The drives and affects in Nietzsche’s accounts of knowledge, freedom, and affirmation

Abstract

In this thesis I give accounts of the drives and affects in Nietzsche’s work and use them to give further accounts of three main topics in Nietzsche’s positive philosophy: knowledge, freedom, and affirmation.

In the first two chapters I give accounts of the drives and affects respectively. I argue that the affects play a prominent role in Nietzsche’s work because of their connection to what he thinks it means to value something. I argue that, for Nietzsche, valuing x involves having a positive affective orientation toward x induced by one’s strongest drives.

In chapter 3 I give an account of Nietzsche’s perspectivism. I argue that it consists of two main claims, one descriptive and one prescriptive. The descriptive claim is that knowledge is guided shaped by the affects. The prescriptive claim is that knowledge can be enhanced by using the affects.
I chapter 4 I outline Nietzsche’s three-pronged attack on what he deems an absurd conception of freedom. I then give an account of Nietzsche’s positive conception of freedom. I argue that Nietzschean freedom is a kind of self-determination, it involves being determined by values that are suited to the conditions of one’s flourishing.

In chapter 5 I argue that affirmation is primarily an unreflective process that involves willing power in a way that enhances life. Nietzsche claims that the essence of life is the will to power. Thus, I argue that affirming life just is willing power in a way that brings about the enhancement, expansion, and increased complexity of the will to power itself.

In chapter 6 I look at one particular affect, gaiety, of the kind expressed by what Nietzsche calls “higher laughter” and look at the role it plays in the three main topics of the thesis. I have two goals in the chapter. The first is to illuminate the nature of one particularly important affect in Nietzsche’s positive thought. The second is to use that affect to draw out some important interrelationships between affirmation, freedom, and knowledge.

Finally, in the conclusion, I look at Nietzsche’s style. One important aspect of Nietzsche’s style is that it is affectively engaged and designed to elicit an emotional reaction in its audience. I examine one particular aspect of Nietzsche’s emotive style, namely, his use of humour. I show how Nietzsche uses humour to two main ends. Firstly, it plays a role in Nietzsche’s ad hominem attacks on philosophers, religions, and traditional morality. Secondly, he uses humour to foster the intimacy of a shared sense of community. Humour is one of the ways in which Nietzsche uses his style to find the appropriate readers for his works.

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ORCID for Christopher Janaway: orcid.org/0000-0002-9600-8837

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