Strategic responsibility under imperfect information
Strategic responsibility under imperfect information
A central issue in the specification and verification of autonomous agents and multiagent systems is the ascription of responsibility to individual agents and groups of agents When designing a (multi)agent system, we must specify which agents or groups of agents are responsible for bringing about a particular state of affairs Similarly, when verifying a multiagent system, we may wish to determine the responsibility of agents or groups of agents for a particular state of affairs, and the contribution of each agent to bringing about that state of affairs In this paper, we discuss several aspects of responsibility, including strategic ability of agents, their epistemic properties, and their relationship to the evolution of the system behavior We introduce a formal framework for reasoning about the responsibility of individual agents and agent groups in terms of the agents' strategies and epistemic properties, and state some properties of the framework.
Concurrent game structures, Responsibility in agent systems, Strategic reasoning, Temporal and modal logic
592-600
International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Yazdanpanah, Vahid
28f82058-5e51-4f56-be14-191ab5767d56
Dastani, Mehdi
44cecb91-95c6-4821-a307-c43e9434ea4a
Jamroga, Wojciech
04b81b57-c7a8-4cf8-9648-3ce0135f4a08
Alechina, Natasha
3163139c-7578-4c62-905a-61efd5310bb7
Logan, Brian
5504a2f6-3e32-427a-b94e-6c0c922049ec
May 2019
Yazdanpanah, Vahid
28f82058-5e51-4f56-be14-191ab5767d56
Dastani, Mehdi
44cecb91-95c6-4821-a307-c43e9434ea4a
Jamroga, Wojciech
04b81b57-c7a8-4cf8-9648-3ce0135f4a08
Alechina, Natasha
3163139c-7578-4c62-905a-61efd5310bb7
Logan, Brian
5504a2f6-3e32-427a-b94e-6c0c922049ec
Yazdanpanah, Vahid, Dastani, Mehdi, Jamroga, Wojciech, Alechina, Natasha and Logan, Brian
(2019)
Strategic responsibility under imperfect information.
Agmon, N., Taylor, M.E., Elkind, E. and Veloso, M.
(eds.)
In AAMAS '19: Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems.
vol. 2,
International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.
.
(doi:10.5555/3306127.3331745).
Record type:
Conference or Workshop Item
(Paper)
Abstract
A central issue in the specification and verification of autonomous agents and multiagent systems is the ascription of responsibility to individual agents and groups of agents When designing a (multi)agent system, we must specify which agents or groups of agents are responsible for bringing about a particular state of affairs Similarly, when verifying a multiagent system, we may wish to determine the responsibility of agents or groups of agents for a particular state of affairs, and the contribution of each agent to bringing about that state of affairs In this paper, we discuss several aspects of responsibility, including strategic ability of agents, their epistemic properties, and their relationship to the evolution of the system behavior We introduce a formal framework for reasoning about the responsibility of individual agents and agent groups in terms of the agents' strategies and epistemic properties, and state some properties of the framework.
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More information
Published date: May 2019
Venue - Dates:
18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2019, , Montreal, Canada, 2019-05-13 - 2019-05-17
Keywords:
Concurrent game structures, Responsibility in agent systems, Strategic reasoning, Temporal and modal logic
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 441451
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/441451
PURE UUID: 9575d873-0926-4bbc-9884-2dfee225a8e6
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Date deposited: 12 Jun 2020 16:40
Last modified: 16 Apr 2024 01:58
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Contributors
Author:
Vahid Yazdanpanah
Author:
Mehdi Dastani
Author:
Wojciech Jamroga
Author:
Natasha Alechina
Author:
Brian Logan
Editor:
N. Agmon
Editor:
M.E. Taylor
Editor:
E. Elkind
Editor:
M. Veloso
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