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A puzzle about enkratic reasoning

A puzzle about enkratic reasoning
A puzzle about enkratic reasoning
Enkratic reasoning – reasoning from believing that you ought to do something to an intention to do that thing – seems good. But there is a puzzle about how it could be. Good reasoning preserves correctness, other things equal. But enkratic reasoning does not preserve correctness. This is because what you ought to do depends on your epistemic position, but what it is correct to intend does not. In this paper, I motivate these claims and thus show that there is a puzzle. I then argue that the best solution is to deny that correctness is always independent of your epistemic position. As I explain, a notable upshot is that a central epistemic norm directs us to believe, not simply what is true, but what we are in a position to know.
0031-8116
3177-3196
Way, Jonathan
2c3f95c6-ba9f-4640-b2f6-d23363a96c48
Way, Jonathan
2c3f95c6-ba9f-4640-b2f6-d23363a96c48

Way, Jonathan (2021) A puzzle about enkratic reasoning. Philosophical Studies, 178 (10), 3177-3196. (doi:10.1007/s11098-020-01575-z).

Record type: Article

Abstract

Enkratic reasoning – reasoning from believing that you ought to do something to an intention to do that thing – seems good. But there is a puzzle about how it could be. Good reasoning preserves correctness, other things equal. But enkratic reasoning does not preserve correctness. This is because what you ought to do depends on your epistemic position, but what it is correct to intend does not. In this paper, I motivate these claims and thus show that there is a puzzle. I then argue that the best solution is to deny that correctness is always independent of your epistemic position. As I explain, a notable upshot is that a central epistemic norm directs us to believe, not simply what is true, but what we are in a position to know.

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More information

Accepted/In Press date: 2 September 2020
e-pub ahead of print date: 15 October 2020
Published date: 1 October 2021

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 437399
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/437399
ISSN: 0031-8116
PURE UUID: 063e94fd-23e6-40d0-bfe4-b8014d0bd3ca

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Date deposited: 29 Jan 2020 17:33
Last modified: 07 May 2024 16:55

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