

# **Personal respirators for population level control of the COVID19 pandemic**

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36 personal respirator. Widespread use of personal respirators has not been possible to date due to their  
37 complexity and limited supply. We have developed a simple personal respirator in Southampton  
38 (PeRSo), made from cheap, mass-produced components (7, 8). The motor unit fan pulls air through a  
39 high efficiency filter, powered by rechargeable batteries. The clear air is delivered into a hood with a  
40 clear plastic visor, and passes standard sniff and bacterial tests (Figure 1). We have initiated  
41 manufacture locally and are aiming to roll out widely in the United Kingdom, and are investigating  
42 components suitable for local production in the developing world (PeRSo-DW).



43  
44 **Figure 1.** PeRSo prototype  
45

46 However, in addition to protecting healthcare staff as per the original design intention, PeRSOs could  
47 potentially be used for wider control of SARS-CoV-2. Whilst this may seem fanciful, if one had  
48 proposed in December 2019 that one third of the world would be under lockdown three months later,  
49 this would have seemed ridiculous. Wearing PeRSOs outside the house would allow society to return  
50 to productivity, with industries and business re-enabled, and individuals able to meet face-to-face.

51  
52 Evidently, implementation challenges exist, but the alternative of waiting for a vaccine indefinitely  
53 seem worse in terms of economic impact. As a control strategy, PeRSo use outside the house would  
54 be compulsory in areas with active transmission. Once the cycle of transmission is broken, respirator  
55 use would be optional. Strengthened public health screening would be required to identify breakdown  
56 areas, leading to travel restrictions and return to compulsory PeRSo use. Humans would all look  
57 highly unusual, but SARS-CoV-2 would be controlled and this would act as a bridge to a new vaccine  
58 or drug therapy. Whilst the costs may seem high, compared to the economic costs of a prolonged  
59 lock-down, this is trivial.

60  
61 We propose the PeRSOs should be mass produced and deployed to healthcare workers in areas of  
62 SARS-CoV-2 transmission urgently. Later, wider use could be considered, such as in roles involving  
63 frequent interpersonal contact. Ultimately, this will permit a return to normal vaccine becomes  
64 available, just as a bed net protects in malarial regions. Public health interventions of increased  
65 surveillance and compliance with regular hand hygiene, in particular before and after removing the

66 PeRSo, will also be needed. The return to a semblance of global “normality”, and the upswing  
67 economic productivity, will reduce the impact of the pandemic on the poorest in the world.

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