and the rest of the south in a military capability were evident.

From the last few years of Edward II’s reign the use of Southampton for both soldiers and sailors increased greatly from earlier in his reign and that of his father’s. The constant pressures and conflicts with Scotland, France and rebellion forced Edward to constantly raise men, excluding only five years in the mid to late 1310s. Southampton provided hundreds of men, if not more, included in county arrays, and perhaps more importantly provided mariners to transport men, supplies and wage war at sea for the king. This extensive use of Southampton’s manpower probably was many times greater than what was provided as soldiers abroad, maybe even numbering over a thousand during Edward’s reign, though a specific number is impossible due the vagueness of orders for ‘ships’ or ‘all ships’. What can be seen is almost constant involvement of large numbers of men from Southampton throughout Edward II’s reign and in all his major conflicts.

Reign of Edward III

Edward III continued to employ arrayed troops in his armies for his many military needs. In June 1328 Southampton’s mayor and bailiffs were required to raise mariners for all ships 40 tuns and above; as well as soldiers to equip them. These preparations were needed to defend the coast, as spies had reported a great French fleet preparing to attack. Whether this was an assault planned by the French king is hard to gauge but seems improbable at this date, as both sides were not in a strong enough position internally to wage meaningful war. As there is no indication in the above array that they were to fight against the French king, the command could have been in response to large scale piracy which had plagued the coast in the past. Perhaps Philip, being unable to enforce his will on Edward, was taking advantage of the instability in England by encouraging this piracy.

479 CCR 1327-1330, p. 397.
480 Ibid, p. 397.
In late July 1330 arrays were commanded in 31 English cities and towns for all knights and men capable of bearing arms to resist rebels to the ‘king’. This order was sent to Southampton addressed to the mayor and bailiffs to raise their townsmen. The purpose, though, may be more obscure. The order states ‘rebels to the king’, but more probably Roger Mortimer and Isabel were using the array to strengthen their position with force. By 1330 their power became uncertain, and their rule led many nobles to grow disaffected, including Edward III, who fathered a son only a month earlier. This array may have been an attempt of Roger and Isabel to solidify their positions, much like Edward II did late in his reign.

After Edward III took the throne, there were few orders to Southampton for men, sailors or other supplies for several years. During this time Edward’s campaigns were in Scotland against Robert the Bruce and were more land based, so it seems Southampton was geographically unimportant and was not directly involved. For five years Southampton did not play a part in the king’s military organisation until tensions with France erupted in the mid 1330s, forcing Southampton back into play.

As relations sickened between Edward III and Philip VI, disagreements led them to war. With Edward III’s victories in Scotland, Robert Bruce’s son King David fled to France, finding a protector in Philip. From then on England had to deal with France in its Scottish conflicts and Scotland in her French ones. With attacks probable from Scotland or France, Edward III needed to prepare. In January 1335 arrays were ordered for defence. Southampton, on the French border, was readied as well. Again in August Edward III commanded ‘all cities, boroughs, market towns, seaports, and other places in bailiwick’ to ready all men 16 to 60. This array included all knights, esquires and commoners, with arms and armour required according to their station on risk of ‘forfeiture’. These arrays were to protect the coast from French attacks. Even while war was not officially being waged, the king was organising his towns and counties for attack. Southampton by its location was involved by necessity.

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481 Ibid, p. 572.
482 Ibid, p. 572.
483 *CPR 1334-1338*, p. 137; Sumption, *Hundred Years’ War*, pp. 139-150.
484 *CPR 1334-1338*, p. 139.
485 *CCR 1333-1337*, p. 516.
486 Ibid, p. 516.
In February 1336 another general levy was ordered to defend the coast from attack. Even though war had not formally opened with France, attacks at sea were increasing, Philip even promoting them, especially on the southern coast. With these dangers increasing, military organisation for defence was imperative for the realm and arrays were a crucial part of this system. In May Southampton was given a reprieve from providing men and ships, as they had already provided a great warship of 160 tuns with ‘double equipment’, crew and soldiers. Since defence was becoming more important along the southern coast, the king had to manage manpower carefully to ensure Southampton had sufficient men for their protection. However, they were asked to pay £40 of the 300 marks Hampshire was paying toward their soldiers. Such delicate business was important, as the king needed manpower for his wars abroad, but had to balance this against the safety of susceptible locations, such as Southampton.

Edward, fearing seaborne assaults, in October made Hugh Ball constable of the Channel Islands. The reprieve from May lasted only a short duration as just two days after Hugh’s appointment the town provided 50 armed men ‘for the defence of the islands’. Like Southampton, the Channel Islands were under threat and men were diverted there to strengthen them. An array was also organised in Hampshire to counter the threat of French raids, the keepers of the maritime land having all men there at their command. In November more armed men, archers and sailors were ordered by Ball from the town to the Channel Islands. The level of military activity indicates the concern that the king and his military leadership had for the Channel Islands. While the second force was not numbered, Southampton provided at least 100 soldiers and many more including mariners. Southampton played a role in protecting the areas around it and was a recruitment ground for the king’s military leadership.

By October 1337 mariners of the town manned four ships for the king where they remained till January 1338. Their purpose and destination is unknown, though they probably were involved in the defence of the sea, the Channel Islands and Southern Coast,

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490 CCR 1333-1337, p. 581.
492 CPR 1334-1338, p. 324.
494 CCR 1333-1337, p. 715.
495 CPR 1334-1338, p. 337; CCR 1333-1337, p. 712.
as attacks by the French and their allies increased. On 10 November 1337 more mariners were required for two large 200 tun war ships and four other barges. While their function was not stated, they were at sea for 88 days. In December 1337, 60 mariners from Southampton took several ships with siege equipment to Scotland. In January 1338 seven entire crews were commanded from the town, four for ships of the town and three for confiscated Flemish ships in the king’s wars. From 1337 and early 1338 the town provided entire crews on several occasions in fulfilment of their military obligations to the king.

In 1338 French piracy took a clear and structured shift to attempt to force Edward III to terms with Philip VI. These raids of 1338 to 1339 caused destruction along the southern coast of England. In July 1338 Edward ordered all men, including those from landlocked counties such as Berkshire, arrayed and readied to defend the realm, particularly Portsmouth and Southampton. While the array may have been called and men readied, the raids continued and county levies appear to have been unable to halt them, allowing Southampton to be raided in October 1338.

An investigation in 1338 found many of the keepers, officials arrayed and townsmen had fled, leaving Southampton to be burned and plundered. Apparently some men even used bribes to avoid participation. After the enemy force had departed, some men sent to protect the town continued pillaging Southampton, furthering the damage. As punishment, all defaulters were listed, arrested and placed in the Tower. One Nicholas de Moundenard of Southampton was imprisoned in the Tower July 1339. The failure in this situation was less of the system itself, which continued to be used for centuries, but more of individuals. Disloyalty or cowardice in abandoning their posts and obligations, corruption in accepting bribes, not raising sufficient men for defence, and lack of information all played a part in the French’s cataclysmic attacks on Southampton.

After the raid on Southampton Edward III organised arrays in Hampshire to protect the coast. In mid November 1338 the same arrayers as in July were called to raise the

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497 CCR 1337-1339, p. 215
499 CPR 1338-1340, pp. 134 and 139.
503 Platt, Medieval Southampton, p. 110.
504 CPR 1338-1340, p. 140.
county in case of French attacks. While the clear failure of the array in dealing with the raid was apparent to Edward, he still relied primarily on it for defence. This was for two reasons. One was that Edward III realized the discrepancies were those of action, not organisation, and second that there was little other choice. Edward could not afford to keep a large force for sufficient time in many places to meet the French attacks. While the array system for defence had weaknesses, it was realistically the only way to raise sufficient men over such a large area and have a possibility of success.

Edward also employed garrisons and royal officials in select locations in protection of the south, including Southampton. In February 1339 the king ordered ten men-at-arms and twenty archers from Hampshire to garrison Winchester Castle. Winchester, Southampton and Portsmouth all received garrisons and additional men to bolster the locally arrayed inhabitants. After the raid Southampton also received a keeper who held all military and civic power in the town. By March 1339 the town acquired the right to elect officials but not their military powers. Edward also ordered the inhabitants to return to Southampton for manpower or risk the loss of all their goods and lands there. In September 1339 Thomas atte March was ordered to protect Southampton, where he had lived three and a half years, and find armed men for its defence. Royal officials arrayed the town on 28 July 1340 by command of the king. It was not till 1341 that the town regained their military rights with several arrays of that year indicating that the town was once more in charge of their military obligations. While the keepership and garrisons were drastic changes, they were important for the town’s military organisation, allowing them time to regain strength after such a devastating attack.

While the changes Edward III made were limited, they appear to have been effective, as subsequent attempted raids in 1339 were less successful. Edward placed men, both from inside and outside county limits, and royal garrisons in locations of high risk to reinforce local inhabitants. These forces could be large, in the hundreds even, and remain in

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505 Ibid, p. 140.
506 CCR 1339-1341, p. 7.
507 See Chapter Three - Defensive schemes of the king and others in relation to Southampton.
509 CCR 1339-1341, p. 102; Platt, Medieval Southampton, p. 113.
511 CPR 1338-1340, p. 316.
512 CPR 1340-1343, p. 12.
a location for months, at times even years. Additionally, he selected men to lead these forces and reside there. The greater change probably was the destruction caused in the county. Men were then forced to deal with the severity of the situation and prepare to defend themselves and their homes. The king thereafter by kind word or deed and stern punishment, placed further weight on this realisation and aided or punished men to fulfil their obligations.

For the next decades few if any demands were placed upon Southampton for soldiers. This partially relates to the great damage the town suffered in the raid of 1338, as well as the Black Death which depleted the town’s population. Another consideration was the need for sufficient townsmen to defend themselves. For much of this period the town was bereft of royal garrisons, and those present were typically small. Another consideration was that the town was greatly involved in another aspect of self protection by construction of the seaward town wall and improving existent defences. As the war shifted more to offensive actions in France, Southampton gained some reprieve from war, especially after the English victory over the French fleet at Sluys, in many ways halting the attacks on the south ports.

The town continued fulfilling another military obligation in providing mariners for the king’s fleets. During the following decades of Edward’s reign, the war was not in England but in France. The king needed men, horses, equipment and supplies on the continent and Southampton was a valuable asset in this function. From 1341 to 1346 there was but one year without commands for crews. The number of mariners required must have been staggering, as many orders for ships included all in port. Without this assistance the war across the channel would have been impossible. These men waged Edward’s war at sea, transported his armies, victuals, arms and armour, provided support to his armies on land and maintained communication with his base in England. The victory of Crecy and other battles of the early to mid 1340s would never have taken place without the support of towns like Southampton. The town’s nearly constant supply of crewmen was an important contribution to Edward’s military organisation.

For three years there were no demands on Southampton. In July 1349 the need for sailors resumed with twelve ships arrested in Southampton, the command spread between

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514 See Chapter Three-Defensive schemes of the king and others in relation to Southampton.
515 CCR 1341-1343, pp. 107, 667; CCR 1343-1346, pp. 102, 537, 588, 632; CPR 1340-1343, p. 591; CPR 1343-1345, p. 92.
516 CCR 1341-1343, p. 107; CCR 1343-1346, pp. 102, 588; CPR 1340-1343, p. 591; CPR 1343-1345, p. 92.
Hampshire, Devon and Dorset. The order indicates no purpose, perhaps transport, though it is possible they were employed in growing sea conflicts such as the Battle of Les Espagnols sur Mer. While this distribution might be related to Southampton's rebuilding or lack of manpower and other resources it also correlates to a slowing in the war that followed the fall of Calais and the arrival of the Black Death. This might reflect less the town's ability and more the king's needs at the time.

Demands for mariners continued during the 1350s while calls for soldiers and defence remained silent. This relates to the French position in the 1350s and that most military action occurred in France with a few exceptions. Even demands for crews took place only in three years starting in 1353, with two in 1355. All but one was for a few ships (one to three), requiring fewer sailors, while that of July 1355 called for all ships. Though the demand for one or two ships is small, this might be misleading, as one 1353 command included two 'great ships' perhaps requiring one hundred men or more. Since there were several military activities in 1355, it is hard to identify what these men were employed in, perhaps transporting Edward III to Calais, Prince Edward to Aquitaine, or both. These fleets met in Southampton to protect themselves and the town as they awaited the king's orders. As mentioned earlier, seizures of every ship in port required massive numbers of mariners from the town, a demonstration of the town's military abilities.

Even after Poitiers and other misfortunes that kept France from defeating the English armies on land, France remained a threat. Early in February 1360 as Edward III was away in France, arrays were commanded in Hampshire and much of England to protect the southern coast from French attacks. In March Edward ordered more soldiers readied and Southampton to provide mariners for coastal defence, as he had received 'sure intelligence' that a French fleet had gathered to attack the town, Portsmouth or Sandwich. Men from several counties were to reinforce the Hampshire levies in Southampton and Portsmouth. Not only was the entire county raised but a vast number of mariners employed in defence on land and sea.

Even after the treaty was made initially between Edward III and the Dauphin Charles at Brétigny in May, England was still on guard. In August Edward ordered

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517 CPR 1348-1350, p. 386.
518 CPR 1350-1354, p. 512; CPR 1354-1358, pp. 52, 178, 214.
519 CPR 1350-1354, p. 512; CPR 1354-1358, pp. 52, 178, 214.
520 CPR 1358-1361, pp. 405-408.
521 CPR 1360-1364, pp. 97-98.
522 Ibid, p. 97.
Hampshire’s men-at-arms and archers to array. In addition to these men, mariners from all Hampshire were raised to provide defence at sea, crews being in short supply as many foreign ships were being deployed and lacked sailors. While positioning for defence against French threats occurred during much of 1360, soon after August, events relaxed for the next decade, perhaps culminating with the ratification of the treaty in October in Calais.

Southampton’s manpower is difficult to gauge with the limited records available. After the loss of men from death, injury and departure after the 1338 raid and Black Death, the town probably was at its lowest population in the late medieval period. An inquisition by the town keeper Sir Henry Peverel in 1360 indicates the town could muster for defence thirty well-armed men, thirty other armed men, thirty archers, and 200 men called ‘clubmen’. Peverel’s own recommendation was for 100 men-at-arms and 100 archers. While Peverel found the manpower less than optimal, they were able to muster a force larger than Peverel desired, and some well equipped, though lacking in the soldiers he felt were needed. It is probable that these 300 men only included those inside the walls, which discounted many men the town could theoretically draw upon for their military necessities.

In 1364 demands were made on Southampton to provide aid in the military activities of the king’s sons. In June Lionel Duke of Clarence required mariners for 80 ships from Southampton to Bristol for his activities in Ireland. It is doubtful that any one port could bear such demands, though the weight probably fell hardest on major ports such as Southampton and Bristol. On the same day crews for other ships were ordered to carry Prince Edward and his army to Gascony. As the war with France halted, Edward and his sons had the time and ability to allocate men, money and other resources to furthering their other political aims. Such demands at one time must have been great upon Southampton regardless of how dispersed they were.

Although France and England were technically at peace during most of the 1360s, late in the decade it became clear it would not last. Throughout the ‘peace’ small scale struggles continued, mostly through their allies, piracy and raiding. In February 1367 the king renewed calls to array and defend against increased French activity. At the same time the king ordered the mayor and bailiffs to ‘compel’ all men who owned or rented property in Southampton to stay ‘continually’. This provided funds for the town

523 CPR 1358-1361, p. 452.
524 CMI 1348-1377, pp. 154-155; Platt, Medieval Southampton, p. 123.
526 CPR 1364-1367, p. 430.
fortifications and also ensured a large number of defensible men in the town for its protection.\textsuperscript{527} If Edward had only wanted money from the townsmen he could have allowed them freedom to travel, indicating they were needed to defend the town. As tensions increased, Edward was preparing his kingdom for renewed hostilities, especially Southampton and Southern England as they would bear the brunt of this.

Even though Edward worked hard to maintain peace, as French intentions to break the treaty were made obvious, he prepared for conflict. In March 1369 Edward III ordered all men aged 16 to 60 levied in all counties.\textsuperscript{528} In late March an array of all men 16 to 60 was made specifically to the Mayor and Bailiffs of Southampton and Winchester.\textsuperscript{529} The specific commands for towns to ready and array showed the respect the king had for their organisation and authority as well as reflected the growing danger they were facing. Further preparations took place in June 1369 when Huge de Escote was named captain and keeper of Southampton and charged with its defence.\textsuperscript{530}

On 9 May all townsmen and their goods were to be kept in Southampton for its defence.\textsuperscript{531} Once more the king was working to ensure sufficient men were in the town for its protection. In July Edward again sent orders to the sheriffs to prepare their counties from French attack and raise all men.\textsuperscript{532} Later in August men from outside the country were deployed to Southampton and Portsmouth, still in fear of French invasion.\textsuperscript{533} At this time Emery de St. Amand was selected as Southampton’s keeper.\textsuperscript{534} In September another array was issued in Hampshire, with Southampton expected to aid in defence of the surrounding coasts.\textsuperscript{535} 1369 was one of the most intense years in terms of arrays of Hampshire and Southampton. For most of the year Southampton was at the ready for French assault. Since the 1338 raid on Southampton the array had almost exclusively been used for defence and 1369 demonstrated this in the extreme with calls every few months.

1370 continued along similar lines as 1369, with almost quarterly orders for arrays. These arrays started almost constant calls for manpower that decade. In February 1370 all men-at-arms, armed men, hobelars, and archers 16 to 60 were raised, as informants claimed

\textsuperscript{527} CPR 1367-1370, p. 229.
\textsuperscript{528} Ibid, pp. 264-265; CCR 1368-1374, p. 18.
\textsuperscript{529} CCR 1368-1374, p. 18.
\textsuperscript{530} CPR 1367-1370, p. 270.
\textsuperscript{531} CCR 1368-1374, p. 20.
\textsuperscript{532} Ibid, p. 36.
\textsuperscript{533} CPR 1367-1370, p. 303.
\textsuperscript{534} Ibid, p. 304.
\textsuperscript{535} Ibid, p. 305.
a French fleet was ready to invade. In August John Polymond and Hugh de Escote, arrayed Southampton and its suburbs as supposed French targets. Those who were unable to provide military service personally were to provide another with arms and armour according to their wealth. In November the sheriff was to ensure that all men were readied and present. A similar order was given to most of the southern counties of Sussex, Dorset, Somerset, Devon and Cornwall. Throughout all of 1370 arrays were in effect in Southampton as threats grew from a more aggressive France than had been for decades.

The worries of French attacks intensified almost yearly for the remainder of Edward’s reign with arrays and preparations made to counter it. Both Southampton and Hampshire were ordered to array the 16 and 20 May 1371, 3 February 1372, 24 May 1375, 29 April 1377 and the town specifically 20 July 1373. All these arrays were commanded for fear of French attacks. The order from the king in July 1373 instructed the mayor and bailiffs once more to compel townsmen to remain there with not just their goods but with their families. This was so that these men would ‘continually safeguard the town’ as a great fleet of French barges and other ships were rumoured. The 1375 command to Hampshire specifically directed them ‘to guard all ports and sea-shore..., resist and destroy all persons wishing to invade the realm by land or sea’. In addition to the raising and equipping of all men of the town and county they were to use ‘beacons (ignem) on the hills or otherwise to warn the men of the country’. Not only were the men to resist their enemies, but to set warnings about the county to alert them if a force should attack. As is indicated by the near-constant demands of manpower upon Southampton at the end of Edward’s reign, the area was put on the defensive for fear of French attacks. By the end of Edward’s reign the array was the primary and an invaluable tool in protecting the kingdom from its enemies.

While defence was the town’s primary military function for most of Edward III’s reign, their second most important contribution was that of providing experienced sailors,
particularly as French maritime power increased in the 1370s.\textsuperscript{546} On 28 April and 16 May 1371 orders for mariners were made.\textsuperscript{547} The counties of Somerset, Dorset, Devon, Cornwall, Gloucester and Hampshire were to find men-at-arms, archers, mariners and other men ‘for the defence of the ships’. If any refused they were to be arrested or have their lands confiscated, showing the seriousness of the order.\textsuperscript{548} The sailors and levied soldiers were employed for defence at sea. On 12 April sailors were commanded of Southampton once more for defence at sea.\textsuperscript{549} Later in October 1373 the king ordered mariners to crew all the ships over twenty-three tuns which were arrested from Bristol to Southampton for William de Windsor for use in Ireland.\textsuperscript{550} While the recruitment of men for transport remained a chief part of their military function, they also provided protection at sea, another of the town’s military capabilities.

From Edward III’s reign several themes can be drawn regarding Southampton’s military organisation. Primarily the town was employed in defence. Excluding times when the war shifted exclusively to France, Southampton’s main duty was to guard itself. The town’s next major contribution was provision of sailors. Thousands of mariners from the town were employed in the king’s fleets. Lastly the town occasionally provided soldiers, but throughout Edward’s reign the number is comparably lower than those before him.

\textbf{Reign of Richard II}

At the start of Richard II’s reign French attacks continued if not intensified.\textsuperscript{551} The Franco-Castilian alliance provided France with one of the most formidable naval fleets of the time making devastating raids in 1377 to 1378.\textsuperscript{552} In this dire situation the king (or his council as he was a minor) had John Arundel made town keeper, including a sizable garrison.\textsuperscript{553} Many military preparations took place throughout 1377, including multiple arrays of Southampton and Hampshire.\textsuperscript{554} Dorset and Hampshire’s defences were placed under William, Earl of Salisbury.\textsuperscript{555} Early in 1379 Hampshire was arrayed ‘to guard all the

\textsuperscript{547} CPR 1370-1374, pp. 72, 88 and 109.
\textsuperscript{548} Ibid, p. 88.
\textsuperscript{549} Ibid, p. 270
\textsuperscript{550} Ibid, p. 347.
\textsuperscript{552} Ibid, pp. 34-35.
\textsuperscript{553} CPR 1377-1381, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{554} Ibid, pp. 4, 7, 9, 12 and 38.
\textsuperscript{555} Ibid, p. 4.
ports and shores of the sea against (French) attack'. Excluding two years of the 1370s Southampton was at arms. With such threats the town was not only arrayed but had a military leader with a large garrison, the county array and outside counties to aid in their defence. In June to July 1377 alone, Southampton and Hampshire were arrayed three times. The levy of the town and reinforcements sent there clearly were aimed to prevent disasters similar to that of 1338. Presumably these preparations were successful as much of the south coast, including places close to Southampton, such as the Isle of Wight, were raided.

The town contributed mariners to Richard as well. In October 1377 sailors were raised for a balinger from Southampton in the employ of Sir Hugh Calveley. As Hugh was captain of Calais and engaged in much of the naval activities in the Channel early in Richard’s reign, it is possible this balinger was employed in any number of activities, including the siege of Calais in 1377 as reinforcements for its defences. With the great number of French attacks late in the 1370s, these vessels were probably employed in the defence of the southern coast which would have strengthened the many arrays and defensive measures taking place in Hampshire and other counties at the time.

The first half of the 1380s show almost constant use of arrays in Southampton, issued in March 1380, July and December 1381, March 1382, June 1383, January 1385, June 1385, March 1386, and August 1386. Most of the arrays follow the last few decades’ theme of defence against the French, who continued to force England on the defensive. The array was reused, as it had not been since Edward II’s reign, against rebellion in 1381. The arrays of 1380 and 1383 were to defend the southern coast from French attacks. That of June 1383 states the sheriff was to ensure ‘no hurt shall come’ to the Southampton and its surrounds. While often this is a given part of the array for defence, including the entire county, the fact that Southampton was specifically singled out indicates the concern felt over its protection. The Sheriff of Wiltshire was given a similar

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556 Ibid. p. 359.
557 Ibid. pp. 4, 38.
558 CCR 1377-1381. p. 21.
command regarding Southampton.\textsuperscript{562} Once more the king’s orders regarding the town and its care demonstrate the importance he placed on it.

Southampton provided more than arrayed men in 1383 with two orders for mariners that year. Before the array to protect the southern coasts from the French was issued, the king ordered two arrests of mariners from Southampton. The first was to provide crews for six ships bringing supplies to Cherbourg, then in English hands, on 26 March 1383. As the town and castle were garrisoned by the English at the time, such reinforcements and supplies to their foothold in France were vital to its retention. The second call was for the Bishop of Norwich’s ill-fated campaign in Flanders, and commanded crews for unnumbered ships, only said to be sufficient to transport the bishop’s army. This order was made just four days after that for Cherbourg. Whatever the number of ships, this would have demanded a great amount of manpower from the town, especially coupled with the previous call for six ships that at least numbered 120 men, probably more. Apart from these two demands for ships in 1383, few others appeared in the 1380s. Much of this halt probably related to declining English activity in France that decade.

The array of 1385 illustrates ways in which the king directed the town’s array and enforced his wishes. Two of the arrayers were the town keeper, Thomas Holland, the king’s half-brother and Earl of Kent, and John Sondes his deputy, probably present for his lord in Southampton. All arrayed were to be present physically or if unable to provide another in their place. Those arrayed were also to be paid, any refusing to array were to be arrested. Beacons once more were set to warn them.\textsuperscript{563} Holland and his man were not the only men the king empowered to lead arrays in Southampton. In July Richard II ordered William, The Bishop of Winchester to survey all the men-at-arms, archers and hobelars of Hampshire and Southampton.\textsuperscript{564} The Bishop was ordered to ensure all were armed and arrayed and the town was strongly defended, taking extra men from the county if needed, while the others defended the coasts.\textsuperscript{565}

In March 1386 another array was commanded under Holland, though it was perhaps carried out by Sondes.\textsuperscript{566} It is no coincidence that these commissions of array were directed

\textsuperscript{562} Ibid, p. 314.
\textsuperscript{563} CPR 1381-1385, p. 588.
\textsuperscript{564} CPR 1385-1389, p. 12.
\textsuperscript{565} Ibid, p. 12.
\textsuperscript{566} CCR 1385-1389, p. 60.
to or included the keeper of the town and his representative. He was placed in the town specifically to prepare and lead the townsfolk in conflict. In August 1386 the king ordered John Polymond and John Sondes, Holland’s deputy, to ready the town for enemy invasion which was being prepared in the north of France and in Flanders. Weaknesses in the town fortifications were also to be repaired, perhaps another use of the newly levied manpower as workmen. In addition to the town’s array the county was ordered to array under the sheriff. By placing his half-brother in the town, Richard showed his interest in Southampton’s protection and administration as well as ensuring that his brother had a personal representative present. While Richard continued to use local townsfolk to aid in such arrays the additional support would have been an important aid to them and their self protection.

The arrays of 1381 to 1382 were raised to counter internal rebellion. In July 1381 Richard II responded to civil uprisings by preparing armed forces. In Hampshire and Wiltshire the king commanded men to put down large public gatherings or those breaking his peace with armed force if needed. In December, with the threat of uprising perhaps still in the air, the king reiterated these commands. Early in 1382 this was still a concern as it was once more repeated. A number of well known civic leaders of Southampton were listed as arrayers, including John Polymond and William Bacon, both of whom had extensive experience working for the king.

In 1389 England and France established a temporary truce. During the 1390s the array was called but one year, as the truce with France neared its expiry. In March 1392 Southampton was arrayed in order to ‘resist invasion in case of war’. Once more the town keeper and his deputy were part of the arrayers selected. After this, no further arrays were ordered in Southampton during Richard II’s reign. This was because the war had in reality ended for the time being. The end of the war did not end requests to the town for soldiers completely, as it allowed the king to focus on other objectives. One peculiar request from April 1393 shows how versatile the king’s commands could be. Richard II

567 Ibid, p. 60.
568 CPR 1385-1389, p. 258.
569 CCR 1385-1389, p. 253.
570 CPR 1381-1385, p. 74.
571 Ibid, p. 74.
572 Ibid, pp. 84-85.
573 Ibid, pp. 138-141.
574 CPR 1391-1396, p. 88; CCR 1389-1392, p. 522.
575 CPR 1391-1396, p. 249.
granted Genoese merchants of London the right to array 80 men-at-arms for their ships from Southampton to Genoa to defend their goods and ships. While clearly not directly in the king’s service the king employed the array for his foreign allies showing how varied the provision of men from the town could be.

While the use of the town for soldiers mostly ceased in the 1390s the employment of the town to recruit mariners continued. In April 1395, July 1398, and February 1399 the king commanded a massive number of crews for his wars in Ireland. Raising a large fleet to transport his armies and supplies, Richard required crews for every ship twenty-five tuns or above, which would have included all but the smallest vessels of the time. This must have been an immense drain on the town’s naval resources not only in the frequency of the demands, especially from 1398 to 1399, but also the quantities that Richard required, basically all but the smallest ships of the town were enlisted.

Richard II’s reign shares several similarities with that of his grandfather. Their use of the townsmen primarily for defence remained constant during their reigns. Both had periods of high intensity of threats, as the late 1370s to mid 1380s for Richard mirrored the late 1330s and late 1360s to early 1370s for Edward III. For Southampton, Hampshire and the south in general, the late 1360s to mid 1380s were a time of great trepidation. The many demands to array must have been a huge tax on the men and their resources. It was not until after 1392 that arrays ceased, though since 1386 the town had been at relative peace from the need to array. Unlike Edward III, Richard did not make nearly the same use of the town for ship crews. In 1377 there was but one call, 1383 had two, and the mid to late 1390s had four. That said the number of mariners provided in 1383 was probably at least in the hundreds. The arrays of 1395 to 1399, especially 1399, were probably much, much larger. Many of these levies could be tied to Richard’s unstable reign. With fewer large and constant wars punctuated with occasional campaigns the town faced similar demands. As Sherborne noted, that after 1380 there was a reduction in English land and sea activities abroad, so to it was in Southampton.

Reign of Henry IV

On 18 December 1399 the new king, Henry IV, ordered commissions of array over many counties to be ready by early February. With his recent seizure of power this force probably was to counter any opposition to him. The nobles and many knights who served as arrayers did so in various counties, though many who were of sub-knightly class were exclusive to Hampshire, probably local. All these men-at-arms, armed men and archers of the county were surveyed in Southampton by Robert Markeley, the king’s sergeant-at-arms. Earlier in December Henry had ordered mariners of Southampton to crew his ship Anne to London, which was probably also tied to Henry defending himself. In January 1400 the king ordered Southampton’s mayor and bailiffs to array the townsmen as ‘certain of his enemies’ were preparing to invade. Additional precautions were to fortify the town and that men be ‘sufficiently arrayed and furnished’ to ‘safeguard’ it and its hinterlands by night and day. Henry left no question for accountability if the town failed: they would first risk their safety as well as royal displeasure. In many ways Henry needed the array to solidify his position with force. A possible attempt was made to remove him around the Epiphany, 1400, by some nobles still loyal to Richard. This made towns such as Southampton useful as possible recruitment pools for Henry IV.

Tied into these internal issues was renewed conflict with Scotland and France. The Scottish king, seeing an opportunity to exploit an unstable usurper, began supporting various factions against Henry. To answer this, the king launched a northern campaign against the Scots. On 22 August 1400, Henry ordered Southampton to array for war with the Scots. The town was to gather crews for all the ships in port and send them to Scotland. In addition to the mariners needed, archers and armed men were also required. Following a well established pattern, Henry commanded crews for his ships from Southampton but he also ordered soldiers to be employed outside the county, something Richard II had done but once.

France also sensed England’s instability and began nearly constant threats during the first half of Henry’s reign. On 11 January 1401 a crew from Southampton was to man a
newly built barge of the town to help counter French activities, including possible landings in Wales to meet with rebels there. On 22 April 1401 all ships of thirty tuns and above were ordered to the king's service, probably for defence, from Southampton and Sandwich. Such a massive fleet must have required a huge number of sailors and captains. Other preparations were made the next year as in July 1402 Henry ordered all Hampshire to array and defend the sea coast from French assaults and 'invasion'.

In 1403 Southampton received several orders from Henry IV as hostilities with France continued. In Wales the war against Owen Glendower was growing more difficult and the French appeared eager to exploit this by landing in England. In August the king ordered Southampton to array. These preparations were influenced as well by Breton and French naval attacks which 'burnt divers towns and killed, wounded, robbed and captured the king's lieges ... and also have assembled in great fleets at sea to destroy the king's lieges'. Southampton was ordered to raise mariners for a naval force and counter the French and their allies at sea. In early September this call was repeated for all Hampshire. In addition to those arrayed in Hampshire, Southampton itself was required to protect English ships at sea. The mayor, Walter Lange, and John Lymbourne were to provide men-at-arms, archers and mariners. Two further arrays were ordered in September lead by John, Lord of Lovell, Thomas, Lord Camoys, Thomas Skelton, and John Lisle, including review of the town walls, and the second by the bishop of Winchester who was ordered to array Southampton specifically as well as Hampshire. November and December 1403 brought more arrays to Hampshire in the face of persistent French threats. Outside counties were also to come and assist them. In November 1403 Southampton provided mariners for another fleet to counter the French at sea for several months into 1404. Late 1403 was a time of almost constant military pressure on the town. From August onward the town and at times county was on alert to deal with probable

585 Ibid, p. 238
587 Ibid, pp. 287 and 298.
588 Ibid, p. 298.
589 Ibid, p. 298.
590 Ibid, p. 298
591 Ibid, p. 287.
592 Ibid, p. 298.
593 Ibid, pp. 287-290; CCR 1402-1405, p. 82.
596 CPR 1401-1405, pp. 360 and 356.
French assaults. The employment of townsmen defensively at sea also shows how much responsibility Henry placed upon the town and perhaps gives an idea of the potential forces they could raise in addition to those required for protection on land.

Much of 1404 and 1405 were like 1403 for Southampton, though the French threats had grown less frequent. In January 1404 all men-at-arms, armed men and archers of all counties were called to array in defence from French attacks. In March 1404 a naval force was prepared and mariners of Southampton were employed in defence of the south coast at sea. The array probably was raised for some weeks or months, as was the naval force, and there were not renewed calls for arrays till late 1404. This perhaps indicates a slight abatement in local threat. In October, French attacks caused the king to order all 'fencible' men to arms and repel their enemies. Another naval force was raised, apparently one much greater than earlier in 1404, which involved even more mariners. On 1 March 1405 crews for all vessels 36 tuns or larger were required to serve under his son Thomas at sea. In April and July 1405 arrays were ordered in Hampshire. The July order stated the French had assembled with no small force in the parts of Picardy, who propose to besiege and destroy the king's castles and towns in those parts and harm the king's lieges and to go to Wales to strengthen the rebels there. Compared to 1403 it seems probable that French attacks had lessened, though between two arrays and the naval force raised from the town, 1404 was still a precarious time in which the town remained important in the defence of the south. In 1405, like in 1403, attacks were more concentrated during late spring into summer. Regardless of the consistency of attacks, Southampton had been under threat or military burdens the entire reign of Henry IV to 1405.

In 1406 arrays in Southampton ceased as foreign threat subsided. While no manpower was required on shore, the king's military activities did not cease. Both in July and August 1406 mariners of the town and county were recruited. What these vessels were required for is unstated except in August, where the ambiguous phrase 'king's business' was used. For the first command only 36 mariners were ordered from the town,

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97 CCR 1402-1405, pp. 244-245.
98 Ibid, p. 263.
100 CPR 1401-1405, p. 506.
102 CCR 1402-1405, p. 503; CPR 1405-1408, p. 61.
103 Ibid, pp. 61-62.
104 Ibid, pp. 234, 237.
while that of August required sailors to crew two ships, split between Hampshire and Dorset. While it is possible that these ships were employed in defence, the French threat appears to have decreased by 1406. The demands of 1406 were small compared to the earlier years of Henry’s reign, as the town provided perhaps 100 sailors the entire year.

Through the rest of Henry’s reign no other arrays were made or other military demands but one in September 1407 as Prince Henry fought Owen Glendower in Wales.\textsuperscript{606} King Henry ordered all lords, knights, esquires, yeomen and those with lands or payments from him in various counties, including Hampshire, to comprise an armed force that he or his deputy would lead to Wales.\textsuperscript{607} It is unclear how this would have affected Southampton, though it is fair to say that of all Henry’s reign to date 1407 was the lightest year in military obligations to the king and ushered in several years of peace. As we have seen, early in Henry’s reign Southampton was incredibly active in his military designs. Contributions were made most years both as arrays for defence on land and sea and for the protection of the south coast. With the exclusion of men sent to Scotland as soldiers, the rest of the armed men were at least in their home county or in defence at sea. Mariners made contributions outside the region, going to Wales and Scotland. After 1405 the threat greatly lessened from France, pressures shifted elsewhere, and the demands on the town greatly diminished with little employment in 1406 and probably even less in 1407. Thereafter the town was asked to make little military if any contribution, till Henry of Monmouth became king.

\textbf{Reign of Henry V}

Henry V increased demands on Southampton greatly. Although he commanded several arrays during his reign, Henry’s greatest military demand was in mariners for his war in France. Most of these arrays took place early in his reign before major gains in Northern France, indicating that even after Agincourt Henry felt France was still a viable threat. After the conquest of much of Normandy (1417-1419) arrays persisted, though infrequently. Demands for crews, however, were a constant feature of Henry’s reign and the town’s primary military utilization.

Henry only made one request for men from Southampton before 1415. In January 1414 the king ordered crews for several ships of the town to transport both Henry and the

\textsuperscript{606} Ibid, p. 361.
\textsuperscript{607} Ibid, pp. 361-362.
French king’s ambassadors to France. While not directly tied to military activity, transport of diplomats and other non-combatants was important during war and peace alike. This request would have been small, with two to four crews totalling 100 mariners or so. For Southampton this was the start of near constant participation in Henry V’s campaigns. Heavy demands on Southampton began in 1415. As Henry’s military campaigns were executed, Southampton became central. In March and July 1415 all ships of twenty tuns and above were required fully crewed. Such a seizure of all vessels, including modest and even small ships, would have required hundreds of men at a minimum. This fleet patrolled the Channel in advance of the invasion and then transported Henry’s armies for the siege of Harfleur.

After 1415 Henry’s demand for naval manpower increased becoming nearly continuous. In 1416 there were six different orders for mariners from Southampton: two in April, two in May, one in July and another in September. Of these calls half were for all ships in port, another being all ships above twenty tuns. One in May and another in September were for mariners for one ship each, with May’s order divided between several other ports and Southampton. All but one seizure was intended to carry men to Normandy to secure Harfleur, the mid April arrest to ward off attacks by the French, Genoese and their allies. Such frequent seizures including even small vessels were heavy demands; it is hard to imagine that these requests did not completely drain the town of these tradesmen. Both for home defence and abroad Southampton proved an asset to the king’s military pursuits.

More than half of Henry’s arrays to Southampton took place in 1416 alone. With one command in April, two in May and another in August, from spring to late summer Hampshire was in almost constant array. These requests indicate continued danger of French attacks, with April’s array raised to counter a great fleet of French and Genoese. Several other Southern counties were also raised to prepare themselves for this danger.

The next five years Southampton primarily provided mariners with few other military functions. Calls for ship crews were made in February and November 1417, two in March and October 1418, two in August and October 1419, February 1420 and May

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608 CPR 1413-1416, pp. 177 and 221
609 CPR 1413-1419, p. 162; CPR 1413-1416, p. 344.
610 CPR 1413-1419, p. 346; CPR 1416-1422, pp. 36, 70, 73, 76, 82.
611 CPR 1413-1419, p. 346; CPR 1416-1422, p. 72.
612 Ibid, p. 72.
Three of these commands were for the press of all ships twenty to twenty-four tuns or greater (February 1417, 24 August 1419, and February 1420). Several of the ships commanded in other arrests were larger and would have demanded larger crews. August’s 1419 command required eight vessels 60 tuns or more and four balingers of twenty tuns or larger. All these arrests of mariners were for the war with France, though the latter was to stop a French fleet travelling to Scotland with military supplies and men. As before the town showed how versatile its military obligations could be by active war at sea. Southampton provided primarily mariners every year of Henry’s reign excluding the first and the last. Such constant and heavy demands yearly demonstrate how important towns like Southampton were to the king.

While Southampton’s main contribution was provision of mariners they also maintained defence at home while the king made war in France. For most of Henry’s reign there were few arrays, so it can be assumed that he felt the town sufficiently governed its own defence and that there was little chance of French attack, since he had successfully taken the war to them. There were but two arrays after 1416 in Hampshire: March 1419 and June 1421. Both these arrays were commanded under threat from the navies of French allies. The king of Castile and Leon was the aggressor inspiring the 1419 array, which states his fleet was of ‘no small number’ and intended to ‘burn and destroy the ships and shipping of the realm and especially the king’s ships at Suthampton and Portesmuth and invade the realm’. The order of June 1421 implies once more the King of Castile and Leon intended to attack but this time aided by the King of Aragon, both having amassed fleets to attack English ships to ‘invade the realm’. Danger for most of Henry’s reign excluding 1416 seems faint, with only these two arrays called over his entire reign. The fact that it is not the French but their Iberian allies also shows France’s position at sea and conversely the importance of their Spanish allies. Defence of Southampton was paramount. These men had a dual purpose of protecting the county, town and the king’s fleet amassed there.

Throughout Henry V’s reign Southampton demonstrated its military capabilities. Southampton provided mariners every year of Henry’s reign but two, often with heavy and

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614 Ibid, p. 268
615 Ibid, pp. 209, 323.
616 Ibid, p. 209.
617 Ibid, p. 323.
frequent demands. Hundreds if not thousands of townsmen participated in the king’s wars that won most of Northern France. These mariners were predominantly for transport of armies and supplies that facilitated Henry’s successes, but were also used in defence at sea. While Henry was away the town also protected itself and the area about it. While for most of Henry’s reign Southampton was relatively inactive defensively, 1416 and the infrequent orders to arm in 1419 and 1421 made great demands on the townsmen with arrays. Notwithstanding his short reign, Southampton’s military involvement increased to all-time records, proving itself a major asset in the south for manpower at sea and land.

Reign of Henry VI

Early in Henry VI’s reign the military demands on Southampton remained much the same as during the last part of Henry V. Few demands for arrays were made early on as the French were still too weak for a concerted assault; however as Henry’s kingship progressed, and the French regained their strength, this threat rematerialized. Southampton’s primary obligation for manpower early in this new reign remained mariners to crew the king’s fleets to France. However, Henry VI required fewer sailors from Southampton proportionally throughout his reign than his father, partially because the main southern port shifted from Southampton elsewhere, such as Dover and Sandwich.

Nonetheless, the first eight years of Henry VI’s reign included a few instances of Southampton providing men for the wars in France. Over seven years, from 1422 to 1429, there were only four orders for crews, with two in the same year: June and December 1423, July 1426, and March 1428.\(^\text{618}\) All commands were for mariners to transport men to France. With Henry V’s death, both the number and frequency of mariners required of Southampton diminished. Two of the four orders for sailors were to crew an arrest of all vessels in port. All ships twenty to 200 tuns were arrested, so the crews would have varied from twenty to 60 men.\(^\text{619}\) Another order in June 1423 was just for mariners to crew ‘ships’ so it is possible that three of the four calls for men were rather large demands. The 1426 request was to transport 400 soldiers so it probably was smaller in number than the others.

In 1430 several factors changed Southampton’s role in the military designs of the king. With increasing French power, renewed threats were growing against English forces. On 17 June 1430 the king ordered a naval force of Southampton to protect the realm at sea

\(^{618}\) CPR1422-1429, pp. 124, 192, 362, 469.  
\(^{619}\) CPR 1321-1324, pp. 417-418.
from possible French assaults. Several town leaders including William Soper organised and directed this in Southampton. Other southern ports were arrayed as well, making a large system of defence at sea. With French threats at sea it is surprising the counties were not raised at this time for land defence, perhaps indicating that the French and their allies were still relatively weak and more focused on attacking English ships than trying to land and raid the coasts.\(^{620}\) Only in one year in the first half of the 1430s were sailors ordered from the town. In February and March 1431 Southampton was ordered to provide crews for all ships of the town for war in France.\(^{621}\) This shift in Southampton’s military utility toward defence continued in the 1430s. After more than a decade without arrays for land defence, arrays were issued in May and December 1435.\(^ {622}\) Two years later in May 1437 arrays were ordered in Hampshire and the southern coast.\(^ {623}\) As was common by this time men were set into groups with watches day and night to alert them of enemies, lest they be caught unawares. In 1435 England’s position in France was deteriorating, as much of Normandy had been penetrated and threatened along with the Duke of Burgundy shifting sides, leaving England under growing danger. Once more the initial reaction to possible attacks primarily fell to the array, these reversals in France drawing the frontier ever closer. In 1437 the array was ordered to counter continued threats. For the moment England still controlled much of Normandy which limited the threats and therefore need of large-scale arrays. Requests for sailors resumed late in the 1430s with increased pressures on the English government to counter French gains. Commands were made in March 1438, March, May and October 1439.\(^ {624}\) Only one of these commands was for all ships with mariners, the rest simply state ‘ships’ and their crews. Over two years, especially 1439, the town once more was providing manpower on a large scale for the king’s wars. All these fleets were to transport men needed in the defence of Normandy against French pressure. As was the case with all Henry’s reign so far, arrays were infrequent punctuated by occasional and often large demands upon the town.

The 1440s presented continued resurgence in Southampton’s contribution of crews for the king’s war efforts with nearly yearly calls from 1440 to 1445. Orders were made in May and July 1440, February and November 1441, March and June 1442, March 1443, and

\(^{620}\) *CPR* 1429-1436, p. 74.
\(^{621}\) Ibid, pp. 130, 131.
\(^{622}\) *CPR* 1429-1436, pp. 473, 519.
\(^{623}\) *CCR* 1435-1441, p. 127.
\(^{624}\) *CPR* 1436-1441, pp. 149, 273 and 312-313, 340.
December 1445. These seizures of mariners were for transporting men to Normandy with one exception. In May 1440 Southampton, among several ports, arrested 30 vessels with crews to combat pirates. With several concerns occupying the government it appears piracy became a major threat to the south. Information had reached the king of nine ships of Holland and Zealand ‘lying in wait’ to attack five ships owned by various Englishmen. While for much of Henry’s reign Southampton was not heavily involved, the first half of the 1440s showed the town was still prepared and capable. The use of mariners in home defence and abroad, transport and war, show how varied and important Southampton’s position was in England’s military structure.

Another unique request for manpower occurred in November 1441. The king ordered the town to provide ‘Fencibles’ to escort men to Normandy. The crews probably were fairly large as two great ships and a balinger were provided. The town also supplied additional armed men for further security to those travelling to France. Such unique assignments show how versatile and potentially useful Southampton was as a military organisation. Renewed arrays were commanded in the 1440s though intermittently. March 1443 and September 1449 were the only arrays that decade. There were naval actions both for local and regional defence in addition to these arrays, like that of May 1440. The arrays of 1443 and 1449 indicate the reversal of English power in Normandy. As a result the border between the two hostile countries changed and Southampton was open to assault. It is surprising there were not more arrays for Southampton in the 1440s. This probably was less due to the 1444 truce than because the French needed time to reorganise before further activity. The September 1449 array of Hampshire reflected France’s final onslaughts on Normandy. Without this geographical buffer attack seemed eminent, mariners were demanded from Southampton in a last attempt to save the English hold in France. In June and September 1449 crews were readied to transport men from Portsmouth to Normandy. Both orders were large, providing men for all ships in port. The order in June was open ended to continually supply men ‘from time to time’. With great need of mariners Henry turned to ports such as Southampton continuing his trend of infrequent and

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626 CPR 1436-1441, p. 411.
627 CPR 1441-1446, p. 48
629 CPR 1436-1441, p. 411.
630 CPR 1446-1452, pp. 270, 317.
631 Ibid, p. 270.
large demands. The continual drain of all sailors in the town must have been a heavy responsibility. Portsmouth and Poole were commanded likewise, though Southampton being closer to Portsmouth, where these armies were gathering, probably faced a larger portion of demand than Poole. In July the king employed some of these crews to protect the coast. With such conflicts to English interests at home and in France, Southampton continued in its role as a provider of mariners for the king’s fleets.

During the 1450s the demands on Southampton continued to change. The first half of the 1450s the town provided sailors as Southampton’s main military role; March and June 1451, June 1452, January and July 1453, July 1454. Apart from 1452 which was for defence at sea the rest were primarily for transport to France, those of 1453 specifically to Gascony where they were to aid in defence. It is probable the January 1453 transport included John Talbot’s reinforcements that accompanied him to defeat at Castillon. The later transport in July, only a week after the battle, may not even have been employed. It is hard to imagine this force was to make a second attempt in Gascony against the French after Castillon. It is possible the order was created before the news of Castillon had reached the king. Southampton perhaps having recruited ships and mariners before news reached the townspeople of the disaster, the force may have already left the port before learning Talbot’s fate.

As in most of Henry’s reign, the intermittent use of large orders for mariners continued till the end of the Hundred Year’s War. This provision of mariners chiefly for transport ceased as the war in France came to its final exhausted conclusion. The array then greatly increased in frequency, being used yearly thereafter, demonstrating England’s growing anxiety over renewed attacks at home. The changes in Southampton’s employment were a clear indication how far England’s fortunes had reversed from earlier in Henry VI’s reign. Southampton experienced almost perpetual arrays after England’s defeat in the Hundred Years’ War. Arrays are made almost yearly starting in May 1454, August 1456, August, September, December of 1457, February and December 1459, several of which included multiple calls to arm within one month. Most were to counter French threats in the south, especially in the mid-1450s. Southampton’s only provision of a crew in the

632 Ibid, p. 270.
1450s after Castillon was in June 1454 for defence, once more showing their priority was the border with France, now menacingly close.

In 1457, a year of intensive French raids including a major assault on Sandwich, attacks were carried out on Southampton, so from September to December every man living there was ready for attack. In December 1457 two arrays were made, one to Southampton for 46 archers and one to Hampshire for 385. Their employment was vaguely stated as the king’s business. While this force was not large compared to some other towns, it is comparable to that of Lincoln, Hull and Newcastle. The number of archers raised by Hampshire was also the fewest, though not by much, Somerset 405, Oxfordshire 419, Gloucester 424 and Suffolk 429. Considering its proximity to the sea it is logical that they would provide fewer men abroad, as protection of the coast was now of paramount importance. Southampton Steward’s Book of 1457 tells of these French attacks from the town’s perspective including that townsmen drove an attack off. 1457 undoubtedly stretched Southampton’s military ability but further showed its capabilities in defence.

With rebellion fomenting in England, Southampton remained militarily active. In 1458 the town paid four men to watch the gates night and day for fear of attacks from the men of Calais (rebels). These men were probably additional to the normal watch from the town ordinances, perhaps better equipped or for use to reinforce places not usually safeguarded. Later in the 1450s arrays were called to quell internal rebellion against Richard of York. Between French aggression and civil war, Southampton was increasingly involved as a military organisation in defence over the 1450s.

Southampton during 1460, the last year of Henry VI’s reign, was postured to counter English rebels. In January, April and December 1460 arrays were ordered in Hampshire against rebel factions. The Lancastrians were trying to gain support wherever they could, including counties and towns. Southampton provided two naval forces in January and March 1460 to counter rebel naval activity, the March command warning of landings by the Earl of Warwick. The town had internal issues of its own, as the year

\[\text{\begin{tabular}{l}
\text{635 Ibid, pp. 406-410.} \\
\text{636 Ibid, p. 410.} \\
\text{637 Ibid, pp. 406-408.} \\
\text{638 SBS 1456-1457, p. 24.} \\
\text{639 SBS 1457-1458, p. 18.} \\
\text{640 CPR 1452-1461, pp. 564, 602, 654.} \\
\text{641 Ibid, pp. 564, 606.}
\end{tabular}}\]
began with a major riot during mayoral elections. From the end of the Hundred Years' War for the remainder of Henry VI's reign, Southampton had mounting military responsibilities in defence. Almost all Southampton's manpower, land and sea, from 1454 was used in safeguarding the kingdom.

Southampton's role in Henry VI's reign had therefore fluctuated greatly. Provision of mariners increased in the 1430s to 1440s then nearly ceased in the mid-1450s, and was intermitted with large, infrequent demands for men. With the loss of the Hundred Years' War, defence became Southampton's focus, primarily in arrays but with occasional mariners for defence at sea. At first this was to counter the French, then rebel factions. During Henry VI's reign Southampton showed itself a capable military organisation employed both at home and abroad as the situation demanded.

Southampton's petition to the crown for aid in 1460 gives an idea of the manpower available as the town had 472 loops to defend but only 300 defensible men. Further information indicates there were actually many more than 300 men though some were considered untrustworthy, especially those of 'diverse nations'. This plea was similar to town articles and advice the Bishop of Winchester offered Southampton two years previous, that there were men there who might betray them to the French. While there were many more men who could defend Southampton, fear of employing them brought other internal issues to the forefront. The town felt comfortable raising 300 trustworthy armed men, which to them was insufficient for their defence.

Reign of Edward IV

Southampton was employed by Henry VI's successor in another manner. As always the town was required to provide its own defence, with or without notice of the king, but by the reign of Edward IV Southampton was rarely commanded to provide men for the king's wars abroad, both as sailors or soldiers. With the Wars of the Roses occurring and occasional foreign pressures defence remained Edward's primary request from Southampton.

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645 OBS c.1300 vol. 1, p. 141; Letters of the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries, pp. 13 and 21.
646 Ibid. p. 21.
Taking power from Henry VI, Edward IV required the arrays twice a month in March, May, and June of 1461.\textsuperscript{547} The majority were raised against the continued threat of rebels though two included warnings of French attacks. The first two arrays were called as several battles were taking place between Yorkists and Lancastrians. Edward ordered arrays for local defence and to have men readied throughout the country, never knowing where the next Lancastrian threat would materialize. However, as Southampton was far from most of the conflicts of 1461, they remained passive in these struggles.

With the defeat of the Lancastrians, defence shifted to external threats from France. One array of May 1461 took men of Hampshire to Guernsey, which had recently been taken by the French and who were still in the process of besieging Coram Castle there.\textsuperscript{648} Those arrayed gathered in Southampton where the town provided mariners for transport. Men of Hampshire were also to defend the Isle of Wight from French assault.\textsuperscript{549} Between attacks from the French and rebels, Edward IV’s first year kept Southampton occupied in defence, not just of the town and county but the Isle of Wight and Guernsey. Such regional assistance illustrates one of the ways Southampton protected others abroad.

From 1461 to 1475, Southampton was involved militarily in defence but not frequently till the mid-1460s. The first array after 1461 was isolated in May 1463, with no further arrays until 1466.\textsuperscript{650} From 1466 near constant defensive measures were taken for the next decade. April 1466, January 1467, October 1469, June 1470, April and June 1471, 1473, and January 1475 all included the town arming for conflict.\textsuperscript{651} Southampton defended the coasts from attacks or landings by the Earl of Warwick and the king’s brother the Duke of Clarence in June 1470. This included mariners and ships that formed a guard at sea.\textsuperscript{652} The Steward’s Book of Southampton of 1470-1471 indicates the town increased watches in April 1471, apparently a common procedure when in danger by this date.\textsuperscript{653} The same year Edward ordered Southampton to dispatch nineteen men to protect Beaulieu.\textsuperscript{654} In January 1475 Edward IV ordered Southampton to array soldiers and mariners.\textsuperscript{655} It is possible that

\textsuperscript{547} CPR 1461-1467, pp. 34, 38 and 571; CCR 1461-1468, pp.54-55.
\textsuperscript{648} CPR1461-1467, p. 34.
\textsuperscript{649} Ibid, p. 38.
\textsuperscript{650} Ibid, p. 571
\textsuperscript{551} CCR 1468-1476, pp. 377-378; CPR 1461-1467, pp. 529 and 571; CPR 1467-1477, pp. 55-56, 196, 217 and 220, 495; SBS 1469-1470, pp. 24, 33, 35, 44, 45.
\textsuperscript{652} CPR 1467-1477, pp. 217 and 220
\textsuperscript{653} SBS 1470-1471, p. 33.
\textsuperscript{654} Ibid, p. 44
\textsuperscript{655} CPR 1467-1477, p. 495; CCR 1468-1476, pp. 377-378
they were raised for defence, but equally possible that especially the mariners were raised for the upcoming war in France. After 1461 the townsfolk also fulfilled their military obligations outside the county. In 1469 Southampton supplied mariners for two ships to the Earl of Warwick. In 1470 with conflict between the king and the Lancastrians, including their Scottish allies, men from Southampton itself were involved in the king's quarrel there, though no exact numbers were given. In June of 1471 more townspeople (Davie Trayne, John Goo, Master John De Leche, John Goo, son of John Goo and John Rosse), were recruited to the king's wars under Lord Maltravers. While both these groups were probably fairly small in number, the latter numbering only five men, it does show that like previous kings, Edward IV continued to employ the townsfolk outside their town and county for his wars.

Edward IV's reign, though much shorter than Henry VI's, saw frequent use of Southampton's military organisation. Only two or three requests for mariners were made, probably numbering only a few hundred men total. The primary use of manpower remained the array for the defence of the town and county, though Southampton was often required to protect places in the southern region. The town also provisioned some men for conflicts abroad. Men provided in this way were perhaps similar in number or perhaps even exceeded those supplied as mariners during Edward's reign. While it is hard to gauge the town's military contribution, the king esteemed it well and repaid them with both financial rewards and increased rights. Southampton was clearly involved with many aspects of Edward's military activities, a valuable contribution of the town to the kingdom's military organisation and demonstrating the town as a capable military group.

Reign of Richard III

Southampton remained involved militarily during Richard III's reign, primarily for defence, participating in 1482, 1483 and 1484. In 1482 and 1484 Hampshire was arrayed for coastal defence and to ready men for possible action in Scotland. In 1483 with the Duke of Buckingham's rebellion Richard III ordered Southampton to send as many

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656 PBS, 1469-1471 vol. 1, pp. 34-35.  
657 SBS 1470-1471, p. 24.  
658 Ibid, p. 45.  
660 CPR 1476-1485, pp. 320, 397-399, 491.
horsemen as they could to Coventry for his aid. Although no numbers are recorded, soldiers were sent as Richard gave Southampton additional rights and gifts for this service. The arrays of 1483 to 1484 were in response to Richard's many enemies at home or abroad. These preparations made towns such as Southampton key in the defence of England. While Richard's reign was short, Southampton was engaged all but the last year. As many of the battles of the Wars of the Roses, such as Bosworth, were distant, Southampton appears to have remained uninvolved. Though it is difficult to draw clear conclusions from the few years he reigned, the town provided men in Richard's earliest conflicts as well as defended the south coast from attacks and invasions of rebels and their French and Scottish allies.

Reign of Henry VII

Southampton's military involvement in Henry VII's reign was similar to that of Richard III and Edward IV. Few calls for mariners were made continuing the diminished role of Southampton's naval military activity. Home defence, and to a smaller extent soldiers abroad, continued with regularity though. As with Edward IV and Richard III, Henry's reign was spent dealing with dissenters and their allies, England's usual enemies, Scotland and France. As long as threats were present Southampton remained engaged in various ways in these conflicts.

Defence was Southampton's major military responsibility during Henry VII's reign. From 1485 to 1500 there were three instances of defensive procedures in Southampton in 1486, 1491, and 1497. The French king often supported rebel assaults, which weakened his enemy, so Southampton's defence against France or rebellion tended to be synergetic. As most of the conflicts of the Wars of the Roses were far from Southampton, the town primarily was concerned with maritime activity by rebels in the Channel and French piracy.

A rare count of manpower from the town's wards within the walls remains from the late fifteenth century. In the Book of Fines starting in 1488 the manpower of three wards was given as 470. As the remaining entries in the left column are faded this should be viewed as a minimum number. The right column names the soldier types of these

662 Ibid. p. 19.
664 SCA 5/1.
townsmen which included archers, billmen, pikemen and even gunners. These numbers regarding manpower are incomplete for several reasons though. First the document itself appears to only include those within the walls of Southampton, only a fraction of the men available to the town from suburbs and its hinterlands. The second issue is that the document’s physical condition has degenerated and now the information is incomplete, many of the words and numbers now illegible. Even with these reservations the document does demonstrate Southampton had a large number of well equipped townsmen prepared inside the walls for their military obligations.

In 1497 threats from Warbeck Perkins’ army and Cornish rebellions relatively close in Cornwall and Devon, placed the town in a new position, and the mayor began preparations for assault.\(^665\) Aside from spies sent to gather information on events, townsmen were arrayed to protect themselves.\(^666\) The mayor also ordered six additional men to keep the gates.\(^667\) As in most times of danger Southampton raised additional men to strengthen the town. Even without the king’s commands the town prepared for attacks upon it and its neighbors.

Southampton continued to provide men outside the county on several occasions. In December 1488 and April 1496 the king made requests for men to employ abroad.\(^668\) The 1488 order was to aid the king in supporting his Breton allies. As the Duke of Brittany had just died, this force may have been Henry’s attempt to aid the Duke’s young daughter against Charles VIII of France, though the force seems never to have left England. In 1496 Hampshire was to provide soldiers, this time in Scotland.\(^669\) After decades of infrequent use Henry called crews for all ships in Southampton for Scotland as well. We know some men were at service still in early 1497, so the town must have fulfilled their obligation to the king there.\(^670\) As was customary the use of manpower abroad by this date probably was fairly low, and Henry’s employment of townsmen as soldiers was only a small part of their contribution. What is interesting is that Southampton was readied on several occasions, illustrating their continued use abroad was still appropriate and possible.

As we can see, Southampton’s military contribution in Henry VII’s reign was much like that of his immediate predecessors: fairly frequent periods of arming for defence

\(^{665}\) *SBS 1497-1498*, pp. 1-3.
\(^{666}\) Ibid, pp. 1-3.
\(^{667}\) Ibid, p. 2.
\(^{668}\) *CPR 1485-1494*, pp. 278-279; *CPR 1494-1509*, p. 67.
\(^{669}\) *CPR 1485-1494*, pp. 278-279.
\(^{670}\) *CPR 1494-1509*, p. 91; *SBS 1497-1498*, p. 6.
coupled with small numbers of men employed in several English holdings under threat, usually in the south. Another small function the town continued fulfilling was in providing small numbers of soldiers outside the town. As in the reigns of Edward IV and especially Richard III, Henry relied less and less upon the town for sailors and ships. While the responsibilities changed reign to reign Southampton remained involved in the king's military activities against the French, Scots and internal divisions.

**Conclusion**

Southampton's provision of men to the varied needs of the crown covers every decade of the late medieval period. These demands fluctuated with the situation at hand. Some decades scarcely had a year without an array or provision of soldiers and sailors. This function of Southampton was crucial to the military organisation of Hampshire. Often the mayor and townsmen were charged to array men over the entire county showing their influence regionally. Arrays in Southampton were the primary means by which the king supplied himself with men from the area, especially for local defence. This was essential given the proximity of Southampton to the threat of French attack. The townsmen were the primary defenders of Southampton, their businesses and lives, as it was impossible for the king to defend all English towns.

Early in the reigns of Edward I and Edward II manpower was employed, both in sailors and soldiers, often outside Southampton. This demand seemed to change with internal issues facing Edward II, though soldiers still aided the king outside Hampshire. At the end of Edward II's reign the arrays were almost exclusively for defence. From that point on the array increasingly was defensive in Southampton and Hampshire provided increasingly fewer men abroad as soldiers. However, even into Henry VII's reign townsmen continued serving outside Southampton and Hampshire in support of their military obligations.

While Edward III and those who followed him used soldiers from Southampton and Hampshire, it was infrequent. The importance of this system was evident when England was subject to external threats, in Southampton's case France. While the war was going well on the continent, defensive arrays diminished as there were few dangers of French attacks. During periods of vulnerability arrays increased, such as from the late 1330s through the 1340s, the late 1360s through most of Richard II's reign, and increasing from the 1430s onward. In the decade following the loss of Normandy defensive arrays against
France became common, only shifting to internal defence with the Wars of the Roses. During the last fifteen years of Henry VII’s reign arrays decreased, with only three ordered. In great part after defence the next greatest of Southampton’s responsibilities was in providing crews for ships abroad. For decades this was the chief use of Southampton’s manpower. There was little danger for Southampton when the war was focused in France, making arrays unnecessary, but ships and the skilled men to navigate them were necessary. Easily thousands of men were employed over the course of the late medieval period in this way. Southampton, until Henry V’s reign, was a major port for the war in France. With his passing this began to diminish. In Henry VI’s reign the use of town mariners was less frequent, yet included several very large demands for men. This use of crews from Southampton decreased further under Edward IV and Henry VII with only one command each arresting mariners for all ships of the port, which previously had been more common. This shows the trend that perhaps began with Henry IV’s reign diminished greatly by Edward IV.

These patterns often reflect changes in military systems as a whole. With the indenture system for both soldiers and mariners, fewer men were needed from towns such as Southampton. This still left the town primarily responsible for their own protection but excluded providing soldiers and eventually ships and their crews. The shift away from taking townsmen abroad began during Edward III’s reign, though as discussed above this practice never completely ended. The same occurred with sailors and ships in Edward IV’s reign, shifting from arrests to contract service. Henry VII made use of the seizure of all crews in Southampton only once his reign, perhaps because the newly established royal dockyard in Portsmouth in 1495 provided needed men.

Southampton’s military organisation was important. The next chapter will demonstrate that the town had established a scheme of defence to organise the townsmen. It is probable the town was aware of many threats, as much information passed through or originated in the town and the townsmen arrayed themselves without royal orders. The levying of men in general was the method the king used to organise everyone for defence, channelling their attention to his desired concern. This benefited Southampton by having the local nobility, leadership and men of the county present to aid the townsmen. This was reciprocal. Southampton also assisted other surrounding places and provided leadership to Hampshire’s military activity, illustrating the importance of Southampton’s military organisation to itself and the county, region and kingdom.
Southampton’s provision of manpower was a key part of the town’s military obligation. The primary manner Southampton was employed was in defence. The town provided men primarily for their own protection and defence of Hampshire. To a lesser extent men were sent abroad for the king’s wars throughout the later medieval period. While both contributions fluctuated over the various reigns and conflicts, neither ever completely stopped, men employed as soldiers at home and abroad. After the provision of men for defence comes the supplying of mariners for the king’s navies. In many decades where Southampton was relatively safe from harm this was the town’s main contribution as a military organisation. Decades of Edward III’s reign and most of Henry V’s reign demonstrate this phenomenon. All these aspects of military service were integral to the town’s military organisation and how they interacted in the many conflicts that affected the kingdom and their town.

These soldiers of Southampton, normally engaged in non-military occupations, were brought into war by necessity and played a vital part in the kingdom’s defence. While the king was away or even at home he was unable to protect the entire kingdom from danger. The unpredictability of when and where raids would take place meant that the brunt of protection of the realm lay with the towns and counties being attacked. Southampton, across the Channel from France, was in constant danger from such assaults. In this way the military organisation of Southampton and the ability to raise the townsmen for defence was vital to the county and kingdom to prevent enemies from achieving success both physically and psychologically by gaining victories on English soil. If the enemy attacks were successful, the king would have been forced to abort his foreign wars for fear of finding himself caught between enemy forces both at home and abroad.

The service offered by Southampton abroad was their smallest military contribution at least in numbers of soldiers, though if including mariners this probably changes dramatically. Thousands of men were provided as sailors to the various kings. These men were imperative to success in a conflict, especially in France. Though the numbers of soldiers abroad were small they were not inconsequential. Southampton especially seems to have played an important role in the defence of the south well outside their town’s liberty. The soldiers provided by Southampton participated in the king’s wars abroad, in addition to their numerous contributions of mariners which were a vital part of the king’s ability to wage war at sea outside England.
What is altogether difficult to discern is how the townspeople themselves felt about their military obligation. Most accounts dealing with raising the town’s manpower originate from the king as commands. With no accounts to indicate the town’s reception of these orders their attitudes remain unheard.

These aspects of military manpower were integral to the military organisation of the town. With men defending the kingdom at home the king was able to focus his attention elsewhere. Soldiers from Southampton in the king’s wars abroad brought additional men to support him in his various claims outside England. While defence was the primary way Southampton’s military organisation employed manpower it was able to deal with both aspects of its obligations to the king. This service was only one part of their military obligation but reflects how men outside the warring class were able to be an active and vital part of the town, region and kingdom’s military organisation.
Chapter Three-
Defence Schemes of Southampton

Medieval Southampton was an important town to the kingdom, not only economically, politically and culturally, but militarily as well. One of the most important factors that demonstrate the military organisation of the town was the system it put in place for defence. This military structure was influenced chiefly by two entities: the town itself and the king. It was necessary to make sure that the town was sufficiently strong to defend itself from domestic and foreign threats. The interest of the town to preserve itself is obvious, but the king’s interest in the town was more complex. While it was the king's responsibility to protect his subjects, in reality this was but one of the motives he had for safeguarding the town. Southampton was a viable landing site for enemy forces that could invade England. The king also operated his fleet on many occasions from the town. Protection of his lieges within the town and without, while engaged in their daily trades which maintained society, was also one of his concerns. If the day-to-day activities of the people were halted, as the chevauchées in France showed, these raids could become devastating to the kingdom as well as erode the king’s authority. For these reasons and others Southampton had the king’s attention and that of its own local government.

This chapter will explore the structure employed by the town to fulfil its military obligation, specifically town defence. Among the many factors that need to be explored with respect to the town’s organisation are the defence schemes the townsmen created from c.1300 onward. In addition to these schemes, which were essential to defence, espionage as part of a system of inter-town communication, and the gathering and employment of information for conflict, will be examined. Next will be the involvement of men from outside the town, including the king and his ministers, in organising the town's military

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organisation to deal with the defence of the southern coast, including the town’s defence. All these groups and individuals had an important place in how the military structure in Southampton was constructed and employed.

In this context, it is important to remember that in principle, English towns were to provide for their own defence. The king expected every man in the area to arm himself according to his station in life. If an enemy landed, this group was expected to fight them. According to Attreed, “Medieval English kings expected their urban subjects to assist in the defence of the realm, with their bodies as well as their supplies.” This force was made up of all strata of society from the wealthy to the poor. Locations of great importance to the kingdom’s defence, such as Southampton, often were reinforced by men from outside the locality. Southampton was strengthened by men from not only adjacent lands such as Winchester and Portsmouth, but even those farther off in Oxfordshire, Berkshire and Wiltshire, were obligated to participate in the town’s defence.

Towns like Southampton were expected to provide fortifications in addition to the manpower required of them. With the additions of the defences and the men to protect them, the town still needed to organise them into an effective force, as fortifications are of limited use as a deterrent if poorly defended. This system had two main forms. One is the series of plans the town created to protect itself within the prescribed rights given by the king. The second is the organisation placed upon the town by the crown and its representatives as well as other outside individuals and bodies. Southampton’s local records starting in the thirteenth century describe the defence organisation the town employed. Fortunately these records continue throughout the medieval period giving a detailed view on it. While in some cases the records are difficult to understand as the streets, houses and people named in them change as time goes on, they generally describe

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677 Statutes of the Realm Volume One, p. 259.
679 CPR 1367-1370, p. 229.
680 CCR 1360-1364, pp. 97-98; CCR 1368 -1374, p. 18
681 CPR 1367-1370, p. 229.
the method of how the townsmen were employed to protect their town. The king’s records also have proven vastly important in understanding the military obligation the town had. The Calendar of Close Rolls, Calendar of the Patent Rolls and other of the king’s records have a number of detailed descriptions of what the king required the town do for its protection and the areas surrounding it. These sources also reveal the preparations the town took to fulfil its military obligation.

The defence schemes of Southampton

One important aspect of Southampton’s military organisation was the fact that the town, from at least the late thirteenth century, had a detailed plan for the town’s defence in war and peace. These schemes designated specific responsibilities usually to geographic areas, or wards, with manpower and leadership needed to fulfil these duties. These preparations, if fulfilled, would give the town cohesion to repel an enemy force. This military organisation broke the town into a number of smaller geographic areas, each with manpower and leadership to protect the town and the fortifications prescribed to them. While clearly not infallible it provided clear direction and order for the townsmen in case of an attack.

The fourteenth century

The oldest recorded material on the organised plan of defence for the town is from the Oak Books of Southampton, a book that contains the ordinances of the town Guild Merchant. This account, written c.1300, identified the defence structure of the town that in many ways set the organisation that continued to be used for hundreds of years afterwards and probably was old at the time it was written down. The Guild Merchants’ scheme of defence was the town government’s approach to organise the townsmen into a more efficient and defensible body. This scheme would have been learned and enforced by the town officials for their defence.

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684 Southampton Terrier of 1454, pp. 16-17.
687 See Appendix Chapter Three- Town Ordinances related to Town Defence in the Oak Book of Southampton, c.1300; OBS c.1300 vol. 1, Introduction.
688 Southampton Terrier of 1454, p. 16.
Article 45 begins this scheme stating that some of the town aldermen were to be ‘guardians of the streets’, and were required to swear to keep the king’s peace.\textsuperscript{689} The king’s peace was an all-encompassing statute that included everything from local disturbances to full-scale warfare, which made the aldermen’s position as ‘guardians of the streets’ quite a large responsibility. In the event of conflict these men were responsible for military leadership and activity. Aldermen had a complete list of names of ‘all’ who were in their wards, which they were to update once a month.\textsuperscript{690} This list acted as a muster roll in times of attack or other need, as it gave a clear idea of who the leadership could rely upon and call into service, similar to what was done with any disturbance of the peace as related in Article 46.\textsuperscript{691} The men of these wards were required to defend the town and its defences in an assault.\textsuperscript{692}

These aldermen were to review their wards monthly and ensure that all ‘the points and ordinances made for their ward be well kept’ and if anything was amiss they were to remedy it.\textsuperscript{693} In this way the town was able to repair possible weaknesses in their defence and manpower. With such detail as is found in Article 45 it is clear that the town government knew of the responsibility it bore not just to itself but the king. These aldermen, guardians of the street, were the captains of their wards in protecting them from attack and danger.

The defence scheme continued with Article 46, where the specific boundaries of the wards were given.\textsuperscript{694} The first ward was an area from ‘North Gate’ or Bargate to ‘East Gate’ down to the corner houses of Richard de la Prise and John de la Boleshusse.\textsuperscript{695} Since the article fails to name this ward it will be referred to as the North Ward. This ward included both sides of the street, indicating they were responsible to protect all the northern fortifications and part of the eastern wall of the town. If the North Ward terminated at Eastgate, only one-eighth of the east wall was included. However, if the whole area from the corner houses mentioned to the north wall was included, the North Ward covered one-third of it.\textsuperscript{696} A small section of the western waterfront was also along its boundaries, almost certainly another of their responsibilities. Article 46 reiterates the need to have a

\textsuperscript{689} See Figure Thirty-two; OBS vol. 1, p. 55.
\textsuperscript{690} OBS c.1300 vol. 1., p. 55.
\textsuperscript{691} Ibid, p. 55.
\textsuperscript{692} Ibid, p. 55.
\textsuperscript{693} Ibid, p. 55.
\textsuperscript{694} Ibid, p. 55.
\textsuperscript{695} Ibid, p. 55.
\textsuperscript{696} Ibid, p. 55.
current list of all men in the ward, to enforce the king’s peace, town ordinances, and monitor all foreigners staying in the town. The North Ward was also instructed to have two aldermen instated as guardians.

The next ward, as defined in Article 48, encompassed the area from the same two corner houses mentioned in the North Ward, the houses of Richard de la Prise and John de la Bolehusse, to Newtown street outside the town wall to the east and then to the sea southward. This ward had two aldermen as guardians as well. It seems probable that this ward, which shall be referred to as the East Ward, was to protect the remaining two-thirds to seven-eights of the east wall, depending on the length that the North Ward guarded, and a small area of the southern shore along their boundaries. These two aldermen were also responsible for the protection of Newtown, the suburb outside the town walls to the east.

Article 49 lays out the area of the Centre Ward. This ward ran the length of French Street including both sides of this major thoroughfare. It began north of French Street from the corner of Richard de la Prise’s house and the house opposite of ‘Henry Brya,’ and continued to the sea. This ward, as the two before it, had two aldermen as guardians. To the north of the Centre Ward was a small section of the castle and to the east and west it was bound by neighbouring wards. Only to the south was this ward open to the sea. This ward’s boundaries suggest they were charged with the protection of the southern coast.

Article 50 defines a fourth ward that was bound by the castle in the north, and by the sea to the south and west. It included properties on both sides of Bull Street. This ward would have been responsible for a great deal of the west and southern waterfront, including the western quay. As with the other wards there were two guardians employed. Once more no name is given for this ward in Article 50 so it will be called the West Ward.

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700 Ibid, p. 57.
701 Ibid, p. 57.
702 Ibid, pp. 55-57.
703 Ibid, p. 57.
710 Ibid, p. 59.
The last ward that is listed was completely outside the town walls and will be referred to as the Outer Ward, as it is not named in the Oak Book. This ward was north of North Gate (Bargate) and was assigned three aldermen to act as guardians. The need for more leadership in this division was indicative of the large area the ward covered. As it was outside the town fortifications it is hard to know the part the Outer Ward played in the town defence, though it is unlikely that they would not have been required to help at least in their own defence.

These geographical areas, outside and inside the walls, were created for the security of Southampton by making smaller more effective areas of administration. Article 47 states that each ward was required to provide men to keep the town watches at all times. These articles of the town clearly had more routine functions outside of war, the most common aspect probably being local law enforcement. An obvious example of the day-to-day employment of this system was the arrest of malefactors and ‘evil doers’ in the town. As these functions lay within the same spectrum, these same men were required to arrest, police, or protect the wards from armed attackers. As can be seen by fines issued in Southampton, those neglecting their watch would be punished fiscally for failing to be present or for sleeping on watch. At least two aldermen were given charge of each ward’s defence and leadership, but these men did not fulfil these duties alone. Manpower was provided according to Article 47 with men scheduled by the civic government to keep the watches at all times.

Some of the town fortifications appear in specific wards’ watches so it can be assumed that these structures were in their charges. Unfortunately these accounts do not mention all the defence structures that existed at the time, as they typically only name those used as boundaries of the wards. Circa 1300 there were four wards bordered by the walls

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714 Ibid, p. 57.
715 Southampton Terrier of 1454, p. 16.
716 OBS c.1300 vol. 1 pp. 55-59.
717 Southampton Terrier of 1454, p. 16.
719 OBS c.1300 vol. 1, p. 55.
720 Ibid, p. 57.
and the sea, which remained, in essence, the same set up throughout the entire period.\textsuperscript{722} It is clear that the town fortifications were incomplete at that time as the account states some boundaries as being ‘the sea’.\textsuperscript{723} This town defence scheme shows that the castle was outside the responsibilities of the town as it was used as a boundary but no ward or wards were assigned to it.\textsuperscript{724}

Centre Ward and the West Ward had no significant fortifications in their boundaries at the time the Oak Book account was being compiled in the late thirteenth century.\textsuperscript{725} This indicates they were not protecting a segment of fortifications, but instead protected the beachfront, a difficult charge without major defences. Two wards, the Outer Ward and East Ward, encompass places outside the walls, indicating they were responsible for the defence of areas outside the town walls.\textsuperscript{726} The men of the East Ward who lived without the walls were probably involved in the defence of the east town wall, along with those of the ward within the walls. The Outer Ward possibly helped defend the north wall along with the North Ward, which can be inferred as they were located beside this defence.

Many of these assumptions are given credibility by the fact that in the Southampton Terrier of 1454 the boundaries of these wards had not been altered greatly. If the scheme changed little between 1300 and 1454 then the North Ward’s defence of the east wall stopped at East Gate with the East Ward keeping the rest. The wards that included fortifications in the 1300 scheme were to continue guarding them under the Terrier of 1454. Those that were without defences, such as the Centre and West Wards, by 1454 included fortifications in their responsibilities. This indicates that they had protected that area before these structures were constructed and continued to do so thereafter.\textsuperscript{727}

It is probable that part of the aldermen’s responsibility in keeping the king’s peace included making sure the men of their areas were armed and armoured according to the king’s statutes.\textsuperscript{728} One example from Edward III’s reign ordered that all men ‘have weapons in their house, according to the quantity of their lands and goods, for the maintenance of peace according to the statute.’ Further, these arms and armour were to be

\textsuperscript{722} Ibid, pp. 55, 59.  
\textsuperscript{723} Ibid p. 57.  
\textsuperscript{724} Ibid, p. 59; Southampton Terrier of 1454, p. 21.  
\textsuperscript{725} OBS c.1300 vol. I, p. 59.  
\textsuperscript{726} Ibid, pp. 57-59.  
\textsuperscript{727} Southampton Terrier of 1454.  
\textsuperscript{728} OBS c.1300 vol. I, pp. 45, 55-57, 91; Statutes of the Realm Volume One: 259.
reviewed twice a year.\textsuperscript{729} While not overt in the town account it does state the town was to aid in keeping the king’s peace, which included the town’s military organisation.\textsuperscript{730} These guardians, who reviewed the wards along with writing the names of all available men in each ward, therefore were to verify these men were equipped accordingly.

In 1338 the French landed a devastating raid on the town of Southampton.\textsuperscript{731} While the exact reason for the town’s failure to repel the attack is arguable, it is clear that the town defensive scheme was not employed properly, as the townsmen were caught by surprise and/or fled from the enemy. After Southampton’s defeat, Edward III revoked all local civic authority and installed a keeper and a garrison to protect and govern the town.\textsuperscript{732} Over the next year Edward sent many keepers to the town with garrisons to enforce his wishes there.\textsuperscript{733} This keepership continued throughout the fourteenth century.\textsuperscript{734} While earlier keepers had broader powers, later they played more of a supportive military role, perhaps even advisory. These later keepers retained power to array and compel the town in military matters, but were instructed to have the mayor’s assent and comments and had limited or no civic powers.\textsuperscript{735} The authority of the king’s keeper varied throughout the period. Because the town had failed to protect itself in 1338, the keepers were given more authority; once the town had remedied this situation and improved its internal defence organisation, the keepers’ authority diminished.

Unfortunately there are no accounts containing a revised town defensive scheme or explaining the possible changes caused by new war engines or garrisons brought with the keepers. It can be assumed that the townsmen were still required to defend the town as the keeper had the power to array them, and no other scheme was created excluding them. It is probable that the town defensive scheme of 1300 was still employed, but with the keeper as chief military leader. The keeper would have placed the engines of war and his garrison where he deemed prudent.

\textsuperscript{729} Ibid, p. 259.
\textsuperscript{730} OBS c.1300 vol. 1, p. 55.
\textsuperscript{732} CPR 1338-1340, pp. 180, 275; Platt, Medieval Southampton, p. 109-112.
\textsuperscript{734} CPR 1367-1370, pp. 270, 303-304; CPR 1377-1381, pp. 4, 7, 84-85, 138-141, 311; CPR 1385-1389, pp. 258, 177; CPR 1392-1396, p. 90.
\textsuperscript{735} CPR 1367-1370, pp. 270, 303-304; CPR 1377-1381, pp. 4, 7, 84-85, 138-141, 311; CPR 1385-1389, pp. 258, 177; CPR 1392-1396, p. 90.
After the placement of a town keeper in Southampton in 1338 there was little change to the town’s defence plan throughout the remainder of the fourteenth century. The town appears to have regained much of their authority over time, including military duties, though the keeper stayed to support them. This scheme remained more or less intact through the fourteenth and even the fifteenth century. With the conclusion of the Hundred Years’ War Southampton’s defence scheme received an upgrade to counter France’s renewed threat to them.

The fifteenth century

In 1454 a detailed arrangement was written by the town leadership which appears to be unique in medieval England. The Terrier of 1454 is so detailed that every loop of the defences was assigned to a specific person or persons. The loops mentioned in the Terrier of 1454 were not solely arrowloops and gunports but clearly included the crenelation of the battlements. After the completion of the town wall in the second half of the fourteenth century, such improvement to the organisational structure may have been overdue by the mid fifteenth century. It may be that the former scheme was adequate until the renewed dangers posed by fresh French aggression as the loss of the Hundred Years’ War set in. An example of just one of the five hundred or so listings is, ‘[117] The tenement of William Soper, late of John Lymbourne, in which Gabriel Corbet lives: assigned the next two loops there... 2 (loops)’. Allocation of these loops could have been as little as half a loop for those dwelling in a cottage or occupying a garden plot. Some people listed have multiple loops which seems to correspond to the size of their property and therefore would also suggest they had men, their servants or renters, employed in defence. These townsmen were stationed in the town’s walls and the towers.

The terrier from start to finish was created with the primary purpose of defining the already existing town model of defence, and specifically naming the positions of each person. ‘Pro loupis in gardis murorum ville Suth’ assignatis (Assigned to loops in the wards of the town of Southampton)’. While more detailed than the past systems, it

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736 See Figure Thirty-three; The Southampton Terrier of 1454.
738 Ibid, p. 57.
739 Ibid, pp. 8-9, 99.
describes a defence scheme that follows the traditional defence scheme in which sections of fortifications were protected by those living nearby. It also named the specific locations each individual was to defend, not just each ward. The custody of these specific loops also included maintenance of them.\footnote{Ibid, p. 17.}

The Terrier of 1454 makes a few other adjustments to the town’s defence scheme. For example the Centre Ward, which was to defend the south and southeast of the town, had since been fortified with towers, walls and gates, particularly God’s House Tower and Friary Gate.\footnote{\textit{OBS} c.1300 vol. 1, p. 57.} This alteration was for a number of reasons. One was because the southeast defences of the town from after the raid of 1338 were greatly increased and strengthened, and thus needed a large number of men to keep them. In the 1300 scheme the Centre Ward had the smallest length of the town’s boundaries to defend of all the wards and was a fairly large ward, so it seems sensible that new fortifications were placed in their care.\footnote{Ibid, p. 57.} A small section of what had been in the East Ward became part of the Centre Ward, perhaps those that in the 1300 scheme had defended the same area.\footnote{Ibid, p. 57.} This Ward then had three gates under their keep, including Watergate, a major entrance of the town, God’s House Gate, and Friary Gate.\footnote{See Figure Thirty-three.} When compared to the 1300 scheme, the change in the terrier of 1454 is rather small, but it was important to the protection of the town’s southeast defences. Nevertheless it was significant, considering the increased fortifications built there and the corresponding increased responsibility.

The creation of this document probably was related to the loss of Aquitaine the year before and the fact that the old border had moved unsettlingly close to Southampton. The town government deemed this detailed scheme necessary perhaps to reinvigorate the town to action.\footnote{Ibid, p. 9.} With the constant threat of invasion, especially after the loss of the English king’s French lands, the town’s fear was ever mounting. The attacks on the town from the French in the mid 1450s proved that this fear was not unfounded, and at that time the town successfully repelled a number of attacks.\footnote{\textit{SBS} 1456-1457, p. 24.}
From 1473 we have a civic ordinance by William Overey, a man of great local importance and later a mayor. This account is almost identical to the older ordinance of 1300. The names and locations are those of the c.1300 scheme and the organisation remained the same, as the town was still divided by wards and overseen by aldermen. This unfortunately leaves ambiguous how the town artillery was employed, since by this period the town had accumulated a decent number of firearms, perhaps in the thirties or more. Various contemporary records from the mid to late fifteenth century give detailed lists of locations where guns or other weapons were to be stored or positioned. This indicates that many men assigned to such places would have needed training in the use of the firearms, though the newly rewritten scheme is silent on this.

Later additions to town articles written in the fifteenth century continue to shed light on the issues facing the townspeople and how they countered them. One article that was updated from its c.1300 predecessor is Article 47. The ordinances of c.1300 stated that the aldermen of the ward were to keep and be responsible for their ward. In the 1478 addition this was different, as it mentions constables as the highest authority in the protection of the ward, supported by beadles. It is probable that the aldermen or guardians of the street were these same constables since their positions are the same as before, with perhaps only the name changed. It is also possible that this position was split into a new constable position, leaving the aldermen to other business. It is clear, however, that by 1478 the heads of a ward were assisted by beadles in this duty.

Another difference between these defence schemes is the detail of how the watches were carried out. Article 47 of the c.1300 ordinance states that aldermen were to ensure that wards ‘be well kept and wisely appointed in their ward.’ While the meaning is clear, how this was to be carried out is left rather ambiguous. In an ordinance from 1478 it states that

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750 See Appendix Chapter Three- Town Ordinances related to Town Defence in the Oak Book of Southampton, c. 1473.
751 OBS c.1300 vol. 1, pp. 85-115; Southampton Terrier of 1454, p. 17.
754 SBS 1467-1468, p. 34.
756 See Appendix Chapter Three- Town Ordinances related to Town Defence in the Oak Book of Southampton, c.1478.
757 OBS c.1300 vol. 1, pp. 57, 132.
758 Ibid, p. 57.
759 Ibid, p. 132.
760 Ibid, p. 132.
761 Ibid, p. 57.
the constables and their beadles `shall se that the watches be set in dew season, and that no Allien, Straunger, nor any unmarried man, under the age of 24 yeares, shalbe suffered to watche, nether vew the walles.' This newer Article 47 could indicate one of a number of occurrences or a mixture of them. It could be a trend to have more detail in the specific offices of the town, and/or it also could reflect growing distrust of foreigners, strangers and town youth. This trend affected a number of town ordinances and procedures, as can be seen by the increase in detail of the Terrier of 1454.

More detail was given on the system of town watch in the last quarter of the fifteenth century. The town watch was to have six men always watching within the walls at night. Two of these men were to always be upon the walls while the remaining four were to make rounds around the town itself, including stopping half the time to go up castle hill. This time spent on the castle hill was important because from this vantage point the watch was `to have good respect to the sea and every part of the town, for fire and other dangers'. In this way those inside the walls of Southampton were organised to keep the town safe from attack and other dangers. Outside the town walls a similar system was in place in St. Mary's, Above Bar and Portswood. Clearly the town of Southampton was moving toward a more complex and detailed scheme of defence, possibly learning from past experience, finding that a more detailed plan left less room for error.

By 1478 town watchmen were paid for their services `from all Halloween day to Candlemass, it is agreed that every watch man shall have for every night 3 pence; and afterward, till the feast of all saints, 2 pence.' It may have been a new occurrence to give pay to the watch as the earlier ordinances makes no mention of paying the watchmen. It could also be that the watchmen had always been paid, but the recording of this fact was part of the movement towards more detailed ordinances.

Every townsman was required to `be ready at the walls in proper person, he or a sufficient person, being no alien, for him, up on pain to lose twelve pence for every time making default'. Once more the military obligation of the townsmen themselves is apparent. They were to be present themselves upon call, or to provide another sufficient
man in their place. It is also interesting to note the reoccurring bias toward foreigners that continued over to the defences of the town as well as watching the walls, excluding them apparently from any military obligation in the town.

The newer version of Article 47 indicates that the town leadership was carefully selecting who was allowed to keep guard over the walls, primarily that no unmarried man or man younger than twenty-four should keep town guard. This could have been in order to have more mature men on guard, but also could have been because the married men and older men would have had livelihoods that were tied to the town, which gave them more incentive to keep a good watch. Earlier in Southampton’s history, the townsmen continually distrusted outsiders. This could be for the same reason listed above, they were perceived as having little relation to the town and perhaps would not be trustworthy for its protection. It also might stem from fear that they might betray them to the attackers or even join them in an assault.

In the Southampton Book of Precedents in 1488 there was yet another defence model organised for the town. As before, it is similar to the earlier defence systems with the advantage that, like the Terrier of 1454, it divided the number of loops, though by ward, not individuals. There still were four walled wards, each having responsibility for between 110-120 loops. This format had all the names of leaders and landmarks updated to the date it was written, which makes it valuable to see the leadership of the town defence and identify the areas they were to protect. It also included mention that each ward was responsible for the maintenance of the loops. While once more the general scheme of 1488 is similar to the 1300 and 1473 ordinances, it gives a total of loops per ward and updated names.

The highly detailed models of guard over the town during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries indicate that the town civic leadership was aware of the place it was to play in its own defence. They took this responsibility seriously as can be seen by the various defensive schemes and their improvement over time. It is by these accounts that the military organisation of the town focused its primary and perhaps most important military

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770 Ibid. p. 132.
771 Ibid. p. 132.
772 Letters of the Fifteen and Sixteen Centuries, pp. 13 and 21; Platt, Medieval Southampton, p. 107; Italian Merchants, pp. 24-30.
773 Southampton Terrier of 1454, p. 149-152.
774 Ibid. p. 17.
775 Ibid. p. 149-152.
776 Ibid. p. 17.
obligation to the crown and itself to guard the area from attack both small and large in scale, foreign and domestic. It is also evident from the town ordinances that guarding and maintenance of these defences were one and the same. The defense schemes did not change significantly over the two centuries, but the growing level of detail used to record the defense scheme in the ordinances indicates an increasingly effective and reliable defensive organisation. Whether the town leadership wanted the role of a defensive organisation or not, they played the part, and in many cases were effective in fulfilling this responsibility. While mostly merchants, tradesmen and commoners inhabited Southampton, the defence of the town, region and in some aspects the kingdom, hinged on the preparations of this town and others like it.

Espionage, Inter-Town Military Communication and Aid

One aspect that often is unexplored in the medieval period, even less so regarding civic bodies, is their involvement in gathering information on enemy preparations, activity and movements. While the scarcity of records that clearly describe it taking place hinders such research, it certainly did take place, and towns such as Southampton, appear to have had a major part in the gathering and employment of information. This military function was imperative to keeping the coast protected from enemy attack. The knowledge of enemy preparations, location, the force’s number, equipment gathered, and possible plans would be vital information for preparing a defensive strategy. This foreknowledge could prevent surprise attacks if employed. In Southampton this aspect of military organisation appears to have been very important. Over the entire late medieval period the town gathered information of enemy activity to protect itself.

From royal accounts it is evident that the king expected the town to be on its guard in all aspects, for its own protection, and that of the areas around them. One such way was to monitor events taking place and gather this information. As civil divisions continued to put the kingdom in upheaval in 1323, Edward II ordered the town government to ‘watch for rebels’ and arrest all they suspected of rebel sympathies. This information was used to counter the rebels in the possible attacks they were formulating. In December 1323 a similar order arrived, specifically to stop the king’s enemies’ spies. This account

778 Ibid. p. 138.
779 Ibid 328, p. 536.
indicates that the king’s enemies would also have employed spies gathering information on communities and individual loyalties, and on the king and his forces. In March 1326 this order was reiterated with the addition to watch for enemy men-at-arms. During much of the upheaval of Edward II’s reign the town of Southampton was being employed to gather information on the inhabitants and foreigners there, and was given power to arrest those they deemed a threat.

Town leadership was given a great deal of power to counter foreign influence in the town as well. This power seems to have been abused or enforced further than, or in opposition, even to the king’s wishes. In 1326 the Mayor and Bailiffs of Southampton arrested Berard de Lebreto and all his goods. It seems Berard de Lebreto was also in the employ of Edward II. Whatever the situation that arose for his arrest, the king ordered the town to release him and his goods, and the king sent Hugh de Gavadenuo under his protection to gain his release.

One such example of this military employment is that of Roger Norman, a civic leader from Southampton who, in December of 1338, sent a ship to spy on French activity and identify the possibility of an attack. The order from the king commands Norman ‘to spy out the king’s enemies now assembling in foreign parts and preparing galleys and other ships of war against him and his people’. The act of organising and sending out spies to gather information shows an often overlooked aspect of military organisation that was of vital importance, as it could give a clear advantage to the defenders.

Edward III expected no less from the town than his father. November 1338 the mayor and bailiffs were commanded to arrest all who entered or tried to leave the country with any letters or sealed deeds that might ‘prejudice’ him. At the time the king was preparing for his upcoming war with France, so it is probable he was trying to counter the enemy’s intelligence-gathering on the English and their military ambitions. In March 1342 the town leaders were ordered once more to carefully investigate all who tried to enter the country by the town. Just over a year later the civic government was ordered by Edward

780 Ibid, p. 551.
781 CPR 1324-1327, p. 254.
783 CPR 1338-1340, p. 171.
784 CCR 1337-1339, p. 620.
III to examine all ships and crews entering the country for their safety. Orders to counter French spies were sent to Southampton again in 1345, 1346, 1360, 1364, and 1370. These examples illustrate that the town was being employed frequently to control information, countering French intelligence activity.

Richard II used the town of Southampton in much the same way. In August 1386 the king ordered the Sheriff of Southampton to send men out to spy on the activities of ships in the area and where they were able to land. This was to be done to prepare for French attacks on the country and ready the inhabitants for defence. For the same reasons as past kings had done, Richard was preparing his kingdom to counter French attacks by sending the townsfolk, familiar with the area and enemy, to watch and ready themselves and send news as soon as the information was acquired.

In July 1387 the king sent the Sheriff of Wiltshire a letter regarding news that French warships had been seen preparing to land. This information was said to have come ‘by certificate of the Mayor of Southampton’. In this case the Mayor of Southampton took the initiative and sent the king news once this threat was perceived. This communication provided advance warning for towns, villages, counties and castles to resist the enemy as well as provide readied assistance to others, in this case as Wiltshire was to provide men to protect Southampton.

The fifteenth century was no different in the use of ‘civic’ spies to gather news on enemy movements. In July of 1418 the king ordered the Sheriff of Southampton to prepare the county and organise watches to resist the French, in addition to sending out men to spy on enemy activity. These watches were groups of armed men readied to deter the enemy from attack. The men used as spies would have been probing across the county to find any news of the enemy, where they might land or have landed and then to forewarn the watches.

786 CCR 1343-1346, p. 220.  
789 Ibid. p. 253.  
790 Ibid. p. 329.  
791 Ibid. p. 329.  
792 Ibid. p. 329.  
793 CCR 1413-1419, pp. 472, 505-506.
Another such account comes from May 1438 when six men were paid 18d. for 'skowtewache' by mayor's orders. It appears that in addition to the standard watch taking place daily and nightly in Southampton at times of threat, the mayor of the town would send men abroad to gather information of events going on around the town for their protection. While this Steward's account gives no indication of what the hazard was at that time, nor does it state where the scouts went or what they accomplished, it does indicate a well developed system of military defence through the gathering of information.

The gathering of information was a priority of the town, especially in times of perceived danger. In 1457 the mayor sent William Taylor to Lepe to go and acquire news of the Frenchmen. From this vantage point it appears that either the scout was able to see the activity of the French vessels or perhaps they had already landed and were on foot, or maybe he was to gather news from locals in the area who might know. What was done with the information the town received was also vital. In 1457 Richard Asshe was paid to ride to Portsmouth on official town business. He was sent to the town to bring 'ready tidings out of Normandy of the Frenchmen.' This act indicates that the town of Southampton had and was a part of a developed information gathering and distribution system. The town also sent messengers to the Earl of Wiltshire and the Mayor of Shaftesbury. This information would have been vital to the town and its ability to be prepared for attacks, especially by surprise. This network of town information gathering and sharing was a vital part of preparing for war, giving warning to their neighbors to be ready. It also was a way in which to prepare other towns and provide military assistance outside the town if the need arose.

On 14 May 1461 the Mayor of Southampton ordered Anthony Clement to ride to Winchester to alert them of an enemy fleet approaching the town. This fleet was laid off the Isle of Wight, so the town was alerting their neighbors while they still were able to deal with the enemy force not yet upon them. This also would have prepared their neighbors to be ready to aid one another.

The town was able to acquire information, and in many situations, used this knowledge effectively to make preparations for defence. In 1473 the king sent word to the Mayor of Southampton of possible French attacks. In response, the town organised an

794 SBS 1434-1439, p. 83.
795 SBS 1456-1457, p. 23.
796 Ibid, p. 23.
797 SBS 1456-1457, p. 23.
798 SBS 1461-1462, p. 16.
increased watch, spending some 20s. on additional manpower.\textsuperscript{799} No report of a French attack was made at the time, but it is clear that the town had taken the required steps to be ready for it. Not long after the suspected French attack Southampton faced more troubles. The mayor of the town received news that a fleet of ‘Easternlings’, men of the Hanse, were approaching. He then rode personally to the Grace Dieu to alert those of the garrison there of the danger at hand. It appears the town decided on a different resolution than physical violence, as the mayor later is noted to have sailed out between Southampton and the Isle of Wight to pay the ‘easterlings’ ‘wages’ of 40s.\textsuperscript{800} While perhaps not a physical defence of the town, bribes of this nature were in no way new as a means of town protection.

Even the mayor himself was a part of the acquisition of information for town protection, usually using his affluent position to communicate with men of great social stature. In 1482 the Mayor of Southampton rode to Lyndhurst to meet with the Earl of Arundel to exchange information.\textsuperscript{801} This meeting may have had a number of social, political or other purposes, but the communication of defensive information between these groups was a mutual benefit.

On 11 June 1497 the Mayor of Southampton ordered Thomas Barbour off to Salisbury. There he was supposed to gather information about the Cornishmen and their rebellion. After leaving the town he was to continue spying out information on the same as well as what the Cornishmen were doing. He was paid 10d. and had his horse and other expenses paid for.\textsuperscript{802} The same day two other men were sent out from Southampton for the same purpose. One was sent to the Lord of Winchester (the Bishop) and the other to the City of Winchester. These two men, John Elmes and Robert Blewelt, were to ‘enquire of the doings and demeanour of the Cornishmen’.\textsuperscript{803} John appears to have been out longer as he was paid 10d. and Robert was paid 2s.\textsuperscript{804} More preparations on 15 June were made in Southampton for fear of the Cornish activities. The town paid additional men to guard the gates, fortifications, arms and armour, as well as send out more spies. John Elmes once more was sent out to collect information on the Cornishmen. He was sent to meet with Master Dawtre and the Master Controller, this time specifically to gather information on

\textsuperscript{799} SBS 1472-1473, p. 25.
\textsuperscript{800} Ibid, p. 31.
\textsuperscript{801} SBS 1481-1482, p. 36.
\textsuperscript{802} SBS 1497-1498, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{803} Ibid, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{804} Ibid, p. 1.
Perkins Warbeck. Another spy, Oliver Sherde, was sent out to see Perkyn's ill demeanor. Another man, a servant of the mayor, was sent with a letter from the king to Lord Broke and Portsmouth as well.

Clearly, Southampton had a detailed system of accruing information regarding military activity both in England and outside it. The level of diligence in sending spies on land and sea shows the great lengths and importance information was for the town. Once gained, use of the information for preparing the town and alerting their neighbors demonstrates another important aspect of the town's military schemes. Not only did Southampton have a detailed system of organisation to defend themselves but the town also had another equally complex scheme to gain news on current events. These developments show how multifaceted and complex their military organisation truly was.

**Defensive schemes of the king and others in relation to Southampton**

The town of Southampton played a key role in the military organisation of the kingdom. It was locally important to neighbouring villages, towns, counties, nobles and the king. These persons and organisations recognized Southampton's importance and assisted reciprocally in Southampton's military organisation through various defensive systems. Often these schemes were at the king's command, though independent participation took place, particularly between local towns and lords. As a port, Southampton could have been a weakness to the area, region and kingdom if ill-guarded. After the raid of 1338 particularly, the king implemented several new defences to ensure such an event was not repeated and various steps were put in place to correct this. As a first step, the king ordered additional men to be posted in Southampton to oversee the town's defence. These additional men bolstered the town's military organisation with sufficient leadership and manpower to repel enemy assailants.

The king played the largest part in the measures that both employed and protected Southampton. As with any location in England the first means of protection were the inhabitants of the various towns, cities, counties and villages themselves. On the south coast there were two main administrative areas for defence. One that was central to defence was the county, headed by the sheriff. Throughout this period the sheriff was vital to

806 Ibid, p. 2.
807 Ibid, p. 2.
Hampshire’s military structure. The second was the maritime lands, a swath of lands along the coast for miles inland, led by a keeper of maritime lands. These two areas overlapped in area and jurisdiction but were important as the coastal lands were typically more under threat than the rest of the county and required additional protection. In addition to these men the king provided arrayers for the raising and leadership of men in both areas. Towns were also able to array men for their protection. At times arrays were even employed outside their county in places of increased risk such as Southampton. The levy was complemented by a number of defensive methods. Systems of beacons and patrols were additionally used to keep watch over these geographic areas. On the south coast these systems were often used in conjunction in times of danger.

Wealthy landowners were further required to provide additional soldiers for defence of the counties, maritime lands and especially in towns, including Southampton. These obligations were additional to their responsibility to personally array in their counties providing further men, funds and equipment when required. In times of attack, a wealthy landowner was given a quota of soldiers he had to provide, numerically and by troop type. The more lands they possessed the larger the demands of men and military equipment required. The involvement of outside landowners played a major role in the military organisation of Southampton throughout the period, supplying valuable soldiers and leadership to the town. In this way Southampton was provided additional soldiers to reinforce their town manpower.

Royal military schemes in Southampton

After the raid of 1338 Edward III made several changes to his defensive schemes for Southampton. Some means he employed were the placement of royal officials and troops. Keepers were placed in locations of perceived threat as were garrisons. After the 1338 raid in Southampton, the early keepers held great power, both civic and military, and were charged with safeguarding the town. In many ways these men were to enforce the

king's wishes there and ensure that townsfolk were fulfilling their military obligation, principally in their own defence. The provisions of authority along with a garrison further strengthened the keeper’s ability to strengthen the town’s military organisation. Additionally men were constantly placed to fulfil various functional and organisational duties in the castle, county and town. Edward did continue to rely upon Hampshire and other counties to reinforce Southampton. Yet another layer of additional leadership, military experience and soldiers was provided the town for their protection by the king.

These structures were important to the military schemes of Southampton as they strengthened it and placed the town in context to its surroundings. While the town was the primary party responsible for its safekeeping, this was a difficult charge. The defence of a location as open to assault as Southampton made further systems of protection imperative to counter concerted attacks directed by the French and their allies. The king, individuals and organisations all were part of a network of defence across the kingdom for their mutual protection. In this way Southampton was set into the greater defensive structure of the kingdom, region and locality.

The system of defence Southampton was involved in was a complex scheme of various features. The array, probably dating to the Anglos-Saxon period, was the primary means of large scale defence in England. In December 1325 Edward II ordered a general levy of all men to be armed according to the statute of Winchester for defence. The arrayers were to elect deputies over the arrayed in groups of hundreds so these men would be ready at specific locations in their counties including Hampshire. The array in its theoretical form was structured for sufficient leadership and armament. In addition to leaders and men, more precautions were taken. Those arrayed were to ‘see that beacons be erected and watchmen and sentinels placed in all proper stations.’ It is clear that a fairly complex network of beacons existed to warn of imposing threats and the units of sentinels were placed likewise to gather information and perhaps be an initial deterrent. With warning, the large numbers of men arrayed would then have had time and information to counter enemy attacks. Around this same time a keeper of the coast was chosen to oversee

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813 See Appendix Chapter Three- Outside Soldiers in Southampton
815 CPR 1324-1327, pp. 216-218; Stubbs, Select Charters, p. 463.
817 CPR 1324-1327, p. 216.
818 Sumption, Hundred Years’ War, p. 227.
the maritime lands of Hampshire with the same objective. These functions combined to create overlapping defence, leadership and, if lacking, accountability for their charges.

Outside leadership was not always appreciated in Southampton though. In 1336 the townsmen complained to the king that Adam, Bishop of Winchester was interfering in their affairs. The bishop was not just advising the town leadership of suggestions that might be helpful to them, but had sent his own men to enact his will there. The town pleaded for the king to stop him from this oppression.\(^8\) This account demonstrates two sides of the military obligations assigned to the Bishop of Winchester over Southampton. While the exact details of these commands are unknown, it is obvious the town did not want the bishop, or more specifically his men, to interfere in their military defence schemes. With such assignments from the king, officials had to tread lightly in all directions. Since complaints regarding the bishop’s and other’s interferences are rare, it is probable that much of the time the town appreciated or at the least did not mind such ‘assistance’ in their town.

During the raids of 1338 to 1339 Southampton was reinforced by men from Hampshire and without it. In July 1338 Adam, Bishop of Winchester was once more present defending Portsmouth and Southampton from French raids. For this he had raised his tenants and the men of Fareham.\(^9\) The difficulty of protecting such a large area is evident as during this period Portsmouth was raided and razed undefended. Three days later the king organised men over several counties ‘to be ready to repel invasions of the French at the request or summons of the keepers of the coast.’\(^10\) Hampshire, Berkshire, Wiltshire, Surrey, Sussex, Oxford, and Kent were placed under the Earl of Surrey and Earl of Huntingdon to head this collective. This deployment enabled landlocked counties to reinforce coastal counties. Apparently these men arrived in Southampton shortly after the French attacked, possibly putting them to flight. It was later questioned if those arrayed were not involved in further looting there.

Such combining of counties under a central group was fairly common. On 12 November 1338 John de Warenne, Earl of Surrey, Richard Earl of Arundel, William de Clynton, Earl of Huntingdon, John de Moubray and John de Hampton were appointed overseers of the arrayers of Southampton, Berkshire, Wiltshire, Surrey, Sussex, and Kent.

\(^8\) CPR 1334-1338, p. 291.
\(^9\) CPR 1338-1340, p. 134.
The king stated that this was done to avoid the failure of the past keepers, 'that by default of the said under to guardians of the coast as well as on account of the disobedience and rebellion of some in the said counties, loss of life, destruction of property, and other evils have occurred at Southampton, Portsmouth, and at other places in the said counties, and that similar evils or worse are to be feared'. While avoidance of past failures was paramount, this arrangement also unified the counties for defence and gave the under-guardians, keepers and other leadership a clear structure to rely on. These directors were also to survey the ports and the entire length of the coasts of their counties and to rectify any weaknesses found. All the bishops, various ecclesiastical leaders, earls, barons, knights and others were to present themselves and their men at the nearest coast in their support. Those who neglected this order were to be placed on a list for the king's notification.

With the complete mobilization of all males in the county with a clear and direct structure, Edward III was making moves to resolve many of the weaknesses that allowed prior French raids success. This defence structure helped reinforce and improve Southampton's ability to resist assaults and further incorporated the town's strength with other nearby towns.

From a record of the same year the king's investigation of the raid on Southampton can be found with its conclusion. The enquiry found that many of the keepers and deputies had fled from the threat, and that none of the men raised stood to face the enemy, leaving the town to be burned and plundered. It appears that some of the men even used bribes to avoid going to war, which may have been a common phenomena of the time. The king stated as well that the same men of Southampton neglected their duty and fled. As a punishment a list with all their names was to be made, and they were to be arrested and placed in the Tower. It also appears that after the enemy force had left, the townsmen and those sent to protect the town began pillaging, including the king's wool and wine.

These failures were more of execution than of organisation, as the planned defence schemes were employed improperly, if at all. If beacons, sentries and other companies had been formed and readied as had been ordered prior to the raid, then the attack on Southampton would have been very different. Yet the raid of Southampton underlines one of the main weaknesses of reliance on a largely non-military community in warfare.

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822 Ibid, p. 150.
823 Ibid, p. 149-150.
surprise attack such as that on Southampton met little resistance, and most of the townsmen, instead of gathering to repel the enemies, as more experienced soldiers might have done, fled once the enemies were within the town. If indeed men had bribed the keepers of the coasts as alleged, this reveals another weakness: that men obligated for military service, especially outside their homes are less interested and so are more inclined to disobey, flee or fail to show up. The arrayers and keepers from the raid onward were to strengthen the defences of the town and make sure the men were ready to defend the coasts in the future.  

Secular lords such as John de Warenne Earl of Surrey, Richard Earl of Arundel, William de Clinton Earl of Huntingdon, John de Mowbray and John de Hampton and others played an important role in this function as protectors of the town and county, as they provided men and leadership. The clergy also fulfilled a military role to the king in Southampton, and great ecclesiastical lords such as the Bishop of Winchester were required to provide men and direction as had their lay counterparts. Not only were these lords required to provide armed men and leadership to aid in the defence of the town and the adjacent lands, but they were often called upon to verify to the king that the townsmen and their fortifications were ready to withstand an assault.

Even with the failures of the array as shown by the raid upon Southampton, it remained the prime means of defence in the realm. Counties and towns remained a major part of Southampton’s defence. In February 1339 men from Oxfordshire were arrayed to ‘be attendant’ to Richard, Earl of Arundel and keeper of the maritime lands in Hampshire. Two months later Arundel was also given power to array Wiltshire and Hampshire as Maritime Keeper. Though it is unlikely he did not have the power to array Hampshire in February, it shows his powers to protect the coasts were far-reaching even outside the area of his charge. Help from outside Hampshire was at times long term as well. Berkshire provided men for Southampton’s protection in April and May 1339 with 20 men-at-arms and 40 archers there, in addition to fifteen men-at-arms, 60 armed men and 60 archers in Portsmouth. This help from Berkshire stayed in Portsmouth for a year or

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828 Ibid, pp. 149-150, 179-180; CPR 1340-1343, p.12; CPR 1367-1370, p. 270.
829 CPR 1338-1340, p. 134; CPR 1340-1343, p. 476; CPR 1367-1370, p. 304; CPR 1377-1381, pp. 4, 7, 9 and 12.
830 CPR 1385-1389, p. 177.
831 CCR 1339-1341, p. 19.
832 Ibid, p. 122.
more. These arrays outside Hampshire would have resulted in a surge of several hundred men for coastal defence whereby Southampton and other port towns received additional soldiers. Such forces would have given valuable leadership and manpower to Southampton in times of dire threat, especially after the depopulation of the raid and Black Death.

After the raids came to an end outside counties were infrequently employed in Southampton’s defence by Edward III. Only in 1360 as Edward left for France did the king place orders for counties once more to array and protect Southampton. In spring and summer of 1360 Oxfordshire and Wiltshire provided men to defend Southampton. In March 1360 all men of Oxfordshire were to array to protect Southampton and Portsmouth. In April Wiltshire provided twenty men-at-arms, 50 armed men and 200 archers and Somerset twenty men-at-arms, 40 armed men and 150 archers, once more to aid in the defence of Southampton and Portsmouth. In August Wiltshire supplied a further 100 of the ‘best’ men-at-arms and armed men and 200 archers, Portsmouth receiving 200 men-at-arms and 400 archers from other counties. Obviously Edward realized that the French posed a great threat, especially while he was away, and saw the need of such reinforcement to vulnerable targets. Much of the next decade calls for arrays both inside and outside Hampshire remained silent.

After nearly ten years of peace Edward III required additional men sent to Hampshire. On 13 August 1369 the king ordered the keepers of the peace, arrayers and Sheriff of Wiltshire to provide a hundred of the best men-at-arms and armed men, and twice as many archers to Southampton within six days for its defence. In this situation, with a keeper in the town, it probably would have been his role, perhaps coupled with the mayor, to utilize these additional men from Wiltshire in the town’s defence. As mentioned earlier, since no new scheme appears to have been invented by the successive keepers, it can be assumed that the town continued with its old defensive scheme from c.1300, and the additional men were positioned where there was need of additional manpower, bolstering the townsman and whatever garrisons the keeper had in the town.

834 CCR 1360-1364, pp. 104-105.
835 CPR 1367-1370, pp. 303-304.
836 Ibid, pp. 303-304.
837 Ibid, pp. 303-304.
In 1375 the king called all counties of the Southwest of England, including Hampshire, to prepare for invasion from France. These counties were ‘to guard all ports and sea-shores in the county of Cornwall (Southampton and Devon) where ships can put in, resist and destroy all persons wishing to invade the realm by land or sea, array all defensible men, furnish them with arms suitable to their estate, lead them against any enemies presuming to enter the realm, make some common sign by beacons (ignem) on the hills or otherwise to warn the men of the country.’ As was clearly customary in times of threat men were prepared and armed and beacons placed. What perhaps is of distinction is that this account states one key role they had was safeguarding locations where enemies could land. It is probable that this aspect of the coastal arrays had always included this, though perhaps at this time it was something the king wished specifically to be carried out. To a greater extent this account demonstrates how the counties of England, and especially in this situation, Southampton, Devon and Cornwall were all integral to the defence of the south coast and England in general. At this time the king had basically arrayed all men along the southwest of England to prepare for French attacks showing the level of threat they faced. This event indicates as well the part that counties and towns such as Southampton played in relation to other villages and towns in the neighbouring counties as they all acted as military organisations in unison.

In July 1377 the king made further preparations for the French by placing William, Earl of Salisbury in charge of the protection of the southern coast of Hampshire and Dorset. He ordered all men of these counties to be available to aid the Earl in this. This procedure fits into a larger scale plan to defend the coasts, and similar actions took place to the east with Edmund, Earl of Cambridge and Constable of Dover Castle, William de Latimer and John de Cobham of Kent being ordered to defend the coasts from the French, as they had already landed ‘in great force’. As demonstrated by these accounts, the town fit into a wider context in their county, region and kingdom with the division of varying responsibilities. The town’s part in the king’s organisation was their own defence and that of the immediate area, while the counties were organised as mobile defence forces over a much larger region, possibly even outside the arrayed men’s own counties. However, it is

840 CPR 1377-1381, p. 4.  
841 Ibid, p. 4.
probable that townsfolk from Southampton were part of this general county levy, as they were not excluded.

In 1385, again under threat of French attacks, the king organised the coasts for defence. In Southampton county an array was ordered, and beacons were set to signal and warn the arrayed of enemy activity. Further individuals were put into play when in July 1385 William, Bishop of Winchester, arrayed the men of Hampshire, including Southampton to defend the town. He was also to ensure all men were organised and equipped properly for defence. This example demonstrates the use of men from elsewhere in Hampshire to reinforce Southampton, probably a practice more common than the records indicate. It is possible that in many arrays of Hampshire such actions were carried out even if unstated in the written record. Men of Wiltshire were once more arrayed in July 1387 to protect Southampton. No number was given in this account either, though as before, it is possible Southampton received a hundred or more reinforcements to ensure their defences. An earlier monarch, Richard II, employed this system to fortify Southampton’s defence, though infrequently, only twice his whole reign.

Throughout the fifteenth century arrays, beacons, watches and sentinels remained a main part of defence in Southampton. In July 1418 watches were ordered and men were arrayed along the coast, and in May 1437 the same was done. These watches were specifically to be kept day and night and all able-bodied men were to be ready to resist the king’s enemies at any time. Again in August 1440 this was reiterated but with the addition to look for internal enemies as well. In September 1449 the king ordered a commission to array Hampshire and prepare it for possible attacks as well as aid in the king’s wars in France. These attacks were to be met by an array of all men of the county. The king also ordered these men to survey the mustered men on occasion and organise the beacons to warn them and their men of attackers once they arrived. While time had continued the usefulness of the basic array over Hampshire and its maritime lands accompanied by beacons, watches and other defensive systems remained essentially the same throughout the fifteenth century, perhaps indicating that for the most part they had succeeded.

842 CPR 1381-1385, p. 588.
843 CPR 1385-1389, p. 12.
844 CCR 1385-1389, p. 329.
847 Ibid, p. 316.
848 CPR 1446-1452, p. 317.
During the fifteenth century, men of Hampshire and outside towns and counties continued their support for Southampton, often without royal direction. In December 1403 the men of Wiltshire, at the request of the Mayor of Southampton, arrayed for the defence of Southampton fearing more French coastal attacks. A group of 40 archers was placed in Southampton in November 1417 for ‘the safekeeping of the king’s carracks, ships and vessels in the port of Southampt and the defence of the same against the invasion and malice of the king’s enemies for a quarter of a year’. In March 1418 Hampshire raised three knights, 364 men-at-arms, and 776 archers for the defence of Southampton and the sea under the king’s uncle, Thomas Duke of Exeter. The addition of hundreds of men from various counties illustrates the continuing dangers that Hampshire, and especially Southampton, faced from French raids and the recognition of the need for additional men to deal with these increased threats.

Even after the Hundred Years’ War had ended soldiers from outside the town were employed in its defence. In 1457 one John Gunner from Sandwich was requested by the Mayor of Southampton to come and help them organise their defences for firearms. John appears to have been in Southampton when French attacks came, and he presumably aided in the town’s defence. Men were sent from various places to help defend Southampton, with soldiers being lodged in Bargate and other locations as well as food and drink sent to them. Soldiers of Salisbury were lodged at the Friary. Thomas of Hampton also was in the town with ‘gentlemen’ among his company.

A commission of array was ordered 3 September 1457 in the county for all fencible men, men-at-arms, hobelars and archers for the defence of the coast. On the 26 the commission was again ordered, this time under the Duke of Somerset. December brought yet another call for archers in every wapentake, hundred, rape, city, borough, town, township, village, hamlet and other places in the county. From the latest array it seems the county raised 385 archers for the king’s service as well. It is probable that

849 CCR 1402-1405, p. 288.
850 CPR 1416-1422, p. 145.
852 SBS 1456-1457, p. 23.
856 CPR 1452-1461, p. 400.
859 Ibid, p. 408.
Southampton was included in the defence of the coast and was once more given special attention with additional leadership and soldiers.

In 1458 fear of potential invasions and assaults caused the king to make preparations to counter these dangers. At this time all shires from Cornwall to Yorkshire were arrayed to defend the coasts. As Southampton was one of the possible targets, the town was armed and outside forces were sent there to help bolster it and the adjacent lands for possible attacks from the sea.\(^{860}\) These accounts, the last particularly, show how anxious and real the threat of attack upon the coasts was. It is interesting that men both from various towns and under different lords had come in defence of the town showing not only the many layers of the defensive system but how it could be effectively employed. Once more Southampton received special consideration over much of the kingdom.

On 7 September 1458 the Bishop of Winchester wrote to Hugh Pakenham regarding probable French attacks on the town or adjacent lands. He continued his account by citing the attacks on Sandwich in 1457 as evidence of this probability. He also wrote to the king to request reinforcement of Southampton Castle which he felt was in need of repair. He warned that there were three or four men who would ally with the French if they were to attack,\(^{861}\) advising that the town leadership gather ‘trusty men’ to search them out.\(^ {862}\) This relationship between the town and Bishop was ancient and he often aided them with men and counsel throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Some decades later this relationship was formalized by the king. Perhaps fearing that the town was inadequately prepared, or simply stating the traditional relationship that seems to have existed between the town and the Bishop of Winchester, in 1472 the king ordered the townsmen to be obedient to the Bishop. In addition to the Bishop, this royal decree also ordered the townsmen to obey Sir Maurice Berkeley, the constable of Southampton castle. The relationship between the town and the baronial family of Maurice Berkeley was possibly another traditional relationship that was only being formalized in the royal decree.\(^ {863}\)

Few reinforcements to Southampton were made after the danger of French attacks died down, even during the Wars of the Roses. This probably is because the town played a limited role in the wars and therefore did not require additional men for protection. In 1470 Southampton received soldiers from Edward IV to help Lord Howard guard the ships and

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\(^{860}\) *Letters of the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries*, p.13.

\(^{861}\) Ibid, p. 12.

\(^{862}\) Ibid, p. 13.

port. As there were enemy ships in the area these men were important in local defence. The Mayor of Winchester accompanied by soldiers arrived in the town to reinforce Southampton as well. In 1471 more soldiers of the Earl of Arundel were in Southampton to aid in its defence as the town paid them for their time there. As conflicts in the Wars of the Roses once more arose with several major battles fought over England, it is not surprising that the king allocated soldiers to Southampton’s protection to ensure his support there.

Royal officials and garrisons

As stated earlier, the French succeeded in 1338 in landing a series of raids on the south of England, with an especially damaging attack on Southampton. This resulted in the suspension of town authority then vested to a town keeper who commanded a garrison to protect and govern Southampton. As we saw in Chapter One, this period in the town’s history was marked by frequent increases in the building of Southampton’s fortifications. This activity may possibly have been because of the keeper’s presence or because the townsmen realized the result of their incomplete circuit of fortifications. Regardless of the reason, or perhaps partially due to both, works continued in the town for decades after.

In October 1338, not long after the raid, John de Scures and Thomas Coudray were made the town’s keepers, though they were unable to accept the office as they were involved elsewhere in the king’s service. Shortly after in November 1338, the first keepers arrived, John de Bokland and John de Palton with a garrison of six men-at-arms and twelve archers. These keepers with their garrisons became a common feature in the town for the next few years. From 1339 to 1342 Richard Talbot, Edmund de la Bech, Thomas Earl of Warwick, Philip Thames Prior of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem and the Prior of St. Swithun’s in Winchester Prior with the Abbot of Hyde all held places as town keepers. These garrisons could range from only six men-at-arms and twelve

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864 SBS 1470-1471, p. 23.
865 Ibid, p. 23.
866 Ibid, p. 57.
868 CPR 1338-1340, pp. 180 and 275.
870 CCR 1339-1341, p. 18; Platt, Medieval Southampton, p. 113.
871 See Appendix Chapter Three—Keepers of Southampton.
872 CCR 1339-1341, pp. 18, 115, 106, 155, 260, 205 and 305; Sign Manuals and Letters Patent to 1422, pp. 46-47 and 49-51; TNA E101/22/11; Platt, Medieval Southampton, p. 114.
archers, to one knight banneret, ten knights, 50 men-at-arms and 160 archers under the Earl of Warwick. Such numbers of men in the town would have greatly strengthened Southampton’s defensive capabilities.

The size of the keepers’ garrisons fluctuated greatly, even throughout a keepership. Warwick’s garrison is stated as around 200 men though Platt indicates it probably never exceeded more than 100 at one time. The size of garrison stationed in Southampton probably corresponded to the level of threat, the funds available and perhaps the status of the keeper, as Warwick, an Earl, had the largest personal garrison. From the time directly after the raid to 1342 the king selected keepers for the town, many of whom brought substantial garrisons. This indicates the king understood the town’s vulnerability, especially after the raid, and provided men and leadership to reinforce the town’s military capacity. It is probable that with the continuing raids during 1339 by the French and their allies the king decided it best to maintain keepers in the town with strong garrisons. This visible and probably active reminder of the king’s desire and commitment to make Southampton well defended increased the initial response to military preparations in the town.

The keeper of the town, even if coupled with a strong garrison like that of the Earl of Warwick, still relied on the townsmen for sufficient manpower to protect Southampton. All the keepers placed in Southampton had the power to array the men therein for defence, though later keepers had some limitations even in military matters. As many of the keeper’s garrisons were much smaller than that of the Earl of Warwick’s, this dependence on townsmen was even greater. While they had this power and there is no reason to assume that it often was contested, it did happen at times. Keepers Edmund de le Beche, along with Richard de Penle and Stephen de Bitterle, were ordered to stop compelling the church of St. Mary’s to provide more than the two armed men for the town’s protection, as the church was already involved in its and Southampton’s defence. This power was another useful tool in bolstering the town’s military strength but clearly had limitations. The keepers also could utilize the military obligations of all religious and

873 CCR 1339-1341, p. 18; Sign Manuals and Letters Patent to 1422, pp. 46-47.
876 Ibid, pp. 46-47.
878 Ibid. p. 215.
lay lords and town and county arrays in addition to their garrisons. In November 1338 Hampshire, Berkshire, Wiltshire, Surrey, Sussex, and Kent were arrayed to protect the coast. All the bishops, religious leaders, earls, barons, knights and others were to participate with their men in this defence as well. As illustrated here the king created a multilayered system to provide Southampton’s keepers with sufficient access to additional manpower.

As war with France was inevitable late in Edward III’s reign the keepership of Southampton became very active once again. In June 1369 Hugh de Escote was made Keeper of Southampton, followed by Emery St. Amand who was made keeper in August of the same year. Hugh de Escote’s garrison was rather small for the threat he faced with only eight esquires and two archers. When Emery de St. Amand arrived he brought 47 men-at-arms, 39 hobelars and 172 archers, a much more formidable force for the danger Southampton then faced. Amidst continued French threats in August 1370 Hugh de Escote, apparently with no garrison at all, was once more in Southampton. With John Polymond, the mayor, he was ordered to array the town and its suburbs. This cooperation with the town mayor indicates how the town keeper had become a support or auxiliary to the town leadership. That he was without a garrison at a time of such danger is unusual as well, but it was possibly due to funding difficulties. If funding was the reason, then the manner Robert de Assheton’s garrison was raised in February 1371 fits well. His garrison was of arrayed men from Dorset, Gloucester, Northampton, Rutland and Somerset amounting to 40 men-at-arms and 90 archers, unlike the previous garrisons which were indentured. With increased French aggression keepers and their garrisons, no matter their recruitment, once more were involved in Southampton’s defence.

Richard II’s main assistance to Southampton was not the county arrays but a continual keepership with garrisons. After renewed attacks on the coasts in the summer of 1377, which left Hastings burned and Yarmouth, Rye and the Isle of Wight pillaged, the king placed John Arundel as Southampton’s keeper. His recommended garrison was 100 men-at-arms and 100 archers, but arrived as 140 men-at-arms, 140 archers, twenty

880 CPR 1338-1340, p. 149-150.
881 CPR 1367-1370, pp. 270, 303 and 305; Platt, Medieval Southampton, pp. 125-126.
882 Ibid, p. 126.
883 TNA E101/29/34; Platt, Medieval Southampton, p. 126.
884 CPR 1367-1370, p. 474.
885 CPR 1370-1374, p. 102.
886 CPR 1377-1381, pp. 4, 7; Platt, Medieval Southampton, p. 127.
crossbowmen, eight gunners, and two engineers. After a few months this number decreased, perhaps because the lack of attacks made them unnecessary, and by September only 60 men-at-arms and 60 archers remained, which was still a formidable garrison. He also was empowered as keeper to see that all townsmen 'according to their condition and means were armed with suitable weapons and arrayed against the king's enemies whenever danger is imminent, compelling them thereto by distress or imprisonment if necessary.' In this situation as in those of previous town keepers he was ordered not only to lead the people in defence of the town, but to see that they were prepared and armed in a suitable manner to defend themselves. In this way the king ensured that Southampton remained organised for defence with sufficient soldiers and leadership.

From 1383 to 1397 Richard II made his brother, Thomas Holland, Earl of Kent, Southampton's keeper. John Sondes represented the Earl as keeper in Southampton, which included the duties of commanding of a garrison of archers and men-at-arms. Richard II seems to have directed commands to John in respect to the keepership of the town and castle, which seems to have accommodated all parties involved. It also appears that John was active in the town military organisation prior to this deputyship. With perceived threats of attacks from France during much of Richard's reign, the keeper and his garrison were valuable assets to the town's defence. It is probable that many of the other keepers had in fact been present in their duties; perhaps as the Earl was the king's brother his allowance was to have a deputy there in his place.

After the Earl's time as keeper ended late in the fourteenth century the keepership was passed to Ivo Fitzwarin in January 1400. It is unclear if any garrison was placed in Southampton after that time, and it is likely that, upon Fitzwarin's appointment, the use of garrisons was discontinued. As usual, he had powers to array the men of the town for their defence, and he was ordered to see that the fortifications were in good condition, which were listed specifically including the 'garrites', 'towers', 'loupes' and other defences. He also was told to carry out his labours with the advice of the mayor. This perhaps indicates that the keepership at this time was a purely military office and had become only a support
to the town leaders. When Ivo was appointed, he was asked to make repairs to the fortifications with all haste, as danger was imminent. There are no records of a town keeper after Ivo’s appointment, and it is reasonable to assume that the office ended with him. Why this office ends is debatable as Southampton was entering into a period of raised tensions and foreign threat under Henry IV. It is possible that the position overlapped with the duties of other civic and royal officials in the town and was no longer worthwhile, as each keeper had become more and more auxiliary to the town leadership.

The initial keeperships of 1338 and 1339 were empowered with a wide array of rights in the town, both civic and military. These powers shifted from complete control of the town in consequence of failure, to an advisory and supportive role to bolster the town when successful. From 1338 to 1400 there were more than three decades of keepers listed in Southampton, from 1377 to 1400 with little or no break. This increase in town keeper activity demonstrated Richard II’s fear of possible attacks on Southampton in the late fourteenth century and one way in which he dealt with it.

It appears that the keepers of Southampton became even more common in the late fourteenth century than immediately after the raid. This may not be so straightforward; it may be that the town always had a keeper placed after the raids of 1338. It is possible that during times of relative peace the keeper’s services were not needed and therefore with no active need there were no orders or commands to them in this position. From 1377 to 1397 at least it seems that there was always at least a titular keeper in Southampton. It is possible that there was always a person designated as town keeper as the title appears off and on over the century, becoming more common later.

The town keepers were an essential part to Southampton’s rebuilding after the raid of 1338. Combining their military leadership with most often a garrison, this method of defence for Southampton was a strong reminder of the king’s expectations and assistance to the townsmen and their military organisation. Keepers were also able to recruit men from a wide number of locations to further increase their responsibility over the town. While later keepers may have been limited in authority and more advisory, they continued to play a

897 Ibid, p. 151.
899 CPR 1377-1381, pp. 4, 7; CPR 1396-1399, p. 151.
part as military leaders. This aspect of defence actively participated in Southampton through many of the most dangerous periods of the 1300s effectively strengthening Southampton’s military structure.

Other royal officials

The king had further responsibilities he played in the town by way of the castle.\(^{900}\) The most important royal position was the constable, keeper or custodian of the castle. This post would ensure the castle was maintained and kept in readiness to withstand attack which was vital to the town’s defences. If a constable was diligently engaged then the castle would probably be well repaired and guarded; if not, the castle would fall into disrepair and become a liability to the town defence. From early in Edward III’s reign the right to assign a constable was held by the queen. Queen Phillipa made Thomas West keeper in 1333, John Beauchamp in 1343 and Richard Pembridge in 1360.\(^{901}\) Richard in 1361 appears to have been in control of the castle for several years previous to the time so it may have been sometime in the 1350s this transfer took place.\(^{902}\) After Phillipa’s death Edward continued assigning constables starting in 1372 with John Foxle, who in 1377 was reinstated to the office as castle constable, interrupted in 1375 for a time by Richard Pembridge.\(^{903}\)

This office received £130 or more annually and held responsibility for a large number of other of the king’s properties.\(^{904}\) Most of this money was required to maintain the walls, buildings and other structures of the castle.\(^{905}\) The king offered Richard Pembridge a manor of £110 and designated that he use £100 of that for Southampton castle.\(^{906}\) While it is unstated what the last £10 was intended for or how much work Richard did on the castle, it appears that the king intended the remaining money as payment for services rendered. In November of 1361 the king granted Richard Pembridge a pardon for his keeping of the castle of Southampton so it can be assumed the king continually checked

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\(^{900}\) *Southampton Terrier of 1454*, p. 21.


\(^{902}\) *CPR* 1281-1292, p. 13; *The Kings Works vol. 2* p. 841.

\(^{903}\) *CFR* 1369-1377, p. 155; *CPR* 1370-1374, p. 79; *CPR* 1377-1381, p. 190; *CPR* 1281-1292, p. 13; *The Kings Works vol. 2* p. 841.

\(^{904}\) *CPR* 1281-1292, p. 13; *CPR* 1370-1374, p. 79; *CPR* 1377-1381, p. 190; *The Kings Works vol. 2* p. 841.

\(^{905}\) *CPR* 1377-1381, p. 190.

\(^{906}\) *CPR* 1370-1374, p. 79.
in on the constables of Southampton Castle though apparently it was not always well kept.\textsuperscript{907}

Richard II refortified the castle during his reign, which strengthened the town physically. He also staffed his castle for its organisation and defence. One of the first offices was given to Richard Trenley, who was hired as custodian of the castle gate in December 1379.\textsuperscript{908} On 3 March 1409 the king commissioned John Blakwell in the same position as keeper of the gate.\textsuperscript{909} With John’s appointment in 1409 it states that this office was left vacant at the death of Richard Trenley (Truele or Trueley), a position he had fulfilled for almost 30 years.\textsuperscript{910} Once more this position would have been required to keep the castle prepared and at the ready on a day-to-day basis. John Foxle was reinstated as constable 23 March 1378, though later in 1383 the position passed to Richard II’s half brother Thomas Holland.\textsuperscript{911} He seems to have used his deputy John Sondes as both the town and castle keeper in his place. Holland was given the castle for the remainder of his life in 1397, though he died later that same year.\textsuperscript{912}

Richard II also created a new position for the castle community in Southampton that continued well into the fifteenth century. In 1386 the king placed a cleric, Thomas Tredington, to celebrate divine services and keep the kings arms, armour and artillery in the castle as well as to continue works on the castle for its protection.\textsuperscript{913} This was renewed under Henry IV in 1399.\textsuperscript{914} The position of a cleric and keeper continued on into the late fifteenth century.\textsuperscript{915} This royal official was important in many ways. Clearly he was intended as a leader to direct the care and use of arms, armour and especially artillery kept in the castle and perhaps the town as well. This position also shows the rising importance that firearms played in defence. While clearly an important role in an attack against the castle, his year-round position was in maintaining and acquiring new additions to the castle’s military organisation, and was both physical and administrative.

While Southampton’s keepership appears to have ended during the opening of the fifteenth century, that of the position of Keeper of Southampton Castle remains with a

\textsuperscript{907} CPR 1361-1364, p. 105.  
\textsuperscript{908} CCR 1377-1381, p. 395.  
\textsuperscript{909} CPR 1408-1413, p. 58.  
\textsuperscript{910} CPR 1377-1381, p. 532; CPR 1408-1413, pp. 58 and 68.  
\textsuperscript{911} CPR 1377-1381, p. 190; CPR 1381-1385, p. 311.  
\textsuperscript{912} CPR 1396-1399, p. 151.  
\textsuperscript{913} CPR 1385-1389, pp. 196 and 198.  
\textsuperscript{914} CPR 1399-1401, p. 144.  
\textsuperscript{915} CPR 1436-1441, p. 548; CPR 1452-1461, p. 20.
fairly clear succession throughout the fifteenth century. John Popham first was made constable by Henry IV, then in 1414 by Henry V and in 1423 by Henry VI. Popham probably held the castle over four decades through the reigns of three English kings. The role of custodian of the castle continued in November 1447 with William Stone and Nicholas Crewe in 1457. With Nicholas’s appointment he was to be paid £10 yearly for this service to the king. This £10 perhaps was what the kings had always expected to pay constables after repairs were to have been made. He also was given the right to elect to be the constable directly, or to select a deputy to take his place there. However it is clear the king wished that whoever was employed as constable to have a physical presence there. As this was the case with Thomas Holland, it was probably a common occurrence to appoint a deputy as men of such stature would in many ways be unable to devote their full attention to the castle or to be there personally.

The last three kings of the fifteenth century continued appointing constables to Southampton’s castle. In 1461 Humphrey Audeley was made keeper, followed in 1472 by Maurice Berkeley, then William Berkeley in 1480, and last John Horton in 1483. Throughout all Edward IV’s reign a keeper of the castle was in office, for over a decade apparently in the Berkeley family. It is unclear if Horton remained constable though it seems probable as Richard III would probably have left the appointment and there is no indication Henry VII revoked it after he took power in 1485. Probably after Horton’s death the castle passed in November 1495 to Thomas Overey (Overay), esquire. Perhaps more interesting than those before him, it is probable that this was the same Thomas Overey who was Mayor of Southampton 1488 to 1490. The constableship of the castle going to a townsman and civic leader perhaps demonstrates the confidence that Henry VII had in the town. Perhaps the grant of the castle to Overay integrated it into the townsman’s keeping and protection, completing the transfer of the defence of Southampton into their hands.

These royal positions were important to Southampton’s military organisation. The Castle made up a chief defence of the western circuit of defences. With strong and sufficient leaders and officials, the king could ensure that the castle and the town were held

916 CPR1413-1416, p. 168; CPR 1413-1416, p. 168; CPR 1422-1429, p.111.
918 Ibid, p. 390.
920 CPR 1461-1467, p. 21; CPR 1467-1477, p. 309; CPR 1476-1485, pp. 179, 412.
921 CPR 1494-1509, p. 58.
922 Ibid, p. 58.
securely. The most important part of the castle’s defence was that people were assigned to these positions so that a clear order was established. Whether successful or not, the responsible party then could be found. With a near-constant line of constables of the castle as well as other positions such as the king’s keeper of artillery in the castle, English kings continued creating structured defences for Southampton. With few exceptions, such as that of Thomas Holland during Richard II’s reign, the positions of town keeper and castle keeper remained separate. With the cessation of town keepers with Ivo Fitzwarin during Henry IV’s reign, the keepers of the castle became the most important royal official within the town. At the end of the fifteenth century it is almost fitting that the position was awarded to a former mayor and civic leader Thomas Overay, in a way charging the town with its complete protection. With such leadership positioned in Southampton, the king had created yet another defensive scheme for the town.

Landowners

Individually were also obliged to military service in the counties and maritime lands they held possessions. In Hampshire some of the most active demands for support were upon those dwelling in maritime lands. Within Hampshire’s maritime lands, few places were as important as Southampton and Portsmouth. In addition to the royal garrison in Southampton, men of maritime lands had to provide men to defend the town. In February 1339 various landowners, including ecclesiastical leaders, contributed men-at-arms, archers and armed men for the defence of Southampton and the coast. Examples of these provisions show varied responsibilities. For example, the Abbot of Beaulieu provided two archers and money for fortifications; the Church of St. Mary’s two footmen and four archers. In 1346 John de Peyton supplied a man-at-arms and archer in Hampshire. The same year, Gilbert de Neville was assessed three hobelars and one archer, John de Acton two men-at-arms and 20 marks, and Nicholas Malemeynes one man-at-arms and 10 marks. In this manner men of means supplied soldiers to protect places that were deemed threatened, such as Southampton.

923 CCR 1339-1341, pp. 18, 67.
925 CCR 1339-1341, p. 18.
926 Ibid, p. 67; Platt, Medieval Southampton, p. 114.
927 CCR 1339-1341, p. 215; Platt, Medieval Southampton, p. 114.
928 CFR 1337-1347, p. 505.
929 Ibid, pp. 508, 513, 517.
The obligation of manpower from landowners for additional soldiers was complicated as when one location was under threat, so usually were others. In March 1339 the Abbot of Hyde was freed of providing men in Sussex as he and all his men-at-arms and other soldiers were in Southampton. A similar situation existed with the Abbot of Waverley. Having lands in Hampshire and Sussex, he was expected to provide men in both. The king offered to exclude him from supplying two men-at-arms in Sussex if he would provide more men-at-arms to Southampton. William Corbet was released from his military obligations in Oxfordshire as he was in the company of Edmund de la Beche, Southampton’s keeper, probably in Southampton’s garrison April to July 1339. As he was already in service to the king in an area of particular threat, it is clear that Edward was complaisant excluding him from other, less urgent military service. It can be assumed that others of the garrison were also exempt. This was one of the main weaknesses of this system: if men owned lands throughout England they often could not provide the full number of men they were obliged to in all the areas of land they owned. This meant some counties had many theoretical defenders, though fewer practically. It also indicates preference to the defence of Southampton over other counties, particularly those further inland.

Hampshire and Southampton were not always the beneficiaries of these decisions. In April 1339 the Abbot of Beaulieu provided two archers and money to Southampton’s defences but was excluded from his full contribution as he had already been obliged to provide two men-at-arms and four archers to protect the New Forest. He was also freed of his Surrey and Wiltshire obligations. In May 1339 the Abbot of Hyde was freed from providing six men-at-arms as they had been in Southampton but were moved to Portsmouth, and he was unable to provide more. Clearly this juggling of men could be to Southampton’s disadvantage. The Abbot of Waverley in May provided only half his Hampshire assessment as he had provided men in Essex. Bartholomew de Insula was also forgiven all other military duties as he was on the Isle of Wight, which perhaps was

931 Ibid, p. 68.
932 Ibid, p. 68.
933 CPR 1338-1340, p. 275; CCR 1339-1341, pp.64, 67, 121, 166.
934 CCR 1339-1341, pp. 67, 110.
937 Ibid, p.190.
deemed under greater threat than Southampton. This was true for a number of knights and esquires on the Isle of Wight.

In this way manpower was increased in areas of greater perceived danger from those of less risk. Many men were split in their military obligation over a wide area which in this case left Southampton short staffed, but often not empty handed. Such releases were fairly common, strengthening some counties while weakening others. Once more the king was aware of the military service given by his men and granted permissions of exclusion to prevent them from serving beyond their means.

As these examples illustrate, Southampton was not alone in its defence. The king was mindful of the dangers facing the town and provided assistance to them. Various systems were created by the king to provide leadership, organisation and soldiers to Southampton to strengthen its military capabilities. English kings employed the county arrayer, keepers of maritime lands, town and castle keepers and others in a complex and far reaching system of defence that was able to raise and lead men as well as recruit them for Southampton’s safeguarding. Independent lords, secular and ecclesiastical, and towns contributed to Southampton’s protection as yet another means the town had of acquiring assistance. Whether garrisons stationed in Southampton or levied men from Hampshire or other counties, these men greatly increased the town’s ability to resist their enemies. With the leadership of great men of the land heading these companies, they also received the additional benefit of more experience to protect their town. With such support Southampton’s military capabilities were strengthened and would be able to repulse assault.

**Conclusion**

The king and outside groups along with the town itself organised and maintained the town’s military functions. The king and his ministers’ influence greatly affected the town and their employment as a military organisation even in town defence. Lords, both secular and ecclesiastical, also left their mark on the town, especially men such as the Bishops of Winchester. Most important to the town military organisation were the townsmen themselves. The plans and strategies they set forth were the primary defence and military organisation of the town.

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938 Ibid. p.117.
939 Ibid. pp.117-118.
As they acted as the basic structure for the defence and military institution of the town, the townsmen in many ways bore the brunt of the costs and responsibilities. The detailed strategies the town leadership created and evolved for their own defence gave the townsmen the order needed to act as a body. This development can in small part be seen in the increasing clarity in the town defence schemes over these two centuries. The schemes of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries were adequately organised for defence but those of the fifteenth century saw these schemes gain increased depth and detail, these regulations becoming clearly spelled out. While the town had weaknesses, they also played a vital part in their own protection, the protection of the areas around them, and the kingdom.

It was the king’s ancient right to have influence over the town’s strategies and employment of troops. As was most apparent with his placement of the Keepers of Southampton the king could place as little or as much control on the town as he wished or deemed needed at the time. It is clear that current events also affected the keepership’s rights and powers in Southampton. Earlier keepers had sweeping powers over the town influenced by the inability of the town to prevent the devastation of the raids. Later keepers held fewer powers, demonstrating the town’s increased defensive capabilities. While this interference at times created mixed results with the townsmen, the king knew the importance of the town military structure and needed it to function correctly, or else face increased dangers of attack and invasion.

The English kings most often preferred the town leadership to be in charge of itself, as the cost and attention needed was much less, but they were often willing to take this charge themselves if they felt the situation warranted it. This right to place a keeper over the town initially was used as a reaction or even punishment for the failure in defence against the raid in 1338. Later keepers appear to be more of a royal official in the town to bolster the town leadership and townsmen’s resolve in military preparation, not to replace the civic leadership’s military role. In this way the king was perhaps able to keep his eye on the town, to prevent another failure such as the raid of 1338.

Outside forces sent to help organise the town’s military structure were important elements to their continual development. Men coming at the behest of the king or by ancient custom were important not just in numbers, but also in skill. Men who had experience in military matters would come and review the town for their weaknesses and help in their remedy. Men such as the Bishop of Winchester would often act as an...
intermediary to the king in gaining the king’s favors or assistance as well as advising the
townsmen themselves in their protection.

All these influences determined the military organisation of Southampton. The town
strategies for their own protection varied little from year to year. Excluding an increase in
detail of the town defence schemes they remained surprisingly constant from 1300 to 1500.
It is important that the system of kingdom defence did not change greatly either, nor does it
seem to have grown more detailed in the accounts in the fifteenth century over those of the
fourteenth, remaining nearly the same organisation over the two centuries. What did change
in regard to outside involvement in the town’s protection was the level of involvement in
Southampton. At times of heavy threats of wars and town weakness or failures in defence,
these outside forces often would come to pick up the slack that the town could not. These
additional leaders and men would have been crucial in times such as that following the raid
in 1338 which gave the town time to rejuvenate their own military strength. In the end the
town remained the primary military force in the area but others that bolstered them aided in
preparing for war, a key aspect of Southampton’s military obligation and their own
organisation.
Chapter Four-
Ships, Equipment, Artillery and Guns of Southampton

The provision of ships from port towns such as Southampton is a well known aspect of their urban military obligation. This ancient right was imperative to the king in his conflicts, especially those on the continent or at sea. What might be perhaps less well understood is actually how large a contribution the town and townsmen’s personal ships made. Over much of the late medieval period Southampton was a major provider to the king of ships for transport and war, an essential component to the king’s military ambitions and, perhaps more importantly, protection of the realm from threats.

One of the less studied aspects of medieval urban military history is the arms, armour and other equipment acquired and their employment. This aspect of civic military organisation is both fascinating and important in gaining a better understanding of how well equipped Southampton and its inhabitants were for conflict. Without arms, armour and artillery the town’s ability to act as a military body would be diminished greatly. While alone this aspect does not prove the town a strong military organisation, the lack of these items does indicate the opposite.

In Southampton the availability and ownership of such weapons and armour is evident to a considerable degree. The civic government was engaged in preparing its military organisation with the acquisition and maintenance of arms and armour. Artillery, traditional war engines such as trebuchets and springalds and later firearms, played a part in defending the town from attack. The town kept individual armour and arms, presumably to be used by individual townsmen. These objects additionally were a constant reminder of Southampton’s security and their military responsibilities.

The townsmen were expected to provide themselves with arms and armour for their protection, that of the town and to fulfil their military obligations to the crown. This led to the responsibility to own arms and armour, according to wealth. In England this was

mandatory from at least Henry II's day, if not earlier. In this way the king was able to field large bodies of equipped commoners as soldiers making them more effective in conflict. As can be seen by several royal statutes, ownership of arms and armour was a requirement for all adult males. Yet these royal commands do not by themselves prove conclusive as to individual ownership of weapons. While few accounts of the arms and armour of individual townsmen remain, those that do are examples of the military equipment that they possessed.

Alongside the town leadership and townsmen the king played a role in the equipment that the town used in its military organisation. This took place in two specific ways. One was the provision of the town with arms, armour and artillery to be employed in fulfilling the town's military obligations. The second was in the king's castle in Southampton and the equipment that he placed there for its defence and therefore the town's defence. The king, civic government and townsmen all contributed to the equipment that was used in the town for its military organisation. In many ways this aspect of the town's military organisation is one of the most difficult to uncover. The lack of personal inventories including military equipment of townsmen is a great obstacle to our understanding of this aspect of town military organisation. Notwithstanding this issue, there are sources that indicate the possession of such gear, and, coupled together with other remaining accounts, provide convincing evidence of this function of their military obligation.

This chapter will examine the military equipment of Southampton in three main categories. The first grouping is those of the town or civic corporation's possessions, then those of individual townsmen and lastly the royal military equipment in Southampton. These themes will then be further separated by time, the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, for ease of organisation and to demonstrate possible changes over these periods. These three individual groups and the arms, armour and other martial equipment they owned give

evidence of Southampton's military capabilities which impacted all other aspects of the town's offensive and defensive functions.

**The town equipment, artillery and guns of the fourteenth century**

Prior to the raid of 1338 there is little information as to what manner of artillery or equipment the town had for its own defence. It is probable that military equipment was in the town's possession before the raid, as the town leadership had been involved in military activity previous to this event that included substantial numbers of weapons and armour. As no inventory exists at this early date, it is impossible to know exactly, but it would be improbable they were unarmed.

No sooner had the king taken over the military and other functions of the town than he began sending provisions, specifically military ones. This supply of military equipment indicates Edward III felt the town unprepared for further assault. Whether because Southampton had insufficient equipment or much of it was destroyed during the raid remains an open question. At the start of 1339 he sent a large amount of military equipment. One account describes 'all manner of furniture of engines, springalds, bows, arbalæsts, targets, lances, and all manner of other engines, shall remain in the said town for the safe keeping of the same'. It is clear that Edward had sent a great supply of items specifically for the town to employ in its protection.

One item that is often listed in several different accounts is springalds. These weapons were a type of traditional artillery that commonly was employed in late medieval town defence. These low trajectory artillery pieces were placed upon gates or walls, though some appear to have been mobile, presumably employed by townsmen to shoot at enemies at a distance. While the records are unclear as to exactly the size and design, other records shed further light on the subject and their use in England. One such record from December 1324, as Edward II was preparing for war in France, details a great number of these springalds being gathered for his use in war. In one request for nine springalds to be sent for the king's use, five of them were used to shoot projectiles three-quarters yard

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944 TNA E101/5/2 and E101/5/12.
946 See Figure Thirty-four.
948 Ibid. pp. 4-5, 19
949 *CCR 1323-1328*, p. 246.
long, while four of them loosed projectiles of five-eights a yard, both with iron tips. Edward ordered several hundred of these springalds and thousands of quarrels for both types, indicating that these weapons were employed often in the period, though with no real detail of how they were used. These devices were similar to large crossbows in appearance, as their projectiles clearly indicate a similarity to smaller crossbows but on larger scale. The account also implies various sized springald quarrels were sent. Southampton appears to have had various sizes as well, as can be seen in a later inventory of their equipment.

Alongside this large missile artillery the king sent other standard weapons intended for individual use, including crossbows. There were two types of crossbows sent by the king, shown by the two sizes of bolts that accompanied them. The crossbows being referred to were probably one and two foot crossbows. Jean Liebel asserts these two foot and one foot crossbows refer not to the number of feet needed to span the devise but the length of the bolts in use. In the same account from December 1324, Edward II commanded both one and two foot crossbows gathered alongside the springalds. This account indicates that at the time crossbows were common armaments utilized for a formidable defence.

When Southampton formally regained control of its military duties in 1341, the king gave to the town for its defence the equipment he had had built or sent there. At this time three springalds, 33 arbalest(crossbows), nine arbalest belts (devices used to span the crossbows), 62 lances, 31 bows, 49 sheaves of arrows, an assortment of quarrels for the springalds and two sizes of bolts for the arbalests were provided. Addition town military equipment can be found in an inquisition from 1353. It lists two great mangonels and smaller tripogets (trebuchets) in good order and ready for use. These weapons had probably

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950 Ibid, p. 246.
951 Ibid, p. 246.
955 TNA E101/ 22/6, 17; CCR 1339-1341, pp. 288, 304-305, 340; CMI 1348-1377, p. 38.
956 Liebel, Springalds and Great Crossbows, pp. 59-60.
957 CCR 1323-1328, pp. 603, 640.
958 CMI 1348-1377, p. 38.
been in Southampton since 1339. This inquest also found twelve one foot crossbows with 300 quarrels, twelve bows with 300 arrows, twelve springalds with 300 bolts, twenty-four shields, and twenty-four lances. Over half the crossbows from Edward III’s earlier donations probably had been taken into private hands, most likely by locals, or had been broken. By 1353 the town had nine additional springalds more than the amount acquired from the 1339 contribution. These may have been from before the raid, or could have been purchased since by the town, or were perhaps another royal gift after 1341. Regardless of where and when the town had acquired them, by the third quarter of the fourteenth century the town had a number of springalds that rivaled that of the largest towns in England. For example London at the same time possessed between thirteen to fifteen springalds. From Spain to Eastern Europe these weapons were common to town arsenals. At this time Southampton apparently had a great supply of military equipment, due in no small part to Edward III’s shipment of arms and armour there.

It is probable that some of these large artillery pieces were used to defend the western waterfront of the town. As construction of the town wall took place this may have been done to defend the western perimeter until the wall was completed sometime in the 1370s. One such weapon, called a mangel or manganel, was placed outside Westgate, the site later bore the name mangel for at least a hundred years. As further evidence of this, ammunition for such a device was found in excavations near the site in question. By the late medieval period such artillery had become a commonly employed means of defence. In Southampton the continuance of this non-gunpowder artillery used from first half of the fourteenth century into the mid fifteenth shows their long lived utility to the town’s protection.

960 See Figure Thirty-five; TNA E101/ 22/ 16, 17; CCR 1339-1341, pp. 288, 304-305, 340; CMI 1348-1377, p. 38; C. Platt, Medieval Southampton: The Port and Trading Community, A.D. 1000-1600 (London, 1973) p. 122.
961 CMI 1348-1377, p. 38.
962 Calendar of Letter Books of London Book F, p. 1; and Calendar of Memoranda Roll Volume One, p. 176.
964 Liebel, Springalds and Great Crossbows, pp. 4-5
A development that took place in the late fourteenth century artillery was the introduction of firearms. O’Neil states that England was one of the earliest European powers to actively employ gunpowder artillery, though accounts detailing this are scarce, and indicate they were of limited use early on. Early cannons or guns were usually quite small, weighed no more than 20 to 40 lbs. Russell makes the statement of early firearms, ‘that they exercised no important effect on the outcome of any pitched battle at this time.’ From the mid fourteenth century the size of cannons increased, in great part upon realizing that guns were of limited value on the battlefield but were more useful against fortresses. By the mid fourteenth century cannons reached massive proportions for siege warfare and both the English and French used them extensively after the Agincourt campaign of the Hundred Year’s War. In addition firearms were employed starting in the late fourteenth century in maritime military activities both in coastal fortresses against ships and by ships against coastal fortresses. According to O’Neil cannons became a decisive weapon, though their major technological and tactical growth came later, from 1460 to 1510.

However, the only evidence of guns in Southampton in the fourteenth century is from 1382, when the town purchased one gun for 5s. 8d. Judging by the sum paid for it, it was probably smaller. This was the only gun thus far that could be attributed to town ownership until the second quarter of the fifteenth century, but it shows an important development in adopting new technology at early stages of progress. As we shall see in a later section of this chapter, the use of firearms eventually became an important tool for defence of the coast. Its early inclusion in Southampton’s defence alongside more traditional missile weapons shows the town’s eagerness and willingness to experiment with new weapons for war.

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973 Ibid, p. xvi.
974 O’Neil, Castles and Cannons, p.41.
975 Ibid. p.10; Turner, Town Defences in England and Wales; An Architectural and Documentary Study AD 900-1500 (London, 1971) p.84.
During many decades of the fourteenth century Southampton was heavily armed with both traditional and newer weapons, both large and small. The town, with assistance from the king, acquired and maintained a wide array of weapons for the town’s protection. In great part this probably was in response to the king’s increased attention to the town’s defence after their failure in the raid of 1338. While it is doubtful that the town was unprepared in arms, armour and artillery before the raid, it is doubtless that thereafter it was strengthened many times over.

The town equipment, artillery and guns of the fifteenth century

During the fifteenth century the town continued to acquire weapons, armour, guns and other equipment for defence, much as it had the century before. More traditional arms stayed in use as the primary means of protection for the town and its fortifications. Yet the rise of gunpowder weapons was to become an integral part of this aspect of the town’s military organisation, especially during the second quarter of the fifteenth century and after. At first they were only added alongside traditional artillery, though later they slowly began replacing them. By 1454 and afterwards the town makes no mention of mangonels located on the mangonel site.\(^{977}\) According to Platt this lack of information in the Terrier of 1454, coupled with the fact it had been some time since any traditional artillery had been mentioned in the town records, indicates that the town was no longer using traditional artillery.\(^{978}\) Yet this might not necessarily be so as no weapons are mentioned in this terrier, not even guns. A 1434 inventory lists that some non-gunpowder artillery was still in use at that time, making up a part of the town armament.\(^{979}\) Whether they were still in use by the mid fifteenth century, however, is debateable.

When town stewards left office they would leave a list of the goods in their care to the next steward that would receive them. In 1434 such a list in the Steward’s Book of Southampton exists. A number of weapons that the town had ownership of at the time are given: one great iron cannon, two brass canons, two small cannons or pellet guns, one of iron the other of brass both with wooden tillers, one tryptic or catapult, one iron rod for the cannons, two chambers for the cannons, two unweighed barrels of gunpowder and a

\(^{977}\) SBS 1456-1457, p. 8; SBS 1457-1458, p. 5; Platt, Medieval Southampton, p. 174.
\(^{978}\) SCA 13/1; Platt, Medieval Southampton, p. 174.
\(^{979}\) SBS 1428-1434, p.91.
number of stones for the assorted guns that are unnumbered. It is interesting that the trypict (trebuchet) was still in service, as this may be one of the pieces of artillery delivered during the keepership, found in good order in the 1353 assessment. It also is clear that some traditional artillery was being used among the newer firearms that were steadily becoming more numerous in Southampton. While it is unclear as to when non-gunpowder artillery was discontinued for the town defence, it is apparent that with the increased number of guns listed in town records, that firearms were becoming a main part of town protection.

By the second quarter of the fifteenth century the town had acquired enough guns that moving the ammunition was a fairly lengthy procedure that took days to accomplish. Peter Liell (Lyle), a labourer, was paid 10d. for carrying gun stones to God’s House Tower over two days. The same Peter Liell also hauled gun stones to the tower of the castle for two days and was paid 10d. The quantity of gun stones is not listed nor is the size of the gun stones themselves, but it can be assumed that a man could transport a large number of gun stones over the space of two days. He also was stocking the castle with ammunition, which would have been the king’s responsibility, but the town was the one ordering and paying him. This implies that either the town did what was necessary for its own protection when needed, or that the king requested this himself, but we have no record of the latter.

From the mid fifteenth century onwards the mention of guns and gunpowder weapons in town records increases greatly. This trend apparently indicates that the town government increased the number and use of firearms in the town. In 1450 a list of artillery and repairs to them is listed in the town’s Steward’s Books regarding the town owned equipment for war. One Harry Gunner appears to have been an active part of the town’s firearms, making one large cannon chamber, sixteenth standard gun chambers, repairing ten of them and six guns.

Others were also part of the town outfitting of firearms in 1450. John Piper sold two pestles and John William one to pulverize the town gunpowder. Will Willery made two chambers for the organ guns, and later in the year John Franklin, a carpenter, made a cart

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980 Ibid, p. 91-93.
981 Ibid., p. 111.
982 SBS 1428-1434, p.38.
983 Ibid., p.111.
984 Ibid., p.111.
985 SBS 1449-1450, pp. 33-37.
986 Ibid, p. 33.
987 Ibid, pp. 33, 37.
for one of these organ guns, a firearm equipped with multiple barrels which could be fired simultaneously.  

John Wayte made repairs to the guns kept in Bargate. The powder appears to have been readied for use and stored in portable leather bags, as two were bought. John Swaynsey made six dozen gun stones for various town guns.

By 1450 there is little doubt that Southampton had adopted firearms into their defensive strategy. Powder, guns, chambers, carts, firearms and specialists all could be found in the town and were kept at the ready for their need. Also by the mid fifteenth century it is clear larger cannons were beginning to be placed on carts with wheels for mobility, and Southampton adapted some of their large guns with these.

Firearms and other gun related paraphernalia continued to be found in the town’s inventories. During the mid to late 1450s Saunders Lokyer was heavily engaged with making many of the accessories and repairs for the town firearms. In 1456 to 1457 Saundar provided bolts, bands, forlocks, pouches, staves and touches (igniters). He also cleaned a gun at God’s House Gate, including a new touch hole and he also bound two guns with four iron bands each to their staves. As it can be seen from Saunders Lokyer, the town had craftsmen who provided much if not all their firearms related equipment needed for their defence. Saunders was not an exception, as others were also engaged in Southampton’s firearms needs. The town also purchased sieves for ‘sifting gunpowder’, an important aspect of the powder’s preparation. For transport and use of the gunpowder a hogshead and six white leather bags were purchased.

John Wayt made 600 tampons for the guns of the town around the mid 1450s, probably tied to increased preparations for French attacks. These devices were important, especially for larger guns, as the tampons stopped up the hole and allowed gases to create the force needed to shoot the ball, which was large but was often much smaller than the barrel. Such a quantity of tampons (600) clearly shows how significant the town’s needs were. Burgess Smith made several articles needed for a great gun that weighted 43lbs.

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988 See Figure Thirty-six; SBS 1449-1450, pp. 33, 37.
989 Ibid, p. 57.
990 Ibid, p. 33.
991 Ibid, p. 33.
992 CPRI 1452-1461, p. 564.
993 SBS 1456-1457, pp. 21, 24, 27.
994 Ibid, p. 27.
995 Ibid, p. 27.
996 Ibid, p. 22.
997 Ibid, p. 22.
As is evident, Southampton by the mid fifteenth century was no stranger to firearms and as the numbers increased so too did their demands for the essential materials.

As mentioned earlier in Chapter One, in 1460 the Corporation of the Town of Southampton petitioned the Council of Lords for aid with their defence. One concern the town conveyed was that the number of artillery it possessed at the time was insufficient. The town leaders claim that they owned of the ‘town’s stuff twenty-five guns great and small’^1000 They also state that due to the condition of many of the fortifications being weakened they would need at least 60 guns to protect the town sufficiently, which was financially impossible for them to acquire. Why the civic government thought that 60 guns of various types were ideal is not stated, but clearly the account at least indicates that they felt the town guns were insufficient for their defence. Compared with other towns, even those greater than Southampton, 60 guns would have been substantial for the period. York for example, had only four guns at the start of the sixteenth century. Once again, as the town was petitioning for financial aid they were probably exaggerating their weakened state. However, twenty-five guns great and small does not seem far from accurate as several town inventories of that time, particularly that of 1468, contain a similar number of guns.\(^{1003}\)

The 1468 Steward’s Book contains numerous accounts regarding town artillery. ‘Thomas with the Beard’, the town’s great cannon, still in use, was repaired then deployed upon the walls. The smith, William Frye, was to repair the bolts, forlock, match and a new bed to make it serviceable. William also repaired the town’s ‘gun cart’. Another account from the 1468 Steward’s Book details a list of the guns and their positioning in the town defences. This account is useful in knowing the exact number of firearms employed in the town in 1468, where they were stored and where they were employed in conflict as part of the town defence. It also gives details as to the design and type of guns that the town had

1000 Ibid, p. 21.
1003 *SBS 1428-1434*, pp. 91-93; *SBS 1467-1468*, pp. 34-36.
in their possession. This shows some twenty-eight firearms with varying levels of
description and locations.¹⁰⁰⁷

Bargate one brass gun chambered of himself.  
Bargate 2 guns with 5 chambers and trestles  
Bargate 2 guns without chambers the two which two guns lay in two towers 'which are next to the
said bargate Eastward to St Denys tower'  
St Denys tower one gun without chamber  
One great gun upon wheels 'was wont to stand at bargate at John Roosy's door the which at the
delivery there of stood at the kings custom house door by the Watergate. Chamber for gun stored at Gods
House Tower'  
Tower next westward from Bargate two guns with two chambers  
Pygrym’s Pyt 1 gun with 3 chambers  
Tower next to playhouse one gun without chambers  
Watchtower one gun with 3 chambers  
God's House Tower- One broken gun  
Two whole guns and one serpentine  
Eleven chambers for guns and serpentines  
Spruce chest with 19 chambers to organ gun after specified.  
¾ of a barrel of powder  
Diverse sorts of gun stones  
Broken iron pondery  
In the cheney two chains of iron and the hangers of iron pondery  
2 iron great stakes and 3 ladders  
Millhouse  
2 cart guns  
1 peys organs in a cart  
9 guns  
1 great gun  
1 gun upon trestles chambered of himself  
2 windows of the same house with 2 guns  
6 gun chambers  
1 great broken chamber for the cannon Thomas with the beard  
2 whole chambers for them with 8 gunstones and 8 tampons delivered the 30th day of
1 little Rondelet with gunpowder  
Tower next to Gods House Tower in the East part 2 guns with 3 chambers  
Gebon cornmonger’s tower 2 guns with chambers  
Mechell Luk’s tower 2 guns with 6 chambers.¹⁰⁰⁸

From the 1468 inventory several important aspects of the town’s employment of
firearms is evident. First that the town had a large number and assortment of guns from
small handguns to massive bombards placed strategically around the town for defence.
Second were the locations where these firearms were stored and used, which was not
always the same place. Locations for conflict were not given for some guns as these were
intended for mobile use, presumably where the town was most heavily threatened. This
inventory demonstrates a way in which the town systematically employed fire arms as part
of their general defence for increased protection.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Ibid. pp. 34-35.
¹⁰⁰⁸ Ibid. pp. 34-35.
The town continued to develop the use of gunpowder weapons during the 1470s with new items and repairs. Repair of existing guns was most common, only one gun being bought in 1470 for the whole decade.\(^{1009}\) Repairs were done with several taking place in 1470, 1471, 1474 and 1475.\(^{1010}\) Often these repairs were for several guns at one time. These ranged from vague repairs to very specific entries such as making trestles to rest the guns upon, carts to make them mobile, stocks for handheld guns, forlocks, bands to attach the carts, stocks, beds or other rests to the barrels.

In some situations we know where these works were carried out and what was done. In 1471 the trestle at Friary Gate was repaired, and in July 1475 once the cannons were repaired they were returned to the town quays to be ready for defence.\(^{1011}\) In January 1475 'Thomas with the Beard' was once more repaired and in July the same year received a new cart. This cart must have been rather large as it took nearly two weeks to complete.\(^{1012}\) Repairs were done on the organ gun chambers as well in January 1475.\(^{1013}\) Maintaining the smaller guns was not overlooked, as repairing bands, chambers, chains, forlocks, stands and stocks seems to have been done often, in July 1474 and again in January 1475.\(^{1014}\) Not only townsmen were used in this effort. In 1471 John Reynolds of London, one of the men from the Earl of Salisbury’s company in the town, was employed mending the town guns.\(^{1015}\)

Most of the 1470s activity demonstrates the town’s preoccupation with firearms, a clear indication of the town’s increase in the use of state-of-the-art military technology.

Tampons and ammunition continued to be made in large numbers for the town. In 1471 John Wayte also was hired to make 100 tampons for town guns.\(^{1016}\) In 1475 the town paid men to make gun tampons and even provided them with additional ale for their efforts.\(^{1017}\) The amount of gun stones need for the town defence was not neglected. The town’s store of projectiles apparently was fairly large at this time. Late in the 1470s the store of gun stones was restored, and in 1478 the town paid for a man to spend an entire day hauling gun stones to the store house.\(^{1018}\) Southampton was aware of the need for

\(^{1009}\) SBS 1469-1470, p. 22.
\(^{1010}\) Ibid, pp. 22-23; SBS 1470-1471, pp. 31-33; SCA 5/1/15 SBS 1474-1475, pp. 24 and f.26r.
\(^{1011}\) SBS 1470-1471, pp. 32 and 33; SBS 1474-1475, p. f.26r.
\(^{1012}\) Ibid, p. f.26r.
\(^{1013}\) Ibid, p. f.26r.
\(^{1014}\) Ibid, pp. 24, f.26r.
\(^{1015}\) SBS 1470-1471, p. 31.
\(^{1016}\) Ibid, p. 32.
\(^{1017}\) SBS 1474-1475, p. f.27.
\(^{1018}\) SBS 1478-1479, p. 11.
preparation, and the gathering of tampons and ammunition in large quantities for storage shows a great amount of planning in this aspect to maintain sufficient accessories for their stock of firearms.

During the last two decades of the century this activity slowed slightly. In 1485 the town purchased a number of guns and gun chambers from the Earl of Arundel. While the 1470s was a time of repairs and maintenance, the 1480s saw an increase in new guns in the town with little known maintenance. The 1490s would probably have remained quiet as well had not the situation in the country changed in 1497 with dangers mounting from the Cornish rebellion and contention with the Scots. On 20 November 1497, 42lbs. of gunpowder was purchased, and on 7 December an additional 112lbs. was acquired to prepare for the Cornish and Scottish contentions. On the same day the mayor sent a ship and barge on the king’s service, providing bread, meat, beer, bow strings, ‘bow rings’, candles, beer pots, and three-fourths of a hundred weight of lead pellets worth 3s. The town’s ability to equip itself for home defence and for the king’s uses abroad show the town’s organisational abilities. The town also bought 200 gun tampons in June 1498 and repaired a serpentine. While the last two decades show mostly little activity, punctuated by brief periods of frequency, the town was usually well prepared, needing but small changes for some time after.

The making of gunpowder in Southampton was also part of the town’s defence as a military organisation. The Steward’s Book of 1456 to 1457 contains not only various payments for men to make powder under the town gunner but also details on how this was done. Some fifteen people were involved two to four days at a time in the creation of gunpowder supplied for the town, and were paid over £1/2 for labour. One man designated as a labourer was specifically stated to have earned his wages for ‘beating coal’ for the gunpowder. It is obvious how much of a production this creation of gunpowder was. It started with men breaking raw materials into more manageable parts, sifting the material, then crushing it further with aforementioned pestles and stamps, and lastly mixing the materials together. During one short production of powder in 1475 three men made 222

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1019 SCA 5/1/21 SBS 1485-1486, p. f. 4r.
1020 SBS 1497-1498, p. 3.
1022 Ibid, pp. 4, 5.
1023 SBS 1456-1457, pp. 21-22, SBS 1474-1475, p. f.27.
1024 SBS 1456-1457, p. 21.
This all appears to have taken place under the supervision of the Town Gunner who, as well as his daily pay, was well provided for with bread and beer by the town. This work was not without hazard, as John Brenne was paid 12d. for ‘burning his clothes’ while engaged thus.

The town also kept materials on hand to make gunpowder for their supplies. Throughout the period coal, saltpetre and sulphur were often acquired by the town in large measures, usually quarters of hundred-weights, for future use in the preparation of gunpowder, probably made as in the last paragraph by townsman under the Town Gunner. Apparently the town also knew where to find some of the materials naturally, as in 1475 two men were sent by the town to ‘find’ salt peter for gunpowder over five days. This also indicates that the town kept amounts of both ready to use as well as the raw materials to make more. Here the town’s preparations show the time and expenses the town incurred as a military organisation.

This town supply of gunpowder was not just for use in protecting the town but also the town’s interests. Several accounts of the 1470s indicate the use of gunpowder from the town supply outside Southampton. In 1471 the town sent 22lbs. gunpowder with John Denine on his voyage to the Jersey Island for protection. Again in 1472, by command of the mayor, some 12lbs. of gunpowder were given to John Walker for his crossing as well. Whether on official town business or given out to townsman for their own use, clearly the town was able to provide gunpowder for their use at home and away.

The use and placement of the town guns can often be found in the Stewards’ Books. In 1457 men were busy at work laying the guns out for the defence of the town. William Taylor laid guns at the bulwarks in preparation for attack. John Myles, carpenter, and one man, ‘Sympkyn,’ were working on the quay laying one of the town’s great guns there. The town had a plan for where the guns would be employed in defence. From an inventory in the 1468 Steward’s Book, it is clear that many of the guns were used in towers, gates and even the town walls. When not in use most were amassed in places such as

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1025 SBS 1474-1475, p. f.27.
1026 SBS 1456-1457, p. 22.
1027 Ibid, p. 22.
1029 Ibid, p. f.26r.
1030 SBS 1470-1471, p. 61.
1031 SBS 1472-1473, p. 13.
1032 SBS 1456-1457, p. 22.
1033 Ibid, p. 23.
Bargate and God’s House Tower. Later evidence from 1472 indicates the town was busy deploying and redeploying the town guns for use, repair and storage with some on the quays, to Watergate and some stored in God’s House Tower. Throughout the late fifteenth century artillery played an increasingly important part in the town’s defence. From these accounts it is clear that there were few places that guns were not employed in the town defence, used on the walls, towers, gates, bulwarks and quays.

The town also kept a store of arms and armour on hand probably for townsmen to employ. The steward’s inventory in 1468 lists one linen banner with the king’s arms, another unidentified, three old poleaxes, six lead mallets, five pavises and rusty, broken harnesses. John Payn of Southampton bought several brigandines in 1470 6s. 8d. for the town armoury. In 1481 the town paid to have three loads of weapons brought from Christopher Ambroise’s house. The town also was able to ‘inherit’ goods of deceased individuals in certain situations. While it is hard to discern why the town was able to acquire these items, this took place on a number of occasions. A bill found at the house of John Walker and a sallet found in the house of John Chandeler was acquired in this manner, though later sold. The town had other means of acquisition as well. A sword was even left at the town court for which the town claimed ownership for a time then sold. The town had sufficient arms and armour to lend them out to men both inside and outside the town. In March 1484 Henry Brathwayne, one of the collectors of the king’s customs, borrowed a pair of brigandines from town. The last day of March Robert Wilson was loaned a pair of brigandines for 10s. and a sallet for 2s. 6d. A sallet was also delivered to Walter Liththum for 2d. as well. It is clear that the town had at the least a small cache of arms and armour for their use and enough to lend out to others. While much of these military items appear old or in need of repair, the town kept them on hand to augment the equipment the townsmen themselves possessed to fulfill their military organisation.

1034 SBS 1467-1468, pp. 23, 34-35.
1035 SBS 1472-1473, p. 13.
1036 SBS 1467-1468, p. 34.
1037 SBS 1470-1471, p. 1.
1038 SBS 1481-1482, p. 19.
1039 BRS 1485-1563, p.3.
1040 BRS 1303-1518, p.69.
1041 BRS 1485-1563, p.3.
1042 Ibid, p.3.
1043 Ibid, p.3.
The townsmen's equipment, artillery and guns of the fourteenth century

Ownership of arms and armour was not considered abnormal or a luxury in England during the late medieval period but the responsibility of all males. From the time of Henry II there are clear indications of adult males being required by law to own arms. This responsibility continued throughout the period in question, from 1300 to 1500. Edward I, Edward II and Edward III continually made efforts to further increase the personal arms and armour of the men they could draw upon.\textsuperscript{1044}

Edward I started by forcing all men with £40 annually into knighthood which included a horse and appropriate arms and armour, though this later was dropped to £20 annually.\textsuperscript{1045} Edward II tried similar tactics for better equipped soldiers. He required arrayed men with specific items such as aketons, hauberks, pairs of plates and bascinets. In 1326 he reissued clarification for the required weapon ownership by wealth, including those with £10 to 15 to have a horse and arms and provide themselves or another capable in their place when called.\textsuperscript{1046}

Edward III was much the same, both with specific demands for armour and men as well as general statutes for overall arms and armour ownership. Knighthood was forced upon those with £40 or more to include all required paraphernalia.\textsuperscript{1047} In January 1345 with constant war before him an updated system was set forth for the arms, armour and other equipment required, as before by annual wealth: those with 100\textsuperscript{s} as mounted archers, £10 hobelars, and £25 a man-at-arms.\textsuperscript{1048} Those over £25 yearly were incrementally to provide additional men in the proper equipment, £50 to provide themselves as a man-at-arms as well as another, £100 once more to provide himself as a man-at-arms with three others and beyond £100 to be assessed for more men-at-arms in accordance with their wealth.\textsuperscript{1049} Arms and armour were expected by their rank, that of the hobelar as a haqueton, a visor, a burnished palet, iron gauntlets and a lance (\textit{cum aketona pisario, paletto burnito, cirotecis ferreis et lancea}).\textsuperscript{1050} In this way Edward created a well armed defence force for his

\textsuperscript{1044} CCR 1288-1296, p. 439; CCR 1296-1302, pp. 112, 388, 395; CCR 1302-1307, p. 86.
\textsuperscript{1045} CCR 1288-1296, p. 439; CCR 1296-1302, pp. 112, 388, 395; CCR 1302-1307, p. 86.
\textsuperscript{1046} CCR 1313-1318, pp. 122, 201; CPR 1324-1327, pp. 219.
\textsuperscript{1047} CPR 1343-1346, p. 450.
\textsuperscript{1048} CPR 1343-1345, p. 427.
\textsuperscript{1049} Ibid, p. 427.
\textsuperscript{1050} Ibid, p. 427.
kingdom that included all adult males as well as a pool of manpower he could rely on for equipped soldiers for his armies abroad. With the increasing use of plate armour and the clear value that came from it, it is no surprise that Edward II saw this as a way to give his armies an advantage in combat. While this specifically does not apply just to Southampton but the whole realm, it probably would have been one of the aspects of town’s enforcement of ‘the king’s ordinances’.

Utilization of these weapons was a completely different matter to simple ownership. In June 1363 the king ordered all men on feast days to practice with their bows.\textsuperscript{1051} They were commanded to avoid all other games ‘of no value’ on pain of imprisonment.\textsuperscript{1052} The king’s message reasoned that in great part the archer had brought victory to the English in war.\textsuperscript{1053} Two years later this was once again ordered, and was to be enforced by the sheriffs of all counties in England.\textsuperscript{1054} This has been used to indicate a laxity in the training of the warbow, though at this date it might be more due to a lull in the demands of war than English disinterest in the weapon.

Indications of weapons available to men of Southampton can be identified both directly, where the arms were in their possession, and indirectly where weapons were accessible to them. The most common example of townsmen’s equipment is indirect. Trade in Southampton not uncommonly included the exchange of weapons and armour, both from local tradesmen and abroad. This would have provided a nearby market for townsmen in their acquiring of these materials. While direct evidence, probate inventories and such records show clear ownership of these military items, they make up only a small fraction of the remaining accounts making it impossible to gain a clear understanding of the types of armaments the townsmen would have possessed. Consideration of both these aspects creates a more balanced view of how the men of the town may have been equipped for conflict.

For the fourteenth century the direct evidence for personal arms and armour is limited. Only a few inventories from fourteenth-century Southampton remain including that of Richard Mey. In his will he left Ralph Mey, almost certainly a relative, a bascinet, a breastplate and pair of plate gauntlets.\textsuperscript{1055} This account demonstrates how a townsman

\textsuperscript{1051} CCR 1360-1364, p. 534.
\textsuperscript{1052} Ibid, p. 534.
\textsuperscript{1053} Ibid, p. 534.
\textsuperscript{1054} CCR 1364-1368, p. 181.
\textsuperscript{1055} BIBS 1388-1414, p. 26.
might have been fairly well equipped in this aspect of their military obligations. It also shows one way in which arms and armour were transferred between generations of men in a family increasing the probability of armed townsmen.

Another account demonstrates that townsmen not only provided arms and armour for themselves but also for others in their employ. In May 1398 a ship of Henry Sondey of Southampton was listed as having nine cannons, armaments and harnesses. While possible that the cannons were the ship’s cargo, as it would have been unheard of for so many cannons to be used on a ship at this time, the other arms and armour clearly were stated as used for the defence of the ship. This account indicates that townsmen, particularly wealthy ones such as Henry Sondey, would have owned a great deal of arms and armour, perhaps including cannons. This example demonstrates how well off townsmen were very capable of equipping themselves with sufficient arms and armour and could do the same for others. Whether these firearms were cargo or for the ship’s own defence, it indicates that such weapons were available to the men of the town.

The townsmen also could accumulate arms and armour in somewhat illicit situations as well. In 1322 townsmen acquired arms and armour illegally from a merchant of Genoa. These were not just any townsmen but included the town bailiff, John le Barber, and the mayor, Richard Frost. At this time they ‘seized’ arms and armour, including harnesses for some sixteen people. This armour was inventoried as: pairs of plates, bascinets, collarets, gauntlets, cuisses, greaves and other armour. This was yet another way in which townsmen were able to acquire equipment for war.

The same inquisition of 1360 by the town keeper Sir Henry Peverel that demonstrated the manpower available also indicates their equipment. If thirty well armed men, thirty other armed men, thirty archers, and 200 men called ‘clubmen’ were available, then their equipment can be ascertained. Of the armed men those well armed would have had the best arms and armour in the town and those other armed men would have been equipped similarly to a lesser extent. The archers at the least would have had bows and arrows, and the clubmen probably had only a personal arm without defensive armour. This

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1056 CMI 1377-1399, p. 93.
1058 CPR 1321-1324, p. 250.
1060 Ibid, pp. 251, 453.
1061 Ibid, pp. 251, 453.
small report by the town keeper shows the variety of military equipment owned by the townsmen of Southampton.

Archaeology provides other evidence of equipment with which the townsmen were armed and armoured. During excavations in the mid twentieth century many military objects were recovered. While ownership of these items is always in question, the fact they were often found among other more common objects of town life lends validity to the fact that these items were owned by the inhabitants of the town. Of the armour that was used in the fourteenth century the coat-of-plates or pair of plates remains one of the most difficult to understand or appreciate by modern scholars. Throughout the century it was the most common type of body armour from knight to commoner. Four plates of this armour were discovered at the Cuckoo lane excavation alone.\textsuperscript{1062} While these perhaps date from the late thirteenth century it is clear that the use of such armour would have continued much afterwards.

Other items found on Cuckoo Lane include three more similar plates dating c.1350.\textsuperscript{1063} The most interesting find from Cuckoo Lane is a top plate to either a coat-of-plates or even perhaps an early single piece breastplate, dating c.1350, which would make it a rare and unique survival.\textsuperscript{1064} Not only would this have been a very early example of rigid breastplate, but it shows that the townsmen had possession or at least access to the most up-to-date armour of the day.\textsuperscript{1065} Excavations on High Street found six more plates (probably coat-of-plates) dated 1300 to 1350.\textsuperscript{1066} A buckle commonly used for armour harnesses was also found in one of the High Street excavations.\textsuperscript{1067} With such a large number of these plates and other items associated with armour found in Southampton, it seems armour was commonplace in the town. Coupled with the few inventories from men of Southampton this seems even more likely.

Weapons have been found in excavations in Southampton that have been dated to within the late medieval period. A magnificent sword was found in the excavations off Cuckoo lane.\textsuperscript{1068} It was of a type of sword used in the second half of the thirteenth and into

\textsuperscript{1063} Ibid, p. 285.
\textsuperscript{1064} See Figure Thirty-seven.
\textsuperscript{1065} Ibid, p. 285.
\textsuperscript{1066} Ibid, p. 282.
\textsuperscript{1067} Ibid, p. 287.
\textsuperscript{1068} Ibid, p. 279.
the fourteenth century. If indeed this sword was owned by an inhabitant of the town he must have been wealthy judging by the materials, craftsmanship and design of the weapon. The majority of weapon finds have been the remains of a longbow and a massive number of arrowheads and crossbow quarrel heads. Combined with literary evidence, Southampton appears to have been well stocked in both personal arms and armour.

Demands on Hampshire and Southampton for military equipment and commerce of the same also demonstrate the accessibility of weapons and armour in the town. Weapon demands were common though the fourteenth century. In December 1352 commands were sent to the Mayor and Bailiff of Southampton to ensure fair payment for bows, arrows and bowstrings to the men preparing to go to war and to keep the townsmen from selling arms and armour to the king’s enemies. The king ordered them to arrest these items and certify their sales to legitimate persons only. From this record a number of facts can be gleaned. First, the town had access to buy and sell arms and armour locally. Second, the townsmen were selling to people forbidden by law and ‘unjustly’ raising the prices for the king’s men. The first aspect is by far the most important: that some townsmen owned large amounts of arms and armour. Further evidence of this appears in November 1360 when the king ordered Hampshire to provide 300 painted bows or equivalent payment. In February 1371, 600 sheaves were ordered as well. Of the twenty-six counties with similar requests only four counties provide more. In April 1371, 600 sheaves once more were commanded, while Surrey and Sussex were to provide 1,000 combined, and Somerset and Dorest another 1,000 together.

Customs laws in Southampton reveal further goods involved in the town’s commerce. In the Oak Book of Southampton several military items appear in a list created around 1300 for custom charges on common goods entering the town. This list included bow staves, bows for arbalests and hauberks. The local industry of arms and armour coupled with outside commerce created an environment in which Southampton played a part and accessed military items of every nature to fulfil their military needs.

1069 Ibid, p. 279.
1070 CCR 1349-1354, p. 335.
1071 Ibid, p. 335.
1072 CCR 1354-1360, p. 601.
1073 CCR 1368-1374, pp. 208-209.
1074 Ibid, pp. 208-209.
1076 OBS c.1300 vol. 2, pp. 6, 8.
The townspeople's equipment, artillery and guns of the fifteenth century

While there are still few inventories of the weapons and armour that townsmen owned during the fifteenth century, there are slightly more than the fourteenth century, and there are more accounts in general. The increase in accounts of inventories including personal arms and armour gives more information about the equipment the townsmen possessed. Accounts of trade in the town remain important and with more numerous accounts in the fifteenth century are an excellent tool to identify how large the arms trade in Southampton was, indicating the accessibility of such items. As in the fourteenth century, both of these aspects will establish the probable arms and armour employed by townsmen in their military activity and obligations.

There are several inventories of military equipment townsmen possessed from the fifteenth century. One inventory of Richard Thomas, a town merchant, written in 1447 contains an interesting collection of goods that a wealthy townsman may have owned, including instruments of war. Thomas appears to have been very wealthy, and owned at least two ships ‘the Mary’ and ‘the James’ which he sold previous to his death. Thomas owned included seventeen lances or spears, four pole axes, one dagger and a baselard. He also owned four hand guns, though these were listed among the goods of the respective vessels, probably for their use at sea, though they would have been available to Thomas at his need. Thomas’s inventory gives an example of the type of military equipment a townsman might posses. It is also obvious all these arms were not intended solely for his own personal use.

There are a few other isolated evidences of personal ownership of arms and armour in Southampton. One is that of Gabriel Flemings who owned a brigandine valued at 40s. that was given to John White, who married Gabriel’s widow. John Chandler owned a sallet worth 2s. 6d. John Walker owned a bill that was worth 16d.

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1079 Ibid, pp. 2-4.
1081 BRS 1485-1563, p.3.
1082 Ibid, p.3.
1083 Ibid, p.3.
also bought a sallet from the town for 12d.\textsuperscript{1084} On multiple occasions when townsmen apparently brought their arms including swords to town court they were promptly confiscated then expeditiously sold.\textsuperscript{1085} While these examples are rather disjointed, one to another they demonstrate the theme in question, that many townsmen owned weapons and armour and they were common around the town.

The Southampton Book of Fines 1488 to 1540 sheds further light on equipment owned by townsmen.\textsuperscript{1086} A summary from the late fifteenth century, presumably for fines issued for men lacking equipment, indicates some of the townsmen’s arms and armour at the time. Unfortunately the opening page is now difficult to read, but that which is legible shows a large number of military equipment. 162 harnesses, twenty-three hauberks, nine jacks, 120 pikes and more are listed. Extrapolating from the types of soldiers listed there were near 300 bills, between 30 to 100 bows with arrows and seventeen hand guns.\textsuperscript{1087} It seems the weapons listed were in addition to those present as there are only two pikemen listed and 120 pikes. This document, while difficult to interpret, indicates a large number of both arms and armour present in the town in the late fifteenth century.

In 1441 a list of equipment used in acts of piracy within the liberty of Southampton, probably including townsmen, gives an impression of some of the equipment that was being used in the area and aboard ships.\textsuperscript{1088} These men were armed with ‘swords, crossbows, bombard, pollaxes, 'gysarmes', 'platys' (probably a brigandine) and palets (helmets).\textsuperscript{1089} It is interesting to note the lack of bows in this list and even more interesting to note how they were both armoured and armed well, including large firearms to assault other ships at sea. Clearly men of the area could be well equipped for many types of military activities, licit and illicit.

Town fines also demonstrate arms ownership and employment, though in these cases illicit uses. In 1456 Thomas Van and John Swan were both fined 5s. each for an affray.\textsuperscript{1090} Townsmen not only needed arms and armour for war but at times day to day activity. In 1472 the Mayor of Southampton, Thomas Payne, was attacked by a Spaniard

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1084] Ibid, p.3.
\item[1085] BRS 1303-1518, p.69.
\item[1086] SCA 5/1
\item[1087] Unfortunately the number of archers listed is very difficult to read. There are at least thirty, though probably more.
\item[1088] CPR 1436-1441, p. 575.
\item[1089] Ibid, p. 575.
\item[1090] SBS 1456-1457, p. 10.
\end{footnotes}
who drew his sword on him.\textsuperscript{1091} John Barbour was fined 1s. for drawing a sword on John Adams and insulting him.\textsuperscript{1092} Lewis Aymer was arrested in 1486 for using a sword and wearing a sallet in this assault.\textsuperscript{1093} He was later fined 4d. each, once for the use of the sword and also for the sallet, indicating that it was just as much of a crime to be in a fight with armour as with arms, though it should be noted that his fines were fairly small per offence.\textsuperscript{1094} A surviving record from 1481 details fines for similar attacks that took place. John Smith was fined 9d. for fighting and drawing a blade on a common woman at the stews side.\textsuperscript{1095} John Rose’s son drew a sword and beat a butcher above Bar Street and was fined 6d.\textsuperscript{1096} An unnamed townsman was fined 20d. for fighting and drawing a sword.\textsuperscript{1097} While fights between townsmen were less common than those involving galleymen or others from outside the town, it is clear that townsmen did possess arms and found occasion to employ them both defensively and in the opposite.

Galleymen seem to have a notorious reputation for brawling in this period and those in Southampton were no exception. By and large many of these affrays were related to the large populations of sailors in town. One galleymen was arrested and fined 8d. for carrying a ‘land knife’ about the town. Another galleymen was arrested for actually drawing his blade in a fight and fined 2s.\textsuperscript{1098} There are pages of incidents involving galleymen in the town’s accounts many of which involve swords, daggers and other weapons.\textsuperscript{1099} In 1487 there seems to have been quite a large fight as a number of galleymen were fined 20s.\textsuperscript{1100}

To try and combat the number of fights that took place in town, especially by outsiders with townsmen, strict civic laws were enabled. In 1457 the town ordered ‘No strangers should to bear no weapons and to take their lodgings not in.”\textsuperscript{1101} From this it is apparent the visitors were not to bring weapons into the town, nor to their lodgings. In this way the town tried to lessen crime by having a large number of armed men living
permanently and temporarily in the town. Though the wearing of blades, particularly swords, was often prohibited inside the town, it is clear by these accounts that large numbers of weapons were carried about by townsmen and others dwelling there.

Another indication of the availability of these arms and armour in the town is trade. The arms and armour economy in and through Southampton is evident by records of transactions and the taxes placed upon trade goods by the town. In the fifteenth century there are a large number of records showing the customs being charged on weapons, especially bowstaves and bows. While bows and bowstaves throughout the fifteenth century remain the main commodities in the area, from this evidence other items are also included. This furthered the ability of townsmen to have acquired a great variety of arms and amour.

The Portage and Brokage Books of Southampton as well as other accounts from the town during the fifteenth century provide evidence of large scale commerce of bows and bowstaves through the town. These also prove Southampton had many bowyers and other tradesmen in the town. Starting in the early fifteenth century 100 bowstaves in shipments appears to be about average. From the 1435 to 1436 Port Book of Southampton loads of bowstaves of 100 appear still to be average though this varied, with one Paul Morel bringing in 1240 in one shipment. While probably a larger than normal load of bowstaves it shows that a fair deal of military industry passed through the port of medieval Southampton and would have made such items readily available.

The numbers of bowstaves and shipments only increased later in the decade. From the Port Books of 1439 to 1440 loads of 100 bowstaves are common, increasing to records of shipments of 200, 550 and up to 1500 also passing into the town. The Brokage Books of the same years of 1439 to 1440 show a similar trend with loads from 50 bowstaves or more, with 100 being an average. Large loads continued, one being one and one half hundred-weight of bowstaves carted from Southampton to Salisbury. John Chawyn acquired 100 bowstaves from a townsman of Southampton, perhaps aptly named Richard Bowyer. It is obvious that the numbers involved vary from a modest one hundred to

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1102 BRS 1303-1518, p. 22.
1104 PBS 1439-1440, pp. 11, 12, 28, 61, 62, 93.
1105 BrBS 1439-1440 Volume One, pp. 10-11, 32-33, 57, 85.
1106 Ibid. pp. 10-11.
1107 Ibid. p. 85.
well in the thousands, but in both cases it indicates the presence and availability of bows in and around Southampton.

The mid fifteenth century continued with a near constant flow of bowstaves into the town. 1441 showed one bowyer, Thomas Gerard of Romsey, was charged a £1 duty on his finished bows alone. While it does not give the specific number it is worth noting how much Thomas was charged considering a finished bow perhaps cost 8d. to 12d. This indicates a fairly substantial number of bows leaving the town. The Brokage Books of 1443 to 1444 show the continuance of what the other records of commerce have shown, except that for these years shipments of 200 bowstaves are average, 300 being the upper limit. That said many were not numbered, as one Richard Gonner had two cartloads of bowstaves, and William Hekle shortly after had the same. Over one year late in the 1440s shipments of 100, 200, 350, and 400 bowstaves were fairly common including finished bows in addition to these. Arrows for bows also were recorded as having entered into the town. All these records show just how large the market for bowstaves, and to a lesser extent bows, were in Southampton, with literally thousands, probably between 5,000 to 10,000 bowstaves passing through the town.

The second half of the fifteenth century continued to show evidence of a great deal of trade in Southampton of bowstaves, though perhaps in fewer shipments several were larger on average. From the Port Books of 1469 to 1471 Aungell Corpore arrived in Southampton with 50 staves. One Nicholas de Peysero brought to Southampton 2,000 bowstaves not long afterwards. The smallest shipment of bowstaves listed so far came during these two years, as did the largest. Finished bows also continued to be brought into the town, as Thomas Lemoyn arrived with twenty-four bows and twelve sheaves of arrows and Jeffrey Salmon with twelve bows. Late in the fifteenth century Thomas Overay, a prominent town official and at one point mayor, brought 100 bowstaves to Southampton as part of his wares. It seems throughout the second half of the fifteenth century, especially
the last decades, that trade had slowed, with perhaps only a few thousand bowstaves, probably less than 3,000, and less than a hundred finished bows.

Bows, arrows and bowstaves were not the only military items involved in Southampton. One De Marco Negr', perhaps an Italian, paid 6s. 8d. for bringing one habergeon into port during the late 1430s.\footnote{PBS 1439-1440, p. 80.} Brokage Books of 1443 to 1444 show brimstone and five swords having been taxed.\footnote{BrBs 1443-1444 Volume One, p. 251.} The Brokage Books of 1439 to 1440 show a few other items that were of military use as well; barrels of saltpetre and sulphur, both ingredients used in the mixture of gunpowder. The town also bought materials they used for military purposes including one instance when they purchased 2,000lbs. iron ore at once.\footnote{PBS 1448-1449 vol. I, p. 141, 142, 163.} Other items of a military nature from the Port Books of 1469 to 1471 also arrived daily to the ports of Southampton, including 50lbs. of crossbow thread or cable.\footnote{PBS and BrBS 1448-1449, p. 197; PBS 1469-1471, p. 49, 93, 94.} Armour also was included in the town trade, such as hauberks and other pieces of armour, and even full suits of armour. One Aungel Catan arrived in port with 35 white harnesses. While bows and bowstaves were by far the most common military item entering the town and taxed, doubtless there was a wide range of items that entered the town’s port during the late medieval period.

While the Port Books offer a valuable view of what commerce was taking place in the port and town of Southampton, as well as possible items townsmen could have possessed, this was not the only account of this nature. The Brokage Books of Southampton record the items that had customs paid upon entering the town from the landward side. These records also are full of military equipment entering and leaving the town of Southampton. As before these records show a great flow of arms and armour and indicate that some of this industry may have been based locally.

Royal commands for military equipment and their materials offer more evidence of Southampton and Hampshire’s arms and armour economy. In February 1417 the king ordered his sheriffs in a number of counties, including Southampton, to take six feathers from every goose in the county for the production of arrows. This was for his archers in his war with France. As Henry’s letter reads, ‘God gave him victory by his archers, among
others with their arrows'.\textsuperscript{1123} In July 1421 Henry ordered 40,000 feathers to be collected from Hampshire.\textsuperscript{1124} Just like much of England, Southampton would have had local tradesmen making arms and armour, and in Southampton it appears that bows and arrows were made as well.

In May 1474 Edward IV commanded payment to fletchers, arrowhead makers, bowyers and stringers for making their respective products in the counties of Norfolk, Suffolk, Cambridgeshire, Huntingdonshire and Hampshire. This was for goods he had pressed for his wars in France.\textsuperscript{1125} Specifically mentioned in Hampshire was Southampton for their contribution.\textsuperscript{1126} In March of 1475 the king, Edward IV, ordered Thomas Asshe and Nicholas Long to ‘take’ the men called brigandine makers and all gear and materials needed for them to make brigandines.\textsuperscript{1127} This work was being done to prepare for Edward’s war with France later that year.\textsuperscript{1128} This example demonstrates the existence of yet another industry of military equipment in Hampshire. These industries, brigandines and archery supplies in particular, can be seen in and around Southampton.

While the town government owned a large supply of guns by the mid fifteenth century, it is hard to clarify if this was the case for the individual townsmen. From the fifteenth century we know at least one inhabitant did own four firearms. Though he was very rich it would be hard to imagine he was an isolated case. However, the number of handguns used by townsmen might never have been very large during the fifteenth century, as even in the 1556 muster of Southampton only twenty guns were listed in the whole town.\textsuperscript{1129} As there are few mentions of weapons in general this should not be taken to mean that they were not owned by townsmen, as they were included in some of the few accounts of arms owned by townsmen.

While many of these accounts provide only indirect evidence of arms ownership, coupled with those that show direct ownership they give a good idea of the types of arms and armour possibly owned by townsmen. Although Southampton’s men probably were not always armed and armoured in the best or most up-to-date equipment, they clearly were armed and armoured, in most cases, sufficient for their needs. Sadly it is probable that most

\textsuperscript{1123} CCR 1413-1419, p. 336.
\textsuperscript{1124} CCR 1419-1422, p. 166.
\textsuperscript{1125} CPR 1467-1477, p. 462.
\textsuperscript{1126} Ibid, p. 462.
\textsuperscript{1127} Ibid, p. 524.
\textsuperscript{1128} Ibid, p. 524.
\textsuperscript{1129} SCA 13/2/2, 4, 5a; Platt, Medieval Southampton, p. 174.
inventories and wills have been lost which diminishes our understanding of how they, in reality, were equipped. What is clear though is that the town’s men had access and owned a wide number of weapons and armour, thus fulfilling their military obligation both to the king and the town.

**The king’s equipment, artillery and guns in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries**

Before the raids of 1338 Edward III began sending arms and equipment to defend his possessions in Southampton.\(^{1130}\) It appears that Edward had significant armaments there as in March 1336 amidst French attacks to the south coast he sent sixty stones for his engines of war to his castle in Southampton.\(^{1131}\) Edward was aware of the need to equip his castle there but perhaps was not concerned enough to justify large expenses or even felt that it was sufficiently prepared. While the king did organise his castle with arms and armour it was not until after the raid that Edward III’s attention was fully turned toward the military equipment of the town, particularly the state of his own castle.

After the raid in 1338 Edward III began large scale efforts to strengthen the town, including his own castle there. A large part of this was done through his keeper with a garrison.\(^{1132}\) Edward also sent great amounts of artillery such as springalds and engines, arms, aketons (a padded textile armour) lances, arbalests, shields and armour for the town and castle’s defence.\(^{1133}\) Engineers also were sent to construct powerful and large engines of war to protect Southampton and the castle. The king continued sending munitions with another shipment in April of more springalds, arbalests, quarrels, bows with arrows, lances and breastplates.\(^{1134}\) An account of 16 April included 300 quarrels for two foot arbalests and springalds, and 1000 one foot quarrels for lesser arbelests sent to Southampton.\(^{1135}\) In May, June and July more engines, springalds, bows, lances, other weapons and armour were still being delivered from the king.\(^{1136}\) Between the 12 May to 11 August the king spent £206 4½d. on the manufacture and repair of springalds and other engines of war in the castle and town.\(^{1137}\) When the king began to return the rights and authority to the

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1130 CCR 1337-1339, pp. 15-16.
1131 Ibid. pp. 15-16.
1132 Platt, Medieval Southampton, pp. 108-114.
1134 CCR 1339-1341, pp. 64, 82, 83 and 189.
1135 Ibid, p. 64.
1136 Ibid. pp. 82-83, 161.
1137 TNA E101/22/11; Platt, Medieval Southampton, p. 114.
townsmen, he also began to gift them artillery, arms and armour for their own defence. However, not all this equipment was surrendered as much was kept, probably for the castle. Clearly Edward III decided after the raid that the need outweighed the costs for the defence of his castle in Southampton.

The last quarter of the century, after Richard II refortified much of the castle, firearms were recorded in Southampton Castle for the first time. In 1386 three guns were sent for its defence, probably some six years after the new castle’s completion. In July 1386 Thomas Tredyngton was made cleric of the castle’s chapel, and in addition to preparing the divine services he received a position over the armaments due to his military skill with guns and artillery. These services were renewed under Henry IV in 1399. Thereafter few mentions are made specifically of firearms being in the castle though doubtless they were there. Other possible changes might also have been masked by the fact that the king was not directly over the castle for a large part of the fourteenth century, as it had passed to various keepers and owners, as gifts from the king.

Apart from the continuance of the king’s chaplain who was placed in charge of the king’s military equipment in the castle back in 1386, there is little more evidence of military equipment in the castle for the late fourteenth and fifteenth century. As far as can be ascertained from 1386 to the 1470, almost continuously, a line of chaplains were in the castle with this responsibility. From 1386 to 1405 Thomas Tredyngton was named as chaplain and paid £10 yearly to celebrate divine services in the king’s castle as well as for the care the artillery, armour, arms and guns housed there. In 1411 Henry Romayn received the position which was renewed in 1423. Alan Norwell then filled this position, probably after Henry passed away, and although no date is given for his initial placement he was replaced in 1441. William Rosshalle in 1441 took his place until 1452. Lastly John Gadstone took over directly for William in 1452, which he probably held until

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138 TNA E101/ 22/ 16 and 17; CCR 1339-1341, pp. 288, 304 to 305, 340.
139 O’Neil, Castles and Cannons, p. 10.
140 CCR 1385-1389, pp. 162-163; CPR 1385-1389, p. 196; Platt, Medieval Southampton, p. 130
141 CPR 1399-1401, p. 144.
144 CPR 1385-1389, pp. 196 and 198; CPR 1402-1405, p. 44; CPR 1405-1408, p. 103.
his death in the late 1460s or 1470s. All held the same responsibility to keep the castle defensible both in structure and equipment and maintain the artillery, guns, arms and armour of the castle.

Others were placed in this position after John Gadstone. In December 1470 Brother Thomas Hemyngforth was given the custody of the chapel in the king’s tower in the town. In December 1484 John Bury was placed in this charge. Both lack any information regarding anything military, and apparently the position was then only to celebrate divine service. It is possible that it was just not mentioned, or that someone else was given the task by this date. Thereafter the position that began with Thomas Tredyngton in the 1380s appears to have ceased. While little can be said about specific weapons placed in the castle after 1383 the position the Chaplain held militarily for close to 100 years attests to their existence there.

**Royal requisition of ships from Southampton**

Southampton’s primary obligation for equipment demanded of the town was as a naval military organisation, providing ships for warfare. Loades wrote that the ‘navy is the show of sea power’. Kings showed their dominance and lordship over the sea through fleets of ships. Most of the medieval period English kings owned few or no warships, so the responsibility fell to coastal towns and cities. The huge costs of the initial purchase of a ship and the need of almost constant upkeep made maintaining a fleet of warships close to impossible for a medieval king. For this reason the levying of ships and obliging towns to provide new ships for war at their own costs was essential to the kingdom’s defence and the king’s wars. Without them coastal defence, foreign attacks, and transport of armies by sea in Britain and abroad would have been impossible. These obligations were primarily in two forms: first a levy of ships that the town would be expected to provide, and second

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150 CPR 1467-1477, p. 229.
151 CCR 1476-1485, p. 314.
where the king required new ships to be constructed specifically for war. While both methods were employed the first method, the levy of ships, mostly large merchant ships, was the favoured process.

The importance of Southampton’s contribution to the king’s naval military activities was impressive. Throughout the period 1300 to 1500 Southampton was involved in providing ships every decade except the 1480s.1157 These demands vary numerically from a single ship to every vessel in port, as well as the individual size of the ships involved. Their purposes also differ from transport to actual warfare whether it be abroad or at sea. The calls for ships also fluctuate in frequency in any given decade, year or even month depending on the current events taking place and the king himself. The capability Southampton had to provide such fleets shows in many ways one of the town’s most important military obligations to the king. As mariners provided by Southampton has already been examined in Chapter Two this section will focus on the vessels themselves.

Some vessels provided by the town were well equipped warships. One warship was specially built by the town for Edward I in November 1294.1158 This ship was designed for war as can be seen by the equipment. It was equipped with fore, aft and a top castle and was laden with helmets for each crewmember, padded armour for most, 60 crossbows with 6,000 bolts, 120 lances, 100 halberds, and 240 javelins.1159 This armament indicates a strong military purpose and the organisation of the crew, one master, three constables and 120 sailors, makes it out to be a formidable ship.1160 Such naval capabilities demonstrate Southampton’s military ability.

Most vessels intended for the king’s employ were privately owned. These ships would then be equipped with necessary arms and armour. Often when a ship was arrested for royal service it was ordered to be ‘doubly equipped’.1161 As ships generally ran armed for day to day maritime activity this probably implies a more military necessity. In addition to military equipment for the crew the ship also was armed with castles, protected platforms from which to fight. During the thirteenth century and after ships were outfitted for war with permanent or temporary castles, placed on the hull and stern of the ship once at the

1157 See Appendix Chapter Four- Ship Provision, Seizures and Arrests of Hampshire.
1158 Platt, Medieval Southampton, p. 61.
1159 TNA E101/5/2 and E101/5/12; Platt, Medieval Southampton, p. 62.
1160 Ibid, p. 61.
meeting place.\textsuperscript{1162} Hutchinson makes the statement that these often became fixed castles by the fourteenth century.\textsuperscript{1163} Even ships intended for everyday life were in this way armed for military duty in Southampton’s obligation to the king.

Ships intended for transport also were required to provide specialized equipment for the king’s needs. Bridges to disembark men, horses and equipment were essential to these ships’ functions. Edward II in 1324 ordered ships to have sufficient bridges per ship to the number of men and horses, while his son required of the town leadership in 1331 60 bridges for the same.\textsuperscript{1164} As well as bridges to unload the men ‘hurdles’ were required presumably to organise and keep the horses aboard during transport, in 1331 Edward required 600 of these from Southampton for the ships he pressed. Clearly for military or other purposes ships of Southampton functioned in many requirements.

Edward I and Edward II employed the town in much of their military activities. Southampton provided several ships per year of Edward I’s remaining reign in the fourteenth century, culminating with twenty provided in 1304.\textsuperscript{1165} Most of these orders from 1301 to 1303 were for his continued war in Scotland until it came to a temporary close.\textsuperscript{1166} Edward made the most commands in 1301 with orders in February, March and May, and only one arrest each in 1302 and 1303. All were for two ships except May 1301 and March 1303 which demanded ‘ships’ in general. How many ships provided is impossible to say only that it was more than two. This indicates that at a minimum during 1301 to 1303 ten ships were provided for the king’s wars in Scotland. The largest call was in 1304 to transport the king’s men to Flanders with twenty ships of the town. In just a matter of four years during the end of Edward’s reign over thirty ships were required.

Southampton continued in this role under Edward I’s son. Edward II, from August 1308 to July 1313, made almost yearly orders for ships of the town.\textsuperscript{1167} In August 1308, September 1310, May 1311, August 1312, and July 1313 Edward commanded arrests of the town. Once more the focus of these arrests was conflict in Scotland but that of August 1312, which was a war galley, demanded to fight rebels. Like those of his father most were

\textsuperscript{1162} Loades, ‘The Tudor Navy’, p. 12.
\textsuperscript{1163} G. Hutchinson, Medieval Ships and Ship Building (London: 1994) p. 47.
\textsuperscript{1164} CPR 1321-1324, p. 417-418; CCR 1330-1333, p. 209.
\textsuperscript{1165} CCR 1296-1302, pp. 482-483; CPR 1292-1301, pp. 583-584, 595; CPR 1301-1307, p. 75; CCR 1302-1307, p. 78, 205.
\textsuperscript{1166} CCR 1296-1302, pp. 482-483; CPR 1292-1301, pp. 583-584, 595; CPR 1301-1307, p. 75; CCR 1302-1307, p. 78.
relatively small orders for one to three ships. What is clear though is that these ships were required to be armed for war. Edward anticipated these to be employed in combat. The largest call for ships, from July 1313, included thirty of the 'greater and better' ships in Devon, Dorset, Hampshire and Sussex. These ships seem to have been employed in Scotland, presumably to transport men there but it is possible that Edward planned to use these vessels to counter the Scots and their allies at sea. Once more Southampton in five years provided a great number of ships, probably similar in number as they had to Edward II's father.

With Edward II's defeat at Bannockburn Southampton had a slight reprieve from demands for vessels for most of a decade. This peace changed in 1322 with three very large orders for ships from the town. With conflict clear between Edward and many English nobles with foreign support, the king was turning to Southampton for military assistance. All but the June command demand all ships in the port, illustrating the level of threat and need that Edward was faced with by his rebellious barons in 1322. After the defeat of Lancaster and many of his adherents that year, focus shifted to Gascony in 1324. With renewed contention between the French king over the English lands in France, Edward made two orders for ship seizures in May, one for six ships the second a larger demand for all vessels of 40 tuns or larger. As would be seen in Edward III's reign, large numbers of ships were required for any activity on the continent. This was particularly vital for transporting men and equipment, but also for naval support and communication with England.

In the last year of Edward's reign civil opposition once more had grown and the demands for maritime support turned to defence. June, August, and September 1326 all had orders for vessels of Southampton, with three in August and September each. Many of these orders would have raised most if not all the ships in port to his defence. All of these demands were for one purpose, to defend Edward's position from English rebels and their foreign allies, a shift from Southampton's ships mainly being employed abroad on the king's errands. From 1322 to 1326 the town provided well over fifty ships for the king's service, perhaps even twice this when considering the frequency in which Edward made use

1168 CCR 1318-1323, p.524, 531, 559.
1169 CPR 1321-1324, p. 417; CCR 1323-1328, pp. 182-183, 187
1170 CPR 1324-1327, pp. 279, 310-311; CCR 1323-1328, pp. 611-613, 641, 643.
of arresting all ships in port. Southampton was expected to play a part in all Edward’s major military activities and at sea this was no different.

Ship arrests in Southampton increased dramatically over Edward III’s reign, basically beginning with the outbreak of the Hundred Years’ War. The first few years of Edward’s reign demanded little of Southampton till the mid 1330s, with only requests in March 1327 for three ships on the king’s business and June 1328 for all ships 40 tuns or more for defence.\(^1\) With contention growing between Edward III and Philip VI of France these ships in 1328 were to protect the southern coast from a French fleet supposedly being prepared. While this seizure of ships in 1328 may have been large, it was the only seizure of this size for much of the first decade of Edward’s reign.

With real threats now present and the war becoming more intense with Philip VI, Edward began making preparations to defend England and wage his war in France. May and December 1336, October and November 1337, and January 1338 all had demands made for defensive preparations requiring ships of Southampton.\(^2\) In total some 19 vessels were required of the town during these arrests, illustrating the increased danger being posed to the south from France, their allies and the way in which Southampton was employed by the king to counter it.\(^3\) Several of these vessels were sent with townsmen to aid in the defence of the Channel Islands; Southampton clearly played a role in the king’s defensive organisation where needed.\(^4\) The town also provided a ship in December 1337 to transport men and supplies, specifically siege equipment, to the king’s military activities against the Scots.\(^5\) Over just two years Southampton remained an active participant in the king’s military needs, this time primarily for defence, but they continued as well in providing men abroad.

After the raid of Southampton in 1338, use of the town’s vessels shifted from defence to transport. With the king’s very active war in France having begun, the town was a main contributor to his naval needs, especially in transport. For the next fifteen years there were many calls for transport ships indicating war abroad was the focus. Orders for vessels of the town appear in February 1341, November and December 1342, May 1343, early and mid (June) 1345, January 1346, July 1349, July 1353, May 1354, and February

\(^1\) CPR 1327-1330, p. 27; CCR 1327-1330, p. 397.
\(^4\) CPR 1334-1338, p. 337; CCR 1333-1337, p. 712.
\(^5\) CPR 1334-1338, p. 559.
Many of these ship seizures were massive, as December 1342, May 1343, June 1345 included all ships in port, February 1341 required all 60 tuns or larger, and November 1342, May 1343, 1345, and January 1346 demanded ‘ships’ of Southampton. From 1349 to 1355 the demands on ships decreased for transport from the previous decade with six ships of Southampton as well as twelve divided between Devon, Dorset and Hampshire in 1349. With almost constant needs for transport, Southampton from 1340 to 1355 was heavily involved with fourteen orders for ships over nine of these fifteen years.

In mid 1355 seizures for transport halted and those for defence once more became common. Large orders for ships, including all vessels in port, were made in June 1355, March and August 1360. What is interesting about these demands for vessels for defence is that England was in one of its most successful periods in the Hundred Years’ War between the victory of Crécy and Treaty of Bretigny, the last even after the treaty was concluded. Edward still felt a French threat at sea, and raising such forces along the southern coasts indicates attack was not unlikely.

During the supposed peace of the 1360s Southampton’s role once more shifted and greatly decreased, from both defence and transport of men to wars with France. With the treaty Edward was able to focus his military abilities to further his influence elsewhere. In 1364 two of Edward’s sons, Edward and Lionel, were engaged in these military activities and Southampton was called to provide them ships. Lionel was to have 80 vessels of 40 tuns or above from all ports, Southampton to Bristol, for his use in Ireland while his elder brother Edward was to have sufficient of the remaining ships to take him to Aquitaine. While impossible to attribute a number to Southampton’s involvement, larger ports similar to it, such as Bristol, probably provided a significant portion to create these fleets. For 1364 the town probably provided a great number of vessels, probably dozens, but it was but one of two years of activity during the 1360s.

Southampton for the rest of Edward’s reign was much less involved than in earlier years. Commands for ships came only in April and May 1371 as well as April and October 1373 for the remainder of his reign. Those of 1371 were once more for transport to France. From summer 1372 France was in control of the channel increasing pressure on the

1176 CCR 1341-1343, pp. 107, 667; CPR 1340-1343, p. 591; CCR 1343-1346, pp. 102; 537, 588, 632; CPR 1343-1345, p. 92; CCR 1348-1350, pp. 386, 512; CPR 1354-1358, p. 52, 178.
1177 CCR 1354-1360, p. 214; CCR 1360-1364, pp. 97-98; CPR 1358-1361, p. 452.
1178 CPR 1361-1364, p. 518.
1179 CPR 1370-1374, pp. 72, 88, 109, 270, 347.
south coast and leading to calls for ships for defence. In 1373, the April order was for defence from French naval attacks, and October to transport men to Ireland. Southampton appears to have been much less involved the last few years of Edwards’s life with only four demands in two years of seven. This probably was tied to changes in how the war was being carried out in the 1370s and the fact that it was becoming less and less successful. One would expect an increase in defensive orders for ships in the 1370s, but this does not seem to have been the case. As there were many more defensive procedures taking place on land, it might have been another shift in the manner in which the king meant to defend the southern coast.

Southampton’s involvement with ships during Edward III’s reign was great. Part of this was the intensity of the war with France as well as the great length of his reign. It is nearly impossible to arrive at a specific number of ships the town provided during his reign. Unlike previous monarchs Edward employed the arrest of all ships in the port frequently along with other large and small scale seizures from the town. The amount of activity also fluctuated, the start of the war to Bretingy being the most involved, while starting with the 1360s their involvement decreased. Shifts can be seen as well in the use of these ships. During periods of severe threat like the mid to late 1330s great arrests for defence were made, while shortly after the better part of two decades was spent exclusively in transport. In all these aspects Southampton proved itself a valuable asset to Edward and his military ambitions.

Southampton provided ships to Richard II throughout his reign but with less frequency and demand as well as almost exclusively abroad. The late 1370s, especially 1377, found intensified French raids along the south coast. With the exception of a town baling in 1377 by Hugh Calveley for defence of the south coast, possibly even the defence of Calais, all other employments were transport for the king’s wars. The 1380s saw only two demands for ships, both of which came in March 1383. One was for six ships to transport support to the town and castle of Cherbourg, the other for as many ships as was required to transport the Bishop of Norwich on his ill-fated ‘crusade’ in the Low

1180 Sherborne, ‘The English Navy’, p. 34.
1182 CCR 1377-1381, p. 21; G. Hutchinson, Medieval Ships, p. 152.
Countries. While the second arrest command was probably fairly large no other orders were made in the 1380s.

The last five years of the 1390s saw renewed demands for vessels in Richard’s wars in Ireland, in April 1385, July and August 1398 and February 1399. The latter demands were for large numbers of ships, in August 1398 for all ships 40 tuns or above and February 1399 all ships twenty-five tuns or more. While the frequency of demands for ships is not constant until the end of the 1390s, three of the seven orders for ships were for huge numbers of ships, virtually emptying the port. Unlike Edward III, Richard seems to have not employed Southampton very often for defence, with only one of his orders for ships being utilized so, and the rest were for transport. Much of this probably was due to the decrease in general activity abroad, as much of Richard’s energy was employed at home with discontent factions. While overall the time spent in the king’s service decreased, Southampton did remain able to provide ships to fulfil their military service at sea, with several very large showings.

Just as during the reign of Richard II, Southampton’s involvement with Henry IV was markedly different. From 1400 to 1406, nine demands were made upon Southampton, seven for defence, one to wars in Scotland and one unknown, on the king’s business. These demands on the town’s ships show Henry IV’s fears of attacks from foreign factions upon him and his usurped throne. The size of many of these seizures for defence was also fairly large: November 1403 and March 1404 were for all vessels, March 1404 for all ships 36 tuns or greater, October 1404 all 40 tuns or above, and April 1401 for all vessels 80 tuns or larger. Several years also have multiple orders in a year, 1401 and 1403 with two each and 1404 with three. Southampton during much of Henry’s reign was involved with frequent and heavy demands of ships for defence of the kingdom at sea. From the taking of the throne onward, Henry IV actively employed Southampton for the first half of his reign.

Under Henry V Southampton once again was heavily involved in the king’s wars abroad, mostly in transport. From 1414 on to 1421 Southampton was involved every year

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1183 CCR 1381-1383, pp. 259, 261.
1184 CPR 1391-1396, p. 590; CPR 1396-1399, pp. 432, 438, 511.
in the king’s wars, usually with various calls for vessels a year.\textsuperscript{1188} Many of the years were loaded with demand after demand for vessels, 1416 and 1418 having four each. All were intended for transport to war abroad but April 1416 was ordered for defence.\textsuperscript{1189} Many of these very frequent commands for ships once more included most ships in port: all ships, or all ships as low as twenty tuns or above. With such a major need to transport manpower to France from England Henry employed Southampton, and towns like it, to do this. Over less than a decade Southampton provided ships more frequently to Henry V than for any English king of the late medieval period, and in great numbers, perhaps only second to Edward III. Southampton obviously had become a major benefit for Henry’s naval military needs.

Southampton’s role under Henry VI changed greatly from the start to its end. Throughout the 1430s Southampton continued providing vessels to transport the king’s men and supplies to France but much less often, though still at times in great numbers. June and December 1423, July 1426 and March 1428 were the only orders made at this time.\textsuperscript{1190} Of these two were specifically large: December 1423 and March 1428 included a great number of ships, with 1423 requiring all twenty to 200 tuns and 1428 twenty to 120 tuns. The 1430s continue this trend of fewer commands, but larger numbers per command for transport, with orders in February and March 1431, March 1438, March, May and October 1439.\textsuperscript{1191} Once more demands for all ships or all ships of a certain size by tuns were the most common. This pattern was disturbed but once in June 1430 with a call for ‘diverse ships’ for defence.\textsuperscript{1192}

May 1440 broke a continuation of the 1430s and 1440s as well with another call for thirty ships of ten ports including Southampton.\textsuperscript{1193} Excluding May 1440 the rest of the 1440s were continued demands on Southampton’s ships for transport to France. Commands were steady 1440 to 1445, and again in 1449 with increased aggression in English lands in France.\textsuperscript{1194} In January and June of 1453 two more calls for all ships in Southampton were

\textsuperscript{1188} CCR 1413-1419, p. 162; CPR 1413-1416, pp. 177, 221, 344, 346; CPR 1416-1422, pp. 36, 70, 73, 76, 85, 148, 199, 202, 204, 268, 270, 275, 319.
\textsuperscript{1189} CCR 1413-1419, p. 346.
\textsuperscript{1190} CPR 1422-1429, pp. 124, 192, 362, 469.
\textsuperscript{1191} CPR 1429-1436, pp. 130, 131; CPR 1436-1441, pp. 149, 273, 312-313, 340.
\textsuperscript{1192} CPR 1429-1436, p. 74.
\textsuperscript{1193} CPR 1436-1441, p. 411.
made in the king’s plans to recover Aquitaine but thereafter, with the war in France effectively closed, no others were made.1195

Starting in 1452 Henry VI’s employment of Southampton’s ships was also used in defence as his possessions in France crumbled. In June 1452 and July 1454 the king employed ships in defence of the southern coast, that of 1454 including all ships in port.1196 The only other employment of Henry’s reign for ships of the town was in March 1460 in an attempt to keep the earl of Warwick from re-entering England.1197 The employment of ships of Southampton mirrors, in many ways, Henry VI’s reign: inactivity over much of the time with few occurrences of large scale seizures. Once England lost its place in Normandy and Gascony, defence once more became more important with increased French attacks and civil conflict.

The trend of employing these arrested ships from Southampton continued under Edward IV. Southampton provided ships for defence in May 1461, 1469, June 1470 and January 1475.1198 Since the greatest concern during Edward’s reign was maintaining the throne he had taken from Henry VI, Southampton’s use of defence tended to be in conflict with Lancastrians and their allies. Since much of the conflict between Lancastrians and Yorkists was on land, Southampton’s contribution in ships was not generally very large, with only one arrest in 1475 for all vessels in port, which may have been intended to ferry his army across to France before he was paid off.1199 Edward IV’s reign started a major decrease in Southampton’s involvement in maritime military activity. While Henry VI’s reign was marked by infrequent, large arrests, Edward IV’s was punctuated by infrequent, usually small calls for ships.

During the reigns of Richard III and Henry VII Southampton was even less involved in provision of vessels for the king’s military activities. The town provided no ships during Richard’s short reign and but one to Henry VII during the fifteen years of his reign till 1500. The one occasion ships were provided him was in 1497 for activity against the Scots.1200 The order was for all vessels in port and Southampton’s Steward’s Book even details some of the equipment the town furnished on one of the vessels. This decrease in the use of Southampton’s ships probably was because more and more ships were contracted for

1195 CPR 1452-1461, pp. 52, 123.
1196 CPR 1446-1452, p. 579; CPR 1452-1461, pp. 176 and 224.
1198 CPR 1461-1467, p. 38; CPR 1467-1477, pp. 217, 220, 495; PBS 1469-1471 vol. 1, pp. 34-35.
1199 CPR 1467-1477, p. 495.
1200 CPR 1494-1509, p. 91; SBS 1497-1498, p. 6.
service and large fleets arrested of towns were only needed in dire situations. Henry VII employed Portsmouth over Southampton as his preferred port in the area further lessening Southampton's importance.\textsuperscript{1201} When the war in France was over with Henry VI, England became embroiled in internal issues. As a result Southampton's military obligation in ships decreased greatly in most aspects, the last two decades to nearly nothing.

From 1300 to 1500 Southampton's provision of ships to the various kings of England fluctuated greatly. As can be seen in Edward III and Henry V's reign these ships were imperative to successful wars carried out in France. The town's use in defence both in the town and without it was also beneficial in keeping the kingdom safe. It is clear that after the Hundred Years' War ended the use of the town for ships decreased till after Edward IV's reign, though they were still available but remained unused for the most part. Ultimately this probably derives from internal over external conflict in England where ships were of limited if any use combined with royal designs on larger and more centralized fleets and indentured ship service. When required, Southampton demonstrated its capacity as a naval military organisation. Throughout the many reigns of the period the town provided a great number of ships in their military obligations, with hundreds probably if not more provided in Edward III's and Henry V's reigns alone.

\textit{Conclusion}

Southampton's primary and probably most important contribution to the crown as a military organisation was in provision of ships. In all but one decade in two hundred years the town provided ships to the king, during many reigns in heavy demands. This relationship was important to the king's wars and though it was fluid, often dependant on the king and the military situation at the time, it remained in use the entire period. One trend that is also evident is that during the second half of the fifteenth century the employment of the town's ships by the king decreased from previous monarchs. Throughout the late medieval period a key aspect of Southampton's military obligation was providing these ships for war abroad and at home.

While probably one of the most difficult aspects of Southampton's military obligation to study the arms, armour and artillery owned by the town, individual townsmen and the king in the town were vital to it. All other military aspects examined in this thesis

would be impacted by the failure of these groups to provide military equipment for the town defence and military obligation. All three of these parties played roles of varying importance in the arms and armour that the town had access to within the late medieval period.

The town government’s place in this system in great part revolved around the larger devices used for town protection. In the fourteenth and into the fifteenth century traditional siege engines, mangonels and springalds played a key part in the town defence. These items were maintained and administered by the civic leadership for the safe keeping of the town. This body also kept on hand smaller items of military equipment, personal arms and armour that could presumably have been used by those lacking any, or equipment to be employed for a specific purpose in the town military organisation.

From the many town and royal records the number, type and use of town equipment controlled by the civic government can be ascertained. These various tools of war were one way in which the town leaders increased the effectiveness of the town’s military organisation. In many ways the changes and adaptations of military equipment show the attitude of the town leadership toward their military organisation. The effectiveness of many of the other aspects of Southampton’s military functions was related to the arms, armour and artillery of the town, particularly of the equipment it owned for defence.

The equipment of the townsmen in a way was the base of Southampton’s military power, as they themselves were the foundation of the town in general. To fulfil their military obligations to the town and to the king the townsmen needed to be armed. The better arms and armour the town possessed the more effective the individuals made their military organisation. Just as the townsmen being well equipped increased their effectiveness, likewise the lack of these items lowered it. It is clear that townsmen owned weapons and armour, in some cases in great numbers, to fulfil their military obligations. While on an individual level it is harder to explore it is clear that many types of arms and armour were available to the townsmen and in some illicit cases used there.

While the king’s equipment revolves for most of the period around his castle in the town and the royal officials who were charged with the care of artillery, arms and armour of the castle, he at times was a main force in supplying the town with military equipment. After the raid in 1338 the king’s aid to the town was greatly increased. Much of the arms, armour and artillery the town had after the raid was probably given as a gift from the king. This was clearly because the king knew the town would be much more effective if provided
with sufficient military equipment. While this involvement changed over time, decreasing throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth century, the initial supply of equipment was a huge aid to the town’s ability to protect itself.

The way in which all these factors were interwoven determined the extent to which the town was equipped for their military duties. The weapons, armour and artillery clearly were secondary to the importance of manpower of the town’s military organisation, yet they greatly enhanced the individual and therefore the town’s military efficacy. Ever improving and acquiring more and more equipment was one way in which the town of Southampton was able to fulfil its military obligation by strengthening all military aspects of the town.
Conclusion

The purpose of this thesis was to explore an aspect of town and military organisation that often is left unexplored: the military organisation of Southampton. As stated in the introduction this would be done by focusing on four primary military activities: fortification construction and repairs, arraying manpower, defensive schemes and military equipment. These four roles, if carried out by the town, would clearly demonstrate the town’s characterization as a military organisation. Did Southampton fulfil these obligations and therefore act as a military organisation? The answer to this inquiry must be in the affirmative. From 1300 to 1500 there is not a single decade the town failed to be involved in at least one of these responsibilities. During many of these decades Southampton acted in most, if not all, of these four military activities concurrently. Without doubt Southampton performed its role as a military organisation.

Southampton clearly satisfied its military obligations often and at times under heavy demands. During the reigns of Edward III and Henry V, periods of increased conflict of the Hundred Years’ War, Southampton participated with great frequency and in large numbers over many of their military functions. Such a high level of activity, while not constant over the entire 200 year period, was not uncommon and shows how versatile and capable the town was to act as a military organisation. While there were changes to Southampton’s military obligations from 1300 to 1500, they were usually unique to the military function itself. These will be discussed in detail in below. The changes that took place regarding Southampton’s military organisation cannot be ascribed to any one specific internal or external source. From kings, nobles, clergy, royal officials, civic leaders, internal and external conflicts and other influences, the town was motivated to improve its military organisation. The town leadership themselves played the greatest influence in these developments, as they had the primary and ultimate responsibility to ensure they functioned.

One aspect that was left out of this study was how the town felt in regards to fulfilment of these military obligations. Attempts to explore this are possible, but the documents available leave only superficial estimates. The fulfilment of any of the
townsmen's duties could easily have been done in spite of being seen as an incredible burden, especially during the reigns of men like Edward III and Henry V. With no evidence of complaints from Southampton in regards to such demands, and as men granted freedom from their military burden remained involved of their own choice, it appears those we know about did not begrudge their military positions. In many ways it may correspond to Southampton's location. Positioned close to France, the town relied upon the king and others for assistance in military matters. Additionally such obedience in their military obligations often carried rewards that enriched the town in authority and financially.

Not only is the sentiment of the townspeople difficult to ascertain from the sources available, but often so to is the outcome of Southampton's participation as a military organisation. As most of the evidence rests on royal commands to the town or civic records detailing preparations we often do not know the full extent of the town's participation. In consideration of this, the few accounts that do include details on the result generally indicate that Southampton successfully fulfilled their duties to themselves and the king.

Another aspect that also is limited by the sources available is a complete picture of the town activities within the lower tiers in this larger military organisation. The majority of examples demonstrate a top down dynamic, with the king ordering Southampton or its neighbours to military activity. There are only a handful of examples showing how this worked from Southampton up in this system, or even horizontally between other towns, villages, counties and regions, knight, lords, clergy and other individuals. Thus, probably one of the most vital aspects of Southampton's and the kingdom's defence remains unrepresented. If the full relationship of this military organisational system could be unravelled, it is probable that we would see more evidence of independent interaction and cooperation between the lower echelons.

One characteristic that can be viewed from the various martial functions was that the town's military organisation was developed in great part in response to external factors. In many cases Southampton's participation was in response to a specific conflict. When news reached the town of French forces gathering outside England or attacking elsewhere in England, the town would begin readying itself. Usually these activities incorporated many if not all of the four discussed themes for defensive and offensive deployment. In this way Southampton for the most part showed itself to be competent, both in their defence and in fulfilment of their royal military obligations. For much of the period the civic and royal defence schemes appear to have been successful countering periods of severe threat, their
fortifications (once complete) were a strong deterrent, the town was a near constant provider of soldiers, sailors, and ships, and held a respectable town arsenal. All these functions demonstrate Southampton’s military organisation.

Further this research demonstrates the place Southampton had in a detailed and somewhat complex system of smaller and larger military organisations. This structure included geographic locations such as its suburbs, villages, towns, cities, counties, maritime lands, regions and the kingdom. It also included individual men, lords, nobles, ecclesiastical leaders and the king. Where this system is most evident is in defence. Southampton received support from several sources to reinforce against attacks. Yet this system was reciprocal. The town provided aid to other locations and individuals when they were in need, both under obligation and of their own resolve. In many ways the relationship Southampton had in this system shows Southampton’s military organisation in action.

Moreover the fact that Southampton was part of such a military system indicates it was just one of many groups and individuals involved. This allows urban military organisation to be set inside a wider context of military activity and organisations in England. This is important in understanding just how developed and complex these networks created for conflict were. The king had several military organisations all running concurrently and reciprocally to theoretically support and strengthen the other. Most if not all English towns and cities were involved in this same military system.

This research on Southampton’s military organisation also influences the understanding of urban administration and town life. Southampton’s military activity can now be set beside their economic, social, political, cultural and other activities to give more depth and understanding of just how varied the responsibilities of English medieval towns were. In this way past works on medieval urban life, in this case Southampton, are enhanced and enriched. In a broader context, it is probable many if not most English towns also displayed this further aspect of town organisation.

More evidence can now be found of the individual military activities of Southampton. In Chapter One the most visible reminder of Southampton’s military organisation was examined, the town fortifications. These structures were important markers of how developed the town military organisation was, as it required time, money and planning to orchestrate these fortifications previous to a conflict to be effective. This military function was an active arm of the defence schemes the town employed, covered in Chapter Three, providing physical structures for the wards’ defence. While the town had
some fortifications at the start of the period, they were not completed for much of the fourteenth century. This is important, as it may have demonstrated a feeling in the town of complacency regarding assault before the raid of 1338. In leaving the seaward approach open the town displayed one face, just as later completion of the encircling wall circuit, near constant repairs and introduction of new technologies showed another.

Periods of the construction and repair of town fortifications varied greatly through the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Early in the fourteenth century until the raids of 1338 the town perhaps remained engaged finishing the landward defences, but building only symbolic fortifications on the seaward side. After the raid the town was roused first by the severity of the consequences of their failure, and then by royal pressure in the form of the keeper for much of the time that the town’s enclosing walls were being completed. From just after the raid to sometime at the start of the last quarter of the fourteenth century, a matter of about three decades, the town built several major protective structures such as Watergate and Westgate but particularly completed the encircling walls that Edward I had commanded them to build at the turn of the century. This pattern ties into the opening of the Hundred Years’ War at a time when Southampton was a prime target, and hence incomplete town walls and other defences warranted more urgent and frequent works.

The first half of the fifteenth century saw further developments in the town fortifications. These improvements included God’s House and Catchcold Towers, both of which were designed for firearms, with several bulwarks to counter firearms. However most of these fifty years was focused on maintenance of earlier fortifications. The second half of the fifteenth century was spent almost exclusively on repairs. Some small ditches and defensive works were made, bulwarks being the most common and numerous as they were added to apparently at all main gates, and more obscurely some wood and earth defence in the Salt Marshes. Once these were complete, few changes were made for newer technology, such as artillery towers and bulwarks. After the Hundred Years’ War ended, no major construction took place, even during periods of civil disturbance in the Wars of the Roses, most of this conflict fought far from Southampton.

The fortifications of the town demonstrate a level of Southampton’s military organisation that is otherwise hard to assess. These defensive structures reveal one major phase of construction that lasted for three or so decades after the raid of 1338. This period of building was an awakening of sorts, by both the crown and the town, that without sufficient fortifications, Southampton was susceptible to enemy attack. With this realization
the defences were completed. Thereafter through much of the late fourteenth and into the first half of the fifteenth century another phase followed which added modifications and additions for newer technologies, particularly firearms, which showed that the town was still diligent and interested in improving their fortifications.

As the Hundred Years’ War drew to a conclusion, then ended, and threats grew closer to Southampton once more, one might suspect the townsmen would have had a fury of projects, ushering in a new phase of building, but this appears not to have been the case. While it may have been a lack of interest, it is more probable that the town had completed the majority of the defences deemed necessary; with repairs and small additions of moats, walls, bridges and bulwarks they felt, justified or not, that they were secure from attacks. The one possibly large structure that was built after the end of the Hundred Years’ War was the mysterious fort in the Salt Marshes. If more information existed, this could show that Southampton was still dedicated and growing as a military organisation regarding their fortifications, and not only maintaining itself, but this remains an unknown. In this way the attitude of the town toward their fortifications reflects their attitude toward their military obligations.

This fluctuation in building phases over time rests on several factors. Part of this was the incentive to build defensive structures. Southampton often built in response to a direct threat. One example of this is that of the raid of 1338. This event demonstrated what they, as well as English Monarchs’ from Edward I knew, that the town defences along the seaward side of Southampton were inadequate, but until the raid went uncorrected. Thereafter the town worked on their defensive structures for the next hundred years. As long as the war continued, the town continued building fortifications. The completion of the walls of Southampton before the severe raids of summer 1377 were built in preparation for assaults in general and appear to have done their job, as the French left the town alone. An increase in the number of bulwarks in the town after the Hundred Years’ War ended, corresponded with renewed French attacks, further demonstrating this phenomenon. As the town was the primary source of funding, this too was an issue. The lack of money on hand after the raid probably contributed to the length of time it took to complete the town walls.

Clearly Southampton demonstrated itself a capable military body after the raid of 1338. Before this event it is questionable whether the term ‘capable’ could be used regarding fortifications, as a great part of the devastation resulted from a failure to fulfil this
obligation. It was able to meet the various needs of the town’s protection but not all. After this event the town made up for their failure in leaps and bounds.

The town also demonstrated it was keen on keeping up with new military technology for fortifications. Southampton’s use of fortifications developed for pre-gunpowder artillery, use of murder holes and later developments to allow for firearms shows the town was interested in maintaining their town with current military engineering. The town’s use of artillery fortifications, both firearms and otherwise, as early as they did, places them before many of their English and other European towns. The building and repair of these defensive structures was a clear indicator of the town’s military organisation. The organisation of manpower, funds and engineering in the creation of these defensive structures demonstrates the capabilities Southampton had.

Chapter Two appraised the capacity Southampton had for the provision of men over the period of 1300 to 1500. This is probably one of the aspects of Southampton’s military organisation that was most active: raising men for the king’s use abroad or for their own use at home spans the entire period in question. If fortifications were a physical demonstration of Southampton’s defence scheme, manpower was an active display of it. The array of men was equally important to physical defences, if not more so, providing the foundation needed for self-protection: men. Southampton’s primary provision of men was in soldiers and sailors. As most of the sources remaining document the demands of the king to the town for defensive and offensive use, few examples remain of the town’s independent raising of men as soldiers or sailors. This leaves an uneven understanding of the town’s ability to array and employ soldiers in their own use which further would increase the town’s military organisation and unquestionably took place. Limitations aside, the accounts present a manifestation of Southampton’s ability to array men as soldiers and provide mariners in military activity showing an organised and often employed structure.

Raising manpower from the town was fairly complex. For employment of manpower as soldiers, Southampton had only one two-decade period, 1340 to 1360, when it was not in use. Until late in Edward II’s reign these men were primarily employed outside the town in the king’s wars. This probably was because there was little threat to Southampton at the time. From this time onward townsmen were primarily used defensively as soldiers. There were several instances where townsmen were employed outside the town in this period, at least once in each reign from Edward III to Henry VII. While the use of townsmen outside the country decreased unmistakably with Edward III,
the king still maintained and employed this right, though clearly defence was their primary role.

While provision of armed men was important, especially for defence, men as mariners for the king’s fleets was second only to defence in the town’s military importance. Provision of mariners took place in every reign but that of Richard III. These demands fluctuated greatly but there were decades that the town provided men nearly yearly, such as during the reign of Henry V. The town’s provision of men for defence at home remained their principal military obligation, followed by the provision of ship crews. It should be pointed out that for several decades many more men were provided as sailors than for defence, though in general this remained secondary.

The last employment of townspeople in conflict was the town’s provision of men for war abroad. Though during this period this was the least frequently used aspect of manpower, its importance should not be overlooked. Early on, during the reigns of Edward I and Edward II, the town provided men abroad much more often than they did for home defence, and perhaps as many if not more than ships’ crews. The fact that every king from Edward I to Henry VII employed town soldiers abroad at least once during their reigns shows that while it was less frequent, it was still a current military obligation, one in which the town was actively engaged.

While the employment of the men of Southampton changed in purpose, it remained constant in that it was used by all English kings of the period. From Edward I to Henry VII not one king failed to employ men of Southampton in conflict. Clearly by the end of the period defence, which had always been a primary use of arrayed manpower, became in essence the town’s military obligation regarding manpower. While uses of soldiers and sailors abroad continued, they were far fewer than had been required by early monarchs of the fourteenth century. This was related to changes in general English military organisation, as by Edward III’s time indentures became the primary means of raising armies, though English kings still relied on Southampton for mariners and defence. Regardless of how it was used, the town’s ability to raise men remained, and as can be seen late in the fifteenth century Southampton independently readied men for its own defence.

The array of men of Southampton as sailors and soldiers was a crucial part of their military organisation. This was the key to all the other martial activities the town fulfilled. Without men the fortifications, schemes of defence and arms and armour were useless. The ability the town had not only of defending themselves and their own interests as well as in
fulfilment of their military obligations to the king clearly denotes the town's military abilities.

The third chapter discussed both the internal and external defensive schemes, one of the key aspects of any military organisation. Beginning with the civic scheme itself from the start of the period to the end, the town had an organised and defined order to how it defended itself. This divided the town into prearranged manageable wards with the local leadership as captains and inhabitants as troops. The town also had an organised method for acquiring information. This acquisition of intelligence, while more difficult to uncover, shows the depth and breadth that the town's independent defensive schemes reached. Scouts were sent to gather information on land and sea, inside and outside England. Lastly, the kings' and others' involvement in Southampton's protective schemes were examined. These external forces made significant contributions to the town strengthening it with leaders, skilled men and soldiers.

The military scheme employed by the town of Southampton changed little from 1300 to 1500. The greatest development was increased clarity in detail in the town's defensive regulations. Documents such as the Terrier of 1454 and other town ordinances from the second half of the fifteenth century reveal a trend of micromanagement that was not seen earlier. This included very specific elements, as the terrier even assigned men to defend individual loops. The use of scouts and other information gathering remained the same throughout the time frame as well, with men sent abroad to acquire and disseminate information as part of Southampton's protection scheme. In great part this lack of change reflects the efficacy of the c.1300 schemes; if it had been inefficient, other solutions or provisions would have been made, but they were not. In some cases there was clear evidence of this success.

The town appears to have formed their earliest defence schemes well before the period studied in this thesis. It may in fact have been one of the earliest aspects of town administration created. As time continued, this scheme was clarified, and more detail was added as needed. This defence scheme, while updated over the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, remained primarily the same. The original town defensive scheme or its subsequent updated versions appear not to have been tied to any one specific event or threat. Only one town defensive ordinance was, namely the Terrier of 1454. This document clearly was drawn up in response to the increased danger Southampton faced with England losing the Hundred Years' War to France, leaving the kingdom open to assault.
Southampton also had a developed system to acquire information. The town had a network of scouts that acquired military intelligence. They employed this news at home allowing them time to prepare for conflict. It further allowed them to gain assistance from their allies. These reports were disseminated to other towns and individuals, such as the king, to allow them time to do the same. The involvement of Southampton in espionage clearly enhanced their defence schemes by giving them the ability to prepare effectively.

In regards to Southampton’s position in the king’s defensive schemes the town’s role changed very little. The county and maritime land’s use of the array, organisation of beacons and sentries can be seen throughout the period. As stated before regarding the civic schemes, the lack of change is an indication of its defensive utility. One aspect of royal intervention that does change was that of the town keeper. The continued employment of a town keeper through much of the fourteenth century after the raids of 1338, often with garrisons, indicates the king was not disinterested in the town’s military status. Why the king discontinued the keepership sometime in the fifteenth century is hard to explain, especially as Southampton’s threat grew at the start and middle of the century. Nevertheless the king’s use of a keeper was imperative to Southampton’s rebuilding its military organisation after the raids of 1338. The many layers of protection the king had in place both to assist the town and employ it greatly increased its military integrity.

One last feature regarding Southampton’s place in outside military schemes is that of the involvement of independent lords, towns and counties. It is often difficult to distinguish whether these groups acted in response to a royal command or of their own will in the town’s protection. While the use of lords, counties and other towns was a major tool employed by the king for Southampton’s safekeeping to provide leadership and men, a network of alliances between these groups and the town is evident. In many of these examples it is clear towns, lords and other outside forces came without royal order to Southampton’s defence. These additional men only further strengthened the town’s military structure with leadership, soldiers, experience and skills.

Probably the most difficult aspect to examine of Southampton’s military organisation is their martial equipment, which was examined in Chapter Four. While that of ships is obvious and clearly important by its sheer volume and frequency, with arrests made every decade but the 1480s, the military arms and armour owned by the town and the townsmen were imperative to an effective military organisation. Arms and armour would have been required in any of Southampton’s military obligations, and artillery primarily for
town defence. The town’s personal arms and armour were important to provide for those in
the town who were needed for defence but could not afford the costs of equipment. More
vital to their military capabilities was the town’s artillery, which was crucial in repelling
enemy attackers. The personal military equipment of townsmen was central to their use as
sailors and soldiers both at home or in the king’s service abroad. Equipped soldiers and
sailors strengthened the town’s ability to defend itself and in the king’s wars on land or sea.
Perhaps the most critical use of Southampton’s military equipment outside the town,
though also for home defence, was ships owned by townsmen. A strong navy was
important for transport and conflict. As a major port of the Southern coast the town’s
vessels were employed to protect England as well as in the king’s wars. Each of these types
of equipment was important to the facility of the town to fulfil the many aspects of its
military organisation.

Before the raid of 1338 we know little about the arms and armour the town or
townsmen owned. With royal intervention in the town after the raid we know that the king
sent a great amount of personal arms and larger engines for war to Southampton. Later all
this equipment was turned over to the town leadership for their defence. During the next
decades, at least the 1350s but probably until 1434, the town was well equipped with these
and similar armaments. During the late fourteenth century there is record of a single gun in
the town. Not until 1434 can more evidence of firearms in the town’s armoury be found,
and at this date only five were listed. From 1434 onward the number of firearms greatly
increased in numbers and variety. By 1460 the town had several dozen, including some that
were apparently fairly large. It is probable that Southampton maintained non-gunpowder
and gunpowder artillery as well as smaller arms and armour. The town’s use of non-
gunpowder as well as gunpowder artillery demonstrates their ability to adopt new
technology to fulfil their military obligations. Such an arsenal greatly enhanced
Southampton’s ability to defend itself and its military capability.

Personal arms are much more difficult to ascertain, as few inventories for the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries exist. Coupling these with archaeological artefacts, trade
in arms and armour, and records of criminal activity their probable equipment becomes
evident. Early plate armour, including ‘pair of plates’ armour or coat of plates, appears to
have been fairly common in the town, as were other early articles of defensive armour.
Trade records exist verifying that the trade of bows in both finished and unfinished form
were very common in the town. During this period all manner of personal arms could be
found in the town, even firearms. Evidence of both arms and armour townsmen possessed were some of the most state-of-the-art equipment of the day regarding military technology. These items would have been vital for all aspects of the town’s military obligations and protection.

Ships were the most important aspect of town military equipment for the king’s employment in conflict. From Edward I to Henry VII all but Richard III required ships of Southampton. Edward III probably required the most ships due both to situation and sizes of his forces, coupled with fairly constantly orders until the end of his reign. Henry V was the most frequent user of the town’s ships nearly yearly his entire reign. The use of such massive numbers of vessels, often frequently, would have been a major burden to the town and vital to the king’s ability to wage war abroad and in many cases protect the kingdom. While providing ships placed an obviously heavy load upon the town, Southampton demonstrated yet another of its features as a military body.

As demonstrated above the roles Southampton fulfilled as a military organisation show a number of overall traits. Some of these can more easily be demonstrated as they overreach all these four categories. Southampton seems to have fulfilled many of its roles as a reaction, mostly to royal commands. The town did, especially regarding defensive schemes, fortifications and armaments, prepare for conflict without any clear threat, but most of their military activity is tied to the level of threat they faced at the time. The defensive schemes are the best example of strategic preparation for future attack, as all these town ordinances were created free of current threat except the Terrier of 1454 which was made to counter increased French danger to the town. There are decades in the mid fourteenth century in which Southampton faced relatively little threat when the town was constructing new fortifications. These were being built with strategic goals in mind for further town defence, as were the increasing number of town artillery pieces during this period. That said, by and large the men provided as soldiers and sailors, ships, and the many fortifications, weapons and armour prepared were done in response to the possibility of a current attack.

One theme that becomes apparent from this research is that many later defence schemes and military organisations, such as those employed by Henry VIII, were utilized by earlier monarchs. Indeed as can be seen, the use of fortified positions and royal garrisons to man them were employed by Edward III in the late 1330s to counter French threat. The primary defence of the kingdom during the reign of Henry VIII and his daughter Elizabeth
remained their power to raise all adult males to arms. Another innovation attributed to Henry VIII is his use of purpose built artillery fortifications, but as evidenced by Chapter One, Southampton was already implementing such building strategies for even non-gunpowder artillery centuries before Henry’s birth. Even the centralization Henry VIII employed in his military organisation was to some degree exerted by Edward III in the form of a royal official, the Keeper of Southampton in the town. Perhaps the primary difference between Henry VIII and his predecessors would be the level of royal control he demonstrated as well as the great number of fortifications he built and manned with royal garrisons on a full time basis, as those before him had limited these acts to times of need.

Southampton’s location in many ways ensured that it had to have an active military organisation during this period. Sharing the channel with France it had no choice when faced with threats but to prepare and act or react to the situation. Doubtlessly other cities and towns of medieval England had similar organisations created for their protection and in fulfilment of their military obligations to the king. With very little comparative research having been done on this topic, much work can be done in identifying the many ways in which urban locations prepared for and were involved in conflict. While English urban fortifications have received more notice, the defensive schemes, manpower raised and military equipment employed all remain topics deserving increased research. In many cases the organisation employed for military functions was similar to those of social administration in these locations, with the town leadership sharing the burden of political, social, military and other duties alongside their everyday work.

The place of the individual townsmen in regards to involvement in conflict is also an avenue of further study. Much recent research on medieval military history has been focused upon individuals, including commoners, in a variety of military roles. Such research might tie into where and how townsmen were employed in war, their armaments or possible military skills they provided there. The role that civic leadership played inside and outside towns in various military functions further would demonstrate any importance that these towns or cities provided. This would also provide a more human level to these soldiers outside the knightly class that so easily are lost to higher status personages.

The time period selected for this study also could also be expanded either earlier or later. The military obligation of Southampton and other English towns and cities began long before 1300. This requirement also continued long after 1500. As stated above, Henry VIII and other English kings continued to require many of the same obligations of their
urban subjects for centuries thereafter. Examining what parts urban places played in this system of military obligations will demonstrate one aspect of the development of towns and cities that creates a fuller and clearer view of the complex and important rise of urban locations in the medieval period.

Southampton from 1300 to 1500 rarely remained long without fulfilling some part of its military obligation. The town's own military scheme and that of the king was a continual and imperative function that not only kept the town safe but those interrelated in defence, especially in the south coast of England. The fortifications in many ways tie into this first responsibility as an active indicator of the town's own interest in its self-protection. The town often, at times in great numbers, provided soldiers, sailors, ships and military equipment for their defence and that of the kingdom. The town, while principally a non-military entity, demonstrated time and again its value in conflicts both abroad and at home in the frequency, size and many roles it played as a military organisation.
Figures

Figure One. Southampton

Figure Two. Southampton and surroundings
Figure Three. John Speed's Map of Southampton and Suburbs 1611
Figure Four. Southampton circa 1300 (edited by author, original map from *Southampton Terrier of 1454*, Ed. L.A. Burgess)

Figure Five. Bargate (2006)
Figure Six. God’s House Gate (2006)  
Figure Seven. Close up of windows  
Figure Eight. Peaked wall  
Figure Nine. Window (inside)
Figure Ten. Westgate (2006-Front)  
Figure Eleven. Westgate (Back)  

Figure Twelve. Westgate shown from the Western Esplanade side abutted by the Royal Standard Public House on the left, which is shown as being domesticated.
Figure Thirteen. Watergate (2006)

Figure Fourteen. Machicolation

Figure Fifteen. 1772 Engraving Watergate. SCA – Veal Collection V102.
Figure Sixteen. Friary Gate (2008-inside)

Figure Seventeen. Loops (outside and inside)

Figure Eighteen. The Arcade (2006)

Figure Nineteen. Machicolation

Figure Twenty. Gunport
Figure Twenty-one. Arundel’s Tower (2006-atchcold tower to the right)

Figure Twenty-two. Polymond’s Tower (2006)
Figure Twenty-three. Original Acc No. 1495 held in the Southampton Art Gallery Store. Watercolour Edward Dayes 1804. Title – Tower near York Buildings, Southampton c.1794-1763

Figure Twenty-four. Lithograph G. Mayley 1828. Title – North View of the North-East Tower of the Old Walls, Southampton as it appeared Dec 3rd 1828
Figure Twenty-five. Arrowloop (inside) of Arundel’s Tower

Figure Twenty-Six. First Tower East of Bargate, modified Arrowloop to include a gunport.
Figure Twenty-seven- God’s House Tower (and Gate-2006)

Figure Twenty-eight. Gunport

Figure Twenty-nine- windows
Figure Thirty. Eastgate Eighteenth century, Copplestone Warre Bampfylde [1720-1791]

Figure Thirty-one. Southampton’s Fortification c.1454 (map from *Southampton Terrier of 1454*, Ed. L.A. Burgess)
Figure Thirty-two. Wards of Southampton c.1300 (edited by author, original map from Southampton Terrier of 1454, Ed. L.A. Burgess)
Figure Thirty-three. Wards of Southampton c.1454 (edited by author, original map from *Southampton Terrier of 1454*, Ed. L.A. Burgess)
Figure Thirty-Four. Springald (Bayerisches Armeemuseum, Ingorstadt. Photo Courtesy Bertus Brokamp)

Figure Thirty-Five. Trebuchet and Catapult-Possible ‘trypict’ or ‘Magnet’ (Royal Armouries, Fort Nelson)
Figure Thirty-six. Organ gun on cart/carriage (Company of St. Barbara)

Figure Thirty-seven. Southampton Breastplate/Coat of Plates (Southampton Archaeology Museum)
## Appendix

### Chapter One-The Fortifications of Southampton

**Murage Grants to Southampton from 1300-1500**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Grant</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Specifics</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11 November 1260</td>
<td>Murage</td>
<td>Ten years</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1258-1266, p. 126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 November 1270</td>
<td>Murage</td>
<td>Five years</td>
<td>To take effect on St. Andrew's Day, 30 November 1271</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1266-1272, p. 492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 March 1282</td>
<td>Murage</td>
<td>Three years</td>
<td>From Easter</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1281-1292, p. 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 March 1286</td>
<td>Murage</td>
<td>Five years</td>
<td>From Easter</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1281-1292, p. 229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 March 1321</td>
<td>Murage</td>
<td>Three years</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1317-1321, p. 590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 March 1326</td>
<td>Murage</td>
<td>Seven years</td>
<td>1d. on each £ or 1/2d. on each 10s. For both Wall and Quay</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1321-1326, p. 252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 March 1327</td>
<td>Murage</td>
<td>Six years</td>
<td>Probably continued from last grant by Edward II</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1236-1330, p. 64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 March 1336</td>
<td>Murage</td>
<td>Five years</td>
<td>Tax was as before 1d. for £, 1/2d. for 10s. and 1/4d. for 5s. For both Wall and Quay</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1334-1338, pp. 240-241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 March 1341</td>
<td>Murage</td>
<td>Five Years, then made six (In November 1341 the duration was stated as six)</td>
<td>Began 20 March 1341</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1340-1343, pp. 136 and 339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 May 1345</td>
<td>Murage</td>
<td>Six Years</td>
<td>Seems to have been an error in reissuing the grant</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1343-1345, p. 467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 April 1347</td>
<td>Murage</td>
<td>Four years</td>
<td>From 20 May-Correction to previous grant</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1345-1348, p. 279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 June 1355</td>
<td>Murage</td>
<td>Ten years</td>
<td>Same Murage tolls as before</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1354-1358, p. 254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1366</td>
<td>Murage</td>
<td>Ten years</td>
<td>Same Murage tolls as before</td>
<td>The Charters of Southampton 1199-1480, p. 23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Freedom from the King's Fee Farm to Southampton from 1300-1500

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Grant</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Specifics</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 December 1342</td>
<td>Lack of funds after raid- allow spending on fortifications</td>
<td>Unknown- until recover from raid</td>
<td>½ payment (£100)</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1340-1343, p. 572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 March 1351</td>
<td>Recovery</td>
<td>Eight Years</td>
<td>Full exemption</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1350-1354, p. 56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 December 1377</td>
<td>Fortifications, Defence and to give men incentive to live in town</td>
<td>Two years</td>
<td>Full exemption as well as full pardon from arrears owed from Edward III’s reign</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1377-1381, p. 76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 March 1380</td>
<td>Fortifications and defence</td>
<td>Three Years</td>
<td>Full exemption. From December of 1379, all money raised so far to go to the walls and fortifications</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1377-1381, p. 448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 November 1383</td>
<td>Fortifications and defence</td>
<td>Three years</td>
<td>½ payment (£100)From December 1383</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1381-1385, p. 184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 March 1400</td>
<td>Fortifications and defence</td>
<td>One year</td>
<td>Full exemption plus £100 from the town wool customs</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1399-1401, p. 240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 September 1401</td>
<td>Fortifications and defence</td>
<td>Six years</td>
<td>Full exemption. From Michaelmas previous (September 29)</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1399-1401, p. 535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Henry V’s Reign</td>
<td>Fortifications and defence</td>
<td>Unknown-Yearly</td>
<td>½ payment (£100)</td>
<td>The Charters of Southampton 1199-1480, p. 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1426 and 1445</td>
<td>Fortifications and defence</td>
<td>Unknown- To 1445? Several allocations of Southampton fee farm in the 1440s</td>
<td>½ payment (£100) -As Richard II granted</td>
<td>The Charters of Southampton 1199-1480, p.41,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1445</td>
<td>Fortifications and defence</td>
<td>Unknown-Appears to have been very short lived as by 1447 the fee farm is assigned to (PR 1446-1452)</td>
<td>Full exemption</td>
<td>The Charters of Southampton 1199-1480, pp.55 and 83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter Two- Manpower of Southampton

Provision or Arrays of Soldiers from Southampton and Hampshire from 1300-1500

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17 November 1294</td>
<td>War galley (S)</td>
<td>War with French</td>
<td>Unknown-Ordered to be made in November 1294 once finished crewed and sent to meet with Royal fleet in Spring 1295</td>
<td>TNA E. 101/ 5/2, 12; Colin Platt’s Medieval Southampton, pp. 61-62.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 March 1303</td>
<td>Men-at-Arms (H)</td>
<td>Wars with Scotland</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1302-1307, p.78.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 April 1304</td>
<td>‘Fencible men’ (S, H)</td>
<td>Wars in Flanders allied to Philip IV</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1302-1307, p.205.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 August 1308</td>
<td>42 soldiers (S)</td>
<td>Wars with Scotland</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1307-1313, p. 75 and 122.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 December 1309</td>
<td>Men-at-Arms (S)</td>
<td>War with Scotland</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1307-1313, p. 237.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before 8 September 1310</td>
<td>Crews for 2 ships and armed men(S)</td>
<td>War in Scotland</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Foedera Volume Two, p. 109.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 August 1312</td>
<td>Men-at-Arms (S)</td>
<td>‘Fight King’s enemies’</td>
<td>More than 1 month (Town required to pay one month)</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1307-1313, p.477.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 July 1313</td>
<td>‘footmen well armed with fitting arms’ (H)</td>
<td>To embark in Ships under William de Monte-Acuto probably against the Scots</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1313-1317, p. 6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 March 1322</td>
<td>‘Able bodied men’ (S)</td>
<td>To fight against Rebels and Scots</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1318-1323, p.524.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 March, 4 and 12 April 1322</td>
<td>500 footmen (H, excluding Winchester)</td>
<td>Wars with Scotland</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1321-1324, pp.96-100.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 June 1322</td>
<td>100 Armed Men (S)</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>More than 2 months at town’s expense</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1318-1323, p. 559.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 October 1322</td>
<td>All men (H)</td>
<td>Unknown- Possibly defence but since French attacks are not probable and many counties listed are in the south perhaps to have men ready for the wars in Scotland</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1321-1324, p.213.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 May 1322</td>
<td>500 footmen (H, excluding maritime lands which would include Southampton)</td>
<td>War with Scotland</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1318-1323, pp. 548-549.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 March 1323</td>
<td>All men (H)</td>
<td>‘Be ready at king’s</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1321-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Troops</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Comment</td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 May 1323</td>
<td>500 archers (H, to merge with men of Dorset, Somerset and Wiltshire)</td>
<td>War in Scotland- Perhaps a repeat of March Patent Rolls order or additional men required</td>
<td>Unknown- Close Rolls 1318-1323, p. 645.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early August 1324</td>
<td>800 (H, excluding Winchester)</td>
<td>Gascony</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1324-1327, pp. 8-10.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 November 1324</td>
<td>All men (H)</td>
<td>Gascony</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1324-1327, pp. 53-55.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 December 1324</td>
<td>10 Men-at-Arms and 100 Archers (H, in addition to 21-22)</td>
<td>Gascony</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1324-1327, pp.77-78.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-26 January 1326</td>
<td>All Men (H)</td>
<td>Rebels/French</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1324-1327, pp. 219-223.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 February 1326</td>
<td>Men-at-Arms, Hobelars, footmen (H)</td>
<td>Rebels/French</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1323-1328, p. 543.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 August 1326</td>
<td>All Men (H)</td>
<td>Rebels/French</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1323-1328, p. 639.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 August 1326</td>
<td>200 footmen, 400 archers (H)</td>
<td>Rebels/French</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1324-1327, p. 309.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 August 1326</td>
<td>200 footmen (H)</td>
<td>Rebels/French</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1323-1328, p. 643.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 September 1326</td>
<td>1000 'archers and others' (H)</td>
<td>Rebels</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1324-1327, p. 327.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 June 1328</td>
<td>All Men (S)</td>
<td>Defence-French</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1327-1330, p. 397.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 January 1335</td>
<td>All Men (H)</td>
<td>Defence-Probably French/Scots</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1334-1338, p. 139.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 March 1335</td>
<td>'All knights and others' (H)</td>
<td>War with Scotland</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1333-1337, pp. 469-470.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 August 1335</td>
<td>All men (S,H)</td>
<td>Defence-French</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1333-1337, p. 516.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Force</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 February 1336</td>
<td>All Men (H)</td>
<td>Defence-French</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1333-1337, pp. 647-648</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 October 1336</td>
<td>50 Armed men (S)</td>
<td>Defence-French at Channel Islands</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1334-1338, p. 324.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 October 1336</td>
<td>All Men (H)</td>
<td>Defence-French</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1333-1337, p. 715.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 November 1336</td>
<td>50 Armed men (S, perhaps same 50 from early October order but no indication they are the same group)</td>
<td>Defence-French at the Channel Islands</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1334-1338, p. 337; Close Rolls 1333-1337, p. 712.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 July 1338</td>
<td>All men (H)</td>
<td>Defence-French</td>
<td>Patent Rolls of Edward III 1338-1340, pp. 134 and 139-140.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 February 1360</td>
<td>All men (H)</td>
<td>Defence-</td>
<td>Calendar of Patent Rolls 1358-1361, pp. 405-408.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 March 1360</td>
<td>All men (H)</td>
<td>Defence-French</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1360-1364, p. 97.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 February 1367</td>
<td>All men (H)</td>
<td>Defence-French</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1364-1367, p. 430.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 March 1369</td>
<td>All men (H)</td>
<td>Defence-French</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1368-1374, pp. 18; Patent Rolls 1367-1370, pp. 264-265.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 March 1369</td>
<td>All men (S and Winchester)</td>
<td>Defence-French</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1368-1374, p. 18.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 May 1369</td>
<td>All men (S)</td>
<td>Defence-French</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1368-1374, p. 20.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 July 1369</td>
<td>All men (H)</td>
<td>Defence-French</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1368-1374, p. 36.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 February 1370</td>
<td>All men (H, 1 of 34 counties ordered arrayed)</td>
<td>Defence-French preparing a 'great fleet'</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1368-1374, p. 124.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 August 1370</td>
<td>All men (S, clearly stated to include town and suburbs)</td>
<td>Defence-French</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1367-1370, p. 474.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 February 1372</td>
<td>All men (H)</td>
<td>Defence-French</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1368-1374, p. 276.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 July 1373</td>
<td>All men (S)</td>
<td>Defence-French</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1368-1374, pp. 202-203.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Document References</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 April 1377</td>
<td>All men (H)</td>
<td>Defence-French</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls of 1374-1377, pp. 496-497.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 June 1377</td>
<td>All men (S)</td>
<td>Defence-French</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1377-1381, p. 4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 June 1377</td>
<td>All men (Southern coast, including Southampton)</td>
<td>Defence-French</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1377-1381, p. 4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 December 1381</td>
<td>All men (H)</td>
<td>Defence-Rebels</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1381-1385, pp. 84-85.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 June 1383</td>
<td>All men (H)</td>
<td>Defence-French</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1381-1385, p. 314.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 March 1386</td>
<td>All men (H)</td>
<td>Defence-French</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1385-1389, p. 60.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 August 1386</td>
<td>All men (S)</td>
<td>Defence-French</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1385-1389, 258.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 January 1400</td>
<td>All men (S)</td>
<td>Defence-'Certain of the king’s enemies’</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1399-1402, p. 58.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 August 1400</td>
<td>Armed men and archers (S)</td>
<td>For war in Scotland</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1399-1402, p. 169.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>Defence/ Cause</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 January 1404</td>
<td>All men-at-arms, armed men and archers (H and all other counties)</td>
<td>Defence-French</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1402-1405, pp. 244-245.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 October 1404</td>
<td>All men-at-arms, armed men, hobelars and archers (H and all other counties)</td>
<td>Defence-French</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1402-1405, p. 478.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 April 1405</td>
<td>All men (H and all other counties)</td>
<td>Defence-French</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1402-1405, p. 503.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 April 1416</td>
<td>Men (H)</td>
<td>Defence- To be used aboard ships to counter a French/Genoese Fleet</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1413-1419, p. 346.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 August 1416</td>
<td>All men (H)</td>
<td>Defence-French</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1416-1422, p. 72.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 May 1437</td>
<td>All men (H)</td>
<td>Defence-French</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1435-1441, p. 127.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 August 1457</td>
<td>All men (H)</td>
<td>Defence- Invasion by ‘king’s enemies’</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1452-1461, p. 371.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 and 26 September 1457</td>
<td>All men (S &amp; H)</td>
<td>Defence- Invasion by ‘king’s enemies’</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1452-1461, pp. 400 and 405.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Command</td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 December 1457</td>
<td>385 archers</td>
<td>King’s Use</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1452-1461, pp. 406-409.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 December 1457</td>
<td>46 archers</td>
<td>King’s Use</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1452-1461, p. 410.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 February 1459</td>
<td>All men</td>
<td>Defence-King’s enemies</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1452-1461, pp. 494-495.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 March 1461</td>
<td>All men (S, H and all counties)</td>
<td>Defence-put down Lancastrian rebels</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1461-1468, pp. 54-55.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 May 1461</td>
<td>All men</td>
<td>Defence-rebels and French</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1461-1467, p. 34.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 June 1461</td>
<td>All men</td>
<td>Defence-rebels</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1461-1467, p. 571.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 June 1461</td>
<td>All men</td>
<td>Defence-rebels</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1461-1467, p. 571.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 May 1463</td>
<td>All Men</td>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1461-1467, p. 571.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 and 21 April 1466</td>
<td>All men</td>
<td>Defence-rebels</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1461-1467, pp. 529 and 571.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 January 1467</td>
<td>All men</td>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1467-1477, pp. 55-56.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 October 1469</td>
<td>All men</td>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1467-1477, p. 196.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1470</td>
<td>‘Soldiers’ (S, number unknown. Town paid 26s. 8p.)</td>
<td>War with Scots, in ‘north country’</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Southampton Steward’s Book 1469-1470, p. 24.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 to 18 April 1471</td>
<td>Increased watches</td>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Southampton Steward’s Book 1470-1471, p. 33.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First half of 1471</td>
<td>19 men</td>
<td>Defence of Harbor of Beaulieu on king’s command</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Southampton Steward’s Book 1470-1471, p. 44.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before 15 June 1471</td>
<td>5 soldiers</td>
<td>Under Lord Matrevace’s command</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Southampton Steward’s Book 1470-1471, p. 45.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1473</td>
<td>All men</td>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Southampton Steward’s Book 1472-1473, p. 35.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Activity</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 May 1482</td>
<td>All men (H)</td>
<td>Defence- ‘Sea Coasts’. Also required to be ready to go to Scotland within 14 days</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1476-1485, p. 320.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 May 1484</td>
<td>All men (H)</td>
<td>Defence- ‘Sea Coasts’. Also required to be ready to go to Scotland within 14 days</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1476-1485, pp. 397-399.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1486</td>
<td>Increased watch (S)</td>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>Southampton Steward’s Book 1486, p. f. 7.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 April 1496</td>
<td>All men (H)</td>
<td>Prepare for war with Scots</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1474-1509, p. 67.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Requirement</td>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>Sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 November 1294</td>
<td>120 sailors, constables and one master for War</td>
<td>War with French</td>
<td>Unknown-Ordered to be made in</td>
<td>TNA E. 101/ 5/2, 12.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>galley (S)</td>
<td></td>
<td>November 1294 met with Royal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>fleet in Spring 1295</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 October 1297</td>
<td>Crews for all ships 40 Tuns and above (S)</td>
<td>Transport men and supplies to</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1296-1302, pp. 76 and 81.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Flanders for war against Philip IV</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 February 1301</td>
<td>Crews for 2 ships (S)</td>
<td>War in Scotland</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1296-1302, pp. 482-483.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 May 1301</td>
<td>Crews for 'ships' (H)</td>
<td>War in Scotland</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1292-1301, pp. 595-596.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 November 1302</td>
<td>Crews for 2 ships (S)</td>
<td>War in Scotland</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1301-1307, p. 75.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 March 1303</td>
<td>Ships’ Crews (S)</td>
<td>Wars in Scotland</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1302-1307, p.78.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 April 1304</td>
<td>Crews and Masters for 20 Ships (S, H)</td>
<td>Wars in Flanders allied with Philip IV</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1302-1307, p.205.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 August 1308</td>
<td>Crew for 1 ship, 42 men, one constable and a master all armed (S)</td>
<td>Wars in Scotland</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1307-1313, p. 75 and 122.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before 8 November 1310</td>
<td>Crews for 2 ships and armed men(S)</td>
<td>War in Scotland</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Foedera Volume Two, p. 109.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 May 1311</td>
<td>Crews for 3 ‘fully armed’ ships (S)</td>
<td>War in Scotland</td>
<td>At least 7 weeks</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1307-1313, pp. 352-353.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 August 1312</td>
<td>Sailors and Men at Arms (S, perhaps for only newly built town galley)</td>
<td>'Fight King’s enemies'</td>
<td>More than 1 month</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1307-1313, p.477.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 July 1313</td>
<td>Crews and soldiers for '30 of the greater and better ships’ (H, Sussex, Devon and Dorsett)</td>
<td>To embark in Ships under William de Monte-Acuto probably against the Scots</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1313-1317, p. 6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 March 1322</td>
<td>Crews for many ships (S)</td>
<td>To fight against Rebels and Scots</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1318-1323, p.524.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 April 1322</td>
<td>Crews for many ships (S)</td>
<td>To Ireland</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1318-1323, p. 531.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 June 1322</td>
<td>Crews for 2 ships (S)</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>More than 2 months at town’s expense</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1318-1323, p. 559.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 May 1324</td>
<td>Crews for all ships 40 tuns and above(S)</td>
<td>War in Gascony-Ready in port for king’s needs</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1323-1328, p. 183.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 June 1326</td>
<td>Crews for 1 Ship of Thomas Byndenon (S)</td>
<td>'divers parts'</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1324-1327, p. 279.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Action Description</td>
<td>Responsible Party</td>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>Source(s)</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 and 15 August 1326</td>
<td>Crews and soldiers for all ships 50 tuns (S)</td>
<td>Rebels/French</td>
<td></td>
<td>Close Rolls 1323-1328, p. 641; Patent Rolls 1324-1327, pp. 310-311.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 August 1326</td>
<td>All ships smaller than 50 tuns to remain in port (S)</td>
<td>Rebels/French</td>
<td></td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1324-1327, pp. 310-311.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 August 1326</td>
<td>Crews for 13 Ships (S)</td>
<td>Rebels/French</td>
<td></td>
<td>Close Rolls 1323-1328, p. 643.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 September 1326</td>
<td>48 men to crew 1 ship, under Master William atte Hime (S)</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
<td>Close Rolls 1323-1328, p. 611.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 March 1327</td>
<td>Crews for 3 ships of Southampton</td>
<td>King’s business in</td>
<td></td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1327-1330, p. 27.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 June 1328</td>
<td>Crews for all ships 40 tuns or more in port (S)</td>
<td>Defence-French</td>
<td></td>
<td>Close Rolls 1327-1330, p. 397.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 November 1336</td>
<td>Crew for 1 Ship to transport men to Channel Islands (S)</td>
<td>Defence-French at the Channel Islands</td>
<td></td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1334-1338, p. 337; Close Rolls 1333-1337, p. 712.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before 8 October 1337</td>
<td>Crew for 4 ships (S)</td>
<td>Unknown-King’s Service</td>
<td></td>
<td>Close Rolls 1337-1339, pp. 194, 226-227.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 November 1337</td>
<td>Crew for 2 ships of 200 tuns with ‘double equipment’ and 4 barges, including 48 mariners and constables (S)</td>
<td>Unknown-King’s Service</td>
<td>88 days</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1337-1339, p. 215.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 December 1337</td>
<td>60 men, mariners and others for a ship ‘La Coggersshippe’ (S, H)</td>
<td>War in Scotland-particularly carry war engines and equipment there</td>
<td></td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1334-1338, p. 559.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 January 1338</td>
<td>Crews for 4 ships plus 3 additional arrested of Flanders(S)</td>
<td>Unknown-King’s Service</td>
<td></td>
<td>Close Rolls 1337-1339, pp. 226-227.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 February 1341</td>
<td>Crews for all ships 60 tuns and above and ‘Fluves’(S)</td>
<td>Wars in France</td>
<td></td>
<td>Close Rolls 1341-1343, p. 107.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 May 1343</td>
<td>Crews of all ships</td>
<td>Wars in France-To</td>
<td></td>
<td>Close Rolls 1343-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>War/Defense</td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before 30 May 1343</td>
<td>Crew for ships (H) remain in port ready for king's use</td>
<td>Wars in France-Transport to Brittany. Ships left without permission.</td>
<td>Unknown-Possibly orders of 1342 though possible they are from early 1343 as well.</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1343-1345, p. 92.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 March 1345</td>
<td>Crew for ships (S) Wars in France</td>
<td></td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1343-1346, p. 537.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 June 1345</td>
<td>Crew for all ships(S) Wars in France-Remain in port for king's need</td>
<td></td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1343-1346, p. 588.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 January 1346</td>
<td>Crew for ships (S) Wars in France-Three Released for trade</td>
<td></td>
<td>Unknown-Probably from 1345</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1343-1346, p. 632.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 1349</td>
<td>Crews for 12 ships(H, Dorset and Devon)</td>
<td>War in France</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1348-1350, p. 386.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre 30 May 1354</td>
<td>Crew for at least one ship (S)</td>
<td>War in France</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1354-1358, p. 52.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 July 1355</td>
<td>Crews for all ships (S) War with France-Defence</td>
<td></td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1354-1360, p. 214.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 March 1360</td>
<td>Crews for all ships (S) War with France-Defence</td>
<td></td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1360-1364, pp. 97-98.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 August 1360</td>
<td>Crews for all ships, particularly foreign ships in Southampton(S)</td>
<td>War with France-Defence</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1358-1361, p. 452.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 June 1364</td>
<td>Crews for 80 ships, 40 tuns and above(S, Ports Southampton to Bristol)</td>
<td>To Ireland with Lionel, Duke of Clarence</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1361-1364, p. 518.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 June 1364</td>
<td>Crews of ships(S) War with France-Black Prince to Gascony</td>
<td></td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1361-1364, p. 518.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 April and 16 May 1371</td>
<td>Crews for ships(S) War with France</td>
<td></td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1370-1374, pp. 72, 88 and 109.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 April 1373</td>
<td>Crew for 1 War barge (S, funded by town and other surrounding ports)</td>
<td>War with France-Defence. Made to be part of king's war fleet of newly built barges</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1370-1374, p. 207.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 October 1373</td>
<td>Crews for all ships over 24 tuns and up (S)</td>
<td>For wars in Ireland</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1370-1374, p. 347.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 October 1377</td>
<td>Crew for 1 Balinger (S) Under Hugh Calveley as Admiral</td>
<td></td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1377-1381, p. 21.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 March 1383</td>
<td>Crews for 6 Ships To Cherbourg</td>
<td></td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1381-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Destination</td>
<td>Reason</td>
<td>Source</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 April 1395</td>
<td>Crews for ships</td>
<td>To Wars in Ireland</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1391-1396, p. 590.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 July 1398</td>
<td>Mariners for 'La Marie of Southampton' (S)</td>
<td>To Wars in Ireland</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1396-1399, p. 438.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 August 1398</td>
<td>Crew for all ships 40 tuns or above, unladen (S)</td>
<td>To Wars in Ireland</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1396-1399, p. 432.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 February 1399</td>
<td>Crews for all ships 25 tuns and above (S)</td>
<td>To Wars in Ireland</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1396-1399, p. 511.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 August 1400</td>
<td>Crews for arrayed 'ships, barges, balingers and other vessels' (S)</td>
<td>For war in Scotland</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1399-1402, p. 169.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 January 1401</td>
<td>Crew for 1 newly built war barge (S)</td>
<td>Defence-To counter possible French landing in Wales</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1399-1402, p. 238.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 April 1401</td>
<td>Crews for all ships 30 tuns or above (S)</td>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1399-1401, p. 515.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 August 1403</td>
<td>Crews for ships of Southampton (H)</td>
<td>Defence-To Counter attacks by men of Brittany and others breaking the Truce</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1401-1405, p. 298.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 November 1403</td>
<td>Crews for all ships (H)</td>
<td>To await king's order-Probably defence against the French</td>
<td>Unknown- At least till January</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1401-1405, pp. 360 and 356.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 March 1404</td>
<td>Crews for all ships (S)</td>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1402-1405, p. 263.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 October 1404</td>
<td>Crews for all ships 40 tuns or above (S)</td>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1401-1405, p. 506.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 March 1405</td>
<td>Crews for all ships 36 tuns or above (S)</td>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1401-1405, p. 512.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 July 1406</td>
<td>36 Mariners from Southampton for 'La Alice' of Southampton (S)</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1405-1408, p. 234.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 August 1406</td>
<td>Mariners (H and Dorset)</td>
<td>To crew two ships in king's business in Wales</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1405-1408, p. 237.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 January 1414</td>
<td>Crews for ships (S, Pole, Melcombe and Weymouth)</td>
<td>Transport Ambassadors to France both of Henry and king of France</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1413-1416, pp. 177 and 221.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 March 1415</td>
<td>Crews for all ships</td>
<td>War with France</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1413-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Source</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 July 1415</td>
<td>Crews for all ships 20 tuns and above(S)</td>
<td>Transport men to Normandy</td>
<td>1419, p. 162.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 April 1416</td>
<td>Crews for all ships (H)</td>
<td>Defence-To counter a fleet of French and Genoese warships</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 April 1416</td>
<td>All ships 20 tuns and above(S)</td>
<td>War with France-Transport men to Normandy</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 May 1416</td>
<td>Crews for all Ships and other vessels (H)</td>
<td>War with France-Transport men to Normandy</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 May 1416</td>
<td>Crew for 1 ship(S or Dover, Crewell, Sandwich, Chichester)</td>
<td>War with France-Transport William Carswell’s men to Normandy</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 July 1416</td>
<td>Crews for all ships</td>
<td>War with France-Transport men to Normandy</td>
<td>Unknown-Probably many ships arrested from pervious commands</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 September 1416</td>
<td>Mariners for a balinger from Sandwich(S)</td>
<td>War with France-Transport men to Normandy</td>
<td>Unknown-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 February 1417</td>
<td>Crew for all ships 20 tuns and above(S, H)</td>
<td>War with France-Transport men to Normandy</td>
<td>Unknown-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 November 1417</td>
<td>Sailors for the king’s ships(S)</td>
<td>Ship Maintenance</td>
<td>Time to time</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 March 1418</td>
<td>Crews for ships(S)</td>
<td>War with France-Transport men to Normandy</td>
<td>Unknown-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 March 1418</td>
<td>Crews for ships(S)</td>
<td>War with France-Transport men to Normandy</td>
<td>Unknown-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 October 1418</td>
<td>1 ship or barge 50 tuns or above(S)</td>
<td>War with France-For Thomas Trevarek to wage the king’s war at sea</td>
<td>Until Christmas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 October 1418</td>
<td>Crews for 2 ships(S)</td>
<td>War with France-Transport men to Normandy</td>
<td>Unknown-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 and 24 August 1419</td>
<td>Crews for ships; 8 ships of 60 tuns or larger and 4 balingers of 20 tuns or over (H, Cornwall, Somerset, Dorset or Southampton-Cornwall provided the initial 12)</td>
<td>War with France-To stop a fleet ships carrying arms, armour and soldiers from assisting the Scots</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 October 1419</td>
<td>Crews for ships(S)</td>
<td>War with France-Transport Richard Scrope’s Army to France</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 February 1420</td>
<td>Crews for all ships</td>
<td>War with France-Transport men to Normandy</td>
<td>Unknown-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Crews/Transport Details</td>
<td>Event/Command</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 February 1431</td>
<td>Crews for all ships 20-100 tuns (H)</td>
<td>War in France-Transport John Tiptoft to Normandy</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1429-1436, p. 130.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 March 1439 (</td>
<td>Crews for all ships (S, Pole, Melcombe, Bridgewater, Exeter, Dartmouth, Plymouth and</td>
<td>War in France-Transport John, earl of Huntingdon and retinue to Aquitaine</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1436-1441, pp. 273 and 312-313.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>possible repeat</td>
<td>Fowy)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>command)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td>Ships Details</td>
<td>Action Details</td>
<td>Reference</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 February 1441</td>
<td>War in France-Transport Richard, duke of York, lieutenant-general to France</td>
<td>De Scales and retinue to France were arrested in the kingdom.</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1436-1441, p. 538.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 November 1441</td>
<td>Escort King’s men to Normandy</td>
<td>‘Mariners’ for 2 large ships and a balinger (S)</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1441-1446, p. 48.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 March 1442</td>
<td>War in France-Transport John Talbot and his men to Normandy</td>
<td>Mariners for all ships 20 tuns and above (S, Pole, Melcombe, Bristol, Exeter, Dertmouth, Plymouth and Fowy)</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1441-1446, p. 79.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 March 1443</td>
<td>War in France-Transport to Aquitaine</td>
<td>Crews for all ships(S, London, Sandwich, All ports Southampton to Bristol and All ports from the Thames to Newcastle)</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1441-1446, pp. 156-157.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 December 1445</td>
<td>War in France-Transport the king’s ministers, men and 120 horses to Harfleur</td>
<td>Crews for 5 Ships(S)</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1441-1446, pp. 422.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 June 1449</td>
<td>To Normandy</td>
<td>‘Masters and mariners’ (S)</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1446-1452, p. 270.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 to 29 September 1449</td>
<td>To Normandy from Portsmouth</td>
<td>Crews for arrested ships (H)</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1446-1452, p. 317.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 June 1452</td>
<td>Defence-Service at Sea</td>
<td>Crews for all ships(S)</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1446-1452, p. 579.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 January 1453</td>
<td>War with France</td>
<td>Crews for all ships 50 tuns or above(S, London to Fowy)</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1452-1461, p. 52.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 July 1453</td>
<td>War with France-Transport an army to Gascony</td>
<td>Crews for all ships(S)</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1452-1461, p. 123.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 July 1454</td>
<td>Defence-Coastal defence at sea</td>
<td>Mariners for the Trinity of Southampton (S)</td>
<td>At least till November as in 21 October 1454 more mariners are being recruited for the ship</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1452-1461, pp. 176 and 224.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Task Details</td>
<td>Location/Reference</td>
<td>Reference</td>
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<tr>
<td>26 March 1460</td>
<td>Crews for ships (S) to man galleys of Earl of Wiltshire</td>
<td>Defence-Fight at sea against Earl of Warwick</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 May 1461</td>
<td>Mariners (H) to transport men to reclaim Guernsey from French.</td>
<td>Defence-Transport men</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>to reclaim Guernsey from</td>
<td></td>
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<td>French.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unstated the need</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>for mariners and ships</td>
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<td>but met in Soton.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Without fleet of ships</td>
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<td></td>
<td>they could not</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>have gotten to Guernsey or</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Isle of Wight.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Crews for 2 Ships (S) to man galleys of Earl of Warwick</td>
<td>Defence-Earl of Warwick</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to man galleys of Earl of Warwick two ships for king's business</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 June 1470</td>
<td>Crews for arrested ships (S)</td>
<td>Defence- to Resist rebels, George Duke of Clarence and Richard, Earl of Warwick</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 January 1475</td>
<td>Mariners for all ships in port to be armed for war (S)</td>
<td>Defence-War in France?</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 January 1497</td>
<td>Crews for all ships in port (S)</td>
<td>War with Scots</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ship Size to Crew$^\text{1202}$

240-200 tuns to have 60 men (mariners)
180-160 tuns 40 men
140 tuns 35 men
120 tuns 28 men
100 tuns 26 men
80 tuns 24 men
60 tuns 21 men

Masters and Constables required-

180 tuns and upwards has a master and two constables
160 tuns or less has a master and one constable

Chapter Three- Defence Schemes of Southampton

Town Ordinances related to Town Defence in the Oak Book of Southampton, c.1300

Article. 45-Of that which the alderman and Guardians of the streets of the town of Southampton, etc.. The alderman, Guardians of the streets of the town, shall swear loyalty to keep the King’s peace, and cause to be enrolled the names of all who are in their ward, and once in every month at least shall go around to see that the points and ordinances made for their ward be well kept; and if they find anything in their ward that is against the ordinances of the guild and of the town, they shall give notice of it to the alderman and to the bailiffs of the town, and they shall in no wise omit this, if they would enjoy the franchise of the town.

Article. 46- Of two aldermen who shall keep the peace within the boundaries. It is provided, by common consent of the town, that from the North Gate to the East Gate, and to the corner [house] which belonged to Richard de la Prise and the great house (or capital messuage) which belonged to John de la Bolehusse, on both sides of the street, with all the parish of our Lady in the East Street, there shall be two aldermen elected as Guardians, to take care that the peace be well kept within the boundaries aforesaid, and they shall cause to be enrolled the names of all who are dwelling in their ward, and they shall be bound in good security to keep the Kings peace, and their securities shall be enrolled; and they shall take care that no person stay in their ward beyond one night, without finding

1203 The Oak Book of Southampton Volume One, Ed. P. Struder, Southampton Record Society (Southampton 1910) pp. 55-59/
such security as before is said, if he desire to remain in the town, that the town may receive no hurt or damage through him.\textsuperscript{1204} And the two Aldermen shall once in eight days, or in fifteen days at least, go around their ward to see that nothing be done contrary to the form aforesaid within their ward. And if there be any offender in the ward aforesaid who work will not submit to be attacked (arrested), the sworn sergeant(s) of the town and the alderman, together with the whole of their ward, shall go with all their power and follow the malefactor until he be taken, and if the alderman do not this, the town will cast the blame on them.\textsuperscript{1205}

Article. 47- \textit{That the watchs of the town be wisely appointed and kept in all points in their.} And the alderman shall take care that the watchs of the town be well kept and wisely appointed in their ward.

Article. 48- \textit{From the corner which belonged to Richard de la Prise unto New- town, two alderman and all.} From the corner (house) which belonged to Richard de la Prise, and the great house which belonged to John de la Bolesusse, and unto the sea, together with Newtown street, there shall be two alderman and the form aforesaid.

Article. 49- \textit{From French Street to the sea, two aldermen, as is aforesaid.} For all French Street, that is to say, from the corner (house) which belonged to Richard de la Prise, and from Henry Brya on the other side, and on both sides of the street to the sea, there shall be two aldermen, as is aforesaid.

Article. 50- \textit{From Simnel Street to the Castle there shall be two Aldermen.} From Simnel Street, with the fish market, and the whole of Bull Street, with all the West Quay to the castle, there shall be three aldermen, as it is before provided.

\textsuperscript{1204} Oak Book vol. 1, p. 55- 'Richard de la Prise is mentioned in deed of late 13th.'\textsuperscript{1205} Oak Book vol. 1, p. 56- According to Speed's translation the sentence ends, 'town will take matter into their own hands'. The French, 'la vile se prendra (le prendera) a eus'.
Article. 51- *Outside north gate to Lubrie Street (Lobery Street) there shall be three aldermen.* From outside North Gate on the one hand, and on the other from the streets of Full-Flood, together with the strand and Lubrie street, there shall be three aldermen in the form aforesaid.\textsuperscript{1206}

\textsuperscript{1206} *Oak Book* vol.1, pp. 55-59.
Town Ordinances related to Town Defence in the Oak Book of Southampton, c. 1473

Article 45- the alderman, wardens of the streets of the town, ought for two swear, that they shall truly to keep the Kings peace, and that they shall to enroll the names of them that they have in their ward, and they shall make a search, every month at the least, to see that the points and stablementes made of their ward the well held. And if they find anything that is against the stablementes Of the guild of the town in their ward, they shall do it to with to the chief alderman and to the bailiffs of the town, and that they shall not letin any man, as they will enjoy the franchise of the town.

Article. 46- It is provided, by the common council of the town, that from the north gate on to the east gate, and to the corner that was Richard de la Price, and the chief house that was to John bolehouse, of that one party, and of that other of that street, with all the parish of our lady in east street, there shall be to alderman, chosen wardens to take keep of the peace, that it be well kept, within the foresaid bounds: and they shall do to set in roll The names of all those that be dwelling in their ward, And they shall find pledges sufficient to be at the Kings peace, and other pledges shall be entered in the roll. Also, they shall take keep that no man shall dwell in their ward past a night, but if he find pledges as aforesaid, if he should be a dweller in the town, that skath not hurt by him should fall to the town. And the two aldermen shall make every 8 days, or 15 days, at the most, a search through their ward, and oversee that no man do against the man aforesaid within their ward. And if they find any in their ward, that shall trespass and will not suffer th be attached by the serjeants sworn to the town, the Alderman and

1207 Oak Book vol. 1, pp. 93-94.
all the ward shall go with their full power, and sew the malefactors, till they be taken; And if the Alderman will not do so, the town shall lay the charge to the said alderman.

Article 47—the alderman shall take good keep, that the watches of the town be well kept and wisely, and every man in his ward.

Article 48—from the corner that was Richard de la price and the chief house that was John de la belehouse, into the sea, with all the street of Newtown, shall be two alderman and form aforesaid.

Article 49—of all the French street, that is to wite, from the corner that was Richard de la price and Henry Bryan, on the other party, on the other side of the said street, into the sea, there shall be two alderman, as is aforesaid.

Article 50—from Simnel Street, with the fish market, and all the bull street, with all the west hithe, Onto the castle, there shall be two Alderman, as is aforesaid.

Article 51—without the Northgate, one every side, with the street of full flood, the stronde and boole barre strete, there shall be three aldermen, in form aforesaid.
Town Ordinances related to Town Defence in the Oak Book of Southampton, c. 1478

'There shall nightly be six men watching within the town, where of always two to keep the walls, and the other four to walk within the town, and half times to walk up to the castle hill, and there to have good respect to the sea and every part of the town, for fire and other dangers. And that every man, when the watch, to his house, be ready at the walls in proper person, the or a sufficient person, being no alien, for him, up on pain to lose twelve pence for every time making default. And from all Halloween day to Candlemass, it is agreed that every watch man shall have for every night 3 pence; and afterward, till the feast of all saints, 2 pence. And then no watchmen depart from the watch, before Candlemas day, before six of the clock in the morning, up on pain of imprisonment and further punishment, as shall be thought good for his dessert. And from Candlemas to the feast of all saints, before five of the clock.

Item, that there shall be for watchmen nightly Above Bar and saint Mary's, keeping their walks to our lady of grace, and by the seaside to god's house gate, and so a to the post against Arundel's Tower, and the other two to walk about bar and up to the cross by hither Rokesden lane, and sometime down goslinge lane to hilbridge, and so by the seaside up to bar gate.

Item, The Tethinge of Portiswoode to keep nightly two men watching, and this to endure as long as shall be thought necessary; every watchmen to keep his watch, and have like wages, as abovesaid.'

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1208 Oak Book vol. 1, p. 94
## Keepers of Southampton

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Garrison</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To 2 May 1276</td>
<td>Adam de Wynton</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Patent Rolls Edward I 1272-1281, p. 143; Close Rolls 1272-1279, pp. 145, 148, 149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th November 1338-January of 1339</td>
<td>John de Bokland (Bokelond) and John de Palton (Palynton)</td>
<td>'No small number' 6MAA and 12 archers upon arrival</td>
<td>Fine Roll 1337-1347, p. 97; Close Rolls 1337-1339, p. 606.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April to July 1339</td>
<td>Edmund de la Beche (June of 1339 Rich de Penle and Stepehn de Bitterle named as keepers in CR 1339-41 p. 215.)</td>
<td>4 kts/ 15 MAA/ 40 footmen/ 50 archers</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1338-1340, p. 275; Close Roll 1339-1341, pp.64,67 166.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late July 1339 to 25 August 1339</td>
<td>Thomas de Beauchamp, Earl of Warwick</td>
<td>40 archers and 50 MAA of his own including himself as well as one knight banneret, 10kts, 120 archers</td>
<td>Sign Manuals a Letters Patent Volume I, pp. 46-47;Close Rolls 1339-1341, p. 180.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 September 1339</td>
<td>Prior of (Hostpital of St. John?)</td>
<td>1kt/12MAA Later 20 MAA/10Archers</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1339-1341, pp. 288, 304-365 and 340.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 December 1352</td>
<td>Henry Peverel (keeper of Soton and seaside)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Miscellaneous Inquisitions 1348-1377 pp. 38, 154.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 April 1360</td>
<td>Hugh de Escote, Knight</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1367-1370, p. 270.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1369</td>
<td>Emery de Sancto Amando</td>
<td>47 men-at-arm, 39 hobelars and 172 archers</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1367-1370, pp. 303-304; TNA E101/29/ 34; Platt, Medieval Southampton, p. 126.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1370</td>
<td>Hugh de Escote, Knight</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1367-1370, p. 474.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Person</td>
<td>Details</td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| February 1371 (to Martinmas, 11th November) | Robert de Assheton          | Total 40 men-at-arms and 90 archers  
Gloucester array 10 men-at-arms and 20 archers  
Northampton and Rutland array 10 men-at-arms and 20 archers  
| 30 June 1377, still keeper in 14 June 1378 | John d' Arundel             | 120MAA/120Archers/20 crossbowmen/8 gunners-40MAA/40Archers plus castle garrison (In July said to be 100 MAA and 100 Archers)                            | Patent Rolls 1377-1381, pp. 4, 7, 12.                                   |
| 30 June 1383 to mid 1390's? Possible to 1397 when he looses the title keeper of the town of Southampton but remains the keeper of the king's castle there | Thomas Holland, Earl of Kent- John Sondes, knight acting in his place | Some MAA and archers in castle and town in 1386            | Patent Rolls 1381-1385, pp. 84-85, 138-141 and 311; Patent Rolls 1385-89, pp. 258 and 177, 236-237; Patent Rolls 1392-1396, p. 90. |
Men of the Southampton Garrison from 25 July to 25 August 1339

Keeper
Thomas de Beauchamp, Earl of Warwick

Banneret
Thomas de Astleye

Total Knight’s Banneret-1

Knights
Johannes de Lysours
Nicholus Pecche
Nicholus de Charneles
Nicholus de Burneby
Johannes le Botiller
Johannes de Leukenore
Johannes Golafre

Total Knights-7

Men-at-Arms
Robertus le Zousche
Johannes le Despenc(er)
Henricus le Mortym(er)
Willelmus de Hardeshull
Johannes Haunsard
Willelmus de Shobyndon
Radulphus Basset
Willelmus Lucy
Walterus le Blount
Fulco de Holcote
Thomas Folyot
Johannes de Harle
Nicholus Gascoun
Thomas de Heule
Rogerus de Ledbury
Ricardus de Perytone
Ricardus Chamberleyn
Adam le Trompeur
Thomas le Trompeur
Walterus le Ken
Gilbertus Chastiloun

Stephanus de Dupham
Ricardus de Redynges
Hugo de Bromwyche
Robertus de Stretfeld
Ricardus de Hanford
Roger de Kenynton
Bertreamus de Wyme
Willelmus Ryuel
Nicholaus de Egebaston
Johannes de Esenhall
Oliverus de Brompton
Thomas de Burneby
Johannes Scot
Johannes Burdet
Willelmus Carles
Johannes de Milton
Radulphus Pecche
Johannes de Verdon
Johannes de Norden
Johannes Moreuille
Petrus de Wasseburne

Total Men-at-Arms- 42

Archers
Robertus de Redyng
Johannes de Bredon
Johannes de Clifton
Willelmus de Pullesdon
Johannes Tenyton
Johannes Chaundeler
Johannes Hunte
Nicholus Hunte
Johannes Tourn
Ricardus de Burmynchm
Willelmus Wachente
Johannus Staleward
Johannus de Sewell
Robertus de Crukelade
Johannus Lempent
Peter de Dounton
Johannes le fletchere
Johannes de Chestre
Joh(ann)es Hydecot
Ricardus Chaunt
Thomas le Hende
Willelmus Tillere
Robertus Raulere
Willelmus Port(er)
O. Hende
Philippus de Wygemor
Johannes Styf
Willelmus Bras
Rogerus Porter
Nicholus de Harpecot
Simon Plot
Henricus Croule
Petrus Brid
Walterus de Clatircot
Johannes Troggere
Johannes Fortfere
Nicholus de Brayton
Johannes de Warrick
Johannes de la Pantrie
Johannes le Taillour

Total Archers- 40

Surplus archers released from service

Robertus de Sallesbury
Willelmus Spencer
Adam Long
Philippus de la March
Johannes le Ferroure
Johannes Veisy
Hugo de Wadburgh
Ricardus Scot
Robertus de Bereweden
Simon de Clatircoos

Total Archers Released- 10

Total Soldiers of Garrison- 100, less ten archers later released
### Outside Soldiers in Southampton

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual/Group &amp; Date</th>
<th>Men Provided</th>
<th>Duration-Details</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hampshire, Berkshire, Wiltshire, Surrey, Sussex, and Kent</td>
<td>Arrays</td>
<td>Defence the Coasts (landlocked counties to aid those along the sea)</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1338-1340, p. 149-150.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various landowners both secular and ecclesiastical February 1339</td>
<td>Men-at-arms, archers and armed men</td>
<td>Defence the Coasts</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1339-1341, p. 18.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbot of Beaulieu March 1339</td>
<td>Two archers(s, 2MAA and 4 archers in New Forest + money for Soton fortifications)</td>
<td>Southampton</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1339-1341, p. 67.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbot of Waverly March 1339</td>
<td>Men at arms</td>
<td>Southampton</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1339-1341, p. 68.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Corbet April 1339</td>
<td>In person</td>
<td>Southampton</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1338-1340, p. 275; Close Roll 1339-1341, pp. 64, 67 166.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men of Berkshire April 1339</td>
<td>Arrayed 20MAA and 40 archers</td>
<td>Southampton</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1339-1341, p. 71.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbot of Waverly May 1339</td>
<td>½ assessed amount</td>
<td>Southampton</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1339-1341, p. 190.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert ate Barre May 1339</td>
<td>In person plus men at arms</td>
<td>Southampton</td>
<td>Fine Rolls 1337-1347, p. 129.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church of St. Mary's (soton suburb)</td>
<td>Two men at arms, later 2 footmen and 4 archers (plus costs of fortifications)</td>
<td>Southampton</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1339-1341, p. 215.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbott of Beaulieu</td>
<td>Two archers (plus costs of fortifications)</td>
<td>Southampton</td>
<td>Close rolls 1339 to 1341, p. 67.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John de Peyton 1346</td>
<td>1MAA and 1 archer in Soton</td>
<td>Southampton</td>
<td>Fine Rolls 1337-1347, p. 505.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilbert de Neville 1346</td>
<td>3hobelars and 1 archer</td>
<td>Southampton</td>
<td>Fine Rolls 1337-1347, p. 508.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John de Acton 1346</td>
<td>2MAA + 20 marks</td>
<td>Southampton</td>
<td>Fine Rolls 1337-1347, p. 513.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicholas Malemeynes</td>
<td>1MAA + 10marks</td>
<td>Southampton</td>
<td>Fine Rolls 1337-1347, p. 517.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men of Oxfordshire and 10 other counties May 1360</td>
<td>All arrayed</td>
<td>Southampton and Portsmouth</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1360-1364, p. 98.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiltshire</td>
<td>20 men-at-arms, 50</td>
<td>Southampton and</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1360-1364.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Troops and Details</td>
<td>Source Range</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1360</td>
<td>armed men and 200 archers</td>
<td>Portsmouth</td>
<td>pp. 104-105.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiltshire</td>
<td></td>
<td>Southport</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1385-1389, p. 329.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiltshire</td>
<td>December 1403</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1402-1405, p. 288.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Garrison at Hamble</td>
<td>40 archers</td>
<td>Initially for ½ year but reference continues for much of the 15th century-Protect ships at Hamble</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1416-1422, p. 145.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hampshire March 1419</td>
<td>Array men</td>
<td>to protect coast, i.e. Southampton</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1416-1422, p. 209.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hampshire June 1421</td>
<td>Array men</td>
<td>to protect coast, i.e. Southampton</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1416-1422, p. 323.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hampshire December 1457</td>
<td>Arrayed-</td>
<td>Protect Coast</td>
<td>Patent Rolls of 1452-1461, p. 405.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Howard 1470</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Southampton and Protect king’s ships in Southampton</td>
<td>Southampton Stewards Book 1470-1471, p. 23.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor of Winchester 1470</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Southampton</td>
<td>Southampton Stewards Book 1470-1471, p. 23.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earl of Arundel 1471</td>
<td>Soldiers</td>
<td>Southampton</td>
<td>Southampton Stewards Book 1470-1471, p. 57.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Chapter Four- Ships, Equipment, Artillery and Guns of Southampton

#### Ship Provision, Seizures and Arrests of Hampshire from 1300-1500

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17 and 28 November 1294</td>
<td>1 Galley (S)</td>
<td>War with France</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>TNA E101/5/2 and E101/5/12.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 October 1297</td>
<td>Crews for all ships 40 Tuns and above (S)</td>
<td>Transport men and supplies to Flanders</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1296-1302, pp. 76 and 81.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 February 1301</td>
<td>2 ships (S)</td>
<td>War in Scotland</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1296-1302, pp. 482-483.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 November 1302</td>
<td>2 Ships (S)</td>
<td>War in Scotland</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1301-1307, p. 75.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 April 1304</td>
<td>20 Ships (S, H)</td>
<td>Wars in Flanders</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1302-1307, p.205.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 August 1308</td>
<td>1 ship with armaments (S)</td>
<td>Wars in Scotland</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1307-1313, p. 75 and 122.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before 8 September 1310</td>
<td>2 ships (S)</td>
<td>War in Scotland</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Foedera Volume Two, p. 109.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 May 1311</td>
<td>3 ‘fully armed’ ships (S)</td>
<td>War in Scotland</td>
<td>At least 7 weeks</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1307-1313, pp. 352-353.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 August 1312</td>
<td>War galley, newly built by town (S)</td>
<td>‘Fight King’s enemies’</td>
<td>More than 1 month</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1307-1313, p.477.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 July 1313</td>
<td>‘30 of the greater and better ships’ (H, Sussex, Devon and Dorset)</td>
<td>To embark in Ships under William de Monte-Acuto probably against the Scots</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1313-1317, p. 6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 March 1322</td>
<td>‘As many ships as able’ (S)</td>
<td>To fight against Rebels and Scots</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1318-1323, p.524.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 April 1322</td>
<td>‘As many ships and barges as needed’ (S)</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1318-1323, p. 531.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 June 1322</td>
<td>2 ships (S)</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>More than 2 months at town’s expense</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1318-1323, p. 559.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 May 1324</td>
<td>All ships 40 tuns</td>
<td>War in Gascony</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1323-1324.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Details</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 and 15 August 1326</td>
<td>All ships 50 tuns and above, ‘double equipment’ (S)</td>
<td>Rebels/French</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1323-1327, p. 641; Patent Rolls 1324-1327, pp. 310-311.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 August 1326</td>
<td>All ships smaller than 50 tuns to remain in port (S)</td>
<td>Rebels/French</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1324-1327, pp. 310-311.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 August 1326</td>
<td>13 Ships double equipment (S, for 200 men raised from Hampshire)</td>
<td>Rebels/French</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1323-1328, p. 643.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 September 1326</td>
<td>1 ship, under Master William atte Hirne (S)</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1323-1328, p. 611.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 September 1326</td>
<td>All ships (S)</td>
<td>Rebels/French</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1323-1328, pp. 611-613.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 March 1327</td>
<td>Three ships (S)</td>
<td>King’s business in Aquitaine</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1327-1330, p. 27.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 June 1328</td>
<td>All ships of 40 tuns or more (S)</td>
<td>Defence-French</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1327-1330, p. 397.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 May 1336</td>
<td>1 Ship of 160 tuns, double equipment (S)</td>
<td>Defence-French</td>
<td>Close Rolls of 1333-1337, p. 581.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 November 1336</td>
<td>1 Ship to transport 50 Armed men of town to Channel Islands (S)</td>
<td>Defence-French at the Channel Islands</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1334-1338, p. 337; Close Rolls 1333-1337, p. 712.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before 8 October 1337 and 10 January 1338</td>
<td>4 ships (S)</td>
<td>Unknown-King’s Service, probably defence</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1337-1339, pp. 194, 226-227.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 November 1337</td>
<td>2 ships of 200 tuns with ‘double equipment’ and 4 barges (S)</td>
<td>Unknown-King’s Service, probably defence</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1337-1339, p. 215.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 December 1337</td>
<td>1 ship ‘La Coggersshippe’ (S)</td>
<td>War in Scotland particularly carry war engines and equipment there</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1334-1338, p. 559.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 January 1338</td>
<td>7 ships, Forgiven full number to 4 plus 3 additional arrested of Flanders(S)</td>
<td>Unknown-King’s Service, probably defence</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1337-1339, pp. 226-227.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 February 1341</td>
<td>All ships 60 tuns and above and ‘Fluves’(S)</td>
<td>Wars in France</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1341-1343, p. 107.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 November 1342</td>
<td>‘Ships’ (S)</td>
<td>Wars in France-Transport men from Wales to France</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1341-1343, p. 667.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Ships/Type</td>
<td>War(s)</td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1342</td>
<td></td>
<td>Wars in France-To remain in port ready for king's use</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1343-1346, p. 591.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 May 1343</td>
<td>All ships (S)</td>
<td>Wars in France-Transport to Brittany. Ships left without permission.</td>
<td>Unknown-Possibly orders of 1342 though possible they are from early 1343 as well.</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1343-1345, p. 92.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 March 1345</td>
<td>Ships (S)</td>
<td>Wars in France</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1343-1346, p. 537.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 1349</td>
<td>12 ships (H, Dorset and Devon)</td>
<td>War in France</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1348-1350, p. 386.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before 30 May 1354</td>
<td>At least one ship (S)</td>
<td>War in France</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1354-1358, p. 52.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 July 1355</td>
<td>All ships (S)</td>
<td>War with France-Defence</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1354-1360, p. 214.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 March 1360</td>
<td>All ships (S)</td>
<td>War with France-Defence</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1360-1364, pp. 97-98.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 August 1360</td>
<td>All ships, particularly foreign ships in Southampton (S)</td>
<td>War with France-Defence</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1358-1361, p. 452.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 June 1364</td>
<td>80 ships, 40 tuns and above (S, Ports Southampton to Bristol)</td>
<td>To Ireland with Lionel, Duke of Clarence</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1361-1364, p. 518.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 April and 16 May 1371</td>
<td>Ships (S)</td>
<td>War with France-Black Prince to Gascony</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1370-1374, pp. 72, 88 and 109.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 April 1373</td>
<td>1 War barge (S, funded by town and other surrounding ports)</td>
<td>War with France-Defence. Made to be part of king's war fleet of newly built barges</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1370-1374, p. 270.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 October 1373</td>
<td>All ships over 24 tuns and up (S)</td>
<td>For wars in Ireland</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1370-1374, p. 347.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 October 1377</td>
<td>1 Bailer 'fully armed and equipped' (S)</td>
<td>Under Hugh Calveley as Admiral and Captain of Calais</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1377-1381, p. 21.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 March 1383</td>
<td>6 Ships (S)</td>
<td>To Cherbourg</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1381-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Owner/Designation</td>
<td>Location/Operation</td>
<td>Source/Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 March 1383</td>
<td>As many ships as needed</td>
<td>Transport Bishop of Norwich</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1381-1385, p. 259.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 April 1395</td>
<td>Ships</td>
<td>To Wars in Ireland</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1391-1396, p. 590.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 July 1398</td>
<td>'La Marie of Southampton' (S)</td>
<td>To Wars in Ireland</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1396-1399, p. 438.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 August 1398</td>
<td>All ships 40 tons or above, unladen (S)</td>
<td>To Wars in Ireland</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1396-1399, p. 432.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 February 1399</td>
<td>All ships 25 tons and above</td>
<td>To Wars in Ireland</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1396-1399, p. 511.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 August 1400</td>
<td>Arrayed 'ships, barges, balingers and other vessels' (S)</td>
<td>For war in Scotland</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1399-1402, p. 169.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 January 1401</td>
<td>1 newly built war barge (S)</td>
<td>Defence-To counter possible French landing in Wales</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1399-1402, p. 238.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 April 1401</td>
<td>All ships 80 tons or above (S)</td>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1399-1401, p. 515.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 August 1403</td>
<td>Ships (S)</td>
<td>Defence-To Counter attacks by men of Brittany and others breaking the Truce</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1401-1405, p. 298.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 November 1403</td>
<td>All ships(S)</td>
<td>To await king's order-Probably defence against the French</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1401-1405, pp. 356 and 360.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 March 1404</td>
<td>All ships(S)</td>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1402-1405, p. 263.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 October 1404</td>
<td>All ships 40 tons or above(S)</td>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1401-1405, p. 506.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 March 1404</td>
<td>All ships 36 tons or above(S)</td>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1401-1405, p.512.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 July 1406</td>
<td>'La Alice' of Southampton(S)</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1405-1408, p. 234.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 January 1414</td>
<td>Ships(S, Pole, Melcombe and Weymouth)</td>
<td>Transport Ambassadors to France both of Henry and king of France</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls1413-1416, pp. 177 and 221.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 March 1415</td>
<td>All ships 20 tons and above(S)</td>
<td>War with France-Transport men to Normandy</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1413-1419, p. 162.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 July 1415</td>
<td>All ships 20 tons and above(S)</td>
<td>War with France-Transport men to Normandy</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1413-1416, p. 344.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 April 1416</td>
<td>All ships (H)</td>
<td>Defence-To counter a fleet of French and Genoese warships</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Close Rolls 1413-1419, p. 346.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 April 1416</td>
<td>All ships 20 tons and above(S)</td>
<td>War with France-Transport men to Normandy</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1416-1422, p. 70.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 May 1416</td>
<td>'Ships and other'</td>
<td>War with France-</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1416-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Vessels</td>
<td>Task Description</td>
<td>Command</td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 May 1416</td>
<td>1 ship (S or Dover, Orewell, Sandwich, Chichester)</td>
<td>War with France-Transport men to Normandy</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1416-1422, p. 76.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 July 1416</td>
<td>All ships</td>
<td>War with France-Transport men to Normandy</td>
<td>Unknown-Probably many ships arrested from pervious commands</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1416-1422, p. 36.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 February 1417</td>
<td>All ships 20 tuns and above (S, H)</td>
<td>War with France-Transport men to Normandy</td>
<td>Unknown-</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1416-1422, p. 85.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 October 1418</td>
<td>1 ship or barge 50 tuns or above (S)</td>
<td>War with France-For Thomas Trevarek to wage the king's war at sea</td>
<td>Until Christmas</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1416-1422, p. 204.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 and 24 August 1419</td>
<td>More than 12 ships; 8 ships of 60 tuns or larger and 4 balingers of 20 tuns or over (H, Cornwall, Somerset, Dorset or Southampton-Cornwall provided the initial 12)</td>
<td>War with France-To stop a fleet ships carrying arms, armour and soldiers from assisting the Scots</td>
<td>Unknown-</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1416-1422, p. 268.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 October 1419</td>
<td>Ships (S)</td>
<td>War with France-Transport Richard Scrope's Army to France</td>
<td>Unknown-</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1416-1422, p. 270.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 February 1420</td>
<td>All ships 24 tuns or larger (S)</td>
<td>War with France-Transport Duke of Bedford's army to Normandy</td>
<td>Unknown-</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1416-1422, p. 275.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 December 1423</td>
<td>All ships 20-200 tuns (S, H, Dorset, Devon and Cornwall)</td>
<td>War in France-</td>
<td>Unknown-</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1422-1429, p. 192.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 July 1426</td>
<td>Ships to transport</td>
<td>War in France-</td>
<td>Unknown-</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1422-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Ships/Command</td>
<td>Remarks/Notes/Contact</td>
<td>War/Transportation Details</td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 June 1430</td>
<td>'Divers ships' (S)</td>
<td>Defence-Specifically at sea</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1429-1436, p. 74.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 February 1431</td>
<td>All ships 20-100 tuns (H)</td>
<td>War in France</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1429-1436, p. 130.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 March 1431</td>
<td>All ships (H)</td>
<td>War in France-Transport Earl of Salisbury, his retinue and 5000 horses</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1429-1436, p. 131.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 March 1439</td>
<td>All ships, stated as 30 tuns or above in 2nd command (S, Pole, Melcombe, Bridgewater, Exeter, Dartmouth, Plymouth and Fowy)</td>
<td>War in France-John, Earl of Huntingdon and retinue to Aquitaine</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1436-1441, pp. 273 and 312-313.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 July 1440</td>
<td>Ships 24 tuns or more (S)</td>
<td>War with France-Transport Thomas De Scales and retinue to France</td>
<td>Unknown-By this time many ships had been arrested in the kingdom</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1436-1441, p. 451.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 February 1441</td>
<td>All ships 20 tuns or more (H, Dorset, Devon and Cornwall)</td>
<td>War in France-Transport Richard, Duke of York, lieutenant-general to France</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1436-1441, p. 538.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 November 1441</td>
<td>2 large ships and a balinger (S)</td>
<td>Escort King’s men to Normandy</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1441-1446, p. 48.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 March 1442</td>
<td>All ships 20 tuns and above (S, Pole, Melcombe, Bristol, Exeter, Dartmouth, Plymouth and Fowy)</td>
<td>War in France-War in France-Transport John Talbot and his men to Normandy</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1441-1446, p. 79.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Details</td>
<td>Destination</td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>Source</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 December 1445</td>
<td>5 Ships (S)</td>
<td>War in France-Transport the king's ministers, men and 120 horses to Harfleur</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1441-1446, pp. 422.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 June 1449</td>
<td>'Ships and other vessels' (S)</td>
<td>To Normandy</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1446-1452, p. 270.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 to 29 September 1449</td>
<td>Ships and vessels (H)</td>
<td>To Normandy from Portsmouth</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1446-1452, p. 317.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1451</td>
<td>Juliane of Southampton (S)</td>
<td>Transport Richard Woodville and retinue to Aquitaine</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls of Henry VI 1446-1452, p. 444.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 June 1452</td>
<td>All ships (S)</td>
<td>Defence-Service at Sea</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1446-1452, p. 579.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 January 1453</td>
<td>All ships 50 tuns or above (S, London to Fowey)</td>
<td>War with France</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1452-1461, p. 52.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 July 1453</td>
<td>All ships (S)</td>
<td>War with France-Transport an army to Gascony</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1452-1461, p. 123.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 July 1454</td>
<td>1 ship the Trinity of Southampton (S)</td>
<td>Defence-Coastal defence</td>
<td>At least till November as in 21 October 1454 more mariners are being recruited for the ship</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1452-1461, pp. 176 and 224.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 May 1461</td>
<td>Mariners (H)</td>
<td>Defence-Transport men to reclaim Guernsey from French. Unstated the need for mariners and ships but met in Soton. Without fleet of ships they could not have gotten to Guernsey or Isle of Wight</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1461-1467, p. 38.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 January 1475</td>
<td>All ships and vessels in port (S)</td>
<td>Defence-</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1467-1477, p. 495.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 January 1497</td>
<td>All ships, carvels,</td>
<td>War with Scots</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Patent Rolls 1494-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>barques and other vessels of any portage (S)</td>
<td>1509, p. 91; Southampton Steward's Book 1497-1498, p. 6.</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
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