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Zealotry and influence maximization in the voter model: when to target zealots?

Zealotry and influence maximization in the voter model: when to target zealots?
Zealotry and influence maximization in the voter model: when to target zealots?
In this paper, we study influence maximization in the voter model in the presence of biased voters (partial zealots) on complex networks. Under what conditions should an external controller with finite budget who aims at maximizing its influence over the system target partial zealots? Our analysis, based on both analytical and numerical results, shows a rich diagram of preferences and degree-dependencies of allocations to partial zealots and normal agents varying with the budget. We find that when we have a large budget or for low levels of zealotry, optimal strategies should give larger allocations to partial zealots and allocations are positively correlated with node degree. In contrast, for low budgets or highly-biased zealots, optimal strategies give higher allocations to normal agents, with some residual allocations to partial zealots, and allocations to both types of agents decrease with node degree. Our results emphasize that heterogeneity in agent properties strongly affects strategies for influence maximization on heterogeneous networks
Complex networks, Influence maximization, Voter model, Zealots
2213-8684
107-118
Springer
Romero Moreno, Guillermo
8c2f32d6-b0b5-4563-af22-c08b410b867f
Manino, Edoardo
e5cec65c-c44b-45de-8255-7b1d8edfc04d
Tran-Thanh, Long
e0666669-d34b-460e-950d-e8b139fab16c
Brede, Markus
bbd03865-8e0b-4372-b9d7-cd549631f3f7
Barbosa, Hugo
Menezes, Ronaldo
Gomez-Gardenes, Jesus
Gonçalves, Bruno
Mangioni, Giuseppe
Oliveira, Marcos
Romero Moreno, Guillermo
8c2f32d6-b0b5-4563-af22-c08b410b867f
Manino, Edoardo
e5cec65c-c44b-45de-8255-7b1d8edfc04d
Tran-Thanh, Long
e0666669-d34b-460e-950d-e8b139fab16c
Brede, Markus
bbd03865-8e0b-4372-b9d7-cd549631f3f7
Barbosa, Hugo
Menezes, Ronaldo
Gomez-Gardenes, Jesus
Gonçalves, Bruno
Mangioni, Giuseppe
Oliveira, Marcos

Romero Moreno, Guillermo, Manino, Edoardo, Tran-Thanh, Long and Brede, Markus (2020) Zealotry and influence maximization in the voter model: when to target zealots? Barbosa, Hugo, Menezes, Ronaldo, Gomez-Gardenes, Jesus, Gonçalves, Bruno, Mangioni, Giuseppe and Oliveira, Marcos (eds.) In Complex Networks XI - Proceedings of the 11th Conference on Complex Networks, CompleNet 2020: Proceedings of the 11th Conference on Complex Networks CompleNet 2020. Springer. pp. 107-118 . (doi:10.1007/978-3-030-40943-2_10).

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)

Abstract

In this paper, we study influence maximization in the voter model in the presence of biased voters (partial zealots) on complex networks. Under what conditions should an external controller with finite budget who aims at maximizing its influence over the system target partial zealots? Our analysis, based on both analytical and numerical results, shows a rich diagram of preferences and degree-dependencies of allocations to partial zealots and normal agents varying with the budget. We find that when we have a large budget or for low levels of zealotry, optimal strategies should give larger allocations to partial zealots and allocations are positively correlated with node degree. In contrast, for low budgets or highly-biased zealots, optimal strategies give higher allocations to normal agents, with some residual allocations to partial zealots, and allocations to both types of agents decrease with node degree. Our results emphasize that heterogeneity in agent properties strongly affects strategies for influence maximization on heterogeneous networks

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Accepted/In Press date: 11 December 2019
e-pub ahead of print date: 22 February 2020
Published date: 22 February 2020
Venue - Dates: 11th International Conference on Complex Networks, University of Exeter, Virtual, United Kingdom, 2020-03-31 - 2020-04-03
Keywords: Complex networks, Influence maximization, Voter model, Zealots

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 437817
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/437817
ISSN: 2213-8684
PURE UUID: b707a954-839c-4a5e-8367-78ce0d409599
ORCID for Guillermo Romero Moreno: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0002-0316-8306
ORCID for Edoardo Manino: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0003-0028-5440
ORCID for Long Tran-Thanh: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0003-1617-8316

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Date deposited: 19 Feb 2020 17:31
Last modified: 17 Mar 2024 03:54

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Contributors

Author: Guillermo Romero Moreno ORCID iD
Author: Edoardo Manino ORCID iD
Author: Long Tran-Thanh ORCID iD
Author: Markus Brede
Editor: Hugo Barbosa
Editor: Ronaldo Menezes
Editor: Jesus Gomez-Gardenes
Editor: Bruno Gonçalves
Editor: Giuseppe Mangioni
Editor: Marcos Oliveira

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