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ASSURE: A hardware-baSed SecUrity pRotocol for resourcE-constrained IoT systems

ASSURE: A hardware-baSed SecUrity pRotocol for resourcE-constrained IoT systems
ASSURE: A hardware-baSed SecUrity pRotocol for resourcE-constrained IoT systems
The internet of Things technology is expected to generate tremendous economic benefits; this promise is undermined by major security threats.
This is mainly due to the ubiquitous nature of this technology, which makes it easy for potential adversities to have access to IoT devices and carry well-established attacks. The development of defence mechanisms, in this case, is a challenging task, this is due to the fact that most IoT devices have limited computing and energy resources, which makes it hard to implement classic cryptographic algorithms. This paper address this challenge by proposing a lightweight mutual authentication and key agreement protocol named ASSURE based on Rivest Cipher (RC5) and physically unclonable functions (PUFs). To understand the effectiveness of this protocol, a rigorous security analysis under various cyberattack scenarios is performed. In order to evaluate the overheads of the proposed solution, a wireless sensor network using typical IoT devices
called Zolertia Zoul re-mote, is constructed. The functionality of the proposed scheme is verified using a server-client configuration. Then energy consumption and memory utilisation are estimated and compared with the existing solutions, namely: the DTLS (datagram transport layer security) handshake protocol in pre-shared secret (Key) mode and UDP (user datagram protocol). Experimental analysis results indicate that the proposed protocol can save up to 39.5% energy and uses 14% less memory compared to the DTLS handshake protocol.
2509-3436
1-14
Yilmaz, Yildiran
6b5cc6e0-2711-4c0c-8f68-5bca77184d08
Aniello, Leonardo
9846e2e4-1303-4b8b-9092-5d8e9bb514c3
Halak, Basel
8221f839-0dfd-4f81-9865-37def5f79f33
Yilmaz, Yildiran
6b5cc6e0-2711-4c0c-8f68-5bca77184d08
Aniello, Leonardo
9846e2e4-1303-4b8b-9092-5d8e9bb514c3
Halak, Basel
8221f839-0dfd-4f81-9865-37def5f79f33

Yilmaz, Yildiran, Aniello, Leonardo and Halak, Basel (2020) ASSURE: A hardware-baSed SecUrity pRotocol for resourcE-constrained IoT systems. Journal of Hardware and Systems Security, 1-14. (doi:10.1007/s41635-020-00102-0). (In Press)

Record type: Article

Abstract

The internet of Things technology is expected to generate tremendous economic benefits; this promise is undermined by major security threats.
This is mainly due to the ubiquitous nature of this technology, which makes it easy for potential adversities to have access to IoT devices and carry well-established attacks. The development of defence mechanisms, in this case, is a challenging task, this is due to the fact that most IoT devices have limited computing and energy resources, which makes it hard to implement classic cryptographic algorithms. This paper address this challenge by proposing a lightweight mutual authentication and key agreement protocol named ASSURE based on Rivest Cipher (RC5) and physically unclonable functions (PUFs). To understand the effectiveness of this protocol, a rigorous security analysis under various cyberattack scenarios is performed. In order to evaluate the overheads of the proposed solution, a wireless sensor network using typical IoT devices
called Zolertia Zoul re-mote, is constructed. The functionality of the proposed scheme is verified using a server-client configuration. Then energy consumption and memory utilisation are estimated and compared with the existing solutions, namely: the DTLS (datagram transport layer security) handshake protocol in pre-shared secret (Key) mode and UDP (user datagram protocol). Experimental analysis results indicate that the proposed protocol can save up to 39.5% energy and uses 14% less memory compared to the DTLS handshake protocol.

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Accepted/In Press date: 20 August 2020

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 443504
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/443504
ISSN: 2509-3436
PURE UUID: 9d13dd44-6b86-4e4f-bbd2-6b50e3cc79fc
ORCID for Yildiran Yilmaz: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0002-5337-6090
ORCID for Basel Halak: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0003-3470-7226

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Date deposited: 27 Aug 2020 16:31
Last modified: 07 Oct 2020 01:59

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Contributors

Author: Yildiran Yilmaz ORCID iD
Author: Leonardo Aniello
Author: Basel Halak ORCID iD

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