UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON

FACULTY OF ARTS AND HUMANITIES

School of Humanities

THE REPRESENTATIONS OF ISLAM AND MUSLIMS AT THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY 2013-2016: A CORPUS-ASSISTED CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

by
Khaled A. Al-Anbar

Thesis for the degree of

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A B S T R A C T

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This thesis grew out of a sense that there is a timely need to investigate the representational dimension of language and ways in which ideologies are discursively constructed around a much-debated social group that captured global public concern in recent years. Through a specifically tailored discourse-analytical approach, the research combines Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Corpus Linguistics (CL) to analyse a 1,627,000-word corpus of 787 political speeches delivered at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) between 2013-2016. The value of conducting this investigation stems from the observation that divisive rhetoric has become increasingly acceptable in political dialogue around Islam and Muslims following the rise of (a) ISIS and its likes which claim to represent the religion and (b) right-wing populism in Europe. Less academic attention is given to investigating and critiquing the representations of Islam and Muslims in discourses delivered by key political leaders at global leading institutions like the United Nations, certainly not from a linguistic standpoint. It is in this particular context of knowledge gap that this study wishes to contribute.

With the help of CL, this predominantly qualitative investigation draws upon CDA as a theoretical stance and a methodological path to conduct in-depth analyses of the wider effects of bringing religion as an object of debate in international politics. The large data corpus allows me to explore the most frequently recurring representations which become naturalised and get disseminated through political discourse as a crucial vehicle of transmission. Some of the analytical methods applied in this study included Halliday's SFL, the DHA associated with the Vienna school of CDA and van Leeuwen's socio-semantic theories of legitimation.

Analyses unveil that the representations of Islam and Muslims in the discourses of the UNGA are seen as connected to wider depictions including those appearing in media portrayals and other political discourses outside the UN. The studied political statements debated views about (a) the religion itself (b) the threat of extremism, and (c) the challenges of Islamophobia. The thesis concludes by considering the implications of the research findings then provides several recommendations to embrace discourses that promote co-existence and challenge ones that provide sustenance to the 'clash of civilisations' thesis and the politics of fear it promulgates.

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DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP

I, **Khaled A. Al-Anbar,** declare that the thesis entitled *The Representations of Islam and Muslims in the United Nations General Assembly 2013-2016: A Corpus-Assisted Critical Discourse Analysis* and the work presented in the thesis are my own and has been generated by me as the result of my own original research.

I confirm that:

1. This work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research degree at this University;
2. Where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or any other qualification at this University or any other institution, this has been clearly stated;
3. Where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly attributed;
4. Where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given. With the exception of such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work;
5. I have acknowledged all main sources of help;
6. Where the thesis is based on work done by myself jointly with others, I have made clear exactly what was done by others and what I have contributed myself;
7. Parts of this work have been published as:

- Al-Anbar, K. (2018) *Politics of Inclusion/Exclusion in Framing Conflict: The Middle East Crisis in Political Discourse*, A paper presented at the International Conference on Interdisciplinary Social Science Studies. Oxford University, 12-14 October 2018.
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Signed: ……

Date: ……

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In the Name of Allah, the Most Beneficent, the Most Merciful

"Praise be to Allah, to Whom belong all things in the heavens and on earth: to Him be Praise in the Hereafter: and He is full of Wisdom, acquainted with all things" (34: 1, Holy Quran)

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BNC	*British National Corpus*
CBMI	*Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia*
CDA	*Critical Discourse Analysis*
CL	*Corpus Linguistics*
CLA	*Critical Language Awareness*
COCA	*Corpus of Contemporary American English*
CTL	*Critical Text Linguistics*
DA	*Discourse Analysis*
DAISH	*Al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham (Arabic Acronym)*
DHA	*Discourse-Historical Approach*
DRA	*Dialectical Relation Approach*
ECRI	*European Commission against Racism and Intolerance*
EP	*European Parliament*
EU	*European Union*
EUMC	*European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia*
HKJ	*Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*
ISIL	*Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant*
ISIS	*Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham*
KWIC	*Key Word in Context*
PBUH	*Peace Be Upon Him*
PDA	*Political Discourse Analysis*
PM	*Prime Minister*
SFL	*Systemic Functional Linguistics*
TL	*Text Linguistics*
UN	*United Nations*
UNAC	*United Nations Alliance of Civilisations*
UNGA	*United National General Assembly*
UNSC	*United National Security Council*
WoT	*War on Terror*

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

It is not a time for provoking a clash of civilisations or for the self-fulfilling prophecy that such a clash is inevitable. It is rather a time for global engagement and coalition building, for the active promotion of coexistence and cooperation

(Esposito 2002: xii)

1.1. SETTING THE STUDY IN CONTEXT

The positive message encapsulated in the above quotation provides significant clues about the context in which this thesis is situated i.e. the active promotion of coexistence and cooperation at times of peril. This thesis aims at critically investigating the representations of Islam and Muslims in a corpus of international diplomatic addresses[1] delivered at the United Nations General Assembly (henceforth, UNGA). To achieve this aim, this research employs Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Corpus Linguistics (CL) to examine a 1,627,000-word corpus of 787 political speeches delivered at four consecutive annual sessions between 2013-2016. Contextually, a complex array of factors including the epochal and malicious events of 9/11, the rise of multifarious radicalised groups claiming to represent the religion of Islam, and the rise of right-wing populism have all given rise to exclusionary discourses on Islam and Muslims but also further complicated the normative task of integrating pluralistic and multicultural narratives into political discourse. Understanding representation as a process of discursive production calls attention to political speeches in which identities of various groups are defined and distinguished. A key concern in times of high tension is to focus on how to avoid making universal assumptions about particular groups of people but also how to make religious references on the basis of which various political actors can cooperate on a global scale to encounter some of the most pressing issues facing humanity in the 21st century.

[1] Donahue and Prosser (1997) point out that within the United Nations institutional framework specific terminologies are used to refer to spoken language as well as written documents; 'text' refers to the physical record of a discourse, 'address' is a formal speech delivered at one of the UN bodies, and a 'speechtext' is a written transcription of an address.

Whilst the disfavour of Islam and Muslims can be traced back to early Orientalist discourses (Said, 1978), there is now growing evidence of the manifestation of Islamophobic sentiments in political discourse in ways that reinforce the association between Islam and violence by drawing on a pre-existing corpus of representations constructed and produced by Orientalist discourses. On 14 December 2015, the UN's Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, *Adama Dieng*, and the Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, *Jennifer Welsh*, issued a press release statement condemning the escalation of Islamophobia and religious intolerance in political discourse. They cautioned:

> We are sickened by blatant manifestations of hatred and intolerance, including by public figures in response to terrorist attacks by violent extremists, particularly the deliberate and dangerous spread of misinformation and the manipulation of people's fears and concerns for political gain
>
> (Press Statement by Adama Dieng and Jennifer Welsh, 2015)

Later in the same statement and in the context of countering Islamophobic language used by several public officials[2] or candidates wishing to be elected to public office, the special UN advisors also warned that:

> At this time when the world is facing complex challenges, including confronting extremist violent groups and individuals, governments and other leading actors in society should publicly counter lies, prejudice and fear
>
> (ibid, 2015)

This press release, among many others, is an explicit UN statement aimed at discouraging prejudice and bigotry directed at Muslims in the political sphere. The existence of negative attitudes towards Muslim communities, through discursive production, can unquestionably contribute to the potentiality of radicalisation and the everlasting perception of religious rift and global unrest. However, normatively politicians need to be fair, sensitive and accountable when depicting faith as representations might have far-reaching consequences, especially knowing that (a) discourses about religion continue to frame major social changes in the world since the last two centuries (see Green and Searle-Chatterjee, 2008), and (b) religion and security have become the new nexus in international relations (see Seiple and Hoover, 2004). Otis (2004: 11) justifiably argues that 'the twenty-first century will be a time of religious violence and warfare. Although religion has long been

[2] The second chapter provides examples of such use of language.

recognised as one factor, among many, relevant to discussions of security and war-making…it is now emerging (or rather, re-emerging) as the single most important political-ideological default mechanism in global conflict'.

Academic scholarship, at the time of conducting this research, reveals that Islamophobia and negative representations of Islam and Muslims are on the rise especially in Europe and the United States (Abbas, 2001; Baker et al., 2013; Siemaszko, 2015). Recently in 2011, the *United Nations Alliance of Civilizations* (UNAC) identified Islamophobia as an important area of concern. In Britain, the *Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia* (1997) produced a report entitled 'Islamophobia: a challenge for us all' identifying eight components of Islamophobia in British society. Then, in 2004 the same body published another report that focussed on the growth of Islamophobia following the 9/11 attacks as well as the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. This latter report affirmed that such remarkable events not only affected the representations of the religion but also made life more difficult for British Muslims. Not Dissimilarly, polls in the United States indicated a climate of Islamophobia. According to a recent Gallup poll in 2015, 43% of surveyed Americans have reported that they harbour some degree of prejudice towards Muslims (Gallup Poll, 2015). The same poll highlighted that Muslims are the most likely religious group in the US to report experiencing religious or racial discrimination.

However, with an increasing attention turning to the language of political and religious extremism (e.g. Chilton, 2004; Zhou et al., 2005; Pennebaker & Chung, 2008; Prentice et al., 2012) or the depictions of Islam across social and media spheres (e.g. Dunn, 2001; Poole, 2002; Richardson, 2004; Poole and Richardson, 2006; Baker, 2010; Baker et al., 2013), less academic attention is given to investigating the characterisations of Islam and Muslims in relevant discourses of key political leaders or world-leading institutions, certainly not from a critical linguistic perspective. It is in this particular context of knowledge gap that this study wishes to contribute. This study is unique in two principal ways. First, it is a pioneering empirical investigation which aims to explore debating a specific identified theme as it appears in political speeches delivered at the UNGA. Second, the study benefits from a novel methodological synergy between critical discourse analysis and corpus linguistics to illuminate both overt and covert representations in the studied corpus of political speeches.

Choosing to focus on discourses delivered at the UN stems from my belief that this international institution plays an important role in manufacturing world politics, collective beliefs, and ideologies around the most pressing world issues. Foucault (1972) stresses the interrelation between 'institution and discourse' and proposes

the notion of 'institutional power' as a tool of political legitimacy. Foucault's argument emphasises that the power of the institution affects both (a) the discourses and subjects involved in the arguments taking place at a certain institutional site and (b) the layperson or subjects in the public sphere[3] who attach credibility and/or legitimacy to certain discourses by virtue of the institutional framework they appear within (ibid.). Undoubtedly, the position and power which iconic political figures at the UNGA enjoy enhance the opportunity that their messages can be crucial to the construction of social reality due to their role in decision making (See Gal, 2005) and the 'symbolic power' they enjoy (Bourdieu, 1982). In this connection, Baker (2012: 254-255) confirms that:

> Negative representations of social groups are problematic whatever context they occur in, but certain contexts, such as those which are made by powerful or influential text producers or are received by powerful people and/or reach very large numbers of people, may result in more immediate and damaging consequences.

In a CDA spirt, the overall purpose of this thesis is not limited to an academic exercise; it is envisaged that the case-study analyses presented in this work will essentially contribute to greater consciousness of the linguistic mechanisms and textual strategies by which politicians legitimise their arguments and naturalise their ideologies.

Researchers embarking on a project that concerns the representations of a certain religion /religious group have to set limits to the sources and time on which they will focus in order to determine what they are looking for and then establish an analytical strategy. This thesis focusses on examining the myriad ways in which political elite have talked about Islam and Muslims within the UNGA as an international institutional platform, particularly during the four consecutive years (2013-2016). The chosen period is significant as it reflects heightened concerns about 'Muslims' in relation to 'terrorism'. Following the Arab Spring[4] movements of 2010/2011, turmoil swept over many countries in the Middle East, and one of the unfortunate developments was a power vacuum in certain places (e.g. major cities in Iraq and Syria). This gave way to the rise of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and

[3] See Althusser (1971: 136-137) for his account on institutional apparatuses in capitalist societies and their role in formulating dominant ideological systems.

[4] Arab Spring refers to the period of political upheaval and revolutions that swept over the Arab world as of January 2011 and is still on-going (up to the time of writing this thesis). Other popular designations included 'Arab Revolution', 'Arab Uprisings', 'Arab Revolt', 'Arab Awakening'.

al-Sham (ISIS[5]) – a radicalised group that represents a 'totalitarian and genocidal project' under the name of religion (Schmid 2015: 1). Crucially, the claim that such 'self-styled Islamic' group represents the 'pure and unadulterated'[6] version of Islam necessarily involves a negative influence on the representations of the religion of Islam via portraying it as being rooted in violence and extremism. Sadly, what further problematises modern discourses around Islam is a growing evidence for the rise of Islamophobia in political statements (cf. Council on American-Islamic Relations Report, 2017) in ways that contribute to fuelling anti-Muslim sentiment.

Following the 71st General Assembly Annual Session in 2016, the *Department for General Assembly and Conference Management* (DGACM) published 'A Consolidated Synopsis' of the major trends of issues across recent annual UNGA sessions, including a ranking of the most frequently raised topics in the debates over recent years. The synopsis shows that reference to 'terrorism issues' has sharply surged between 2013-2016 forming topical 'spikes' when compared to data from the years 2010-2012.



Figure 1.1: Terrorism Issues Focus at the UNGA annual sessions (2009-2016)

As illustrated in *Figure 1.1* above, while 82 UN member states debated issues related to terrorism in 2009, 99 member states did in 2010, 88 in 2011, and 90 in 2012. However, references to terrorism shot up to 168 times in the year 2013 (which corresponds to 86% of participating member states debating the topic). In the three following years 2014, 2015 and 2016, debate around terrorism continued its

[5] a.k.a. ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) or DAISH the Arabic acronym for (Al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham).

[6] See Schmid, 2015, p.4 for the arguments behind this claim and its counter-arguments.

momentum with 163 member states discussing it in 2014, 129 in 2015, and 160 in 2016. The figures obtained from the DGACM synopsis clearly reflect a monumental shift with an expansion of debates around terrorism and mounting interest in the topic starting from the year 2013. The most significant consequence of the focus on terrorism in the UNGA debate is the role it plays in what Cohen (1963) termed 'agenda-setting'. Whilst politicians might not be able to tell people how to think, they can be successful in telling discourse recipients what to think and what topics matter. In total, while the number of UN member states which debated terrorism issues was 359 states between 2009-2012, this figure rose up to 620 states between 2013-2016 (see *figure 1.2* below).



Figure 1.2: Comparing Terrorism Issues Focus at the UNGA annual sessions (2009-2012 vis-à-vis 2013-2016)

Preliminary analyses of raw data revealed that not only debates around terrorism increased between 2013-2016, but also mentions of the lemmata[7] ISLAM and MUSLIM across the corpus have risen and become highly frequent. As *figure 1.3* below demonstrates, the number of times Islam and Muslim(s) were mentioned escalated from a total of 192 times between 2009-2012 to 520 times between 2013-2016. These findings together provide statistical evidence for a topical spike of debate around terrorism as well as Islam and Muslims between 2013-2016.

[7] From the singular 'lemma' which means 'a set of word forms consisting of a basic uninflected form and its inflectional variants' (Hoffmann et al., 2008: 40-41).



Figure 1.3: Comparing mentions of Islam & Muslims at the UNGA annual sessions (2009-2012 vis-à-vis 2013-2016)

As will become obvious in later chapters, the discourses analysed in this project have predominantly come out in the context of countering the momentum of ISIS and its likes. The speakers' intensive reference to Islam and Muslims in the context of discussing terrorism (more specifically, the rise of ISIS) echoes the concerns animating broader societal debates on the issue, emphasising the same kind of questions about the role of religion in inspiring recent acts of violence.

From a linguistic perspective, another important reason for becoming interested in studying the representations of Islam and Muslims in political discourse in this particular point of history – following the rise of a group like ISIS – lies in the fact that we are witnessing a change of the structure and nomenclature of terror organisations. Undoubtedly, a group like ISIS presents us with a new challenge in the ways it selectively appropriates and refashions traditional Islamic concepts mostly by means of nomination and predication strategies which are employed to serve political and recruiting purposes. The frequent lengthy audio recordings broadcasted by the group in addition to the professionally-produced materials publicised through the group's online magazine Dabiq[8] in several languages send a clear message that this group is unprecedented when it comes to branding its ideology through productions that are linguistically well-crafted and multi-semiotic in nature.

[8] Produced by *Al-Hayat Media Centre* (the media wing of ISIS), *Dabiq* has been described as 'a high-production quality, glossy online magazine' which 'sets out a clear agenda and is an integral part of the ISIS propaganda, branding, marketing and recruitment strategy' (Wignell et al. 2017: 1-2).

There are multifarious illustrations which can be cited as examples of the complexities of the interplay between language and ideology in the group's linguistic choices. For instance, the designation *Al Dawla Al-Islamyya* which translates into 'Islamic State' is a carefully-made linguistic selection that is highly symbolic and well entrenched in Islamic history. The English translation does not do justice nor captures the significance of the name as a religious and political concept which relates to an ideal state of a universal Islamic community, well-connected by faith and spirituality. Based on this, the translation 'Islamic State' could be misleading if generally understood as implying a western conception of bureaucratic statehood (McConnell, 2015).

Another example of how ISIS strategically uses nominations is evidenced through the designation *Dawlat Al Khilafah* (caliphate[9]) which is also another concept tightly linked to the history of Islamic law and theology. Recontextualising the notion of a caliphate through discursive narratives that romanticise the construction of an imagined community and idealist form of governance draws attention to an unprecedented strategic use of language in an attempt to re-invent and resurrect a historical 'golden age' by which all Muslims will have to unite under the caliph's aegis.

A third example that noticeably reflects the group's careful nomenclature strategy is the choice of *Dabiq* as the name of the group's online magazine. According to its first issue in July 2014, the name is taken from the area named Dabiq in the northern countryside of Halab (Aleppo) in Sham. Dabiq was mentioned in a prophetic hadith describing some of the events of the Malahim – the location of a gathering of armies for a battle during the end times or what is sometimes referred to as Armageddon in English. The potential appeal and numerous signals embedded in using a nomenclature like 'Dabiq' assert the group's careful linguistic choices which are crafted with symbolism aimed to be meaningful to potential recruits.

These are just a few examples of the great many problematic linguistic nominations that have become a ubiquitous feature of the lexicon used by contemporary radical organisations. I strongly believe that taking such labels and nominations for granted in political statements and argumentation schemes is profoundly unhelpful and counter-productive in the attempt to control violence and dismantle the ideologies of extremist groups. In such a context, I find it important to explore whether discursive productions at the UNGA challenge the articulation of certain nominations which are strategically employed by a group like ISIS.

[9] A strategically ambiguous and historically based understanding of governance that romanticises an imagined community which emulates the image of the early Islamic ruling institution.

In keeping with the interests of this research, there will be an emphasis on exploring the ways in which the rise of radicalised movements (like *ISIS, Al-Shabaab*[10] *and Boko-Haram*) might affect the representations of the religion and its adherents in political discourse. In addition to conducting corpus-assisted analyses of the 787 political speeches under study, the thesis will identify individual texts/speakers believed to have played a significant role in constructing representations of Islam and Muslims (see section 4.2.1 for the rationale for data selection).

From a linguistic standpoint and since the analytical focus of this study is the diplomatic discourses delivered by leaders at the United Nations, it is worth pointing out that this genre of text, produced by elite individuals within a specific institutional framework, represents a form of international interaction involving debates over the most pressing world issues. While, as articulated earlier, the speeches at the UNGA acquire special importance in their own right as powerful tools in the political field of diplomatic interaction, it has to be made clear that these discourses feature distinctive characteristics at the linguistic and discursive levels in terms of framing and formatting. Central to the discussion in this context are Donahue and Prosser's (1997: 65) four features of the addresses delivered at the UNGA which provide a significant indication for a specific 'genre' that involves:

- Congratulating the current president of the proceedings, or at least addressing the speech towards him/her.
- Affirming the importance or necessity of the UN and one's allegiance to its aims.
- Using highly polite and formal language.
- Providing observations on regional or world issues.

Methodologically, this research approaches the studied discourses assuming a dialectical relationship between discourse and social practice drawing on concepts and analytical tools from the Dialectical-Relational Approach (associated with Norman Fairclough), the Discourse-Historical Approach (associated with the Vienna school of Ruth Wodak and her colleagues) as well as the Socio-Semantic Models of Representation and Legitimation Strategies (associated with Theo van Leeuwen). The conscious methodological choices in this thesis are driven by the ambition of providing a guide on how to conduct an analysis of representations in political discourse employing a synergy that combines various strands of CDA with Corpus Linguistics analytical tools. Applying a methodological synergy of

[10] Composed of a mixture of Somali recruits and foreign fighters, Al-Shabaab is another militant group affiliated to al Qaeda which benefited from Somalia's decades-long chaos to maintain its hold on large parts of rural areas in south-central Somalia in 2015, and perpetrated a number of attacks in Somalia and neighbouring Kenya.

quantitative and qualitative analyses can be useful in exploring how patterns of positive/negative representations of Islam and Muslims are actualised across various discourses at the collocational, structural and stylistic levels. CDA, in its different strands, is a powerful mechanism for identifying social problems, revealing power inequalities and discursive injustices. Meanwhile, corpus tools are means for considering large amounts of data which enable practitioners to make statistically-supported claims based on quantitative evidence[11]. Attempting to achieve a balance of using CDA and CL whereby each one reinforces the other is a task taken up in this thesis, and as McEnery and Wilson (1996: 169) put it forward '[G]one is the concept of the corpus as the sole *explicandum* of language use. Present instead is the concept of a balanced corpus being used to *aid* the investigation of a language'.

1.2. INTRODUCING CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS: AGENDA & PRINCIPLES

In this section, Critical Discourse Analysis is briefly discussed, reserving a more detailed discussion for chapter 3. CDA is predicated on the idea that discursive and social processes are interconnected. Over recent decades, CDA has been established as a branch of linguistics that essentially regards language as a form of social practice and studies discourse from interdisciplinary perspectives. What distinguishes CDA from other schools is its unequivocal commitment to criticising unfair social practices with the aim of driving positive change (Titscher et al. 2000). Fairclough's *Language and Power* (1989) is seen as a foundational book which introduced CDA as a useful framework for exposing the power of language in political struggle, highlighting links between discursive and non-discursive spheres of politics. Explaining their view of CDA, Fairclough, Mulderrig and Wodak (2011: 357) argue that:

> We might best see CDA as a problem-oriented interdisciplinary research movement subsuming a variety of approaches, each with different theoretical models, research methods and agenda.

The theoretical and methodological approaches employed in this thesis draw heavily on CDA which, by definition, is committed to sociologically oriented textual analyses and postulates connections among the three pillars *Language, Ideology and Power*. CDA is an interdisciplinary approach that primarily studies 'the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context' (Van Dijk 2001a: 352). Whether it be

[11] Section 3.10.4 discusses in further detail the significance of combining Critical Discourse Analysis with Corpus Linguistics.

for the most successful speakers in promoting their agenda or those who did not learn the art to conceal their views, politicians are aware that '[T]hose who control discourse control society' (De Landtsheer, 1998: 4) and that political discourse is a mechanism of social production that primarily aims to present audiences with the declared interests of political actors. However, invisible and undeclared interests can still be 'denaturalized' by critically exploring contradictions, mischaracterisations, and inconsistencies in discourse. In order to achieve such an emancipatory goal, CDA explicitly declares solidarity with the oppressed and borrows concepts from multifarious disciplines to maintain a critical exploration of the research problem.

This thesis is premised on Mulderrig's (2016) view that CDA applications involve adopting both 'a rationale in which discourse is seen as part of the problem and discourse analysis as a way of addressing the problem through interpretation and critique'. CDA thus becomes an appropriate analytical framework to approach the specific problem addressed in this thesis i.e. the representations of Islam and Muslims in recent years which encounter a twofold challenge: (a) reinforced negative stereotyping and Islamophobic attitudes in the political, social and media spheres which constitute a 'discourse' in the Foucauldian sense; and (b) a discursively hegemonic discourse of terrorism operating under the name of Islam which aims to achieve politically motivated goals.

Procedurally, CDA usually begins with the identification of a social problem with a discursive aspect attached to it (Chouliaraki & Fairlclough, 1999: 60). Since 'determining interest in advance' is a distinguishing feature of CDA projects (cf. section 3.4 for further discussion) and since self-reflection is pivotal to being 'critical', I find it useful to reflect on my stance[12] as a Muslim researcher embarking on a CDA project that involves investigating the representations of Islam and Muslims. I cannot claim that my choice of the topic or the analyses presented in this research are totally unbiased. Such claim cannot be made given that 'all social research is biased' and that 'what exists is what we perceive to exist' (Burr, 1995: 2). McEnery et al. (2013: 274) warn practitioners in the field of discourse analysis about the dangers of claiming totally unbiased analyses affirming that 'anybody who makes such a claim is misguided'. In fact, a commonly held precept of CDA is that it acknowledges that no single reading of the text can be the 'objective' or 'most comprehensive' as explained in the following quotation from Fairclough (2003: 14-15):

[12] I follow Biber and Finegan's (1989) conceptualisation of *stance* as 'the lexical and grammatical expression of attitudes, feelings, judgements, or commitment concerning the propositional content of a message'.

> We should assume that no analysis of a text can tell us all there is to be said about it – there is no such thing as a complete and definitive analysis of a text. Textual analysis is also inevitably selective: in any analysis, we choose to ask certain questions about social events and texts, and not other possible questions.

He continues:

> There is no such thing as an 'objective' analysis of a text, if by that we mean an analysis which simply describes what is 'there' in the text without being 'biased' by the 'subjectivity' of the analyst.

Accordingly, I acknowledge that, to a certain extent, interpretations and readings appearing from my analyses would involve aspects of my own identity as a Muslim and cognitive alignments as a human. Although there is nothing, in my view, that prevents a Muslim from researching a topic that involves Islam and Muslims, the triangulation[13] of approaches and methodologies as well as the reflexive mindset which I attempt to adopt throughout this project are helpful in approaching my data and analyses in ways that assist in reducing the potential for researcher bias to affect my interpretations and explanations. Throughout this work, I attempt as much as I can to avoid making definitive statements about the studied discourses and to allow readers to draw their own conclusions. In every stage of my analysis, I seek a balance between 'sitting on the fence' through being descriptive and engaging with the remit of CDA through being critical.

1.3. AIMS OF THE STUDY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This thesis grew out of a sense that there is a timely need to investigate the representational dimension of language and ways in which ideologies are discursively constructed around a much-debated social group that captured global public concern in recent years. Embracing a heuristic discourse-analytical approach, the present thesis sheds light on how world leaders used language to invigorate urgent international cooperation to resolve one of the pivotal and most pressing issues facing humanity in the 21st century, i.e. the rise of terrorism. At issue are the politics of representation and the scenarios of how the *Self* and *Other* are depicted

[13] Triangulation is a concept coined by Newby (1977) referring to the idea of utilising multiple methods of analysis and data types. Baker (2006: 16) lists the following advantages of triangulation: 'it facilitates validity checks of hypotheses, it anchors findings in more robust interpretations and explanations, and it allows researchers to respond flexibly to unforeseen problems and aspects of their research'.

by multiple political actors representing groups who belong to different regional and religious backgrounds. Zotzmann and O'Regan (2016: 114) assert that:

> classifications of self and other are largely influenced by discourses about social groups that are produced and re-produced at different levels of society and in different social spheres, e.g. the media, education and politics

In a similar vein, Wilson (2001: 401) views representation in political discourse as associated with 'the issue of how language is employed in different ways to represent what we can know, believe, and perhaps think', while Chilton (2004) posits that misrepresentation is 'simply lying, in its most extreme manifestation, but includes various kinds of omissions, verbal evasion and denial' (p. 46).

The impetus for this work, therefore, becomes to unravel and demystify the (micro and macro) strategies through which certain discourses constructed identities and representations of the *Self* and *Other*. Analytic attention will focus on the content of the speeches, the discursive and argumentation strategies employed by the speakers, the linguistic realisations (i.e., language patterns and devices) used to achieve a persuasive function in addition to locating any interdiscursive connections and intertextual relations. Using DHA's triangulation framework developed by Wodak and Meyer (2009), this thesis aims to analyse four levels of context: (1) the text-internal context, (2) the intertextual and interdiscursive relationships, (3) the context of situation, and finally (4) the socio-political and historical context[14].

The study incorporated in this thesis is oriented to the following aims: (a) revealing the linguistic resources that political speakers use to construct the image of Islam and Muslims in the UNGA, (b) identifying the discursive-strategic aspects of the studied discourses and their ideological underpinnings, and (c) exploring the ideological positions and identity narratives of different political leaders in authentic speeches that debated issues surrounding Islam and Muslims. In principle, the following five research questions were formulated in accordance with the previously mentioned aims of the current research:

1. In what ways are Islam and Muslims represented in UNGA high-level debates between 2013-2016?

[14] Also see section 4.3 for a detailed discussion on the strands of CDA employed in the analyses.

2. What are the frequent topics of debate around Islam and Muslims in the studied corpus?
3. What are the discursive and argumentation strategies employed by political elite to construct views and legitimise arguments about Islam and Muslims?
4. On a micro-level, what are some of the typical traits and style selections used by different political actors, and for what purpose?

It is hoped that by offering answers to these questions the present thesis will contribute to a better understanding of the construction of the image of Islam and Muslims in the speeches delivered at the UNGA between 2013-2016.

1.4. OUTLINE OF THE THESIS

In order to achieve the above-mentioned aims and answer the questions underpinning the discussion, this thesis is presented in seven chapters of which this introduction is the first – the organisational structure of this thesis is as follows:

- **Chapter 1** provides an introduction to the thesis attempting to set the study in its context. It then moves on to introduce CDA, its agenda and some of its key principles. This first chapter also presents the motivation of the study, its aims and research questions before finally offering this breakdown of the thesis.

- **Chapter 2**, which consists of two main parts, essentially builds on the context presented in the first chapter by taking into account some of the historical and current issues pertaining to the representations of Islam and Muslims. Much of what Chapter 2 hopes to achieve is some critical reflections on research problem viz. the contemporary resurgence of fear of Islam and Muslims in many parts of the world. Building on the understanding that discourse is dialectically a constitutive and constituent component of social reality (Stoegner and Wodak, 2016), the first part of the second chapter provides basic contextual information that allows readers to understand what kind of impact a particular political history can have on formulating discourses around Islam and Muslims. This part also makes a case for understanding the politics of fear and affect pre-and-post 9/11 reflecting on the renewed concerns appearing as a result of the dramatic rise of ISIS and its likes. Meanwhile, the bulk of the second part of this chapter considers the

United Nations as a spatial setting of the analysed speeches offering a critique of its role as a global governance institutional framework.

- **The third chapter** clarifies the chief theoretical assumptions that inform this study, the main approaches it employs as well as the methodological instruments applied in the analysis. The first part of this chapter is primarily theoretical comprising a discussion of key concepts in CDA including *discourse*, *critique*, *power* and *ideology* together with reflections on the theoretical developments of studying language and the relationship between linguistics and social sciences (or what is termed 'the cultural turn'). The chapter then delves into the ontological and epistemological underpinnings of CDA as the major framework of analysis employed in this thesis. It synthesises principal scholarship of analysing political discourse in order to explain the reasoning behind choosing CDA as an analytical framework to critique discursive representations of Islam and Muslims. Then, another section in this chapter is devoted to the genesis of CDA, its aims, methodological procedure and some of its major criticisms, in a kind of literature review of the paradigm. Finally, in seeking to explain how the major CDA strands adopted in this study will work in practice, the final part of the chapter sheds further light on the premises of each approach.

- **Chapter 4** is chiefly concerned with presenting the stages of compiling the corpus of the study, the electronic text-encoding procedure as well as the toolkit employed to analyse the data quantitatively and qualitatively based on the approaches outlined in the preceding chapter. Whilst the first part of the chapter is primarily devoted to outlining the procedure of capturing data, the second and more practical part of this chapter focusses on the operationalisation of CDA and corpus linguistics presenting the major categories of discourse analysis (micro and macro) which will be the basis of empirical work that follows.

- **Chapter 5** presents the collocational profile and the ideological representations of the lemmata ISLAM and MUSLIM which occurred 520 times within the UNGA corpus of 787 speeches. Analyses in this chapter examine collocations using the corpus linguistic tool *Sketch Engine* and explore some of the ideological representations using CDA methods. I scrutinise word sketches, lists of collocations and concordance lines to find out the most commonly occurring themes discussed in relation to Islam and Muslims. This chapter also aims to go beyond the descriptive level by linking representations to the wider socio-political contexts that underlie them.

- The penultimate chapter (**Chapter 6**) which takes up and extends the analyses conducted in Chapter 5 is where I analyse four selected speeches to look at how Islam and Muslims are contested by four politicians representing Muslim and non-Muslim voices. One of the key foci of this chapter is to examine the linguistic and ideological representations of the religion and its adherents in the four analysed speeches. The analyses in this chapter also aim to provide a socio-political perspective on the studied speeches by means of elucidating a set of discursive strategies employed to construct identities of different social and political actors (e.g. groups, parties, and states) according to particular political agendas.

- Finally, **Chapter 7** draws together the insights of the various chapters, summarising the findings of the thesis by revisiting its research questions and offering a more general discussion of the implications. The conclusions offered in this chapter locate the findings within the wider socio-political contexts sketched out in chapter two. This chapter emphasises the need for attending to the discursive construction of Islam and Muslims in political discourse as well as the political and social consequences of the many ways of representing the religion and those who profess the Muslim faith. Furthermore, this chapter considers the wider effects of bringing religion as an object of debate in international politics. Finally, the chapter concludes the thesis with some recommendations and implications that address some of the issues that have been raised by the current project before briefly discussing some limitations of this endeavour and making suggestions for further study.

Chapter 2

POLITICAL & HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The question of Islam as a political force is a vital question of our times and will be for several years to come. The precondition for its treatment with a minimum of intelligence is probably not to start from a platform of hatred

Michel Foucault (1996: 708)[15]

2.1. REPRESENTATIONS OF ISLAM AND MUSLIMS: THE SOCIO-POLITICAL AND DISCOURSE-HISTORICAL DIMENSION

This chapter aims to offer a description of the historical and current issues pertaining to the representations of Islam and Muslims. However, I have to admit that the review of portrayals of Islam and Muslims presented in this chapter remain skeletal given the impossibility of offering a comprehensive account that deals with all aspects of depicting Islam and Muslims. Much of what this chapter hopes to achieve is some critical reflections on the contemporary resurgence of fear of Islam and Muslims in many parts of the world, which, as will be established later on, is the result of a complex array of factors.

Building on the understanding that discourse is dialectically a constitutive and constituent component of social reality (Wodak and Meyer, 2016), the first part of this chapter provides basic contextual information that helps readers realise what kind of impact a particular political history can have on formulating discourses around a particular group of people. This part sheds light on the politics of fear and affect pre-and-post 9/11 and paves the road for reflections on the renewed concerns that came out as a result of the dramatic rise of ISIS and its likes. After attempting to historicise the discourses of religious difference in relation to anxiety, fear or animosity towards Islam and Muslims prior to and post 9/11, the chapter then

[15] Michel Foucault, *Dits et Ecrits III* (Paris: Gallimard, 1996), 708, quoted in Francois Burgat, Face to Face with Political Islam (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), 177.

reflects on the concomitant US-led global 'War on Terror' which has only deepened the scrutiny and suspicion of Islam and Muslims and created discourses that promote alienation and division. The second part of this chapter considers the anarchical nature of world politics and reflects on what means of cooperation are most prominent in international relations. These discussions are primarily meant to pave the road for introducing the United Nations as a spatial setting of the analysed speeches before questioning its role as an institutional structure for global governance.

The following questions will somehow guide the discussion in the present chapter: To what extent are the representations of Islam and Muslims unbiased? What does previous research tell us about the historical dimensions of representing the religion and its followers? In what ways have Orientalism and Islamophobia impacted on perceptions about Islam and Muslims? To what extent have 9/11 and the rise of radicalised organisations is a component in the construction of the image of Islam? These are some of the questions that will be addressed in the following sections.

2.1.1. Representing Islam and Muslims: Politics of fear and affection pre-and-post 9/11

Muslim/non-Muslim relations have historically been influenced by stereotypes which worked to the detriment of intercultural and interreligious dialogue. Undoubtedly, the Orientalist roots of the process of *Othering* Islam and Muslims paved the way for a climate of fearing the religion and its adherents. However, normatively mutual respect and reciprocal acceptance are inevitable for establishing harmony in our globalised world. There is a need for both Muslims and non-Muslims to accommodate the other and work constructively towards building global relations.

Religion is an integral part of human life which, in fact, has played a significant role in shaping the cultural identity of people across various communities. Albanese (2012: 10) defines religion as 'a system of symbols (creed, code, cultus) by which people (as a community) locate themselves in the world with reference to both ordinary and extraordinary powers, meanings, and values'. Given the salience of religion in many parts of the world, it is important to shed further light on the positive role that religion plays in the lives of individuals. Religion helps people to regulate behaviour but also to cope with difficulties. Hemeyer (2015: 26) asserts that following the 9/11 atrocities 'Americans had in fact attended religious services in higher numbers than usual, even discounting the special services in the aftermath of the attacks'.

The three Abrahamic religions – Christianity, Judaism and Islam – share beliefs, concepts and history and call for interfaith dialogue emphasising that spheres of acceptance and mutual goodwill are much larger than issues of difference. Allah says in the Holy Qur'an:

> O mankind, indeed We have created you from male and female and made you peoples and tribes that you may know one another. Indeed, the most noble of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous of you. Indeed, Allah is Knowing and Acquainted.
>
> (Al-Hujurat Surah 49:13)

Although the history of relations between Christianity, Judaism, and Islam has gone through numerous phases including the tense and uneasy, Al-Milad (2006: 336) posits that coexistence and getting to know the other 'is one of most noble concepts of communication and the most valuable and efficient way to avoid clashes among nations and differing civilizations'. On the importance of love for the neighbour, Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) said: 'None of you has faith until you love for your neighbour what you love for yourself' (Sahih Muslim, 45). Along similar lines, in the New Testament, Jesus Christ (PBUH) also said:

> Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is One. And you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, with all your mind, and with all your strength.' This is the first commandment. And the second, like it, is this: 'You shall love your neighbour as yourself. 'There is no other commandment greater than these.
>
> (Bible Gateway, 2016 - Mark 12: 29-31)

Even other scriptures - beyond the Abrahamic family of religions - enunciate the same principles of treating others as one would like to be treated and encourage peaceful coexistence. Esposito (2011) argues that geographical proximity, similar spiritual reference, and shared values are common denominators that link the West and Islam, and therefore should be constructive factors utilised for positive change. However, unfortunately, in spite of such closeness within the traditions and the fact that histories of the East and the West are tightly connected –providing enough reasons for cooperation – much of the recent history provides evidence to the contrary.

Whilst the terrorist attacks against the World Trade Centre and Pentagon on September 11, 2011 and later in Europe have, no doubt, given rise to negative portrayals of Islam and Muslims, issues of mischaracterising Islam and the link between Islam and terrorism go far beyond 9/11. The European Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) report following the 9/11 attacks

confirmed that '...anti-Muslim sentiment has emanated from a vast array of sources and taken on a range of manifestations... built upon premises that were already pre-existent to the events of September 11'. Accordingly, I claim that 9/11 came at a time where conditions were ripe for fearing Islam, and the event itself fed the growth of both fear of Islam in the West and anti-Americanism in the Muslim world. Of course, this does not mean that we should underestimate the 9/11 effect; statistics coming from the FBI official documents are evidence that violence against Muslims has risen noticeably following 9/11. In numbers, the five-year average of hate crimes increased from *30.6* before 9/11 to *171* for the five years following the event. Overall, however, it should be stressed that perceiving Islamophobia as a consequence of recent history terrorist incidents does not do justice to the complexity of the issue.

Manifestations of Islamophobia[16] can be traced back to early orientalist[17] discourses (Said, 1981/1997) in the latter part of the twentieth century which, by and large, contributed to the construction of a complex set of attitudes towards Islam and Muslims in Europe and the United States. The history of fearing Islam is interwoven with post-modernity, colonial expansionism and globalisation in ways that make this issue one of the most dominant epistemological problems in the modern era. In their two renowned essays *The Roots of Muslim Rage (1990)* and *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996)*, political scientists *Bernard Lewis* and *Samuel Huntington* respectively expected an ideological confrontation and that religio-cultural differences will become a major source of rift between nations in the aftermath of the break-up of the Soviet bloc. They both subscribed to the idea that the separation of politics and religion is exclusively a 'Judeo-Christian' achievement, and that Islam turns to violent means for it has been 'unable' or 'unwilling' to emulate such achievement.

A leading figure in the field of *Orientalism* is Edward Said[18], who discussed the representations of Islam in the West in a number of academic publications, theorises

[16] I follow Allen's (2010) conceptualisation of the term Islamophobia as both transitory and retrospective ideological phenomenon, functioning in the same way as anti-Semitism. Allen maintains that the term Islamophobia is 'a descriptor that is able to be employed to refer to all historical and paradigmatic anti-Muslim, anti-Islamic phenomena' (p. 14).

[17] Orientalist here refers to how the Western world perceives the non-Occidental other. Here I follow Said's description of Orientalism as 'a Western style for dominating, restructuring and having authority over the Orient' (1978, p. 20).

[18] Edward Said is a Palestinian American public intellectual, professor of literature and a prominent figure in the field of postcolonial studies. He wrote extensively on the cultural and political understanding between the Eastern and Western worlds, and is considered by many as a leading authority on the representation of Islam in the media. His works were influenced by Antonio Gramsci, Michel Foucault, Theodor Adorno, and others.

that a shift in the international 'configuration of forces' is noticeable (Said, 1997). Rather than arguing that a clash is unavoidable, Said sought to explore some of the ways in which Islam and Muslims are discursively constructed in a distorted way within a violent hierarchy of differentiation claiming that 'there has been an intense focus on Muslims and Islam in the American and Western media, most of it characterized by a more highly exaggerated stereotyping and belligerent hostility' (1997: xi). Said believed that Western focus on studying the Islamic civilization was 'political intellectualism' that aimed at affirming a European self-perception, rather than driven by an objective academic impetus. In *Orientalism*, Said (1978/ 2003: 287) went further to argue that even academic books and articles mirrored the anxiety and were subject to bias as popular media sources:

> Books and articles are regularly published on Islam and the Arabs that represent absolutely no change over the virulent anti-Islamic polemics of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance.

Similarly, Skalli (2004: 45-46) summed up his understanding of what he termed the 'Orientalist project' arguing that:

> Orientalism exploited real differences between Eastern and Western cultures and turned them into the logic of the superior versus the inferior race. To the Western superior being, civilised thinking and behaving was opposed by the mysterious, vicious and inferior Oriental being. In a unique exercise of distortion of historical and cultural realities, the Orientalist project established the 'us' versus 'them' opposition.

The Orientalist accounts of Muslims as the ontological *Other*, who is culturally backward, anti-Semitic and anti-Christian, repressive of women, irredeemably alien and averse to democracy, are part of what is now recognised by journalists, politicians and academic intellectuals as 'Islamophobia', a term that first appeared in a 1922 essay by Étienne Dinet[19], but has not become very popular as referring to a generalised fear of Islam and/or discrimination against Muslims until the 1990s. Kalin (2011: 4) defines Islamophobia as a term that denotes 'acts of intolerance, discrimination, unfounded fear and racism against Islam and Muslims'. It is argued that the most influential form of Islamophobia on public opinion are the ones practiced by the educated or elite members of society. Malik (2004: 9) postulates that:

[19] See Étienne Dinet (1922) L'Oreint vu de l'Occident. Paris: Paul Geuthner. Also, Allen and Nielsen (2002) offer a number of narratives on the coinage of the term and theories of its origin.

> Subtle forms [of Islamophobia] amongst the educated and well-placed elite are well entrenched and proportionately more dangerous… the elite formulates and disseminates racism to the grassroots, where it becomes more explicit and violent.

The United Nations was one of the first major world organisations to recognise the international scope of Islamophobia when in 2004 Kofi Annan, its then Secretary-General, invited UN members for a conference on confronting Islamophobia[20]. Annan emphasised the need to counter this form of hatred arguing that:

> [w]hen the world is compelled to coin a new term to take account of increasingly widespread bigotry – that is a sad and troubling development. Such is the case with 'Islamophobia'. Since the September 11 attacks on the United States, many Muslims, particularly in the West, have found themselves the objects of suspicion, harassment and discrimination… Too many people see Islam as a monolith as intrinsically opposed to the West.
>
> (Annan 'UN Secretary-General', 2004)

In the same year, Jacques Derrida in a conversation with Mustafa Cherif warned that there is a need 'to deconstruct the European intellectual construct of Islam' (2008, p. 38). Islamophobia, however, did not only occur in the U.S. and Europe but extended beyond making it a dominant epistemological, social, and political problem. Shryock (2010: 1) finds evidence that 'related strains of it [Islamophobia] are well developed in India and China, in several African states with sizable Muslim minorities, and even in Muslim-majority countries (Turkey, Egypt, Algeria, Lebanon), where prominent political parties and opposition groups are Islamist in orientation'.

Wherever they appear, stereotypes can produce problematic representations in media, cultural, and political discourses that homogenise 'others', justify actions against them and promote intolerance. Negative stereotypes have the power to 'act as an expression of prejudice and function as a tool to justify discrimination. Thus, stereotypes are not simply defectively defined social categories; they underpin and give meaning to social action' (Franklin et al., 2005: 254). Previous literature in western contexts suggests that, on the one hand, Muslims are increasingly associated with terrorism, extremism and intolerance; on the other hand, some

[20] *Confronting Islamophobia: Education for Tolerance and Understanding* is a conference that was organised by the United Nations Department of Public Information (UNDPI) and took place at UN Headquarters in New York as part of seminar series that aimed to raise international awareness regarding intolerance towards Islam and Muslims.

Muslims are increasingly seeing the West as an imperialistic coloniser who aims to destabilise the Muslim world.

A growing body of academic literature is, therefore, seeking to explore the resurgence of religion in the study of international politics. Whilst religion was previously peripheral in international politics, many analysts and observers agree that this has changed over the few past decades. Otis (2004: 11) justifiably argues that 'the twenty-first century will be a time of religious violence and warfare. Although religion has long been recognised as one factor, among many, relevant to discussions of security and war-making…it is now emerging (or rather, re-emerging) as the single most important political-ideological default mechanism in global conflict'. Not dissimilarly, Fox and Sandler (2004) observe that 'we must include in our understanding and research of international relations the various manifestations of religion and their influence on the range of social and political phenomena that the discipline of international relations seeks to explain' (p.1-2).

The rise of xenophobia and hostility towards minority groups, or what van Dijk (1992) termed as forms of 'modern racism' have become new mechanisms which neoliberal states use to (a) marginalise and silence opposition, (b) deflect attention away from political realities such as cuts in social services, issues of unemployment and struggles over economic resources. According to van Dijk, 'modern racism' is subtler and is sometimes justified as legitimate:

> The more 'modern', subtle and indirect forms of ethnic or racial inequality, and especially the 'racism', or rather 'ethnicism' based on constructions of cultural difference and incompatibility, is seldom characterized as 'racism', but at most as xenophobia, and more often than not, as legitimate cultural self-defence (1992: 93)

The paranoia stoked by the media has become now echoed by politicians to justify antagonising the *Other*. Capitalising on the threat of mass migration and linking it to the alleged 'danger' of multiculturalism is now replacing the traditional distinctions between 'East' and 'West' (or Christian Occident and Muslim Orient). For example, on 25 March 2011, Geert Wilders, the founder and leader of the *Party for Freedom* in the Netherlands, delivered a speech in Rome as a member of the then Dutch governmental coalition. In that speech, Wilders set a clear example of a discourse that unifies the Judeo-Christian civilization in contradistinction to a non-western *Other*. He maintains that:

> Together with Jerusalem and Athens, Rome is the cradle of our western civilization – the most advanced and superior civilization the world has ever seen. As Westerners, we share the same Judeo-Christian culture. I am from the Netherlands and you are from Italy. Our national cultures are branches of the same tree. We do not belong to multiple cultures, but

to different branches of one single culture. This is why, when we come to Rome, we all come home in a sense. We belong here, as we also belong in Athens and in Jerusalem. Ordinary people are well aware that they are witnessing a population replacement phenomenon. Ordinary people feel attached to the civilization which their ancestors created. They do not want it to be replaced by a multicultural society where the values of the immigrants are considered as good as their own. It is not xenophobia or Islamophobia to consider our Western culture as superior to other cultures – it is plain common sense.

The Runnymede Trust's Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia (CBMI[21]) produced a report in 1997 entitled '*Islamophobia: a challenge for us all'* in which it provided the following visual diagram that outlines the major problems encountered by some Muslim communities in the UK:



Figure 2.1: Islamophobia: a challenge for us all: Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, 1997

Based on a consultation paper designed by the commission and distributed to county councils, government departments, race equality councils and other organisations including universities and think-tanks, the report also listed the

[21] CBMI was established by a group of human rights activists, the Runnymede Trust, as research think-tank to respond to race riots. Their report on Islamophobia was amongst the first to recognise Islamophobia as a problem encountering the British Muslim population.

following discursive elements that contributed to the negative representation of Islam in the UK:

- Islam is seen as a single monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to new realities.
- Islam is seen as separate and other – (a) not having any aims or values in common with other cultures (b) not affected by them (c) not influencing them.
- Islam is seen as inferior to the West – barbaric, irrational, primitive, sexist.
- Islam is seen as violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of terrorism, engaged in 'a clash of civilisations'.
- Islam is seen as a political ideology, used for political or military advantage.
- Criticisms made by Islam of 'the West' rejected out of hand
- Hostility towards Islam is used to justify discriminatory practices towards Muslims and the exclusion of Muslims from mainstream society.
- Anti-Muslim hostility is accepted as natural and 'normal'.

(Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia 1997: 3)

In 2002, Allen and Nielsen of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) published *The Summary Report on Islamophobia in the EU after 11 September 2001*, which provided evidence of an increase in the acts of discrimination against Muslims in fifteen European countries in the recent years. Similarly, the online-published annual report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) warned ten years later that:

> Islamophobia continues to manifest itself in different guises within European societies. Muslim communities and their members continue to face prejudice, negative attitudes and discrimination. The discourse of certain political figures or some of the media contributes to this negative climate, which can sometimes lead to acts of violence against Muslim communities.
>
> (31 December 2007)

2.1.2. Attitudes towards Islam and Muslims in the Media

This section is intended to provide an account of the representations of Islam and Muslims in the media. Adopting Zotzmann and O'Regan's (2016) conception that perceptions of the *Self* and *Other* are affected by discourses 'produced and (re)produced at different levels of society and in different social spheres', it becomes necessary not to restrict our discussion about the representations of Islam and Muslims to academic references or organisational reports forgetting

about other social spheres including media which play greater role in shaping public perceptions of social groups in late modern societies.

Media function as the informational complex linking various aspects of society, and thus analysing media reports can, unquestionably, enlighten our understanding of the discourses surrounding Islam and Muslims and some of the historical and current issues pertaining to their representations. Media play a crucial role in the (re)production of knowledge about events as well as the construction of social reality (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). Media are not only a key source of information for laypeople who want to know what is going on in the world around them but also for key political actors[22].

There has been concentrated scrutiny of the representations of Islam and Muslims in the media over the past two decades, and the landmark work by Edward Said, *Covering Islam: How the Media and Experts Determine How We See The Rest of The World (1981, revised in 1997),* was amongst the first attempts that exposed multiple examples of mischaracterising Islam in the media. Said's book, as stated in its introduction, completed a trilogy of books that addressed modern relationships between the Islamic world, the Arab world and the Orient on one hand, and the West, primarily France, Britain and the US on the other. This trilogy began with *Orientalism* (1978, revised 2003), which Said describes as the most generalizing of the three, followed by *The Question of Palestine* (1979, revised in 2002), and *Covering Islam* (1981, revised in 1997). In *Covering Islam*[23], Said punned 'covering' in the two senses of 'reporting' and 'concealing'. Said argued that the media propagated Islam as extremist, anti-intellectual, fundamentalist, negative, threatening, oppressive and backward and in his view, such portrayals do not amount to an 'interpretation in the genuine sense but an assertion of power' (p. 150).

Since then, the proliferation of literature on the representations of Islam and Muslims in different contexts and using varying methodological techniques and approaches to analysis have, in fact, backed Said's conclusions. In 1996, Awass studied *The Representation of Islam in the American Media* and argued that Islam is

[22] For example, see MacNicol's (2011) analysis of how media outlets like *Al-Jazeera* and *CNN* were major sources of information for President Obama and his administration about the unfolding events of the Arab Spring in Egypt.

[23] *Covering Islam* consisted of three major parts: a first part examining portrayals of Islam in the news and media; a second part focussing on coverage of revolutionary Iran, the reporting of the Iranian hostage crisis as well as US media coverage of the siege of the American Embassy in Iran in 1981; and finally, a third part discussing relations of knowledge and power in the context of perceiving Islam and Middle Eastern cultures.

'the most misunderstood religion to Western society'. The author analysed news articles and his analyses revealed a 'prejudiced and inaccurate' coverage of Islam and Muslims that portrays Islam as derogatory and a threat to Western security (Awass, 1996: 96). Similarly, Dunn (2001) reported on the key stereotypes of Islam in the Australian media based on content analyses of the two daily newspapers *The Sydney Morning Herald* and *The Australian Financial Review* between 1992 and 1996. Dunn identified seven negative categories of reference to Islam or Muslims including: 'fanatic, intolerant, militant, fundamentalist, misogynist, alien and other negatives' (ibid., 296). The author recorded 870 instances of using the descriptive words 'Islam(ic)' or 'Muslim', 75% of which were associated with negative terms. Another study that also investigated the representations of Islam in Australian newspapers is Akbarzadeh and Smith (2005) which analysed the two newspapers *The Age* and *Herald Sun* between 2001 and 2004. The authors point out that although the two newspapers are not Islamophobic, 'the representation of Islam and Muslims is not problem-free' and that 'the type of news stories and their content could still leave a negative impression' (p. 36).

The British press has also come under much academic scrutiny for applying a problematic system of representations to stories on Islam. Richardson (2004) examined a selection of British broadsheet newspapers, including *The Financial Times*, the *Guardian*, the *Independent*, the *Telegraph*, the *Times*, the *Independent on Sunday* and the *Sunday Times*. Richardson used critical discourse analysis methods to approach the analysed texts which consisted of materials published over four months in the year 1997. He identified the four following argumentative themes that are linked to the reporting of Islam:

- A military threat.
- Associated with terrorists/extremists.
- A threat to democracy.
- A sexist or social threat.

Again, in the British context, Moore, Mason and Lewis (2008: 20-21) provided a content analysis of *The Representation of British Muslims in the National Print News Media 2000-2008* and concluded that:

- Coverage of British Muslims has increased over the period from 2000-2008.
- The bulk of coverage of British Muslims focusses on Muslims as a threat (in relation to terrorism), a problem (in terms of differences in values) or both.
- One in five stories about British Muslims make comparisons between Islam and other religions.

- The language used about British Muslims reflects the negative or problematic contexts in which they tend to appear.

The authors have also examined samples of visuals appearing in the studied articles and found out that visual representations were not much different from but rather reflected the portrayals indicated in the content analysis. Images included mugshots, Muslims outside police stations or law courts, Muslims engaged in religious practices, and Muslim men far more visible than Muslim women.

Applying a mixture of critical discourse analysis and corpus linguistics to examine more than 140 million words published in the British national press about Islam and Muslims, Baker et al.'s (2013) *Discourse Analysis and Media Attitudes: The Representation of Islam in the British Press* is another recent investigation that looked into the representations of Islam in the archives of the British press over an eleven-year period from (1998-2009). What is new in this book is its use of corpus linguistics tools to provide statistical evidence for a bias against Islam and Muslims in the British print media. Quantitative data provided in this book demonstrate the dramatic increase in stories surrounding Islam and Muslims and confirm that Muslims were generally represented within particular discursive frameworks as 'causes of concern if not sources of threat' (Baker et al. 2013: 65). Such quantitatively-supported findings are significant not only because they affirm previous investigations by other researchers who have based their analyses on smaller data sets, but also as they call attention to patterns of representation in the discourses of widely spread news organisations. The authors' categorization of representations enabled them to reflect on the complexities of portraying Islam and Muslims in certain social contexts.

In light of previous studies exploring media representations of Islam and Muslims, it becomes clear that the media coverage is not unbiased. To date, however, there is still a lack of scholarship addressing the ways in which Islam and Muslims are talked about in carefully crafted political discourses of top-level political speeches. This research, therefore, is an effort towards this research gap through conducting a comparative analysis of how a number of politicians portray Islam and Muslims within the UNGA as an international institutional framework. The next section takes a look at the influence of 9/11 and relates more to political discourse.

2.1.3. 9/11 and the 'War on Terror'[24] Political Discourse

> It does not matter whether the war is actually happening, and, since no decisive victory is possible, it does not matter whether the war is going well or badly. All that is needed is that a state of war should exist
>
> (George Orwell, 1984)

After attempting to historicise the discourses of religious difference in relation to anxiety, fear or animosity towards Islam and Muslims prior to 9/11, this section discusses how the catastrophic events of 9/11 and the concomitant US-led global 'war on terror' have deepened suspicion of Islam and Muslims in the West. Unsurprisingly, however, the atrocious attacks 'gave a pre-existent prejudice a much greater credibility and validity' (Allen and Nielsen 2002, p. 42). As Jackson (2014) confirms the 'war on terror' is a combination of institutional practices (governmental policies, military and intelligence procedures, political activities) and a discursive project (the language of combatting terrorism built on certain assumptions, beliefs and supporting narratives). Language thus plays an extraordinary role in shaping opinions and spreading ideologies. This study hopes to contribute to understating the contemporary renewed concerns around terrorism (following the rise of ISIS and its likes) through examining how political reality is manufactured by world politicians at the UNGA when talking about Islam and Muslims.

Since 9/11, the topic of 'war on terror' became one of the most over-used (and many times clichéd) themes that shaped political discourses at the domestic and international levels. Politicians supporting the 'war on terror' contributed to building systems of meanings (a stock repertoire of clichés and stereotypes) that would help in normalizing waging wars. Fominaya and Wood (2011: 2) maintain that the 'global' war on terror 'has fuelled anti-terrorism legislation that has been used to quash dissent and to criminalize activists within countries whose states claim a particular affinity with human rights'. Political narratives of the USA and its allies, following the 9/11 attacks, have clearly attempted to portray war as an unavoidable choice via discourses of victim-hood that discredit all other

[24] Quotation marks appear around the term 'war on terror' to emphasise what Jackson (2005) described as the term's special and artificial quality; the aim is not to contribute to its normalization.

alternatives in defence of 'imagined communities' (Anderson, 1991); and thus, creating an atmosphere which normalises counter-violence and abuse of human rights. Jackson (2005) believes:

> The 'war on terrorism' is currently one of a great many kinds of political discourses, and it is attempting—with considerable success—to become hegemonic over alternative discourses, such as pacifist, human rights based, feminist, environmental or anti-globalization discourse (p. 19)

Kellner (2004), while condemning the tragic events, distinguishes between an 'insincere' explanation, as articulated and foregrounded by George W. Bush, which claims that 'they [the terrorists] hate us for our freedom' and a more dialectical and critical exploration that takes into account the ways in which the American foreign policy, especially the recent military operations in the Middle East can contribute to the explanation.

Very soon in wake of the attacks, the enemy was defined using phrases like 'Islamic fascism', 'radical Islam' and 'Islamic extremism'. Cole (2009) stresses that 'putting "Islamic" in front of another word implies that it is intrinsic to or characteristic of the Islamic religion or civilization' (p. 128). Such totalizing phrases, unfortunately, have quickly invaded the political lexicon, and the 'war on terror' rhetoric became central to political platforms of the USA and its allies around the world capitalising on the paranoia and 'moral panic'[25] that unleashed in wake of the attacks (see Cohen, 2002).

Gay (2007) offered a critique of Bush's violent dialectic between what Bush called 'forces of good' and 'the element of terror'. His critique manifested how Bush's rhetoric tended to have a totalising aspect employed to serve geopolitical agendas and to justify the US military interference in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Noor (2010: 51-52), who also studied Bush's WoT rhetoric, reinforced Gay's findings arguing that four salient features were instrumentalised by the Bush administration:

a. The monochromatic world order (splitting the world along the fault-lines of religion, culture and civilisation while appropriating all positive elements almost exclusively to the 'West');

[25] The theory of 'moral panic' introduced by Cohen is an effective way of looking at discourses on the 'War on Terror'. This theory can be used to explain how periods of communal anxiety such as that surrounding terrorism initiate unjustified fear towards certain groups of people.

b. The frontier between the West and the Muslim world is a violent one: The identity of the 'West' is seen as opposed to the 'forces of terror' and can only be guarded by force.
c. The irrationality of the other: The 'other' is denied any claims to reason and rational action.
d. Closed horizons of the same: Horizons of the safe and familiar are kept closed and narrow all the time in an attempt to refuse engagement with the 'other' on any meaningful basis.

Based on such observations, understanding intolerant discourses that incite violence not only necessitates a critical consideration of discourses produced by fundamentalist groups but also requires a deeper and more critical enquiry into the ones which place emphasis on resisting such fundamentalist discourses. The 'war on terror' rhetoric in political discourse should be challenged and a fine line must be drawn between legitimate and illegitimate uses of force and violence, and between resisting terror and initiating acts of terror. Blurring such distinctions risks the fabric of the globalised world of our times and promotes a clash of civilizations rather than co-existence. As Jackson (2005: 12) fairly maintains 'the greatest danger of the current discourse [of 'war on terror'] is that we too become terrorist; and that as we demonise, dehumanise and brutalise the enemy 'other'; it becomes a war *of* terrorisms, rather than a war *on* terrorism' (original emphasis).

2.1.4. The Rise of ISIS

This study is a CDA investigation of the representations of Islam and Muslims in political discourse amidst renewed international concerns about the rise of ISIS which expanded its reach benefiting from the military momentum of the group and the power vacuum in particular places (especially in Iraq and Syria). More than ten years after 9/11 attacks, we witnessed the emergence of more radicalised movements like: The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham[26] (ISIS)[27], Al-Shabab[28] and Boko-Haram. Compared to previous radicalised groups, these movements have

[26] A general name for the whole Levant/Greater Syria.

[27] a.k.a. ISIL (The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) or DAISH the Arabic acronym for (Al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham).

[28] Al-Shabab is an organisation affiliated to al Qaeda that operates in Somalia and Ethiopia. Al-Shabab underwent dramatic transformations recently and gained more powers benefiting from Somalia's state of anarchy. According to Wise (2011: 1) the group transformed 'from a largely nationalist organisation focussed on driving out Ethiopia through conventional military means to a hybrid movement that has increasingly embraced transnational terrorism and attempted to portray itself as part of al Qaeda led global war against the West'.

expanded their global reach and established an unprecedented threat to international security.

The official departure of the American troops from Iraq and the 2011 Arab Spring turmoil which led to regime change in some countries (e.g. Tunisia, Libya, Egypt/twice, and Yemen) and state failure in others (e.g. Syria) created fertile soil in which ISIS took root and grew. For years al-Qaeda was regarded as the primary terrorist threat and Osama bin Laden as the leader of global terrorism. However, on June 29, 2014, the spokesman for ISIS, Abu Mohammad al-Adnani, announced the restoration of the Islamic Caliphate[29] in a triumphant audio recording that named Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi[30], who spent about five years in American captivity in the Bucca prison in Iraq, as the new Caliph[31]. Since then, the group which called itself a 'state' have captured the world's attention through becoming 'the most powerful terrorist group in the world' (Denison 2016: 3).

Whilst the roots of ISIS go back to state failure in Iraq and the civil war in Syria, it also was the result of the repression of Sunnis by Nouri al-Maliki's Shi'ite government in Iraq and the atrocities committed by the Alawite-minority ruling regime against its own people in Syria[32]. ISIS managed to establish its major footholds in several cities across Iraq and Syria (almost half of northern Syria and third of northern-western Iraq)[33], thus it is considered a global 'jihadi takfiri[34]' organisation which brought the terrorist agenda to a new level by means of expanding its international reach and reinforcing its cyberspace presence. Alongside the Iraqi and Syrian lands it seized, ISIS increased its momentum and established offshoots in Libya, the Sinai Peninsula, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Caucasus and elsewhere. It also carried out or inspired 'lone-wolves' terrorist

[29] See section 1.1 of the *Introduction Chapter* for further discussion on the strategic usefulness of employing nominations like 'Islamic Caliphate' .

[30] Ibrahim Awad al-Badri (aka Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, which is thought to have adopted the name of the first Muslim caliph Abu Bakr as-Siddiq bin Abi Quhafah).

[31] Caliph derives from the Arabic word '*khalifah*' (literally 'successor'); a person considered a religious successor to prophet Muhammad (PBUH). In contemporary extremists' discourse, the concepts of Caliph and Caliphate are constructed through romanticising an image of the early Islamic institution (or 'Islamic Golden Age') as an imagined community, ignoring much of the historical experience of the Caliphate as a system of government.

[32] According to SNHR (the Syrian Network for Human Rights), up until September 2017 the Syrian government has killed 201,786 civilians since 2011 (including 26,019 children and 24,309 women).

[33] Alongside the Iraqi and Syrian lands it seized, ISIS has established offshoots in Libya, the Sinai Peninsula, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Caucasus and elsewhere.

[34] See Karawan (1995) for a discussion on how '*Takfir*' or '*takfeer*' is a contentious concept in the Islamist discourse. '*Takfir*' denotes declaring another Muslim as a non-believer (or *Kafir*).

attacks in Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, France, the United States of America, Britain, Canada, the Netherlands, Australia and other countries across the globe.

An important factor that has strategically contributed to the global outreach of ISIS is the fact that this group is an ideological movement as much as it is a militant one (Flournoy and Fontaine, 2015). ISIS manipulative and highly capable media campaign is unprecedented due to the professionally-produced materials including photos, videos, blogs, audio recordings as well as carefully-crafted ideological pronouncements that are constantly propagated over various conventional and new media outlets. According to Schmitt (2015) ISIS produces nearly 90,000 posts, tweets and other social media interactions in more than twenty-four languages every day, upstaging similar movements (like al-Qaeda) thus embracing an unprecedented self-marketing activity.

Choosing the name ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) is indicative of the group's ideology and its ambitious political project; which aspires to (1) establish a state, (2) expand across the region, and (3) conquer the rest of the world. In his first and hitherto only appearance in a *khutba* (Friday sermon), Al-Baghdadi called upon Muslims around the world to give him *bay'ah*[35] as caliph; thus, attracting thousands of rebellious supporters to come and join. The fact that the self-styled Islamic State claims that it represents the 'pure and unadulterated'[36] version of Islam necessarily involves a negative influence on the representation of the religion through portraying it as rooted in violence and extremism.

The international community's response to ISIS has been predominantly focussed on the use of military force; mainly aerial bombings. However, ISIS cannot be defeated by military means solely. Obama's 2014 six-point strategy, for instance, did not deliver much of what it promised (i.e. 'degrade, and ultimately destroy, ISIL'[37]) though was adopted by an international coalition of 63 concerned countries. As ISIS operates on the ideological as much as the militant level, there is a need for a more sophisticated approach to break the momentum

[35] As defined in the *Oxford Dictionary of Islam*, Baya'h is an 'Oath of allegiance to a leader. Unwritten pact given on behalf of the subjects by leading members of the tribe with the understanding that, as long as the leader abides by certain responsibilities towards his subjects, they are to maintain their allegiance to him. Representatives usually include religious scholars and political leaders' (2003: 32).

[36] See Schmid, 2015, p.4 for the argumentative element in such claim and its counter-message.

[37] President Obama's Speech on Combating ISIS and Terrorism, *11 September 2014*. https://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/10/politics/transcript-obama-syria-isis-speech/index.html

of the group. Flournoy and Fontaine (2015: 7) criticised the current strategies employed to counter ISIS describing the efforts exerted by the USA and its coalition as 'inadequate and ineffective' due to the lack of ideological campaigning that may help in revealing the truth about this group.

From a pragma-linguistic standpoint, Darweesh and Muzhir (2016) criticised the discursive strategies employed by three USA key leading politicians (i.e., Barack Obama, John Kerry and Hillary Clinton) as being over-reliant on self-glorification and negative *Other* representation in ways that reinforced ideological polarisation. Observing how politicians around the world reacted to the atrocities committed by ISIS and its sympathisers, there is no question that political counter-terrorism messages have over-emphasised and exaggerated the advantages of using force, which in many cases has proven unproductive. Counterproductively, these messages have often turned a blind eye to countering the ideology of terrorism and failed to speak to the hearts and minds of those vulnerable to ISIS propaganda.

Schmid (2015) therefore emphasises the importance of targeting the ideological and theological perspectives through formulating faith-based persuasive counter-arguments which explain vulnerabilities in the group's narratives from theological, historical and other angles. Schmid attempted to provide arguments to counter a dozen claims of ISIS. A similar effort has been made by a group of 152 leading Islamic scholars who, following the proclamation of the Caliphate, sent a letter to Al-Baghdadi listing, from a purely theological point of view, the faults in the group's arguments and the violations it committed against Islamic laws.

These postulations intimately link with one of the major foundations of the present research which, through the analyses carried out in the thesis, aims to offer insights into what arguments/narratives world-leading politicians attached to the portrayals of Islam and Muslims at a critical timing.

The studied discourses - as will be shown in the analysis chapters - provide varying official accounts for the same events; hence, different theses compete for 'the one and only narrative which should be hegemonic' (Wodak 2009: 316). Having this in mind and given the influence of discourses which 'accumulate into a larger cultural narrative shared by many' (Hodges, 2011: 4), a pertinent question remains: *To what extent the UNGA discourses provide opportunities for unity and building meaningful co-existence among different cultures and religious communities?* and *to what extent do these discourses bridge or widen the gap between peoples of different regions and religions?*

The next part of this chapter introduces the United Nations, considers the anarchical nature of world politics and reflects on means of cooperation in international relations before moving on to offering a critique of the role played by the UN as a global governance institutional framework.

2.2. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE & THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

A distinctive feature of the 21st century is the combined economic and socio-political changes that led to *globalisation*. Individuals and institutions alike have been influenced by the ramifications of globalisation. However, governments and international organisations have so far failed to live up to peoples' expectations. They neither established mechanisms for development that meet the needs of world citizens nor succeeded in encountering the risks that threaten peoples' lives every day around the world. As an intergovernmental organisation, the UN is amongst the very few bodies that were established to put in place a stable international order in the post-cold war epoch. This section discusses the UN as a spatial setting of the speeches analysed in this thesis and briefly touches on the past, present and possible future roles played by this organisation discussing some of the controversies around its role.

Since the year 1945 following World War II, the United Nations became a unique intergovernmental organisation that attempted to establish a 'new world order' through initiating an international platform for its member states to dialogue and express their views on the most pressing issues encountering humanity. Protecting international peace and ensuring security have been repetitively emphasised as the idealistic primary goals of the institution; the *First Article* of the UN's founding charter sketches this role through giving prominence to the following four aims:

> (a) Maintaining international peace and security through taking effective measures for the prevention of threats to peace; (b) developing friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples; (c) achieving international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and promoting fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and (d) being a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

Whether the UN was able to achieve these aims is a contentious affair which will be discussed in further detail at a later point. However, it is agreed that international institutions, like the UN can constitute cooperative means for different states to overcome their problems and negotiate multilateral agreements (Keohane, 1984).

The UNGA, the platform in which the analysed speeches have been delivered, serves as one of the main organs of the UN and is the only international body that brings together universal representatives of all 193 member states of the United Nations. Every year, representatives meet in the General Assembly Hall at the United Nations Headquarters in New York in September to debate a spectrum of international issues with critical importance to the world community, particularly ones related to attaining peace and security. Kaufmann (1980: 27) views the UNGA's addresses as 'a series of monologues in which each head of a delegation, usually the foreign minister, undertakes a *tour d'horizon* of the current state of the world's problems as seen in the light of his [or her] government's policy'.

In this context, Peterson (2006) reminds us that many ambitious global reformers and international legal specialists who believe in a more orderly international system based on international law look at the UNGA as a potential world parliament justifying that 'seeing the General Assembly as a proto-world government is encouraged by its status as the only principal UN organ including all member states and the similarity between its formal rules of procedure and the rules of parliamentary practice used in national legislature' (p.3). Unlike addresses at other UN organs (such as the Security Council, for example), speeches at the UNGA can be useful for small or rather powerless countries with little economic or military weight to 'throw around'. Such small countries can devote their speeches and votes to issues of particular concern to them which constitutes an opportunity to gain respect and achieve goals through persuasion and representation.

As one of the six fundamental organs of the United Nations[38], one reason behind choosing the UNGA as the primary UN forum to be investigated in this study is that it is the only one in which all member nations have equal representation. Concerning decision-making at the UNGA on important matters such as those on peace and security, a two-thirds majority of the votes is required in order to implement any proposed recommendations. Bailey (1967: 240) clarifies that:

[38] The United Nations system consists of six principal organs that were established by the Charter of the United Nations, these are: UN General Assembly, UN Secretariat, International Court of Justice, UN Security Council, UN Economic and Social Council and UN Trusteeship Council. For further information on the functions of each of these organs see (http://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/main-organs/index.html).

> Each Member of the General Assembly has one vote, and no distinction is made between large and small, strong and weak, old and new, wise and foolish. The relationship between power and influence has never been a direct one, but in traditional diplomacy, a State could be influential in spite of its folly; in conference diplomacy, a State may be influential in spite of its weakness.

Therefore, every state in this particular context (regardless of size, population or military power) can have a decisive vote on issues that matter the most. The UNGA provides its 193 Members of the UN with 'a unique forum for multilateral discussion of the full spectrum of international issues covered by the Charter'. It also plays a significant role in the process of 'standard-setting and the codification of international law'.[39]

Keohane (1984) argues that international institutions, like the UN, are 'cooperative means by which nation-states can overcome their collective action problems'. Martin (1992: 12) reinforces such understanding by pointing out that international institutions can serve as 'useful commitment mechanisms'. In my view, discourses delivered inside such internationally significant institution gain special importance for the fact that the General Assembly is the main deliberative, policymaking and representative organ of the UN.

The use of language in this international institutional context acquires special importance and can be crucial to the construction of social reality due to the political positions and powers of the speakers, let alone that of the institution (Gal 2005; Mayr 2008). From a decision-making standpoint, discourses at the UNGA can also impact on social reality through the ability of the speakers to directly influence the recommendations and action plans adopted by the institution following each annual debate.

2.3. CONTEXTUAL COMPLEXITIES: SPEAKING AT POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS SETTINGS

As noted in the introduction chapter, the recent wave of conflict justified by radicalised movements in the name of Islam alongside the rise right-wing populist parties in different parts of the world make religion a central object of debate in political discourse. Given that religion is likely to remain at the forefront of international politics for years to come, this section revisits the idea of overt reference to religion as a category constructed within political discourse

[39] For more details on the functions and powers of the General Assembly, see http://www.un.org/en/ga/about/background.shtml

highlighting the religio-political connection, and how leaders speak into these two different but more recently very related discursive settings.

Hurd (2008: 134) observes that 'it is now unsustainable to claim that religion plays no significant role in international relations; it has become a critical consideration in international security, global politics, and foreign policy'. Similarly, Crines and Theakston (2015: 158) point out that political speakers' deliberate use of religious rhetoric can be seen as a strategy 'to justify policy, support their ideological positions, present a public persona, and underline their personal ethical appeal to highlight their individual moral suitability to be a national leader'.

Perhaps the core issue with debating religion in political settings nowadays lies in the fact that it is usually discussed around concerns about the role of religion in security and conflict. In fact, state representatives and political leaders have not been able to avoid involvement in discussions about religion in religious as well as political settings. One of the major reasons behind incorporating religious references in political discourse is the ability of both to address deep human concerns and formulate key identity markers of human existence. In addition to the above two motives, Beyers (2015: 159-160) lists three other reasons that tempt politicians to utilise religion as a political instrument:

- In certain contexts, the interconnectedness of political and religious spheres makes it acceptable to and even desirable for religious considerations to be part of political decisions.
- By utilising religious jargon within the political discourse, a subtle claim to divine approval of political decisions is made.
- Religious communities are effective partners in the implementation of political policies.

Appeal to religion in political discourse can also be motivated by other reasons including the wish to create an image of a religious, moral, trustworthy politician as much as it serves as a legitimation strategy. For example, as will be shown later in chapter 4, King Abdullah II of Jordan emphasises a religious rhetoric in his discourse relying on his revered religious credentials and lineage to the prophet of Islam. Drawing on Van Leeuwen's conceptualisation of legitimation strategies, the king's continuous focus on his religious status and politico-religious authority can be seen as an authorisation strategy that adds power and legitimacy to his arguments.

Yet contextually the purpose and character of the institutions in which speeches are delivered regulates the type and amount of religious arguments that can be made on a particular occasion. Politicians usually make a judgment as to when the use of

religious arguments is appropriate. Whilst certain political speakers adopt religious rhetoric as part of their discourse even in speeches away from an obviously religious occasion, others prefer to tone down their religious language outside of certain religious settings. Williams (2018: 379) compares Obama's religious references to those of David Cameron and argues that while Cameron 'may have decided that to use religious rhetoric outside of specifically religious occasions may do him more harm than good', Obama had no issues to incorporate religious discourse in campaign speeches and inaugural addresses.

However, the interconnections produced by globalisation and supranational institutions like the United Nations have triggered a change in the context of incorporating religious rhetoric in political speech. Whilst reference to religion seems now unescapable, the types of arguments around religion remain regulated by the norms of what can be said in high-level meetings like the UNGA annual sessions. Political speakers are aware that reference to religious symbols or theological ideas that do not take into account the diverse religious backgrounds of the discourse recipients would incontrovertibly backfire on political speakers. Within an international institution like the UNGA and due to the rehearsed and prepared nature of the speeches delivered at the annual meetings, I suggest that the two following criteria are important for a successful selection of particular religious references:

- First, willingness to adopt religious diversity: Given the growing plurality of religious beliefs in our post-modern era, political speakers at the UNGA need to give prominence to theological ideals that appeal to people of all religions or no religion, and provide a moral inspiration for cooperation in seeking the common good of all nations.
- Second, seeking an appropriate balance between religious arguments and modern democratic principles: Because the UNGA draws on a combination of diplomatic and parliamentary democratic practices, it stands to reason that hard-line religious arguments will not enjoy much support but rather can easily get dismissed for being 'undemocratic'. Therefore, a particular expression of religion that conforms to the 'moderate' ideals of furthering human values and are compatible with the realisation of freedom and liberty is more likely to gain advocacy.

2.4. A CRITIQUE OF THE UNITED NATIONS AS AN INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL PLATFORM

As a consequence of the absence of a world government, there is no overarching authority, and every country is out for itself. This vision of cooperation and sustaining international relations under such conditions of anarchy is proposed by what Robert Keohane (1984) has termed 'neo-liberal institutionalism'. Keohane's view of global cooperation recognises the anarchic nature of the international system and the idea that behaviour of states is largely affected by their own values and interests. However, Keohane believes that cooperation is achievable, even in the absence of a global government, through mediating competition between different parties by a network of international norms and institutions. Political scholars adopting Keohane's vision establish their arguments based on the belief that (a) different political players will need to repeatedly interact and thus this creates what they called a 'shadow of the future' and (b) international institutions increase transparency and reduce uncertainty through creating platforms for discussion and expressing views and interests.

Embracing the idea that only political institutions that attract no criticism are ones that everybody regards as immaterial, Keohane's *The Study of Political Influence in the General Assembly* published in 1967 was among the first academic attempts to assess the political process and struggle for influence under the UNGA. In this paper, Keohane (ibid, 222-223) distinguished three types of state influence:

a. Influence over outcomes by affecting the policies of individual members.
b. Influence over the choices with which the General Assembly is faced, e.g. proposing an item for the agenda that no other state is willing to propose.
c. Voting influence; as each state enjoys influence equal to 1/n, where n is the number of member states.

Martin (1992: 12) points out that international institutions can serve as 'useful commitment mechanisms'. Yet when it comes to commitment, the extent to which a certain international institution is powerful necessarily affects whether its decisions/actions will be widely embraced. A major complaint about the General Assembly over the years relates to its legislative authority and the ability to resolve disputes. One of the most frequently cited examples that question the legislative competence of the UNGA is the way in which it dealt with how Israel violated the international law regarding the treatment of the Palestinian occupied territories and acted against the UNGA resolutions in 1979. However, obstacles of this sort should not lead us to underestimate the role which the UNGA played on other occasions or in general as a site of political interaction. Peterson (2006: 5) argues:

> Concluding that the General Assembly does not directly create international law rules binding on member states does not mean it is irrelevant to the development of globally shared norms and rules. It

> constantly engages in norm-creation and norm-adjustment as it accepts new issues onto the international agenda, considers new ideas, debates the relative merits of competing positions, and attempts to formulate statements of goals and methods for achieving them that will win widespread support. Many of the ideas first expressed in assembly resolutions have been incorporated in multilateral treaties or adopted into state practice enough to become customary international law.

Weiss (2000) is also amongst scholars that urge us to look at the successful and special role played by the UN in coordinating global governance despite the numerous operational challenges (e.g. the multiplicity of actors involved and the bureaucracy resulting from varied capacities of member states). Understood as such, discourses appearing at an institutional framework like that of the different organs of the UN (especially the UNGA) can be viewed as key mediums for constructing representations as well as dialoguing positions. Speeches delivered at the UNGA are not just directed to the diplomats and delegations who listen to them first-hand, but also to the unseen millions. High-level debates can contribute to promoting conciliation as they offer chances for exchanging views and accommodating interests. On the importance of the speeches delivered at the UNGA, Bailey (1967: 70) posits that:

> The Debate itself has certain intrinsic values: it is a barometer, which indicates changes in the international climate, and it has also been compared to a safety valve because it enables governments to let off steam on contentious issues without causing undue damage. Members are able to discuss issues they consider important without the necessity of proposing them as separate items for the agenda. For several years, for example, the Assembly decided not to consider the question of Chinese representation, yet Members freely expressed their views on the matter during the General Debate.

Drawing on Hughes' (1936) conceptualisation of institutions as patterns of social practice, Lawrence (2008) emphasised the connection between power and institution through claiming that 'institutions exist to the extent that they are powerful – the extent to which they affect the behaviours, beliefs and opportunities of individuals, groups, organisations and societies'. (p. 170).

In further exploring the links between power and institution, Lawrence (1999) identified three dimensions of the relationship – institutional control, institutional agency, and institutional resistance. *Figure 2.2* below illustrates, from my perspective, how Lawrence positions the role of each of the three elements in an intermingling system of institutional politics:

For Lawrence, power at the 'institutional control' level usually works indirectly and can be primarily observed through 'the compliance of organisational actors to institutional rules and norms' (ibid., 173). The second role of power at the 'institutional agency' level appears in the influence different actors have on the institutional arrangements. Agency in this context, Lawrence confirms, requires 'actors to mobilize resources, engage in institutional consents over meanings and practices, develop support or attack forms of discourse and practice – all involving discrete, strategic acts of mobilization' (1999: 174). Last, but never least, resistance involves achieving compromises with other agents over what choices should be available and what decisions should be made.



Figure 2.2: Dimensions of the relationship between Power and Institution

Therefore, in order to pursue a political struggle, or reinforce certain discursive representations, one would first need to get involved in 'a discursive struggle'. Inside an institutional framework like that of the UN, alternative interpretations and representations in discourse have to be realised prior to becoming part of the political decision-making process. The last two dimensions in Lawrence's model (i.e. institutional agency and institutional resistance) can be invoked to demystify the role a discursive struggle can play in (re)producing or resisting hegemonic representations of various social actors.

At this point, it is important to note that the UN's ability to stand for the powerless did not remain unchallenged for long but rather has been put to the test many times by the many complexities and worldly conflicts that have occurred since the organisation's foundation. Although scrutinising the UN's power and success in managing the clashes occurring within the international system is beyond the scope of the current project, it still would be valuable to discuss the UN's much-debated role and legitimacy as a leading authority in the quest for universal peace and cooperation.

Barnett and Duvall's (2005) influential article '*Power in International Politics*', reviews two contesting arguments in this regard. The first argument suggests that certain powerful UN states retain a key decision-making role at the expense of less powerful actors:

> Although neoliberal institutionalists have tended to highlight how international institutions produce cooperation, they could just as easily have emphasised how institutions shape the bargaining advantage of actors, freeze asymmetries, and establish parameters for change that benefit some at the expense of others (p. 41)

Drawing on Giddens' (1979) conceptualisation of power in international relations, Barnett and Duvall (2005: 42) observe that the internationalisation of institutions gave states 'the authority to voice their interests and represent themselves' and can help new and emerging states to get recognized worldwide. They also assume that 'the emergence of a human rights discourse helped to make possible the very category of human rights activists who give voice to human rights norms'. On the other hand, Peterson (2006: 122-136) outlined the following four criticisms of the UNGA in a chapter entitled *Key Criticisms of the General Assembly in a Historical Context*:

- The UNGA is captive to the mechanical politics of an 'automatic majority' able to summon up a two-thirds vote for any proposition, regardless of its intellectual, moral, or political merit, and grinding out nearly identical resolutions year after year regardless of whether those resolutions say anything helpful on the issue addressed.

- The UNGA can be seen as an 'ineffective talk shop' where delegates treat each other to dull and spend lots of time in and outside the meeting hall haggling intensely over minor changes in the wording of resolutions that are meaningless to anyone outside, will not be read, and will not be acted upon.

- The UNGA is all too effective in spreading values contrary to those on which the Charter is based and inimical to creating a better world.

- The UNGA's legitimacy is seriously eroded by the 'democratic deficit' resulting from the lack of a clear line of connection or accountability between the peoples of the member states and the delegates in the assembly.

2.5. SUMMARY

This chapter presented the socio-historical context of the object of my investigation. The representations of Islam and Muslims in the discourses of the UNGA are seen as connected to wider depictions including those appearing in media portrayals and

other political discourses outside the UN. In order to demonstrate the impetus for conducting the present research, it was necessary to explore the short history of representing Islam and Muslims pre-and-post the era of atrocities committed by certain radical groups under the name of religion.

This chapter also had a further aim of setting out a critique of the UN as an international institutional platform in which the studied discourses have been delivered. Adopting Wodak's (2001) dialectal understating of discourse as influencing and social reality and being influenced by it, the second part of this chapter looked at the institutional aspect which gives us clues about the restrictions and possibilities of driving change through discursive and political action. In the next chapter, I will review the literature on how different political actors - through the use of political strategies and discursive dynamics – deploy ideological representations of *Self* and *Other*.

In the following chapter, an attempt is also made to delve into the theoretical framework of the thesis, thereby theoretically grounding many of the discussions and arguments presented in this chapter and upcoming ones. It also clarifies the use of CDA, which is at once an approach and method in this work.

Chapter 3

THEORY, APPROACH AND METHOD

> *Critical theories, thus also CDA, want to produce and convey critical knowledge that enables human beings to emancipate themselves from forms of domination through self-reflection. Thus, they are aimed at producing 'enlightenment and emancipation'*
>
> *Wodak and Meyer (2001: 7)*

3.1. OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTER

This chapter, and the thesis as a whole, views politics as discourse, political speech as social practice and discourse analysis as the endeavour to understand what goals political speakers want to achieve through the use of language. Discourse analysis is seen as a tool enabling us to 'focus not only on the actual uses of language as a form of social interaction, in particular situations and contexts, but also on forms of representation in which different social categories, different social practices and relations are constructed from and in the interests of a particular point of view, a particular conception of social reality' (Deacon et al. 1999: 146).

The aim of this chapter, in the main, is to outline the core theoretical assumptions that inform this study as well as the methodological tools applied in the analysis. The chapter historicises the theoretical developments of studying language and the relationship between linguistics and social sciences, the different approaches to CDA and the ontological and epistemological underpinnings of its different strands.

The chapter also deals with how scholars defined and conceptualised notions like *discourse, critique, power* and *ideology*. It then synthesises principal scholarship of analysing political discourse in order to explain the usefulness of choosing CDA as an analytical framework to critique the discursive representations encoded in lexical and grammatical choices as well as the contextual dimensions in which they occur. Another section of the chapter deals with CDA, its evolution, aims, methodological procedure and some of its major criticisms, in a kind of literature review of the paradigm. Finally, the chapter demonstrates how the major CDA

approaches adopted in this study will work in practice outlining some of the tools that will be used for the data analysis.

3.2. THE CULTURAL TURN AND CDA'S INTELLECTUAL ANTECEDENTS

In seeking to understand how discourse affects social reality and gets affected by it, it is necessary to demonstrate the connections between the two. Significantly, one way of doing so is to explicate the relationship between linguistics and social sciences in general through looking backwards at the theoretical origins and developments of studying language.

The initial impetus for studying discourse emerged as a result of innovative tendencies that were introduced to linguistic theory and methodology, including, for example, the emergence of the Prague School in 1960s (Jakobson, 1960), systemic functional linguistics (Halliday, 1978), text linguistics (de Beaugrande and Dressler, 1981), the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory (associated with the works of Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Erich Fromm and Herbert Marcuse). Prominent figures and proponents of such intellectual trends presented a challenge to the generative models of Chomskyan linguistics - which were then dominating linguistic academic discussions – seeking to shift focus from studying made up chunks to investigating naturally occurring language forms or 'language-in-action'[40], to use Jan Blommaert's terminology (Blommaert 2005: 3).

Traditionally, formalist approaches to linguistics did not pay proper attention to a pragmatic approach that brings into play aspects beyond the sentential, syntactic or semantic analyses[41]. The research agenda of the formalist approaches 'was not directed towards theorizing any relationship there might be between the human language faculty and the social nature of humans' (Chilton 2004: x). Worthily, such quintessential shifts have, to a large extent, placed the study of discourse in a unique relation to the wider social sciences research programme and opened the previously-closed doors of interdisciplinarity.

The present thesis, therefore, mirrors the results of the above-mentioned shift in agenda. This research commits to the view that language – as well as other forms of semiosis– is a form of 'social practice' (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 258). What such

[40] Upholding the idea that language was approached in isolation from social aspects, Blommaert (2005: 3) insists that 'what is traditionally understood by language is but one manifestation of it'. He also highlights the importance of research that investigates 'socially situated and contextualised discourse' (p. 35).

[41] See Brown and Yule (1983) for a discussion on the difference of what they termed 'a traditional formal approach' versus 'a functional approach'.

understanding of language implies is that language is an integral part of society. Language is seen in this project as a socially-oriented process which affects society and gets affected by it. The shift towards extra-linguistic factors has inspired many theoretical and methodological approaches to textual analysis. Among these which seem to have proliferated through literature is the British and Australian Critical Linguistics and Critical Language Awareness (CLA) which were developed by a group of linguists and academics in related fields (e.g. Roger Fowler, Gunther Kress, James Martin, Robert Hodge and others). O'Halloran (2000: 16) regards Critical Linguistics as 'the application of a particular set of linguistic procedures to texts with a view to uncovering concealed cultural and ideological meanings'. Such a view is, in fact, linked to the claim made by Fowler et al., (1979: 185) that 'there are strong and pervasive connections between linguistic structure and social structure'.

On a historical note, Critical Linguistics was first implemented on studies of language use by a group of scholars at the University of East Anglia during the 1970s. Scholars in this group who regarded power relations as a vital theoretical issue in linguistic research were largely influenced by M.A.K. Halliday – the British-born Australian linguist and founder of Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) (see Kress and Hodge, 1979).

CDA is another development that emerged as a result of the focus on Hallidayan SFL. By the late 1980s, Fairclough, probably the most prominent theoretician in CDA, began to propose an approach that social-scientifically analyses texts based on a link drawn between the work of British and Australian 'critical linguistics' and the European social theories of Bourdieu (1977 and 1990) particularly his concepts of habitus and field, Gramsci (1971) particularly his concept of *hegemony*, Foucault (1971) particularly his concept of *orders of discourse* and Habermas (1987) particularly his *colonialization thesis*. Although Critical Linguistics and CDA have sometimes been referred to interchangeably in the literature, CDA is distinguished by its notable interest in the unbreakable bond connecting language to power as well as its emphasis on context (Titscher et. al, 2000 & Wodak 2001). In other words, CDA is rather seen as a problem-oriented approach to or a research programme of 'discourse analysis' that essentially regards text as the basic unit of communication and thus more explicitly connects text to the social (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997).

3.3. THE NOTION OF 'DISCOURSE'

Of the numerous meanings of discourse, Baker and Ellece (2011: 30-31) in their book *Key Terms in Discourse Analysis* identified at least five senses in which the

term 'discourse' has been referred to in the literature. Discourse, in a wider sense, may refer to any form of 'language in use' (Brown and Yule, 1983) or 'spoken language' in the context of speech. In a basic sense which would be more relevant to text structure and pragmatics, discourse may also denote 'language above the sentence or above the clause' (Stubbs, 1983: 1). In particular contexts of language use e.g. political discourse or media discourse, discourse refers to 'genre or text type'. Finally, in a Foucaultian sense, discourse involves 'practices which systematically form the objects of which they speak' (Foucault, 1972: 49). As noted earlier, the range of definitions associated with the term discourse causes a fair amount of confusion as much as definitions seek to clarify the term and follow its historical trajectory. Wodak and Meyer (2009) allude to the slippery ice of defining 'discourse', which in their view expanded the meanings which the term covers:

> anything from a historical moment, *a lieu de memoire*, a policy, a political strategy, narratives in a restricted or broad sense of the term, text, talk, a speech, topic-related conversations, to language per se, thus stretching the meaning of discourse from a genre to a register or style, from a building to a political programme
>
> (p. 2-3)

In light of the relationship between language and the social in general, the term 'discourse' gained currency and significance in numerous academic disciplines of the social sciences. Zotzmann (2007: 37) reminds us that the term 'has been used in a vast number of vague and at times rather obfuscating ways'. Although there has been no agreed-upon definition of the notion 'discourse', it is noticeable that most CDA scholars are influenced by the Foucaultian sense of 'discourse' as a way of representing social practice (Fairclough, 1989; Fairclough, 1995; Wodak 2001; van Dijk 1985; Wodak and De Cillia 1999; Wodak and van Dijk, 2000; van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999; Scollon 2001; Wodak et al. 2009).

Foucault (1972: 140-141) perceives 'discourse' as 'an entity of sequences of signs in that they are enouncements', explaining that an 'enouncement' is part of the process through which signs establish particular repeatable relations with the objects they refer to. Sequences of signs according to these relations constitute coherent units that we call a 'discourse'. In this sense, a discourse consists of 'a group of statements which provide a language for talking about – a way of representing knowledge about – a particular topic at a particular historical moment' (Hall, 1992: 291).

'Discourse' is determined by the properties of social conditions but also contributes to shaping social power and promoting social change. Fairclough, in

numerous academic publications (e.g. Fairclough 2003; Fairclough et al., 2004; Fairclough 2005) alluded to the abovementioned conceptual confusion around the term 'discourse'. He distinguishes between 'discourse' in an 'abstract sense' and 'discourse' as a 'count noun'; whereby the former refers to 'semiosis' while the latter refers to ways of representing particular aspects of social life. Endorsing Foucault's (1972) emphasis on the linkage between discourse and the social, Fairclough posits that:

> Discourse contributes to the constitution of all those dimensions of social structure which directly or indirectly shape and constrain it; its own norms and conventions, as well as the relations, identities and institutions which lie behind them. Discourse is a practice not just of representing the world, but of signifying the world, constituting and constructing the world in meaning. (1992a: 64)

Reisigl and Wodak (2009: 89) also argue that 'as object of investigation, a discourse is not a closed unit, but a dynamic semiotic entity that is open to reinterpretation and continuation' making the focus on the discursive practice one of the basic tenets of CDA. In this respect, although CDA, as noted earlier, is primarily influenced by Foucault's way of dealing with discourse, Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999: 152) acknowledge that:

> What differentiates CDA from some Foucaultian version of discourse analysis used by social scientists is that it is… a 'textually oriented' discourse analysis, i.e., it anchors its analytical claims about discourses in close analysis of texts

More restricted in sense, the term 'discourse' within the scope of this study is understood as 'language in use' in the context of political messages conveyed in speeches delivered at a particular historical moment (i.e. UNGA speeches delivered between 2013-2016), as well as the practices of their production, dissemination, reception and interpretation. By foregrounding the real-world functions of language in such a way, this study traces discourse emphasising the role which background information and context of situation play in the (re)formation or resistance of ideologies.

3.4. CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS: GENESIS, AIMS, METHODICAL PROCEDURE AND CRITICISM

> We might best see CDA as a problem-oriented interdisciplinary research movement subsuming a variety of approaches, each with different theoretical models, research methods and agenda

(Fairclough, Mulderrig and Wodak, 2011: 357)

This section engages with the swift development of CDA reviewing some of its major research agendas and core principles. In spite of dissimilarity in ways of referring to CDA as an 'approach', a 'school', or even a 'movement', there is a consensus among scholars that CDA is 'characterized by the common interests in de-mystifying ideologies and power by means of the systematic and retroductable investigation of semiotic data (written, spoken or visual)' (Wodak and Meyer, 2009 pp. 3). Therefore, CDA regards discourse as a form of social practice and acknowledges a link between language and power (Fairclough, 1989). A more detailed definition of CDA is offered in Fairclough (1993: 135). He explains that CDA is:

> discourse analysis which aims to systematically explore often opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes; to investigate how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power; and to explore how the opacity of these relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power and hegemony

Venturing into a CDA project is not only useful for disclosing the discursive aspects underpinning the existence of certain social phenomena but also for offering insights into the complexity of power relations within society at large via careful and rigorous interpretations that pay close attention to text and context. This proposition is linked to the core objective of CDA; which is, according to Wodak and Meyer (2009:10), to 'investigate critically social inequality as it is expressed, constituted, legitimized, and so on, by language use'. Acting as a facilitator for change through its practical applications, CDA is ultimately regarded as 'guide for human action' (Wodak 2001: 10). In this light, Zotzmann and O'Regan (2016: 115) argue that analysts resort to CDA to 'open up alternative viewpoints on and explanations of particular social phenomena, which in turn are a pre-condition for alternative courses of action'.

Concerning the evolution of CDA as a research paradigm, CDA became known as a formal discipline within social sciences after a number of coincidentally akin critical research publications. For instance, Norman Fairclough's (1989) ground-breaking *Language and Power*, Ruth Wodak's (1989) *Language, Power and Ideology*, Teun Van Dijk's (1984) *Prejudice in Discourse*, (1989a) *Social Cognition and discourse*, and (1989b) *Structure of Discourse and Structures of Power*. One also should not forget the horizons opened by the *Discourse and Society* academic journal which was

launched in 1990. In 1991, a two-day symposium gathering organised by Teun Van Dijk at the University of Amsterdam opened spheres of discussion related to different views towards CDA and paved the road for future collaborative work among some of the participating scholars who, according to an interview with Wodak in (2007), included figures like: Teun van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, Gunther Kress, Theo van Leeuwen. The fruits of their collaborative efforts were later realised in several publications that kept coming until this very day including a wide range of authored books, edited volumes and journal articles (e.g. Fairclough & Wodak, 1997; Fairclough et al. 2004; Fairclough et al. 2011; Wodak and van Dijk, 2000; Wodak and van Leeuwen, 2002).

Due to the sophisticated nature of social problems, CDA's problem-oriented applications should be multidisciplinary and multi-methodical; Wodak and Meyer (2009: 7) confirm that CDA, as it has been the norm within approaches that are based on critical theory, 'emphasises the need for interdisciplinary work in order to gain a proper understanding of how language functions in constituting and transmitting knowledge, in organising social institutions or in exercising power'. Given that CDA is based on the tenets of social theory, 'discourse' is thus seen as a 'cross-discipline' (Fairclough, 1989) with contributions from numerous acknowledged disciplines including linguistics, cognitive psychology, sociology, anthropology... etc. As Slembrouck (2001: 37) succinctly puts it, CDA's emphasis on the significance of interdisciplinary research encouraged 'closing some of the notional gaps that separated departments of language study, communication studies and centres for cultural studies'.

However, celebrating interdisciplinarity necessitates an interdisciplinary procedure that can account for the various historical, socio-political, psychological, cultural and ideological elements that make up discourse. Wodak and Meyer (2016) agree to such understanding of Critical Discourse Studies (CDS)[42] as being multi-methodical and rooted in multiple theoretical traditions:

> CDS has never been and never attempted to be or provide one single or specific theory. Neither is one specific methodology characteristic of research in CDA. Quite the contrary, studies in CDS are multifarious, derived from quite different theoretical backgrounds, oriented towards different data and methodologies (p.5)

In a CDA manner, a political text, for instance, is described then investigated with reference to a wide range of perspectives, shunting back and forth between data

[42] Some scholars prefer the term Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) to indicate the diversity of critical studies

and analysis (Meyer, 2001) to open chances for new engagements and developments. According to Meyer (2001), the following characteristics distinguish CDA's 'methodical procedure' from other sociolinguistic approaches:

- *Determining interest in advance*: CDA is primarily used by scholars as a means for advocating groups who suffer from social discrimination. Van Dijk (2001a: 96) touches upon this idea of a scholar's stance in CDA postulating that '[U]nlike much other scholarship, CDA does not deny but explicitly defines and defends its own socio-political position. That is, CDA is biased – and proud of it.' In this light, such position is not unjustified bearing in mind that CDA shares support and stands up for the 'aggrieved'.
- *Practical relevance of results*: One important feature of CDA is being 'critical' to problems of/in society. Therefore, it, in the main, aims to make opaque power relations visible, and by that means contribute to change on the ground. To critically reflect on the analysis, Fairclough (2001) raised the question of 'how and where scholars should publish' so that they expand the impact of critical research.
- *Significance of historical context*: In some way or another, all discourses are historical and thereby readers should be referred to societal, cultural and ideological backgrounds – in this spirit, it useful to remind ourselves that CDA is a multidisciplinary enterprise.
- *Relationships between language and society are mediated*: Different approaches within CDA mediate the relations between language and society differently. Meyer (2001) draws attention to Fairclough's use of Halliday's 'multifunctional theory' as well as to Foucault's concept of 'orders of discourse' to mediate the relationships between language and society.
- *CDA analyses 'linguistic surface' as well*: Besides its emphasis on power relations, ideology and identity, CDA features linguistic analyses. Hatim and Mason (1997: 161) confirm that 'behind the systematic linguistic choices we make, there is inevitably a prior classification of reality in ideological terms'.
- *Methodologically, CDA is hermeneutic*: Interpretation of meanings is performed in a circle in which every part of meaning depends on understanding the context of the whole. In Meyer's words, 'hermeneutics can be understood as the method of grasping and producing meaning relations' (2001: 16).

Meyer's above-mentioned theorisations hoped to summarise a great deal of how CDA doctrines work to investigate language use with a view to revealing concealed associations in a given context. As Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 258) argue 'the ideological loading of particular ways of using language and the relations of power which underlie them are often unclear to people' and that 'CDA aims to make more visible these opaque aspects of discourse'.

One of the concerns in this study is CDA's practical relevance, especially its treatment of discourse as a social practice which is characterised by its ideological impact on leadership practices. Political speeches analysed in this work involve the use of discursive strategies conditioned by the institution and generated on the basis of cultural, religious and other socio-political factors. Presumably, these speeches constitute planned discursive practices that mirror how ideologies are constantly reshaped by discourse when it comes to talking about Islam and Muslims over a certain period of time (e.g. the studied time span 2013-2016).

In spite of its evolution as a principal critical paradigm and the large number of research projects in CDA studies in the last half-century, the historical development of CDA and its different approaches attracted criticism on different grounds including accusations of 'subjectivity', 'cherry-picking', 'passing judgements', and 'being unscientific' to name a few (see Widdowson, 1996 and 1998; Hammersley, 1997; O'Halloran, 2000). CDA was mainly criticised by some linguists who position themselves outside the borders of this paradigm and warn of the spread of its momentum undermining some of its methodological and theoretical flaws. However, CDA exponents have acknowledged, and in many cases addressed, the major criticism addressed to the approach. Ruth Wodak, a CDA leading academic, urges that 'all possible systematic reading should be considered' (Wodak, 2009: 314) and suggests diversifying perspectives as well as triangulating data, theories and methods to minimise risks of bias. Meyer (2001: 15) addressed the major and frequently-debated 'subjectivity' criticism confirming that subjectivity here is in a sense a virtue; which is not really a surprising conclusion as it sounds at first given the claim that 'CDA scholars play an advocatory role for groups who suffer from social discrimination'.

Along these lines, van Leeuwen (2009: 278-279) propounds the idea that Critical Discourse analysts 'are aware that their work is driven by social, economical and political motives, but they argue that this applies to all academic work, and that CDA at least makes its position explicit. And they feel no need to apologize for the critical stance of their work'. However, faced with such a wealth of disagreement around CDA's political commitment and bias criticisms, I agree with Baker's (2012) post-structuralist view that 'bias is unavoidable when conducting social research, and the aim for neutral objectivity is in itself a 'stance'' (p. 255).

Form a different angle, Hammersley (1997: 237-248) attacks the term 'critical' as a founding assumption of CDA claiming that CDA practitioners over-emphasise the concept of criticality (in the sense it is more critical and emancipatory than other paradigms) and the ambitious claims of offering a comprehensive understanding of society – from a superior position to a large extent. A point of criticism, which the

current project makes a serious attempt to counter, is that CDA is configured in an essentially negative sense and seemed to propagate a deterministic vision of society. In tandem with Luke's (2002) proposals, this research believes that a new, positively-oriented CDA should illuminate minority discourses and diasporic voices, emergent counter-discourses, reinterpretations of mainstream discourses by different groups of subjects, and strategies of resistance. Also, to meet this challenge this study, it is hoped, is an attempt to come to terms with new ways of negotiating representations taking into account emerging counter-discourses and voices of resistance. In my view, CDA has a lot to offer in this respect.

Although reacting to CDA's criticism lies beyond the scope of the current project and has been discussed and dealt with in the literature (e.g. see Breeze, 2011), CDA should not be dealt with as a unitary or homogeneous entity but rather should be seen as consisting of a wealth of identifiable movements, schools and models that can be traced back to different linguistic antecedents and different intellectual traditions. CDA also tends to draw on a mix of conceptual underpinnings from various streams of thought that influenced the realm of CDA.

3.5. ANALYSING POLITICAL DISCOURSE

> When we think of politics, we think of it mainly in terms of the struggle for power in order to secure specific ideas and interests and put them into practice. This process of manifesting a political will and transforming it into concrete social action is realised first of all between political parties. In this process, *language plays an important role*. In fact, any political action is prepared, accompanied, controlled and influenced *by language*.
>
> (Schäffner 1997: 1, my emphasis)

In the first paragraph of her prologue to *Analysing Political Speeches* 1997, Schäffner reminds us of the intricate linkage between *language* and *politics*. She asserts that political action is prepared, accompanied, controlled and influenced by language, she also adds that the former can be 'guided, explained, justified, evaluated, criticized…' (ibid., 1) by the latter. However, the interaction of influences between language and political action presupposes a complexity of interconnectedness that nearly makes it impossible for political discourse analysts to turn a blind eye on any aspect, linguistic or extra-linguistic, when seeking to achieve a comprehensive reading of their subject of investigation.

Contemporary approaches to political discourse have been particularly concerned about the social context surrounding the production and consumption

of discourse in the political sphere; Wodak (2001: 14) asserts that 'context is crucial for CDA, since this explicitly includes social-psychological, political and ideological components and thereby postulates an interdisciplinary procedure'.

In a call for more attention to the linguistic, discursive and communicative dimension of politics, Chilton (2004) provides a twofold definition which he came up with consulting both the study of politics as well as discourse studies of politics. He postulates that politics, on the one hand, is seen as 'a struggle for power, between those who seek to assert and maintain their power and those who seek to resist it' while on the other hand, it is viewed as 'cooperation, as the practices and institutions that a society has for resolving clashes of interest over money, influence, liberty and the like (ibid., 3). Chilton also draws attention to the idea that 'the doing of politics is predominantly constituted in language' (p.6) and that 'politics is very largely the use of language, even if the converse is not true' (p.14). In relation to this, Chilton (ibid.) puts forward three strategic functions which are prevalent in political discourse: coercion, legitimisation and delegitimisation, as well as representation and misrepresentation.

A third view of political discourse comes from Fairclough and Fairclough (2012: 11) who grounded their understanding of 'politics' based on a particular view of political discourse as a form of practical argumentation. They hypothesised that:

> Politics is most fundamentally about making choices about how to act in response to circumstances and events and in light of certain goals and values, and such choices and the actions which follow from them are based upon practical reasoning about what should be done.

Despite the fact that political discourse analysis is more common in the works of analysts coming from a linguistic background rather than scholars of politics or political scientists, the interdisciplinary analyses which cut across the two fields are many (e.g. Chilton, 1985; Fairclough, 2000; Reisigl and Wodak, 2001; Chilton, 2004). Luke (2002) speaks of a linguistic turn in political science which occurred in tandem with a cultural and political turn within the field of linguistics (see section 3.1) and as part of the late 20th-century acknowledgment of the constitutive function of discourse. On the benefits that discourse analysts can bring to the field of politics, Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) assert that the analysis of political discourse 'can have a lot to offer political science and can contribute to answering genuine political questions' (p. 18).

As far as 'political discourse analysis' (or PDA) is concerned, van Dijk (1997: 11) confirms that PDA 'is both about political discourse, and it is also a critical enterprise' and thus is concerned with the discursive production, reproduction

and resistance of power, control, and domination. He also insists that PDA's contributions 'should be able to answer genuine and relevant political questions and deal with issues that are discussed in political science' (ibid, 11-12). Such a view is, to a great extent, compatible with most of the contemporary paradigms to studying political discourse in the social sciences including the various approaches within CDA. Whilst many studies in the CDA literature focussed on details of the theoretical and methodological aspects of political discourse (van Dijk, 1985, 1997, 2001a; Wodak, 1989, 2001; Wodak and Meyer, 2009; Fairclough, 1989, 2000; Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012; Chilton, 2004; Wodak and Meyer, 2016), other studies stressed a more practical relevance offering case-study applications on the relationships between language and the political (Fairclough, 2000; Ensink and Sauer, 2003; van Leeuwen, 2008; Stoegner and Wodak, 2016).

Studying political discourse from a critical standpoint closely aligns with CDA which presupposes that political discourse should be studied critically and that CDA, at its core, is a political enterprise. In such view, CDA projects which focus exclusively on the discourse of political individuals or institutions would be characterised as PDA ventures. Embracing a CDA analytical framework in this study follows Luke's (2002: 97) characterisation of CDA as an 'explicitly political inquiry into social, economic, and cultural power'. Accordingly, choosing to employ CDA as an analytical framework to analyse political discourse in this study stems from an interest to investigate the structural properties of language in relation to their communicative functions.

3.6. THREE APPROACHES TO POLITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

CDA approaches are much more diffuse than their shared principles. By drawing attention to the cognitive-linguistic perspectives of discourse, Chilton (2004) proposed 'a spatial proximation model' for doing political discourse analysis whereby he envisioned a framework for not only comprehending the ways of mentally positioning the *Self* and one's group but also for incorporating a reading of the minds of others in light of their interests, values and motives. In his view, more attention to the 'cognitive capacities' is necessary to understand and interpret human thought and interaction.

Differently, Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) presented an approach to analysing political discourse that surpasses the post-structuralist formulations of political discourse; one characterised by its view of political discourse as mainly

a form of practical argumentation affecting decisions and/or actions. The Faircloughs (2012: 23) posit that:

> A well-grounded critical perspective on political discourse requires argument reconstruction and analysis, as a basis for non-arbitrary evaluation and, if an explicit focus on argumentation is intended, then analysis should be carried out in terms of the analytical framework of some version of argumentation theory.

Apart from its commitment to the centrality of 'argument' as a major analytical category, the Faircloughs' way of conceptualising the construction/reconstruction of political arguments is oriented towards highlighting political action in ways compatible with the underlying presuppositions of both the classical Aristotelian view[43] as well as some other contemporary trends[44] in political theory.

Another well-established approach for analysing political discourse, which is employed to a greater extent in the current thesis, is the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA)[45] associated with the Viennese school of discourse analysis in the academic works of Ruth Wodak, Martin Reisigl and de Cillia (e.g. Wodak et al., 1999; Reisigl and Wodak, 2009; Wodak at al. 2009; Reisigl and Wodak, 2016). DHA is presented as a 'context-sensitive theory that follows a complex concept of social critique and focusses on the historical and political dimension of discursive actions' (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: xii). In addition to being influenced by the British school of discourse analysis especially the Hallidayan systemic functional linguistics, the historical and socio-political attributes constitute valuable resources that are explicitly integrated into DHA analyses when researching the interaction between language and society. According to its prominent figures, DHA, as an approach committed to critical discourse analysis, has been influenced by other sub-disciplines including: Classical and new rhetoric, argumentation theory, German 'politico-linguistics' and socio-political orientation of critical theory (ibid. 32).

Clarification is necessary at this point on the intersection of the three abovementioned approaches which, despite differences, in many cases instruct practitioners to do similar things or start from similar assumptions. While I draw

[43] A view adopted by other approaches to political discourse like DHA.

[44] See, for example, Hay 2007 & Garner 2009; Hay (2007) identifies politics in terms of deliberation or choosing from available decisions what to do in a particular situation. In a similar vein, Garner (2009) regarded decision making as a needed mechanism in politics through which the interests of different groups can be reconciled.

[45] See sections 3.10.2 and 4.3.2 for a more detailed discussion on the major principles of DHA and its operationalisation in the current thesis.

particularly on DHA to undertake qualitative analyses in this project, many concepts from the two other approaches presented in this section remain relevant and useful as will become clear in the analysis chapters.

3.7. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CONTEXTUAL EVIDENCE

CDA emphasises *context* not least because it started as a response to the descriptive nature of studying language and a challenge to studies that undertake language analyses in isolation from their social contexts. Van Dijk (2006: 133) points out that a particular occasion does affect the way a politician speaks as 'there is a need for a cognitive collaboration between situations and talk or text, that is a context'. CDA practitioners predominantly urge a 'catholic marriage' between text and context highlighting the significance of contextual evidence (Fowler, 1996; Fairclough and Wodak, 1997; Rogers, 2004).

On a broader level, CDA is very much concerned with the historicity of discursive productions which should involve an explicit consideration of 'social-psychological, political and ideological components' (Meyer, 2001: 15). This is a way of viewing *context* which Weiss and Wodak (2003: 21) embrace maintaining that context is much more than 'setting in space/time' or reflecting on the 'situational framework'. Seen in terms of the historical dimension and background knowledge, *context*, to them, involves comprehensive explanations of meanings and their associations.

According to Wodak (2001: 67) comprehensive CDA analyses are operationalised as long as four levels of context are taken into consideration:

1. The immediate language or text-internal co-text;
2. The intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourses;
3. The extra-linguistic social/sociological variables and institutional frames of a specific 'context of situation' (middle range theories); and
4. The broader socio-political and historical contexts, which the discursive practices are embedded in and related to ('grand' theories)

(Wodak, 2001: 67)

This thesis works with the four abovementioned layers of context to incorporate the discursive with the non-discursive in a dual relation. This, on the one hand,

gives rise to the idea that discourse is historical and, on the other hand, guarantees a more comprehensive investigation of different phenomena in a qualitative analysis.

3.8. THE NOTION OF 'CRITIQUE'

This section looks at the aspect of 'critique' and 'criticality' within the CDA school of thought. Since the development of CDA which has been significantly influenced by the Frankfurt School and other intellectual traditions, much of its research work provoked a critical reflection on the relationship between language and social structures. The notions '*critique/critical*' seem to be applied at the different phases of a CDA project from the very stage of choosing a social problem with a discursive aspect attached to it, to eliciting data and then throughout practical analyses. But, what does 'critique' or 'critical' precisely imply?

Many CDA scholars warned of equating 'critical' with the common-sense meaning of 'being negative' (see Wodak 2007); critical should be viewed as 'having distance to the data, embedding the data in the social, taking a political stance explicitly, and a focus on self-reflection as scholars doing research' (Wodak 2001: 9). Wodak in a later interview stressed the importance of reflexivity in being critical when she defined the term as 'not taken things for granted, opening up complexity, challenging reductionism, dogmatism and dichotomies, being reflective in my research, and through these processes making opaque structures of power relations and ideologies manifest' (2007: 3). In this way, Wodak's view of 'criticality' subscribes to Hegel by incorporating both negative and positive, deconstruction and construction, but also alludes to the comprehensive nature of CDA research which welcomes projects that study reforming/resisting discourses which call for social change. It is important to note that Wodak's conceptualisation of the term 'critical' within CDA offers a way to deal with calls for embracing the antidote to CDA, Positive Discourse Analysis[46].

[46] Martin (1999) called for supporting *Positive Discourse Analysis* as 'a positive style of Discourse Analysis that focusses on hope and change, by way of complementing the deconstructive expose associated with Critical Discourse Analysis' (p. 29). In support for such proposal, Luke (2002: 106) wrote, 'CDA would need to begin to develop a strong positive thesis about discourse and the productive uses of power'. See section 3.4 for more

Van Dijk (2001a), in a much similar vein, commented on the meaning of 'critical' when combined with discourse analysis asserting that 'CDA is a – critical – perspective on doing scholarship: it is, so to speak, discourse analysis with an attitude' (p. 96). In a later work, he added that being critical is also 'a state of mind… a way of dissenting and many more things' (van Dijk, 2013). Based on similar premises, Fairclough, a major exponent of CDA, confirms that critique is 'essentially making visible the interconnectedness of things' (Fairclough, 1985: 747) and points out that CDA is critical in two senses:

> CDA is critical in the sense it seeks to establish non-obvious connections between semiosis and other elements of social processes, including connections which contribute to unequal relations of power. It is also 'critical' in the sense that it is a form of research and analysis which is committed to changing people's lives for the better
>
> (Fairclough 2001: 26— original emphasis)

On broader terms, Fairclough believes that discourse gets naturalised over time to the extent that we seem to treat the ideologies packed within it as common and accepted; thus, the role of a critical reading becomes to demystify such naturalisations by drawing relationships between the discourse and its social contextualisation. Sayer (2009) took the concept of 'criticality' one step further claiming that critical research 'supports subjugated knowledge against 'dominant knowledge' and thus entails a normative stance that can offer explanations on why particular erroneous beliefs are adhered to.

In terms of analysis, CDA is 'critical' in the sense that it requires a systematic procedure of analysis that accounts for as many relevant aspects as possible in an interdisciplinary and multi-methodological manner (see Wodak and Meyer, 2001, 2009; Reisigl and Wodak 2001; Wodak 2013). On a more detailed overview of 'critique' within CDA, Reisigl and Wodak (2016: 25) identified three levels of 'critique':

> - '*Text or discourse immanent critique*' [which] aims to discover inconsistencies, (self)contradictions, paradoxes and dilemmas in the text internal or discourse internal structures.
>
> - '*Socio-diagnostic critique*' [which] is concerned with uncovering the – particularly latent – persuasive or manipulative character of discursive practices. Here, researchers rely on contextual knowledge and draw on

information on how this thesis relates to proposals of embracing 'a positive discourse analysis' stance.

social theories and other theoretical models from various disciplines to interpret discursive events.

- Future related *prospective critique* [which] seeks to improve communication (e.g. by elaborating guidelines against sexist language use or by reducing 'language barriers' in hospitals, schools and so forth).

Such emphasis on being 'critical' or 'involving critique' is crucial given that CDA shares a platform of emancipation and seeks to raise awareness about inequalities and injustices in society which is an agenda taken up by many critical theorists including Michael Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu, Jurgen Habermas, Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Antonio Gramsci and others.

At the heart of this study lies the issue of criticality in understanding the meaning of discourse being aware of the dialectical connection between discourse and society. This research will draw on CDA works that best fit the scope and aims of this thesis, attending to both a systematic explanation of the discourse-society relationships as well as how such connections can be discursively manipulated for different reasons. In practice, the studied discourses in this project are subjected to two levels of critique: first, a critique that targets unsettling internal contradictions within the studied UNGA political statements, and second, a critique that involves reflecting on the political and ethical effects of the representations appearing from the studied corpus.

3.9. POWER AND IDEOLOGY IN CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

In many contemporary areas of research within political and social sciences, the dynamic and fluid concepts of 'power' and 'ideology' are ubiquitous. Weber (1978: 926) defines power as the potential that 'a man or a number of men to realize their own will even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action'. Discourse, in this context, plays a crucial role in affecting and being affected by power; it is a means by which power can be exerted, and the more power an individual possesses, the more powerful his/her discourse will become. Reisigl and Wodak (2016: 26) identified power as 'the possibility of enforcing one's own will within a social relationship against the will or interests of others'.

Taking that viewpoint, CDA's transdisciplinary approach to data aims to tackle unequal power relations through particular attention to discourse as (a) context-sensitive and (b) having the power to reproduce the social world. This thesis takes into account the issues of social inequality and reproductions of antipathy in

political discourse as having the potential for an impact upon societies.

Ideology, on the other hand, is regarded as 'a perspective (often one-sided), i.e. a worldview and a system composed of related mental representations, convictions, opinions, attitudes, values and evaluations, which is shared by members of a specific social group' (ibid, 25). This, in a way, connects to Thompson's (1990) understanding of ideology as 'social forms and processes within which, and by means of which, hegemonic symbolic forms circulate in the social world' (cited in Reisigl & Wodak, 2009: 88). Reisigl and Wodak (2016) provided four features of ideologies based on Mullins' (1972) characterisation of the notion:

1. Ideology must have power over cognition,
2. It is capable of guiding individuals' evaluations,
3. It provides guidance through action, and
4. It must be logically coherent.

(p. 8)

This thesis aspires to explore how language plays a role in producing, reproducing or resisting particular ideologies. It, in the main, focusses on more hidden and latent forms of ideologies, which may seem neutral and thus stay largely unchallenged. Studying the discursive strategies employed by political actors will provide details about the textual properties used to convey particular representations (i.e. ideological perspectives) of the social world.

3.10. How Does CDA Inform this Project? Approaches and Conceptual Frameworks

Different CDA scholars approached their problem-oriented investigations in different ways and incorporated influences from various theoretical sources; this resulted in the creation of a variety of CDA strands. This study integrates a number of CDA approaches to achieve the aims of the study and investigate patterns of representing Islam and Muslims in the UNGA speeches between 2013-2016. While DHA stands out as the main strand of CDA adopted throughout the thesis for its emphasis on inductive tools of analysis, the thesis also benefits from other approaches to CDA. In the following sections, I wish to present an overview of the approaches applied in this thesis before discussing their operationalisation and tools of analysis later in chapter 4.

3.10.1. Fairclough's 'Description, Interpretation and Explanation'

In *Language and Power (1989)*, Fairclough sought to lay the foundation of CDA as a politico-linguistic academic enterprise that endeavours to unpack the ideological underpinnings of discourse. This approach seeks to identify how changes in power are changes in discourse; therefore, exploring the transformative effects of discursive changes is crucial. Fairclough's approach has been premised upon the perception that the relationship between the text and its socio-cultural practice is constructed via discourse practice which governs how a text is produced or interpreted. According to Fairclough (1995), a special characteristic of his approach to discourse is that:

> [T]he link between sociocultural practice and text is mediated by discourse practice; how a text is produced or interpreted, in the sense of what discursive practices and conventions are drawn from what order(s) of discourse and how they are articulated together, depends upon the nature of the sociocultural practice which the discourse is a part of (including the relationship to existing hegemonies); the nature of the discourse practice of text production shapes the text; and the nature of the discourse practice of text interpretation determines how the surface features of a text will be interpreted
>
> (Fairclough, 1995: 97)

Fairclough's early approach, which heavily draws upon systemic functional linguistics, offers a three-dimensional framework for analysing discourse as:

(a) a text, looking into lexical choices, syntax, clause combination and organisation;
(b) a discourse practice, looking into how the text is produced, distributed, interpreted and (re)appropriated; and
(c) a socio-cultural practice, looking into the situational, institutional or societal levels of analysis.

(Fairclough 1995: 97).

Operationalising this approach, Fairclough (1995; 2003; 2015) incorporates three fundamental processes: description of the text, interpretation of the inexorable link between text and interaction, and explanation of the relationship between interaction and social context. In the ***description*** step, analysts account for the textual/linguistic features of the analysed material, then move on to the process of ***interpretation*** through which socio-semantic relations are explored, and finally they ponder on ***explanation*** through which the linguistic characteristics are linked to various levels of context to reveal the role of discursive productions in terms of social change. However, Fairclough (2001: 22) clarifies that these three phases of analysis should not be realised as mutually exclusive, noting that the description phase, for instance, often requires some degree of interpretation. In light of this,

these three phases of analysis are taken on board as tools for investigating this project's corpus with constant movement back and forth between the three levels of analysis. However, since the genre examined in this thesis involves specifically complex circumstances of production, it would not be feasible to account for issues pertaining to how political speeches are usually written by 'spin-doctors' rather than politicians who deliver them. It is important to point out that my analyses will be oriented towards texts (i.e. the political speeches) rather than the conditions of their production. However, while the analysed speeches represent the views of their producers, this should not imply sole authorship.

3.10.2. The Discourse-Historical Approach & Discursive Strategies

DHA, which is the main strand of CDA applied in this thesis, has been developed as a conceptual framework for analysing political discourse through systematically integrating the historical and socio-political knowledge in its discursive analysis. On the importance of historical and socio-political contexts, Wodak (2001: 14) posits that within the norm of CDA, 'all discourses are historical and can therefore only be understood with reference to their context' and with reference to 'culture, society and ideology'. Ruth Wodak and Martin Reisigl, with a number of their colleagues at Vienna University, put in place the cornerstones of DHA as a way of scrutinising discourse in order to demystify latent power dynamics (see, for instance, Wodak et al. 1999; Reisigl and Wodak 2001; Wodak 2016). One precept distinguishing Wodak's DHA is an emphasis on deciphering the discursive hegemony of powerful actors as a means to uphold power by way of incorporating analyses on multi-contextual levels (Reisigl and Wodak 2009). As such, Reisigl and Wodak believe (and frequently emphasise) that DHA is 'the most linguistically oriented' approach that endeavours to 'fit linguistic theories into their model of discourse' (ibid, 26-27) by extensive reference to discursive strategies.

Historically on the practical application level, DHA inaugurated with a project focussing on investigating the development of an anti-Semitic stereotyping trend that surfaced in the public discourses in 1986 during the Austrian presidential campaign of Kurt Walheim (Wodak and De Cillia, 1999). The approach, then, enthusiastically pursued empirical explorations of discriminatory discourses (e.g. extreme right-wing parties' discursive production). Wodak led projects that scrutinised public discourses in the Romanian context to unravel racism against immigrants. Wodak also wrote extensively about the political gains which some powerful actors maintain through social exclusion and the (re)construction of national identities, emphasising the role of discursive (re)formations of sameness

'us' and otherness 'them' (e.g. 1999 with de Chillia and Reisigl). More recent projects studied the construction of national identities in Austria and Hungry (Wodak and Kovacs, 2004), the politics of fear and right-wing populist discourses in Europe (Wodak, 2015) discourse and politics of the European Union (Wodak and Krzyzanowski, 2017), as well as the radical right and antisemitism (Wodak, 2018).

According to Meyer (2001), the process of methodological choice and its effectiveness in examining the data encompasses (a) the observed phenomena (b) explication of the theoretical assumptions and (c) the method which connects theory to observation. Analytically, the three dimensions which DHA suggests should be the main players in any discursive construction are: *the topics*, *the discursive strategies* and *the linguistic means*[47] (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001).

Furthermore, analyses of political texts in DHA are subject to the principle of triangulation which 'implies taking a whole range of empirical observations, theories and methods as well as background information into account' (Wodak, 2001: 89). Such integration of different sources of knowledge (historical, social, and linguistic) minimises the risk of being biased and diversifies perspectives (See section 3.7 for further discussion on the bias criticism levelled at CDA). According to Wodak (ibid, 65), the validity of the favoured interpretations of discursive events needs to be theoretically justified throughout.

On the operationalisation level, DHA places substantial emphasis on the concept of 'strategy' which Wodak (2003: 139) frequently refers to as: 'a more or less intentional plan of practice (including discursive practices) adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic goal'. She continues, '[D]iscursive Strategies are located at different levels of linguistic organisation and complexity'. Wodak and Reisigl (2016) identified five discursive macro-strategies that are employed by political actors suggesting that approaching these strategies in CDA projects (like the present one) would be beneficial to explore ways of deciphering ideological implications. These strategies are:

Nomination

In their seminal work, Wodak and Reisigl (2016: 33) start with '*nomination*' (or the referential strategy); which is usually implemented to represent and construct social actors, objects or actions to form in-groups ('us') and out-groups ('them') in clear-cut ways. Among the linguistic devices applied to bring this strategy into operation

[47] In contrast with Fairclough's emphasis on *description*, *interpretation* and *explanation* as outlined in the above section.

are deictic references, anthroponomy, metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche.

Predication

Another strategy is '*predication*' which depicts social actors, objects or actions according to the evaluative attribution of positive or negative traits through predicates (e.g. collocations, relative clauses, comparisons, similes and other rhetorical figures). As Richardson (2007: 50) points out referential strategies not only 'project meaning and social values onto the referent, they also establish coherence with the way that other social actors are referred to and represented'.

Argumentation

De Beaugrande and Dressler (1981: 184) define argumentative texts as ones 'utilised to promote the acceptance or evaluation of certain beliefs or ideas as true vs. false, or positive vs. negative'. Studying the argumentative nature of texts reveals the multi-faceted significance of language as a tool for persuasion and justification. The third discursive strategy, according to Wodak and Reisigl (2016) is '*argumentation*' or what they termed '*topoi*', which aim to justify and legitimise positive and negative attributions. Topoi (or loci) are regarded as an integral part of the argumentation structure. For Wodak (2001), topoi are parts of argumentation which belong to the obligatory, either explicit or inferable premises. These are content-related warrants or 'conclusion rules' which connect the argument or arguments with the conclusion, the claim. (Wodak 2001: 74). Such topoi can be effective in terms of persuasion as they adhere to providing arguments typical for a specific issue (Van der Valk, 2003).

Perspectivation (Framing or Discourse Representation)

The fourth discursive strategy in Wodak and Reisigl's taxonomy is '*perspectivation*', a discursive framing technique through which political actors declare their positions by either expressing involvement in a certain practice or distancing themselves from it. Among the multifarious linguistic means in which perspectivation can be realised, the acts of describing, reporting, narrating and quoting are the most notable ones.

Intensification and Mitigation

Finally, the fifth strategy involves the use of '*intensification or mitigation*' or the alternation between the two. In practice, this strategy is put into practice when political actors modify 'the epistemic status' of a proposition (i.e. knowledge claims about something) by intensifying or mitigating the illocutionary force of utterances. *Table 3.1*, adopted from (Reisigl and Wodak 2016: 33), encapsulates the

abovementioned five discursive strategies which DHA give prominence to (and are key components of my method of analysis):

Table 3.1: Discursive strategies, objectives and devices (Reisigl & Wodak, 2016: 33)

Strategy	Objective(s)	Device(s)
Nomination	Discursive construction of social actors, objects, phenomena, events and processes, actions	Membership categorization devices, deictics, anthroponyms, etc. Tropes such as metaphors, metonymies and synecdoche (*pars pro toto*, *totum pro parte*) Verbs and nouns used to denote processes and actions, etc.
Predication	Discursive qualification of social actors, objects, phenomena, events, processes and actions (more or less positively and negatively)	Stereotypical, evaluative attribution of negative and positive traits (e.g. in the form of adjectives, appositions, prepositional phrases, relative clauses, conjunctional clauses, infinitive clauses and participial clauses or groups) Explicit predicates or predicative nouns/ adjectives/ pronouns Collocations Explicit comparisons, similes, metaphors and other rhetorical figures Allusions, evocations and presuppositions/ implicatures etc.
Argumentation	Justification and questioning of claims of truth and normative rightness	Topoi (see below) Fallacies (see below)

Perspectivation, Framing or Discourse Representation	Positioning speaker's or writer's point of view and expressing involvement or distance	Deictics Direct, Indirect or Free Indirect Speech Quotation marks, discourse markers or particles Metaphors Animating Prosody
Intensification and Mitigation	Modifying the illocutionary force and thus the epistemic or deontic status of utterances	Diminutives and Augmentatives Modal particles, tag questions, subjunctives, hesitations, vague expressions Hyperboles, Litotes Indirect speech acts Verbs of saying, thinking, feeling etc.

In the context of the UNGA debates, different political actors upholding different worldviews (and *ipso facto*) different political agendas compete to establish/affirm hegemonic discourses that help to construct identities in ways that assist them to achieve political goals (e.g. implementing national and international policymaking preferences through reinforcing representations of in-groups and out-groups). The abovementioned discursive strategies are used in negative other-presentation and positive self-presentation with links established between the values of the speaker, certain political-action preferences as well as the positioning of different political actors according to personal worldviews. In this project, analysing the selected data according to the main principles of DHA, especially its conceptualisation of 'discursive strategies' and emphasis on the integration of the historical and political context will help in identifying the discourse macro-topics employed in the analysed speeches when referring to Islam and Muslims. Moreover, with the help of DHA, it would potentially become easier to pinpoint some of the major discursive strategies employed to promote/give legitimacy to certain political ideologies in relation to the representations of the studied group. Another advantage of employing DHA relates to the interdisciplinary perspective it encourages which can be significant to illustrate relations between the discursive and the non-discursive spheres of politics.

3.10.3. Intertextuality and Interdiscursivity

The semiotic notion of *Intertextuality* refers to the link to components of other texts (Fairclough, 2003). Blommaert (2005: 46) states that it 'refers to the fact that

whenever we speak we produce the words of others, we constantly cite and re-cite expressions, and recycle meanings that are already available'. To start with, the history of intertextuality dates back to the late 1980s when Bakhtin (1981 and 1986) highlighted the dialogic nature of texts explaining that several voices are always present in a given text. Synthesising Bakhtin's dialogism with de Saussure's study of semiotic signs, Julia Kristeva used the term *intertextuality* for the first time to describe how text and talk involve reference to other texts and discourses (Kristeva, 1986). In this sense, texts generate meanings and understandings through creating links to and building on other texts. Kristeva (1986: 66) maintains that 'any text is constructed of a mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption and transformation of another'.

Kristeva (1986) propounded two kinds of intertextuality, horizontal and vertical. Kristeva spoke of the horizontal axis of reference connections, or what Fairclough (1992b) later termed 'manifest intertextuality'. In this type of intertextuality, the interrelation between the extracted elements and the new text is a manifest one, typically indicated by direct referencing tools (quotation marks, for example). Fairclough (ibid.) points out that this type of intertextuality occurs when 'specific other texts are overtly drawn upon within a text' (p. 117). Vertical intertextuality, on the other hand, is more of an implicit intertextual reference, and thus requires more efforts to unearth as its retrieval partially depends on the individual's knowledge about other texts. Fairclough (1992: 104) dubbed this type as 'constitutive intertextuality' arguing that a text may 'incorporate another text without the latter being explicitly clued. Using such concealed discourses (e.g. representing a mosaic of genres) in the production of a text perhaps aim to, among other things, get the reader/receiver of the message to reformulate already existing political, cultural and ideological beliefs in ways that aid the writer's/producer's ends.

To this effect, observing indications of mixed genres and the use of multiple voices, it can be argued that the two abovementioned categories of intertextuality, as I will be explaining at length in the analysis chapters, are explicitly employed in the political discourses studied in the present thesis particularly in contexts of positive 'self' and negative 'other' representations.

Relating to an example of how using a generic framing device like 'once upon time' unleashes our expectations of a narrative or a plot structure, Briggs and Bauman (2009) argued that 'generic' intertextual references provide models for creating cohesion and coherence but also exceed such structural effect to provide 'powerful means of ordering discourse in historical and social terms' (p. 226). When producers of discourse make connections to other historical or social texts (e.g. sacred texts or

words of the ancestors) that bear some sort of authority, we can say that they provide their discourse with more authority and social power in their present context too. Briggs and Bauman (1992) postulated that choosing to use intertextual strategies is ideologically motivated depending on the relevant social, cultural, political, economic and historical considerations. However, they believe that generic intertextuality is not an essential aspect of the relation between text and genre, arguing that such relation is usually constructed as 'a text can be linked to generic precedents in multiple ways; generic framings of texts are thus often blurred, ambiguous, contradictory' (p. 163). Therefore, analysing particular ways in which such generic intertextualities are employed in discourse will provide insights into how this process not only reflects but also (re)produces social power. In connection to this, Wodak and Meyer (2009) regard interrelations among texts as contexts in which power can be negotiated and power struggles can be further pursued. They argue that 'texts are often sites of struggles in that they show traces of differing discourses and ideologies contending and struggling for dominance' (p. 10).

Although the term intertextuality has originated in a post-structuralist sense that sidesteps asking questions in a historical critique fashion[48], it has now become an umbrella term used within multiple fields and approaches of analysis. Stead (2009: 20), in this context, identified three common features that typify an intertextual approach to analysis – which are indeed useful for the purpose of this study and therefore merits some attention. These are:

- Textual creation – texts are a 'mosaic' of quotations from other texts;
- Textual meaning – meaning comes from a 'dialogue' between texts;
- Textual hermeneutics – a reader's role in the production of meaning.

Within the DHA to CDA, Reisigl and Wodak (2009) referred to two processes involved in making intertextual references. First, taking an element out of its context (i.e. a process called decontextualisation) and then reproducing it in a new context (i.e. a process called recontextualisation). Fairclough (2003: 222), defines recontextualisation as 'a relationship between different networks of social practices, where elements of one social practice are appropriated by, or relocated in the context of, another'. Consequently, the extracted discursive elements may acquire new meanings after being employed in a new context. Linell (1998: 145) also suggested that 'recontextualisation is never the simple movement of a fixed meaning across texts: it always involves meaning transformation'.

[48] See Kristeva (1986) for a detailed discussion on how she objected to the use of the term *intertextuality* to investigate authorial intent and influence.

Concerning the ideological influence of recontextualisation, Richardson and Wodak (2009) provided evidence that Austrian and British far-right groups recontextualised anti-Semitic and fascist ideologies to create and reproduce a present-day exclusionary rhetoric against groups like blacks and Muslims. Thus, applying a critical lens to intertextual references provides discourse analysts with a tool explore what goals discourse producers can achieve through making certain linguistic choices in an intertextual context, a point from which they can relate to the higher thematic structure of a text. A guiding question for this project's intertextual analysis is: *To what degree do the messages regarding Islam and Muslims depart from or resort to similar/different intertextual references?*

Although interdiscursivity relates to intertextuality as different discourses are linked to each other in multiple ways, the concept *interdiscursivity* is grounded on the notions of 'heteroglossia' and 'dialogicality' provided for in Bakhtin's (1981 and 1986) works. However, attempting to draw lines of difference between the three notions, Fairclough (1992) maintains that interdiscursivity gives more prominence to ideology than heteroglossia does, and that dialogicality is mostly applied in the stylistic approach to literary texts, whereas interdiscursivity is applied to both literary as well as non-literary texts. Fairclough, moreover, equates interdiscursivity with constitutive intertextuality in the sense that both refer to the intertextual relation of genres and discourse conventions.

Likewise, Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999: 45) argue that interdiscursivity relates to 'shifting articulation of different discourses, genres and voices in interactions and texts'. In this sense and from a CDA standpoint, scrutinising interdiscursivity and constitutive intertextual relations in a given text helps in explaining 'why macrostructures of inequality are persistent and pervasive and can get reinforced and perpetuated via discursive processes across multiple sites and multiple texts over a sustained period of time' (Lin, 2014: 2017).

Consulting CDA's literature on interdiscursivity, it can be noted that many researchers have adopted Fairclough's framework of pursuing interdiscursivity to understand the dynamics of social phenomena. Bhatia (1995), for example, studied interdiscursivity in legal documents, administrative communications and business advertisement. His study revealed that mixing genres is a characteristic of the professional domains he studied. Similarly, Scollon (2000) has also applied the Faircloughian approach to interdiscursivity in his ethnographic study of news discourse and concluded that constructing identities in news discourse involves employing interdiscursivity extensively.

Alongside the benefits that can be gained from exploring interdiscursivity in the Faircloughian tradition, the present thesis also applies the notion of intertextuality following the norm of paradigms that defined interdiscursivity with reference to the principle of topicality. Under the umbrella of DHA, Reisigl and Wodak (2009: 90) clarify that:

> Interdiscursivity signifies that discourses are linked to each other in various ways. If we conceive 'discourse' as primarily topic-related (as 'discourse on x'), we will observe that a discourse on climate change frequently refers to topics or sub-topics of other discourses, such as finances or health.

This topicality-oriented approach to interdiscursivity helps in explicating what social change a text aspires to achieve through its different topics and sub-topics. Examples of scholars who applied this approach to interdiscursivity are also many. Baker et al. (2008) used it to examine the discursive presentation of *Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Immigrants and Migrants* (RASIM) in the British press. De Cillia et al. (1999) similarly introduced a combination of interdiscursivity and historical analysis to study the discursive construction of national identities in Austria. More recently, El Naggar (2012) has applied this approach to explore the processes of persuasion in a speech by the Muslim televangelist Hamza Yusuf and found out that the speaker invoked some discourse topics and dismissed others to achieve persuasive intentions, but also linked his speech to the religious realm to highlight religion as a force for change.

3.10.4. Corpus Linguistics

Corpus Linguistics has been widely employed in a plethora of areas of linguistic enquiry, including lexicology and lexicography (e.g. Clear et al. 1996), language teaching (e.g. Johns, 1997) literary texts (e.g. Louw, 1997) and discourse analysis (Partington et al. 2004; Mautner, 2006; Baker et al. 2008). Before looking at the value which corpus-based analyses could bring to the field of discourse studies and to this study in particular, it behoves me to start with a historical note on corpus linguistics in general. Leech (1992: 116) defines the notion 'corpora' as:

> [R]arely haphazard collections of textual material: They are generally assembled with particular purposes in mind, and are often assembled to be (informally speaking) representative of some language use or text type.
>
> (Leech, 1992: 116)

In this definition, an emphasis is put on the representative value of a corpus. Reflecting on this definition and many other attempts to define corpora, McEnery

et al. (2006: 5) sought to provide a more up-to-date definition that takes into account the fundamental qualities of a corpus. They write:

> … [t]here is an increasing consensus that a corpus is a collection of (1) machine-readable (2) authentic texts (including transcripts of spoken data) which is (3) sampled to be (4) representative of a particular language or language variety.

In his earlier work, Leech (1991) ascertained that what differentiates corpora from archives is 'a particular "representative" function' of the former (p. 11). Corpus linguistics, therefore, as Baker (2006: 1) points out, 'utilizes bodies of electronically encoded text, implementing a more quantitative methodology, for example by using frequency information'. Computerised language patterns or machine-readable texts have many advantages which make using corpus software appealing to many linguists. Some of these advantages include saving time and efforts as well as more accuracy and comprehensiveness.

McEnery et al. (2006) confirm that historically speaking using corpora (in the sense of collections of texts) in language studies has its roots dating back to the pre-Chomskyan period in works such as Boas (1940) who collected writings on race, language and culture. At that time computer software was not available to linguists, which means that texts were manually collected in sizes smaller than those available nowadays.

Regarding the question of whether corpus linguistics is a methodology or a theory, McEnery et al. (2006) believe (and strongly stress) that it is a methodology rather than an independent branch of linguistics although this is not agreed to by all scholars in the field. The authors explain, 'Corpus linguistics, in contrast [to independent branches of linguistics], is not restricted to a particular aspect of language. Rather, it can be employed to explore any area of linguistic research' (ibid. 7).

On the operationalisation level, those with previous experience of corpus linguistics will be aware of two approaches to handling corpus data:

- The first one is to use ready-made or publicly available corpora (or what some authors refer to as 'off the peg' corpora), and such corpora usually consist of millions of words collected from a wide range of written (and spoken) texts. An example of such corpora is the *British National Corpus* (BNC, 2008), which comprises 100 million words as samples of written and

spoken language (90% written), and (10% Spoken)[49]. This corpus contains texts (and transcripts) for the period from 1960 to 1993. Another example of an 'off the peg' corpus is the *Corpus of Contemporary American English*[50] (COCA, 2008) which includes a 425 million-word corpus of American English with texts (and transcripts) covering a more recent period (1990-2011).

- The second choice available to researchers interested in using corpus tools would be to build their own corpora (aka, 'DIY' or 'tailor-made'), whereby they will have to compile their machine-readable data to be processed by computer software at the time of analysis.

Some scholars recommend combining both types of corpora for better results. For instance, Mautner (2006: 35) suggests that:

> Very often the biggest potential lies in combining the use of both type of corpora, tailor-made and off-the-peg, so that in a sense the potential drawbacks of one can be offset by key advantages of the other.

This thesis belongs to the corpus-based (rather than corpus-driven) kind of study that employs a qualitative method of study. Tognini-Bonelli (2001: 17) explicates the difference between corpus-based and corpus-driven approaches positing that while the former 'starts with a pre-existing theory which is validated using corpus data', the latter 'builds up the theory step by step in the presence of the evidence, the observation of certain patterns leads to a hypothesis, which, in turn, leads to the generalisation in terms of rules of usage and finally finds unification in a theoretical statement'.

On using a synergy of corpus linguistics and CDA, Mautner (ibid) postulates that CDA's interest in socially and historically situated texts justifies the researchers' appeal to beginning with purpose-built corpora. The combination of the two is not a new phenomenon, according to her. She notes that:

> [a]wareness has been growing that corpus linguistic techniques can be harnessed profitably in order to uncover relationships between language and the social – one of the central concerns of discourse analysis generally and its 'critical' variety in particular.
>
> (2006: 32)

[49] cf. The British National Corpus official webpage at: (http://www.natcorp.ox.ac.uk/corpus/index.xml)

[50] More information about the Corpus of Contemporary American English can be found at the official webpage: (https://corpus.byu.edu/coca/).

The idea of considering large data sets in discourse analysis is welcomed by many scholars in the field. De Beaugrande suggested that large corpora are supportive in returning the project of discourse analysis to authentic data (de Beaugrande, 1997). Authors who applied combinations of CDA and CL believe in the fruitful cooperation between the two. Academic publications in recent literature have devoted sections to explicate and justify the combination demonstrating the mutual benefits for the two approaches. In this regard, some authors have investigated the roots of both to find similarities. Mautner (2006: 32) quotes J. R. Firth, one of the founding fathers of corpus linguistics, who described corpus linguistics as involving 'a contextual and sociological technique' (Firth, 1935/1957: 13) to suggest that the social, which is crucial to CDA, is also of importance to corpus linguistics. In another section of the same chapter, Mautner (2006) cited eight principles governing CDA as put forward by Fairclough and Wodak (1997) to prove that 'none of these is inherently inimical to a corpus linguistic approach' (Mautner, 2006: 33). She, also, continues to claim that CDA and corpus linguistics are 'a natural match' (ibid.) highlighting the common interest in authentic data and language in use. In connection to this, Baker (2006: 183) comments that:

> A corpus-based analysis of discourse affords the researcher with the patterns and trends in language (from the subtle to the gross). People are not computers though, and their ways of interacting with texts are very different both from computers and from each other. Corpus-based discourse analysis should therefore play an important role in terms of removing bias, testing hypotheses, identifying norms and outliers and raising new research questions. It should not replace other forms of close human analysis, but act in tandem with them.

This thesis regards a CDA-CL synergy as an opportunity to identify social power abuse and patterns of (mis)representation in political discourse. Whilst one of the aims of attending to CL in this thesis is to be exhaustive and make findings more generalisable, I also hope to overcome the 'cherry-picking' criticism as one of the commonly cited potential criticisms levelled to CDA. Baker (2006: 92) confirms that 'the corpus-based approach at least helps to counter some of this bias, by providing quantitative evidence of patterns that may be more difficult to ignore'.

Corpus tools, according to Hunston (2002), can reveal discursive patterns emerging from keyword and collocation analyses which might not get noticed manually. As established in section 3.5 of this chapter, CDA has been criticised for interpreting discursive patterns and their prosodies based on 'intuition'. For instance, Widdowson (2000) used a corpus to test Fairclough's (1995) hypothesis that the verb 'flock' was of 'notoriously passive' (ibid, 113) when used in reference to poor people and found out that 'flock' were rather consistently used to describe people who are

active and thus entails a positive discourse prosody. However, emphasising the pros of corpus-based approaches to CDA should not indicate that it comes without a price or that it does not have its own caveats. Baker (2006: 18-19) discusses the following three issues which deserve special attention:

- First, one problem with a corpus is that it contains decontextualised examples of language. We may not know the ideologies of the text producers in a corpus.
- Second, frequent patterns of language do not always necessarily imply underlying hegemonic discourses. Or rather, the 'power' of individual texts or speakers in a corpus may not be evenly distributed.
- Third, frequent patterns of language (even when used by powerful text producers) do not always imply mainstream ways of thinking. Sometimes what is not said or written is more important than what is there.

It should be borne in mind that a corpus-informed CDA involves lots of interpretation. In another publication, Baker (2012: 255) reminds us not to be 'blindly evangelical about it [corpus linguistics]' and 'to be careful in overstating the ability of CL to reduce researcher bias' as 'the interpretation and evaluation of quantitative patterns are still very much likely to be subject to human bias'.

3.10.5. Halliday's Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL)

CDA has been informed by a variety of grand and middle-range linguistic theories which enriched the paradigm and equipped it with crucial tools at the explanation level. CDA, in many ways, subscribes to a functional view of language and strongly acknowledges the benefits of SFL as a linguistic theory and approach that investigates language in use. CDA underlines the inexorable link between form and function. Wodak (2001: 8) emphasises that:

> Whether analysts with a critical approach prefer to focus on microlinguistic features, macrolinguistic features, textual, discursive or contextual features, whether their angle is primarily philosophical, sociological or historical – in most studies there is a reference to Hallidayan systemic functional grammar. This indicates that an understanding of the basic claims of Halliday's grammar and his approach to linguistic analysis is essential for a proper understanding of CDA.

Systemic Functional Linguistics (associated with M. A. K. Halliday, 1978), which provides significant insights for textual analysis, presumes that language is a 'system of meaning potential' (Halliday, 1978: 39); meaning that preferring to use

certain lexico-grammatical patterns over others reflects the text producer's conscious or unconscious spur to covey a certain message in a certain way. A 'systemic' paradigm, in the Hallidayan tradition, is one that essentially regards language as a system of choices in terms of modelling, voice, lexical choices, grammatical chains … etc. Besides its emphasis on the role of linguistic choices/preferences in meaning-making processes, SFL stresses a socio-cultural perspective that deals with language as a form of social behaviour. Halliday (ibid, 41) maintains that:

> [a] text is an instance of social meaning in a particular context of situation. We shall therefore expect to find the situation embodied or enshrined in the text, not piecemeal, but in a way which reflects the systematic relation between the semantic structure and the social environment

Accordingly, Halliday's approach to systemic functional analysis is premised on the notion that language is a social semiotic system and views language as constitutive of three interrelated semiotic 'metafunctions': (a) *textual* which relates to how a text coheres and to organisation above the sentence level; (b) *interpersonal* which relates to the construction of identities, the relationships between the interlocutors, and language as a medium for interaction; and finally (c) *ideational* which relates to the contents of a text including ideas and representations. Analyses applying these three 'metafunctions' can be beneficial in interpreting patterns of representing 'the self' and 'the other' in sociological terms. Put differently, analysing the lexico-grammatical realisations that occur in actual texts is very much useful for capturing some sense of the materialised forms of representation (e.g. full vs. reduced agency).

3.10.6. Van Leeuwen's Model of Representation & Socio-Semantic Model of Legitimation Strategies

Analysis of representations of social actors (or groups) and discursive qualities assigned to *Us* versus *Them* based on aspects such as religion, ethnicity, gender, race, etc. have been at the heart of CDA research over the past few decades. Not denying the benefits of adopting SFL categories of analysis, Van Leeuwen, who almost single-handily theorised for the *model of representing social actors*, draws attention to the fact that 'there is no neat fit between sociological and linguistic categories' (van Leeuwen, 1996: 33) and warns of the danger of CDA's possible overdependence on SFL categories to account for sociologically-based meanings. Hence, he proposed the idea of looking for abstract categories of representation which are partially social and partially discursive (ibid., 1996).

In his 2007 article entitled *Legitimation in discourse and communication*, van Leeuwen introduced 'a framework for analysing the way discourses construct legitimation for social practices' (p. 91). Leeuwen's critically-oriented framework allows analysts to 'separate out the actors, actions and so on from the reactions, purposes and legitimations, but on the other hand also show how these two aspects of the text, the representations and the interpretations, one could say, are related' (ibid, 109).

3.11. SUMMARY

This chapter shed some light on the historical background of the study of 'discourse' as part of the study of language, and the significance of exploring the relationship between language, power and ideology when studying political discourses. The chapter also outlined some of the theoretical underpinnings which inform the current project before discussing CDA, how it originated and progressed, its main approaches, methodological tools, and some of the criticisms it encountered over the last two decades. One of the aims that this chapter hoped to achieve was to show how a multi-dimensional CDA model of analysis allows us to look at the totality of representations in the studied corpus through examining the discourses both on their own and as part of a larger socio-political context. Also, as has been articulated previously in the chapter, CDA is able to raise questions regarding how linguistic analyses can contribute to social change by raising awareness of the many (implicit and explicit) ways through which power is legitimised in language. By grounding the discussions theoretically and methodologically, this chapter also aimed to establish for the view that the exercise of power and the (re)production of representations can be traced in political texts.

In the next chapter, I outline the data collection, the electronic text-encoding procedures as well as the procedures employed to analyse data quantitatively and qualitatively based on the approaches outlined in this chapter.

Chapter 4

DATA
&
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

All humans are dead except those who have knowledge; and those who have knowledge are asleep, except those who do good deeds; and those who do good deeds are deceived, except those who are sincere; and those who are sincere are always in a state of worry

Imam Al-Shafi'i

4.1. OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTER

This chapter is chiefly concerned with presenting the stages of compiling the corpus of this study as well as explicating (by means of elucidating examples) some of the major tools employed to analyse the data qualitatively and quantitatively based on the approaches and tools outlined in the preceding chapter. Due to the size of data examined in this endeavour (i.e. approximately a total of 1,627,000 words), feasibility necessitated a selective analytical focus. Therefore, analyses will be conducted according to the following stages:

1. Corpus linguistic tools will be applied to the data in order to identify the discursive patterns (mainly nouns and adjectives) which might be interesting instances of representing Islam and Muslims, thus providing an initial descriptive overview of the themes surrounding mentions of 'Islam and Muslims' and narrowing down the parameters of analysis in terms of topicality[51]. This stage involves eliciting frequency counts, keywords, word sketches[52], and collocations[53].

[51] Topicality here refers to the identification of topics and sub-topics which a particular speech addresses.

[52] According to Kilgarriff et al. (2014: 9), a word sketch is 'a one-page summary of a word's grammatical and collocational behaviour'.

[53] These terminologies are explored and explained in detail in the next section.

2. Drawing on a range of CDA approaches that fit very well with the stated intention of this research, illustrative extracts will be scrutinised in greater depth; these will mainly be analysed through investigating concordance lines (i.e. patterns of representing Islam and Muslims within context).

3. After analysing the corpus and having identified different statistical indicators, I analyse four selected speeches in full. These are chosen for their socio-political relevance and for being exemplars of the range of representations appearing from the corpus[54]. Some of the analytical methods applied on these four speeches will include Halliday's systemic functional grammar, the discourse-historical approach, Leeuwen's theories of legitimation among other conceptual frameworks outlined in the preceding chapter and further linked to the context of this thesis in section 4.3 of this chapter.

The abovementioned three stages reflect what Baker et al., (2008) termed a 'methodological synergy', in which CDA and corpus linguistics are constantly operationalised at every level of the analysis. For instance, in the first stage (which might supposedly appear as a corpus-based phase of the analysis), a number of textual strategies have been brought into the context of analysis to bring to the surface potential ideology-making processes across the entire corpus. Similarly, the detailed CDA analyses of the four selected speeches (which might appear as a purely qualitative stage) benefited from some of the corpus-based indicators arrived at in the previous stage. Combining CDA and CL analytical tools in this manner can be very useful as a procedure for exploring representations in the context of this project. CDA in its different forms is a powerful mechanism for identifying social problems, revealing power inequalities and discursive injustices; meanwhile, corpus tools are means for considering large amounts of data which enable practitioners to make statistically-supported claims based on quantitative evidence. Yet, as Mulderrig (2006) reminds us, we have to always bear in mind that one of the main challenges which encounter researchers who apply a CDA-CL synergy remains how this methodology can be best presented as a systematised and coherent process. Put differently, this synergy is an interaction of methods which continually evolve across the different stages of analysis. Mulderrig (2011: 564) suggests that:

[54] Further justification for choosing these particular speeches will follow in chapter 6.

> Unlike some forms of discourse-based research, CDA does not begin with a fixed theoretical and methodological stance. Instead, the research process begins with a particular topic … and the theoretical and methodological tools are then developed as the object of research is progressively refined.

Therefore, rather than adhering to one specific model of analysis, this thesis takes an eclectic and manifold approach to textual analysis benefiting from statistical evidence but simultaneously refusing to divorce the analysed speeches from the context of production and reception.

4.2. CAPTURING DATA, PREPARING FOR ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTING CORPUS TOOLS

The data used in this thesis comprised a specialised corpus[55] of around 1,627,129 words consisting of all 787 political speeches that were delivered during the UNGA high-level meeting debates in the following four sessions:

- The 68th Ordinary UNGA, 2013 – 196 speeches.
- The 69th Ordinary UNGA, 2014 – 196 speeches.
- The 70th Ordinary UNGA, 2015 – 197 speeches.
- The 71st Ordinary UNGA, 2016 – 198 speeches.

In collecting the research data, the first step was to download the political speeches from the UNGA online depository collections which dedicated a page featuring the statements delivered at the UN in 6 languages (Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish)[56]. The next step was to store the data in plain text Unicode Text Format (UTF-8) to be machine-readable and fitting to be installed in the online corpus analysis tool *Sketch Engine* (Kilgarriff et al. 2004). Using this corpus facility, data can be (manually or automatically) tagged according to the grammatical rules of a certain language prior to obtaining frequency counts, word sketches, key-word

[55] Sinclair (1982) maintains that there are three types of corpora, serving different purposes: (a) *Specialist corpora* which are designed for the investigation of a particular issue; (b) *Reference corpora* or Sample corpora, which contain a large amount of text from a wide range of authors and genres, with the aim of creating a database which represents the language as broadly as possible; and (c) *Monitor corpora*, which are reference corpora which have developed over time and which can be divided into periods, thereby permitting diachronic research into language development.

[56] https://gadebate.un.org/en/sessions-archive

lists, KWIC concordances as well as collocations[57]. Although this first step of preparing the data is certainly labour-intensive and requires painstaking efforts, this initial stage was taken as an opportunity to get familiarised with the corpus and to avoid 'commenc[ing] from the position of *tabula rasa*' (Partington, 2003: 259).

In order to obtain word sketches[58] on the representations of Islam and Muslims in the studied corpus, the first task was to decide on the lemmata[59] to be searched for in order to locate patterns that relate to the studied discourse topic. Accordingly, the following search terms -which were kept as generic as possible- were utilised as parameters to generate word sketches:

- ***First lemma (ISLAM)****: Islam, Islams, Islamic, Islamist, Islamists, Islamophobia, Islamophobic, un-Islamic, Anti- Islamic.*
- ***Second lemma (MUSLIM)****: Muslim, Muslims, non-Muslim, non-Muslims.*

The abovementioned lemmata share a direct reference to the identity associated with Islam as a religion and Muslims as followers of the religion. Reading through the corpus, these terms were identified as focal points of the discourses on the representation of Islam and Muslims in the corpus. Thus, an automated query was conducted using the abovementioned search terms within the 787 speeches; a technique that is rather well-matched with the 'corpus-driven' norms of corpus linguistics research (see Tognini-Bonelli, 2001). However, the automated query was paused whenever any of the search terms was no longer in the main texts of the speeches but in the 'transitional word' delivered by the head of the session while introducing each speaker.

At this point, the lemma *Islam* presented a challenge that needed to be addressed with regard to results precision. Whilst most of the obtained results of this lemma provided patterns with clear relevance to representing Islam and Muslims, some results contained names of persons, organisations, cities or even countries (e.g. *Islam Karimov, Organization of the Islamic Conference, Islamabad, and the Islamic Republic of Iran*). Including such patterns may raise concerns of relevance and precision, hence these were filtered out through examining all concordance lists of the lemma ISLAM

[57] Later sections will discuss notions of (word sketches, frequency lists, key-word analyses, KWIC and collocations) and how each can be useful to uncover the existence of discourses in texts.

[58] 'Summary of a word's grammatical and collocational behaviour' (Kilgarriff et al., 2014: 9)

[59] From the singular 'lemma' which means 'a set of word forms consisting of a basic uninflected form and its inflectional variants' (Hoffmann et al., 2008: 40-41). A more comprehensive and lexicography-oriented definition of 'lemma' was earlier provided by Francis and Kucera (1982: 1) defining it as 'a set of lexical forms having the same stem and belonging to the same major word class, differing only in inflection and/or spelling'.

to exclude all instances which were not expected to offer any significant readings into the representation of the religion or its adherents. The excluded hits contained the followings (in order of appearance in the concordance list):

> *Islamic Republic of Iran* OR *ISIS* OR *ISIL* OR *Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham* OR *Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant* OR *Islam Bibi* OR *Islamic Republic of Pakistan* OR *Islamic Republic of Afghanistan* OR *Islamabad* OR *Islamic Republic of Mauritania* OR *Islamic State* OR *Islamic Caliphate* OR *Party-Jamaat-e-Islam* OR *Hezeb-e-Islam* OR *Organization of the Islamic Conference* OR *Islam Karimov* OR *Islamic Development Bank*

The following sections are meant to outline various analytical tools and techniques that are utilised in conducting the corpus-assisted discourse analyses. Illustrative examples of actual usage from the data are used to explain each technique in an attempt to circumvent abstract explanations that discard practicality and relevance.

4.2.1. Frequency Counts and the Rationale for Data Selection

As Baker (2006: 47) puts it, 'frequency is one of the most central concepts underpinning the analysis of corpora'. In corpus-based analyses, frequency counts of linguistic elements can be a good point of departure to highlight the existence of interesting phenomena in the data. In this project, frequencies are particularly significant in detecting political speeches that referred to Islam and Muslims. The reappearance of the two lemmata ISLAM and MUSLIM in particular speeches was a factor in arousing my interest in opting to subject these speeches (or at least extracts from these) to further in-depth critical analyses.

As it would be practically very hard to qualitatively analyse all the 787 speeches on their entirety due to the limited time and research resources, I opted for using the quantitative component as an initial 'surface' indicator of the frequencies and presence/absence of reference to the investigated discourse topic. Here, it is worth noting that the frequency indicator will not be - as will be seen later in the chapter - the only factor for deciding on which speeches are subjected to in-depth CDA analyses. However, the insights gained from what van Dijk (1988) called a quantitative computer-aided 'superficial content analysis' would be useful to identify the texts which can be sites for more sophisticated qualitative analyses. In this light, there was a need to search for the speeches that contained frequent mentions of the studied discourse topic. This meant that I needed to upload all the speeches to *Sketch Engine* facility with every speech carrying a different file name in order to obtain the texts that referred to the two lemmata *ISLAM and MUSLIM* more frequently than others. *Table 4.1* below shows the relative frequency of reference to the two lemmata by state representatives who delivered speeches at the UNGA

within the four years (2013-2016):

Table 4.1: Frequencies of the lemmata ISLAM & MUSLIM

No.	COUNTRY	FREQ.	No.	COUNTRY	FREQ.	No.	COUNTRY	FREQ.	No.	COUNTRY	FREQ.
1	Malaysia	77	19	Tunisia	6	37	Yemen	3	55	Arminia	1
2	Jordan	49	20	Lebanon	6	38	Qatar	3	56	Switzerland	1
3	Israel	46	21	Niger	6	39	Belgium	3	57	Philippines	1
4	Gambia	39	22	Hungary	5	40	Argentine	3	58	Ghana	1
5	USA	33	23	Kuwait	5	41	Morocco	2	59	Croatia	1
6	Egypt	18	24	European Council	5	42	Venezuela	2	60	Serbia	1
7	UK	14	25	Indonesia	4	43	Turkmenistan	2	61	Djibouti	1
8	Maldives	14	26	Bosnia and Herzegovina	4	44	France	2	62	Cyprus	1
9	Iran	13	27	Mauritania	4	45	Nigeria	2	63	Somalia	1
10	Turkey	13	28	Syria	4	46	Czech Republic	2	64	Nepal	1
11	Afghanistan	12	29	Kazakhstan	4	47	Bulgaria	2	65	Romania	1
12	Pakistan	11	30	Russia	4	48	Luxembourg	2	66	Poland	1
13	Bahrain	11	31	Iraq	4	49	Canada	2	67	Liechtenstein	1
14	UAE	10	32	UN Secretary General	3	50	Comoros	1	68	Fiji	1
15	Senegal	10	33	President of session	3	51	Australia	1	69	Lesotho	1
16	Palestine	7	34	Azerbaijan	3	52	Madagascar	1	70	Timor-Leste	1
17	Mali	7	35	Libya	3	53	Georgia	1	71	Ireland	1
18	Saudi Arabia	7	36	Central African Republic	3	54	Myanmar	1	72	Sri Lanka	1

In *table 4.1* above, the 'No.' column gives the ranking of state representatives according to the number of times they referred to the lemmata ISLAM & MUSLIM, the second column shows the name of the country, and the third column 'FREQ.' gives raw frequencies of reference to the two lemmata. Comparing the frequencies not only allowed me to identify the speeches/speakers which referred to Islam/Muslims but also enabled me to spot the ones that talked about this discourse topic more frequently than others. From a quantitative perspective, such a list is likely to be useful in (1) giving indications about texts/extracts that deserve more attention and (b) justifying why certain leaders' discourses are worthy of a more detailed analysis and richer examination.

Having come this far, it is now worth briefly outlining the trajectories I followed in selecting four speeches to be analysed in their entirety. As will become clear, I did not opt for depending solely on the frequencies of referring to the lemmata ISLAM & MUSLIM within the speeches. Although frequencies proved significant in locating speeches/speakers that made *Islam* and *Muslims* important foci of the argument, a list of frequencies remains a limited measure as it takes no account of wider socio-political contexts nor provides any clues about the ideological and religious backgrounds of the text producers. This stage of speech selection was seen as an opportunity of what Baker et al. (2008) called 'a potential methodological cross-pollination' that could benefit CDA and CL. At this stage, the obtained frequencies of the lemmata ISLAM & MUSLIM served as precursory indicators informing a subsequent stage of selecting data where interrogations were needed in a more qualitative manner via a close reading of the top individual texts to decide which ones are worthy of more in-depth CDA analyses.

If numbers are to be followed blindly, then the obvious choice would be to analyse the speeches delivered by the state representatives of Malaysia, Jordan, Israel and Gambia who topped the list of speakers in terms of reference to *Islam* and/or *Muslims* over the studied period. This, however, would obviously lead to analysing three speeches delivered by Muslim leaders and one by a Jewish. Going after this choice warrants considering two overriding concerns: first, risking to lose some of the diversity of views and representations which might emerge from speeches by leaders of other religious backgrounds, and second, risking to lose the views of head of states whose countries have played a more significant role in shaping recent politics around terrorism issues (for example, the USA and the UK) and whose speeches have also appeared within the list of top 10 speakers who extensively referred to *Islam* and *Muslims* within the corpus. With that in mind, I decided to make careful selections of the speeches to be considered for in-depth CDA analyses.

As can be seen in *table 4.1.*, state representatives who referred to topics around 'Islam or Muslims' are 72. Zooming in on the highlighted list of top ten speakers

who referred to *Islam* and *Muslims* more frequently than others (*Table 4.2* below) reveals that seven speakers are in fact Muslim leaders, with the representatives of Malaysia and Jordan making the most frequent mentions (a total of 77 and 49 hits respectively).

Table 4.2: List of the top ten state representatives in terms of reference to *Islam* and *Muslims*

No.	COUNTRY	FREQ.
1	Malaysia	77
2	Jordan	49
3	Israel	46
4	Gambia	39
5	USA	33
6	Egypt	18
7	UK	14
8	Maldives	14
9	Iran	13
10	Turkey	13

The three non-Muslim leaders within this list are the representatives of Israel, the USA and the UK (with a total of 46, 33 and 14 hits respectively). Reading carefully through the speeches of these three speakers, and after conducting some preliminary qualitative analyses, it became clear that these three were worthy of deeper full analyses for a number of textual and socio-political motives which I will attempt to briefly touch upon in the coming paragraphs with more justifications and elaboration on the social, political and religious contexts to follow in the preamble of analysing each speech in chapter 6.

Although I was already inclined to analyse a full speech by the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for topping the list of non-Muslim leaders with the most frequent reference to the lemmata ISLAM & MUSLIM, I became more interested in the his addresses following some preliminary corpus-based findings which revealed that the second strongest collocate of the word ISLAM within the entire UNGA corpus was the adjective 'militant', and that all mentions of 'militant Islam' came from Netanyahu's 2014 speech. In addition, a closer look at the transcript of the PM's speech revealed many instances of conflations between different Islamist groups as will be shown in the analysis.

Besides the role which the USA plays as a leader of the 'war on terror' and the range of insights of looking at its leadership's discourse towards Islam and Muslims, President Barack Obama's intensive reference to Islam and Muslims in the context of counter-terrorism proposals made him the second top non-Muslim

head of state in terms of reference to the religion and its followers. Another motive for studying Obama's discourse on Islam and Muslims is the fact that the president's discourse on religion has recently attracted academic and media attention for maintaining a positive rhetoric (e.g. Sajjad, 2015 and Salama, 2012) and for repudiating terminologies like 'militant Islam, Islamist extremists, Islamic terrorism' on the grounds that such usage of language might be harmful to some Muslims and helpful in making the terrorist ideologies spread faster.

The third and final non-Muslim state leader whose discourse appeared in our list of most references to Islam and Muslims was the British Prime Minister David Cameron. As a representative of the UK's government, one of the closest allies of the United States and one of the major actors in the coalition to combat ISIS, I find it interesting to compare the portrayals of Islam and Muslims in Cameron's speeches with those appearing from Obama's speeches, and to test the alleged mixture of ways in which the PM's discourse towards religion has been branded including claims that the UK's discourse under Cameron's coalition government is witnessing 'a gradual move to take religious identities and faith communities more seriously' (O'Toole, 2012: 6). At the textual level, one of the early observations was that the PM used collocations like 'Islamist extremism', a nomination which the PM himself condemned publicly describing it as 'lazy use of language' which many Muslims find 'deeply offending' (Cameron, 2007).

Finally, selecting a speech as an illustration of Muslim voices within the UNGA debates was not a difficult task given that seven Muslim state representatives appeared in the list of top ten speakers who mentioned *Islam* and *Muslims* in their addresses. Topping the list were the Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak and the King of Jordan, Abdullah II ibn Al-Hussein. However, my choice to analyse a speech by King Abdullah was guided by a number of religio-political and textual factors:

- First, the King has long been particularly visible in political debates defending Islam and its image in many Western contexts and global platforms[60] (see El-Sharif, 2014; Al-Anbar, 2015; Templeton, 2018; Beavers, 2018). In 2016, the King was recognised by the *Royal Islamic Strategies Studies Centre* as the most influential Muslim voice in its list of *The Worlds' 500 Most Influential Muslims*[61]. In 2018, the King was awarded *Templeton Prize Laureate*

[60] Further justification for choosing the speech by King Abdullah is provided in section 6.5.2.

[61] The full list of *The Worlds' 500 Most Influential Muslims 2016* can be accessed from the official website of '*The Royal Islamic Strategic Studies Centre' at*: https://www.themuslim500.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/TheMuslim500-2016-low.pdf

for seeking religious harmony within Islam and between Islam and other religions. In 2019, the King received the *Lamp of Peace Award* for efforts in promoting interfaith dialogue and peace (Gavlak, 2019).

- Second, the significance of the King's inescapable involvement in the politics about religion is particularly interesting not least for being the 41st-generation direct descendant of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and in the light of his role as the custodian of the Muslim and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem (a position held by the Hashemite dynasty since 1924).
- Third, the role played by Jordan in recent conflicts as a neighbouring country having borders with Iraq and Syria (parts of which have been seized by ISIS).
- Fourth, certain unique linguistic choices in the king's discourse seemed particularly interesting and worth subjecting to critical analysis. For instance, the King's use of a nomination like khawarij[62] (outlaws) in reference to ISIS is worthy of attention given the historical and theological significance of the term within the Islamic tradition.
- Fifth, with multiple intertextual references to religious ideals from the Torah, the Bible and the Quran, the King's discourse featured arguments that draw on both the political and theological responses to the problem of violence perpetrated under the name of the religion, which has rarely been done elsewhere within the studied corpus.

Having outlined some of the reasons that guided my data selection decisions for what speeches I chose to analyse on their entirety, it is worth mentioning that all other speeches, especially ones that featured intensive reference to Islam and Muslims like PM Najib Razak's discourse, will also pass under the critical radar as part of my analysis especially at the stage of examining concordance lines that reveal keywords within their contexts of use.

4.2.2. Keyword Lists

In this project, keyword lists are seen as indicators of lexical items with frequencies that are statistically higher in one corpus when compared to another corpus (usually referred to as a reference corpus). Scott (2008: 135) defines a keyword as a word 'whose frequency is usually high in comparison with some norm'. In this study, keywords will help to uncover the topics which receive more attention when it comes to discussing Islam and Muslims. Unlike frequency lists which can only derive the most statistically frequent utterances, a keyword list is a measure of frequency based on saliency. Inspired by the prominence it gives to the concept of saliency, Baker (2006) regards this measure as 'likely to be more useful in suggesting

[62] See section 6.5.2 for further discussion on the historical and theological significance of using the term and recontextualising the first civil war within Islam.

lexical items that warrant further examination' (Baker 2006: 125). So bearing in mind that this project wishes to explore the discursive representations of a particular religion and a specific religious group, keywords provide a direct statistical mean of documenting foregrounded utterances (and thus discourses) in comparison to either a general reference corpus or alternative smaller amounts of data in a specialised corpus. *Figure 4.1* below shows how Sketch Engine offers its users the option to choose their reference corpus or sub-corpus as can been seen in the drop-down list below.



Figure 4.1: Sketch Engine Reference Corpus Options

As far as this study is concerned, keyword lists were generated using the British National Corpus (BNC) as a reference corpus, which is highly-credited as a large reference corpus consisting of around one 100-million words of written and spoken data representing a wide range of genres (newspapers, political speeches, published research journals from various academic fields, fiction writings, letters, leaflets, brochures… etc.). In this study, the BNC acts as a good benchmark of natural usage of language across different domains providing background data for keyword

calculations. When producing a list of keywords for a specialised corpus, *Sketch Engine* compares the size of the studied corpus to that of the reference corpus taking the frequencies of words within both into account. The software then performs statistical tests on each word to give it a *p value* (a measure of probability). The *p value*, which is a number between 0 and 1, implies how confident we can be that a certain word is a keyword rather than occurred due to chance alone. *Figure 4.2* below is a screenshot of showing a keyword list from president Obama's address to the UNGA in 2014:

Corpus: **OB**

Reference corpus: **British National Corpus (BNC)**
Switch focus and reference (sub)corpus

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		OB		*British National Corpus (BNC)*	
word	frequency	frequency/mill	frequency	frequency/mill	Score
ISIL	6	1189.8	0	0.0	1190.8
extremism	6	1189.8	92	0.8	654.7
sectarian	5	991.5	303	2.7	268.5
terrorists	7	1388.1	676	6.0	198.0
Muslim	9	1784.7	1,041	9.3	173.9
Ukraine	6	1189.8	797	7.1	147.1
religions	5	991.5	692	6.2	138.6
Syria	5	991.5	794	7.1	123.0
nations	12	2379.5	2,217	19.7	114.8
borders	5	991.5	1,167	10.4	87.2
reject	6	1189.8	1,488	13.2	83.6
violent	7	1388.1	2,606	23.2	57.4
America	21	4164.2	8,841	78.7	52.3
ultimately	5	991.5	2,489	22.2	42.9
Iraq	5	991.5	2,626	23.4	40.7
peace	13	2577.8	7,507	66.8	38.0
global	5	991.5	2,996	26.7	35.9
Russia	6	1189.8	3,678	32.7	35.3
conflict	9	1784.7	5,647	50.3	34.8
communities	5	991.5	3,405	30.3	31.7

Figure 4.2: Keywords in President Obama's 2014 Address using BNC as a reference corpus

The figure above shows each keyword, along with its frequency and frequency per million in both the specialised corpus (in our case Obama's speech) and the reference corpus (in our case the BNC). The software determines the keyness of a word based on the statistical significance of its frequency in comparison to the reference corpus rather than depending on its frequency in the specialised corpus. Notice that although the raw frequency of the word '*nations*' is 12 mentions in Obama's speech, it appeared after words like (*ISIL, extremism, sectarian, terrorists* …etc) whose raw frequencies are lower in the specialised corpus but are considered unusually high in comparison with their frequencies in the reference corpus.

Regarding the statistical standards used to determine the keywords, corpus software allows users to employ different statistical parameters, which 'can lead to varying results' (McEnery and Hardie, 2012: 127). According to Kilgarriff and Tugwell (2001: 34) salience is estimated as the product of Mutual Information (MI) and log frequency. Sketch Engine calculates the keyness score of a word according to the following formula:

$$\frac{fpm_{focus} + n}{fpm_{ref} + n}$$

Kilgarriff et al. (2014) explain that $f\,pm_{focus}$ is the normalised 'per million' frequency of the word in the focus corpus (the corpus we are interested in), $f\,pm_{ref}$ is the normalised 'per million' frequency of the word in the reference corpus, n is the simple *Maths* (smoothing) parameter (n = 1 is the default value).

Since the calculation of keywords is based on the comparison between a researcher's specialised corpus and the chosen reference corpus, then the results of keyword calculation for a given text/speech is likely to vary depending on the selected reference corpus. This possibility of variation in keyword results has been well recognised by a number of corpus linguists (cf. Baker, 2006; Scott, 2009; McEnery and Hardie, 2012). Goh (2011: 254) justifiably suggests that 'varying results of keyword calculation caused by varying the reference corpus can be understood as arguing for the diversity of the aboutness of a text rather than different qualities of keyword lists or reference corpora'. However, to demonstrate the idea of how choosing a different reference corpus is likely to result in varying keyword lists, let us compare the list of keywords obtained in *figure 4.2* above using the BNC as a reference corpus with the following list of keywords obtained in *figure 4.3* below using my UNGA corpus (transcripts of all UNGA speeches between 2013-2016) as a reference corpus:

Corpus: **OB**

Reference corpus: **UNGA Corpus**
Switch focus and reference (sub)corpus

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	OB		*UNGA Corpus*		
word	frequency	frequency/mill	frequency	frequency/mill	Score
Muslim	9	1784.7	92	51.9	33.7
sectarian	5	991.5	63	35.5	27.2
So	8	1586.4	104	58.7	26.6
Because	5	991.5	70	39.5	24.5
ultimately	5	991.5	71	40.1	24.2
reject	6	1189.8	91	51.3	22.7
religions	5	991.5	98	55.3	17.6
you	18	3569.3	378	213.3	16.7
And	26	5155.7	559	315.4	16.3
ISIL	6	1189.8	130	73.4	16.0
prepared	5	991.5	111	62.6	15.6
something	5	991.5	117	66.0	14.8
America	21	4164.2	545	307.5	13.5
terrorists	7	1388.1	235	132.6	10.4
young	13	2577.8	445	251.1	10.2
whether	6	1189.8	215	121.3	9.7
Russia	6	1189.8	247	139.4	8.5
across	7	1388.1	289	163.1	8.5
violent	7	1388.1	296	167.0	8.3
power	9	1784.7	446	251.7	7.1

Figure 4.3: Keywords in President Obama's 2014 Address using the UNGA specialised corpus as a reference corpus

As we can see, although many words appeared in both lists as keywords (e.g. *Muslim, sectarian, terrorists, ISIL, religions, reject, violent, America, ultimately* … etc), there is a noticeable difference in the keywords obtained using these two different reference corpora. The second list of keywords obtained using my UNGA corpus as a reference corpus included words like (*so, you, and, across, because, something*) which did not appear in the list generated using the BNC as a reference corpus. Meanwhile, the first list in *figure 4.2* generated using the BNC as a reference corpus provided words like (*peace, extremism, nations, borders, Iraq, global, communities*) that did not appear in the list generated using my UNGA corpus as a reference corpus. In principle, this finding, strongly suggests that using the BNC as a reference corpus proved more significant since it provided important content words at the expense of function words obtained using my UNGA corpus. In simple terms, studying the linguistic environment surrounding the use of words like (*peace, extremism, nations, borders, Iraq, global, communities)* serves the objectives of this research more than considering words like (*so, you, and, across, because, something*).

4.2.3. Word Sketches

Baker et al., (2012) regard a word sketch as one of the recent concepts in corpus linguistics and argue that it is a 'broad-brush' approach to data through which researchers can access a 'big picture' of how a particular word collocates with neighbouring words while at the same time grouping collocates according to their grammatical relationship to the node word[63]. Kilgarriff and Tugwell (2001: 34) clarify that a word sketch is 'a page of data … which shows, for the word in question, ordered lists of high-salience grammatical relations … These are listed for each relation in order of salience, with the count of corpus instances'. To illustrate the significance of the information obtained from a word sketch, let us look at *figure 4.4* below which shows a screenshot of a word sketch of the word 'peace'[64] in our corpus[65].



Figure 4.4: Word Sketch of 'peace' in the UNGA corpus

[63] aka. grammatical tagging, POS-tagging or word-category disambiguation - all refer to the task of marking up words in a corpus as corresponding to a particular part of speech.

[64] I use the word 'peace' for the purpose of exemplification. I have intentionally not used a word not relevant to the subject of this study like 'Islam' or 'Muslims' as at this stage to avoid revealing results that need an in-depth explanation. Sketches of these words will appear later in the analysis chapters.

[65] This screenshot is slightly abbreviated due to the constraints of space.

The online software tool *Sketch Engine* has identified five grammatical groups that collocated with the word *peace*:

- {[modifier] + *peace*}
  e.g. lasting peace, international peace, global peace, durable peace, and sustainable peace.
- {*peace* as a modifier + [verb or noun]}
  e.g. peace talks, peace operations, peace initiative, and peace agreement.
- {[verb] + *peace* as an object}
  e.g. maintain peace, promote peace, ensure peace, achieve peace and restore peace.
- {peace as a subject + [verb]}
  e.g. peace is and *peace has.*
- {peace and/or x}
  e.g. peace and security, peace and stability, peace and development, peace and justice, and peace and prosperity.

Let us consider the first column in our figure which shows words that appeared as modifiers of peace {[modifier] + *peace*}. Examples of modifying collocates that preceded the word peace included: {[lasting, international, world, global, durable, sustainable, regional, just, comprehensive, and social] *peace*}. Statistically, although the most frequent modifier appearing in the neighbourhood of the noun *peace* is the adjective *international* (co-occurring 487 times), still *Sketch Engine* did not prioritise it as the first modifying collocate. It rather has put the adjective *lasting* at the top of the list even though it appeared near the word *peace* 132 times only (355 times less than *international*).

This tells us something significant about the statistical procedure through which the software derives collocates before presenting them in a word sketch. It, apparently, does not perform a simple count of co-occurrences but rather carries out a number of statistical tests. The software calculates the number of occurrences of the keyword (*peace*, in our example) across the whole corpus, it then calculates the number of occurrences of each of the collocates (*international* and *lasting*, in our example) in the whole corpus, before finally calculating the number of occurrences wherein the two words appeared both next to and away from one another. Based on such statistical tests, the software assigned the modifying adjective *lasting* a logDice value of (11.33) and the adjective international a value of (10.96) suggesting that the adjective *lasting* in our specialised corpus is the first and strongest candidate collocate that is expected to co-occur with the noun *peace*.

Using the data that a word sketch makes available allows a fine-grained analysis of collocation, grouped according to their grammatical relation to the searched term. As Kilgarriff and Tugwell (2001) remind us, a word sketch reveals fixed idioms that

contain usually recurring collocates but also identifies less obvious collocates that can serve as a basis to uncover how the pairing of two words in naturally occurring data can be a factor in constructing discourses.

4.2.4. Concordance Lines

Manual examination of concordance lines is another efficient technique that allows researchers to conduct within-context investigations or as Kalgirriff et al. (2014: 10) put it, taking researchers 'to the raw data, underlying any analysis'. Partington (1998: 9) describes a concordance[66] as 'the item being studied (keyword or node)' along with 'the immediate co-text to the left and right of the keyword'. To demonstrate the importance of examining concordance lines in corpus-based discourse studies, let us consider the four following concordance lines from our data.

Figure 4.5: Concordance lines of 'Islam' and 'extreme'

Each of the above four lines presents the 'node word' or 'search term' *Islam* with a few words to its left and right allowing us to access the immediate context of our search term presented to us in the order in which they occur in the speech. One observation in the above lines is the deceiving use of the adjective *extreme* near our node word *Islam*. Without studying the context provided to us in the concordance lines, we might falsely assume a negative association between *Islam* and *extremism*. However, a closer look at the concordance lines provides strong evidence that the speaker is, in fact, rejecting the use of *'extreme Islam'* or *'violent Islam'*. Here, it is also worth noting that the online software tool *Sketch Engine* also offers its users further surrounding context when needed through clicking on the search term appearing in red. *Figure 4.6* below shows an extended context for the last line in *figure 4.5* above.

[66] Another name of a concordance is 'keyword in context' or 'KWIC'

< previous various treacherous hate groups cannot be associated with Islam, as our Islamic religion is pure and unique and cannot therefore be classified into varying degrees such as moderate Islam, democratic Islam, extreme Islam or violent *Islam* . Simply put, Islam is a pure religion that encourages the best of human behaviour and interpersonal relationships, among other virtues, as prescribed by Allah, the almighty creator. In other words, the adherents of next >

Figure 4.6: Example of extended KWIC for the word 'Islam'

4.2.5. Collocations, Semantic Preferences and Discourse Prosodies

> When two words frequently collocate, there is evidence that the discourses surrounding them are particularly powerful – the strength of collocation implies that these are two which have been linked in the minds of people and have been used again and again – perhaps to the point where even one half of the pair is likely to prime someone who hears or reads the first word to think of the other half
>
> (Baker 2006: 114)

Use of collocations is another aspect which the current research investigates in order to examine whether the words appearing within the neighbourhood of the two node lemmata ISLAM and MUSLIM give any clue about attempts to construct discursively variant ideological stances. To achieve this aim, it seems necessary to carry out a detailed collocational analysis that transcends the first impressions arrived at based on the broad word sketches elicited in the previous step.

Historically, while the term 'collocation' was initially introduced by Palmer (1938) in his renowned dictionary, *A Grammar of English Words*, the term did extend its technical sense in the works of Firth ([1951]1957) who proposed 'to bring [collocation] forward as a technical term; meaning by *collocation*, and to apply the test of *collocability*' (p. 194, original emphasis). Firth further argues that 'you shall know a lot about a word from the company it keeps' (p. 11). In discourse studies, collocation provides indications about the recurrent use of two or more lexical items. Leech (1992: 20) argues that 'the association of a word acquires an account of the meanings of words which tend to occur in its environment'. In corpus-based approaches to discourse, collocation has been additionally utilised to indicate social cognitive implications.

Discussions around how analyses focussing on collocations can be significant in exploring discourse patterns lead me to discuss the two notions 'semantic preference' and 'discourse prosody' which have indissoluble ties with the phenomenon of collocation. Sinclair's (1966) notion of 'semantic preference' is defined by Stubbs (2001) as 'the relation, not between individual words, but

between a lemma or word-form and a set of semantically related words' (p. 65). Stubbs provides examples of this phenomenon citing his observation that the adjective *large* typically tends to collocate with words from a particular semantic set that indicates 'quantities and sizes' (e.g. (*large)* number(s), (*large)* scale, (*large)* quantities, *(large)* amounts). Whilst semantic preference is concerned with identifying a set of collocates that share some semantic features, 'discourse prosody' or 'semantic prosody', as Sinclair prefers to call it, is more concerned with an evaluative attitude resulting from the recurrent use of certain collocations. Louw (1993: 160) defines the notion 'semantic prosody' as the 'consistent aura of meaning with which a form is imbued by its collocates'. Baker and McEnery (2005) analysed collocations of refugee(s) and asylum seeker(s) appearing in a range of British newspapers and concluded that discourses around these two groups were negatively framed referring to them as 'packages, invaders, pests or water' (p. 197).

Regarding the operationalisation of collocate analyses, I will follow Baker's (2006: 119-120) step-by-step guide to collocational analysis which involves:

- Building a corpus.
- Deciding on a search term.
- Obtaining a list of collocations.
- Deciding on how many collocates you want to look at.
- Grouping the collocates semantically, thematically or grammatically.
- Obtaining concordances of the collocates to look for patterns within the context.
- Considering contesting discourses.
- Looking at concordance lines that do not contain collocates.
- Considering how collocates relate to each other.
- Explaining why particular discourse patterns appear around collocates.

Now back to our data, let us have a look at *table 4.3* which lists the top twenty collocates of the lemma ISLAM:

Table 4.3: Top twenty collocates with the lemma ISLAM in the corpus

Number	Collocate	Co-occurrence count	Candidate count	T-score	MI	logDice
1	**religion**	29	306	5.379	9.888	10.930
2	**militant**	14	67	3.740	11.029	10.853
3	**Islam**	19	181	4.355	10.036	10.748
4	**name**	14	204	3.736	9.422	10.219
5	**true**	16	379	3.991	8.722	9.871
6	**khawarij**	5	8	2.236	12.609	9.760
7	**moderate**	6	46	2.448	10.349	9.758
8	**outlaw**	5	13	2.235	11.909	9.722
9	**teaching**	5	29	2.235	10.752	9.608
10	**Christianity**	4	9	2.000	12.118	9.430
11	**abuse**	6	147	2.443	8.673	9.227
12	**nothing**	7	215	2.638	8.347	9.178
13	**Muslims**	4	62	1.997	9.333	9.075
14	**teach**	4	62	1.997	9.333	9.075
15	**Muslim**	5	129	2.230	8.598	9.046
16	**Judaism**	3	6	1.732	12.288	9.038
17	**noble**	5	176	2.228	8.150	8.842
18	**enemy**	3	91	1.727	8.365	8.497
19	**nature**	5	282	2.223	7.470	8.467
20	**extreme**	4	302	1.985	7.049	8.084

As *table 4.3* clearly shows the lemma ISLAM collocated with nouns (e.g. religion, Muslims, Christianity), adjectives (militant, true, noble, name, extreme, enemy) and verbs (e.g. abuse, teach). What we see in *table 4.3* is that religion is the strongest collocate of Islam which is obviously an expected collocate. Another observation is that this list of collocates provides strong initial indicators about the major topics (or semantic categories) debated in relation to Islam throughout UNGA high-level meetings. The followings are some of the keywords appearing in this list, although a different categorisation may appear if other less frequent collocates were taken into account:

- IDENTIFYING CHARACTERISATIONS
  (nature, teaching, teach, Muslim, Muslims, nothing, name)
- RELIGION
  (religion, Islam, Christianity, Judaism).
- POSITIVE ATTRIBUTES
  (true, moderate, noble).
- NEGATIVE ATTRIBUTES
  (militant, khawarij, outlaw, abuse, enemy, extreme).

While the four above categories will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, it might be useful to clarify that the above categorisation did not rely only on the literal meanings of the collocates appearing in the list but rather relied on consulting the concordance lines in which the collocates are used. For example, at the first glance the word 'nothing' may not appear to fit into the category 'identifying characterisations' of the noun Islam, but going back to the contexts in which it was regularly used in the corpus, we discover that it was used to identify Islam through removing the 'extremism accusation' using discursive realisations like 'nothing to do with Islam' as shown in *Figure 4.7*.



Figure 4.7: Concordance lines of the word *nothing* as a collocate of *Islam*

Similarly, a closer look at concordances of words in the first semantic category (i.e. CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE) provides evidence that not all arguments within this semantic domain were associated with Islam but rather that many instances were attempts to juxtapose and counter certain extremist groups that allegedly claim to stand for Islam. Let us take the verb collocate *abuse* which collocated with Islam with a log-dice of 9.227:



Figure 4.8: Concordance lines of the verb *abuse* as a collocate of *Islam*

All six lines in *figure 4.8* provide evidence that the verb *abuse,* which at face value indicates a negative discourse prosody, is, in fact, suggestive of a more positive one for isolating Islam and the 1.5 billion Muslims from groups that abuse the religion like ISIL (e.g. line 2). Examining these collocates in context leads us to observe a dominant overarching discourse that there exists *a conflict within Islam* rather than *with Islam*; a conflict between Muslims and extremist groups operating under the name of the religion.

The second strongest collocate in the list *militant* (with a log-dice of 10.85) which also falls under the first category of CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE tends to indicate a kind of Islam; '*militant Islam*'. However, it is worth noting that a closer look at the concordance lines of this collocate reveals that all 14 instances of '*militant + Islam*' came from the speeches of the Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu, which in turn reduces the potential of assuming that this structure is spread over the UNGA corpus. As established earlier in section 4.2.1, the prime minister's full speech will be critically evaluated in the qualitative part of the analysis which to examine the use of this collocate within its larger co-text.

4.3. OPERATIONALISATION OF CDA TOOLS

Given the socio-political context and theoretical assumptions sketched out in the previous chapter, CDA becomes a particularly useful way of approaching detailed text analyses in this thesis, not least since it provides a link between the linguistic and the social. However, the theoretical and analytic frameworks utilised by CDA practitioners are diverse and very much dependent on what perspectives an analyst wishes to illuminate. The purpose of this section is to (a) set out the framework I have put together in order to provide answers to the questions this thesis raised in earlier chapters, (b) introduce the CDA analytical concepts and related tools adopted in this study, and (c) provide some examples from my data analyses to give a brief illustration of how the chosen CDA approaches are employed in the current project.

As delineated earlier in chapter 3, this study, which primarily adopts DHA's proposed methods as the central analytical model of data analyses, also benefits from analytical categories including Fairclough's 'description, explanation and interpretation' model, Halliday's SFL, and van Leeuwen's model of legitimation strategies. The significance of combining tools from these approaches is that it allows conducting a comprehensive analysis of the discursive and non-discursive in political discourse. These together have the potential of overcoming reductionist conceptualisations of political discourse which do not offer a balance between the linguistic and extra-linguistic factors of exercising power through discourse.

Fairclough's 'description, explanation and interpretation' pushes analysis towards the totality of representations of Islam and Muslims within the studied corpus, and allows examining certain texts on their own, and intertextually in relation to other texts within and outside the UNGA corpus. At the linguistic description level, I relate to particular social and political conditions of producing the analysed speeches and certain extracts referenced throughout my analyses. At the explanation level, I use a variety of linguistic tools that help in understanding the intended meanings in light of the social and political conditions operating at the time of producing the analysed speeches. However, it should be admitted that because this study concerns numerous speeches delivered at the UNGA which involve complex production conditions, interpretations of the processes of text production remain subsidiary and are dealt with in their totality focussing on the processes of speech production within the UNGA in general.

Using the DHA, my analyses will (a) identify the major discourse topics related to the representations of Islam and Muslims (b) detect the discursive strategies utilised to construct views around the religion or particular groups which identify as Muslims, and (c) examine the linguistic means or context-dependent linguistic realisations at the textual level. As explained later in section 4.3.2, five major categories of the DHA; *Nomination, Predication, Argumentation, Perspectivation,* as well as *Intensification and Mitigation*, are employed in my analyses of the UNGA political statements. Whilst the DHA is more effective in emphasising the concept of 'strategy' at the discursive level, Halliday's SFL, particularly his tripartite semiotic 'metafunctions' and conceptualisation of modality and transitivity, comes into play to emphasise linguistic and grammatical notions that embody means of representing social actors and assigning agency. Furthermore, choosing SFL to be one of the tools of analysis in this project is inspired by the suggestion that this approach could be one way of enhancing a CDA enterprise through more detailed linguistic analyses of the studied texts (cf. Martin, 2011 and Fairclough, 2013).

Finally, the analysis of legitimation adds a further dimension that links representations of Islam and Muslims with discourses of purpose and value as much as it allows a shift in focus from linguistic categories to sociological categories in struggles for the legitimation of proposed representations and practices. Benefiting from van Leeuwen's four major categories of legitimation; viz. *Authorization, Moral Evaluation, Rationalization,* and *Mythopoesis*, I attempt to unearth how political speakers explain their -sometimes competing- views on Islam, Muslims or particular Islamist groups.

4.3.1. Implementing Fairclough's 'Description, Explanation and Interpretation'

Following Fairclough (1995; 2003; 2015), this project aims to reveal the role of discursive productions as part of the practices that shape social change. To this end, I draw together Fairclough's three fundamental levels of analysis: description of the text/speech (mainly its formal properties), interpretation of the link between text/speech and interaction, and explanation of the relationship between interaction and social context. These three phases of analysis are generally considered for investigating the project's corpus with constant movement back and forth between three levels of analysis. Using Fairclough's multidimensional model assists in examining the speeches both on their own and intertextually. For example, using this model I am able to use analytical tools to explain the victim-victimiser arguments across various speeches. It is also important to note that the bulk of text-level analyses in this project which is based on the operationalisation of Halliday's systemic functional paradigm are also relevant to Fairclough's model for the fact that they both subscribe to the idea that language is a form of social practice and also as Fairclough (1992a: 27) makes it clear that his textual analyses 'draw heavily upon Halliday's work'. Section 4.3.3 below discusses the implementation of notions from Halliday's SFL and identifies only these concepts that I employ for my analyses.

4.3.2. Implementing the Discourse-Historical Approach

DHA has been operationalised in various ways in previous research and to various degrees. While some practitioners have employed DHA to conduct large-scale analyses of lengthy texts, others used it to focus on smaller pieces of spoken or written discourses. DHA has been used in studies that focussed on racist discourses, national identities and discourses of 'Us' versus 'Them'. The first DHA study was that of Wodak et al. (1990) in which they examined anti-Semitic stereotyped portrayals emerging in the 1986 Austrian presidential campaign of former UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim. Another DHA investigation within the Austrian context appeared in Matouschek et al. (1995) which unravelled discrimination

against migrants from Romania and the discursive construction of national identity. More recently, Wodak and Boukala (2015) employed DHA to analyse two case-study speeches on the 'revival of nationalism in the European Union'; one by Geert Wilders on immigration and multiculturalism in the aftermath of the clashes in Tunisia and the arrival of many refugees to Italy, and the other by David Cameron on the contemporary British-EU relations. In this study, my approach draws on the DHA to emphasise the historical and contextual dimensions of studying political discourse. To remind the reader, an analysis from a DHA perspective understands discourse as:

a. Related to a macro-topic;
b. A cluster of context-dependent semiotic practices that are situated within specific fields of social action;
c. Socially constituted as well as socially constitutive.

As delineated in the preceding chapter, DHA places substantial emphasis on the concept of 'strategy' which Reisigl and Wodak (2016: 33) understand as: 'a more or less intentional plan of practice (including discursive practices) adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic goal. Discursive Strategies are located at different levels of linguistic organisation and complexity'. As articulated in section 3.11.2 in the previous chapter, Reisigl and Wodak (ibid) outlined five major strategies usually employed by political actors. The sections below explain and list examples of the discursive strategies and textual tools appearing from my data.

Nomination Strategies

According to Reisigl and Wodak (2016: 33) nomination (or referential) strategies are usually employed to portray and construct social actors in categorical ways form in-groups and out-groups. Following are examples of some of the linguistic devices that will be applied to the studied discourses and are categorised as nomination strategies:

- Deictic References

While, according to Ward (2004), pronouns have two principal textual functions – to index speaker roles and that of reference, in discourse studies the use of pronouns as deictic exponents of how identities or degrees of involvement are constructed have been studied from different perspectives (e.g. Levinson, 1983 and Wilson, 1990). Halliday and Hasan (1976) referenced the deictic realisation of meaning as a vital textual element that reveals the multifaceted nature of social relations. In a later study, Halliday (1994: 189) reaffirmed that within the SFL paradigm of textual analysis 'the personal pronoun represents the world according to the speaker in the

context of a speech exchange'. Therefore, it can be claimed that within the first textual function of pronouns (i.e. indexing), social and political intimacy/distance is constructed. According to Scott (2013) the use of pronouns is not only a grammatical expression of clusivity and not limited to establishing 'Us' versus 'Them' distinctions. She believes the use of pronouns 'can also promote credit-seeking responsibility-shunning'. Johnson (1994) sheds light on the challenge which speakers go through to establish co-operative deictic reference when more than one community is involved. In this context, Volmert's (1989: 123) cited by (Wodak et al. 1999) emphasises that:

> A speaker can unite himself and his audience into a single 'community sharing a common destiny' by letting fall into oblivion all differences in origin, confession, class and lifestyle with a simple 'we'.

For example, in Cameron's 2014 UNGA speech, as we will see later on, it is notable that he extensively uses the deictic first-person pronoun 'we'. This can be seen as a tool used to unite himself with his audience but also as a way to share responsibility for policy and action when needed. 'We' in his speech was used to refer to 'British people', 'British Government', 'UN member states', 'freedom fighters' and in particular cases to other possible referents like 'everyone who believes in justice and co-existence'.

- Metaphors, Metonymies and Synecdoche

Metaphor, as a concept, refers to the use of a word (or a series of words, phrases, or expressions) to figuratively indicate an atypical meaning. In more technical terms, metaphor is a structural mapping from a particular conceptual domain to another, and its sole aim is to call up a visual image. In other words, the use of metaphor involves encouraging the process of thinking about one thing in terms of another (i.e. resemblance) when two things are different but still some similarities can be perceived. Paffey (2008 :102-103, original emphasis) confirms that 'metaphorical constructions are employed in language in order to help – or even *make* – us view objects, concepts and processes in quite particular and unconventional ways'. Aristotle was among the first scholars to study metaphorical language from a linguistic perspective, defining this phenomenon as 'the transference of a name from the object to which it has a natural application' (cited in Foss, 1996: 187). However, modern and more recent approaches to studying metaphor (e.g. the cognitive metaphor theory) have highlighted the need for more critical awareness when analysing metaphors in discourse. Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 156) remark that:

> Metaphors may create reality for us, especially social realities. A metaphor may thus be a guide for future action […] this will, in turn, reinforce the power of the metaphor to make experience coherent. In this sense, metaphors can be self-fulfilling prophecies.

Fairclough (1995: 74) also emphasises that metaphorical language provokes ideological implications that should be taken into account when analysing discourse. According to him, this can be done by means of exploring how certain metaphorical representations invoke differences in power or reconceptualisations of ideas available to us. This study sets out to explore these representations through analysing the way metaphors functioned in the analysed speeches, providing discourse producers with cognitive machinery and access to our familiar domains of experience. For instance - as later analyses will demonstrate - Netanyahu's view of ISIS, Iran and Hamas is materialised in the metaphor of being '*branches of the same poisonous tree*' (Netanyahu's UNGA speech, 2014). Employing the domain of PLANTS, the Israeli PM metaphorised an alleged connection between three different entities using the keywords 'branches' and 'tree'.

Not much different from the study of metaphor, metonymy[67] and synecdoche[68] as figures of speech have been objects of inquiry in both the field of cognitive linguistics and pragmatics. Historically, Aristotle categorised what we recognise as metonymy and synecdoche as classes of metaphors that belong to classical rhetorical devices (Nerlich et al., 2002). Also, from a cogitative-linguistic perspective, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) regarded metonymy as a cognitive process or pragmatic inferencing (rather than merely a relationship between words) which builds on our universal and experiential conceptions. Securitising the use of metaphoric and metonymic meanings in discourse from a critical perspective is useful taking into account Krišković (2009) view that 'these are not regarded as being part of what is said or explicated, but as being derived via implicature' (p. 56). Thus, throughout my analyses, it is my intention to make these metaphoric and metonymic mappings explicit by showing how political actors can resort to the use of such devices to transfer meanings from a 'source domain' into a 'target domain' exploiting the associative power of language to provoke affective responses. For

[67] According to Kövecses and Radden (1998: 39) metonymy is 'a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides mental access to another entity, the target, within the same domain, or idealized cognitive model'. In other words, metonymy is the use of a word to describe something that is closely linked to it. An example of this is using the word *crown* to refer to power or authority.

[68] Synecdoche is a figure of speech that uses a representative term to express a whole. In distinguishing synecdoche from metaphor and metonymy, Smirlock (1976: 313) notes that 'where metaphor relies on analogy and metonymy on association, synecdoche is more purely representational: the synecdochic term not only emphasises certain attributes to the whole, as a vehicle does its tenor; it replaces that whole with a single attribute.

example, the following statement by the King of Spain involves the use of synecdoche where a body part is meant to refer to a person:

> Iraq suffers the ravages of terrorism *at the hands of Da'esh*, which is already retreating thanks to the perseverance of the Iraqi Government and the support of an international coalition, of which Spain is a member (*Don Felipe VI, King of the Kingdom of Spain, 20th September 2016*).

In this example, a 'hand' as an indivisible part of a creature cannot exist independently from a human body. With this in mind, King Felipe used the word 'hands' to substitute for people affiliated with Da'esh.

Predication Strategies

- Attribution of negative/positive traits and explicit predicates

Reisigl and Wodak (2016) demonstrated that predication strategies are employed to establish discursive qualifications of social actors, phenomena, events or actions according to the evaluative attribution of positive or negative features and through enforcing explicit predicates. In this work, the naming strategies employed to refer to actors/objects/phenomena/events and the qualities they are attributed with are examined. Based on Reisigl and Wodak's (2016) work, the implementation of predication strategies at the discursive level can be briefly summarised in the following illustrative figure:



Figure 4.9: Implementation of predication strategies at the discursive level

Employing a combination of the above linguistic mechanisms, my data demonstrate many instances of how the predicational and referential strategies could work hand

in hand to evoke (positive Self/negative Other) representations. For example, in PM Cameron's 2014 speech, reference to 'preachers of hate' (David Cameron, 24 September 2014), which the PM calls for banning from entering the UK and other UN countries denotes a predication of negative Other presentation through use of the noun 'hate' . In another example, the following statement by the Iraqi Vice-President associated the social and political positions of what he terms the 'Arab and Islamic nation' with negative predications such as being 'oppressed, disadvantaged, and vulnerable':

> Our faith in humankind does not preclude us from taking up the just cause of *the oppressed, the disadvantaged and the vulnerable*, or from showing solidarity with the just causes of our Arab and Islamic nation, raising our voices in defence of their rights, their humanity and their causes (*Mr. Khudheir Mussa Al-Khuzaie, Vice-President of the Republic of Iraq, 27th September 2013*)

Argumentation Strategies

> An argument is a set of statements (propositions), made up of three parts, a conclusion, a set of premises, and an inference from the premises to the conclusion. (Walton 2009: 2)

On the operationalisation level, four tasks are crucial to the construction of argumentation which are characterised by Walton as follows:

> A. *Identification*: identifying the premises and conclusion of an argument.
> B. *Analysis*: Finding implicit premises and conclusions of an argument that needs to be made explicit in order to properly evaluate it.
> C. *Evaluation*: Determining whether an argument is weak or strong by general criteria that can be applied to it.
> D. *Invention*: Constructing new arguments that can be used to prove a specific conclusion.
>
> (ibid, 1)

Answering the question of how argumentation can be relevant to the study of CDA, Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) discussed two fundamental characteristics of critical social science: being normative and being explanatory. Whilst the former refers to the evaluation of social beliefs 'against a standard of values and practices', the latter seeks to 'explain why social realities are as they are, and how they are sustained or changed' (ibid. 79). The authors believe, and I agree, that CDA is not enough to carry out such critique alone. Therefore, bringing the study of argumentation and CDA together in interdisciplinary cooperation would assist in extending the focus of the critique.

Following DHA's tradition of approaching discourse, this study regards Topoi (or loci) as dialectical schemes used by political actors to convince their audiences of the validity of their claims. As maintained in the preceding chapter (section 3.10.2) topoi have a pivotal role in establishing discourses of *Self* and *Other*. In addition to justifying the transition from arguments to conclusions (Reisigl and Wodak 2009: 74), topoi are strategies for choosing certain lines of argument from a set of all possible ones.

Topoi, according to Kienpointner (1996), are parts of argumentation structures which lead to obligatory (either explicit or inferable) premises, and 'search formulas which tell you how and where to look for arguments'. Not differently, Richardson (2004) understands topoi as 'reservoirs of generalised key ideas from which specific statements or arguments can be generalised'. In a nutshell, using topoi justifies moving from arguments to conclusions and assists in 'deconstructing presupposed and frequently fallacious prejudices embedded in everyday common-sense conversations' (Wodak 2016: 6).

Understanding topoi as conditional phrases such as 'if x, then y' or 'y, because x', Wodak and Boukala (2015) link the use of topoi to justification and legitimation in political discourse and highlight the overlap between Aristotle's topoi and DHA's understanding of the term:

> *topos* should be understood as a quasi 'elliptic' argument (an enthymeme), where the premise is followed by the conclusion without giving any explicit evidence, while taking the conclusion to confirm, and relate to, the presupposed *endoxon* (original emphasis, p. 94)

Going back to the roots of topoi in the Aristotelian sense, one finds two types of topoi: general and common, which are both applicable to the three genres of formal speech (judicial, deliberative, and epideictic). Although some degree of bias is unavoidable in political arguments, analysts examine arguments presuming that 'there are rules for rational disputes and constructive arguing which allow discerning reasonable topoi from fallacies (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009: 110).

It is my intention in this study to benefit from the analysis of topoi as a way of critique that aims to expose the erroneous grounds based on which some assumptions are constructed 'to naturalize and legitimize particular forms of knowledge and political practices' (Jackson, 2007: 395). In this thesis, topoi are identified through pursuing (a) the claim (i.e. a certain statement which contains what is argued and has to be justified), (b) the grounds for justification/premise (i.e. the evidence or facts used to prove the speaker's claim, and (c) the warrant or conclusion rule (i.e. the hypothetical scheme that constitutes the bridge between the

claim and the grounds for justification. Some examples of the topoi which occurred across the studied corpus are listed below[69]:

- **Topos of threat (danger):** If there are specific dangers and threats, one should do something against them.

> ISIS and Hamas *share a fanatical creed* that they *both seek to impose well beyond the territory under their control*
>
> *(Benjamin Netanyahu – PM of Israel, 29 September 2014)*

This statement from Netanyahu's 2014 UNGA address is an example of using the *topos of threat* to construct a background of assumptions about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict from a security prism. It is an example of how Hamas is repeatedly presented as a permanent threat and allegedly linked to ISIS in terms of demand and objective. The argumentative strength of this topos depends on the involvement of Hamas in the 2007 Gaza war against Israel. The war provided a strong argumentative platform for establishing a dichotomous world in which Israel is confronted by two threats within its region, viz. ISIS and Hamas. This commonly repeated and re-contextualised line of argumentation (inside and outside the UN halls) can be seen as a jump conclusion rule that uncritically dismisses the differences between Hamas and ISIS in many aspects including scope and demand.

- **Topos of burden**: If a person, an institution or a country is burdened by specific problems, one should act in order to diminish these burdens. In an attempt to speed up serious measures against ISIS, the underlined phrases in the following statement by Mr. Victor-Viorel Ponta, the PM of Romania, are means for calling the attention of UN member states to feel the burden of 'radical Islamist movements'. Justifiable claims that ISIS 'threatens to destabilise the entire Middle East' and 'represents a major challenge to the international order' depicts the group as a burden to be overcome and 'dealt with by all states'.

> The *proliferation of radical Islamist movements* and the emergence of new groups, such as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham (ISIS), have led to an enhanced terrorist threat. They represent a new breed of terrorism, which *threatens to destabilize the entire Middle East and the world*. ISIS goes beyond

[69] Explanations/definitions of the most commonly used topoi were adopted from Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 74-80).

> Iraq and Syria, and therefore *represents a major challenge to the international order* and *must be dealt with by all States*
>
> (*Mr. Victor-Viorel Ponta, Prime Minister of Romania, 25 September 2014*)

- **Topos of authority**: if authority X says A is true, then A is true

In the following statement from his 2013 address, King Abdullah II benefits from citing religious scholars as sources of authority to refute and condemn the establishment of an Islamic State in the way ISIS did. The opinion of scholars who participated in or subscribed to the *Amman Message, A Common Word* and *the World Interfaith Harmony Week* initiatives are cited as examples of authority voices that refuse a 'single prescribed model for an Islamic State' and affirm that a 'modern Islamic State should be a civic State, founded on institutions and with an inclusive constitution based on the rule of law, justice and freedom of opinion and faith'.

> Last month, Jordan hosted more than *100 eminent Muslim scholars from around the world*. Their work affirms the true teachings of Islam and builds on Jordan's long-standing interfaith and intra-religious initiatives: the Amman Message, A Common Word, and World Interfaith Harmony Week. *The scholars said* that there was no single prescribed model for an Islamic State, but they affirmed that the modern Islamic State should be a civic State, *founded on institutions and with an inclusive constitution based on the rule of law, justice and freedom of opinion and faith*. The modern Islamic State should uphold equality across the ethnic and religious spectrum. *The scholars decisively condemned* the incitement of ethnic and sectarian conflict, known in Arabic as fitna
>
> (*King Abdullah II of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 24 September 2013*).

- **Topos of urgency**: Decisions have to be made or actions have to be taken very quickly.

Evoking a crisis frame, the following lines from the address by the President of Somalia Mr. Hassan Mahmud employs a topos of urgency to justify and legitimise the need for quick action against the group which calls itself *Al-Shabab*. Combining the modal verb 'must' with the adverb 'now' in the sentence 'we must now defeat their poisonous ideology with innovative strategies, cutting-edge technologies, comprehensive education and vigorous communication' reflects urgency and necessity of taking certain

actions. In addition, the repetitive use of the modality marker 'will' as can be seen in the statement below emphasises a deterministic approach which also discursively constructs a sense of urgency and willingness to take action.

> But I reassure the Assembly that we *will fight* and defeat Al-Shabaab in the deserts and in the towns, on digital and on social media. We *will fight* them on the airwaves and in the newspapers. We challenge them in schools, colleges and universities, and we *will overcome* them. We have defeated them militarily on the battlefield, and we must now defeat their poisonous ideology with innovative strategies, cutting-edge technologies, comprehensive education and vigorous communication. That is the commitment that we *will fulfil*, and I call on our partners to remain strong and stand shoulder to shoulder with Kenya and with Somalia. Only if we remain resolute and together will we prevail.
>
> (*Mr. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, President of the Federal Republic of Somalia, 26 September 2013*)

- **Topos of history**: because history teaches us that specific actions have specific consequences, one should perform or omit a specific action in a specific situation (allegedly) comparable with the historical example referred to.

  The topos of history maintained in the following statement by President Barack Obama uses historical evidence to stigmatise 'religious sectarianism, narrow tribalism, or jingoism'. Drawing on the idea that 'history tells us that the dark forces unleashed by this type of politics surely make all of us less secure', the President makes a compelling case for the need to pursue ideals and 'give expression to (our) best hopes, not our deepest fears'.

  > Politics and solidarity that depend on demonizing others, that draw on religious sectarianism, narrow tribalism or jingoism, may at times look like strength in the moment, but over time their weakness will be exposed. *And history tells us that the dark forces unleashed by this type of politics surely make all of us less secure*. Our world has been there before. We gain nothing from going back. Instead, I believe that we must go forward in pursuit of our ideals, not abandon them at this critical time. We must give expression to our best hopes, not our deepest fears
  >
  > (*Mr. Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, 28 September 2015*)

Perspectivation (Framing or Discourse Representation)

The fourth discursive strategy in Reisigl and Wodak's taxonomy is 'perspectivation', a discursive framing technique through which political actors declare their positions by either expressing involvement in a certain practice or distancing themselves from it. Alongside *deictics* and other linguistic means through which perspectivation can be realised, the acts of *selectivity, quoting, reporting*, and *storytelling* are the most notable.

- Selectivity

Selectivity is a standard framing device, and being 'selective' helps political speakers to (a) foreground evidence that promotes their arguments and (b) refrain from mentioning evidence against them. From a critical perspective, it becomes the responsibility of both the discourse analyst and the audience to listen carefully for not only what has been said but also what has not. The analysed speeches in this project, as in many other genres of political discourse, maintained a considerable amount of self-promotion through selecting examples, stories and arguments that depict a good *Self* and evil *Other*. In his 2016 address to the UNGA, the president of Egypt, Abdel Fattah Al Sisi, depicted his country as a valiant defender of lofty ideals, enduring sacrifices and leading others when it comes to the effort 'to defeat terrorism' and 'refute the extremist ideologies':

> *Egypt has always stressed that the effort to defeat terrorism* will never achieve its end unless we address the root causes of the phenomenon, confront terrorist groups with decisiveness and refute the extremist ideologies that give birth to terrorism and its proponents. *I call upon the international community to take all possible measures* to prevent terrorism from exploiting advances in information technology, which have contributed to endowing the phenomena of terrorism and ideological extremism with dangerous new dimensions that have given them a global reach
>
> (*Mr. Abdel Fattah Al Sisi, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 20 September 2016*).

Notice the selective use of phrases like 'Egypt has always stressed the effort to…' and 'I call upon the international community to take all possible measures…' which obviously promote Egypt's role in the fight against terrorism. At the same time, the president's speech omits mention of recent political events inside Egypt that might be seen as polarising, feeding division or providing fertile soil for violence.

- Quoting

Quoting is another persuasive framing strategy that depends on citing successful and well-recognised predecessors appealing to their authority (see section 3.11.3 for a detailed discussion on the use of intertextuality). Speakers align themselves with the principles of the precedents they are quoting, creating a frame of reference with which they wish to unite. Apart from being a discourse framing strategy, quoting serves a legitimising function by recalling the wisdom of religious texts or great men and women. For instance, consider how King Abdullah II of Jordan cited the verse (Surah Al-Baqarah: 136) from the Quran to prove a point about how Islam forbids coercion in religion.

> Every citizen is guaranteed the State's protection for themselves, their families, their properties, their honour, their privacy, and their freedom of religion and thought. Muslims believe in the divine origins of the Bible and the Torah. God says in the Quran: "*Say Ye: 'We believe in Allah, and the revelation given to us, and to Abraham, Ishmael and Isaac and Jacob, and the tribes, and that given to Moses and Jesus, and that given to the Prophets from their Lord: We make no difference between one and another of them: and we submit to Allah*.'" (The Holy Qur'an, II:136)

- Reporting and the Appeal to Stories

Maxwell and Dickman's 2007 book *The Elements of Persuasion: Use of storytelling to pitch better, sell faster and win more business* emphasised that a story is 'a fact, wrapped in an emotion that compels us to take an action that transforms our world' (p.5). Stories and political narratives are key means which tie together arguments into a conclusion. Stories retell events with emotion but also suggest a change. Therefore, storytelling is a discursive strategy which political actors use to invite their audiences to faraway worlds to build up an experiential sense and powerful attachment. As a key resource for persuasion, storytelling gives a political speech 'the qualitative elements that help audiences engage with the speaker and recall the key points' (Weber, 2016). In the American context, Weber (ibid.) studied storytelling in the State of the Union Addresses between 1961-2016 and concluded that the general trend was towards an increase in storytelling. In the following passage from Netanyahu's 2016 UNGA speech, the Israeli PM reports the story of his visit to Ahmed Dawabsheh, a victim of the Duma village arson attack[70], in an attempt to achieve emotional appeal and to respond to international condemnation.

[70] On 31 July 2015, masked attackers firebombed the Dawabsheh home in Duma village burning alive the 18-moth old Ali Dawabsheh, his brother Ahmed and their parents. Ali died on the scene, both his parents died from their injuries within weeks while his brother Ahmed was the only survivor after he suffered serious burns.

> Let us consider the tragic case of Ahmed Dawabsha. I shall never forget visiting Ahmed in the hospital, just hours after he was attacked. This little boy — a baby — was badly burned. Ahmed was the victim of a horrible terrorist attack perpetrated by Jews. He lay bandaged and unconscious as Israeli doctors worked around the clock to save him. No words could bring comfort to this boy or to his family. Nevertheless, as I stood by his bedside, I told his uncle: "This is not our people. This is not our way". I then ordered extraordinary measures to bring Ahmed's assailants to justice, and today the Jewish citizens of Israel accused of attacking the Dawabsha family are in jail awaiting trial. For some, that story shows that both sides have their extremists and that both sides are equally responsible for our seemingly endless conflict. However, what Ahmed's story actually proves is the very opposite. It illustrates the profound difference between our two societies. While Israeli leaders condemn terrorists — Arabs and Jews alike — Palestinian leaders celebrate terrorists.

Citing this story in his 2016 UNGA speech, the Israeli PM appeals to *ethical superiority*[71] as a means for showing special attention to morals even in times of war.

Intensification and Mitigation

The fifth strategy involves the use of 'intensification or mitigation' or the alternation between the two. In practice, this strategy is put into practice when political actors modify 'the epistemic status' of a proposition (i.e. knowledge claims about something) by intensifying or mitigating the illocutionary force of utterances. Whilst the bulk of the text-level analyses in this study will relate more to Reisigl and Wodak's first four strategies (nomination, predication, argumentation and perspectivation), the most commonly used strategies of intensification and mitigation which clearly appeared in the analysed speeches, as we will see later, were vague expressions, repetitions, hyperboles and rhetorical tag questions. As a meaning intensifying strategy, notice the repletion of the verb '*strike*' four times in the following sentence from President François Hollande's 2014 speech:

> That group — Daesh — does not *strike* only those who think differently from themselves; they also *strike* Muslims, they *strike* civilian populations, and they *strike* minorities.
>
> (*François Hollande, President of the French Republic, 24th September 2014*)

[71] Ethical superiority as a discursive strategy relies on the supposition that the speaker is ethically superior to his/her antagonist(s) because of practising certain actions (though these actions might not provide enough supporting evidence for the proclaimed ethical superiority).

4.3.3. Implementing Systemic Functional Linguistics

The present study benefits from SFL as a theory of language centred around the notion of language function, and accounts for both the syntactic structures of language and the social context. Halliday's approach to systemic functional analysis is, therefore, premised on the notion that language is a social semiotic system and views language as constitutive of three interrelated semiotic 'metafunctions': (a) textual which relates to how a text coheres and to organisation above the sentence level; (b) interpersonal which relates to the construction of identities, the relationships between producers and recipients, and language as a medium for interaction; and finally (c) ideational which relates to the contents of a text including ideas and representations.

Stratification, which is a significant notion within SFL, calls for analysing four strata of language: *Context, Semantics, Lexico-Grammar* and *Phonology-Graphology* (Halliday, 1994). As stated earlier in *section 3.10.5*, a speaker's preference to invest in certain lexico-grammatical patterns over others reflects his/her conscious (or unconscious) effort to convey specific meanings and perform specific functions. Lexico-grammatically speaking, modality and transitivity can be seen as helpful devices which are also vehicles of ideological orientation not least when knowing that such devices directly relate to power differentials and are sometimes difficult to spot in practice (Thompson, 2004). In principle, this study sets out to explore how these two particular syntactic devices were put into effect.

Modality

Within Halliday's abovementioned tripartite semiotic metafunctions, the interpersonal function (which conventionally looks at how meaning is contracted through a relationship between discourse interlocutors) is often reflected through modality. Fowler (1996: 166-167) argues that the significance of modality lies in its being 'the means by which people express their degree of commitment to the truth of the propositions they utter, and their views on the desirability or otherwise of the states of affairs referred to'. This view of modality, through the lens of ideological orientation, lends support to Fairclough's (1992a) operationalisation of modality at the textual level which fundamentally looked at 'the extent to which producers commit themselves to, or conversely, distance themselves from, propositions' (p.142).

Lyons (1977) identifies two types of modality, which are adopted here to explore how modality was employed across the studied corpus; these are 'epistemic

modality' and 'deontic modality'. While former relates to the degree of confidence or certainty of a particular proposition (e.g. *I will do* versus *I might do*), the latter relates to the obligation to implement a certain decision or uphold a particular principle (*we must do* versus *we shall do*). Discourse analysts can look for modality markers as grammatical clues that signify ideological attitudes and reflect the speaker's objectivity/subjectivity towards a discussed matter. Analysts usually look for auxiliary modal verbs (*must, may, shall, can, will, ought to, have to, might, should, could, would*); adjectives (*indispensable, (un)certain, (un)fortunate, probable, vital, necessary*); adverbs (*maybe, supposedly, probably, possibly, barely, hardly, strongly, robustly, certainly*) among other forms of language that carry explicit and subtle attitudinal meanings.

Transitivity

A very significant element of Halliday's ideational metafunction (which is concerned with the ideas and representations within texts) is transitivity. Kress (1976: 159) regards transitivity as 'the representation in language of processes, the participants therein, and the circumstantial features associated with them'. Transitivity has been famously employed to unravel social inequality and power differentials following the attention it received since Halliday's (1985) ground-breaking work *Introduction to Functional Grammar*.

Halliday used the term transitivity to refer to a grammatical system of 'process types' and 'participants' which can be used (and often is) to communicate ideologies by choices at the syntactic level. In other words, transitivity not only deals with the processes (i.e. verbs) but also encompasses the relationship between the processes and the participants involved. The following quote from Halliday (1994) sums up the significance of analysing transitivity and the role it plays in representing reality:

> Analysing transitivity implies concern with the clause in its ideational function, its role as a means of representing patterns of experience and its various aspects of reality, i.e., goings-on: doing, happening, feeling, being, etc. It also specifies the different types of processes that are recognized in the language (in its semantic system) and the structures by which they are expressed (the lexico-grammatical system).

Since transitivity is a layered and complex grammatical notion, it would be impossible for this study to encompass a detailed analysis of every verb and its associated processes, rather the present study invests in exploring the system of voice (active versus agentless passive) in relation to manifesting agency. The strength of the grammatical device in hand, and what makes it significant to the analyses conducted in this project, lies in its ability to foreground or background

agency. Analysing the revelation of agency (or conversely the concealment thereof), identifying the goal (or who is acted upon), as well as the process itself (verbs of doing and saying), would help analysts to demystify the basic grammatical frameworks of representation.

4.3.4. Implementing Van Leeuwen's Model of Representation & Socio-Semantic Model of Legitimation Strategies

In his 2007 seminal article entitled *Legitimation in discourse and communication*, van Leeuwen introduced 'a framework for analysing the way discourses construct legitimation for social practices' (p. 91). Being relevant to the textual analytical research on the representation of social groups, his operationalisation of analytical categories gives priority to socio-semantic aspects over linguistic realisation. Leeuwen's critically-oriented framework allows analysts to 'separate out the actors, actions and so on from the reactions, purposes and legitimations, but on the other hand also show how these two aspects of the text, the representations and the interpretations, one could say, are related' (ibid, 109). To this end, van Leeuwen (2007: 92) proposed the following four major categories of legitimation – these are presented with examples from later analyses:

1. *Authorization*, that is, legitimation by reference to the authority of tradition, custom and law, and of persons in whom institutional authority of some kind is vested. In his 2015 UNGA speech, the Sudanese Minister of Foreign Affairs condemns the implementation of unilateral sanctions resorting to the power and authority of a study conducted by the Human Rights Council to legitimise his argument. He also emphasises the proposition that Sudanese laws and legislation 'fully comply with international law and the international instruments on terrorism' legitimising his country's laws and legislations on terrorism, and highlighting how much it adheres to the 'norms and provisions' of the international law:

> Our discussion on human rights brings us back to the issue of unilateral sanctions, in the context of which we would like to mention *the study conducted by the Human Rights Council* two years ago on the human rights implications of such sanctions. The study concluded that innocent people, not Governments, are the primary victims of sanctions regimes. The Sudan has always been an active partner in international efforts to combat terrorism. At the national level, we have made

considerable progress in ensuring that *our laws and legislation fully comply with international law and the international instruments on terrorism* to which the Sudan became a party more than a decade ago. *The Sudan adheres strictly to their norms and provisions*

(*Mr. Ibrahim Ahmed Abd al-Aziz Ghandour, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Sudan, 2 October 2015*)

2. *Moral evaluation*, that is, legitimation by (often very oblique) reference to value systems. Similar to the previous example in which the Sudanese Minister for Foreign Affairs emphasised the importance of adhering to international laws of countering terrorism as means for legitimising arguments about how sanctions are unfair, the President of Romania, Mr. Klaus Iohannis highlighted the importance of 'strengthening the rule of law' and generating 'innovative legal tools' to combat terrorism. However, the Romanian president focussed on the values standing behind his country's proposals to legitimise their implementation. Notice the repetitive use of the noun 'values' in the following excerpt from the president's UNGA 2015 address:

> It is with that purpose in mind that Romania and Spain have set in motion a process of reflection on the possible creation of an international court for the crime of terrorism. We are fully aware of the conceptual and operational difficulties of such an undertaking. However, *the values* that stand behind that reflection, which are aimed at strengthening *the rule of law* in our multilateral anti-terrorist drive, are likely to generate fresh ideas for *innovative legal tools*. We believe that that reflection process is worthwhile in its own right, as it will fuel the debate on *reinforcing the values of justice and international law*. I would like to take this opportunity to invite all interested delegations to engage in good-faith discussions about *how to implement those values* in the fight against terrorism
>
> (*Mr. Klaus Werner Iohannis, President of Romania, 29 September 2015*)

3. *Rationalisation*, that is, legitimation by reference to the goals and uses of institutionalised social action, and to the knowledge society has constructed to endow them with cognitive validity. According to van Leeuwen (2007: 102), rationalisation can be explicitly or implicitly expressed in discourse. An explicit formula to realise rationalisation is '*I do x in order to do (or be, or have) y*' along with a purpose clause like 'to', 'in order to', and 'so as to'. In the following extract from the 2013

address by Ms. Cristina Fernández, President of the Argentine Republic, notice the explicit use of goal-oriented rationalisations which are constructed as conscious motives for political action. In her statement, the goal of avoiding more deaths (explicitly expressed in the clause 'in order to avoid deaths') which led Argentine to oppose military action against Daesh in Syria was subject to 'reasoning', 'common sense', and 'great respect for the norms of international law'.

> We welcome the fact that an agreement has been reached on the question of Syria. My country opposed direct intervention — bombing. It was quite simple. The argument that, *in order to avoid deaths*, you would cause even more deaths could not be sustained by *any reasoning* or even *common sense*. We did not speak out at that time only to speak. Furthermore, we were not discussing just any country, but one *with great respect for the norms of international law*
>
> (*Ms. Cristina Fernández, President of the Argentine Republic, 24 September 2013*).

4. *Mythopoesis*, that is, legitimation conveyed through narratives whose outcomes reward legitimate actions and punish non-legitimate actions. Van Leeuwen (2007: 105-106) identifies two ways of establishing legitimation through storytelling – *moral tales* and *cautionary tales*. Whilst in moral tales protagonists 'are rewarded for engaging in legitimate social practices, or restoring the legitimate order', cautionary tales 'convey what will happen if you do not conform to the norms of social practices'. Consider the following statement by King Abdullah II in which he delegitimises the actions of khawarij (outlaws of Islam) through moral and cautionary tales. Telling a cautionary story, the King establishes that the motives of extremists are 'hunger for power, control of people, of money and land'. The King also expresses his belief that although 'outlaw gangs are nothing but a drop in the ocean', the 1.7 billion 'good men and women' who follow Islam should be cautioned that 'a drop of venom can poison a well'. On the other hand, in a moral tale Muslims who conform to the ideals of the 'global Muslim community of '1.7 billion good men and women' are rewarded through restoring the image of their religion and protecting 'the purity of [their] faith from worldly contamination'.

> When we examine the motives of those outlaws, the khawarij, and, indeed, the motives of extremists on all sides, we find *hunger for power, control of people, of money and of land*. They use religion as a mask. Is there a worse crime than twisting God's word to promote one's own interests? Is there a more despicable act than feeding on the vulnerable and innocent, to recruit them to one's ranks? In the global Muslim community — *1.7 billion good men and women*, one quarter of humankind — today's *outlaw gangs are nothing but a drop in the ocean. But a drop of venom can poison a well*. We must *protect the purity of our faith from worldly contamination*. As Muslims, this is our fight, as it is our duty
> (*King Abdullah II ibn Al Hussein, King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 28 September 2015*).

In this work, Leeuwen's (2007) legitimation strategies of authorisation, moral evaluation, rationalisation and mythopesis will be conceptualised, explained, and amalgamated with other analytical means to analyse how language use helps political actors to champion a certain ideological stance in a convincing manner while synchronically working to delegitimise counter-stances; which, in effect, contribute to maintaining or changing the direction of politics and decision-making inside the UN.

4.4. SUMMARY

To summarise, this chapter was primarily divided into two main parts: one concerned with presenting the stages of compiling the corpus of the study, clarifying the data selection criteria and explaining some of the major corpus-based tools employed to analyse the data quantitatively, meanwhile, the other part aimed to explain the quantitatively based approaches and tools that are applied in later chapters. The chapter also showed the mechanisms and procedures employed to achieve a methodological synergy combining CDA and corpus linguistics which suits an analysis of patterns of representation. Different sections in this chapter prove that corpus tools and qualitative CDA methods can effectively work hand in hand to (a) identify patterns/categories of representation, and (b) carry out deeper analyses on representative texts that deserve special attention and further examination.

Chapter 5

REPRESENTATIONS OF ISLAM AND MUSLIMS

… qualitative work using corpora can show typicality of use

Susan Hunston (2007: 46)

5.1. OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTER

This chapter details how politicians spoke about Islam and Muslims at UNGA between 2013-2016 using specific linguistic strategies. Because this chapter is where I investigate the corpus in its entirety, the focus is mostly upon recurring patterns of representation in the data. This chapter also aims to go beyond the descriptive level through linking representations to the wider socio-political contexts that underlie them.

The lemmata ISLAM and MUSLIM occurred 520 times within the UNGA corpus of 787 speeches. Analyses in this chapter examine patterns of representation using the corpus linguistics tool *Sketch Engine* and as well as some relevant CDA devices. To do this, I investigate word sketches, lists of collocations and concordance lines to find out the most commonly occurring themes in relation to Islam and Muslims.

As established in the preceding chapter, a word sketch is a 'broad-brush' approach to data through which researchers can access a 'big picture' of how a particular word collocates with neighbouring words while at the same time grouping collocates according to their grammatical relationship to the node word. Meanwhile, the manual examination of concordance lines is an efficient technique that allows researchers to conduct within-context investigations.

This chapter is divided into three major sections. After this overview, section 5.2 investigates the lemma ISLAM, followed by section 5.3. which deals with the lemma MUSLIM. The two sections together are set to capture all instances of mentioning Islam and Muslims which could potentially inform the current study by means of an automated query using the lemmata of the two terms, which include:

- **ISLAM**: *Islam, Islams, Islamic, Islamist, Islamists, Islamophobia, Islamophobic, un-Islamic, Anti-Islamic.*
- **MUSLIM**: *Muslim, Muslims, non-Muslim, non-Muslims*.

The advantage of considering all instances of mentioning the lemmata ISLAM and MUSLIM relates to *accountability* (Leech, 1992: 112) and *replicability* (Doyle, 2005) as two core principles of corpus linguistics as a scientific method. The combination of both can make linguists more confident in the validity of how they approach datasets and allow for checking and rechecking results.

5.2. THE LEMMA ISLAM

Having outlined in the previous chapter some of the key corpus tools used in my analysis, I now turn to reporting the main findings of the *word sketch* analyses obtained in the first stage of corpus analyses. Obtaining a list of collocates appearing near the two abstract concepts *Islam* and *Islamic* provides strong initial indicators about the major semantic categories used in relation to Islam throughout the UNGA addresses. The first stage of analysis was to obtain *word sketches* and *collocation lists* of the abstract noun and impersonal adjective that refer to the religion, i.e. *Islam* and *Islamic*. Prior to this, a researcher has to decide on a collocation span (the range of words to the right and left within which a certain word is considered a collocate). Baker et al. (2013: 36) confirm that '[T]here is no standard within corpus linguistics circles with regard to what such a span should be'. However, two of the most popular corpus linguistics analysis tools (i.e. *Sketch Engine* and *WordSmith*) have set a default span of five words to the right and left of the search word. Therefore, I have used this default span following Baker et al's (2013) recommendation that 'longer spans can throw up unrelated cases' and 'shorter spans result in fewer collocates' (p. 37).

In a corpus-based approach to collocation, there are many statistical formulae through which co-occurring items can be computationally determined including *t* and *z scores*, *MI* and *logDice* indications. In this thesis, I use the convention of Church et al. (1994) in intersecting the three, which is also the default option used in the corpus software package *Sketch Engine*. Following Leech's (1974: 20) definition of 'collocative meaning' as 'the associations a word acquires on account of the meanings of words which tend to occur in its environment', *Table 5.1* below lists the top twenty collocates of the lemma ISLAM within the corpus.

Table 5.1: Top twenty collocates with the lemma ISLAM in the corpus

Number	Collocate	Co-occurrence count	Candidate count	T-score	MI	logDice
1	**religion**	29	306	5.379	9.888	10.930
2	**militant**	14	67	3.740	11.029	10.853
3	**Islam**	19	181	4.355	10.036	10.748
4	**name**	14	204	3.736	9.422	10.219
5	**true**	16	379	3.991	8.722	9.871
6	**khawarij**	5	8	2.236	12.609	9.760
7	**moderate**	6	46	2.448	10.349	9.758
8	**outlaw**	5	13	2.235	11.909	9.722
9	**teaching**	5	29	2.235	10.752	9.608
10	**Christianity**	4	9	2.000	12.118	9.430
11	**abuse**	6	147	2.443	8.673	9.227
12	**nothing**	7	215	2.638	8.347	9.178
13	**Muslims**	4	62	1.997	9.333	9.075
14	**teach**	4	62	1.997	9.333	9.075
15	**Muslim**	5	129	2.230	8.598	9.046
16	**Judaism**	3	6	1.732	12.288	9.038
17	**noble**	5	176	2.228	8.150	8.842
18	**enemy**	3	91	1.727	8.365	8.497
19	**nature**	5	282	2.223	7.470	8.467
20	**extreme**	4	302	1.985	7.049	8.084

One observation is that this list of collocates provides strong initial indicators about the major topics (or semantic categories) debated in relation to Islam throughout UNGA 2013-2016 sessions. As *table 5.1* clearly shows the lemma ISLAM collocates with nouns (e.g. religion, Muslims, Christianity), adjectives (e.g. militant, true, noble, name, extreme, enemy) and verbs (e.g. abuse, teach). The main twenty collocates of the lemma ISLAM show that Islam is represented in relation to a relatively restricted range of issues which can be clustered into a limited number of semantic categories. The followings are some of the categories of topics that we can infer from the list, although a different classification may occur if other less frequent collocates were taken into account (which is something I do at a later stage):

- IDENTIFYING CHARACTERISATIONS
  (nature, teaching, teach, Muslim, Muslims, nothing, name)
- RELIGION
  (religion, Islam, Christianity, Judaism).

- POSITIVE ATTRIBUTES
  (true, moderate, noble).
- NEGATIVE ATTRIBUTES
  (militant, khawarij, outlaw, abuse, enemy, extreme).

These four categories represent four major frames that indicate different semantic preferences. Before discussing these categories in more detail, it might be useful to clarify that the above categorisation did not rely exclusively on the literal meaning of the collocates appearing in the list but rather took into consideration meanings established via co-text by consulting concordance lines, which is a much more qualitative form of analysis. For example, the word 'nothing' may not appear to semantically fit into the category IDENTIFYING CHARACTERISATIONS of the noun Islam, but the textual context in which it was used in the corpus shows that it was employed to identify Islam through removing the extremism accusation using phrases like 'nothing to do with Islam' as shown in *figure 5.1* below.

file415667...	of religion that have	*nothing*	to do with Islam .There is no civil war in Syria. It is a
file415667...	Islamist extremism. This has	*nothing*	to do with Islam , which is a peaceful religion that inspires
file415667...	this past summer has	*nothing*	to do with Islam . It is the return of barbaric ghosts from
file415667...	differences. That has	*nothing*	to do with the Islam we are seeing today.We reiterate our profound
file415667...	and sickening. It has	*nothing*	to do with Islam , a religion of peace, tolerance and understanding
file415667...	so-called Islamic State knows	*nothing*	of Islam ﷺ noble ideals, compassion or solemn duty
file415667...	death fatwas that have	*nothing*	to do with Islam . They have bragged about supporting terrorism

Figure 5.1: Concordance lines of the word *nothing* as a collocate of *Islam*

A closer look at concordance lines of other words in the NEGATIVE ATTRIBUTES semantic category also provides evidence that not all 'conflict' words indicate negative attitudes towards the religion. For instance, the verb 'abuse', although it might have a negative connotation at face value, it was rather used to describe the actions of some extremist groups that claim to represent Islam. The verb collocate *abuse* collocates with 'Islam' with a log-dice of 9.227 (making it the most frequent verb collocate of Islam):

file415667...	that we should not allow them to	*abuse*	Islam and offend the 1.5 billion Muslims who
file415667...	two weeks ago, ISIL is	*abusing*	the name of Islam and the very values of Islam and of every
file415667...	equality of women before God, they	*abuse*	Islam . When the khawarij persecute minorities
file415667...	they deny freedom of religion, they	*abuse*	Islam .Islam teaches that all humanity is equal
file415667...	deny freedom of religion, they	*abuse*	Islam. Islam teaches that all humanity is equal in dignity
file415667...	religion? Absolutely not. They flout and	*abuse*	Islam . They kill their own brothers and sisters

Figure 5.2: Concordance lines of the verb *abuse* as a collocate of *Islam*

All six lines in *figure 5.2* support that the verb *abuse,* is, in fact, suggestive of a more positive discourse prosody[72] to distinguish between Islam and the actions of groups that abuse the religion like 'ISIL' or 'Khawarij'. Examining the previous concordance lines leads to the observation that some speakers believe that there is *a conflict within Islam* rather than *with Islam*; a conflict between Muslims and extremist groups operating under the name of the religion. Certain groups 'abuse Islam' and its 'values' and thus 'offend the 1.5 billion Muslims' around the world.

Also, the second strongest collocate in the above list i.e. *militant* (with a log-dice of 10.85) falls under the category of NEGATIVE ATTRIBUTES. Unlike the last example, the use of *militant* next to *Islam* intends to indicate a type of Islam; that is '*militant Islam*'. Consider the following statement by the Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu:

> Militant Islam's ambition to dominate the world seems mad … therefore, the question before us is whether militant Islam will have the power to realize its unbridled ambitions
>
> *(29 September 2014)*

Such collocational use of *militant* and *Islam* that attaches militancy to the abstract noun *Islam* might give the implication that Islam as a religion is linked with militancy and thus can be claimed to enforce a negatively shaded semantic frame. One can be critical of such use of language claiming that it is a misnomer. While militant groups which the speaker intends to refer to claim to follow Islamic values, they do not necessarily do. Another example of attaching a collocate with a negative connotation to the word *Islam* comes from a speech by Donald Tusk – the President of the European Council:

> Globalization makes fear more contagious and more potent. It dangerously links together the anxieties of the Middle East, Africa, Asia, Europe and America. One example, among others, is that of the radical Islam of Da'esh, which spreads terror from Jakarta to Nice, from Tunis to Brussels, from Sirte to Orlando.
>
> (*21 September 2016*)

In fact using words like *radical* near the words *Islam* or *Muslims* can impose a particular framing. Lakoff (2016) argues that:

> 'Radical' puts Muslims on a linear scale and 'terrorists' imposes a frame on the scale, suggesting that terrorism is built into the religion itself.

[72] A discourse prosody describes 'the speaker's evaluative attitude' (Stubbs, 2007: 178) or according to Louw (1993: 160) refers to the 'consistent aura of meaning with which a form is imbued by its collocates'.

> The grammar suggests that there is something about Islam that has terrorism inherent in it.

I would argue the adjective *militant* in Netanyahu's speech would invoke a similar frame. The PM's speech will be analysed in the next chapter, and this will enable me to examine the use of this collocate within its larger co-text. However, it is worth noting at this stage that a closer look at the concordance lines of this collocate reveals that all 14 instances of *'militant + Islam'* appeared in the same speech (i.e. the Israeli PM's 2014 address) which in turn reduces the potential of assuming that this collocational pattern is spread over the UNGA corpus.

Looking back again at our list of top twenty collocates of the lemma ISLAM is that a plethora of collocates either relate to RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS SPECTRUM (Islam and [Christianity, Judaism, religion]) or associate Islam with POSITIVE ATTRIBUTES ([moderate, true, noble] Islam) as in the following example:

> Islam has been present in Mali since the eleventh century, and it has been a tolerant and moderate Islam that is based on humanism, the acceptance of others and the right to differences. That has nothing to do with the Islam we are seeing today.
>
> *(Ibrahim Keita - President of Mali, 27 September 2014)*

Through the use of certain predicational strategies, different speakers created a discourse dichotomising Muslims into two groups, *good Muslims* (who are moderate, tolerant, noble and true) and *bad Muslims* (who are militant, extreme and abuse the religion). Although the argument in the above quote is a somewhat more positive image of the religion on the first reading, it can be argued that emphasising positive characteristics of Islam and Muslims in such manner could be an indication of a problem with the religion and its followers. Indeed, repeated use of positive predications can have the impact that by the very act of emphasising positive attributes, it tells audiences that something is not quite right. In the previous extract, President Keita's emphasis on the 'moderate' and 'tolerant' qualities of the Islam of the past, which according to the speaker, are not features of 'the Islam we are seeing today' reinforces the idea that something is wrong with today's Islam rather than with a tiny minority of politically motivated extremist groups.

Moving on to collocates in the IDENTIFYING CHARACTERISATIONS category, it is noticed that most of these referred to the nature of Islam from certain speakers' viewpoints. Collocates in this category (for example, *nature, teach, teachings*) suggest an attempt to define the religion through reference to some of its attributes and teachings. Consider the following example:

> The teachings of true Islam are clear: sectarian conflict and strife are utterly condemned. Islam prohibits violence against Christians and other communities that make up each country. Let me say once again that Arab Christians are an integral part of my religion's past and future.
>
> (*Abdullah II – King of Jordan, 20 September 2016*)

Now regarding the verbs that collocated with the noun *Islam*, *figure 5.3* below reveals that one of the most frequent collocates is the verb 'to be'. Islam as a subject of a sentence collocated 14 times with 'be'. Consulting the concordance lines of cases where Islam and 'be' collocated (see *figure 5.3* below) clearly reflects some speakers' attempts to define the religion and some of its aspects and teachings. For instance, 'Islam is a religion of peace and tolerance has nothing to do with the activities of those anti-Islamic bands of dangerous criminals, who spread nothing but deep-seated hatred for human life and whose sole intention is to desecrate and defame Islam' *(Al Hadji Jammeh – President of the Republic of Gambia, 25 September, 2014)* and 'Islam is a religion which essentially advocates openness, tolerance and love of one's neighbour *(Ismaël Guelleh - President of the Republic of Djibouti, 30 September, 2015).*

1	a religion on that account is unfair and unwise.	Islam *is*	a religion of peace, compassion and
2	religions and peoples. The teachings of true	Islam *are*	clear: sectarian conflict and strife are
3	devotion to the peaceful and noble religion of	Islam *are*	, in fact, an insult not only to all true
4	are haram, or forbidden, for a Muslim.	Islam *is*	a religion of peace and tolerance and has
5	, extreme Islam or violent Islam. Simply put,	Islam *is*	a pure religion that encourages the best of
6	it is carried out under the banner of religion.	Islam has *been*	present in Mali since the eleventh
7	in danger, because everywhere we look militant	Islam *is*	on the march. It is not militants; it is not
8	and lose the war.The fight against militant	Islam *is*	indivisible. When militant Islam succeeds
9	behalf of a supposed religious belief, whereas	Islam *is*	a religion which essentially advocates
10	to be carrying out jihad in the name of Allah,	Islam *is*	a religion of peace and tolerance. Islam asks
11	When some, out of prejudice or ignorance of what	Islam *is*	, seek to exclude Muslims from fulfilling
12	peace agenda in Afghanistan. I would add that	Islam *is*	a religion with a clear thought, culture,
13	the notion of a clash of civilizations in which	Islam *is*	at war with the West. Their incendiary
14	West. Their incendiary rhetoric lambasting	Islam *is*	unacceptable and can serve only to further

Figure 5.3: Concordance lines of the verb *be* as a collocate of *Islam*

Figure 5.3 also demonstrates attempts made in certain speeches to counter the thesis of 'a clash of civilisations' between Islam and the West. For example, the Vice-President of the Republic of Gambia argues that: 'We are also greatly concerned that certain rogue politicians and pseudo-intellectuals with nefarious intentions are using the terrorism card to revive and propagate the notion of a clash of civilizations in which Islam is at war with the West. Their incendiary rhetoric lambasting Islam is unacceptable and can serve only to further polarize the world' *(Dr. Isatou Saidy – Vice-President of the Republic of Gambia, 21 September, 2016).*

Expanding my analysis to cover lower-frequency collocates reveals another frame that associated with *Islam* which was that of DOCTRINE ([Sunni, shia'a, branch, version, approach] Islam/of Islam) which in most cases either aimed to (a) demonstrate diversity within the religion (e.g. 'there should be no strife among Muslims, including Shia and Sunni, who may take different paths but seek the same destination' *Najib Razak – Prime Minister of Malaysia, 1 October 2015*) or (b) condemn conflicts based on sectarian divisions (e.g. 'the scapegoating of people based on their ethnicity or religion, whether Christian, Yazidi, Kurdish, Sunni, Shia or Jewish — all of that, taken together, harks back to a mentality and a culture we thought had long been consigned to the dustbin of history' *Charles Flanagan - Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade of Ireland, 29 September 2014).*

Examining a word sketch of *Islam*, the list of top twenty collocates as well as concordance lines of certain collocates demonstrate that *Islam* was frequently constructed in terms of religious beliefs, identifying characteristics, positive attributes and to a lesser extent conflict and violence. Moving on to the adjective *Islamic*, its main pattern in the corpus is as a modifier of nouns referring to: (a) RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS SPECTRUM, (b) COLLECTIVES, (c) VIOLENCE AND CONFLICT, and (d) POSITIVE ATTRIBUTES. *Table 5.2* below is a list of some of the most frequent collocates in a word sketch of the lexical items appearing near the adjective *Islamic*:

Table 5.2: Adjectival and noun collocates of the word *Islamic*

Category	Collocates (adjectival and noun)
RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS SPECTRUM	scholar, faith, teachings, thought, values, law, religion, sharia, religious, committed, true
VIOLENCE AND CONFLICT	militant, fanatic, military
COLLECTIVES	world, many, coalition, ummah (community)
POSITIVE ATTRIBUTES	inclusive, modern, cooperation

The first observation here is that a set of interrelated topics are commonly indexed by collocates of *Islam* and collocates of *Islamic*. For instance, ones in the categories of RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, VIOLENCE AND CONFLICT and POSITIVE ATTRIBUTES. Yet, a new category of collocates that appeared close to *Islamic* but not as much near *Islam* is that of REFERENCE TO COLLECTIVES (e.g. Islamic [world, coalition, community]). A concordance search of the nomination *Islamic world* (see *figure 5.4* below) demonstrates that it tends to refer to large groups of Muslims or countries with a majority of Muslim populations.



Figure 5.4: Concordance lines of '*Islamic world(s)*'

Representing Muslims as a single group using nominations like *Islamic world* (or *Muslim world,* as we will see later) involves the risk of alienating Muslims by means of establishing the idea that they belong to a different world from the default world in which the rest of humanity lives. As established earlier in Chapter 2, one of the definitions of Islamophobia according to the Runnymede Trust 1997 related to perceiving Islam as a 'single monolithic bloc'. In this context, I share the same view as Carpenter and Cagaptay (2009) in that the term *Muslim world* (and *Islamic world*) 'is not only an analytical error – it's also a critical public diplomacy mistake. Muslim world unfairly and singularly assigns adherents of Islam into a figurative ghetto. And particularly in the post-September 11, this relegation carries a real moral hazard: by lumping together extremists, secularists, and everyone in between, the term Muslim world legitimizes the idea that all of the group's members are locked in deadly conflict with the non-Islamic world'. In this context, Baker et al. (2013: 132-133) also support the idea that using these two phrases involves potential danger 'particularly as other religions are not normally characterised in this way, and because the term seems to background differences between branches of Islam'.

Finally, before moving on to discuss ways of sketching Muslim(s) in the corpus, I would like to examine the use of the term *Islamist* which although has been used less frequently in our corpus (only 20 times), it tended to hold a negative discourse prosody of violence and a semantic preference of collectives. *Table 5.3* below lists the adjectival, noun and verb collocates of the word *Islamist*.

Table 5.3: Adjectival, noun and verb collocates of the word *Islamic*

Category	Collocates (adjectival and noun)	Collocates (verb)
VIOLENCE AND CONFLICT	militant, extremism, dictatorship, extremism, terrorism, neo-Nazi	arm, confront, smuggle (explosives)
COLLECTIVES	party, group, movement	share

Figure 5.5 below reveals that of all 20 instances of using *Islamist(s)*, the most recurring pattern was ([militant] Islamist(s)) and, to a lesser extent, patterns like ([radical] Islamist), (Islamist [extremism]), (Islamist [dictatorship]) and (Islamist [terrorism]).



to stay. We see it in Tunisia, where secular and	Islamist	parties worked together through a political
terrorist threat is a poisonous ideology of	Islamist	extremism. This has nothing to do with Islam,
countless acts of generosity every day.	Islamist	extremism on the other hand believes in using
our military? I do not believe that the treat of	Islamist	extremism will best be solved by Western ground
authority between secular modernists and	Islamists	. We are using moderation to grapple with the
the Middle East. The proliferation of radical	Islamist	movements and the emergence of new groups, such
All politics is local. For the militant	Islamists	, all politics is global, because their
the global ambitions of its fellow militant	Islamists	, and that is why its supporters cheered wildly
.And what they share in common, all militant	Islamists	share in common Boko Haram in Nigeria,
Nazis believed in a master race. The militant	Islamists	believe in a master faith. They just disagree as
to us all.It is one thing to confront militant	Islamists	on pickup trucks armed with Kalashnikov rifles
. It is another thing to confront militant	Islamists	armed with weapons of mass destruction. I
, that means a nuclear-armed Iran and militant	Islamist	movements gaining ground in the Sunni world.
. States are disintegrating, and militant	Islamists	are filling the void. Israel cannot have
be a generational struggle against the	Islamist	extremist ideology that drives it.But the
State as a stepping stone for yet another	Islamist	dictatorship in the Middle East but as
out against are the actions of the militant	Islamists	who are smuggling explosives into the Al-Aqsa
values are under savage assault by militant	Islamists	, who are forcing millions of terrified people
No country can claim to be immune to the threat of	Islamist	terrorism, fundamentalism and fanaticism,
violent extremism and non-violent extremism,	Islamist	and neo-Nazi, hate and fear in all their forms.

Figure 5.5: Concordance lines of the word *Islamist(s)*

Nonetheless, in the above statements, there are only two instances of using Islamist in positively shaded semantic contexts which appeared in the following statements from a speech by Barack Obama and another by Mohamed Moncef Marzouki. 'We see it in Tunisia, where secular and Islamist parties worked together through a political process to produce a new constitution' *(Barack Obama – President of the United States of America, 24 September 2014)* and 'we are distributing authority between secular modernists and Islamists. We are using moderation to grapple with counter-revolution and to eliminate the residues of despotism through a just transition' (*Mohamed Moncef Marzouki – President of Tunisia, 25 September 2014*).

5.3. THE LEMMA MUSLIM

Having presented findings of sketching Islam using analyses carried out on using the lemma ISLAM (mainly the most frequent three words '*Islam, Islamic* and *Islamist*'), I now turn attention to the lemma MUSLIM which comprises forms of reference to the adherents of the religion. Adopting van Dijk's (2009) conceptualisation of 'context models' and 'social cognition' and his view on how personal beliefs of language users influence discourse production, I find it highly significant to shed

light on whether speakers at the UNGA characterised 'Muslims' in ways different from how they spoke about 'Islam'.

In this section, I summarise some of the key indicators that emerge from producing word sketches for *Muslim* and *Muslims* as well as the list of collocates for the singular and the plural. As shown in *table 5.4* below, a first observation is that the word Muslim tended to collocate more with nouns and adjectives that relate to RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS BELIEFS and less with nouns and adjectives that relate to NEGATIVE ATTRIBUTES, if compared to the lemma ISLAM (*Islam, Islamic, Islamist*). In many cases, Muslim as a modifying adjective is used next to nouns relating to religion (e.g. Muslim [cleric, scholar, worshiper, sect, faith, pilgrim]).

The second frame which a sketch of the word Muslim reveals is that of ETHNICITY or NATIONALITY. This frame, which we have not seen as commonly used with the lemma Islam, is indexed by collocates like (Arab, Palestinian, French, American, African). Collocates in this category represented certain Muslim groups in terms of their ethnicity or nationality. It is noticeable that the ethnicity of certain Muslim groups like *Arab* tends to be treated as interchangeable with the religious identity of being Muslim. However, the fact that Indonesia, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and Nigeria which are not Arab are respectively the top five counties in terms of the largest Muslim populations is an indication of the inaccuracy of assuming that Arabs are Muslims and Muslims are Arabs.

In our corpus, a statement like 'The Arab Spring showed that the Muslim world is crying out for change' (*Najib Razak – Prime Minister of Malaysia, 28 September 2013)* echoes an approach of disregarding religious diversity within Arab countries and gives the sense that being Muslim is subsumed within the ethnic identity of being Arab. By using the two terms interchangeably in an ambiguous manner, audiences might presume that Muslims are Arabs and Arabs are Muslims.

Depending on the context, other uses of ethnicity/nationality collocates with the adjective *Muslim* occurred as a means of emphasising the religious identity of Muslim minorities within certain countries. For example, consider the following statement in Obama's 2014 speech:

> 'when it comes to America and Islam, there is no us and them, there is only us, because millions of Muslim Americans are part of the fabric of our country.
>
> *(Barack Obama – President of the USA, 24 September 2014)*

While the emphasis on the idea that 'Muslim Americans are part of the fabric of our country' in the above statement seems a deliberate attempt to be inclusive, it implies the existence of perceptions that Muslim Americans are *not* part of the fabric of America and raises questions about whether being Muslim fits comfortably with being American. The use of nominations like 'Muslim Americans' or 'British Muslims' (as shown later in *table 5.5*) could become problematic knowing that Muslims are the only people of faith who are assigned this kind of nomination within the entire corpus. Terms like 'Christian Americans', 'Sikh Americans' or 'Hindu Americans' are never used, and thus this way of describing Muslims seems to be predominantly reserved for Muslims and thus can be interpreted as a perlocutionary act for that it aims to convince listeners that Muslims are Americans too.

Table 5.4 below reveals another observation regarding the use of the adjective Muslim as a modifier of nouns that indicate COLLECTIVES. COLLECTIVES along with RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS SPECTRUM are, by far, the most populous topic categories of collocates appearing close to the adjective *Muslim*.

Table 5.4: Adjectival, noun and verb collocates of the word *Muslim*

Category	Collocates (adjectival and noun)	Collocates (verb)
RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS SPECTRUM	sect, pilgrim, worshiper, scholar, cleric, faith, spiritual, Christian, Hindu, non-Muslim	worship
VIOLENCE AND CONFLICT	destruction, terrorist	persecute, refuse, suffer
ETHNICITY/NATIONALITY	Arab, French, Palestinian, American, African, immigrant	---
COLLECTIVES	world, societies, population, nation, ummah (community), people, states, country, many, large, minority	---

Collocates in the category COLLECTIVES included nouns and adjectives like (world, societies, population, nation, ummah (worldwide community), people, states, country, many, large, minority). Again, some of these words are sometimes used to refer to all Muslims across the world in ways that unfairly disregard differences among those who profess the Muslim faith. The most common collocate of *Muslim* in this category is the noun *world* forming the nomination *Muslim world* which, as

argued earlier might falsely represent Muslims as a homogenous group, and has been criticised by many.

Richardson (2006) points out that this particular phrase can be exclusionary claiming that 'the referential ambiguity, fuzziness and indeterminacy of this phrase paradoxically add to its utility, its breadth and power' (p. 231). The contexts of using this phrase, in some cases, add to the problematic nature of the phrase itself. For example, a statement like 'Last year, I spoke of the conflict between Sunni and Shia that is tearing the Muslim world apart' (*Najib Razak – Prime Minister of Malaysia, 26 September 2014)* exaggerates the Sunni-Shia divide and suggests that recent tensions in countries like Iraq and Syria are causing split among all Muslims around the world or, at least, all countries with significant Muslim populations. While, as shown above, using the phrase *Muslim world* uncritically in political contexts can be problematic, Baker et al. (2013: 274) maintain that 'perhaps the acceptability of the term depends on the context of its use' citing examples of incorporating the phrase in the name of organisations like the *Muslim World League* (MWL) and academic journals like *The Muslim World Journal* and *Muslim World Journal of Human Rights*.

Another word in this category that could be problematic to the representation of Muslims is *community*. While, in fact, there are many different ways that Muslim communities are formed in relation to approach (e.g. Sunni, Shi'a), nationality (Indonesian, Iraqi, Afghani, Turkish, Malaysian) or ethnicity (Kurdish, Punjabi, Arab, Hazara), the nomination 'Muslim community' does not recognise the diversity of communities and rather constructs Muslims as a single community. Van Leeuwen's (1996) theories of individualisation and assimilation of social actors are useful in this context. Van Leeuwen maintains that using the mass noun 'community' is a clear example of assimilation through which group identity is constructed instead of individual identity. Whilst many Muslims may feel attached to non-Muslim groups, designations like 'Muslim community' can discursively construct Muslims as affiliated with each other regardless of whether they really are. The ambiguous nomination 'Muslim community' assigns a concrete identity to Muslims which can create a form of essentialisation.

Interestingly, although the literal translation of the Arabic word 'ummah' is 'community', its specific usage within religious discourses throughout the history of Islam makes it an attention-grabbing collocate to consider. As a religious ideal, the word 'ummah' promotes an idea of worldwide unity amongst Muslims in ways that transcend geographical boundaries among different nations. Schmidt (2005: 577) maintains that believing in the concept of 'ummah' means being part of 'a broader-crossing community that includes believers worldwide and raises ambitions for what the believers ought to be – unified, innately connected,

characterised by profound mutual loyalty and the practice of high moral standards'. Predictably, Muslim speakers use of this concept of 'imagined community' (see Anderson, 1991) juxtaposes an ideal vision of Muslims which is at stake because of the sectarian conflicts taking place within certain Muslim countries, and thus urges Muslims to unite in taking certain actions that would protect the 'ummah'. Consider the following example of using the word in King Abdullah II's 2014 address the UNGA:

> The scholars decisively condemned the incitement of ethnic and sectarian conflict, known in Arabic as fitna. They recognized that evil for what it is — a threat to the Muslim world, the Ummah, and indeed to all humankind.
>
> *(King Abdullah II – King of Jordan, 24 September 2013)*

As far as the plural form *Muslims* is concerned, examining collocates in the first category in *table 5.5* which relates to RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS SPECTRUM shows that some noun and adjectival collocates characterise Muslims in terms of the level of their belief (e.g. *devout* and *moderate*). Other nouns and verbs in this category indexed practices relating to Islam (e.g. *mosque, worship*).

Table 5.5: Adjectival, noun and verb collocates of the word *Muslims*

Category	Collocates (adjectival and noun)	Collocates (verb)
RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS SPECTRUM	devout, moderate, moderation, mosque, Jews, Christians	believe, worship, hold, swear (allegiance), cherish.
VIOLENCE AND CONFLICT	terrorists, deception	offend, strike, refuse, suffer, mislead, respond
ETHNICITY/NATIONALITY	Arabs, Palestinian, British	---
COLLECTIVES	majority, many, quarter	---
POSITIVE ATTRIBUTES	peace-loving, moderate, innocent, fellow, loving, peaceful, brotherhood, great, true, genuine, victim, together	join, understand, share, allow, include

However, it is noted that the most common frame of collocates which appeared near the word *Muslims* are within the frame POSITIVE ATTRIBUTES. In this category, the noun *Muslims* is qualified by adjectives denoting positive traits. Although ascribing positive qualities to Muslims is established throughout many speeches and largely aimed to achieve a positive outcome, mentioning positive traits to counteract archetypal views about the religion and its adherents might have the effect that by

the very act of emphasising the positive traits, listeners are told that something is wrong.

Another way of exploring the representations attached to the word Muslims is through investigating the predicational content which illuminates what characteristics and qualities are attributed to Muslims as social actors. *Table 5.6* below shows some examples of how speakers at the UNGA formulated predications about Muslims in addition to what they are saying about them thematically:

Table 5.6: Predications for Muslims within the corpus

No.	Nomination	Predication
1	Muslims	'should work together to promote a greater understanding of what a true Islamic State means'
2	1.5 billion Muslims	'have refused to subscribe to the views of this small minority'
3	Muslims	'are suffering across the world'
4	Genuine Muslims	'are worshipping the Almighty Allah, whose message in the Holy Quran repeatedly draws our attention to the need to live together in peace for our common humanity'
5	Our fellow Muslims	'are poor and marginalized and are now fleeing Syria in massive numbers, causing social and economic distress in Europe'
6	Muslims	'are asked by Islam to seek knowledge and, as the Prophet has said, to do so as far as China, so as to learn from the cradle to the grave'

The above six statements about Muslims exemplify some of the attributes ascribed to Muslims. In the first and second statement, we can see that the speakers try to counteract a stereotype of Muslims by declaring that Muslims 'refused to subscribe' to the views of a tiny minority and calling on Muslims to 'work together to promote a greater understanding of what a true Islamic State means'. Statements 3 and 5 victimise Muslims (or specific Muslim groups) by depicting them as suffering, poor and marginalised. Statements 4 and 6 refer to Muslim beliefs and suggest that the Islamic tradition (i.e. the Holy Quran and prophetic example) which ask Muslims 'to seek knowledge' and 'learn' offers Muslims solutions for their current problems and how 'to live together in peace'. Investigating the entire corpus for predications of Muslims, I found instances that were a bit more difficult to establish for the fact some statements 'objectified' Muslims through formulating arguments about what

had been done to Muslims or what they should do as opposed to what they have done. Some of these are listed in *table 5.7* below:

Table 5.7: Another set of predications for Muslims within the corpus

Speaker	Sentence with Muslims	The gist of the speaker's message about Muslims
Ms. Aïchatou Boulama Kané, *Minister of State of Niger*	The terrorists of Boko Haram, like all other terrorists, are not Muslims. On the contrary, they are the worst enemies of Islam.	Terrorists do not represent Muslims.
Mr. Ban Ki-Moon, *Secretary-General of the UN*	Muslims in particular are being targeted by stereotyping and suspicion that evoke haunting echoes of the dark past. I urge political leaders and candidates to not engage in the cynical and dangerous political math of adding votes by dividing people and multiplying fear.	Muslims are unfairly targeted by stereotyping and suspicion in the political sphere.
Mr. Barack Obama, *President of the United States of America*	Terrorist networks use social media to prey upon the minds of our youth, endangering open societies and spurring anger against innocent immigrants and Muslims.	Terrorists' use of social media aims to spur anger against innocent Muslims.
Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, *Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan*	The stereotyping of Muslims as extremists and terrorists must stop. We must all use the influence and reach of the United Nations to avert a clash of civilizations and to promote harmony among followers of diverse religions all around the world. Terrorism negates Islam's humanistic outlook and noble values. Those who perpetrate terrorism are enemies of Muslims and Islam itself.	Stereotyping of Muslims as terrorists must stop and terrorists are enemies of Muslims and Islam.
King Abdullah II ibn Al Hussein, *King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*	Muslims need to help identify and counter the outlaws of Islam who pick and choose and cut and paste religious texts in order to twist and distort true Islamic teaching.	Muslims should have a role in countering terrorists.
Mr. Macky Sall,	By the same token, we reject facile and unjust assignments of blame.	Muslims should not be stigmatised or blamed for

President of the Republic of Senegal	Neither Islam nor Muslims are to blame for what we are witnessing. We refuse to have the senseless acts of a faithless, lawless minority be used as a pretext for stigmatizing more than 1 billion Muslims and their religion.	the actions of a lawless minority.
Mr. Haider Al Abadi, *Prime Minister of the Republic of Iraq*	ISIL has murdered thousands of Muslims, wrought destruction and spread its evil to many Arab and Islamic States.	Thousands of Muslims have been victims of ISIL.

As shown above, some speakers formulated predications that construct Muslims as 'victims' in both the literal and figurative senses of the word. They are victims of ISIL which 'has murdered thousands of Muslims' but also victims of 'political leaders and candidates' who target Muslims by 'stereotyping and suspicion' and terrorist networks that use social media 'to spur anger' against Muslims. Muslims are also called upon to 'identify and counter' terrorists who 'distort true Islamic teaching'.

In general, analyses in this chapter reveal limited frameworks and themes of discussion around Islam and Muslims. The findings demonstrate that speaking about Islam and Muslims was primarily oriented towards the following thematic categories:

- RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS SPECTRUM / IDENTIFYING CHARACTERISATIONS
- VIOLENCE AND CONFLICT
- POSITIVE ATTRIBUTES
- ETHNICITY/NATIONALITY
- COLLECTIVE REFERENCES

Chapter 6

ANALYSIS OF FOUR UNGA SPEECHES

One of the principal causes of the rising intolerance of Islam in many parts of the world is ignorance or, if I may say so, lack of proper understanding of Islam, often rooted in a failure to distinguish between mainstream Islam and Muslims and the words and actions of extremists

(Esposito and Kalin 2011: vii)

6.1. OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTER

In this chapter which builds on and extends the analyses conducted in Chapter 5, I analyse four selected speeches to look at how Islam and Muslims are constructed by four politicians representing Muslim and non-Muslim voices. Whilst the four speakers can form a shared group of elite politicians, it would be significant to scrutinise how they belong to different groups that usually split along religious, political and ideological lines. Following Fairclough's (2003: 203) proposal that CDA studies 'how societies work and produce both beneficial and detrimental effects, and how these detrimental effects can be mitigated or eliminated', it was important to look at speeches that reproduce inequalities in society and ones that draw on elements of challenging and questioning unequal power relations.

The aim of this chapter is to examine the linguistic and ideological construction of the religion and its adherents, then speculations about possible explanations or implications of findings will be offered. It should be noted, however, that although I draw on four entire speeches that I chose to analyse, I particularly focus on parts that are relevant to my research topic. The UNGA speeches, as established in previous chapters, deal with issues of importance for the speaker (and the state he represents) while I am only interested in the sections that contain patterns of representing Islam and Muslims.

The linguistically grounded analysis of political language offered in this chapter aims to provide a socio-political perspective on the studied speeches through elucidating a set of discursive strategies employed to construct identities of different social and political actors (e.g. groups, parties, and states) according to particular

political agenda of various speakers. To deliver a comprehensive analysis, I make use of many predefined taxonomies of linguistic tools available in the CDA literature (e.g. Reisigl and Wodak 2016 five discursive strategies, van Leeuwen's 2007 legitimation strategies[73], among other notions outlined in chapter 4). I aim to analyse the chosen four speeches in order to understand (a) the ways in which each speaker constructed his views around Islam and Muslims (b) the discursive topics and subtopics of his debate around the religion and its adherents (c) the discursive and argumentation strategies employed in the speeches, and finally (d) the significance of certain word choices at the micro-level. My analysis of each political speech begins with notes about the socio-political context of the speech, potential geopolitical interests of the speaker, then reasons behind selecting the speech for analysis.

[73] Van Leeuwen 2007 proposed authorisation, moral evaluation, rationalisation and mythopoesis as four legitimation strategies used by political actors to justify a certain political agenda.

6.2. PRIME MINISTER BENJAMIN NETANYAHU'S ADDRESS

6.2.1. Transcript of the speech

United Nations General Assembly Hall
New York City, New York
29 September 2014

Thank you Mr. President,

Distinguished delegates,

I come here from Jerusalem to speak on behalf of my people, the people of Israel. I have come to speak about the dangers we face and about the opportunities we seek. I have come to expose the brazen lies spoken from this very rostrum about my country and the brave soldiers who defend it.

The people of Israel pray for peace, but our hopes for peace, and those of the world, are in danger, because everywhere we look militant Islam is on the march. It is not militants; it is not Islam; it is militant Islam, and typically, its first victims are other Muslims. But it spares no one. Christians, Jews, Yazidis, Kurds — no creed, no faith, no ethnic group is beyond its sights, and it is rapidly spreading in every part of the world. We know the famous American saying "All politics is local". For the militant Islamists, all politics is global, because their ultimate goal is to dominate the world.

Now that threat might seem exaggerated to some, since it starts out small, like a cancer that attacks a particular part of the body. But left unchecked, the cancer grows, metastasizing over wider and wider areas. To protect the peace and security of the world, we must remove that cancer before it is too late. Last week, many of the countries represented here rightly applauded President Obama for leading the effort to confront the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham (ISIS); and yet weeks before, some of those same countries — the same countries that now support confronting ISIS — opposed Israel for confronting Hamas. Evidently, they do not understand that ISIS and Hamas are branches of the same poisonous tree.

ISIS and Hamas share a fanatical creed that they both seek to impose well beyond the territory under their control. Let us listen to what ISIS's self-declared Caliph, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, said two months ago. He said that the day would soon come when the Muslim would walk everywhere as a master, and that Muslims would cause the world to hear and understand the meaning of terrorism, and destroy the idol of democracy. Now let us listen to Khaled Mashal, the leader of Hamas. He proclaims a similar vision of the future. "We say this to the West", he says. "By Allah it will be defeated, and tomorrow our nation will sit on the throne of the world".

As its Charter makes clear, Hamas's immediate goal is to destroy Israel; but it has a broader objective. It also wants a caliphate. Hamas shares the global ambitions of its fellow militant Islamists, and that is why its supporters cheered wildly in the streets of Gaza when thousands of Americans were murdered on 9/11. That is why its leaders condemned the United States for killing Osama Bin Laden, whom

they praised as a holy warrior. When it comes to their ultimate goals, therefore, Hamas is ISIS and ISIS is Hamas.

And what they share in common, all militant Islamists share in common — Boko Haram in Nigeria, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, Hizbullah in Lebanon, Al-Nusra in Syria, the Al-Mahdi Army in Iraq and the Al-Qaida branches in Yemen, Libya, the Philippines, India and elsewhere. Some are radical Sunnis, some are radical Shiites. Some want to restore a pre-medieval caliphate from the seventh century. Others want to trigger the apocalyptic return of an imam from the ninth century.

They operate in different lands. They target different victims. They even kill each other in their battle for supremacy. But they all share a fanatic ideology. They all seek to create ever expanding enclaves of militant Islam, where there is no freedom and no tolerance, where women are treated as chattel, Christians are decimated and minorities are subjugated, and sometimes given the stark choice: convert or die. For them, anyone can be considered an infidel, including fellow Muslims.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Militant Islam's ambition to dominate the world seems mad, but so too did the global ambitions of another fanatic ideology that swept into power eight decades ago. The Nazis believed in a master race. The militant Islamists believe in a master faith. They just disagree as to who among them will be the master of the master faith. That is what they truly disagree about. Therefore, the question before us is whether militant Islam will have the power to realize its unbridled ambitions.

There is one place where that could soon happen — the Islamic State of Iran. For 35 years, Iran has relentlessly pursued the global mission that was set forth by its founding ruler, Ayatollah Khomeini, with the following words:

"We will export our revolution to the entire world, until the cry 'There is no God but Allah' will echo throughout the world over".

Ever since, the regime's brutal enforcers, Iran's Revolutionary Guards, have done exactly that. Let us listen to its current commander, General Mohammad Ali Jafari, who clearly stated that goal:

"Our Imam did not limit the Islamic Revolution to this country. Our duty is to prepare the way for an Islamic world Government."

Iran's president, Mr. Rouhani, stood here last week and shed crocodile tears over what he called the globalization of terrorism. Maybe he should spare us those phony tears and have a word instead with the commanders of Iran's Revolutionary Guards. He could ask them to call off Iran's global terror campaign, which has included attacks in two dozen countries on five continents since 2011 alone. To say that Iran does not practice terrorism is like saying Derek Jeter never played shortstop for the New York Yankees. The bemoaning by the Iranian President of the spread of terrorism has got to be one of history's greatest displays of double talk.

Some argue that Iran's global terror campaign — its subversion of countries throughout the Middle East and well beyond the Middle East — is the work of the extremists. They say that things are changing. They point to last year's election in Iran. They claim that Iran's smooth-talking President and Foreign Minister have changed not only the tone of Iran's foreign policy but also its substance. They believe that Rouhani and Zarif generally want to reconcile with the West, that they have abandoned the global mission of the Islamic Revolution. Really?

So let us look at what Foreign Minister Zarif wrote in his book just a few years ago:

"We have a fundamental problem with the West, and especially with America. This is because we are heirs to a global mission which is tied to our raison d'être".

A global mission which is tied to our very reason for being? Then Zarif asks a question — an interesting question, in my view. He says, "How come Malaysia" — referring to an overwhelmingly Muslim country — "does not have similar problems?" Then he answers: "Because Malaysia is not trying to change the international order". That is our moderate.

So let us not be fooled by Iran's manipulative charm offensive. It is designed for one purpose and one purpose only — to have the sanctions lifted and the obstacles to Iran's path to the bomb removed. The Islamic Republic is now trying to bamboozle its way to an agreement that will remove the sanctions it still faces and leave it with the capacity of thousands of centrifuges to enrich uranium. That would effectively cement Iran's place as a threshold military nuclear Power. In the future, at the time of its choosing, Iran, the world's most dangerous regime, in the world's most dangerous region, would obtain the world's most dangerous weapons. Allowing that to happen would pose the gravest threat to us all.

It is one thing to confront militant Islamists on pickup trucks armed with Kalashnikov rifles. It is another thing to confront militant Islamists armed with weapons of mass destruction. I remember that last year everyone here was rightly concerned about the chemical weapons in Syria, including the possibility that they would fall into the hands of terrorists. Well, that did not happen, and President Obama deserves great credit for leading the diplomatic effort to dismantle virtually all of Syria's chemical weapons capability. We can only imagine how much more dangerous the Islamic State — ISIS — would be if it possessed chemical weapons. Now, imagine how much more dangerous the Islamic State of Iran would be if it possessed nuclear weapons.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Would you let ISIS enrich uranium? Would you let ISIS build a heavy-water reactor? Would you let ISIS develop intercontinental ballistic missiles? Of course you would not. Then you must not let the Islamic State of Iran do those things either, because if you do, here is what will happen. Once Iran produces atomic bombs, all the charms and all the smiles will suddenly disappear — they will just

vanish. It is then that the ayatollahs will show their true face and unleash their aggressive fanaticism on the entire world.

There is only one responsible course of action to address this threat. Iran's nuclear military capabilities must be fully dismantled (applause). Make no mistake — ISIS must be defeated, but to defeat ISIS and leave Iran as a threshold nuclear Power is to win the battle and lose the war (applause).

Ladies and gentlemen,

The fight against militant Islam is indivisible. When militant Islam succeeds anywhere, it is emboldened everywhere. When it suffers a blow in one place, it is set back in every place. That is why Israel's fight against Hamas is not just our fight; it is everyone's fight. Israel is fighting a fanaticism today that other countries may be forced to fight tomorrow. For 50 days this past summer, Hamas fired thousands of rockets at Israel, many of them supplied by Iran. I want you to think about what their countries would do if thousands of rockets were fired at your cities. Imagine millions of your citizens having seconds at most to scramble to bomb shelters, day after day. Members would not let terrorists fire rockets at your cities with impunity, nor would they let terrorists dig dozens of terror tunnels under your borders to infiltrate your towns in order to murder and kidnap your citizens. Israel justly defended itself against both rocket attacks and terror tunnels (applause).

Yet Israel faced another challenge. We faced a propaganda war because, in an attempt to win the world's sympathy, Hamas cynically used Palestinian civilians as human shields. It used schools — not just schools, United Nations schools — private homes, mosques and even hospitals to store and fire rockets at Israel. As Israel surgically struck at the rocket launchers and at the tunnels, Palestinian civilians were tragically but unintentionally killed. There are heartrending images that resulted, and these fuelled libellous charges that Israel was deliberately targeting civilians. We were not. We deeply regret every single civilian casualty.

And the truth is, Israel was doing everything to minimize Palestinian civilian casualties. Hamas was doing everything to maximize Israeli civilian casualties and Palestinian civilian casualties. Israel dropped flyers, made phone calls, sent text messages, broadcast warnings in Arabic on Palestinian television — all this to enable Palestinian civilians to evacuate targeted areas. No other country and no other army in history have gone to greater lengths to avoid casualties among the civilian population of their enemies (applause).

Such concern for Palestinian life was all the more remarkable given that Israeli civilians were being bombarded by rockets, day after day, night after night. And as their families were being rocketed by Hamas, Israel's citizen army, the brave soldiers of the Israel Defense Forces, our young boys and girls, upheld the highest moral values of any army in the world (applause). Israel's soldiers deserve not condemnation but admiration — admiration from decent people everywhere (applause).

Here is what Hamas did. Hamas embedded its missile batteries in residential areas and told Palestinians to ignore Israel's warnings to leave. And just in case people did not get the message, they executed Palestinian civilians in Gaza who dared to protest. And, no less reprehensible, Hamas deliberately placed its rockets where Palestinian children live and play.

Let me show the Assembly a photograph. It was taken by a France 24 crew during the recent conflict. It shows two Hamas rocket launchers, which were used to attack us. Three children can be seen playing next to them. Hamas deliberately put its rockets in hundreds of residential areas like this — hundreds of them. That is a war crime. I say to President Abbas, these are the crimes — the war crimes — committed by his Hamas partners in the national unity Government which he heads and for which he is responsible. These are the real war crimes he should have investigated or spoken out against from this rostrum last week (applause).

As Israel's children huddle in bomb shelters and Israel's Iron Dome missile defence knocked Hamas rockets out of the sky, the profound moral difference between Israel and Hamas could not have been clearer. Israel was using its missiles to protect its children; Hamas was using its children to protect its missiles (applause).

By investigating Israel rather than Hamas for war crimes, the United Nations Human Rights Council has betrayed its noble mission to protect the innocent. In fact, what it is doing is to turn the laws of war upside down. Israel, which took unprecedented steps to minimize civilian casualties, is condemned; Hamas, which both targeted and hid behind civilians — that is a double war crime — is given a pass. The Human Rights Council is thus sending a clear message to terrorists everywhere: "Use civilians as a human shield. Use them again and again and again." And you know why? Because, sadly, it works. By granting international legitimacy to the use of human shields, the Human Rights Council has thus become a terrorist rights council, and it will have repercussions — it probably already has — in terms of the use of civilians as human shields. It is not just our interests; it is not our values that are under attack: it is your interests and your values.

We live in a world steeped in tyranny and terror, where gays are hanged from cranes in Tehran, political prisoners are executed in Gaza, young girls are abducted en masse in Nigeria and hundreds of thousands are butchered in Syria, Libya and Iraq, yet nearly half – nearly half of the UN Human Rights Council's resolutions focusing on a single country have been directed against Israel — the one true democracy in the Middle East; Israel, where issues are openly debated in a boisterous Parliament, where human rights are protected by independent courts, and where women, gays and minorities live in a genuinely free society.

The biased treatment of Israel by the Human Rights Council — that is a misnomer, but I will use it just the same — is only one manifestation of the return of one of the world's oldest prejudices. We hear mobs today in Europe calling for the gassing of Jews. We hear some national leaders compare Israel to the Nazis. This

is not a function of Israel's policies; it is a function of diseased minds, and that disease has a name. It is called anti-Semitism. It is now spreading in polite society where it masquerades as legitimate criticism of Israel. For centuries, the Jewish people have been demonized with blood libels and charges of deicide. Today, the Jewish State is demonized with the apartheid libel and charges of genocide (genocide).

In what moral universe does genocide include warning the enemy civilian population to get out of harm's way or ensuring that they receive tons (tons) of humanitarian aid each day, even as thousands of rockets are being fired at us, or setting up a field hospital to aid their wounded? I suppose it is the same moral universe in which a man who wrote a dissertation of lies about the Holocaust and who insists on a Palestine free of Jews — Judenrein — can stand at this rostrum and shamelessly accuse Israel of genocide and ethnic cleansing. In the past, outrageous lies against the Jews were the precursors to the wholesale slaughter of our people. But no more; today, we the Jewish people have the power to defend ourselves. We will defend ourselves against our enemies on the battlefield (applause) and we will expose their lies against us in the court of public opinion. Israel will continue to stand proud and unbowed (applause).

Despite the enormous challenges facing Israel, I believe we have a historic opportunity. After decades of seeing Israel as their enemy, leading States in the Arab world increasingly recognize that together we and they face many of the same dangers. Principally, that means a nuclear-armed Iran and militant Islamist movements gaining ground in the Sunni world. Our challenge is to transform those common interests in order to create a productive partnership that would build a more secure, peaceful and prosperous Middle East. Together we can strengthen regional security. We can advance projects in water, agriculture, transportation, health care, energy and so many other fields.

I believe that the partnership between us can also help facilitate peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Many have long assumed that an Israeli-Palestinian peace can help facilitate a broader rapprochement between Israel and the Arab world. But I believe that, these days, it may work the other way around, namely, that a broader rapprochement between Israel and the Arab world may help facilitate an Israeli-Palestinian peace. Therefore, to achieve that peace, we must look not only to Jerusalem and Ramallah but also to Cairo, Amman, Abu Dhabi, Riyadh and elsewhere. I believe that peace could be realized with the active involvement of Arab countries that are willing to provide political, material and other indispensable support.

I am ready to make a historic compromise, and not because Israel occupies a foreign land. The people of Israel are not occupiers in the land of Israel. History, archaeology and common sense all make clear that we have had a singular attachment to this land for over 3,000 years. I want peace because I want to create a better future for my people. But it must be a genuine peace, one that is anchored in mutual recognition and enduring security arrangements — rock-solid security arrangements — on the ground. Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon and Gaza

created two militant Islamic enclaves on our borders from which tens of thousands of rockets have been fired at Israel. Those sobering experiences heightens Israel's security concerns regarding potential territorial concessions in the future.

Those security concerns are even greater today. Let us just look around. The Middle East is in chaos. States are disintegrating, and militant Islamists are filling the void. Israel cannot have territories from which it withdraws taken over by Islamic militants yet again, as happened in Gaza and Lebanon. That would place the likes of ISIS within mortar range, a few miles of 80 per cent of our population. Think about that. The distance between the 1967 lines and the suburbs of Tel Aviv is similar to the distance between United Nations Headquarters and Times Square. Israel is a tiny country. That is why in any peace agreement, which will obviously necessitate a territorial compromise, I will always insist that Israel be able to defend itself, by itself, against any threat (applause).

Yet despite everything that has happened, some still do not take Israel's security concerns seriously, but I do and I always will. That is because as Prime Minister of Israel I am entrusted with the awesome responsibility of ensuring the future of the Jewish people and the future of the Jewish State. No matter what pressure is brought to bear, I will never waver in fulfilling that responsibility.

I believe that with a fresh approach on the part of our neighbours, we can advance peace despite the difficulties we face. In Israel, we have a record of making the impossible possible. We have made a desolate land flourish, and with very few natural resources we have used the fertile minds of our people to turn Israel into a global centre of technology and innovation. Peace would enable Israel to realize its full potential and to bring a promising future not only to our people and not only to the Palestinian people, but to many, many others in our region. But the old template for peace must be updated. It must take into account new realities and new roles and responsibilities for our Arab neighbours.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

There is a new Middle East. It presents new dangers but also new opportunities. Israel is prepared to work with Arab partners and the international community to confront those dangers and to seize those opportunities. Together, we must recognize the global threat of militant Islam, the primacy of dismantling Iran's nuclear weapons capability, and the indispensable role of Arab States in advancing peace with the Palestinians. All that may fly in the face of conventional wisdom, but it is the truth. And the truth must always be spoken, especially in the United Nations. Isaiah, a great prophet of peace, taught us nearly 3,000 years ago in Jerusalem to speak truth to power. He said:

"For the sake of Zion, I will not be silent. For the sake of Jerusalem, I will not be still until her justice shines bright and her salvation glows like a flaming torch".

Let us light a torch of truth and justice to safeguard our common future. (Applause).

6.2.2. Analysis of the speech

The first speech analysed in this chapter is by Benjamin Netanyahu (the PM of Israel since March 2009, a member of the Knesset and Chairman of the right-wing Likud party). As is the case with other speeches investigated in this chapter, this speech is an example of a carefully crafted political address delivered at the UNGA high-level sessions between 2013-2016. Within this time span, Netanyahu represented Israel in all four sessions but what makes the speech delivered on 29 September 2014 of particular interest is the speaker's intensive focus on Muslim groups in the context of the dangers that threaten Israel's future. Statistically speaking, this speech referenced the lemmata[74] ISLAM and MUSLIM a total of *twenty-eight* times out of the *forty-six* times they appeared in the four addresses which the PM delivered between 2013-2016.

As far as the wider socio-political context is concerned, this speech was delivered three days after the Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas addressed the UNGA accusing Israel of leading a 'war of genocide' in Gaza over the summer of 2014. The speech also comes at a time when world leaders are concerned about the continuing dangerous rise of militant extremism. Another major concern in this speech is Iran's nuclear programme and the then on-going negotiations between Iran and certain Western powers (including the USA and some of its European allies). This last frame is not surprising to followers of Netanyahu's political discourse. Orossová (2016: 10) observes that nuclear-armed Iran 'characterizes one of the most important points made by Benjamin Netanyahu in the vast majority of the speeches he gave in front of an international foreign audience since he was inaugurated into the Israeli Prime Minister's office on 31st March 2009'. Broadly speaking, Netanyahu devoted this speech to address two major macro-topics: 'militant Islam' and 'peace' from an Israeli perspective. Throughout, these two topics were linked to other sub-topics that fed into but also supported the speaker's thread of arguments. *Table 6.1* below demonstrates the general organisation of the speech in terms of topicality:

[74] From the singular 'lemma' which means 'a set of word forms consisting of a basic uninflected form and its inflectional variants' (Hoffmann et al., 2008: 40-41).

Table 6.1: Topicality[75] analysis of Netanyahu's 2014 address at the UNGA

Line No.	Discussed Themes
1	Thanking the president of the session
2-6	Greetings and introductory remarks outlining the two major themes the speaker is addressing: • 'The dangers we face' – reference to militant Islam (ISIS, Hamas and Iran) • The opportunities we seek' – Establishing peace in the Middle East region.
7-14	Discussing the first enemy ('militant Islam') – Reference to **ISIS**.
15-39	Discussing the second enemy ('militant Islam') – Reference to **Hamas** 'ISIS and Hamas are branches of the same poisonous tree' (line 23)
40-59	Discussing the monolithic and indivisible ideology of 'militant Islamists'
60-125	Discussing the third enemy ('militant Islam') – Reference to **Iran** 97-103 Articulating the speaker's stance towards nuclear negotiations between Iran and world powers.
127-174	Discussing Gaza's 51-day war 127-130 'Israel's fight against Hamas is everyone's fight' 131-132 Connections between Hamas and Iran 140-142 The role of propaganda during Gaza war 148-161 Defending Israel's military strategy 162-174 Accusing Hamas of using civilians as human shields (Using a photograph as a visual aid)
175-222	Discussing anti-Semitism and Criticising the United Nations for its positions against Israel • Portraying the United Nations Human Rights Council as 'a terrorist council' (line 189) • Confirming Israel's ability to defend itself militarily
223-289	Suggesting solutions to the conflict in the region (Israeli Palestinian conflict). • Calling on neighbouring 'Arab states' to enhance cooperation with Israel at multiple levels (water projects, agriculture, transportation, health care, energy and security) • Israel's willingness to compromise in order to build a better future

In this speech, an effort is made to depict the three enemies of the state of Israel (i.e. ISIS, Hamas and Iran) as 'branches of the same poisonous tree' (line 23). By doing

[75] Topicality here refers to the identification of topics and sub-topics in the speech.

so, the PM (a) benefits from the already established notorious image of ISIS and (b) easily combines regional opponents as an extended out-group that threatens the existence of Israel. Lazar and Lazar (2004: 239) point out that politicians conflate different kinds and degrees of threat 'to constitute a largely undifferentiated enemy – an easy slippage from "they are different from us" to "they are all the same"'. In this manner, the speaker produced polarising frameworks in the representation of in and out groups through the attribution of positive/negative qualities to different social actors. On the one hand, ISIS, Hamas and Iran are 'branches of the same poisonous tree' (line 23). Israel, on the other hand, is portrayed as seeking 'peace' (lines 229, 232, 234, 237, 245 and 246) and suffering local and regional challenges caused by 'militant Islam' as well as an international conspiracy of a UN 'terrorist rights council' (lines 189).

While it does not come as a surprise that Netanyahu uses the adjective 'terrorist' to describe a group like ISIS, his use of the same adjective to describe an organ of the United Nations (i.e. the United Nations Human Rights Council) is particularly noteworthy. I argue this particular use of the term 'terrorist' aims to achieve a political effect and reflects how the term 'has become an essentially contested concept, one whose meaning lends itself to endless dispute but no resolution' (Weinberg et al. 2004: 778). Using this nomination, the UNHRC becomes part of the out-group whose role is especially criticised. In this way, Netanyahu uses a foregrounding strategy by which he emphasises discussions about the enemies as the locus of the speech in an attempt to sidestep tackling criticism directed at the Israeli government actions throughout its war against Gaza.

The other macro-topic which underlies the speech is *peace* and the circumstances that would lead to a state of peace in the Middle East from Netanyahu's perspective. Within this theme, it is noted that in many instances *peace,* which is used a total of 17 times, appeared in contexts of justifying war, e.g. 'to protect peace and security of the world, we must remove that cancer[76] before it is too late' (lines 17-18). Reference to peace in such context becomes a war-normalising discursive strategy which targets incorporating the rhetoric of war as an integral part of the process that leads to peace. Gavriely-Nuri (2014) who deconstructed the discursive strategies used by various Israeli high-level representatives claims that many Israeli officials use what she termed *Peace in the Service of War (PSW)* rhetoric in the speeches delivered at times of war.

She postulates that, in general, PSW discourse 'aims at justifying and legitimizing war through the use of a series of discursive strategies that create various pseudo-

[76] The significance of employing the metaphor of 'cancer' is discussed later in the analysis as a carrier of meaning across various cognitive domains through analogical extension.

logical connections between war and peace, such as arguing that the initiation of war is essential for making or reinstating peace' (p. 2). Whilst Gavriely-Nuri's study propounds that the Israeli 'just war' rhetoric is a politico-cultural phenomenon, this strategy of 'masking war with peace' has historically been used by politicians to justify involvement in the use of military force. Morek and Pincus (2000) studied war-declaration speeches, announcing the outbreak of World War I and World War II and drew on similarities found in Hitler, Wilson, Mussolini and Roosevelt's justifications of war by means of: (a) deemphasising the misery caused by wars and (b) drawing an idealistic view of a peaceful future following a war, for example Mussolini's promise 'to give peace and justice to Italy, Europe and the world' and Wilson's promise of 'the war to end all wars'.

Following Reisigl and Wodak's (2009: 90) suggestion that 'discourses are open and often hybrid; new sub-topics can be created at many points', analyses of this speech demonstrate how the Israeli PM operationalised a number of intersecting sub-topics that fall under two major discourse topics (i.e. 'militant Islam' and 'peace'). Identifying the discourse topics, which I do for the four analysed speeches, is a macro-level analytical category that aims to understand how the management of topics can be part of manipulating ideology to varying degrees. Put differently, discourse topics are entry points for understanding the control over what is made available within a particular socio-political context. *Table 6.2* below outlines the interdiscursive relations and overlapping discourse topics that can be drawn out from Netanyahu's speech:

Table 6.2: The interdiscursive relationships and overlapping discourse topics on 'militant Islam' and 'peace'.

'Militant Islam'	**Intersecting Topics**	**'Peace'**
Discourse Topic 1:	Discourse Topic 2:	Discourse Topic 3:
Countering ISIS	Ideology of 'militant Islam'	Calling on leading Arab states to enhance relations with Israel
Discourse Topic 4:	Topic Discourse 5:	Discourse Topic 6:
Countering Hamas	Criticising the UNHRC and the UN's stance towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict	Gaza war and the need to take Israel's security seriously
Discourse Topic 7:	Discourse Topic 8:	Discourse Topic 9:
Countering Iran	Anti-Semitism	Nuclear negotiations between Iran and world powers

Looking at the above table which is structured on the basis of topicality, it becomes possible to deconstruct the ways in which the PM linked his discussions around 'militant Islam' ideologies, criticising the UNHR and anti-Semitism to formulate conclusions on how the three worked together to give rise to militancy and impeded the peace process. The discourse topics outlined in the previous table are ideologically conflated together to form a highly-centralised worldview.

Initial corpus-assisted analyses using the software package *Sketch Engine* show that Netanyahu referred to the lemma ISLAM i.e. *Islam* or *Islamist(s)* 17 times in this address. *Figures 6.1* and *6.2* are visual representations of the collocational behaviour of the words *Islam* and *Islamist(s)* in the speech. The size of words and coloured circles around *Islam* in *figure 6.1* and *Islamist(s)* in *figure 6.2* is indicative of the frequency of co-occurrence with other words. The adjective *militant* is represented by the largest circle in the two figures meaning that it was the most frequently recurring adjective near the search words *Islam* and *Islamist(s)*.



Figure 6.1: A Sketch visualisation of *Islam*

Figure 6.2.: A Sketch visualisation of *Islamist(s)*

However, in order to gain insights into the contexts in which these terms appear, the following two *figures 6.3* and *6.4* of concordance lines were extracted using the corpus software *Sketch Engine*.



Figure 6.3: Key word in context for the word 'Islam'



Figure 6.4: Key word in context for the word 'Islamist(s)'

As can be seen in the above figures, all mentions of *Islam* and *Islamist(s)* revolved around conflict and militancy. The fact that the adjective *militant* co-occurs near the words *Islam* and *Islamist(s)* almost every time the words are used is indicative of a negative discourse prosody. Such concentrated collocational use of *militant* and *Islam* gives the implication that Islam as a religion is explicitly linked with militancy and thus enforces a certain semantic frame. Lakoff (2016) argues that using words like radical near the words Islam or Muslims is a misnomer that can impose a particular framing 'suggesting that terrorism is built into the religion itself'. I argue the adjective 'militant' would invoke a similar frame.

However, line 2 in *figure 6.3* above illustrates how Netanyahu attempted not to conflate 'Islam' with 'terrorism' or 'militancy' through his opening statement: '… everywhere we look militant Islam is on the march. It is not militants; it is not Islam; it is militant Islam' (lines 8-9). Although, on a superficial level, the PM is offering a disclaimer that the problem is not with Islam itself, this statement functions as a mitigation strategy in avoidance of the possibility that arguments about 'militant Islam' be interpreted as hostile towards the religion itself. In fact, even when the speaker declares that the problem is not with Islam, 'when we negate a frame, we evoke the frame' Lakoff (2004: 3). Responsibility in

representing others in discourse, Lakoff continues, 'begins with empathy, the ability to understand others and feel what they feel' (ibid, 62). In a similar vein, McWhorter (2015: 2) clarifies that:

> Attributing group traits to individuals is a deeply seated psychological habit. When a person is unfamiliar, we are less likely to process them as an individual than we are to seek to classify them into some higher category. Implicit Association tests, most famous these days as revealing that black people are more readily associated with negative words than positive ones, are ample testament to this. Stereotyping is almost certainly programmed in our genes. Once it may have been a useful defence mechanism, but today it is disadvantageous as often as it is useful.

Therefore, such debated constructions of the image of Islam in Netanyahu's speech on what he termed 'militant Islam' must be challenged by pointing out the misconceptions contained within his depictions of different social actors. Using nominations like 'militant Islam' can be ineffective and loosely referring to every opposing force[77] as 'terrorist' can be practically counter-productive. Malik (2004: 9) warns that 'subtle forms [of Islamophobia] amongst the educated and well-placed elite are well-entrenched and proportionately more dangerous … [because] the elite formulates and disseminates racism to the grassroots, where it becomes more explicit and violent'.

In this speech, emphasis on the construction of a negative *Other* as the imminent threat allowed the speaker to de-legitimise the enemy while simultaneously facilitating a mission of legitimising the *Self* position. Netanyahu depicts a dichotomisation of dually constructed homogenous/unified '*us*' versus a homogenous/unified '*them*' via conflating particular actors which in his view belong to the category of 'our enemies' (line 220). Such categorisation is strategically employed to explicitly group the bad other paving the way for constructing the absolute right self. Consider the following quotes taken from the speech:

- 'For the militant Islamists, all politics is global, because their ultimate goal is to dominate the world' **(lines 13-14).**
- 'The same countries that now support confronting ISIS — opposed Israel for confronting Hamas. Evidently, they do not understand that ISIS and Hamas are branches of the same poisonous tree' **(lines 21-23).**
- 'Hamas is ISIS and ISIS is Hamas' **(lines 39)**

[77] Notice Netanyahu's reference to the UNHRC as a 'terrorist council' lines (line 189).

- 'Hamas's immediate goal is to destroy Israel; but it has a broader objective. It also wants a caliphate. Hamas shares the global ambitions of its fellow militant Islamists' **(lines 33-35)**
- 'And what they share in common, all militant Islamists share in common — Boko Haram in Nigeria, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, Hizbullah in Lebanon, Al-Nusra in Syria, the Al-Mahdi Army in Iraq and the Al-Qaida branches in Yemen, Libya, the Philippines, India and elsewhere. Some are radical Sunnis, some are radical Shiites. Some want to restore a pre-medieval caliphate from the seventh century. Others want to trigger the apocalyptic return of an imam from the ninth century.' **(lines 40-45).**
- 'To say that Iran does not practice terrorism is like saying Derek Jeter never played shortstop for the New York Yankees' **(lines 75-76)**.
- We can only imagine how much more dangerous the Islamic State — ISIS — would be if it possessed chemical weapons. Now, imagine how much more dangerous the Islamic State of Iran would be if it possessed nuclear weapons **(lines 110-113).**
- Principally, that means a nuclear-armed Iran and militant Islamist movements gaining ground in the Sunni world **(lines 226-227).**

In these statements, the speaker employed a referential/predicational strategy of calling his enemies by names that denote predications of negative *Other* presentations. This is most obvious in his use of phrases like 'radical Sunnis' referring to Hamas and 'radical Shiites' referring to Iran puts forward predicational assumptions communicating ideologically induced evaluations about these political actors. Another example is the systematic repetitive reference to Iran as 'the Islamic State of Iran' (line 60, 112-113, 117) instead of its actual name, the Islamic Republic of Iran. This nominalisation strategy aims at blurring the differences between two different actors - the notorious ISIS and the country of Iran - meshing one into the other. The frequency and quality of references to a positive (legitimate) S*elf* and a negative (de-legitimised) *Other* are evident in the PM linguistic choices. An obvious example is when the speaker discussed the ideology of 'militant Islam' in ways that serve his attempt to delegitimise the enemies who 'all share a fanatic ideology' (line 47) and 'believe in a master faith' (lines 56-57) in a way similar to how 'Nazis believed in a master race' (line 65). On a micro-linguistic level, the use of personal pronouns (e.g. I, we, us, our) and third-person pronouns (e.g. they, their, them) manifests a dichotomous referential strategy.

In the above quote, Netanyahu conflates different political actors (e.g. ISIS, Hamas and Iran) disregarding any differences amongst them or any resulting inaccuracies for the purpose of attributing an entire spectrum of negative characterisations to the three entities together. Leading from the work of Hodges (2011) who employed CDA to demonstrate how US presidential political speeches discursively

constructed the two dissimilar enemies Iraq and Al-Qaeda as 'interchangeable adversaries' (p. 16). Similarly, I argue that in this speech Netanyahu is discursively positioning ISIS, Hamas and Iran as interchangeable and equal security threats that demand the same kind of defensive response.

As part of the *Self* legitimising rhetoric, Netanyahu emphasised his political position as a PM of Israel in ways that entail that he is entitled to speak on behalf of 'the Jewish people' (lines 207-208, 219 and 265) and 'the Jewish State' (line 265). The purpose here is to establish a presupposition[78] of widespread backing and grassroots legitimacy.

> That is because as Prime Minister of Israel I am ***entrusted with the awesome responsibility*** of ensuring the future of the ***Jewish people*** and the future of the ***Jewish State***. No matter what pressure is brought to bear, I will never waver in fulfilling that responsibility.
>
> **(lines 263-266)**

It is also possible to see another presupposition strategy in the discursive construction of the *Self*, which is the inclusion of other groups who assumingly share the speaker's views. Richardson (2007: 64) maintains that by using nominal presuppositions particular hidden meanings can be detected which are not directly apparent in the text. *Table 6.3* below illustrates some ways in which Netanyahu used his role as a PM of the Israeli government to legitimise his views in various instances:

[78] According to Richardson (2007: 63) a presupposition is 'a taken for granted, implicit claim embedded within explicit meanings of a text or utterance'.

Table 6.3: Referential legitimisation strategies employed in Netanyahu's address

Legitimisation Strategy	Discursive Patterns	Line(s)
Speaking on behalf of Israel and the Jewish people	Yet Israel faced another challenge. **We** faced a propaganda war…	Line 140
	as Prime Minister of Israel I am ***entrusted with the awesome responsibility*** of ensuring the future of the ***Jewish people*** and the future of the ***Jewish State***.	Lines 263-265
	But no more; today, **we the Jewish people** have the power to defend ourselves	Lines 219-220
Speaking on behalf of the UN member states and/or creating an in-group with Arab neighbouring countries	**We** live in a world steeped in tyranny and terror.	Line 193
	I believe **we** have a historic opportunity *(referring to Arab countries in the region)*	Lines 223-224
	We can advance peace despite the difficulties **we face** *(referring to Arab countries in the region)*	Lines 267-268

Netanyahu extensively used the deictic first-person pronoun 'we' (31 times throughout the speech) as: (a) a legitimising tool to unite himself with his audience, (b) a way to share responsibility for policy and action with actors he believes should join the efforts of the Israeli government (including Arab allies) and (c) a tactic to emphasise the power of the state of Israel. 'We' in the speech was used to refer 'Jewish people', 'Israeli government', 'UN member states', 'Israel and its Arab neighbouring countries' and in particular cases to other possible referents like 'everyone who believes in justice'. In this context, Volmert's (1989: 123) cited in (Wodak et al. 1999) emphasises that:

> A speaker can unite himself and his audience into a single 'community sharing a common destiny' by letting fall into oblivion all differences in origin, confession, class and lifestyle with a simple 'we'.

At the micro-linguistic level, another discursive strategy that Netanyahu used to make his speech deserving special attention is the integration of vocabulary and linguistic tools that emphasise the imminence of the threat and the need for rapid and urgent action or what is called in DHA a *topos of urgency*. In a *topos of urgency*, an argument is constructed as follows: Decisions have to be made or actions have to be taken very quickly for the urgency of the situation. In many places, the PM urged the international community (especially the UNGA member states) to act

immediately to defeat the threat of 'militant Islam'. *Table 6.4* below outlines some patterns of urgency in the speech which are employed as a meaning intensifying strategy.

Table 6.4: Lexical items used by Netanyahu to indicate urgency

Number	Pattern	Line(s)
1	***Must*** (used 10 times)	18, 117, 123, 124, 237, 246, 274 (twice), 279, 283.
2	I believe We have ***a historic opportunity***	223-224
3	I am ***ready to make a historic compromise***	242
4	The Islamic republic of Iran ***is now trying to bamboozle its way to an agreement***	97-98
5	But left unchecked, ***the cancer grows, metastasizing over wider and wider areas.***	16-17
6	Would you let ISIS enrich uranium? ***…then you must not let the Islamic State of Iran*** do those things either.	115-118

Argumentatively, it can be noted that the discourse on 'militant Islam' in Netanyahu's speech understands a three-fold political threat:

- **ISIS**: which 'spares no one' (10) and 'is rapidly spreading in every part of the world' (11-12).
- **Iran**: as a 'threshold nuclear power' (124) that 'practice terrorism' (75) and which is 'the world's most dangerous regime' (101).
- **Hamas**: which shares with ISIS a 'fanatical creed … to impose well beyond the territory under its control' (24-25) and whose ultimate goal is 'to destroy Israel' (33).

The three actors (ISIS, Iran and Hamas) are linked in order to victimise Israel through forming out-groups that pose an existential threat to his state and in his view to the whole world. After constructing these opposing groups and their negative predications like 'radical' (line 43 – twice), 'apocalyptic' (line 45), 'fanatic' (lines 24, 47, 55, 121, 130) and 'brutal' (65), the speaker naturalises a rubric of 'fighting' these three groups as an action beyond criticality and a decision that should be embraced by all UN member states.

Examples of such strategy include statements like 'the fight against militant Islam is indivisible' (127), 'that is why Israel's fight against Hamas is **not just our fight**; **it is everyone's fight**' (129-130) and 'Israel is fighting a fanaticism today that other countries may be forced to fight tomorrow' (130-131). The victimisation discourse was then further linked to the role played by the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) when it sent an independent commission of inquiry to investigate the war crimes committed during the 51-day conflict in Gaza strip. Following the committee's condemnation of the Israeli government's actions, Netanyahu used this speech as a timely opportunity to portray the council as 'a terrorist rights council' (189) that 'betrayed its noble mission to protect the innocent' (181) and turned 'the laws of war upside down' (182). In this manner, Netanyahu is misleadingly *framing*[79] the UNHR as 'terrorist' and is using the two argumentation strategies *Argumentum ad misericordiam*[80] and *Ignoratio elenchi*[81] to sidestep a fact-based argument that counters the UN report which concluded that:

> Israeli forces conducted more than 6,000 airstrikes and fired approximately 50,000 tank and artillery shells at targets within the enclave. The explosion of force used by Israel ultimately resulted in 1,462 Palestinian civilian casualties, a third of which were children. Moreover, the fighting in Gaza also resulted in the massive destruction of civilian infrastructure with some 100,000 residents still homeless.
>
> (UN News Centre, 2015)

In this particular context, Netanyahu uses 'pathos' or *appeal to emotions* rather than counter-arguing the UNHR's claims: The following paragraph (especially the underlined statements) reflects Netanyahu's appeal to emotive language:

> The Human Rights Council is thus sending a clear message to terrorists everywhere: "Use civilians as a human shield. Use them **again and again and again**." And you know why? Because, **sadly**, it works. We live in **a world steeped in tyranny and terror,** where **gays are hanged from cranes** in Tehran, **political prisoners are executed** in Gaza, **young girls are abducted *en masse*** in Nigeria and **hundreds of thousands are butchered** in Syria, Libya and Iraq, yet nearly half – nearly half of the UN Human Rights Council's resolutions focusing on a single country have been directed against Israel **(lines 185-197)**

[79] Goffman (1974: 10-11) defines framing as 'the way a situation is defined based on organisational principles and one's own subjective experience of an event'.

[80] *Argumentum ad misericordiam* refers to the unjustified use of emotions and empathy to sidestep a relevant logical argumentation.

[81] *Ignoratio elenchi* means ignoring the counter-argument through discussing a different thesis irrelevant to the actual discourse.

Another argumentation fallacy that can be seen in the above quote is the victim-victimiser reversals (aka *Trajectio in alium*[82]). Statements like 'use civilians as a human shield' (line 186) and 'political prisoners are executed in Gaza' (line 194) were employed to shift the blame and alleviate the responsibility of killing around 1,462 Palestinian civilian causalities during the war. Finally, in the same context of justifying war, the PM uses appeal to the stick (aka *Argumentum as baculum*[83]) stating that 'today, we the Jewish people have the power to defend ourselves. We will defend ourselves against our enemies on the battlefield' (lines 219-220). Overall, it was apparent that opponents and/or critics of the Israeli government/military policies are consistently labelled as 'terrorists' (line 185), 'biased' (line 201) and 'anti-Semitic' (line 206), whereas the Israeli government and defence forces are portrayed as upholding 'the highest moral values' (lines 158-159), deserving 'admiration' (line 160) and longing for 'peace' (line 232) and 'justice' (line 288). In that sense, audiences are presented with exaggerated binary contrasts between good and evil in an attempt to elude responsibility and 'win the hearts'.

Besides the abovementioned fallacies which were employed as legitimisation and justification strategies, Netanyahu adopted a number of topoi[84] as part of his argumentation schema. Keinpointner (1996) suggested that being able to identify topoi is vital for demystifying superficially convincing arguments in political genres. One problematic premise in the form of a *topos of threat* is explained below:

Table 6.5: Topos of threat – Hamas is as dangerous as ISIS

Topos of Threat	**Definition**	**If certain dangers are observed, one should do something about them**
	Line Number(s)	**24-25**
	Premise	Hamas is as dangerous as ISIS
	Warrant	Since Hamas took over the Gaza Strip in 2007 and since ISIS aims to control areas to establish a caliphate, then they both pose the same kind of threat and should be countered.
	Fallacious Conclusion	*"ISIS and Hamas share a fanatical creed that they both seek to impose well beyond the territory under their control"*

It is observed that the *topos of threat* was a running argumentation thread in the speech which often followed the formula 'if x then y'. This formula allowed the

[82] *Trajectio in alium* is a discursive strategy used to decrease responsibility for taking action and to reverse a victim-victimiser relationship.

[83] *Argumentum as baculum* (or appeal to the stick) is another discursive strategy which justifies forms of force as means of persuasion; fallacies pertaining to this strategy lie in the introduction of force whenever an antagonist refuses to comply with the speaker's wishes.

[84] According to Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 102) topoi are content related warrants or conclusion rules which connect the argument with the conclusion or the central claim and therefore provide justification.

speaker to do two things: (a) unite his opponents as one group that shares the same goals and (b) justify the use of force in fighting the enemy at home (i.e. Hamas). In fact, a huge claim like 'Hamas is ISIS and ISIS is Hamas' is considered a 'fallacy' in the DHA as Netanyahu's argument disregards the two groups' different histories, evolution and ideologies. Mullin-Lery (2008: 269) confirms that Hamas is 'an Islamo-nationalist movement with roots in the Muslim Brotherhood and whose *raison d'etre* lies in its effort to end the Israeli occupation of Palestine'. Mullin also observes that while it is easier within a security paradigm to claim that all Islamist groups are 'fundamentalist' or 'terrorist', it is clear that such view overlooks the non-violent ways through which certain groups 'constitute and affect social movements, and state-society and interstate relations, and are themselves affected by historical/contemporary, oppressive/permissive relationships with other states/nations/peoples' (p. 271). That this decontextualised claim can be made with such confidence is a testament to the power of discourse to distort and disguise facts. In response to this particular fallacy in Netanyahu's speech, Jen Psaki, the US State Department Spokeswoman commented on the conflation in the PM's statement pointing out that although the two organisations 'are both designated terrorist organisations under the United States designations, but certainly we see differences in terms of the threat and otherwise'. She adds 'we don't believe that Prime Minister Netanyahu or anyone else from Israel is suggesting that the United States launch a military campaign against Hamas' (Azulay et al., 2014). Such conflations in the speech offered the media many catchy 'sound-bites' ready-made to be used for coverage (e.g. 'ISIS is Hamas, Hamas is ISIS'[85], 'Netanyahu Links Hamas with ISIS, and Equates ISIS with Iran'[86], UN Human Rights Council a 'terrorist rights council'[87]).

Netanyahu also uses the *topos of burden* in order to suggest that the stance he upholds is the right course of action when it comes to dealing with the Iranian nuclear programme. However, the arguments he uses to suggest 'the only one responsible course of action' is not conciliatory but rather confrontational. Here is an example of how Netanyahu uses the *topos of burden*.

[85] http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/185610

[86] https://www.nytimes.com/news/un-general-assembly/2014/09/29/netanyahu-links-hamas-with-isis-and-equates-isis-with-iran/?_r=0

[87] https://www.jihadwatch.org/2014/09/netanyahu-at-un-un-human-rights-council-a-terrorist-rights-council

Table 6.6: Topos of burden – Iran's nuclear programme and the right course of action

Topos of burden	Definition	If a person, an institution or a country is burdened by specific problems, one should act in order to diminish these burdens (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 76).
	Line Number(s)	**122-125**
	Premise	Holding negotiations with Iran is not a successful policy while dismantling its nuclear military capabilities is the right course of action.
	Warrant	If Iran's nuclear military capabilities are not fully dismantled, Iran will produce atomic bombs and the ayatollahs will show their true face and unleash their aggressive fanaticism on the entire world.
	Fallacious Conclusion	*"There is only one responsible course of action to address this threat. Iran's nuclear military capabilities must be fully dismantled. Make no mistake – ISIS must be defeated, but to defeat ISIS and leave Iran as a threshold nuclear Power is to win the battle and lose the war". (lines 115-118)*

Alongside these fallacious argumentation schemata, Netanyahu employed religious *intertextuality* to reinforce his arguments by means of invoking a voice of authority. Towards the end of the speech, Netanyahu has intertextually referred to the words of Isaiah ben Amoz, an 8th century BCE Jewish prophet who granted his name to the Book of Isaiah[88], to reinforce the idea that there is a continuing mission to encourage Jewish people to return to Jerusalem.

> Isaiah, a great prophet of peace, taught us nearly 3,000 years ago in Jerusalem to speak truth to power. He said: "For the sake of Zion, I will not be silent. For the sake of Jerusalem, I will not be still until her justice shines bright and her salvation glows like a flaming torch". Let us light a torch of truth and justice to safeguard our common future.
>
> **(lines 284-288)**

In this way, the threat that ISIS, Hamas and Iran want to destroy Israel is not unprecedented but rather is portrayed as a mission parallel to the ones narrated about Biblical characters. The speech also used multiple other intertextual references through quoting the words of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, ISIS's self-declared Caliph (lines 25-29); Khaled Mashal, the leader of Hamas (lines 29-32); Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran (lines 60-64); and Muhammad Javad Zarif, the Foreign Minister of Iran (lines 86-89). The purpose of establishing these intertextual relations is to link the three antagonist actors, weaken their standpoints and strengthen the speaker's own argument. For instance, in the

[88] The return of the exiled people from Babylon to Jerusalem is a central theme in chapters 40-55 in Second Isaiah.

following extract Netanyahu borrows two quotes from Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi and Khaled Mashal to intensify a discourse of similarity and proximity between the two:

> Let us listen to what ISIS's self-declared Caliph, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, said two months ago. He said that the day would soon come when the Muslim would walk everywhere as a master, and that Muslims would cause the world to hear and understand the meaning of terrorism, and destroy the idol of democracy. Now let us listen to Khaled Mashal, the leader of Hamas. He proclaims a similar vision of the future. "We say this to the West", he says. "By Allah it will be defeated, and tomorrow our nation will sit on the throne of the world". As its Charter makes clear, Hamas's immediate goal is to destroy Israel; but it has a broader objective. It also wants a caliphate.
>
> **(lines 25-34)**

Argumentatively, this extract could be an obvious example of the *straw man fallacy*[89] through which the PM oversimplifies the position of the leader of Hamas depending on quoting his words out of context and relating them to the ideas of Al-Baghdadi.

Regarding the use of particular rhetorical devices, Netanyahu's discourse on 'militant Islam' was supplemented by a number of metaphors that were employed as tools of nomination. The speech benefited from *medical metaphors* which have a long history of usage as one of the oldest instruments to counter political dissidents and disorder. Here is an example of Netanyahu's use of a *cancer metaphor*:

> Now that threat might seem exaggerated to some, since it starts out small, ***like a cancer*** that ***attacks a particular part of the body***. But left unchecked, the ***cancer grows***, metastasizing over wider and wider areas. To protect the peace and security of the world, we must ***remove that cancer*** before it is too late.
>
> **(lines 15-18)**

Netanyahu used the metaphorical expression '*crocodile tears*' in reference to President Rouhani's speech at the UNGA few days before Netanyahu's speech: 'Iran's president, Mr. Rouhani, stood here last week and shed crocodile tears over what he called the globalisation of terrorism. Maybe he should spare us those phony tears and have a word instead with the commanders of Iran's Revolutionary Guards' (lines 70-73). A third example of employing metaphor in the PM's speech occurred when Netanyahu metaphorically classified ISIS and Hamas as 'branches

[89] In straw man fallacies, the speaker misrepresents an opposing position through oversimplifying his/her opponent's argument or quoting his/her words out of context.

of the same poisonous tree' (line 23). In light of the systematic distribution of these metaphors to describe his antagonists, one can say that metaphor, as cognitive machinery with access to our familiar domains of experience, has been discursively employed as a nomination strategy serving a particular political agenda.

Another rhetorical strategy which manifests at the micro-level is the intensive use of rhetorical questions in two forms: (a) *anacoenosis* which is a rhetorical question posed to an audience who purportedly share the speaker's view on an issue, and (b) *hypophora* which allows a speaker to answer his/her own rhetorical question at length. Lines (83-85, 115-117, 185-187, and 211-214) below are samples of the rhetorical questions used to criticise the enemy and appeal to the emotions of the listeners.

- They believe that Rouhani and Zarif generally want to reconcile with the West, that they have abandoned the global mission of the Islamic Revolution. Really? (**lines 83-85**).
- Would you let ISIS enrich uranium? Would you let ISIS build a heavy-water reactor? Would you let ISIS develop intercontinental ballistic missiles? Of course, you would not. (**lines 115-117**).
- The Human Rights Council is thus sending a clear message to terrorists everywhere: "Use civilians as a human shield. Use them again and again and again." And you know why? Because, sadly, it works. (**lines 185-187**).
- In what moral universe does genocide include warning the enemy civilian population to get out of harm's way or ensuring that they receive tons (tons) of humanitarian aid each day, even as thousands of rockets are being fired at us, or setting up a field hospital to aid their wounded? (**lines 211-214**)

It is noted that the intensive use of rhetorical questions in the speech reflects a more didactic register which in many cases presuppose an uninformed audience. Overall, this analysis demonstrates that the Israeli PM has used language in this particular discursive event to formulate persuasive arguments that depicted three different actors in ways that serve a political agenda. The analysis captured illustrative examples of how patterns of representation (nomination, predication and intensification) were employed throughout the speech.

The line of arguments in Netanyahu's speech reflects a view of Islam and Islamism through a security prism, and an obvious attempt to misrepresent facts and conflate different actors through hyper simplification (e.g. statements like 'ISIS is Hamas and Hamas is ISIS'). This reflected that the speech fails to comprehend the diverse nature of Islamist groups, both in substance and demand; something that led to instances of sweeping generalisations and alienation of large groups of Muslims. I would claim Netanyahu is dismissive of the need to take seriously the motives of

an Islamist movement like Hamas as means to attain desired ends, and instead relies on pretensions that all Islamist movements are essentially violent and aim for a universal Islamic empire.

6.3. PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA'S ADDRESS

6.3.1. Transcript of the speech

United Nations General Assembly Hall
New York City, New York
24 September 2014

Mr. President, Mr. Secretary General, fellow delegates, ladies and gentlemen: We come together at a crossroads between war and peace; between disorder and integration; between fear and hope.

Around the globe, there are signposts of progress. The shadow of World War that existed at the founding of this institution has been lifted, and the prospect of war between major powers reduced. The ranks of member states has more than tripled, and more people live under governments they elected. Hundreds of millions of human beings have been freed from the prison of poverty, with the proportion of those living in extreme poverty cut in half. And the world economy continues to strengthen after the worst financial crisis of our lives.

Today, whether you live in downtown Manhattan or in my grandmother's village more than 200 miles from Nairobi, you can hold in your hand more information than the world's greatest libraries. Together, we've learned how to cure disease and harness the power of the wind and the sun. The very existence of this institution is a unique achievement -- the people of the world committing to resolve their differences peacefully, and to solve their problems together. I often tell young people in the United States that despite the headlines, this is the best time in human history to be born, for you are more likely than ever before to be literate, to be healthy, to be free to pursue your dreams.

And yet there is a pervasive unease in our world -- a sense that the very forces that have brought us together have created new dangers and made it difficult for any single nation to insulate itself from global forces. As we gather here, an outbreak of Ebola overwhelms public health systems in West Africa and threatens to move rapidly across borders. Russian aggression in Europe recalls the days when large nations trampled small ones in pursuit of territorial ambition. The brutality of terrorists in Syria and Iraq forces us to look into the heart of darkness.

Each of these problems demands urgent attention. But they are also symptoms of a broader problem -- the failure of our international system to keep pace with an interconnected world. We, collectively, have not invested adequately in the public health capacity of developing countries. Too often, we have failed to enforce international norms when it's inconvenient to do so. And we have not confronted forcefully enough the intolerance, sectarianism, and hopelessness that feeds violent extremism in too many parts of the globe.

Fellow delegates, we come together as united nations with a choice to make. We can renew the international system that has enabled so much progress, or we can allow ourselves to be pulled back by an undertow of instability. We can reaffirm our

collective responsibility to confront global problems, or be swamped by more and more outbreaks of instability. And for America, the choice is clear: We choose hope over fear. We see the future not as something out of our control, but as something we can shape for the better through concerted and collective effort. We reject fatalism or cynicism when it comes to human affairs. We choose to work for the world as it should be, as our children deserve it to be.

There is much that must be done to meet the test of this moment. But today I'd like to focus on two defining questions at the root of so many of our challenges -- whether the nations here today will be able to renew the purpose of the UN's founding; and whether we will come together to reject the cancer of violent extremism.

First, all of us -- big nations and small -- must meet our responsibility to observe and enforce international norms. We are here because others realized that we gain more from cooperation than conquest. One hundred years ago, a World War claimed the lives of many millions, proving that with the terrible power of modern weaponry, the cause of empire ultimately leads to the graveyard. It would take another World War to roll back the forces of fascism, the notions of racial supremacy, and form this United Nations to ensure that no nation can subjugate its neighbors and claim their territory.

Recently, Russia's actions in Ukraine challenge this post-war order. Here are the facts. After the people of Ukraine mobilized popular protests and calls for reform, their corrupt president fled. Against the will of the government in Kyiv, Crimea was annexed. Russia poured arms into eastern Ukraine, fueling violent separatists and a conflict that has killed thousands. When a civilian airliner was shot down from areas that these proxies controlled, they refused to allow access to the crash for days. When Ukraine started to reassert control over its territory, Russia gave up the pretense of merely supporting the separatists, and moved troops across the border.

This is a vision of the world in which might makes right -- a world in which one nation's borders can be redrawn by another, and civilized people are not allowed to recover the remains of their loved ones because of the truth that might be revealed. America stands for something different. We believe that right makes might -- that bigger nations should not be able to bully smaller ones, and that people should be able to choose their own future.

And these are simple truths, but they must be defended. America and our allies will support the people of Ukraine as they develop their democracy and economy. We will reinforce our NATO Allies and uphold our commitment to collective self-defense. We will impose a cost on Russia for aggression, and we will counter falsehoods with the truth. And we call upon others to join us on the right side of history -- for while small gains can be won at the barrel of a gun, they will ultimately be turned back if enough voices support the freedom of nations and peoples to make their own decisions.

Moreover, a different path is available -- the path of diplomacy and peace, and the ideals this institution is designed to uphold. The recent cease-fire agreement in Ukraine offers an opening to achieve those objectives. If Russia takes that path -- a path that for stretches of the post-Cold War period resulted in prosperity for the Russian people -- then we will lift our sanctions and welcome Russia's role in addressing common challenges. After all, that's what the United States and Russia

have been able to do in past years -- from reducing our nuclear stockpiles to meeting our obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, to cooperating to remove and destroy Syria's declared chemical weapons. And that's the kind of cooperation we are prepared to pursue again -- if Russia changes course.

This speaks to a central question of our global age -- whether we will solve our problems together, in a spirit of mutual interest and mutual respect, or whether we descend into the destructive rivalries of the past. When nations find common ground, not simply based on power, but on principle, then we can make enormous progress. And I stand before you today committed to investing American strength to working with all nations to address the problems we face in the 21st century.

As we speak, America is deploying our doctors and scientists -- supported by our military -- to help contain the outbreak of Ebola and pursue new treatments. But we need a broader effort to stop a disease that could kill hundreds of thousands, inflict horrific suffering, destabilize economies, and move rapidly across borders. It's easy to see this as a distant problem -- until it is not. And that is why we will continue to mobilize other countries to join us in making concrete commitments, significant commitments to fight this outbreak, and enhance our system of global health security for the long term.

America is pursuing a diplomatic resolution to the Iranian nuclear issue, as part of our commitment to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and pursue the peace and security of a world without them. And this can only take place if Iran seizes this historic opportunity. My message to Iran's leaders and people has been simple and consistent: Do not let this opportunity pass. We can reach a solution that meets your energy needs while assuring the world that your program is peaceful.

America is and will continue to be a Pacific power, promoting peace, stability, and the free flow of commerce among nations. But we will insist that all nations abide by the rules of the road, and resolve their territorial disputes peacefully, consistent with international law. That's how the Asia-Pacific has grown. And that's the only way to protect this progress going forward.

America is committed to a development agenda that eradicates extreme poverty by 2030. We will do our part to help people feed themselves, power their economies, and care for their sick. If the world acts together, we can make sure that all of our children enjoy lives of opportunity and dignity.

America is pursuing ambitious reductions in our carbon emissions, and we've increased our investments in clean energy. We will do our part, and help developing nations do theirs. But the science tells us we can only succeed in combating climate change if we are joined in this effort by every other nation, by every major power. That's how we can protect this planet for our children and our grandchildren.

In other words, on issue after issue, we cannot rely on a rule book written for a different century. If we lift our eyes beyond our borders -- if we think globally and if we act cooperatively -- we can shape the course of this century, as our predecessors shaped the post-World War II age. But as we look to the future, one issue risks a cycle of conflict that could derail so much progress, and that is the cancer of violent extremism that has ravaged so many parts of the Muslim world.

Of course, terrorism is not new. Speaking before this Assembly, President Kennedy put it well: "Terror is not a new weapon," he said. "Throughout history it has been used by those who could not prevail, either by persuasion or example." In the 20th century, terror was used by all manner of groups who failed to come to power through public support. But in this century, we have faced a more lethal and ideological brand of terrorists who have perverted one of the world's great religions. With access to technology that allows small groups to do great harm, they have embraced a nightmarish vision that would divide the world into adherents and infidels -- killing as many innocent civilians as possible, employing the most brutal methods to intimidate people within their communities.

I have made it clear that America will not base our entire foreign policy on reacting to terrorism. Instead, we've waged a focused campaign against al Qaeda and its associated forces -- taking out their leaders, denying them the safe havens they rely on. At the same time, we have reaffirmed again and again that the United States is not and never will be at war with Islam. Islam teaches peace. Muslims of the world over aspire to live with dignity and a sense of justice. And when it comes to America and Islam, there is no us and them, there is only us -- because millions of Muslim Americans are part of the fabric of our country.

So we reject any suggestion of a clash of civilizations. Belief in permanent religious war is the misguided refuge of extremists who cannot build or create anything, and therefore peddle only fanaticism and hate. And it is no exaggeration to say that humanity's future depends on us uniting against those who would divide us along the fault lines of tribe or sect, race or religion.

But this is not simply a matter of words. Collectively, we must take concrete steps to address the danger posed by religiously motivated fanatics, and the trends that fuel their recruitment. Moreover, this campaign against extremism goes beyond a narrow security challenge. For while we've degraded methodically core al Qaeda and supported a transition to a sovereign Afghan government, extremist ideology has shifted to other places -- particularly in the Middle East and North Africa, where a quarter of young people have no job, where food and water could grow scarce, where corruption is rampant and sectarian conflicts have become increasingly hard to contain.

As an international community, we must meet this challenge with a focus on four areas. First, the terrorist group known as ISIL must be degraded and ultimately destroyed.

This group has terrorized all who they come across in Iraq and Syria. Mothers, sisters, daughters have been subjected to rape as a weapon of war. Innocent children have been gunned down. Bodies have been dumped in mass graves. Religious minorities have been starved to death. In the most horrific crimes imaginable, innocent human beings have been beheaded, with videos of the atrocity distributed to shock the conscience of the world.

No God condones this terror. No grievance justifies these actions. There can be no reasoning -- no negotiation -- with this brand of evil. The only language understood by killers like this is the language of force. So the United States of America will work with a broad coalition to dismantle this network of death.

In this effort, we do not act alone -- nor do we intend to send U.S. troops to occupy foreign lands. Instead, we will support Iraqis and Syrians fighting to reclaim their communities. We will use our military might in a campaign of airstrikes to roll back ISIL. We will train and equip forces fighting against these terrorists on the ground. We will work to cut off their financing, and to stop the flow of fighters into and out of the region. And already, over 40 nations have offered to join this coalition.

Today, I ask the world to join in this effort. Those who have joined ISIL should leave the battlefield while they can. Those who continue to fight for a hateful cause will find they are increasingly alone. For we will not succumb to threats, and we will demonstrate that the future belongs to those who build -- not those who destroy. So that's an immediate challenge, the first challenge that we must meet.

The second: It is time for the world -- especially Muslim communities -- to explicitly, forcefully, and consistently reject the ideology of organizations like al Qaeda and ISIL.

It is one of the tasks of all great religions to accommodate devout faith with a modern, multicultural world. No children are born hating, and no children -- anywhere -- should be educated to hate other people. There should be no more tolerance of so-called clerics who call upon people to harm innocents because they're Jewish, or because they're Christian, or because they're Muslim. It is time for a new compact among the civilized peoples of this world to eradicate war at its most fundamental source, and that is the corruption of young minds by violent ideology.

That means cutting off the funding that fuels this hate. It's time to end the hypocrisy of those who accumulate wealth through the global economy and then siphon funds to those who teach children to tear it down.

That means contesting the space that terrorists occupy, including the Internet and social media. Their propaganda has coerced young people to travel abroad to fight their wars, and turned students -- young people full of potential -- into suicide bombers. We must offer an alternative vision.

That means bringing people of different faiths together. All religions have been attacked by extremists from within at some point, and all people of faith have a responsibility to lift up the value at the heart of all great religions: Do unto thy neighbor as you would do -- you would have done unto yourself.

The ideology of ISIL or al Qaeda or Boko Haram will wilt and die if it is consistently exposed and confronted and refuted in the light of day. Look at the new Forum for Promoting Peace in Muslim Societies -- Sheikh bin Bayyah described its purpose: "We must declare war on war, so the outcome will be peace upon peace." Look at the young British Muslims who responded to terrorist propaganda by starting the "NotInMyName" campaign, declaring, "ISIS is hiding behind a false Islam." Look at the Christian and Muslim leaders who came together in the Central African Republic to reject violence; listen to the Imam who said, "Politics try to divide the religious in our country, but religion shouldn't be a cause of hate, war, or strife."

Later today, the Security Council will adopt a resolution that underscores the responsibility of states to counter violent extremism. But resolutions must be followed by tangible commitments, so we're accountable when we fall short. Next year, we should all be prepared to announce the concrete steps that we have taken to

counter extremist ideologies in our own countries -- by getting intolerance out of schools, stopping radicalization before it spreads, and promoting institutions and programs that build new bridges of understanding.

Third, we must address the cycle of conflict -- especially sectarian conflict -- that creates the conditions that terrorists prey upon.

There is nothing new about wars within religions. Christianity endured centuries of vicious sectarian conflict. Today, it is violence within Muslim communities that has become the source of so much human misery. It is time to acknowledge the destruction wrought by proxy wars and terror campaigns between Sunni and Shia across the Middle East. And it is time that political, civic and religious leaders reject sectarian strife. So let's be clear: This is a fight that no one is winning. A brutal civil war in Syria has already killed nearly 200,000 people, displaced millions. Iraq has come perilously close to plunging back into the abyss. The conflict has created a fertile recruiting ground for terrorists who inevitably export this violence.

The good news is we also see signs that this tide could be reversed. We have a new, inclusive government in Baghdad; a new Iraqi Prime Minister welcomed by his neighbors; Lebanese factions rejecting those who try to provoke war. And these steps must be followed by a broader truce. Nowhere is this more necessary than Syria.

Together with our partners, America is training and equipping the Syrian opposition to be a counterweight to the terrorists of ISIL and the brutality of the Assad regime. But the only lasting solution to Syria's civil war is political -- an inclusive political transition that responds to the legitimate aspirations of all Syrian citizens, regardless of ethnicity, regardless of creed.

Cynics may argue that such an outcome can never come to pass. But there is no other way for this madness to end -- whether one year from now or ten. And it points to the fact that it's time for a broader negotiation in the region in which major powers address their differences directly, honestly, and peacefully across the table from one another, rather than through gun-wielding proxies. I can promise you America will remain engaged in the region, and we are prepared to engage in that effort.

My fourth and final point is a simple one: The countries of the Arab and Muslim world must focus on the extraordinary potential of their people -- especially the youth.

And here I'd like to speak directly to young people across the Muslim world. You come from a great tradition that stands for education, not ignorance; innovation, not destruction; the dignity of life, not murder. Those who call you away from this path are betraying this tradition, not defending it.

You have demonstrated that when young people have the tools to succeed -- good schools, education in math and science, an economy that nurtures creativity and entrepreneurship -- then societies will flourish. So America will partner with those that promote that vision.

Where women are full participants in a country's politics or economy, societies are more likely to succeed. And that's why we support the participation of women in parliaments and peace processes, schools and the economy.

If young people live in places where the only option is between the dictates of a state, or the lure of an extremist underground, then no counterterrorism strategy can succeed. But where a genuine civil society is allowed to flourish -- where people can express their views, and organize peacefully for a better life -- then you dramatically expand the alternatives to terror.

And such positive change need not come at the expense of tradition and faith. We see this in Iraq, where a young man started a library for his peers. "We link Iraq's heritage to their hearts," he said, and "give them a reason to stay." We see it in Tunisia, where secular and Islamist parties worked together through a political process to produce a new constitution. We see it in Senegal, where civil society thrives alongside a strong democratic government. We see it in Malaysia, where vibrant entrepreneurship is propelling a former colony into the ranks of advanced economies. And we see it in Indonesia, where what began as a violent transition has evolved into a genuine democracy.

Now, ultimately, the task of rejecting sectarianism and rejecting extremism is a generational task -- and a task for the people of the Middle East themselves. No external power can bring about a transformation of hearts and minds. But America will be a respectful and constructive partner. We will neither tolerate terrorist safe havens, nor act as an occupying power. We will take action against threats to our security and our allies, while building an architecture of counterterrorism cooperation. We will increase efforts to lift up those who counter extremist ideologies and who seek to resolve sectarian conflict. And we will expand our programs to support entrepreneurship and civil society, education and youth -- because, ultimately, these investments are the best antidote to violence.

We recognize as well that leadership will be necessary to address the conflict between Palestinians and Israelis. As bleak as the landscape appears, America will not give up on the pursuit of peace. Understand, the situation in Iraq and Syria and Libya should cure anybody of the illusion that the Arab-Israeli conflict is the main source of problems in the region. For far too long, that's been used as an excuse to distract people from problems at home. The violence engulfing the region today has made too many Israelis ready to abandon the hard work of peace. And that's something worthy of reflection within Israel.

Because let's be clear: The status quo in the West Bank and Gaza is not sustainable. We cannot afford to turn away from this effort -- not when rockets are fired at innocent Israelis, or the lives of so many Palestinian children are taken from us in Gaza. So long as I am President, we will stand up for the principle that Israelis, Palestinians, the region and the world will be more just and more safe with two states living side by side, in peace and security.

So this is what America is prepared to do: Taking action against immediate threats, while pursuing a world in which the need for such action is diminished. The United States will never shy away from defending our interests, but we will also not shy away from the promise of this institution and its Universal Declaration of Human Rights -- the notion that peace is not merely the absence of war, but the presence of a better life.

I realize that America's critics will be quick to point out that at times we too have failed to live up to our ideals; that America has plenty of problems within its own borders. This is true. In a summer marked by instability in the Middle East and Eastern Europe, I know the world also took notice of the small American city of Ferguson, Missouri -- where a young man was killed, and a community was divided. So, yes, we have our own racial and ethnic tensions. And like every country, we continually wrestle with how to reconcile the vast changes wrought by globalization and greater diversity with the traditions that we hold dear.

But we welcome the scrutiny of the world -- because what you see in America is a country that has steadily worked to address our problems, to make our union more perfect, to bridge the divides that existed at the founding of this nation. America is not the same as it was 100 years ago, or 50 years ago, or even a decade ago. Because we fight for our ideals, and we are willing to criticize ourselves when we fall short. Because we hold our leaders accountable, and insist on a free press and independent judiciary. Because we address our differences in the open space of democracy -- with respect for the rule of law; with a place for people of every race and every religion; and with an unyielding belief in the ability of individual men and women to change their communities and their circumstances and their countries for the better.

After nearly six years as President, I believe that this promise can help light the world. Because I have seen a longing for positive change -- for peace and for freedom and for opportunity and for the end to bigotry -- in the eyes of young people who I've met around the globe.

They remind me that no matter who you are, or where you come from, or what you look like, or what God you pray to, or who you love, there is something fundamental that we all share. Eleanor Roosevelt, a champion of the UN and America's role in it, once asked, "Where, after all, do universal human rights begin? In small places," she said, "close to home -- so close and so small that they cannot be seen on any maps of the world. Yet they are the world of the individual person; the neighborhood he lives in; the school or college he attends; the factory, farm or office where he works."

Around the world, young people are moving forward hungry for a better world. Around the world, in small places, they're overcoming hatred and bigotry and sectarianism. And they're learning to respect each other, despite differences.

The people of the world now look to us, here, to be as decent, and as dignified, and as courageous as they are trying to be in their daily lives. And at this crossroads, I can promise you that the United States of America will not be distracted or deterred from what must be done. We are heirs to a proud legacy of freedom, and we're prepared to do what is necessary to secure that legacy for generations to come. I ask that you join us in this common mission, for today's children and tomorrow's.

Thank you very much.

6.3.2. Analysis of the speech

The second speech analysed in this chapter is the address by President Barack Obama, the 44th president of the United States from 20 January 2009 to 20 January 2017. The speech was delivered on 24 September 2014 emphasising a wide range of topics including the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, tackling terrorism, relations with Iran and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Besides the role which the USA plays as a leader of the 'war on terror' and the fact that this speech intensively refers to Islam and Muslims in the context of counter-terrorism proposals, Obama's political eloquence which frequently relates to rational and humanitarian ideals makes studying this speech an interesting case. Kienpointner (2013: 373) maintains that Obama 'tries to overcome the standard strategic manoeuvring of political rhetoric which is often polarizing and destructive'.

In relation to the subject matter of this research, some argue that Obama maintains positive rhetoric towards Islam and Muslims which in turn makes him stand in stark contrast with his predecessor George W. Bush (Sajjad, 2015 and Salama, 2012). In 2013 Obama announced that the USA is no longer pursuing the global 'war on terror' which was initiated by Bush, proposing a new strategy focussing on 'targeted efforts to dismantle specific networks of violent extremists' (see Jackson, 2005). While in many instances Bush's 'war on terror' political rhetoric constructed the United States' self-identity in contradistinction to an Islamist *Other*, Obama's discourses attempted to promote a post-'war on terror' rhetoric that backgrounds religious and political divides between Muslims and the United States and rather presents both as partners in historical conflicts and contemporary challenges.

In particular, the speech that Obama delivered at Cairo University in June 2009 signified a new beginning of relations with Muslims based on a 'rhetoric of pluralization' (Salama, 2012). Starting his Cairo speech with the Islamic preamble 'Assalaamu alaykum', citing verses from the Qur'an and declaring that 'America is not at war with Islam' symbolises a deliberate effort to appeal to the *pathos* of Muslims but also could reflect that 'Obama is more sensitive to the power of language and its ability to impact perceptions and relations between peoples and nations' (Mullin 2011:265).

Obama's 2014 UNGA address, although can be described as wide-ranging, focusses mainly on the following four themes:

(a) Russia's actions in Ukraine
(b) Violent extremism

(c) Pursuing a diplomatic resolution to the Iranian nuclear issue
(d) The Palestinian-Israeli conflict

The discourse on Russia's actions in Ukraine focusses on the United States' effort to rescue Ukraine from Russia's presence in the Eastern part of the country. In the speech, Obama offers a 'path of diplomacy' (line 76) based on 'cease-fire agreements' (line 77) that might lead to lifting the sanctions imposed on Russia. Following this, substantial weight is placed on **the discourse on violent extremism** which constitutes a significant amount of the content of the speech. It condemns extremist actors including 'ISIL, al Qaeda and Boko Haram' declaring that 'there can be no reasoning –no negotiation– with this brand of evil' (lines 167-168). Within this discourse topic, the speech also attends to the ideas of rejecting a 'clash of civilizations' (line 144), promoting collective action (lines 149-159), and propagating religious mutual understanding (lines 224-225). **The discourse on the Iranian nuclear issue** highlights that 'America is pursuing a diplomatic resolution' (line 100) and calls on Iran to 'seize this historic opportunity' (lines 102-103) based on a compromise that attends to Iran's energy needs and assures the world concerning the peacefulness of the programme. Finally, **the discourse on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict** addressed the status quo in the West Bank and Gaza describing the situation as 'not sustainable' (lines 290-291) and calling for revitalising the two-state solution.

Other discourse topics that the speech touches on more briefly included the outbreak of Ebola in West Africa, the US ambition to eradicate extreme poverty by 2030, and the US efforts in combatting climate change and reducing carbon emissions. *Table 6.7* below demonstrates a more detailed analysis of topicality within the speech:

Table 6.7: Topicality analysis of President Obama's UNGA address

Line No.	Discussed Themes
1-3	Introducing a war vs. peace dichotomy
4-19	Highlighting progress made around the globe (i.e. inviting hope)
20-26	Presenting some of the current challenges facing the world today
27-33	Describing the failure of the current international system to keep pace with an interconnected world.
34-42	Presenting a dichotomy of 'renewing the international system' vs. 'instability'
43-46	Emphasising the need for urgent action
47-53	Referring to sad past experiences (The World War)
54-85	Tackling Russia and the Russian-Ukrainian conflict 54-61 Description of the conflict

	62-67 Russian Values vs. American Values 68-75 America's position (supporting Ukraine) 76-85 Offering a 'diplomatic' path
86-99	Emphasising the US positive role in previous world conflicts
100-105	Tackling Iran and the US leadership message to Iran
106-125	Emphasising the US positive role in: 106-110 Promoting justice and the rule of law 111-114 Eradicating poverty 115-119 Solving climate change problems 120-125 Promoting cooperation
126-298	Tackling Terrorism 126 Introducing the extremism threat 126-128 Recalling past experiences with terrorism and Kennedy's view 129-135 Describing the nature of today's terrorism threat 136-278 The US current approach to counter terrorism • 136-139 A focused campaign • 140-148 Emphasising differences between Islam and terrorism • 149-157 Calling for collective efforts • 158-281 Proposing a four-fold solution: - Degrading ISIL - Rejecting terrorist ideology - Solving sectarian conflicts - Supporting Arab and Muslim people (esp. youth) • 272-274 Role of Middle Eastern countries • 274-281 Role of the USA
282-295	Presenting views on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict
296-301	Emphasising the US commitment to the UDHR
302-340	Tackling critics of the US internal challenges

Of all the above-mentioned topics that Obama touched on, at the heart of the speech was the topic of violent extremism which stands out as the major macro-topic of the speech. Around half of the speech (more specifically 2293 out of 4528 words) were devoted to this major topic and it is within this theme of argument where remarks about Islam and Muslims appeared in the speech. Examining the list of 'keywords in context'[90] for this speech, *figure 6.5* below reveals that at least 15 out of the top 20 keywords in the speech are relevant to the macro-topic 'violent

[90] In chapter 4 (section 4.2.2), I discussed the process of generating a keyword list and why it is helpful as a corpus-based mechanism to capture lexical items with frequencies that are statistically higher (more than could be attributed to chance) in one corpus compared to another corpus.

extremism' (e.g. ISIL, extremism, sectarian, terrorists, religions, violent, nations, reject, Iraq, conflict).

Corpus: **OB**

Reference corpus: **British National Corpus (BNC)**
Switch focus and reference (sub)corpus

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		OB		*British National Corpus (BNC)*	
word	frequency	frequency/mill	frequency	frequency/mill	Score
ISIL	6	1189.8	0	0.0	1190.8
extremism	6	1189.8	92	0.8	654.7
sectarian	5	991.5	303	2.7	268.5
terrorists	7	1388.1	676	6.0	198.0
Muslim	9	1784.7	1,041	9.3	173.9
Ukraine	6	1189.8	797	7.1	147.1
religions	5	991.5	692	6.2	138.6
Syria	5	991.5	794	7.1	123.0
nations	12	2379.5	2,217	19.7	114.8
borders	5	991.5	1,167	10.4	87.2
reject	6	1189.8	1,488	13.2	83.6
violent	7	1388.1	2,606	23.2	57.4
America	21	4164.2	8,841	78.7	52.3
ultimately	5	991.5	2,489	22.2	42.9
Iraq	5	991.5	2,626	23.4	40.7
peace	13	2577.8	7,507	66.8	38.0
global	5	991.5	2,996	26.7	35.9
Russia	6	1189.8	3,678	32.7	35.3
conflict	9	1784.7	5,647	50.3	34.8
communities	5	991.5	3,405	30.3	31.7

Figure 6.5: Top twenty keywords in Obama's speech

Investigating the collocational environment of using the words *Islam, Islamist, Muslim* and *Muslims* could provide significant initial clues about the representations attached to these words in Obama's speech. The first mention of *Islam* in the speech is a reaffirmation that there is no war between America and Islam, which as I established earlier, a theme that Obama emphasised in his Cairo speech and other political statements (see Al-Anbar, 2017).
However, one can claim that the reiterative negation of this particular image presupposes its very existence in the minds of some.

> At the same time, we have reaffirmed again and again that the United States is not and never will be at war with Islam.
>
> **(lines 139-140)**

In the previous statement, Obama uses an intensification strategy through emphasising the negation of the idea that the United States is at war with Islam. This is done using the present and future temporal frames 'is not and never will be' as well as the adverbial 'again and again'. Also notice the repetition which as a discursive strategy can have an emphasising effect (Bazzanella, 1996). Emphatic repetitions 'have emotive connotations and draw extra attention to a notion' (Forraiova, 2011, p. 22). The certainty shown in the previous example is further supported by the following statement that refuses an '*Us*' versus '*Them*' divide:

> And when it comes to America and Islam, there is no us and them, there is only us -- because millions of Muslim Americans are part of the fabric of our country.
>
> **(lines 141-143)**

The declaration in the above statement resonates with Sajjad's claim (2015: 10) that Obama's discourse 'gives a lot of importance to equality and respect to all religions'. Using the verb 'be' ('there is no us and them') without any modality markers reveals certainty. This *winning the hearts* strategy and the assertive tone in the two previous examples reflect that Obama is keen on reflecting a positive attitude towards Islam and Muslims. Yet, whilst the emphasis on the idea that 'Muslim Americans are part of the fabric of our country' (lines 142-143) seems a deliberate attempt to be inclusive, at the same time though it implies the existence of perceptions that Muslim Americans are *not* part of the fabric of America, raising questions about whether being Muslim fits comfortably with being American. Also, notice that starting the sentence with the phrase 'And when it comes to America and Islam' draws attention to issues of compatibility. Such statements, according to Bonifacio and Angeles (2010: 57), 'evoke a concern with Muslims as inherent societal misfits with dubious religious beliefs and practices'. However, it should be noted that this theme of compatibility and integration of Muslims is ubiquitous in the president's discourse about Islam. The following statements from the president's speech to Muslims at the *Islamic Society of Baltimore* in Maryland on February 3, 2016 can be indicative of how much the president highlights the issue:

- 'Our television shows should have some Muslim characters that are unrelated to national security'.
- 'When any religious group is targeted, we all have a responsibility to speak up'.
- 'You fit in here. Right here'.
- 'You are not Muslim or American; you are Muslim and American'.

Regarding the repetitive use of the collocation 'Muslim Americans', it can be problematic knowing that Muslims are the only people of faith who are assigned this kind of nomination in this speech and the entire corpus. Terms like 'Christian Americans', 'Sikh Americans' or 'Hindu Americans' are never used in the corpus, and thus this appellation seems to be predominantly reserved for Muslims; and reference to Muslims in this way can be interpreted as a perlocutionary act for that its aim is to convince listeners that Muslims are Americans too. At another level, Obama's statement can be an example of the use of paralipsis as a rhetorical device that is employed when the speaker draws attention to an issue by the very act of denying it. Regardless of the intentions of the speaker, emphasising that 'millions of Muslims are part of the fabric of our country' alludes to a problem of integration.

The following extract is another place in the speech where Obama reaffirms rejection of 'a clash of civilizations' (line 144) or division 'along the fault lines of tribe or sect, race or religion' (lines 147-148).

> So we reject any suggestion of a clash of civilizations. Belief in permanent religious war is the misguided refuge of extremists who cannot build or create anything, and therefore peddle only fanaticism and hate. And it is no exaggeration to say that humanity's future depends on us uniting against those who would divide us along the fault lines of tribe or sect, race or religion.
>
> **(lines 144-148)**

In these lines, Obama articulates that only extremists believe in a 'permanent religious war' and such belief leads them into a state of creating 'only fanaticism and hate'. The main discursive strategy employed in the above lines is intensifying the rejection of the thesis of a 'clash of civilizations', blaming the spread of the notion on the 'extremists', and finally calling for 'uniting against those who would divide us along the fault lines of tribe or sect, race or religion' (lines 147-148). By highlighting the undesired outcomes of 'fanaticism and hate' (line 146), Obama leaves his audience with the only right choice of 'uniting'. In other places, Obama seems more didactic through highlighting the teachings of Islam and the aspirations of Muslims as in the following example:

> Islam teaches peace. Muslims of the world over aspire to live with dignity and a sense of justice.
>
> **(lines 140-141)**

Obama realises the influence of focussing on a positive message towards Islam and Muslims. The speech contains plentiful examples of presenting Islam and Muslims in a positive light – Islam as a religion that 'teaches peace', and Muslims

as aspiring 'to live with dignity and a sense of justice'. Attempting to win the favourable impressions of 'Muslims of the world', Obama employs a *predicational strategy*[91] via attaching 'peace' to 'Islam', and 'dignity' and 'justice' to 'Muslims'.

Although Obama has frequently employed such 'winning the hearts' strategy, there are places in the speech where Obama changed the tone by devoting attention to the 'so-called clerics who call upon people to harm innocents because they're Jewish, or because they're Christian, or because they're Muslim' (lines 186-188). One can claim that Obama's reference to what Altikriti and Al-Mahadin (2015: 620) termed 'hate preachers' throws light on the heightened concern in some western countries about the 'drowning out' of moderate Muslim voices and the media emphasis on some preachers with odious pasts and messages of hate and violence against the West. However, anchoring Islam in the characters of such clerics can be unhelpful because through the power of example these characters can enter the public imagination as examples of extreme Muslim clerics and then soon become examples of Muslim clerics.

Another problematic representation of Muslims in the speech occurred in the following statement:

> It is time for the world -- especially Muslim communities -- to explicitly, forcefully, and consistently reject the ideology of organizations like al Qaeda and ISIL.
>
> **(lines 182-183)**

Obama's message to the world regarding the need to reject extremist ideologies emphasised a mention of 'Muslim communities' as not acting in harmony with the rest of the world. Whilst Muslims are presumably included within the term 'world' in the previous extract, the parenthesised phrase 'especially Muslim communities' and the use of the three adverbs 'explicitly', 'forcefully' and 'consistently' can be problematic as listeners can get the sense that Muslim communities are passive bystanders who do not 'explicitly, forcefully and consistently reject the ideology of organisations like al Qaeda and ISIL' (line 182-183). However, in avoiding to make explicitly negative statements about 'Muslim communities' such as 'Muslim communities are not doing enough to condemn terrorism in the name of their religion', which can be easily regarded as subjective and not based on fact, Obama demands 'the world - especially Muslim communities' to reject the ideology of extremist organisations. Rather, Obama's

[91] According to Van Leeuwen (1996: 54) a predicational strategy is 'the very process and result of linguistically assigning qualities to persons, animals, objects, events, actions and social phenomena'.

call for Muslims to repudiate the ideology of extremist groups is supported by quotes from Muslim religious figures to create an interdiscursive meaning where an Islamic discourse is intertextually appropriated within a political speech:

> The ideology of ISIL or al Qaeda or Boko Haram will wilt and die if it is consistently exposed and confronted and refuted in the light of day. Look at the new Forum for Promoting Peace in Muslim Societies -- Sheikh bin Bayyah described its purpose: "We must declare war on war, so the outcome will be peace upon peace." Look at the young British Muslims who responded to terrorist propaganda by starting the "NotInMyName" campaign, declaring, "ISIS is hiding behind a false Islam." Look at the Christian and Muslim leaders who came together in the Central African Republic to reject violence; listen to the Imam who said, "Politics try to divide the religious in our country, but religion shouldn't be a cause of hate, war, or strife."
>
> **(lines 202-210)**

This extract is an example of how Obama embedded the propositional content of the *Forum for Promoting Peace in Muslim Societies* through quoting the purpose of the forum as described by the respected Mauritanian religious figure Sheikh Abdullah Bin Bayyah. The second case of intertextuality in the above extract is when Obama imported a quote from the London-based organisation *Not In My Name* which carries the message that 'ISIS is hiding behind a false Islam' (line 207). The third case of intertextuality can be seen in the last line where Obama cited the Central African Imam Omar Kobine Layama who stated during a faith leaders' meeting that 'religion should not be a cause of hate, war, or strife'. In these three instances of manifest intertextuality[92], Obama constructs himself as a carrier of the message that Muslims want to convey, drawing on the authenticity of two Muslim religious figures and a group of British Muslim activists. The repetitive use of the discourse marker 'look at' three times in the above quote can be a sign of clarifying that there is an abundance of Muslim voices that should be heard to balance their views against the ideology propagated by extremist groups.

As such, Obama has distanced himself from incriminating Muslims who do not consistently 'expose', 'confront' and 'refute' the ideology of ISIL, al Qaeda and Boko Haram by drawing on Muslim voices whose discursive effect on Muslim leaders and Muslim audiences can be rhetorically more effective. In the previous extract, there is an overt element of agency ascribed to Muslims, where they seem to be doing something, rather than only having things done to them. Bringing the voice of authentic Muslim social actors aims to set their ideology against the ideology of other actors like (ISIL, al Qaeda and Boko Haram) enacting the socio-

[92] Manifest intertextuality and its use in political discourses is explained in section 3.11.3.

semantic meaning that since the quoted Muslim voices clearly reject, confront and refute the extremists 'in the light of day' (line 203), it is the duty of all true believers in the religion to do the same and it is through an Islamic lens that the ideology of the extremists should be delegitimised. Quotes from Muslim voices can also be seen as a strategy of positioning Muslims as members of the group threatened by extremism, and therefore calling on Muslims to think the way Obama does.

Argumentatively, this speech benefits from the *topos of history* (lines 220-224) as a strategy to emphasise the affinity between Christianity and Islam through demonstrating that history evidences cases of 'wars within religions' (line 220).

> There is nothing new about wars within religions. Christianity endured centuries of vicious sectarian conflict. Today, it is violence within Muslim communities that has become the source of so much human misery. It is time to acknowledge the destruction wrought by proxy wars and terror campaigns between Sunni and Shia across the Middle East.
>
> **(lines 220-224)**

In the previous excerpt, 'violence within Muslim communities' is represented as an instance of the more general phenomenon of 'war within religions'. The speaker points out that while Christianity suffered from such wars at a point of time and was able to overcome that stage, it is now Islam's time to curb violence and solve its internal 'proxy wars' between the 'Sunni and Shia' sects. By stating so, Obama is exerting a discursive effort to eschew polarising language through explicit attempts to combine Christianity and Islam by addressing the harm caused by sectarian wars within the two religions. Bringing the idea that other religions (like Christianity) went through similar sectarian conflicts that Islam is going through today can be regarded as a strategy of inclusion. On the other hand, the president's argument that the statement 'today, it is violence within Muslim communities that has become the source of so much human misery' depicts Muslim communities as sources of contemporary destruction and might imply that these communities are uniquely violent. However, in this context Obama's use of the plural form 'communities' rather than the singular is significant. By using the plural, the speaker avoids the blanket and blind use of the singular form of the word which, as I established in the preceding chapter, can be counterproductive to inclusive arguments.

Another feature in Obama's rhetoric in this speech is that he is keen on associating himself with a historical tradition of political leadership through borrowing elements from their political language, such as in the following example where the president quotes president John F. Kennedy to claim continuity with the legacy of a great leader.

> Of course, terrorism is not new. Speaking before this Assembly, President Kennedy put it well: "Terror is not a new weapon," he said. "Throughout history it has been used by those who could not prevail, either by persuasion or example."
>
> **(lines 126-128)**

By re-contextualising Kennedy's words in the form of manifest intertextuality, Obama is mapping that historical context onto the current state of terrorism in the twenty-first century. Via re-contextualisation, Kennedy's view thus becomes applicable to the contemporary context and could possibly give insight into the nature of the problem (see Blommaert, 2005).

Later in the speech, Obama returns to a more positive tone towards Muslims through embracing a positive presentation of Muslims as a social group whose 'people' especially 'the youth' have an 'extraordinary potential'.

> The countries of the Arab and Muslim world must focus on the extraordinary potential of their people -- especially the youth.
>
> **(lines 244-246)**

This positive representation becomes salient when Obama decides to directly address 'young people across the Muslim world':

> And here I'd like to speak directly to young people across the Muslim world. You come from a great tradition that stands for education, not ignorance; innovation, not destruction; the dignity of life, not murder. Those who call you away from this path are betraying this tradition, not defending it.
>
> **(lines 247-250)**

This extract emphasises and lists a number of positive traits of the Islamic 'tradition', which he believes, stands for 'education, innovation and the dignity of life' (lines 248-250). However, the positive predications in the above statements are directly compared to negative traits like 'ignorance, destruction and murder' (lines 248-249) which, according to Obama, will be an outcome of 'betraying' the tradition. By making such comparisons, Obama is employing a moral evaluation strategy to commend certain actions (e.g. education and innovation) which the speaker embraces and condemn others (e.g. destruction and murder) which are associated with other social actors in the speech (i.e. ISIL, al-Qaeda and Boko Haram). The speaker, then, continues to relate to the challenges and obstacles which young Arabs and Muslims are experiencing. Consider the following extract which emphasises that the youth would not be able to achieve their full potential

if their only option is to live 'between the dictates of a state or the lure of an extremist underground' (lines 258-259):

> If young people live in places where the only option is between the dictates of a state, or the lure of an extremist underground, then no counterterrorism strategy can succeed. But where a genuine civil society is allowed to flourish -- where people can express their views, and organize peacefully for a better life -- then you dramatically expand the alternatives to terror.
>
> And such positive change need not come at the expense of tradition and faith. We see this in Iraq, where a young man started a library for his peers. "We link Iraq's heritage to their hearts," he said, and "give them a reason to stay." We see it in Tunisia, where secular and Islamist parties worked together through a political process to produce a new constitution. We see it in Senegal, where civil society thrives alongside a strong democratic government. We see it in Malaysia, where vibrant entrepreneurship is propelling a former colony into the ranks of advanced economies. And we see it in Indonesia, where what began as a violent transition has evolved into a genuine democracy.
>
> **(lines 258-271)**

After constructing young Arabs and Muslims as being victimised by the political establishment, Obama again repeats praise for Muslims (the people) through voicing a positive tone towards the young. Obama's argument in this context is predicated on the assumption that young Arabs and Muslims are willing to establish 'a genuine civil society' and able to 'express their views, and organize peacefully for a better life' to improve their own wellbeing (lines 274-275). He also explicitly states that 'such positive change need not come at the expense of tradition and faith' (line 263) implying that the youth do not need the support of others to increase awareness regarding their own plight and how to overcome it. This is supported by intertextual references integrating five models of positive change in Iraq, Tunisia, Senegal, Malaysia and Indonesia (lines 263-271). However, another reading of the overemphasis on young Muslims as facing a double-edged sword of 'the dictates of the state' and 'the lure of extremism underground' depicts Muslims as 'victims' (as passive agents) and thus requires engaging in an argument about their worth and positive traits, which Obama extensively does in the previous extract.

6.4. Prime Minister David Cameron's Address

6.4.1. Transcript of the speech

United Nations General Assembly Hall
New York City, New York
25 September 2014

Madam President, this year we face extraordinary tests of our values and our resolve. In responding to the aggression against one of our member states, Ukraine; in seeking peace in the Middle East; in dealing with the terrifying spread of the Ebola virus in West Africa. And in overcoming what I want to focus on today – which is the mortal threat we all face from the rise of ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) in Syria and Iraq.

Deir al-Zor is a province in Eastern Syria. Home to the al-Sheitaat tribe, it was captured by ISIL last month. 700 tribesmen were executed, many were beheaded. The vast majority were civilians - Muslims - who refused to take an oath of allegiance to ISIL's sick extremist world view – and who paid for this with their lives. They are not alone. Across Syria and Northern Iraq thousands have suffered the same fate. Muslims – both Sunni and Shia. Christians, Yazidis, people of every faith and none. ISIL is not a problem restricted to just one region. It has murderous plans to expand its borders well beyond Iraq and Syria, and to carry out terrorist atrocities right across the world. It is recruiting new fighters from all over the world. 500 have gone there from my country Britain, and one of them almost certainly brutally murdered two American journalists and a British aid worker. This is a problem that affects us all. And we must tackle it together.

Now there is not one person in this hall who will view this challenge without reference to the past. Whether in Iraq. Whether in Afghanistan. Now of course it is absolutely right that we should learn the lessons of the past, especially of what happened in Iraq a decade ago. But we have to learn the right lessons. Yes to careful preparation; no to rushing to join a conflict without a clear plan. But we must not be so frozen with fear that we don't do anything at all.

Isolation and withdrawing from a problem like ISIL will only make matters worse. We must not allow past mistakes to become an excuse for indifference or inaction. The right lesson is that we should act – but act differently. We should be comprehensive – defeating the ideology of extremism that is the root cause of this terrorism - so that we win the battle of ideas, not just the battle of military might. We should be intelligent – supporting representative and accountable governments and working with them at their requests, not going in over their heads. We should be inclusive – working with partners in the region who are prepared to be part of the solution, potentially including Iran. And We should be uncompromising – using all the means at our disposal – including military force – to hunt down these extremists

Let me take each of these in turn.

The root cause of this terrorist threat is a poisonous ideology of Islamist extremism. This is nothing to do with Islam, which is a peaceful religion which inspires countless acts of generosity every day. Islamist extremism on the other hand believes in using the most brutal forms of terrorism to force people to accept a warped world view and to live in a quasi-mediaeval state.

To defeat ISIL – and organisations like it - we must defeat this ideology in all its forms. As evidence emerges about the backgrounds of those convicted of terrorist offences, it is clear that many of them were initially influenced by preachers who claim not to encourage violence, but whose world view can be used as a justification for it. We know this world view.

The peddling of lies: that 9/11 was a Jewish plot or that the 7/7 London attacks were staged. The idea that Muslims are persecuted all over the world as a deliberate act of Western policy. The concept of an inevitable clash of civilisations. We must be clear: to defeat the ideology of extremism we need to deal with all forms of extremism – not just violent extremism.

For governments, there are some obvious ways we can do this. We must ban preachers of hate from coming to our countries. We must proscribe organisations that incite terrorism against people at home and abroad. We must work together to take down illegal online material like the recent videos of ISIL murdering hostages. And we must stop the so called non-violent extremists from inciting hatred and intolerance in our schools, our universities and yes, even our prisons.

Of course, there are some who will argue that this is not compatible with free speech and intellectual inquiry. But I ask you: would we sit back and allow right-wing extremists, Nazis or Klu Klux Klansmen to recruit on our university campuses? No.

So, we shouldn't stand by and just allow any form of non-violent extremism. We need to argue that prophecies of a global war of religion pitting Muslims against the rest of the world. These things are nonsense. We need Muslims and their governments around the world to reclaim their religion from these sick terrorists as so many are doing and quite rightly doing today. We all need to help them with programmes that channel young people away from these poisonous ideologues. And we need the strongest possible international focus on tackling this ideology - which is why here at the United Nations, the United Kingdom is calling for a new Special Representative on extremism.

But fighting extremism will never be enough. Communism wasn't defeated simply by pointing out its flaws – but by showing that the alternative of economic freedoms, democracy and the rule of law, these things could build a better society and a better world. Young people need to see the power of a different, better, more open, more democratic path. The twentieth century taught us the vital role of representative and accountable governments in offering their people opportunity, hope and dignity.

Of course, we should not be naive: not every country can move at the same speed or even reach the same destination. And we should respect different cultures and

traditions and histories. But, let's be clear: the failure to meet people's aspirations can create a breeding ground where extremist and even terrorist insurgency can take root.

Governments that only govern for some of their people cause deep resentment. In Iraq the failure of the al-Maliki government to represent all of the people has driven some of them into the arms of the extremists. Too often people have been faced with a false choice between an autocratic and unrepresentative government on the one hand - or a brutal insurgency, with religion misused as its rallying call on the other. To combat this, we must support the building blocks of free and open societies.

In Iraq, this means supporting the creation of a new and genuinely inclusive government capable of uniting all Iraqis – Sunni, Shia and Kurds, Christians and others. In Syria, it must mean a political transition and an end to Assad's brutality. Now I know there are some who think that we should do a deal with Assad in order to defeat ISIL. But I think this view is dangerously misguided. Our enemies' enemy is not our friend. It is another enemy. Doing a deal with Assad will not defeat ISIL - because the bias and the brutality of the Assad regime was and is one of the most powerful recruiting tools for the extremists. Syria needs what Iraq needs: an inclusive, representative, democratic government that can look after the interests of all its people.

So to those who have backed Assad or have stood on the sidelines, I would say this: we are ready to join with you in a new political effort to secure a representative and accountable government in Damascus that can take the fight to ISIL. But it is simply not credible for Assad to lead such a government. Although we are prepared to look at every practical option to find a way forward.

Third, we must be inclusive, engaging the widest possible coalition of countries in this international effort. ISIL is a threat to us all. But the greatest threat is to the region. It is very welcome that a number of Arab countries have already taken part in the action to degrade ISIL. They have shown courage and leadership.

Iran should also be given the chance to show it can be part of the solution, not part of the problem. Earlier today I met with President Rouhani. We have severe disagreements. Iran's support for terrorist organisations, its nuclear programme, its treatment of its people. All these need to change. But Iran's leaders could help in defeating the threat from ISIL. They could help secure a more stable, inclusive Iraq; and a more stable and inclusive Syria. And if they are prepared to do this, then we should welcome their engagement.

Finally, when the safety and security of our people is at stake, we must be uncompromising in our response. That starts at home. For our part, in the United Kingdom, we are introducing new powers. To strengthen our ability to seize passports and stop suspects travelling. To allow us to strip British identity from dual nationals and temporarily prevent some British nationals getting back into our country. To ensure that airlines comply with our no fly lists and security

screening requirements. And to enable our police and our security services to apply for stronger locational constraints on those in the UK who pose a risk.

Here at the United Nations we have led a Security Council Resolution to disrupt the flows of finance to ISIL - to sanction those who are seeking to recruit to ISIL and to encourage countries to do all they can to prevent foreign fighters joining the extremist cause. But what about the role of our military?

I don't believe this threat of Islamist extremism will best be solved by Western ground troops directly trying to pacify or reconstruct Middle Eastern or African countries. But pursing an intelligent and comprehensive approach should include a place for our military.

Our military can support the enormous humanitarian efforts that are necessary - as our Royal Air Force did helping the millions of people who have fled from ISIL. And we should – together – do more to build the capability of the legitimate authorities fighting the extremists.

This can mean training, equipping and advising. Providing technology and the other assets necessary for success. Whether it is supporting action against Boko Haram in Nigeria; against Al-Shabaab in Somalia; against Ansar Al-Sharia in Libya or against Al Qaeda in Yemen - it is right to help those on the frontline who are fighting for their societies and their countries and their freedom.

Along with our European partners we have already been supplying equipment directly to Kurdish forces. We are strengthening the resilience of military forces in neighbouring Lebanon and Jordan. And British Tornado and surveillance aircraft have already been helping with intelligence gathering and logistics to help support those taking on ISIL in Iraq.

We now have a substantial international coalition in place, including Arab nations, committed to confronting and defeating ISIL. We have a comprehensive strategy to do that – with the political, diplomatic, humanitarian and military components that it needs to succeed over time.

The UN Security Council has now received a clear request from the Iraqi government to support it in its military action against ISIL. So we have a clear basis in international law for action. And we have a need to act in our own national interest to protect our people and our society.

So it is right that Britain should now move to a new phase of action. I am therefore recalling the British Parliament on Friday to secure approval for the United Kingdom to take part in international air strikes against ISIL in Iraq.

My message today is simple. We are facing an evil against which the whole of the world should unite. And, as ever in the cause of freedom, democracy and justice, Britain will play its part.

6.4.2. Analysis of the speech

The third speech analysed in this chapter is the address by Mr. David Cameron, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland from 2010 to 2016 and leader of the Conservative Party from 2005 to 2016. As one of the closest allies of the United States and one of the major actors in the coalition to combat ISIS, it would stand to reason to compare the portrayals of Islam and Muslims in Cameron's speech with those appearing from Obama's speech.

Additionally, scrutinising the PM's portrayals of Islam and Muslims in his 2014 UNGA speech might hopefully help in testing the alleged mixture of ways in which the PM's discourse towards religion has been branded. Allen (2018: 1) reports 'an emerging trend [in the UK] whereby religion would appear to be acquiring an increasingly prominent role in the discourses of British politicians'. Allen points out that such a trend 'was particularly prominent while David Cameron was Prime Minister and leader of the Conservative Party' (ibid, 1). Not dissimilarly, O'Toole (2012: 6) agrees that the UK under Cameron's coalition government is witnessing 'a gradual move to take religious identities and faith communities more seriously', and Spencer (2017: 282) points out that Cameron's premiership 'was notable precisely for its willingness to talk about Christianity, religion and faith'. In fact, Cameron's own evangelical Christian faith has been well documented[93] and its role in his political convictions has produced considerable controversy[94].

Allen (2018) unearths discursive evidence that Cameron's 'Christian country' discourse is 'far from shaping or promoting a Britain that might be relevant and appropriate to today's increasingly diverse society' but instead focusses on 'conveying and establishing in the everyday thinking of the populace a construct of today's Britain that sought to demarcate 'us' from 'them''. While Cameron's adoption of the controversial *Prevent Strategy* as part of the *CONTEST*[95] policy was

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[93] In an article which the PM penned for the *Church Times* ahead of Easter Sunday on 16 April 2014, Cameron emphasised his 'evangelical faith' and argued for the need to be 'more confident about our status as a Christian country, more ambitious about expanding the role of faith-based organisations, and, frankly, more evangelical about a faith that compels us to get out there and make a difference to people's lives' (Cameron, 2014).

[94] e.g. Jones, D. (2008) Cameron on Cameron. London: Harper Collins. Crines, A and Theakston, K 'Doing God' in Number 10: British prime ministers, religion and political rhetoric. Politics and Religion. Nelson, F (2018) David Cameron wanted to normalize religion in public life – Theresa May should finish what he started https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2018/03/29/david-cameron-wanted-normalise-religion-public-life-theresa/

[95] *CONTEST* is a counter-terrorism strategy developed by the Home Office in 2003. Annual implementation reports of *CONTEST* was released in 2010 and 2014 outlining the goal of the strategy as aiming 'to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from terrorism,

also criticised by many -especially within Muslim communities- arguing that it stigmatised Muslims in Britain and positioned them as a security threat, others believe that Cameron's discourse on religion and multilateralism embodied a pro-Islam bias that privileged minority communities at the expense of the majority of population. Cameron delivered a plethora of speeches inside and outside Britain which included explicit – and perhaps unprecedented – references to Islam and Muslims. *Table 6.8* is a list of some of these speeches:

Table 6.8: List of relevant speeches by PM David Cameron

No.	Speech	Date
1	PM press statement following Paris talks	23/11/15
2	PM on ISIL at UN General Assembly	29/09/15
3	Extremism: PM speech	20/07/15
4	David Cameron's 2014 Eid al-Adha reception speech	09/10/14
5	PM speech at the UN General Assembly 2014[96]	25/09/14
6	Threat level from international terrorism raised: PM press statement	29/08/14
7	Prime Minister's words at Muslim News Awards	31/03/14
8	David Cameron's 2013 Eid al-Adha reception speech	22/10/13
9	Eid Al-Adha reception speech	31/10/12
10	Prime Minister in Malaysia	13/04/12

Reading through the abovementioned speeches, it becomes clear that David Cameron was inescapably involved in the politics about religion during his time as Prime Minister. This might have been a choice that the PM made but also could be a result of the need to provide an account of how the British Government conceives the role of Islam and Muslims in the wake of the rise of groups like ISIS, Boko Haram and Al-Shabab.

Within the UNGA corpus of this study and as articulated in chapter 4, the representatives of Israel, the USA and the UK were the only non-Muslim leaders in the top-ten list of most frequent reference to topics around Islam and Muslims (with a total of 46, 33, and 14 hits respectively); this statistical evidence also encourages me to analyse the representations appearing from the three speeches.

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so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence'. The strategy consisted of four work steams known as the 'four P's': Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare.

[96] This speech chosen for analysis in this section.

The timing of the speech, which was delivered on 25 September 2014, was crucial for the PM as he was set to return to the UK on the same day to chair a Cabinet meeting the next morning ahead of a parliamentary debate and vote on whether the UK will launch aerial strikes against ISIS targets in Iraq. Thus, it was predictable that the PM will use this speech as an opportunity to show determination in the fight against ISIS. The resignation of the UK shadow education minister and MP for *Tower Hamlets*, Rushanara Ali, ahead of the vote and her clear message that 'further airstrikes will only create further bloodshed and pain in Iraq' unravels the level of controversy that was taking place regarding such decision inside the UK.

After listing a number of challenges facing the international community including 'the aggression against Ukraine' (lines 2-3) 'seeking peace in the Middle East' (line 3) and dealing with the 'spread of Ebola virus in West Africa' (line 4), the PM emphasised that his speech will focus on 'the mortal threat we all face from the rise of ISIL' (lines 5-6). In what follows, the speech is constructed in a way to channel the speaker's views on the problem and propose a 'comprehensive' approach for defeating the group. *Table 6.9* below demonstrates topicality at the sentence level:

Table 6.9: Topicality analysis of David Cameron's UNGA address

Line No.	Discussed Themes
1-6	Introductory remarks outlining the major themes the speaker will address: • Peace in the Middle East • Rise of ISIS
7-156	Countering Violent Extremism 7-18 Depicting ISIL as the enemy 19-27 Reference to the past (Iraq and Afghanistan) and calling for a different path 27-35 Introducing a four-fold approach to countering terrorism <u>Lines 36 – 51 (1st) – Defeating the Ideology of Extremism</u> 36-41 Differentiating between 'Islam' and 'Islamist Extremism' 42-46 Tackling preachers that encourage violence 47-51 Defeating a clash of civilisations <u>Lines 52 – 104 (2nd) Working with Responsible Actors and Accountable Governments</u> 52-57 Banning hate preachers and organisations inciting violence 58-61 Tackling critics on free-speech and non-violent extremism 62-67 The role of Muslim governments

	68-70 The role of international community to counter extremist ideology 71-104 Calling on governments in the region to deliver political change and economic freedom but also back democracy and the rule of law 83-92 (IRAQ) Criticising Nouri Al-Maliki's autocratic and unrepresentative government and calling for establishing another legitimate government 92-104 (SYRIA) Calling for political transition and establishing a new government after removing Bashar Al-Assad
	Lines 105 – 115 (3rd) Taking an Inclusive Approach 105-108 Commending the role played by some Arab actors in the Middle East 109-115 Criticising the role of Iran and inviting it to engage in the efforts
	Lines 116–156 (4th) Taking an Uncompromising Approach 116-119 The Role of the UK and its recent actions 120-123 The Role of the UN 124-152 Calling for military action 124-135 Calling for direct military action 136-145 Training, equipping and advising involved agents 146-153 Supporting the international coalition and the role played by the Iraqi government 154-156 Calling on the British government to support airstrikes in Iraq
157-159	Concluding remarks

The speech promotes four key pillars set out by the PM as a vision to counter ISIL. These are:

(a) Being comprehensive: defeating the 'poisonous ideology of Islamist extremism' (lines 37-38).
(b) Being intelligent: working with 'representative and accountable governments' (line 76).
(c) Being inclusive: working with 'partners in the region' (line 32).
(d) Being uncompromising: use 'all the means at our disposal including military force' (line 34).

Although the speech is obviously oriented towards countering the threat of ISIL as a common goal to be achieved collectively by the UNGA member states, it is also premised on a rhetoric of countering the notion of 'a clash of civilizations'. *Figure 6.6* below demonstrates how '*countering a clash of civilisations*' and '*countering-*

terrorism' are the two intertwined major discourse topics in the PM's speech. It also identifies a number of intersecting sub-topics through which the speaker combined his two major topics:



Figure 6.6: The interdiscursive relationships and overlapping discourse topics on 'countering a clash of civilisations' and 'countering terrorism'.

This speech presents a response to the violence associated with ISIS and its likes or what David Cameron refers to as the 'threat of Islamist extremism' (line 128). Whilst the 'Islamist' threat in Cameron's speech is perceived as a fundamental threat to security that uses 'the most brutal forms of terrorism to force people to accept a warped world view and to live in a quasi-mediaeval state' (lines 40-41), it is made

clear that the problem is not with Islam which is depicted in the speech as 'a peaceful religion which inspires countless acts of generosity everyday' (lines 38-39).

However, good and bad forms of Islam are constantly classified in a binary of 'a peaceful religion' and 'a poisonous ideology'. Representing 'Islamist extremism' as a major threat to 'Muslims (both Sunni and Shia), Christians, Yazidis, people of every faith and none' (lines 12-13) allowed the speaker to create an in-group that includes all the groups threatened by 'Islamist extremism'. Following this initial introduction to the threat and threatened, the PM started to securitise the issue, representing it as posing a cross-faith and a very broad existential threat that must be dismantled militarily or otherwise. In doing so, Cameron uses an accumulation of strongly modalised assertions throughout the speech 'we *must* tackle it' (line 18), 'we *must not* be so frozen with fear that we don't do anything at all' (lines 23-24), 'we *must* defeat this ideology in all its forms' (lines 42-43), and 'we *must* proscribe organisations that incite terrorism' (lines 53-54). Once the enemy is portrayed as 'an evil against which the whole of the world should unite' (lines 157-158), the idea of using 'military force' (line 34) is then easily established as a measure to protect 'the cause of freedom, democracy and justice' (line 158) from the entity responsible for the lack of security.

The first occurrence of the word *Muslims* in the speech was in reference to innocent 'civilian Muslims' (line 9) in Deir al-Zor in Eastern Syria who were killed by ISIL because they 'refused to take an oath of allegiance to ISIL's sick extremist world view' (lines 9-10).

> Deir al-Zor is a province in Eastern Syria. Home to the al-Sheitaat tribe, it was captured by ISIL last month. 700 tribesmen were executed, many were beheaded. The vast majority were civilians - Muslims - who refused to take an oath of allegiance to ISIL's sick extremist world view – and who paid for this with their lives.
>
> **(lines 7-11)**

Employing a *topos of threat*, Cameron begins the speech by appealing to people's emotions (notice mentioning the execution of 700 Syrians) and a discursive attempt to demarcate a rhetorical distinction between Muslims who are constructed as *victims* of extremism and ISIL as a violent group rooted in 'a sick extremist world view' (line 10). Camron's focus on the harm inflicted on the *victims* (notice the construction of passive agents 'were executed', 'were beheaded', and 'paid their lives') is employed to show that the speaker is sympathetic to the plight of Muslims but also presents an attempt to gain political support for his upcoming proposal of a four-fold strategy for countering terrorism. Cameron repeatedly contrasts mainstream Islam with 'Islamist extremism', explaining that 'Islamist extremism'

relies on distortions of an essentially 'peaceful religion' (line 38). He then articulates a similar approach that has been employed in Obama's speech through declaring that the voices of extremists are not representative of Islam and therefore 'Muslims and their governments around the world [need] to reclaim their religion from these sick terrorists' (lines 64-65). Jackson (2007: 411) points out that this commonly cited narrative in political discourse 'implies that not only there is an identifiable line between 'moderates' and 'extremists', but the problem of terrorism is largely internal to the 'Islamic world' and it is the responsibility of the 'Islamic world to fix it'. In this way, Muslims and their governments can be held responsible for the rise of extremism due to their unwillingness or inability to confront and eradicate terrorist elements within their religion.

Next, Cameron attempts to provide rhetorical justifications for the actions he will propose in tackling the threat of 'Islamist extremism'. He paves the way for the argument that in order to save the lives of Muslims (and non-Muslims) from the repressive and backward 'Islamist extremism', the world must take 'uncompromising' (line 34) measures. But, such an argument needs to be well justified as some critics believe that 'there are solid historical and political reasons for suggesting that war, external intervention and foreign occupation are far from being ideal recipes for the introduction of democracy' (Khalidi, 2004: 55). Cognisant of such arguments, Cameron attempts to counter-argue through acknowledging 'past mistakes' (line 26) then presenting his 'new' proposal as a comprehensive solution to the problem:

> Now there is not one person in this hall who will view this challenge without reference to the past. Whether in Iraq. Whether in Afghanistan. Now of course it is absolutely right that we should learn the lessons of the past, especially of what happened in Iraq a decade ago. But we have to learn the right lessons. Yes to careful preparation; no to rushing to join a conflict without a clear plan. But we must not be so frozen with fear that we don't do anything at all.
>
> Isolation and withdrawing from a problem like ISIL will only make matters worse. We must not allow past mistakes to become an excuse for indifference or inaction. The right lesson is that we should act – but act differently.
>
> **(lines 19-27)**

Cameron suggests that UN member states should do what it takes to tackle ISIS 'using all the means at our disposal, including military force' (line 34). While the PM acknowledges past mistakes, and speaks in negative terms of what other governments had done wrong in Iraq and Afghanistan, he sidesteps any elaboration on how decisions of the past were crucial factors in creating situations in which violence has flourished. At the lexical level, the PM used 'but' three times in the

above extract. Instrumentalising 'but' in this manner is a rhetorical strategy called *apophasis*, through which the speaker mentions something quickly in an attempt to pass over it. The argumentation scheme in the previous example is also an example of the *topos of history* in DHA. In a *topos of history*, an argument is constructed as follows: because history teaches us that specific actions have specific consequences, one should perform, adapt or omit a specific action in a specific situation (allegedly) comparable with the historical example referred to. The scheme of this argument is also an example of the *special pleading* (aka double standard) fallacy. In this way, the PM attempts to convince his audience that while certain consequences/rules apply to other previous cases, his own actions should be judged differently or exceptionally. Meanwhile, the PM's argument does not offer much about what exactly went wrong in the past nor gives any guarantees that past mistakes would not re-occur. It would be useful here to think of what the speaker has chosen not to speak about since CDA as an approach attends to what is not said as much as what is said (see McGregor, 2010). At the most fundamental level, neglecting the factors leading to the rise of groups like ISIS can be problematic, not least in the context of justifying and supporting further security measures locally and internationally. Consider this extract in which the PM calls for new measures at the national level:

> We must ban preachers of hate from coming to our countries. We must proscribe organisations that incite terrorism against people at home and abroad. We must work together to take down illegal online material like the recent videos of ISIL murdering hostages. And we must stop the so called non-violent extremists from inciting hatred and intolerance in our schools, our universities and yes, even our prisons.
>
> **(lines 52-57)**

Whilst one might argue that proposals along these lines might have far-reaching consequences on the lives of Muslims as a minority group living in the UK, the PM constructs his suggestions as *forced actions* that have to be taken to prevent potential lethal and catastrophic outcomes of the threat. Also, drawing attention to 'preachers of hate' and 'organisations that incite terrorism' might incite fears that Muslims, especially those living as minority communities within countries of non-Muslim majority, are potential threats. In this way, the PM transfers any moral responsibility of war to the *Other* (i.e., ISIL, preachers of hate and non-violent extremists). The following statement in Cameron's argument which presupposes a voice of criticism is introduced by the discourse marker 'of course' (line 58) to show that the speaker is aware of the antinomy and incompatibility such measures might create for a liberal-democratic country that claims to protect free speech:

> Of course, there are some who will argue that this is not compatible with free speech and intellectual inquiry. But I ask you: would we sit back and allow

> right-wing extremists, Nazis or Klu Klux Klansmen to recruit on our university campuses? No.
>
> **(lines 58-61)**

In the previous statement, Cameron frames criticism that can be levelled to his proposals and legitimises his view using a rhetorical question that compares 'non-violent extremists' to 'right-wing extremists, Nazis or Klu Klux Klansmen' arguing whether such groups should be allowed to recruit in public spaces like university campuses. This *pre-emptive argumentation* [97]strategy involves the recognition of the opposing position or counter-arguments through a sequence in which the ideas preceding the connector 'but' function as acknowledgments that are followed by statements overruling them.

In this way, Cameron has no problem to accommodate the lack of freedom in the hope of purchasing security at the price of liberty. Framing his argument based on the two alternatives (i.e. either losing security or losing liberty), the PM employs a *bifurcation strategy* (aka 'black and white' fallacy) through which a speaker offers only two options only although others might exist. In such manner, a speaker forces his/her audience to accept an 'either/or' dichotomy even if the reality on the ground allows a range of other options.

Also, if we look at the lack of freedom resulting from banning some preachers as a consequence of an action that has to be done, then the PM is employing *the bogus dilemma* through which he presents alternative actions with their consequences, then assumes that since an action has to be done, then we must accept one of the consequences.

Regarding the representations attached to the abstract noun 'Islam', the next extract includes the only mention of the religion in Cameron's speech. In this statement, the PM criticises archetypal portrayals of Islam by the disclaimer that 'the root cause of this terrorist threat is nothing to do with Islam, which is a peaceful religion which inspires countless acts of generosity every day'(lines 37-39). This functions as a mitigation strategy in avoidance of the possibility that arguments about 'Islamist extremism' be interpreted as 'politically incorrect' or hostile towards the religion itself.

> The root cause of this terrorist threat is a poisonous ideology of Islamist extremism. This is nothing to do with Islam, which is a peaceful religion which inspires countless acts of generosity every day. Islamist extremism on

[97] In pre-emptive arguments, the speaker tends to acknowledge an opposing position, or even sympathise with it, but simultaneously showing that particular circumstances demand the option offered by the speaker.

> the other hand believes in using the most brutal forms of terrorism to force people to accept a warped world view and to live in a quasi-mediaeval state.
>
> **(lines 37-41)**

While assigning positive predications to Islam as 'peaceful' and inspiring 'acts of generosity' appears to be inclusive and resistant to Islamophobic sentiments, the PM's use of the phrase 'Islamist extremism' can still be problematic. As proposed earlier in this chapter, the use of the fixed phrase 'Islamist extremism' (which occurs three times in lines 37-38, 39 and 128) could in some way lead people to draw indissoluble links between Islam and extremism. When politicians use such phrases that connect Islam and extremism, the terms might become synonymous in the listeners' minds, skewing the public perception of Muslims.

It is feared that when the word Islamist occurs on its own, without the collocate extremism, some may be primed to think of the word extremism due to the cases in which they have heard the word. Akbarzadeh and Smith (2005) argue that the 'recurring language used to describe Islam and Muslims (such as 'Islamic terrorism', 'Muslim fanatics') can come to be representative of all Muslims and Islam as a religion'. Similarly, Jackson (2007) confirms that using a 'deeply problematic' notion like 'Islamic terrorism' comes 'laden with its own set of unacknowledged assumptions and embedded political-cultural narratives' (p.395).

Further, Cameron's use of the phrase 'Islamist extremism' is self-contradictory given that the PM seems to be fully cognisant of the unpleasant and harmful effect such a phrase might have on Muslim recipients of his discourse, let alone the service it offers to extremists. In 2007, Camron spent two days with two Muslims and their families in Birmingham and had an opportunity to discuss the effect of such phrase on Muslims, this quote summarises the PM's view on such nomination:

> The experience has strengthened my conviction about the right way to build a more cohesive Britain. First, a concerted attack on racism and soft bigotry. You can't even start to talk about a truly integrated society while people are suffering racist insults and abuse, as many still are in our country on a daily basis. We must also be careful about the language we use. No Muslim I've ever met is offended by Christmas, or supports its replacement with 'Winterval'. But many Muslims I've talked to about these issues are deeply offended by the use of the word 'Islamic' or 'Islamist' to describe the terrorist threat we face today. We do need greater understanding of the true nature of the terrorist threat. There's too much complacency about it among non-Muslims, and too much

> denial of it in the Muslim community. But our efforts are not helped by lazy use of language. Indeed, by using the word 'Islamist' to describe the threat, we actually help do the terrorist ideologues' work for them, confirming to many impressionable young Muslim men that to be a 'good Muslim', you have to support their evil campaign.
>
> (Cameron, 2007)

Concerning the representation of different social actors, it is also notable that Cameron extensively uses the deictic third person pronoun 'we'. This can be seen as a tool used to unite himself with the audience but also as a way to share responsibility for policy and action. While 'we' in the speech could denote 'we politicians' as in every politician representing a member state at the UNGA meeting, there were certain uses of 'we' that were more complicated than this, contributing to the formation of in-groups and out-groups. In this context, Wodak et al. (2009: 45) argue that the plural personal pronoun 'we' is the most complex type of pronoun for it can encompass all other personal pronouns. Here is how Wodak et al. (ibid, 46) explain the different uses of 'we':

Table 6.10: Different uses of 'we' (adopted from Wodak et al. (2009))

1	I + you	Partially/totally addressee inclusive
2	I + he/she	Addressee exclusive
3	I + you (plural)	Partially/totally addressee inclusive
4	I + they	Addressee exclusive
5	I + you + he/she	Partially/totally addressee inclusive + someone else
6	I + you(plural) + he/she	Partially/totally addressee inclusive + someone else
7	I + you(plural) + they	Partially/totally addressee inclusive + someone else

The complexity of the pronoun 'we' is reflected in how it is used (sometimes ambiguously) in Cameron's speech. 'We' in the speech is used to refer 'British people' (line 116), 'British Government' (line 118), 'the international coalition to defeat ISIL' (line 146), 'all UN member states' (line 5), 'Britain and its European partners' (line 141) and in particular cases to other possible referents like 'the whole world' (line 157). The following two extracts below show different kinds of 'we' and a shift from the totally addressee inclusive 'we' into a partially addressee inclusive 'we' that frames members of the UN as in-group and excludes Muslims as an out-group:

Extract 1

> This is a problem that affects **us all**. And **we** must tackle it together. Now there is not one person in this hall who will view this challenge without reference to the past. Whether in Iraq. Whether in Afghanistan. Now of course it is absolutely right that **we** should learn the lessons of the past, especially of what happened in Iraq a decade ago. But we have to learn the right lessons. Yes to careful preparation; no to rushing to join a conflict without a clear plan. But **we** must not be so frozen with fear that **we** don't do anything at all.
>
> **(lines 18-24)**

Extract 2

> **We** need **Muslims** and **their governments** around the world to reclaim **their** religion from these sick terrorists as so many are doing and quite rightly doing today. **We** all need to help **them** with programmes that channel young people away from these poisonous ideologues.
>
> **(lines 64-67)**

The use of 'we' in the first extract, 'this is a problem that affects us all. And we must tackle it together' (line 18) is an example of how Cameron attempts to establish a totally addressee inclusive sense. 'We' here implies a global collectivity which at the very least refers to UN member states including Muslim and non-Muslim governments (I + you (plural) + they). However, 'we' in this extract could be an example of what Wodak et al. (2009: 46) call a 'paternalistic we' which shows a directive to others in an asymmetrical power relationship. 'We must tackle it together' (line 18) in this extract can be compared to the way a parent tells a child 'we will now eat our food'; it could indicate the limited self-determination of certain addressees as a result of unequal power relations.

In the first instance of 'we' in the second extract, it seems that Cameron is shifting his use of 'we' to the partially addressee inclusive type of 'we' for that he referred to himself and other UN member states (I + you) as an in-group, then referred to 'Muslims and their governments around the world' as an out-group. In this example, the exclusionary quality of the pronoun 'we' is evident despite attempts by the PM to sound inclusive. In general, although Cameron's use of pronouns does not create definite delineations between '*Us*' versus '*Them*', his use of the pronoun 'we' reflected several overlapping and shifting meanings, as did his denotations for different social actors.

On an ideological level, the second quote (i.e. extract 2 above) can be an explicit example of some speakers' tendency to position Muslims and their governments

as passive bystanders contributing to the problem because they are silent or not doing enough to combat extremism or 'reclaim their religion' from terrorists[98]. In this context, Poole (2002: 252) affirms that 'Islam should not be constructed as the sole explanation for the behaviour of a multitude of different people unified into a collectivity through external definition'. The phrase 'as so many [Muslims and Muslim governments] are doing and quite rightly doing today' ascribes agency to Muslims and their governments as taking the right action from the speaker's perspective. However, the agency is reduced in the next sentence 'We all need to help them with programmes that channel young people away from these poisonous ideologues' (lines 66-67) where Muslims and their governments are presented as objects or 'patients' (passive agents) who need help.

[98] Also consider similar arguments in statements by other politicians: 'We need to rally a coalition of moderates — those willing to reclaim their religion and pursue the path to peace.' *Najib Razak 2014 speech*. 'Muslim leaders should speak up and condemn such violence, lest their silence be mistaken for acceptance.' *Najib Razak 2014 speech*.

6.5. KING ABDULLAH II'S ADDRESS

6.5.1. Transcript of the speech

United Nations General Assembly Hall
New York City, New York
28 September 2014

Bismilahi al-Rahman al-Raheeem

Mr. President, thank you.

Allow me to express today my highest regard for Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon for his dedication and tireless efforts to advance the cause of peace and global harmony. I have deeply appreciated our work together over the past 10 years.

Mr. Secretary-General, your excellencies

As I stand here today, elections to Jordan's national Parliament are coming to a conclusion. It is one more step on our country's positive evolutionary path — a path to which we have insistently conformed despite regional turbulence and a massive refugee burden. It represents an achievement that can be credited largely to our citizens, especially our youth, who have stubbornly held to Jordan's heritage of unity, strength and forward-looking spirit in spite of the odds. And it is those very odds that make the elections a true triumph of progress over regression.

Ladies and gentlemen,

As we gather here today, there are forces at play in my region and beyond whose sole purpose is to stack the odds against the core values that bind our common humanity. I am referring, of course, to the network of extremist terrorists who have dominated headlines lately. And they seek global dominance as well. They want to wipe out our achievements and those of our ancestors, to erase them and drag us back to the Dark Ages.

The question we must ask ourselves as we face the battle of our generation is what our legacy will be. Will we pass on to our children a world dominated by dread and division, where safety and security will be at the forefront of their minds as they board an airplane, attend a concert or football match, or stroll through a mall? Most important, are we doing what must be done to confront and decisively defeat this evil force, so that our children can live in a world where fear and suspicion are replaced by human comradery and hope, so they can reach their fullest potential and add to the stockpile of human achievement accrued over the ages?

As much as I wish it were otherwise, sadly the answer to those questions is no. How can we be effective in this fight when we have not clearly defined who the enemy is? Who are we fighting with, and who are we fighting against? And I am struck today, after several years of facing the global war on terror, by the lack of understanding of the true nature of Islam that I find among many Western officials, think tanks, media leaders and policymakers. I find myself stating the obvious again and again.

False perceptions of Islam and of Muslims serve to fuel the terrorists' agenda of a global struggle by polarizing and factionalizing societies East and West — each

side stigmatizing the other and each side driven deeper into mistrust and intolerance. Muslims, a quarter of the world's population and citizens of every country, have a central role in the future of our planet. Muslim men and women bring the world a rich heritage of civic responsibility, justice, generosity, family life, and faith in God.

When others, out of prejudice or ignorance of what Islam is, seek to exclude Muslims from fulfilling their role, or on the other hand, when the outlaws of Islam, the khawarij, attempt to mislead some Muslims by deforming our religion through false teachings, our societies' future is put at risk. When the outlaws of Islams, the khawarij, murder, when they plunder, when they exploit children and reject the equality of women before God, they abuse Islam. When the khawarij persecute minorities, when they deny freedom of religion, they abuse Islam.

Islam teaches that all humanity is equal in dignity. There is no distinction among the various nations or religions or races. The Quran forbids coercion in religion. Every citizen is guaranteed the State's protection for themselves, their families, their properties, their honour, their privacy, and their freedom of religion and thought. Muslims believe in the divine origins of the Bible and the Torah. God says in the Quran:

"Say Ye: 'We believe in Allah, and the revelation given to us, and to Abraham, Ishmael and Isaac and Jacob, and the tribes, and that given to Moses and Jesus, and that given to the Prophets from their Lord: We make no difference between one and another of them: and we submit to Allah.'" (The Holy Quran, II:136).

Indeed, the prophet mentioned most in the Quran is Moses, named 136 times. Jesus, whom we call "Christ Messiah," is named 25 times. His mother, Mary, called "best of all women in creation," is named 35 times, and there is a chapter in the Quran called Maryam. The khawarij deliberately hide these truths about Islam in order to drive Muslims and non-Muslims apart. We cannot allow that to happen.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Understanding that this is a battle that we must fight together — all religions and all of us who believe in the dignity, freedom, and well-being that is the birth-right of every individual — then we can turn towards our common enemy and examine through a clear lens the unique nature of our foe.

Let me state clearly that those radical outlaw groups do not exist on the fringes of Islam. They are altogether outside of it. Thus, we refer to them as khawarij: outlaws of Islam. They declare the entire civilized world as the enemy and all people, military or civilian, as fair game. They aim to incubate satellite caliphates in every country of the world in order to extend their reach. They are also expanding fast and wide through their mastery and exploitation of modern technology, including social media. To confront this non-traditional enemy, we need non-traditional means, a new mindset, new partnerships and reformed methodologies. For Muslims, first and foremost this is a fight for our future. All elements of our community have a role to play, not only in mosques and religious centers, but media, schools, and communities. Let no one be misled: traditional Sunni Islam and all of its schools of jurisprudence decisively reject the ideas and

claims of the takfiri jihadists. Muslims need to help identify and counter the outlaws of Islam who pick and choose and cut and paste religious texts in order to twist and distort true Islamic teaching.

The international community also faces a fight for the future. The war will not be fought on the battlefield alone. Our adversary has brought the fight to every place where humans live and interact: airports, cafes and city streets. Security cooperation is imperative, but equally important is a holistic approach. We need to open up new channels between continents and nations, within countries and among people. That means reforming the way we communicate, share information and use our technologies. The very same modern communication tools used against us must be employed by us, and we can do that while respecting the important issue of privacy. Creative innovators in the private sector, especially in the technology sector, are vital for our future and must be brought on board.

Ours is a global fight. The focus must not stop with the Middle East, but must reach far beyond into West and East Africa, South-East Asia and the Balkans. In Syria, a military approach will leave no winners, but only losers on every side and further civilian suffering. Ending violence ultimately demands a political process — one shepherded by a unified global vision and led by all of the Syrian people. In Iraq, international support remains critical as the Government and the people continue to uproot the khawarij. However, key to achieving and sustaining any success is an inclusive approach that engages all components of the country in the political process and in State institutions.

As we pursue those goals, the international community must also take responsibility for those whose lives have been crushed and who have been impoverished. I am referring to the millions of refugees and victims. We cannot decisively defeat the scourge of terror and violence without decisively rooting out the injustices that provide it with fertile ground. From the Abu Ghraib prison to the streets of Kabul and schools in Aleppo, injustice and humiliation have left tremendous human suffering in their wake.

No injustice has spread more bitter fruit than the denial of a Palestinian State. I believe that peace is a conscious decision. Israel has to embrace peace, or eventually be engulfed in a sea of hatred in a region of turmoil. Safeguarding Jerusalem is a key concern, as the Holy City is a strategic linchpin not only for my region but for the world.

That is a priority for me personally and for all Muslims. We utterly reject attacks on Muslim and Christian holy sites and any attempts to alter the historic Muslim, Christian and Arab identity of the Holy City. As the Custodian of Islamic Holy Sites in Jerusalem, I will continue my efforts to protect those places and stand up against all violations of their sanctity, including attempts to establish temporal and spatial divisions restricting free use of the Al-Aqsa Mosque on Haram Al-Sharif.

Perhaps the central and most vital battleground for this defining war of our generation is the mind. The despicable, damaging ideology of hate, murder and self-destruction that is being spread in crash courses online and elsewhere must be confronted with a counter-narrative of hope, tolerance and peace. Together, in

the General Assembly and in our regions, countries and communities across the world, we have the power to create that counter-narrative. Let us show that we also have the will to act.

6.5.2. Analysis of the speech

The final speech analysed in this chapter is the address by King Abdullah II of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Alongside the extensive reference to Islam and Muslims in the analysed speech (as shown in chapter 4) and the role that Jordan plays as a country bordering Iraq and Syria (parts of which have been seized by ISIS), the King of Jordan is a significant case study as a member of Hashemite ruling family that claims a direct lineage to the tribe of *Banu Hashim* to which the Prophet of Islam belongs. King Abdullah II is the 41st-generation direct descendant of Prophet Muhammad and is the custodian of the Muslim and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem; a position held by the Hashemite dynasty since 1924. The Hashemite dynasty has ruled Mecca and Medina (the holy lands of Islam) for centuries before King Abdul-Aziz Bin Saud (founder of the Saudi ruling dynasty) was able to distance the Hashemites in 1924 (see Chevallier, 2003).

Since ascending the throne of Jordan in February 1999, King Abdullah became an active voice addressing issues that concern Muslims in various global platforms (see El-Sharif, 2014; Al-Anbar, 2015; Al-Anbar, 2017, Templeton, 2018; Beavers 2018). El-Sharif (2014: 42) confirms that 'this lineage [to the prophet] has been repeatedly represented as a source of inspiration and guidance for the Hashemites in their rule and it allowed the Hashemites to affiliate their rule to Islam and faith'.

In November 2004, King Abdullah II launched *The Amman Message* during the *International Islamic Summit* that hosted 180 leading Muslim scholars from 45 countries. According to its summary, *The Amman Message*, which came in response to the rise of Islamophobia following the attacks of 9/11, aimed to 'declare what Islam is and what it is not, and what actions represent it and what actions do not'[99].

Recognising the King's influence, the *Royal Islamic Strategic Studies Centre* named the King as the most influential Muslim voice in its 2016 list of *The Worlds' 500 Most Influential Muslims*[100]. More recently, the King has been chosen as the *2018 Templeton Prize Laureate* for 'doing more to seek religious harmony within Islam and between Islam and other religions than any other living political leader' (President of the John Templeton Foundation, 2018). In 2019, the King received the

[99] The Amman Message official website: http://ammanmessage.com/?option=com_content&task=view&id=17&Itemid_=31

[100] The full list of *The Worlds' 500 Most Influential Muslims 2016* can be accessed from the official website of '*The Royal Islamic Strategic Studies Centre' at*: https://www.themuslim500.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/TheMuslim500-2016-low.pdf

Lamp of Peace Award for his efforts in promoting interfaith dialogue and peace (Gavlak, 2019).

As far as the context of this study is concerned, it should be noted that the contemporary role which some Muslim leaders' play within a supranational organisation like the UN encounters two main challenges which make their discourses interesting cases for study: On the one hand, leaders need to position themselves within an anti-terrorism narrative taking a stance to influence the debate. On the other hand, they have to be careful about the way they articulate their views as they are seen as contacts and representatives of states with an overwhelming majority of Muslim citizens. In other words, some leaders find themselves faced with internal expectations, external expectations, along with contextual factors such as their own profile, the history of the regions they come from as well as their own political goals.

Within the corpus of this study, the King referred to *Islam* and *Muslims* a total of 49 times in four speeches, 27 of which appeared in the 2014 speech analysed in this section. In this speech, King Abdullah decried both 'Islamophobia' and terrorists that he referred to as 'Khawarij' (outlaws) warning that both are equally damaging. The King's address, which has primarily focussed on the theme of encountering terrorism and Islamophobia, related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict which is also a recurring theme in the King's discourse nationally and internationally (Al-Anbar, 2016a). *Table 6.11* below presents a more detailed analysis of topicality within the speech.

Table 6.11: Topicality analysis of King Abdullah's UNGA address

Line No.	Discussed Themes
1-6	Introduction and thanking the Secretary-General
7-14	Jordanian Parliamentary elections and recent political progress
15-104	Encountering violent extremism 15-21 Introducing the threat of extremist terrorism 22-30 A series of rhetorical questions about the role of the international community in encountering terrorism 31-32 Addressing the effectiveness of the international community's reaction to terrorism 32-40 Tackling the rise of Islamophobia and lack of understating of Islam among many western officials 40-71 King's view on Islam, countering a clash of civilisations and promoting interfaith relations 72-78 Depicting extremists as Khawarij (outlaws)

	78-79 Calling for the use of non-traditional means to encounter a non-traditional enemy 80-86 The role of Muslims in fighting extremism 87-96 Proposing a holistic approach to countering terrorism • Security means • Security cooperation and information sharing • Technological and media means 97 - 98 Calling for international cooperation 98 - 101 The situation in Syria 102-105 The situation in Iraq 106-112 Calling for addressing injustices that create fertile grounds for extremism
113-124	The Palestinian-Israeli conflict and Jordan's role
125-131	Concluding the speech and calling for collective action against terrorism

Structurally, in contrast to the three other speeches analysed in this chapter, the overall structure of this speech clearly reflects Donahue and Prosser's (1997: 65) four features of the addresses delivered at the UNGA as a specific 'genre' that involves:

- Congratulations to the current president of the proceedings
- An affirmation of the importance or necessity of the UN
- The use of highly polite and formal language.
- Observations on regional or world issues.

Examining the list of 'keywords in context' for this speech, *figure 6.7* below reveals that the top three keywords in the speech are relevant to the representation of Islam and Muslims (i.e. *Khawarij*, *Islam* and *Muslims*).

word	frequency	frequency/mill
khawarij	6	3324.1
Islam	12	6648.2
Muslims	9	4986.1
fight	6	3324.1
global	6	3324.1
future	5	2770.1
must	9	4986.1
our	22	12188.4
world	7	3878.1
every	5	2770.1

Figure 6.7: Top ten keywords in King Abdullah's speech

The first keyword, as shown above, *khawarij* (outlaws) is worthy of further investigation. Incorporating the term *khawarij*, the king recontextualises the first civil war in Islam drawing links between the politically motivated injustices of the 7th century and the ones currently taking place. K*hawarij* comes from the Arabic root *kharaja* which means 'went out'. Delivering his speech in English, the king explained the term using the phrase 'outlaws of Islam' so that audiences not familiar with the term and its history can relate to the arguments made:

> … on the other hand, when the outlaws of Islam, the khawarij, attempt to mislead some Muslims by deforming our religion through false teachings, our societies' future is put at risk.
>
> **(lines 45-47)**

Within the Islamic religious tradition, the concept of *khawarij* refers to a group of Muslims who originally supported the authority of Ali ibn Abi Taleb, the 4th Caliph of Islam, also son-in-law and cousin of Prophet Muhammad(PBUH). Later on, *khawarij* rejected Ali's leadership and 'went out' revolting against his rule and showed extremist tendencies after splitting away from mainstream Islam (See Saunders, 1972). Recontextualising the term *khawarij* which is reminiscent of an early clash within Islam, the king invokes two significant presuppositions: first, the ideological fate of the current radical approaches including ISIS, Boko Haram and their likes which are, in his view, similar to the *khawarij*. In this sense, the presupposition is that today's extremist groups will not survive because history proved that *khawarij* were unable to continue after losing their battle against mainstream Islam. The second presupposition is that modern times *khawarij* will also be defeated as *khawarij* were defeated in the *Battle of Nahrawan* in 658 A.D. Form a linguistic standpoint, the speech establishes the appellation *khawarij* to describe 'extremist terrorists' and avoids calling them by names they use to propagate themselves including ISIS, ISIL and Da'esh. This could be seen as a strategy of nomination employed to prevent the terrorist ideology work for them on the grounds that the terminology deprives the group of any legitimacy among Muslims. Khan (2016) who essentially believes that groups like ISIS 'have perverted and distorted and tried to claim the mantle of Islam' calls for using other nominations to refer to the group in order to distance the religion's name from the actions of the group.

Being invoked in the speech, the concept of *khawarij* in Islam was borrowed from its old context (decontextualised) and then was inserted in a new context (recontextualised); a past reference has been reproduced in a contemporary context. Richardson and Wodak's (2009) claim that the recontextualised terms both retain some of their connotations and at the same time acquire new meanings. By recontextualising the term *khawarij (*lines 46, 48, 49, 64, 73 and 103), Islamic

history becomes an incentive for Muslims to fight groups like ISIS, taking Muslim ancestors like Caliph Ali ibn Abi Taleb as a model to follow.

The speech also benefits from the concept of *khawarij* to construct in-group and out-group social actors '*Us*' versus '*Them*'. After declaring that 'we face the battle of our generation' (line 21), the king discursively constructs the two sides of the battle. On the one hand, there is *khawarij* who 'attempt to mislead some Muslims by deforming our religion through false teachings' (lines 46-47). Khawarij 'abuse Islam' (lines 49 and 50) because they 'murder' (line 48), 'plunder' (line 48), 'exploit children and reject the equality of women before God' (lines 48-49), 'persecute minorities' (lines 49-50) and 'deny freedom of religion' (line 50). On the other hand, we have 'all religions and all of us who believe in the dignity, freedom, and well-being that is the birth-right of every individual' (lines 69-70). In DHA, the continual explicit comparisons are seen as devices of predication in which certain social actors are discursively qualified or disqualified (See Reisigl & Wodak 2016). In the king's speech, Muslim men and women 'bring the world a rich heritage of civic responsibility, justice, generosity, family life and faith in God' (lines 42-43) while 'seek[ing] global dominance' (19) wanting 'to wipe out our achievements' (20) and 'drag[ing] us back to the dark ages' (line 21) are the goals of extremist terrorists.

Concordance lines of the word *Islam* would be useful to get initial clues about the contexts of using the word and the representations of the religion in the King's speech.

file412972...	lack of understanding of the true nature of	Islam	that I find among many Western officials
file412972...	obvious again and again.False perceptions of	Islam	and of Muslims serve to fuel the terrorists'
file412972...	others, out of prejudice or ignorance of what	Islam	is, seek to exclude Muslims from fulfilling
file412972...	or on the other hand, when the outlaws of	Islam	, the khawarij, attempt to mislead some
file412972...	equality of women before God, they abuse	Islam	. When the khawarij persecute minorities
file412972...	they deny freedom of religion, they abuse	Islam	.Islam teaches that all humanity is equal
file412972...	deny freedom of religion, they abuse Islam.	Islam	teaches that all humanity is equal in dignity
file412972...	khawarij deliberately hide these truths about	Islam	in order to drive Muslims and non-Muslims
file412972...	outlaw groups do not exist on the fringes of	Islam	. They are altogether outside of it. Thus
file412972...	we refer to them as khawarij: outlaws of	Islam	. They declare the entire civilized world
file412972...	Let no one be misled: traditional Sunni	Islam	and all of its schools of jurisprudence
file412972...	help identify and counter the outlaws of	Islam	who pick and choose and cut and paste religious
file412972...	future is put at risk. When the outlaws of	Islams	, the khawarij, murder, when they plunder

6.8. Concordance lines of the lemma ISLAM in King Abdullah's address

As can be seen, the first three instances of referring to 'Islam' in the speech came in the context of denouncing 'the lack of understanding of the true nature of Islam'

(lines 33-34) which the King notices in conversations with 'many Western officials'. Here, King Abdullah, as a member of the political elite, reports an insider's observation and criticises certain officials' ignorance of what Islam is. In the second and third lines of the above concordance, the king discusses the dire consequences of having 'false perceptions of Islam' (line 37):

> False perceptions of Islam and of Muslims serve to fuel the terrorists' agenda of a global struggle by polarizing and factionalizing societies East and West — each side stigmatizing the other and each side driven deeper into mistrust and intolerance.
>
> **(lines 37-40)**

He continues:

> Muslim men and women bring the world a rich heritage of civic responsibility, justice, generosity, family life, and faith in God. When others, out of prejudice or ignorance of what Islam is, seek to exclude Muslims from fulfilling their role.
>
> **(lines 41-45)**

As can been seen from the second extract, another '*Us*' versus '*Them*' division becomes clear in the predications assigned to Muslims and the Islamophobes. The speaker assigns agency to 'Muslim men and women' as social actors depicting them in a positive light as having the quality of bringing 'rich heritage of civic responsibility, justice, generosity, family life and faith in God' (lines 42-43). Whilst the King is attempting to counteract an archetypal image of Muslims, the attributes he ascribes to the Islamophobes included 'prejudice or ignorance of what Islam is' (line 44) and 'seek[ing] to exclude Muslims from their role' (lines 44-45).

Throughout the speech, the pronoun 'we' is used to refer to multiple social actors; however, the shift in the meaning of 'we' resulted in constructing different in-groups and out-group. In the second paragraph of the speech, 'we' refers to Jordanians (line 9), 'we' in (line 16) refers to member states of the UNGA and 'we' in (line 69) refers to Muslims. Another way of creating connection with the audience was achieved through a series of rhetorical questions (lines 22-32) which also functioned as an intensification strategy to get the audience to accept the thread of the argument.

The king formulates his arguments in a personal way to show personal involvement and commitment to his views. Consider how he modalises some statements with expressions like 'I believe' (lines 113-114), 'I will continue my

efforts' (line 121) and 'this is a priority for me personally' (line 118). The personal focus sustained throughout the speech made the King seem more of a politician who disputes a position with conviction. The use of modality in the following phrases reflects a degree of conviction:

- Creative innovators … are vital for our future and **must** be brought on board (lines 95-96).
- The focus **must not** stop with the Middle East, but **must** reach far beyond into West and East Africa (lines 97-98).
- The international community **must** also take responsibility (lines 106-107).
- Israel **has to** embrace peace, or eventually be engulfed in a sea of hatred in a region of turmoil (lines 114-115).

Conviction was also expressed using hyperbolic expressions that also functioned as a strategy of intensification that can be realised in the use of certain adjectives and adverbs like 'massive' (line 10), 'again and again' (line 36), 'also' (lines 76 and 87), 'every' (line 88 and 99), 'ultimately' (line 100), 'decisively' (line 109/twice), 'utterly' (line 18).

From line 51 – 64, it is possible to see an attempt to define the religion of Islam through direct reference to some of its attributes and teachings:

> Islam teaches that all humanity is equal in dignity. There is no distinction among the various nations or religions or races. The Quran forbids coercion in religion. Every citizen is guaranteed the State's protection for themselves, their families, their properties, their honour, their privacy, and their freedom of religion and thought. Muslims believe in the divine origins of the Bible and the Torah.
>
> **(lines 51-55)**

To create a contrast with the ideas propagated by both extremist terrorists and the Islamophobes, the King argues that 'the Quran forbids coercion in religion' (lines 52-53) and that 'Muslims believe in the divine origins of the Bible and the Torah' (line 54-55). Besides tying the argument to the religious realm (a feature we have not seen in the other speeches analysed in this chapter), the speaker shows how much he is conversant with religious teachings by recontextualising religious elements from the Quran giving them contemporary meanings. Here is an example of a religious-based intertextual reference in the speech:

> God says in the Quran: "Say Ye: 'We believe in Allah, and the revelation given to us, and to Abraham, Ishmael and Isaac and Jacob, and the tribes, and that given to Moses and Jesus, and that given to the Prophets from their

Lord: We make no difference between one and another of them: and we submit to Allah.'" (The Holy Quran, II:136)

(lines 55-60)

Following this quote and as a strategy of intensification, the King also listed the following three facts about the Quran which he believes are 'truths about Islam' (line 64) that 'the khawarij deliberately hide … in order to drive Muslims and non-Muslims apart' (lines 64-65):

- '[T]he prophet mentioned most in the Quran is Moses, named 136 times' (line 61)
- 'Jesus, whom we call "Christ Messiah," is named 25 times' (line 62).
- 'His mother, Mary, called "best of all women in creation," is named 35 times, and there is a chapter in the Quran called Maryam.' (lines 62-64)

Mentioning these facts constitutes an attempt to call for increased interfaith tolerance to improve East-West relations. By doing so, an attempt is made to defend the religion through constructing a counter-discourse from within the Muslim tradition. The King while repetitively demonstrating his commitment to the religious values of Islam, he appears more willing to reach out to Christian and Jew audiences by means of illuminating the status of Christian and Jew religious figures within the Islamic tradition. His view further demonstrates advocacy for a multi-faith consensus that draws on the idea that Islam is a continuation of the revelations of God to his messengers. Between lines 68 - 81 the King reiterates the difference between 'Muslims' and 'khawarij' declaring that 'those radical outlaw groups do not exist on the fringes of Islam. They are altogether outside of it. Thus, we refer to them as khawarij: outlaws of Islam' (lines 73-74).

Compared to the three other speeches analysed in this chapter, the King's speech is rich in religious language despite the religiously diverse nature of the immediate audience of the speech. This speech by the King reflects a tendency to use religious rhetoric outside of specifically religious occasions in order to establish a certain image of his faith, and to draw attention to links between different religious traditions. Since overt religious references have always been part of the King's discourse in political as well as religious occasions, it appears that this approach is not random or haphazard but rather a strategic one.

Chapter 7

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Imagining what it is like to be someone other than yourself is at the core of our humanity. It is the essence of compassion, and it is the beginning of morality

Ian McEwan (2001)

The initial motivation of this thesis was to understand the ways in which Islam and Muslims are represented in the UNGA speeches from 2013 to 2016 using specific discursive strategies. This final chapter revisits the study's research questions and recapitulates the central thrust of the thesis in terms of the research problem and the methodological procedure adopted to achieve the aims of the thesis. This chapter will also summarise the main argument, before drawing together the major findings of the thesis and discussing some of their implications.

The thesis began with the assumption that there is now growing evidence of mischaracterising Islam and Muslims in political discourses; a phenomena which merits attention and consideration. It has also been argued in *Chapter 1* that the (re)production of such perceptions might have far-reaching and dire consequences. Thus, the thesis focussed on examining the ways in which politicians have talked about Islam and Muslims within the UN as an international institutional platform that plays an important role in manufacturing world politics, collective beliefs, and ideologies around the most pressing global issues.

Aiming to make a significant contribution to knowledge through researching a topic that is both highly consequential and notably under-researched, this study developed and operationalised a context-sensitive model of analysis benefiting from a synergy between corpus-linguistics analytical tools and different strands of CDA to carry out analyses on 787 political speeches delivered at four consecutive annual UNGA sessions between 2013-2016. My methodology, especially the specific strands of CDA and corpus tools picked for analyses, might be useful as a template for investigators into the representations of particular groups in political contexts.

As established in Chapter 1, CDA is a powerful mechanism for identifying social problems, revealing power inequalities and discursive injustices. Meanwhile, corpus tools are means for considering large amounts of data which enable

practitioners to make statistically-supported claims based on quantitative evidence. The combination of quantitative and qualitative methods in this thesis have considerably enriched the ensuing analysis, and to my knowledge, this thesis takes into account the largest amount of political statements (1,637,000-word corpus) about Islam and Muslims that have been undertaken.

While the contemporary representations of Islam and Muslims are most clearly illuminated in *Chapter 2*, the discussion took me beyond the time and place of the studied speeches. This chapter is where I presented some of the issues pertaining to the representations of Islam and Muslims in many parts of the world highlighting the politics of fear and affection pre-and-post 9/11 and reflecting on the renewed concerns appearing as a result of the rise of ISIS and its likes. The chapter also considered the UN as a spatial setting of the studied speeches offering a critique of its role as a global governance institutional framework.

The chief theoretical assumptions that inform the present study, the main approaches it employs as well as the methodological instruments applied in the analysis were addressed in *Chapter 3*. Additionally, this chapter also synthesised principal scholarship of analysing political discourse in order to explain the reasoning behind choosing CDA as an analytical framework utilised to critique the discursive representations of Islam and Muslims. In *Chapter 4*, I presented the stages of compiling the corpus of the study, the electronic text-encoding procedure as well as the toolkit employed to analyse the data quantitatively and qualitatively.

Quantitative corpus-based analyses which began with presenting frequency lists in *Chapter 4* were built on and expanded in *Chapter 5* which was concerned with outlining the collocational profile and the ideological representations of the lemmata ISLAM and MUSLIM. *Chapter 5*, which attempted to give a fuller account of the representations appearing from the corpus as a whole, investigated word sketches, lists of collocations and concordance lines to find the most commonly occurring themes in relation to Islam and Muslims and to explore the various positive/negative discourse prosodies attached to the religion and its adherents.

Finally, *Chapter 6* examined four carefully-selected speeches to look further into how Islam and Muslims are represented by Muslim and non-Muslim politicians. It, in the main, sought to uncover what discourse suggests about each speaker's own priorities, purposes and values. Context-sensitive micro and macro analyses in this chapter aimed to provide a socio-political perspective on the studied discourses through elucidating, insofar as possible, a set of discursive and argumentation strategies employed to construct representations of different social and political actors (e.g. groups, parties, and states).

Examining the UNGA corpus using the corpus-linguistics research tool *Sketch Engine* (mainly in Chapter 5) revealed limited frameworks and themes of discussion around Islam and Muslims. Whilst my results contribute new insights to contemporary and longstanding debates in the realm of political communication concerning the representations of Islam and Muslims, it is recognised that with a focus on political discourses at the UNGA they only provide one part of a much bigger picture. The findings demonstrate that speaking about Islam and Muslims was primarily oriented towards the following thematic categories:

- RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS SPECTRUM / IDENTIFYING CHARACTERISATIONS
- VIOLENCE AND CONFLICT
- POSITIVE ATTRIBUTES
- ETHNICITY/NATIONALITY
- COLLECTIVE REFERENCES

Although the speeches contained within the corpus of this study seem to prioritise an international relations positioning coloured by diplomatic language, what emerges from qualitative examinations of the abovementioned categories is a discursive variance and differential representations appearing form the corpus. Speeches analysed in this endeavour embodied a struggle over the meaning of Islam as a religion through competing discourses that seek to define what beliefs and practices represent Islam.

While multiple speakers made very explicit statements aimed at explaining Islam as a religious belief in terms of its teachings, what it stands for, as well as the spirituality of Muslims as followers of the religion, other speakers only emphasised discussions about the violence committed by groups/individuals that claim affiliation to the religion and thus involved placing representations within a context of conflict. It is evident from the discourse analyses conducted on selected extracts from the corpus that some speakers tended to present an incomplete account of a rather complex reality, emphasising the acts of certain radical groups as archetypical of Islam, neglecting diversity within Islam and the complex historic and socio-political dynamics that contributed to the radicalisation of certain groups including the role of colonisation, foreign intervention and economic hardships.

Although in most cases the majority of Muslims were characterised as peaceful, the focus in many speeches was heavily dedicated to a dangerous minority. It is obvious that security was a concern behind the articulation of particular representations, and much of the focus on Islam and Muslims concerned the role played by organisations that claim affiliation to the religion in domestic and international politics.

Certain representations within the theme of VIOLENCE AND CONFLICT were particularly problematic for attaching negatively shaded collocates to the words *Islam* and *Islamist(s)*. Certain speakers' use of specific combinations like 'Islamist extremism', 'radical Islamists', 'militant Islamists' and 'preachers of hate' is indicative of a negative discourse prosody which, as established in Chapter 6, gives the implication that Islam as a religion is explicitly linked to aggression and militancy. If a minority is involved in conflicts, overemphasis on their actions and practices can be harmful given the fact that the vast majority of Muslims are not involved in conflict nor extremists. As has been shown in the analysis of PM David Cameron's speech, this can be more problematic when we know that a certain speaker is especially aware of the bad consequences of using such collocations but still decides to incorporate them into his discourse.

The underlying discourse and the way in which certain speakers irresponsibly constructed Islam around conflict can subtly transmit ideologies that reinforce a conception of a direct link between the religion and conflict, and which represent Muslims as perpetrators of violence. Certain statements like the ones found in PM Benjamin Netanyahu's speech are indicative of a negative agenda, and can be examples of using subtle techniques of misrepresentations of different Islamist political actors (see section 6.2.2). Conflating groups can only contribute to hindering positive social relations between Muslims and non-Muslims across different spheres and only supports the 'myth of confrontation' or 'clash of civilisations'.

Yet, on the whole, the corpus of this study does not contain explicit evidence of extremely negative and generalising archetypal portrayals of Islam or Muslims. It is argued that most speakers were careful not to make outrageous or stereotyping claims about the religion and its adherents. In fact, we find many instances of what can be termed 'discourses of inclusivity' which contained representations that sought to offer a more balanced picture of the religion and its people through emphasising positive attributes employing words like 'moderate, noble, and peaceful' or explicitly dissuading Islamophobic perceptions. Declaring that Islam is not monolithic and certain speakers' reference to positive Muslim voices have actually helped to offset the arguments of war, violence and terrorism. For instance, statements like the following are indicative of competing discourses within the UNGA debates:

> As the Grand Mufti of Egypt said to me two weeks ago, ISIL is abusing the name of Islam and the very values of Islam and of every religion. I welcome the statements made and measures taken by the League of Arab States, the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation and Muslim nations against ISIL
>
> (*Mr. Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, 25 September 2014)*.

Whilst positive representations are not necessarily problematic in and of themselves, it is worth mentioning that emphasising positive traits to counteract archetypal views about the religion can send a message that something is not quite right with the religion.

Within the ETHNICITY/NATIONALITY frame, many politicians problematically blended race, ethnicity and religion without differentiating between them. The ethnicity of certain groups like *Arabs* tended to be treated as interchangeable with the religious identity of being Muslim. Other uses of ethnicity/nationality collocations with the adjective *Muslim* occurred as a means of emphasising the religious identity of Muslim minorities within certain countries. Such uses imply the existence of perceptions that Muslim minorities are *not* part of the fabric of societies they live within and raises questions about whether being Muslim fits comfortably with living in certain countries. The use of nominations like 'Muslim Americans' or 'British Muslims' can be problematic when we know that Muslims are the only people of faith who are assigned this kind of nomination within the entire corpus.

We also have seen that Muslims were frequently referred to using collective nouns such as *world*, *community* and *ummah (worldwide community)*. As argued in Chapter 5, some collective totalising references, which have rapidly invaded the political lexicon, might falsely represent Muslims as a homogenous monolithic entity and lump Muslims together as one unified and colossal bloc. Such findings echo Cohen's (1988: 72) conclusion that certain phrases construct a 'totalizing strategy' through which 'an individual Muslim is constructed as a Muslim whatever other characteristics or commonalities he or she may share with other groups'. However, we have also seen how certain collective nominations reflected homogeneity between Muslims in a positive light when some Muslim leaders used a word like *ummah (worldwide community)* juxtaposing an ideal vision of Muslims which is at stake because of the sectarian conflicts taking place within certain Muslim countries. Revitalising the use of such term urges Muslims to unite in taking certain actions that would protect the *ummah*. Such nomination strategy is evidence of

representations that aim to resist and explicitly reject other negative meanings that appeared in other political speeches within the corpus of this study.

Overall, whilst contexts of conflict and extremism are by far the major perceptual framework within which representations of Muslims have appeared in the corpus, analyses demonstrated a diversity of topics and discursive variance in terms of representation. Certainly, there were also variations in the way in which heads of states constructed views about the religion itself. Differential representations reflected the variety of attitudes held by different politicians and presented multiple competing depictions of the religion and its adherents.

A consistent framework of representation appearing from the corpus of this study was that of Muslims as passive bystanders or secondary social actors who do not explicitly reject the ideology of groups like al Qaeda and ISIL; evidence for this representation is found in the four CDA-analysed speeches and within the analysed concordance lines of the larger corpus as a whole.

Another passive representation was that of Muslims as victims of different forms of injustice. They are victims of 'extremism', 'Islamophobia', 'the dictates of states', 'the lack of knowledge', 'the economic difficulties' and others. Representing Muslims in such victimising rhetoric creates a distorted picture of the majority of Muslims, especially for audiences who are exposed to few alternative depictions of the religion and its followers. It is also noted that most of the discourses that victimise Muslims have often turned a blind eye to countering the ideology of terrorism and failed to speak to the hearts and minds of those vulnerable to the propaganda of extremists. In many cases, a split between 'Islam' and 'the West' is emphasised in a way that represents the existence of two cultural 'camps'. The 'Us' versus 'Them' divide which is clearly referenced in a number of speeches across the studied corpus was employed in many cases to exclude Muslim actors.

Notably, similarities were detected in the various types of topoi drawn upon in the major arguments steering the discussions around Islam and Muslims. The detailed CDA analyses of four selected speeches have echoed the diversity of representations appearing from the corpus as a whole. Representations of social actors in PM Benjamin Netanyahu's speech were premised on a *topos of threat*, a *topos of urgency* and a *topos of burden.* Using such argumentation schemata, the PM conflated depictions of the three different actors *Hamas*, *Iran* and *ISIS* which he metaphorically classified as 'branches of the same poisonous tree'. In attempting to discursively position ISIS and Hamas as interchangeable and equal security threats, the PM used fallacious statements and simplistic claims like 'Hamas is ISIS and ISIS is Hamas' disregarding the fact that the two represent a highly diverse reality both in substance and demand. In a similar vein, the repetitive use of phrases like 'the

Islamic State of Iran' along with an array of nominations and predications that aimed to blur differences between several actors could be read as blanket sweeping generalisations (aka *secundum quid*[101]) alienating large groups of Muslims. Revivificating some of the atavistic fears of Islam, the representations of various Islamist social actors in the PM's speech predominantly focussed on the idea that an Islamist threat targets the 'in-group', be it the existence of Israel or the security of the UN's member states. In many cases, the PM resorted to the victim-victimiser reversals (aka *Trajecto in alium fallacy*) and benefited from different types of rhetorical questions (e.g. *anacoenosis* and *hypophora)* in a didactic manner.

By contrast, analyses of the address by President Barack Obama revealed a more positive tone towards Islam and Muslims. In his 2014 speech, a number of discursive strategies were adopted to avoid the use of polarising and stereotyping language. Early on, the president employed an assertive tone and benefited from emphatic repetitions as discursive strategies to reiterate that the US is not at war with Islam, repudiating the notion of a 'clash of civilizations'. The speech abounds with explicit instances of depicting Islam and Muslims in a positive light through a predicational strategy of attaching 'peace' to 'Islam' and 'dignity and justice' to 'Muslims'. Obama's use of a *topos of history* is clear in instances where the president built on historic evidence to emphasise the affinity between Christianity and Islam. However, representations within this speech are not without problems (see section 6.3.2). As has been shown, some nominations or arguments could be problematic in the sense that they could be read in both inclusive and exclusive ways. Examples of this included the nomination 'Muslim Americans' and the argument that 'Muslim Americans are part of the fabric of the country' which raise questions about whether being Muslim fits comfortably with being American and which allude to a problem of integration. Additionally, analyses of Obama's speech revealed argume nts that dichotomise Muslims into two groups: *moderate initiative-taking individuals* and *passive bystanders*. Quoting well-known Muslim figures was one particular persuasive framing strategy which enabled the president to align himself with the ideology of 'moderate individuals' creating such dichotomous discourse.

PM David Cameron's speech which has overwhelmingly focussed on 'countering terrorism' as well as 'countering the thesis of a clash of civilisations' was built on a *topos of threat*, a *topos of urgency* and a *topos of history*. While the speech is a proof of a discursive attempt to demarcate a distinction between Muslims and extremist

[101] *Secundum quid* is a fallacious argumentation strategy employed through establishing generalisations on the basis of inadequate evidence.

groups, many representations provide views that are in fact questionable. Although Muslims are mostly presented in a positive light, I argued that referring to extremists using nominations like 'Islamist extremism' throughout the speech can be counterproductive to the inclusivity agenda, not least knowing that the PM seems to be fully aware of the unpleasant and harmful effect such phrase might have on Muslim recipients of his discourse as evident from an earlier statement (see section 6.4.2). Additionally, the complexity of using the deictic pronoun 'we' in the speech was noteworthy; Cameron's use of pronouns does not create definite delineations between '*Us*' and '*Them*', and his use of 'we' reflected several overlapping and shifting meanings, as did his denotations for different social actors including Muslims and Muslim governments.

Van Dijk (1996: 91-94) points out that minority groups are frequent topics of political talk and text, but have very little control over their representations in political discourse. Within an establishment like the United Nations, we have seen a mixture of representations and Muslim leaders always have an opportunity to construct their identities and discourses surrounding themselves. King Abdullah II's speech, which was chosen as an example of a Muslim voice that extensively referred to Islam and Muslims, employed strategies of nomination, predication and religious intertextual networks. Using a nomination like *khawarij (outlaws of Islam)* throughout the speech in reference to extremists aimed to achieve a twofold purpose: (1) prevent the spread of terrorist ideologies by refusing to use names they use to propagate themselves including ISIS, ISIL and Da'esh (2) invite a religiously-based reference that appeals to the minds and hearts of Muslims reassuring audiences that the fate of current radical fringes will be similar to that of *khawarij* who lost their battle against mainstream Islam (see section 6.5.2). Throughout the speech, the king formulated '*Us*' versus '*Them*' divisions using numerous predications assigned to Muslims and the Islamophobes. In connection to this, the king's use of manifest and constitutive forms of intertextuality by citing facts and verses from the Quran helped offset the stories of extremism through presenting the views of an 'insider' in addition to presenting the Islamic tradition's view on interfaith tolerance.

Overall, the construction of views around Islam and Muslims in the studied speeches depended on the (re)production of similar linguistic structures, discursive strategies and argumentation schemata. Some of argumentation schemes and fallacies which some speakers resorted to in order to add weight that can assist in carrying their arguments through are listed below[102]:

[102] Explanations/definitions of the most commonly used topoi are adopted from Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 74-80).

- *Topos of burden*: If a person, an institution or a country is burdened by specific problems, one should act in order to diminish these burdens.
- *Topos of threat (danger):* If there are specific dangers and threats, one should do something against them.
- *Topos of authority:* if authority X says A is true, then A is true
- *Topos of justice:* If persons/actions/situations are equal in specific respects, they should be treated/ dealt with in the same way.
- *Topos of history:* because history teaches that specific actions have specific consequences, one should perform or omit a specific action in a specific situation (allegedly) comparable with the historical example referred to.
- *Topos of responsibility*: Because a state or a group of persons is responsible for the emergence or continuation of specific problems, it/they should act in order to find solutions to these problems.
- *Topos of urgency*: Decisions has to be made or actions has to be taken very quickly
- *Topos of reality*: because reality is as it is, a specific action/decision should be performed/made
- *Argumentum ad baculum* (or appeal to the stick): introducing forms of force as means of persuasion; the fallacy in this argument lies in its introduction of irrelevant material (use of force) if an antagonist does not comply with the speaker's wishes.
- *Bifurcation* (or 'black and white' fallacy): introducing two alternatives only although others exist. Using this fallacy, speakers force their audiences to accept an 'either/or' situation while the reality on the ground allows a range of other options.
- *Argumentum ad ignorantiam* (or appeal to ignorance): supposing that a claim is true because it has not been or cannot be proven false.
- *Argumentum ad misericoriam* (or appeal to pity): This fallacy is one of many 'appeal to emotions' fallacies that is capable of replacing convincing arguments with pity and empathy.
- *Dicto simpliciter* (or sweeping generalizations): applying broad rules to individual cases whose special features might differ and thus make it different.
- *The bogus dilemma*: presenting alternative actions along with their consequences; then supposing that since an action has to be done, then we must accept one of the consequences.
- *Ethical superiority*: supposing you are ethically superior to your antagonist(s) without enough supporting evidence.
- *Secundum quid* (or hasty generalization): establishing a generalization on the basis of unrepresentative cases or inadequate evidence.
- *Special pleading* (or double standard): supposing that while certain rules

should apply to other cases, one's own actions can be judged differently (or exceptionally).

- *Straw man fallacy*: misrepresenting the opposing position through oversimplifying an opponent's argument or quoting his/her words out of context.

The discursive and argumentation strategies which have been used by the four speakers are not peculiar to the UNGA genre of political speeches and can be observed elsewhere across other genres of political discourse (e.g. campaigning speeches, party-group meetings and parliamentary addresses). The representations of Islam and Muslims in the discourses of the UNGA are also seen as connected to wider depictions including those appearing in media portrayals and other political discourses outside the UN.

Representations of Islam and Muslims that have been explicated throughout the analyses carried out in this study, in spite of being varied and despite evidence of some forms of resistance, can have a similar impact. One could go further to point out that representations -excluding very few exceptional instances- do not offer enough challenge to the current power relations but rather legitimise existing political relations of dominance. A significant implication of this is that those who write or deliver political speeches that involve discursive elements of representing religion must become more careful to the kinds of political import of their statements about the religion and its followers since as Rehman (2007: 198) argues 'a reckless and uncaring usage of words could jeopardise relations between various communities and societies, and can easily provoke anger and resentment'.

The conclusions presented here are in no way sufficient for making decisive judgements about the competing, and sometimes, conflicting portrayals of Islam and Muslims in political discourse. Baker (2012: 254-255) confirms that 'negative representations of social groups are problematic whatever context they occur in, but certain contexts, such as those which are made by powerful or influential text producers or are received by powerful people and/or reach very large numbers of people, may result in more immediate and damaging consequences'. I would argue that since politicians in this study are members of the powerful elite who not only have access to international governing institutions like the UNGA, but also presumed to be authoritative and have the power to shape support for policies and laws, then their discourses are quite influential and can contribute to hindering or advancing social relations. As Malik (2004: 9) argues 'the elite formulates and disseminates racism to the grassroots, where it becomes more explicit and violent'. Politicians should be aware that negative representations in political discourse can easily make their way deep into the psyche of the ill-informed public, creating waves of 'Islamophobia'.

The patterns of representation explicated in this work are context-bound and are put forward to provide an insight into the portrayals of Islam and its adherents at a given place and time and in a particular politico-historical context. Political debates that involve statements about religion or religious groups should be recognised as a significant focus for discourse analysts and political scientists alike, not least given the continuing and intensive associations of religion with violence which will likely remain for years to come. It is my hope that the critique offered in this thesis marks an instance of the possibility to raise ethical questions and debates about the representations of religion in political discourse.

Perceptions of Islam and Muslims at a time when international and national contexts make those representations inescapably political, can, undoubtedly, open up broader social questions and have profound influences on the (re)formation of policies and politics. In the face of the revitalisation of some of the reactionary fears of Islam in the current political and media discourse, it is crucial that work continues to scrutinise and map the ways in which Islam and Muslims have come to be understood, or more often misunderstood.

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