Multidimensional issue preferences of the
European lavender vote

Stuart J. Turnbull-Dugarte
University of Southampton
s.turnbull-dugarte@soton.ac.uk

***Paper accepted for publication in Journal of European Public Policy***

Abstract: Are lesbian, gay and bisexual voters in Western Europe europhile globalists or eurosceptic nativists? The recently established ‘sexuality gap’ between lavender voters and heterosexuals in Western Europe shows that LGBs are more likely to support left-leaning parties and identify ideologically with the left than their heterosexual peers. We know very little, however, about how this gap plays out in the multidimensional space in Europe where cultural concerns like immigration and EU integration are increasingly important. In this paper, we use data from eight rounds of the European Social Survey (2002-2017) to investigate the impact of LGB status on support for EU integration and immigration. The results show, in line with theoretical expectations regarding the socialising effect of the LGB experience in encouraging support for social liberalism, that lavender voters in Western Europe are significantly more pro-integrationist and pro-immigration than comparable heterosexuals.
Introduction

As part of their campaign to expand their civil rights, lesbian, gay, bisexual (LGB), transgender and other sexual minorities (T+) made the claim that they were ‘just like everybody else, except what they did in bed’ (Hertzog 1996). We now know, from a wide body of US-based literature, that this is not the case and that sexuality impacts citizens’ ideological beliefs (Bailey 1999; Hertzog 1996), policy preferences (Grollman 2017, 2018; Schnabel 2018; Worthen 2020) and political behaviour (Egan 2012; Lewis, Rogers, and Sherrill 2011; Sherrill and Flores 2014; Swank 2018). Beyond the geographical confines of the US, research into the ‘sexuality gap’ is very much in its infancy. In Western Europe we know that LGB voters display a higher probability to vote for social democratic and other leftist parties, are more likely to identify on the left and are more supportive of economic distribution than comparable heterosexuals (Turnbull-Dugarte 2020). However, whilst US political preferences and party competition are largely structured by a coalesced unidimensional economic and sociocultural political axis, the same is not true of the multidimensional nature of politics in Western Europe. Whether the gap between lavender (LGB) and heterosexual voters in relation to party choice and left-right positions travels across the multidimensional political space is therefore an empirical question that has yet to be assessed.

Scholars generally concede that a unidimensional left-right ‘super issue’ (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976) fails to encompass the multidimensional nature of political competition in European states (Bakker, Jolly, and Polk 2012; Caughey, O’Grady, and Warshaw 2019). Rising socioeconomic conditions experienced through the post-war period have given rise to political conflict over post-materialist issues such as environmental concerns, social values related to individual liberty, as well as cultural issues (Inglehart 2008; Kitschelt 1995), particularly over European integration and immigration (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2004). The increasing saliency of cultural questions has been cemented in an independent political cleavage between.

1 Transsexual individuals (T) and other sexuality-based identities (+) are a core group within the LGB(T+) community but they are, regrettably, not included in this study given the inability to identify these individuals with the available data. I refer to individuals as LGB and homosexual interchangeably.
green/alternative/liberals and traditionalist/authoritarian/nationalists (GAL-TAN)\textsuperscript{2} (Bakker, Jolly, and Polk 2012; Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2004).

Importantly, voters’ preferences on matters from the economic and cultural dimensions are not necessarily correlated and it is not uncommon for voters in Europe to support left-wing economic policies whilst preferring socially authoritarian views, or economically right-wing voters to be socially liberal (Bakker, Jolly, and Polk 2020; Van Der Brug and Van Spanje 2009; Lefkofridi, Wagner, and Willmann 2014; Lipset 1983; Oesch and Rennwald 2018). Party competition and voter preferences over integration in the European Union (EU) also tends to form part of this cultural cleavage between socially liberal pro-immigration globalists and socially conservative anti-immigration nationalists (Hooghe and Marks 2018; Whitefield and Rohrschneider 2019).

In this article I investigate how the divergence in the political preferences between LGB and non-LGB individuals travels across these different contemporaneously salient policy conflicts. Specifically, I investigate whether lavender voters have distinct preferences on EU integration, immigration, as well as concrete immigration types (Ruedin 2020). There are two juxtaposed hypotheses. On the one hand, the close link between support for the EU and immigration with cosmopolitan values and social liberalism might lead us to expect LGBs, as contemporary beneficiaries of social liberalism themselves, to be more pro-immigration and europhile. On the other hand, popular commentary points towards some lavender voters having nativist views that may drive them to support (populist) radical right parties (Chalk 2017; Huneke 2019; Mahdawi 2017; Villareal 2019). The presentation of immigration from ethnically distinct groups as inimical to the LGB community (Siegel n.d.) may tap into latent racist attitudes

\textsuperscript{2} Variations of the GAL-TAN dimension have been coined under different terms including, amongst others the: cosmopolitan-parochial divide (De Vries 2018b); or transnational cleavage (Hooghe and Marks 2018).
amongst the lavender electorate (Han 2007) who fear immigration to be a threat to European (pro-gay) values (Mudde 2019).

In contrast to these claims, and in line with evidence related to immigration from the US (Grollman 2017, 2018), the results lend themselves towards the first thesis. Empirically, the findings demonstrate that LGBs are 'over supportive' of both EU integration and immigration, with LGB status exerting an independent effect over and above what can be determined by the distribution of LGBs and non-LGBs across canonical predictors of these variables. Importantly, however, the results also display that, the sexuality gap is consistent independent of (i) the party-system supply of positions on EU integration and multiculturalism (immigration) and (ii) the level of asylum applications to EU countries. There is some evidence, however, that the gap may be moderated by levels of income given that economic incentives affect LGB and non-LGB voters asymmetrically (Turnbull-Dugarte n.d.).

When it comes to understanding support for EU integration and immigration, sexuality matters. Beyond establishing a sexuality gap in preferences on these salient issues, the results also contribute to the wider literature in several ways. Firstly, establishing the variance in political preferences and behaviour of sexual minority voters is, in its own right, of theoretical importance as it furthers our understanding of a sizeable - and largely understudied - social stratum within the electorate. The results show that the sexuality gap in electoral behaviour travels across different and important policy concerns not directly related to LGBs’ own in-group welfare. This suggests that the socialising effect of the gay experience (Bailey 1999; Egan 2012), the diversity-celebrating nature of “gay culture” (Horowitz and Gomez 2018; Ward 2008) may prime them to be more “other-centred” and supportive of other marginalised groups like immigrants (Grollman 2018; Kleiman, Spanierman, and Smith 2015) and this has a substantive effect over LGBs’ political preferences in Europe. Secondly, it develops our understanding of the individual level determinants of some of the most salient areas of political conflict in contemporary Western Europe. Thirdly, the results bring into doubt the argument
regarding the susceptibility of LGB voters to electioneering from the radical right (Chalk 2017; Huneke 2019; Villareal 2019). The analyses presented in the following provide very little evidence that LGBs hold nativist tendencies that may be activated by parties promoting opposition to ethnic outgroups for electoral gain.

**EU integration and immigration in multidimensional Europe**

Currently, two of the most salient political debates in Europe - EU integration and immigration - form part of the cultural globalist-nationalist transnational dimension (Hooghe and Marks 2018; Rovny and Polk 2019; De Vries 2018b). These issues have become two of the most polarising and contested policy debates (Green-Pedersen and Otjes 2019), and accommodating the often contradictory positions of these concerns alongside typical left-right economic positions can present parties with a significant electoral dilemma (Abou-Chadi and Wagner 2020).

European integration and immigration are very much “twin issues” (Hutter and Kriesi 2019). Consistently scholars find that voters’ attitudes towards the supranational polity are tied up with preferences related to immigration and other concerns related to national identity (Evans and Mellon 2019; Lubbers 2008)\(^3\). Parties that adopt nativist and anti-immigration stances, such as (P)RRPs tend to also be eurosceptic (Mudde 2007, 2019), although not universally (Vasilopoulou 2017), and eurosceptic attitudes often predict support for these parties (Werts, Scheepers, and Lubbers 2013). Identity politics and concerns over immigration also tend to play a substantial role in determining voting behaviour in EU referendums, including most notably during the 2016 Brexit referendum in the UK (Goodwin and Milazzo 2017; De Vries 2018a). Support for immigration and EU integration are, therefore, viewed as two sides of the same coin (Hutter and Kriesi 2019), and are indicative of social liberalism and cultural

---

\(^3\) This has not always been the case, but rationalist concerns related to the economic motivations of EU membership play far less of a role now than cultural concerns (Schäfer et al. 2020).
cosmopolitanism (De Vries 2018b). But why might we expect LGBs and heterosexuals to hold divergence views on European integration and immigration?

The sexuality gap in political preferences and voting behaviour is theorised to be the product of two potential mechanisms. Firstly, LGB voters are assumed to be rational welfare-maximisers that will vote for the parties and candidates who, when in office, are likely to provide them with policy outcomes that have a positive impact on their lives, or that of their group (Hertzog 1996; Schaffner and Senic 2006; Sherrill 1996). Since social democratic and other leftist parties have been the main proponents of legislation that enhances the welfare of LGB(T+) citizens in Western Europe (Siegel and Wang 2018), lavender voter has moved to favour these parties out of a desire to expand their ingroup welfare (Turnbull-Dugarte 2020).

The second mechanism posits that LGB voters have undergone a value-shaping process as a result of their lived experience as a minority group that gives them a distinct political outlook from the moment they become of political age (Egan 2012). It is argued that the social ostracization experienced by LGBs who are ‘othered’ and discriminated against by heteronormative institutions and an intolerant society alters their political preferences (Bailey 1999; Hertzog 1996; Kleiman, Spanierman, and Smith 2015; Page 2018) even before partisan mobilisation can take place (Egan 2012). This shaping effect of the gay experience induces the development of distinct social and political values (Kleiman, Spanierman, and Smith 2015; Schnabel 2018) that drive lavender voters to be more predisposed to support policies that are, are more egalitarian, geared towards solidarity with others, and in line with the values of social liberalism (Grollman 2018; Hertzog 1996; Schnabel 2018; Turnbull-Dugarte 2020). Belonging to a marginalised social stratum engenders compassion with other social “underdogs” and disadvantaged groups (Schnabel 2018) like immigrants (Grollman 2017, 2018) or refugees, and the working-class (Bailey 1999).
In addition to the moulding role of shared “underdog” status, there is also the effect of acculturation to “LGB(T+) culture” which is more racially inclusive and diversity-promoting in a way that heteronormative culture is not (Ward 2008). As Horowitz and Gomez explain, LGB identity “cuts across racial groups” which allows LGB individuals to “override the otherwise high borders” created by racial distinctiveness (Horowitz and Gomez 2018: 672). Identification with a shared cross-cutting identity, which is independent of inherited family political dispositions that may promote racial divisions, leads to the emergence of more racially distinct social networks that are not observed to the same degree amongst heterosexuals. Research highlights the increased racial diversity of LGB individuals’ friendship groups vis-à-vis their heterosexual peers, with LGBs significantly more likely to have non-white friends within their close personal networks (Galupo 2009) and to have sexual partners of distinct racial backgrounds - even when conditioning on the geographic propinquity of LGBs in urban areas (Horowitz and Gomez 2018). Given that LGBs rely more heavily - than their heterosexual peers - on friendship circles as the main pillar of kinship rather than family networks (Weinstock 2000), this race-based heterogeneity within personal networks will likely solidify more tolerant and liberal attitudes to ethnic others (Grollman 2017, 2018).

As a result of these mechanisms, it is likely that European lavender voters will fall within the liberal cosmopolitan space of the GAL-TAN cleavage. Moreover, the social democratic and other leftist parties (e.g. Greens) that have banked the electoral support of lavender voters until now (Turnbull-Dugarte 2020), tend to cluster around the pro-integrationist, liberal immigration and globalist space (Whitefield and Rohrschneider 2019), which may also cue LGBs’ positions on these issues. I expect LGBs are more likely to support EU integration and immigration (H1a: pro-integrationist thesis).

Recent popular commentary, however, is at odds with this expectation, with pundits pointing towards the support for (P)RRPs among some in the LGB(T+) community being motivated by anti-immigrant and nativist attitudes (Chalk 2017; Huneke 2019; Mahdawi 2017; Villareal...
(P)RRPs have been actively seeking to “recruit gay and lesbian voters to their cause against immigrants, Muslims, and other minorities” (Siegel n.d.) via the promotion of homonationalist campaign messages (Mudde 2019; Spierings, Lubbers, and Zaslove 2017). Homonationalism refers to the incorporation of sexual minorities into the romanticised understanding of the homogenous “people” of a nation. The inclusion of sexual minorities into the imagined “us” coincides with the exclusion of ethnic minorities, particularly Muslims, as foreign “others” who are presented as an inimical threat to liberal (read LGB(T+) friendly) society (Puar 2013). Homonationalism has been adopted by (P)RRPs who seek to present their nativist and xenophobic rejection of immigration to be necessary in order to protect sexual minorities from the homophobic ethnic outgroup.

Of course, one might argue that these attempts at electioneering lavender voters is unlikely to be fruitful given (P)RRPs have traditionally been unsympathetic, if not explicitly malevolent, towards the interests of LGB voters. The electorate support for (P)RRPs among lavender voters (Chalk 2017; Huneke 2019; Mahdawi 2017) may signal that things are changing (see Spierings, Lubbers, and Zaslove 2017). Examples of the mutual accommodation of LGB(T+)s and (P)RRPs are fast becoming less of a rarity. The Lijst Pim Fotuyn, predecessor to Geert Wilder’s Partij voor de Vrijheid, was founded by the openly gay and outspokenly xenophobic Pim Fortuyn. Both the original and the successor party used the issue of LGB(T+) rights as a rallying torch behind which they sought to mobilise voters against what they perceived as the threat that immigration from non-Western migrants represented for the Netherland’s liberal values (Akkerman 2005; Dudink 2017; De Lange and Mügge 2015). In Norway, Siv Jensen from the anti-immigrant Fransstegspartiet [Progress Party] was awarded the “gay best friend” award at a ceremony in 2018 after commenting on the threat that islamisation represented for LGB(T+) individuals in Norwegian society. In France, Rassemblement National leader Marine Le Pen raised several gay individuals to prominent and visible leadership roles during the 2017 French Presidential election. Germany’s Alternative für Deustchland (AfD) has been under the dual leadership of an openly lesbian and vocal critic of
immigration, Alice Weidel\textsuperscript{4}, since 2017 and the party also boasts its own internal group of sexual minority supporters - the “Alternative Homosexuelle”.

Whilst evidence from the US points towards LGB being more liberal on issues related to race and immigration (Grollman 2017, 2018), it is important to note that the LGB community is not a monolith. Just as there are those with xenophobic and nativist preferences within the heteronormative majority, there are subcultures within the LGB community that display racist tendencies (Han 2007; Han et al. 2017). The emergence of groups like “Alternative Homosexuelle” in Germany or “Twinks4Trump” in the US who claim to be motivated by a desire to defend their state against (allegedly) anti-gay immigrants (Hatfield 2018) is also indicative of LGB subgroups with strong and salient nativist preferences. In direct contrast to H1a, we might expect LGBs to be less supportive of pro-integrationist positions (H1b: anti-integrationist thesis).

Support for immigration can be rather ambiguous and is likely indicative of a wide variety of more concrete attitudes such as aporophobia or nativism and xenophobia. Should lavender voters be opposed to immigration, these preferences are likely to be dependent on the type of immigration concerned. If the nativist and homonationalist messages promoted by (P)RRPs that portray ethnic outgroups - generally focused on Muslims (Akkerman 2005; Mudde 2019) - as inimical to the interests of the LGBs are reflected in the concerns of lavender voters, we might expect them to only be opposed to immigrants from an ethnic outgroup (H2: homonationalist thesis).

Finally, whilst it is obviously the case that many voters who are opposed to immigration do indeed hold racist and xenophobic tendencies, there are also economic motivations to explain

\textsuperscript{4} During a April 2017 speech to the party, Weidel stated that she was in the AfD not despite being a lesbian but because she was a lesbian, arguing that the AfD was the only party capable of stopping “Muslim gangs” who were out to hunt homosexuals in Germany.
anti-immigration positions. Amongst working class citizens, for example, there are fears that the introduction of large numbers of low-skilled migrants into the labour market may lower their employment opportunities (Pardos-Prado and Xena 2019), particularly during economic downturns (Hellwig and Sinno 2017). The same is also true of attitudes to EU integration (Gabel 1998). When governments are engaged in welfare state retrenchment, such as that accelerated at the height of the financial crisis, welfare chauvinism can increase opposition to immigration, particularly among the those on the lower end of the income distribution, as voters become increasingly hostile to the idea that non-citizens are able to access national welfare benefits (Marx and Naumann 2018). If, for example, lower-income individuals are markedly more opposed to immigration because of some perceived economic threat, this might have the effect of reducing the gap between LGB and non-LGB voters’ preferences on globalist concerns like immigration and EU integration (H3: intersectionality thesis).

**Data and method**

To test these hypotheses, I rely on data from a pooled dataset including eight waves (2002-2017) of the European Social Survey (ESS) from twelve Western European countries. The country sample includes Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. These are twelve countries from Western Europe\(^5\) with complete and uninterrupted participation in the ESS.

**Dependent variables**

The dependent variables all seek to measure support for EU integration and immigration. The variables I use to capture support for these policies can be divided into two sections. In the first, I measure general support for EU integration and immigration. EU support is an eleven-

---

\(^5\) Central and Eastern European countries cannot be included in the analysis given measurement strategy returns extremely low numbers of LGB individuals in these states. This is likely the product of the low social acceptance of homosexuality biasing valid responses to questions on the gender makeup of households (Turnbull-Dugarte 2020).
point variable that indicates those who think that EU integration should go further (10) or think it should not (0). Support for immigration is measured in two ways on an eleven-point scale. Firstly, I model support for immigration as those who think that immigration is beneficial (10), or bad (0) for the economy. Secondly, I indicate whether respondents believe immigration enriches (10) or undermines (0) the country’s cultural life.

In the second stage of the analysis, I seek to disentangle voters' preferences for immigration by modelling support for different types of immigration (Ruedin 2020), the purpose of which is to assess whether attitudes towards immigration (and the potential for the sexuality gap in these attitudes) are driven by nativist or aporophobic concerns. As part of the ESS, respondents are asked whether they think the country should allow immigrants with certain characteristics into the country. Relying on three different variations of these questions and dichotomously measure whether citizens believe that none (1) or any (0) of a certain immigrant type should be permitted entry\(^6\). Immigrant types include i) those from poor countries, ii) an ethnic outgroup (ethnicity or race that is distinct from the country majority), and iii) an ethnic ingroup (ethnicity or race that is the same as the country majority). Opposition to immigration from poor countries is used as an indication of aporophobia; whilst rejection of the ethnic outgroup is indicative of nativism.

*Measuring sexuality*

The main independent variable is sexuality, indicating those who are LGB (1) and those who are heterosexual (0). The ESS, like all other cross-national surveys in Europe, does not directly ask about respondents’ sexual orientation. It does, however, provide us with the means to infer an individual’s sexuality based on the gender makeup of their household and their self-declared

---

\(^6\) I assume that the potential confounding effect of social desirability bias in responses will be equally distributed across the LGB and heterosexual population. The effect sizes reported here are likely underestimating the real effect size: comparing self-reported and partner-inferred measures, Schnabel (2018) reports smaller effects using the partner-inferred approach.
relationship and cohabitation status (Turnbull-Dugarte 2020). I infer ESS survey respondents to be LGB if they i) report to cohabit in the same household as their husband/wife/partner, and ii) the gender of the cohabiting individual matches that of the respondent. This measurement strategy, described and validated with similar and alternative datasets (Fischer, Kalmijn, and Steinmetz 2016), is not without its limitations (Kühne, Kroh, and Richter 2019)\textsuperscript{7}. On the one hand the approach is necessary given that there is currently (and unfortunately) not a single cross-national survey that allows us to measure self-declared sexuality so applying this measurement strategy facilitates the stratification of the population by their sexual orientation without which we would be bereft of the tools to assess divergence between LGBs and non-LGBs. Applying this inference method, however, requires that we limit the population to only those cohabiting couples to facilitate a like-for-like comparison. Single individuals are removed from the sample. This ensures that the estimation is a) not capturing cohabitation effects rather than sexuality, and b) LGB individuals unable to be identified because they are single are not included in the comparison group. Reducing the population in this way may limit the generalisability of the findings on the wider LGB population. The main assumption that underlines the external validity of the inferences made is that the confounding effect of cohabitation on the dependent variable(s) is homogenously distributed across LGBs and heterosexuals. We identify 1.4% of the sample as LGB which is comparable to other work using the same measurement approach (see Table A7).

\textit{Controls and model estimation}

For each of the dependent variables, I apply the same vector of controls all of which have an empirically established relationship with the different outcomes. Firstly, basic demographic and socioeconomic indicators are included for gender (base: female), age (years), age squared, education (Hakhverdian et al. 2013; Margalit 2012; Pardos-Prado and Xena 2019), employment status, income, and parental ancestry. Education is recorded using a five-point categorical

\textsuperscript{7} There is a risk of random error in this strategy as a result of gender misreporting. This error, however, is likely to understate the effect of the LGB variable rather than increase it. Black and colleagues (2000) find that such error is only marginal.
variable with respondents reporting the highest level of education achieved. *Employment status* indicates those who are currently employed (baseline), jobseekers, students, retirees, and those not in the labour force (NILF). *Income* is an ordinal indicator that signals the income percentile to which each respondent belongs from the population of each country in a particular year. Income is used as the main moderating variable to test the conditionality of the sexuality gap (H3). Comparing the mean income values for LGB and non-LGB individuals does not reveal any differences of significance in the distribution of the moderator. *Ancestry* is a categorical variable (base: both parents native born to the country) indicating those with one or both parents born outside the surveyed country.

The models also cater for attitudinal and political variables. These include ordinal measures (0-10) of satisfaction with democracy (SWD) and retrospective economic evaluations; a dichotomous indicator for those who feel they are financially struggling; a measure of left-right ideological positions (0-10); and an indicator of self-reported religiosity (0-10). The findings are reported both with and without these additional controls given the potential for post-treatment bias (Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen 2016): we know, for example, that sexuality affects the left-right positions of European voters (Turnbull-Dugarte 2020) and there is theoretical reasons to expect the same of other political and attitudinal outcomes like religiosity and SWD.

In addition to the individual-level indicators, two different country-level variables are included in a stepwise manner. First, I control for the number of asylum arrivals (logged) to each country in the year prior to the survey fieldwork \((t-1)\) to capture the effects of the ongoing migrant crisis that affected a number of EU countries during the years being analysed.\(^9\) Second, I include an indicator of the supply-side factors that might shape voters’ positions on EU

---

\(^8\) Unemployed individuals who are not looking for work, homemakers or other numerated roles

\(^9\) An alternative operationalisation using the number of immigrants provides similar findings (Table A3)
integration or immigration. Relying on data from the Manifesto Project, I create a measure that captures the party-system level position on EU integration and multiculturalism\textsuperscript{10} during the most recent election in each country. This measure takes the mean position of all parties in each election weighted by their respective vote share, with larger (lower) values indicating increased (decreased) support for the two issues. When eurosceptic or anti-immigrant parties emerge in the system or established parties move to accommodate these positions (Abou-Chadi and Wagner 2020), this will be captured in a change in this system-level indicator.

Finally, the model includes both country and year fixed effects. This ensures that any country-specific and longitudinal changes that could have a confounding effect on the dependent variables but are not specifically included in the models are controlled for. Since observations are not independent but rather come from a pooled sample of cross-sectional surveys from different countries, standard errors are clustered for each country\textsuperscript{11}. The total sample $N$, accommodating for missing values, is 92,542.

**Empirical analysis**

Table 1 reports the output of the main model estimations relying on OLS regression. Models 1, 5 and 9 report the effect of sexuality on support for EU integration and both immigration measures whilst controlling for a vector of socioeconomic variables. Models 2, 6 and 10 include political and attitudinal controls. Finally, the remaining models include the addition of the two country-level variables in a stepwise manner.

**Table 1: Modelling the sexuality gap in support for the EU & immigration**

\textsuperscript{10} Multiculturalism is taken as a proxy for immigration stances since the Manifesto Project does not have a time-constant measure of parties’ immigration positions.

\textsuperscript{11} Country clustering serves a substitute for multi-level modelling with a low level-2 $N$ (Steenbergen and Jones 2002). Sampling and population weights are also applied.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual variables</th>
<th>EU integration</th>
<th>Immigration benefits</th>
<th>Immigration enriches</th>
<th>culture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>(12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGB</td>
<td>0.20*</td>
<td>0.20*</td>
<td>0.20*</td>
<td>0.20*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (male)</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age^6</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (ref: primary)</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low secondary</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High secondary</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-secondary</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>0.73**</td>
<td>0.62**</td>
<td>0.62**</td>
<td>0.62**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment (ref: working)</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobseeker</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Studying</td>
<td>0.66**</td>
<td>0.53*</td>
<td>0.53*</td>
<td>0.53*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NILF</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.00**</td>
<td>0.05**</td>
<td>0.05**</td>
<td>0.05**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ancestry (ref: parents native)</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 non-native parent</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 non-native parents</td>
<td>0.50**</td>
<td>0.24*</td>
<td>0.24*</td>
<td>0.24*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic eval.</td>
<td>0.13**</td>
<td>0.13*</td>
<td>0.13*</td>
<td>0.13*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWD</td>
<td>0.17**</td>
<td>0.17**</td>
<td>0.17**</td>
<td>0.17**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Struggling financially</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.04*</td>
<td>-0.04*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * denotes significance at the 0.05 level, ** at the 0.01 level, *** at the 0.001 level.
As hypothesised, the results show that sexuality matters when it comes to explaining support for EU integration and immigration. Across each of the model specifications, the LGB coefficient is both positive and significant which indicates that, on average, LGB status exhibits an independent effect on support for EU integration and immigration above and beyond that which can be explained by the distribution of citizens across the socioeconomic and attitudinal controls specified in the model.

The controls largely comply with theoretical expectations though their interpretation relative to the dependent variables should be considered with caution (Keele, Stevenson, and Elwert 2020). Of note amongst the country-level indicators is that the partisan supply of europhilia/euroscepticism does little to shape support for the EU. On the other hand, party
system positions on multiculturalism and the number of asylum applications does influence citizens’ view on immigration and culture: both have a significant positive effect. In other words, the greater the number of asylum applications and the greater the level of party-system support for multiculturalism, the greater amount of support for the belief that immigration enriches culture.

To gain an intuitive understanding of the magnitude of the LGB effect on the three outcomes of interests, Figure 1 reports the average marginal effect (AME) both the linear estimation reported in Table 1 as well as from a binary operationalisation of support for EU integration and immigration measuring overall placement on a pro-anti EU/immigration dichotomy. The reported coefficients are indicative of the impact of being LGB on the 11-point scale of the outcomes (panel a) and the percentage-point change in the probability of being europhile or pro-immigration (panel b). The lavender voter effect is both significant and substantive. In the case of EU integration, LGBs are .20 points (4.2% of mean; 7.91% of a SD) more supportive of the EU vis-à-vis heterosexuals. In the europhile/eurosceptic dichotomy, LGBs are 3.2 percentage-points more likely to hold favourable preferences on the EU. This sexuality gap is substantive and represents an increase of 7.62% relative to the probability of being europhile amongst heterosexual respondents (.4202).

The sexuality gap echoed in the case of immigration. Those identified as LGB are .31 (5.85% of mean; 13.63% of a SD) and .37 (6.08% of mean; 15.75% of a SD) points more supportive of immigration across both respective measures. In terms of the probability of holding positive immigration views, LGBs are 4.4 percentage-points more likely to believe that immigration benefits the economy and 5.3 percentage-points more likely to think immigration enriches culture. The sexuality gap in the probability is noteworthy: in the case of immigration and the economy (culture) it represents a 10.27% (9.48%) increase compared to the heterosexual baseline probability of .4381 (.5591). These findings provide support for H1a: controlling for various determinants of EU support and attitudes towards immigration, LGBs in Western
Europe are, on average, significantly more europhile and pro-immigration vis-à-vis heterosexuals.

**Figure 1: Average marginal effects (AME)**

In order to test whether the sexuality gap is moderated by socioeconomic status (H3), I re-estimate Models 3, 7, and 11 to include an interaction term between income and sexuality. It is possible that the significant positive effect of sexuality that we observe *on average* is masking variation between LGB individuals across the income distribution (Turnbull-Dugarte n.d.). Figure 2 displays the AME of sexuality conditioned by income on the three continuous outcomes (full output in Table A3).
Figure 2: Conditional effect of sexuality moderated by income
Across the board, the effect is largely constant. In the case of support for the EU (panel a), there appears to be no sexuality gap amongst those on the lower end of the income ladder, a significant gap ($p<0.05$) emerging amongst those with income levels above the mean (6.6). Note that this is where the majority of income observations fall. In attitudes towards immigration (panels b & c) the effect is uniform, with the marginal effects presenting a near-horizontal slope. Whilst the confidence intervals cross zero ($p<0.05$) at the upper bounds across both immigration measures, the point-estimates for different income levels are statistically indistinguishable from one another. In other words, LGBs are more supportive of immigration regardless of their income. There is, therefore, little substantive evidence for H3: the sexuality gap in support for immigration does not appear to be moderated by income.

**Heterogeneous immigration types**

I now turn to investigate whether the increased support among LGBs for immigration varies depending on what type of immigration is proposed. This involves modelling the probability that an individual will support the refusal of entry to any immigrant that comes from i) a poor country, ii) an ethnic outgroup, or iii) an ethnic ingroup.

Figure 3 displays the percentage-point AME of LGB status for each of the three immigration types. Looking first at immigrants from poor countries, lavender voters are, on average, 3.5 percentage-points less likely to reject immigrants from poor nations vis-à-vis their heterosexual peers. Given the predicted probability for heterosexuals (.1166), a -3.5 AME represents a notable fall in the probability of 30.02%.

Turning towards the rejection of ethnic outgroups which, given the strategies of (P)RRPs to court the lavender vote via their messages of homonationalism (Siegel n.d.), is where we might expect to observe a positive LGB effect. The AME for LGB status is -2.6 which indicates that LGBs are significantly less likely to refuse entry from ethnic outgroup immigrants. The
sexuality gap is also symmetrical in the case of ingroup immigrants (AME = -2.5). The magnitudes of the sexuality gap equate to -28.6% (outgroup) and -47.08% (ingroup) relative to the heterosexual baseline probabilities. This suggests that that the divergence between LGB and non-LGB on matters of immigration is not influenced by whether the immigrants themselves are racially or ethnically diverse from the majority population: across all immigrant categories about which survey respondents were able to express a preference, lavender voters are, on average, significantly less likely to be opposed to immigrant entry than their heterosexual peers.

![AME of sexuality on heterogeneous immigration types](chart)

**Figure 3: Support for distinct immigration types**

Of course, support for these different immigration types amongst LGBs and non-LGBs might be asymmetrically moderated by different levels of income (H3). Theoretically we might expect income to moderate the effect given that the (perceived) economic threat represented by immigrants is likely to be asymmetrical for different voter types. To test for this potentiality,
I re-estimate the models used for the different immigration type indicators to include a multiplicative interaction between LGB status and income (full output in Table A4).
Figure 4: AME of sexuality conditioned by income on heterogenous immigration types

Confidence intervals at 95%
Figure 4 displays the main AME moderated by different levels of income on the probability of refusing entry to immigrants from poor countries (panel a). The AME of LGB remains negative and is not significantly moderated by income levels. Although the sexuality gap only becomes significantly distinguishable from zero (p<0.05) with income values five and above, this is likely the result of the low N in the lower bounds on the income distribution (see overlaid histogram). For the income bracket with a plurality of individuals (9), lavender voters are 3.7 percentage-points less likely than heterosexuals with identical income to reject these immigrants.

In the case of rejecting immigrants from an ethnic outgroup (Figure 4: panel b), there is a significant interaction effect (p<0.001) - the probability of rejecting an immigrant from an ethnic outgroup decreases as income increases but the fall is significantly greater for LGBs. Amongst individuals on the lowest income level, LGBs are 4.3 percentage-points (p<0.1) more likely to reject immigration from ethnic outgroups. The predicted probability of heterosexual respondents on the lowest income value is .137 whilst for LGBs it is .18 (+31.46%). The rejection of ethnic immigrants decreases, however, as income increases, and the sexuality gap becomes significantly negative amongst the majority of citizens. The AME of sexuality for respondents with the mean and highest level of income is -2.9 and -4.0 percentage-points (-32.3% and -63.8% vis-à-vis heterosexual baseline), respectively.

Panel c considers the income-conditioned effect of being LGB on support for ethnic ingroup immigration. The interaction effect is significant (see Table A4). LGBs with the lowest level of self-reported income are 2.2 percentage-points (p<0.05) more likely than non-LGBs with the same income to reject immigrants from the ethnic ingroup. As in the case of the ethnic outgroup, however, the effect is reversed among those with greater incomes. The AME of sexuality is equal for voters with the mean and highest level of income, with LGBs being 2.6 percentage points (p<0.001) less likely to reject ethnic ingroup immigrants from entry vis-à-vis heterosexuals with identical income.
Of paramount importance is that the same moderating effect of income is observed in the case of both in- and outgroup migrants. In other words, whilst LGBs on the lower end of the income ladder appear to be more likely to reject ethnic outgroup immigrants, the sexuality gap in these preferences is also observed in the case of the ingroup so we cannot conclude that the divergence is being driven by outgroup rejection. For the income brackets where the majority of the population falls, there is a significant sexuality gap in preferences related to immigration but, across immigration types, this is negative. In the appendix (Figure A4), I replicate these moderation tests using the struggling on income indicator as an alternative measure: the results are largely unchanged.

**Country-level moderating effects**

In a final exploratory analysis, we test if the sexuality gap in outgroup preferences is influenced by country-level factors. Specifically, whether the divergence is moderated by (i) the level of asylum arrivals and (ii) the party system positions on multiculturalism. The multiplicative interaction between the LGB indicator and the two country-level variables, visualised in Figure 5, is insignificant. As the reported AMEs illustrate, LGBs remain less opposed to rejecting ethnic outgroups across the board. Importantly, the significance (p<0.05) of the gap holds over moderator values where a plurality of observations falls. Whilst one might have expected the LGB gap to decrease or become positive (signally greater rejection) in those places where asylum arrivals were highest, the effect remains negative and significant. Using a pre-/post-migrant crisis binary variable reports similar non-moderating effects (see Figure A2). In the case of party-system positions, the slope is near horizontal and only loses significance on either ends of the moderator’s observed values where the N is very low. In real terms this means that the sexuality gap is not affected by the party-system position on multiculturalism.
Figure 5: AME of sexuality conditioned by (a) asylum numbers, and (b) party system positions

Conclusion

Much in the same way that LGBs are more likely to support leftist parties and identify with the left vis-à-vis their heterosexual peers, the findings show that European lavender voters are significantly and substantively more culturally integrationist and europhile than their heterosexual peers. Whilst it has been argued that LGBs constitute a potential vote revenue for the (P)RRPs because of potential nativist attitudes, the empirical evidence presented in this paper shows that this is unlikely. Across a host of different operationalisations of immigration attitudes and immigrant group subtypes, we observe that LGBs are significantly and constantly more supportive of immigration than heterosexual voters. Rather than leading lavender voter to support (P)RRPs, these europhile and pro-immigration attitudes may also contribute to explaining LGB support for parties that fall in the liberal and globalist end of the GAL-TAN axis.
The explanation for the favourable attitudes towards immigration and EU integration amongst LGBs is twofold. On the one hand, the lived experience of LGBs are institutionally and socially marginalised individuals in society is believed to shape lavender voters’ political preferences (Bailey 1999; Egan 2012; Kleiman, Spanierman, and Smith 2015; Page 2018) predisposing them to favour liberal policies (Grollman 2018; Hertzog 1996; Schnabel 2018; Worthen 2020). On the other hand, LGBs are believed to be influenced by partisan cues that seek to cater to their group-based welfare (Sherrill 1996; Turnbull-Dugarte 2020). Given the social democratic parties that have been the entrepreneurial drivers of gay rights issues in most West European states (Siegel and Wang 2018), have also traditionally (yet not universally) advocated culturally liberal pro-immigration and pro-European integration policy stances (Abou-Chadi and Wagner 2020), the potential for partisan cues to shape lavender voters’ preferences on these cultural issues is also clearly present. Future work may seek to better isolate the mechanisms that drive the sexuality gap in these second dimensions debates.

**Bibliography**


Worthen, Meredith G.F. 2020. “‘All the Gays Are Liberal?’ Sexuality and Gender Gaps in Political Perspectives among Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Mostly Heterosexual, and Heterosexual College Students in the Southern USA.” *Sexuality Research and Social Policy* 17(1): 27–42.