The ambitions of consequentialism
The ambitions of consequentialism
Consequentialism is most famously a theory of right action. But many consequentialists assume, and some have explicitly argued, that consequentialism is equally plausible as a direct theory of the right rules, motives, character traits, institutions, and even such things as climates and eye colours. In this paper, I call into question this ‘Global Consequentialist’ extension of consequentialist evaluation beyond the domain of action. Consequentialist treatments of evaluands other than action are most plausible when they are interpreted as claims about reasons for action; other key ethical concepts involve claims about what there is reason to feel, which makes a consequentialist treatment of them implausible.
Mcelwee, Brian
7e1ceac9-766b-412a-9597-98caab46f07b
Mcelwee, Brian
7e1ceac9-766b-412a-9597-98caab46f07b
Mcelwee, Brian
(2019)
The ambitions of consequentialism.
Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy.
(In Press)
Abstract
Consequentialism is most famously a theory of right action. But many consequentialists assume, and some have explicitly argued, that consequentialism is equally plausible as a direct theory of the right rules, motives, character traits, institutions, and even such things as climates and eye colours. In this paper, I call into question this ‘Global Consequentialist’ extension of consequentialist evaluation beyond the domain of action. Consequentialist treatments of evaluands other than action are most plausible when they are interpreted as claims about reasons for action; other key ethical concepts involve claims about what there is reason to feel, which makes a consequentialist treatment of them implausible.
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The Ambitions of Consequentialism JESP Final Version
- Accepted Manuscript
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Accepted/In Press date: 7 February 2019
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Local EPrints ID: 438146
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/438146
ISSN: 1559-3061
PURE UUID: 75e889da-bb59-4475-8380-5acef8be8712
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Date deposited: 03 Mar 2020 17:36
Last modified: 16 Mar 2024 06:41
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